POLITICAL ISLAM AND VIOLENCE IN INDONESIA

Zachary Abuza
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Since the fall of Suharto in 1998, Indonesia has made a successful transition to democracy. However, during the past few years the country has also been racked by Islamist terrorism, most notably the 2002 Bali bombings, and sectarian violence that have left thousands dead. While the two are not linked, they are the most notable trends in Indonesian political development. This book first analyses the newfound role of Islamist parties in Indonesian politics and explains how they are now shaping public policy. It then provides an in-depth analysis of the state of terrorism in Indonesia and strives to understand how Jemaah Islamiyah has reacted to the “War on Terror” and shifted its tactics and strategies to cope with the arrests and crackdowns. Also focusing on the various laskars, or militias, that are engaged in both sectarian violence and attempts to impose sharia law through vigilante actions, the author examines the degree to which these groups, overt and covert, legal and illegal, are able or willing to cooperate with one another. Finally, the book concludes with policy implications for the Indonesian government, the neighbouring ASEAN states, and the Western world.

This book will be of great interest to students of Indonesian politics, Asian studies, political violence, and security studies in general.

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For Taeko and Charley, who learned to count backward
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Islam in Indonesia has always been defined by tolerance, moderation, and pluralism. In Indonesia Islam helped create the foundations of civil society that made the transition to democracy possible whereas in the Middle East Islam has been seen as anathema to democratization. As Robert Hefner has eloquently argued, Islam was the force that facilitated Indonesia’s transition to democracy. Most Indonesians eschew literal interpretations of Islam and violence perpetrated in its name. Indeed, Muslim thinkers in Indonesia have made some of the greatest intellectual and theoretical contributions to the debates over Islam and human rights, Islam and democracy, and Islam and women’s rights. Most Muslims in Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim country, support the secular state, and only a small minority advocates the establishment of an Islamic regime governed by sharia, or strict Islamic law. Even fewer advocate this through violence, although their numbers appear to be growing. The famed anthropologist Clifford Gertz divided Muslims into three categories: Santri, Priyayi, and Abangan. The Santri represented a more Salafist Islam, but were a distinct minority compared to the Priyayi, whose Islamic faith was built upon very deep-seeded Javanese–Hindu culture and mysticism, and the Abangan, whose Islam was also tied to pre-Islamic culture and beliefs. In the New Order era, the “Santri-ization” of Islam occurred as the Priyayi and Abangan tended to support secular institutions and culture.

During the New Order period, political violence was primarily perpetrated by the state. Since Suharto’s fall in May 1998, political and sectarian sub-state actors have racked the country with violence. The causes of this are numerous, and include the breakdown of the overly centralized and authoritarian New Order regime, decentralization, as well as the abolition of the dwi fungsi (dual function) role of the military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI), which previously played a direct part in politics and civil administration. This increase in violence has been exacerbated by competition between the Indonesian National Police (INP) and the TNI, which split in 1999 as a result of disputes over scarce resources.

The increase in political violence in post-Suharto Indonesia is increasingly associated with the rise of political and radical Islam. The burgeoning of civil society is positive, but the loosening of political constraints on it has allowed “uncivil” society to flourish as well. The fall of President Suharto
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was accompanied by a wave of violence against Indonesia’s ethnic Chinese communities, and within months there was a major upsurge in sectarian violence between Muslim and Christian communities in Maluku. Indonesia has now been the victim of four major terrorist attacks since October 2002, perpetrated by Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)—not only a homegrown terrorist network but also the regional affiliate of Al Qaeda. Indeed, the reaction against such political violence and a desire for political stability played a large part in the September 2004 electoral victory of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono over the incumbent President Megawati Sukarnoputri. Yudhoyono, a former general and once Megawati’s top security minister, won by a convincing 60–40 percent majority over a president who was widely seen as ineffective in stemming the mounting violence.

Alongside this rise in political violence and the rise of Islam as a social and political force, a vacuum was emerging at the center of the political process. The fall of Suharto’s authoritarian New Order regime radically altered the political environment in the archipelago. The strongman’s resignation left a weak democracy in which there was intense political competition between successive presidents (interim President B.J. Habibie and then moderate Muslim leader Abdurrahman Wahid, better known as Gus Dur), and a parliament that had a newfound and intense sense of empowerment. Suharto’s successors have often been stymied by a parliament that is no longer quiescent. Strong central government control also broke down as the provinces clamored to redress the historical legacy of over-centralization and demanded more autonomy and revenue sharing. Indonesia’s Big Bang decentralization of 2001 has had profound effects. As the World Bank notes, “Within one year, the Big Bang decentralized much of the responsibility for public service to the local level, almost doubled the regional share in government spending, reassigned two-thirds of the central service to the regions, and handed over more than 16,000 service facilities to the regions.” Yet the local governments had weak administrative capabilities, having been largely emasculated under the New Order regime.

The purpose of this study is to explore the extent to which these three complex phenomena—the rise of Islam as a social and political force; the collapse of a centralized, authoritarian system of government; and the emergence of a marked upsurge in political violence and then terrorism; much of it perpetrated in the name of Islam—are related. It will examine how these phenomena have developed in the 8 years since the fall of Suharto, and will lean forward to assess what we might expect to see in the 5 years of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s term until 2009.

The conventional wisdom amongst political scientists who focus on Indonesia is that the concurrent rise of Islamist political violence and the rise of Islamic politics are coincidental and not at all interrelated. While there is no direct correlation between the two in as much as the Islamist parties do not support violence or condone the activities of terrorist organizations such as Jemaah Islamiyah, the hypothesis of this book is that the rise of this phenomenon is not coincidental. While the Islamists are not large in numbers, they have a
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disproportionate political clout because of their rising numbers and position in weak coalition governments. Political Islam’s rise has created the context in which at the very least state authorities have had limited political support to crack down on violence and, more alarmingly, senior government officials have directly interfered with law enforcement and the judicial process. For example, the former Vice President interceded to have all charges dropped against a leader of an Islamist militia, who engaged in sectarian conflicts during 1999–2001. Likewise, top political leaders have met with the spiritual leader of Jemaah Islamiyah in jail in a show of solidarity—despite the fact that Indonesian courts found he was the terrorist organization’s amir. First, what does it mean when the speaker of the upper house and a leader of the most significant Islamist party attributes a terrorist attack in Bali to “rivalry in the tourism sector” rather than JI? Second, the Islamists are vociferous and outspoken, and few are willing to expend the political capital to challenge them. This has an enormous impact on counter-terrorism (CT) efforts: while the Indonesian government has used the full force of the law to apprehend and prosecute people directly related to terrorist attacks, it refuses to move against the social networks of JI that are responsible for recruiting, indoctrinating, fund-raising, and leading sectarian pogroms. Third, often the Islamist leaders will not condemn the violence perpetrated in Islam’s name. Where was the Ulamas Council’s condemnation of the Bali II attacks, following their summer of the fatwa in which they declared moderate Muslims a threat and justified violence against Islamic sects? The Ulamas Council of Indonesia (MUI) issued a fatwa against terrorism in 2003 and reissued it in November 2005, but their response has been weak and half-hearted. The Islamist leaders often share the same goals, though not means, as many of the leaders of militant groups. Is there a direct correlation between the emergence of political Islam and Islamist violence? No. But it has created the context in which the state has less ability to intervene.

Background: The rise of Muslim–Christian violence and Islamist terrorism

Sectarian violence in Maluku and Sulawesi

In the midst of the chaotic post-Suharto transition to democracy, an altogether new crisis emerged: sectarian violence in Maluku, an inland province in eastern Indonesia with a large Christian community. There had been sporadic outbreaks of communal violence in the 1980s, when ethnic balances were upset by transmigration policies that forced large numbers of Javanese and Madurese to move to the more sparsely populated outer islands. From 1994 to 1996, there were a number of violent confrontations between indigenous peoples of East Timor, Flores, and Kalimantan (all of whom were predominantly Christian) against Muslim migrants. Following the breakaway of East Timor in 1999, these conflicts took on a more sectarian character in Maluku and then in Central Sulawesi. 
Nonetheless, the roots of the violence lay in Suharto’s transmigration policies—a policy implemented by a strong centralized state—which fundamentally altered both the ethno-religious and political balance, and with that, the relative economic position of the communities. In Maluku, “as Christians were eased out of the positions they had traditionally held in the local government, teaching profession, and police, they turned to the private sector, only to find that migrant groups from Sulawesi, among others, had sewn up the market. Christians began to feel that their political, economic, and cultural existence in Ambon was threatened.”10 In parts of Maluku, Muslim migrants gained a political majority and displaced the previously dominant Christian majority. Angered at the perceived loss of power and privilege, a small group of Christian militants sought to become an independent state.11

In January 1999, a small fight in Ambon in Maluku provided the spark for large-scale communal warfare. Despite the presence of a large contingent of military and police forces, the province was effectively segregated along religious lines. Fighting intensified in the second half of 1999, culminating in bloody Christmas, when Christian paramilitaries killed over 500 Muslims in one massacre.12 Beginning in January 2000, mass demonstrations in Jakarta supported by the quasi-official MUI called for a jihad in Maluku to save the Muslims. This led to the emergence of a large Muslim militia—Laskar Jihad—which recruited and trained volunteer fighters and sent them to Maluku in the spring of 2000. The introduction of external forces—including not only members of Laskar Jihad, but also the smaller Laskar Jundullah and Laskar Mujahidin—escalated the communal conflict which the government seemed unable to prevent. By July 2000, although there were approximately 14,000 troops in Maluku, more than 9,000 people had been killed in the fighting and had fled to other parts of the archipelago.13

The conflict in Maluku and Sulawesi is described in more detail in Chapter 4 of this monograph. What is worth noting here is that the violence allowed the emergence of large-scale paramilitary forces—the laskars—that saw themselves taking on the burden of protecting a community in the face of a state that seemed unable or unwilling to prevent attacks. The Islamic militants themselves contended that the state had abrogated its responsibility to defend fellow Muslims. In violent “jihadi videos,” graphic footage of Muslims being attacked by Christians, as Indonesian police and military forces stood by, reinforced this argument.14 As Laskar Jihad’s founder, Jafar Umar Thalib, said:

We founded this movement in order to support Muslims in eastern Indonesia. They were slaughtered by the thousands in Maluku. The government did nothing to defend the Muslims. Subsequent governments did not defend them from Christian attacks. In light of this situation, we had no choice but to found the Laskar Jihad organization, to protect our Muslim brothers in eastern Indonesia.15
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Analysts have been too dismissive of the importance of these sectarian conflicts. Harold Crouch, for example, has written that “The level of violence has not been as high as in some other periods of Indonesia’s post-Independence history and the most severe cases have affected only a small part of the population.” This misses the point entirely. It is not simply a matter of death toll, it is the value which the perpetrators place on it. In the Islamists’ eyes, the weak state in the aftermath of the post-Suharto era had abdicated its responsibilities to defend the Muslim population. Islam was the answer and filled the vacuum left by the state.

Islamist terrorism in Bali and Java

While some Muslim leaders formed militias to defend the interests of Muslims in the face of the state’s inability to prevent the bloodletting in Kalimantan, Maluku, and Sulawesi, others opted for more extreme measures. Hundreds of radical Muslim exiles, including Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, returned to Indonesia in 1999, and took advantage of the newfound political space to push for the implementation of sharia, ostensibly peacefully through the democratic process. The return of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Abdullah Sungkar and the development of the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Mujahidin Council of Indonesia, MMI) in 2000 also changed the nature of the violence—neo-Darul Islam supporters seeking to establish an Islamic state were joined by international jihadists.

The most alarming example of this has been the discovery of JI, a large network of terrorist cells responsible for four major terrorist attacks—in Bali in October 2002, and in Jakarta in August 2003, September 2004 and October 2005—which together have killed approximately 220 people and wounded several hundred more. The Bali bombings of 12 October 2002, remain the most lethal single terrorist attack since the September 11 attacks on the United States and together with the 5 August 2003 attack on the J.W. Marriott hotel in Jakarta had a devastating impact on Indonesia’s economy. The J.W. Marriott bombing and the first Bali bombing were estimated to have cost the government over $1 billion, roughly 1 percent of the GDP. That the group was able to execute a third major attack on 9 September 2004 against a “hard target”—the Australian Embassy in Jakarta—after a concerted effort by regional security services to dislodge it was a troubling development. Founded in Malaysia by radical Indonesian exiles in the early 1990s, JI emerged for a brief period as an important Al Qaeda affiliate. JI has a clear agenda: to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia that will then emanate out, creating a pan-Islamic state across Southeast Asia.

The severity of these terrorist attacks prompted a government crackdown, and to date, more than 350 JI members across the region have been arrested, over 200 in Indonesia alone. Although these arrests hurt JI’s capabilities, it is recruiting—but organized along horizontal cells, rather than a top-down hierarchy—and it maintains the capability to cause significant damage. But, although terrorism remains a top security concern, it is more likely that Indonesia will be confronted...
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with an upsurge in communal violence, following the resurgence of sectarian violence in both Maluku and Sulawesi in the first half of 2004. It began supporting sectarian violence in Indonesia in the late 1990s, and this is a significant part of the organization’s regrouping strategy. Since mid-2004, there has been an upsurge in political violence in these conflict areas, including targeted assassinations, arson attacks, bombings, and three beheadings.

The military—once the paramount political institution and “kingmaker”—now holds an uncertain position. On the one hand, in an attempt to professionalize the military, they formally abolished *dwi fungsi* that gave them a direct role in social and political affairs down to the village level. The TNI chief, General Endriartono Sutarto, issued a ruling that banned all active duty officers from concurrently holding civilian posts. During the 2004 elections, the TNI was unprecedentedly politically quiescent, as General Sutarto issued a ruling that banned all military personnel from voting in the three rounds of elections. Yet a controversial bill in parliament, passed on 30 September 2004, goes a long way in restoring the military’s role in political life. While the new military law abolished the military’s 38 seats in the two houses of parliament, the fact is that those seats were never the source of its political clout. The law allows active duty officers to serve in the civilian bureaucracy if the “position requires military skills.” Most importantly, the new bill does not dismantle the territorial system that gave military leaders an active role in local politics, either directly or indirectly—for example, by vetting candidates. The territorial system, under the new law, was simply renamed “regional empowerment.” Yudhoyono, who in his last uniformed position headed the territorial command system, has promised to keep the system intact, thereby ensuring that the military continues to control the provinces. Following the Bali II terrorist attacks on 1 October 2005, the TNI further pressed for the re-implementation of the territorial command structure. And the TNI remains ensconced in the sectarian conflict zones, not necessarily because of the security interests of the state, but because these are areas where they can best reassert their power and where they have vested economic (and hence political) interests.

Yet, at the same time, President Yudhoyono announced that he was going to select a civilian to head the military in an attempt to rein in the independence of the TNI. According to Yudhoyono, the new defense minister would be a person who understood “the place of the military on national life, democracy and human rights.” To that end, he appointed the respected Juwono Sudarsono, a civilian who held the post under Gus Dur, when the government was trying to depoliticize the military and oust it from day-to-day political affairs. Yet the TNI has been unwilling to withdraw from politics altogether, and has found ways to re-intervene.

President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has stated that he will review the new TNI law that many felt Megawati hastily signed just days before the new president’s inauguration. Moreover, his first dispute and power struggle with the parliament emerged at the end of October 2004 regarding this law. The parliament
believed that under the law, they have the right to determine the succession of the TNI’s leadership, upon the recommendation of the president. Megawati submitted army chief General Ryamizard Ryacudu’s name to the parliament for approval. Yudhoyono withdrew the nomination, but the parliament endorsed Ryacudu anyway. Yudhoyono was careful not to assert that the Parliament does not have the right to approve candidates, but he rejected General Sutarto’s resignation, mandated by the new law, and indicated that he wanted to keep the TNI chief in his current position. Yudhoyono simply asserted that he does not want to be bound by his predecessor’s choice. The parliament seemed unwilling to concede to the new president. This was far more than a debate over the issue of TNI leadership and direction: this was a more fundamental debate over executive versus legislative powers—an issue that 8 years into Indonesia’s democracy is still being debated and contested.

The political reality is that while Yudhoyono enjoyed an overwhelming electoral victory, his Democratic Party holds under 60 of 550 seats, and has few parliamentary allies. To that end, he will likely have to rely on the support of the TNI. Moreover, as the central government is far weaker than it was in the Suharto era, the TNI’s power as a political institution with a nationwide network has grown. Such support will not come without greater concessions to them about their political role. Although legitimate concerns about whether or not the TNI has fully reformed remain, it does deserve credit for not blocking Indonesia’s transition to a democracy. That said, the consequence if democracy fails in Indonesia is that the military is waiting in the wings.

The rise of political Islam: A means of legitimization

While Indonesian society remains largely unsupportive of the jihadists, Indonesia’s political institutions, since the sudden transition to democracy, remain weak. Political parties are often vehicles for candidates; the rule of law is still not uniformly applied; political violence is still routine; and the separation of powers is often opaque. Several Indonesian commentators have warned that democracy is fragile despite successful elections. Four constitutional amendments have made an unworkable constitution workable. Despite that and the fact that Indonesia has now held two democratic elections and has worked to strengthen several political institutions, such as the judiciary—an indication of the gradual consolidation of democracy—there are continued widespread problems, which may have prevented successive governments from acting in a more effective manner to prevent violence. For example, the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (House of People’s Representatives, DPR) continues to be engaged in a struggle with the executive branch to demarcate their respective powers. This has had a profound impact on policymaking in the security arena as well as economic decision-making and the redistribution of wealth, goods, and services.

The growth of democracy also has been a boon of sorts to the Islamists and jihadists, who have used the new political space to broaden their appeal
and push for their legislative agendas. Since President B.J. Habibie lifted the New Order era Anti-Subversion Law in 1999, previously underground or entirely new organizations emerged. Democratization has allowed a raucous free press and civil society to emerge. While both have been essential to the democratic transition, some of the NGO activity is anything but “civil” (i.e., the inclusion of Islamic principles in laws and ordinances).

Many studies of Indonesian politics and the role of Islam are sanguine about the relatively small minority of Islamists and their ability to implement social and political change. While their overall conclusions are likely to hold up in the short to medium term, we must also look at long-term trends, since the Islamists by their own admission have a very long-term agenda and they are very cognizant of the frailties of the state, which has proven incapable or unwilling to intervene in key sectors and provide needed social services.

Understanding Islamism in Indonesia

Following the fall of Suharto, Indonesia saw a concurrent rise of both communal violence and terrorism in particular on the one hand, and of Islamism and religiosity in general on the other. While these phenomena were not related in the 1998–2000 period, it was often hard to discern this. Much of the violence was being perpetrated in the name of Islam, creating a sense that the two were inextricably linked. This was difficult for both analysts and policymakers. On the one hand, some analysts and US policymakers saw the hand of Islamists behind the rise of all political violence and terrorism. On the other hand, some academics created a firewall between the two, arguing that despite increasing piety in the region, Islam in Southeast Asia was “different”—an infertile ground for puritanical, Middle Eastern, or South Asian forms of the faith. However, Indonesian society had, in fact, become more pious, and political Islam re-emerged after years of brutal suppression by the Suharto regime, in large part as a response to the failings of the state, as political Islam at its core is about governance. Crouch notes that “Santri-ization” of Indonesian Islam occurred because of “people of abangan background ‘crossing over’ to Muslim identification,” as well as the “rapid rise of people of poor santri background up the social scale through education.” Islamic identification was up across the board: the 2001 and 2004 PPIM (Center for Islamic and Social Welfare Studies) surveys, have shown a dramatic increase in individual religiosity and piouness. For example the percent of people who pray five times a day or very often was 77 percent in 2001 and 82 percent in 2004; 81.4 percent said that they fasted during Ramadan; and in 2001, 28 percent said they read the Koran always or very often while 28 percent said quite often. These surveys also demonstrated increased support for Islamic governance: 58 percent and 67 percent in 2001 and 2002, respectively, agreed with the statement that Indonesia should be under Islamic governance based on the Koran, Sunnah, and under ulama leadership. In 2001, 61 percent believed that sharia law should be enforced on the Muslim population. At the same time, the
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breakdown of secular institutions allowed sub-state actors to act on behalf of the state and to attempt to set right perceived injustices. Although these phenomena were mostly separate at the time of Suharto’s fall, there is increasing evidence of cooperation between and crossover among a number of militant groups and *Dakwah* organizations.

We need to understand that the objectives and tactics of the Islamist groups, individuals, political parties, and underground organizations differ greatly, and thus require a more nuanced appreciation and response.

In terms of goals, there is a spectrum of objectives that includes, at one end, supporters of Indonesia’s traditional secular, pluralist, and democratic identity, who see no role for Islam in politics. There are also those who believe that there needs to be a stronger role for Islam within Indonesian democracy, who believe that there is a legitimate place for Islam in the national polity of the largest Muslim country in the world. There are those who advocate the implementation of *sharia* and its application to Muslims, although they are still trying to do this within the framework of a democracy (i.e., through the parliament and courts). And there are others who see democracy as anathema to *sharia*. Indeed, there is not even consensus on what *sharia* covers: the veiling of women, the cutting off of hands of thieves, or the banning of the sale of alcohol. This small but vociferous minority wants to transform Indonesia into an Islamic state. Finally, at one edge of the spectrum are those who want to abolish the notion of the Westphalian nation-state system altogether and create *nusantara-rayaa*—an ethnic Malay-based Islamic caliphate in Southeast Asia.

In terms of their tactics, the groups and movements also differ. At one end of the spectrum are groups that eschew violence altogether and want to work through the existing political-legal framework. Other groups actively try to influence politicians through grass-roots mobilization and demonstrations. Some intimidate their opponents or try to silence their critics; others engage in mob violence and attack property—though not persons—to intimidate their opponents. A few groups have followed their leaders’ call to jihad and have actively engaged in armed struggle, establishing militias (with varying degrees of competence, discipline, and weaponry). Many such groups have limited political goals and objectives, and often operate with tacit state support. They can be described as “reactive jihadists.” At the far end of the spectrum are groups that use terrorism and paramilitary activity in order to discredit and ultimately topple the regime—Islamist revolutionaries or “pro-active jihadists.”

These two ranges of goals and tactics can be seen in Figure 1.1. It is clear that the majorities on both axes are concentrated at the lower ends, that is committed to a secular, democratic Indonesia and opposed to political violence. Yet the radicals at the extremes remain disproportionately powerful and vociferous minorities, and tend to shape the agenda.

When one starts to plot Muslim and Islamist groups (political, social, student, and militant) and political parties on the graph, three broad categories present themselves for analysis: (1) Political Islam—political parties and national
Regional Caliphate

Islamic state in Indonesia

Sharia for Muslims in pluralist state but no democracy

Sharia for Muslims within pluralist democracy

Pluralist democracy with greater role for Islam

Secular, pluralist democracy

No violence

Low: protests

Low: intimidation

Moderate: mob violence/attacks on property

High: armed struggle/paramilitary activity for limited objective

High: terrorism/paramilitary activity for revolution

Figure 1.1 Objectives and tactics of Indonesian Islamic groups.
institutions (other than Nadhalatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, which are committed to Indonesia’s existing political system and social order) that support a greater role for Islam in political and social life, including the implementation of *sharia*; (2) Militant Islam—radical groups, supported mainly by disaffected youth that engage in low-intensity conflict and that also support a greater role for Islam in Indonesian political and social life; (3) Islamist terrorism—highly radical militant organizations that use terrorist tactics to bring about a radical political and social realignment. These groups decline in size and membership along the axes, respectively, but increase in lethality.

What is essential to understand is that a graph like this is an electron microscope snap-shot of the state of Islamist and jihadist movements at a certain period of time. These groups and organizations change in size and orientation over time. The situation in Indonesia is highly complex and fluid.

**Purpose of this study**

The goal of this study is to analyze the three different groupings. Subsequent chapters will examine the role that each of these groupings has played in the violence of the post-Suharto period, assess the effectiveness of the government’s responses, and present a summary of the objectives and strength of each grouping at the beginning of President Yudhoyono’s 2004–2009 term. Chapter 5 will explore the extent to which the three groupings might work together in the next 5 years, while a conclusion will consider the policy implications of the rise of violence and Islamism in Indonesia.

The Islamists and jihadists are a small but vociferous minority in a country with, as yet, weak political institutions and growing religious conservatism. This study seeks to understand many overlapping questions: who the radical groups are, what motivates them, how they see themselves, how they plan to build their support base and make inroads to the mainstream, what the public sees in them, how they affect public policy, how moderate Muslim organizations such as the Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama are reacting, and what the government is doing to counter the Islamists.

This study also seeks to understand the medium in which the Islamist movement is growing. What has changed in Indonesian society to allow the Islamists to make gradual inroads? Is there more religiosity in Indonesia, and if so why? Is it a reaction to weak and inefficient secular institutions, or the breakdown in the state’s ability to provide social services, especially schools and courts? Is it simply growing frustration and corruption with secular institutions? Is there a link between the jihadists and Islamists? If so why?

An underlying question of this study is to what degree these groups are connected to one another. While there are three discernable groupings of Islamists and Muslim militants (those working within the existing legal-political framework, those who use violence in a reactive manner, and those who use it in a proactive manner), we need to be aware of crossovers in ideology and membership.
For example, will JI attempt to recruit from the ranks of the radical student organizations that also might be used as vehicles for Islamist political parties? Will members of apolitical and non-violent Islamist organizations provide the ideological grounding for violence-prone jihadists, or at the very least condone their actions?

The 2004–2009 period provides a window for us to monitor events that will help respond to such questions and to assess the growth of Islamist influence in Indonesia. In that time, Indonesia will have had over a decade since the collapse of the authoritarian New Order regime, and the democratic transition should have been consolidated. The decentralization of power that began in 1999 should have had time to be fully implemented, and the legal, political, and fiscal relationships between Jakarta and the provinces should have been regularized. Indonesia will also be in the throes of its third democratic presidential election in 2009. Electoral politics should also have become regularized by then. Moreover, 2009 is also the time frame which the Islamists had publicly set for themselves to begin to make substantial inroads into the political mainstream.30

Indonesia is the world’s third largest democracy and the world’s largest Muslim country. Its success in responding to the challenges of Islam and violence, perpetrated in the name of Islam, will be an important measure of the global struggle against Islamist violence. An Indonesia that is able to keep jihadists situated on the fringes and reduce the appeal of Islamism will be an important partner, along with democracies like India, in the war against terrorism and in the long-term project to promote democratic pluralism. In contrast, an Indonesia that sees violence continue and the Islamists make further inroads will complicate these efforts immeasurably. But for actors, foreign and domestic, the implication is clear: How do we keep these three groups apart from one another? How do we prevent a nexus from developing? How can we keep the jihadists isolated on the fringes? How can we give the Islamists a vested stake in the existing political and legal system?
DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE RISE OF POLITICAL ISLAM

In September 2004, in their first-ever direct presidential elections, Indonesians elected Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as their new president in favor of incumbent Megawati Sukarnoputri. The political reforms that allowed the direct election of the president have been extremely popular and have transformed the political system. For the first time, an independent candidate with a small party base defeated politicians with relatively strong party networks. While this points to the progress Indonesia has made in creating a stable and representative political system, democracy in Indonesia remains fragile. The government still remains weak and unable to effectively redistribute resources, and many government services deliver sub-standard services because of a lack of resources, mismanagement, and corruption. Governance may be slowly improving as institutions become stronger and democratic processes more routine, but the transition to democracy and the changing relations between the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, and the military have complicated the political environment. Political transition has also created opportunities for the rise of groups opposed to *pancasila* and Indonesian pluralism.

Political Islam has been important to the democratic transition in Indonesia, in terms of the role it played both in fostering civil society and in electoral politics. Politics was tightly controlled under Suharto, where only three political parties were allowed to compete, though it was stacked in favor of the government-affiliated party Golkar; but with the collapse of the New Order regime some 80 political parties emerged, approximately 15 of which had some degree of Muslim identity rather than a broad secular ideological basis. These 15 parties were small and fractious, but all were active participants in the democratic process. When they were able to coordinate their activities they demonstrated the potential political power of an Islamist bloc in parliament. Although political Islam first emerged as a reaction to the corruption and authoritarianism of the New Order, it solidified its position because of the failure of the democratic successors to Suharto to deliver social justice and social services.

Most observers saw a limit to the appeal of the Islamist parties. In the 1999 election, approximately 15 percent of voters chose Islamist parties, and many analysts estimated that the Islamist parties would poll along the same lines in the
2004 elections. But to most observers’ surprise, the Islamist parties increased their share of the vote and now control 20 percent of the parliament. The bulk of this increase is accounted for by the electoral gains of one party, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS); the only party that contested both the 1999 and 2004 elections that increased its share of the vote. Although many have been quick to point out that the PKS downplayed its Islamist agenda and focused on the issue of corruption, there are reasons to believe this was a short-term tactical move rather than a sincere change in orientation and a strategic shift in its agenda.

This chapter will probe into why Islamism seems to be growing in popularity, how other political parties and organizations are reacting to it, and what this might mean for Indonesia. On the one hand, the Islamist parties are doing everything that a political party in a democratic system should be doing, such as working within Indonesia’s political-legal framework. And to date, they all seem committed to preserving Indonesia’s new democracy. On the other hand, what the Islamist parties espouse or ultimately envision for Indonesia is not necessarily compatible with democracy. Moreover, the hierarchical nature of the Islamist parties, their cell-based structure, and penchant for secrecy and internal discipline seems intuitively counter to democracy. This remains the key question: Will the Islamist parties, with a decided minority of the popular vote, remain committed to the democratic system? Will they become more secular as they try to win more votes or when they are in power, as has been the case elsewhere in the world, or will they harden their stance to appeal to their political base?

In this discussion, two things need to be kept in context. First, Indonesians have done a remarkable job in a brief period of time in establishing a working democracy. While the democratic transition has still not been fully consolidated, there have been four transitions of power and two rounds of elections. The president is now elected directly by the people, and almost every political institution is stronger than it was at the time of the fall of Suharto. Second, with the success of the 2004 elections, and the end to the crisis of years of political instability, public support for democracy is again climbing. In the 2005 Global Attitudes Survey for the Pew International Research Center for People and the Press, 77 percent of the respondents believed that democracy could work in Indonesia. Interestingly, 85 percent of the respondents believed that Islam should play an important political role and 88 percent believed that Islam’s political role was a good thing. Indeed, 73 percent of the respondents believed that Islam should play a greater role than it currently does in politics—only 15 percent disagreed.

**Historical roots of political Islam in Indonesia**

The history of political Islam (political organization based on Islamic principles) in Indonesia reaches back to more than a century. Dutch colonial policy tried to prevent Islam from becoming a focus of nationalism by co-opting the Javanese-Muslim nobles known as priyayi and turning them into colonial administrators. Mosque officials, or penghulu, were kept subordinate to the priyayi. By the early
Democratization and the Rise of Political Islam

twentieth century, however, the Dutch began to lose control over religious organization in the Netherlands East Indies. Two independent Islamic organizations were founded in 1912, Muhammadiyah and Sarekat Islam (the Islamic Union), and a third, Nahdlatul Ulama (the Revival of Religious Scholars, or NU), was established in 1926. While the Sarekat Islam was the first mass organization that challenged Dutch colonial rule, for the most part these organizations concentrated on welfare, social work, education, business, and health issues and avoided explicit participation in politics. The NU was particularly involved in running a vast network of pesantren. Yet, through these social services and by using the pesantren as agents of social change, the NU and Muhammadiyah developed into key nationalist actors.

The Japanese, who occupied Indonesia from 1942 to 1945, used Islam to build up anti-Western sentiments and established the Kantor Urusan Agama (Office of Religious Affairs), which was given authority over Islamic issues at the local level. In 1943, the Japanese administration required that all Muslim organizations be folded into a single though pre-existing group, Majlis Syuro Muslim in Indonesia (the Indonesian Muslim Consultative Council, or Masyumi), which served as a tool for the Japanese to control Muslim organizations, co-opt the leaders of both NU and Muhammadiyah, and hopefully win the support of the Indonesian populace vis-à-vis the Dutch. After the war, a group of mainly Muhammadiyah leaders reformed Masyumi, and it became one of the leading Indonesian political parties in the war of independence against the Dutch, building a base of support on its Islamic credentials, although this form of Masyumi had little in common with its wartime predecessor and did not include leaders of NU, who formed their own party.

In the late 1940s and 1950s, after the Republic of Indonesia declared independence from the Dutch, the idea of Islamic statehood spread rapidly throughout the archipelago. Many were upset at Sukarno’s ideology of panca-sila (the five principles of the independent Indonesian state), which fell short of either making Islam the state religion (acknowledging merely “one God,” rather than “Allah” or Islam by name), or implanting sharia law into the Indonesian constitution. Sukarno wanted to establish a secular state and importantly assuage the ethnic minority groups that dominated the outer islands of the archipelago. To that end, he controversially removed the draft preamble to the 1945 constitution—a statement that, while not turning Indonesia into an Islamic state, declares that there is a legal “obligation to follow Islamic sharia for its adherents.” This became known as the “Jakarta Charter” and was omitted by Sukarno from the final draft of the constitution. Conservative Muslims never accepted the mostly secular creed of panca-sila as the basis of the Indonesian state, and the inclusion of the Jakarta Charter has always been a central political goal of many Islamists.

In 1947, a group called Darul Islam (DI, Realm of Islam) emerged in the Sundanese highlands of West Java. Led by charismatic anti-Dutch guerrilla Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo, DI quickly spawned a militia (the Indonesian Islamic Army), which spread to other parts of Indonesia, most notably south
Table 2.1 Parliamentary electoral results—1955

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes cast</th>
<th>% of Popular vote</th>
<th># Seats</th>
<th>% of seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PNI</td>
<td>8,434,653</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masyumi</td>
<td>7,903,886</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>22.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>NU</td>
<td>6,995,141</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKI</td>
<td>6,176,914</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSI</td>
<td>1,091,160</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARKINDO</td>
<td>1,003,325</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Katholik</td>
<td>770,740</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSI</td>
<td>753,191</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murba</td>
<td>199,588</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>4,496,701</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>11.7</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>37,785,299</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: http://www.seasite.niu.edu/Indonesian/Indonesian_Elections/Election_text.htm.

Sulawesi. Though there was loose coordination between the groups, in mid-1948 an Islamic constitution was issued. On 7 August 1949, Kartosuwirjo declared the founding of Negara Islam Indonesia, an Islamic state in West Java. As Adam Schwartz notes, “by rejecting Islam as the sole foundation of the state, [the new nationalist government] had made itself as evil an enemy [of Darul Islam] as the Dutch.” This period became known as the “triangular war,” as DI secessionists, Sukarno’s nationalist forces, and the Dutch all fought for supremacy in the archipelago. Support for DI eventually spread to central Java, south Sulawesi, and Aceh. The DI movement was driven underground in 1962 when the government reasserted control over the Sundanese highlands and Kartosuwirjo was captured and executed. In 1965, Kahar Muzakkar who headed DI in south Sulawesi was killed, and the south Kelantanese leader Ibnu Hadjar was executed that same year. DI went underground, but not before the conflict killed some 15,000–20,000 people.

With *pancasila* as the official ideology, Sukarno’s secular government denied radical Muslim the place in government they demanded and refused to establish *sharia* as the foundation of the legal system. Sukarno believed that multi-confessional Indonesia could never be a “unitary” state with Islam as its basis. The pro-*sharia* political organizations suffered further setbacks under Sukarno. In the 1955 elections, a majority of the people voted for secular parties or parties not principally defined as Islamic. The only pro-*sharia* party Masyumi won 21 percent of the vote. Indeed, the two largest secular parties, the Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Party, or PNI) and the Partai Komunis Indonesia (Communist Party of Indonesia, or PKI), were able to match the share of the vote won by Masyumi and NU (Table 2.1). Twenty-eight parties competed in the election, though four took 75 percent of the vote, creating an unworkable coalition government.

Over the next decade, Sukarno’s policies and political alliances vacillated. Increasingly, he moved toward the left. In 1960, he banned the Masyumi and
arrested its leader Mohammad Natsir, implicating the organization in connection with religious rebellions. After the 1963 land reform campaign, Sukarno began to depend heavily on support from the PKI. In 1965, after an abortive—and still controversial—coup attempt by PKI leaders and their allies in the army, secular and religious anti-communist groups led one of the worst cases of political mass-murder in history. Both NU and Muhammadiyah—but especially NU, through its armed wing Ansor—participated in the prolonged slaughter of hundreds of thousands of genuine and suspected PKI members that followed in 1965.\(^{17}\) Both the groups both feared the PKI’s radical land reform program, which threatened the wealth and livelihoods of the rural Muslim elites, and were outraged by the atheist ideology that threatened their religion. To that end, they gave support to the TNI in eradicating their natural enemy. In return they expected concessions from the new regime—a military-Muslim alliance. Later that year, Major General Suharto exerted control over Indonesia through special emergency powers, with the support of both secular and Islamic parties and social organizations unhappy with the PKI and Sukarno’s politics. Once he had consolidated power, however, Suharto continued to promote *Pancasila*, rejecting the Jakarta Charter outright and asserting even greater central control over the political process. This infuriated members of Masyumi, NU, and other Muslim parties, who had expected to be rewarded for their explicit or tacit support of Suharto’s consolidation of power and the purge of the PKI.\(^ {18}\)

Under Suharto’s New Order, NU and Muhammadiyah remained operational, and Masyumi’s leaders such as Mohammad Natsir were released from prison in 1966, but their activities were circumscribed and their political activities eventually banned. Natsir was unable to form a new political party. The two organizations took different approaches to survival under the New Order regime. NU struggled to find its role, at times accepting the status quo and at other times serving as a nascent opposition to Suharto, whereas Muhammadiyah adopted a “policy of non-cooperation with the government.”\(^ {19}\) While a number of Muhammadiyah’s senior members refused to abandon their pro-*sharia* stance, most either retreated to academia or focused on *dakwah* (propagation of Islam). The most significant Muhammadiyah offshoot of this time was Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Council of Indonesia for the Propagation of Islam, or DDII). Founded in 1967 by Mohammed Natsir, its goal was “to create a conservative Islamic constituency capable of challenging the [Suharto] regime.”\(^ {20}\) The organization focused on *Dakwah*—Islamic mission—and their activities focused on proselytizing and indoctrinating students in secular universities. The core of the DDII’s message was *tawhid*—the oneness of god, which states that all aspects of life should be based on the life and teachings of the Prophet. DDII also sought to combat various forces thought to be trying to “Christianize” Indonesia.\(^ {21}\) Over time, DDII moved away from its early pro-democracy tilt and began to adopt a more pan-Islamic worldview, including a radical anti-Zionist agenda.\(^ {22}\) They also targeted liberal Muslims such as Nurcholish Madjid.
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In 1973 the government forced all political parties except the ruling Golkar to merge into an amalgam of two parties. The opposition parties were given seats in parliament, but the government controlled their numbers. The secular parties, including the PNI, became the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Democratic Party of Indonesia, or PDI), while the four Islamic parties formed the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party, or PPP).\textsuperscript{23} Under this new system, Muslim elites were given a role in politics, but to ensure loyalty and compliance all funding and support for their activities came from the state.\textsuperscript{24} Any serious challenge to the regime from one of these parties would thus, most likely, result in their economic ruin. Perceived radicals, such as former Masyumi members, were excluded from the PPP, which was designed to be a weak and divided party, comprised as it was of both traditionalists and modernists.\textsuperscript{25} Suharto thereafter set out to weaken the Islamic community from being able to reassert itself politically. He subordinated Islamic political activities and required all religious organizations to support \textit{pancasila}.\textsuperscript{26} The PPP was banned from using “Islam” in its name or from using any Islamic symbols. As Peter Riddell notes, “The PPP became increasingly ineffective as a vehicle for greater Islamization of the political process. Its loss of support was reflected in successive elections, dropping from 28 percent in 1982 to 16 percent in 1987, a position that barely changed in 1992 when it garnered 17 percent.”\textsuperscript{27} Through these political mechanizations, the government was able to push through a number of important secular reforms, including the 1974 marriage law that was hailed by secularists and women’s groups alike.

In the early 1980s, NU came under the leadership of a charismatic cleric, Abdurrahman Wahid, who was the grandson of one of the organization’s founders. Wahid led the group to adopt his policy of “Kembali Ke Khittah 1926” (a “return to the spirit of 1926”), rejecting overt political involvement and arguing that NU was better able to advocate social change from outside the political system. As the New Order did not allow free and open political dialogue, Wahid argued that participating in the charade of politics was actually destructive and distracting.\textsuperscript{28} NU withdrew from the PPP in 1984, in part to refocus itself on religious, cultural, and social activities, as well as to distance itself from the government and the corrupt political system.\textsuperscript{29}

Although Suharto was successful in weakening Islam politically by the mid-1980s, as a social force it was growing tremendously. The impact of the Iranian revolution in 1979 was profound in all corners of the Muslim world, despite the Shiite dominance of the country. Importantly, it led to a vigorous response from Saudi Arabia and a proliferation of NGOs and organizations, such as the Muslim World League, World Association of Muslim Youth, and other charities, such as Al Haramain, that espoused a puritanical Salafi strain, Wahhabism, to counter the radical Shia threat.\textsuperscript{30} A growing number of scholarships and educational exchanges brought ever more Southeast Asians to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Yemen for study. Student demonstrations against Suharto’s election victory for a third term in 1978 led the Suharto regime to ban all political activities
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by student groups. This drove the student groups even further underground, and increasingly into the Dakwah movement in the mosques. Islamic schools, mosques, and Muslim publications, which faced less state repression than independent secular institutions, became important forums for public policy debate in the heavily circumscribed political structure of the New Order period. There was a rapid proliferation of dakwah organizations on campuses that were dominated by students who had returned from study in the Middle East, including the DDII, Institute for Islamic and Arabic Studies (LIPIA), the al Irsyad Foundation, Hizb’ut Tahrir, Khairu Ulmmah, Himpunan Mahasiswa Isam (Muslim Student Organization), and Kammi. Interestingly, a similar thing was happening in neighboring Malaysia where the Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM) led by Anwar Ibrahim was becoming an important force, and influential in its own right amongst Indonesian student groups. For a growing number of university-educated youths, Islam was the answer. But repression against the Dakwah movement kept them underground, looking for opportunities to emerge.

Those opportunities came in the mid-1980s, as the economy was slowing and the system was increasingly mired in corruption. Suharto turned to Islam as a means to help legitimize his regime. He increased public displays of religiosity, began speaking Arabic, went on the haj (the pilgrimage to Mecca), and promoted the so-called “green” (Islamic-oriented, as opposed to “red” secular nationalist) generals to leadership positions in the military (the Tentera Nasional Indonesia, or the TNI). The TNI’s “green” faction manipulated religious tensions to weaken democratic opposition to the New Order regime. It targeted and discredited moderate Muslims. The green faction became closely aligned with the conservative and anti-Western Ahmad Sumargono, head of the Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam (Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with the Islamic World, or KISDI), which was established in 1987 by Mohammad Natsir and other members of DDII. KISDI was really the first Dakwah organization to become overtly political, which it was able to do because it mobilized popular support toward the mistreatment of Muslims abroad, not in Indonesia, per se. In particular KISDI was focused on the Palestinian Intifadah and the Serb’s ethnic cleansing of Muslims in Bosnia from 1992 to 1995. By the mid to late 1990s, the Suharto regime turned to KISDI to mobilize Islamic youth against pro-democracy forces.

In contrast to the growing ties between conservative Islam and the New Order regime, members of Muhammadiyah and NU were disgusted with the rampant corruption of the Suharto family and its cronies. The newspaper Republika became an outspoken critic of the New Order regime and many of these groups’ members joined the pro-democracy forces. Between 1988 and 1993, Suharto tried to ally with Islamist hard-liners like Sumargono to counter the growing calls for democratization from a large portion of the population. In 1998, KISDI worked closely with Prabowo Subianto, Suharto’s son-in-law and head of Kopassus, to crush the student demonstrations. Harking back to 1965, KISDI hoped for an Islamic-military alliance to prevent communism or secularism from
emerging. To bolster this alliance, he made a number of concessions to conservative Muslims, such as allowing for the founding of an Islamic bank, Bank Muamalat Indonesia, enhancing the authority of Islamic courts, lifting the ban on some aspects of Muslim women’s customary dress in schools, increasing Islamic TV programming, increasing funding for Islamic schools, abolishing the sports lottery, and promoting more Islamic generals. Suharto also created a new state-controlled Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (Union of Muslim Intellectuals of Indonesia, or ICMI) in December 1990, in order to co-opt Muslim intellectuals, as well as to discredit NU and Wahid, whom Suharto had been unable to oust from the organization’s leadership. He placed ICMI under the leadership of his top lieutenant—and later his heir—B.J. Habibie; when Habibie became the head of the ruling party Golkar in 1992, ICMI was able to expand its political influence. In 1993, four cabinet posts went to ICMI members, greatly raising the group’s profile. Amid increasing political agitation and unrest in the 1990s, many leaders, such as Amien Rais were forced out, and in the end, even the conservatives in the ICMI turned on Suharto because they believed he was using them for his own political ends.

The rise of political Islam in the post-New Order period

With the collapse of the New Order, constraints on political organizations were lifted for the first time in decades. Having played a major role in toppling Suharto, Islamic groups were also among the first to capitalize on the liberal climate of reformasi, the pro-democracy, anti-New Order movement that began in early 1998, by asserting their newfound freedoms of press and organization. As Robert Hefner argues, Islam—rather than being a conservative, anti-democratic force—was the single most important force for political change:

Since the late-1980s, the largest audience for democratic and pluralist ideas in Indonesia has been not secular nationalist, but reform minded Muslim democrats. Nowhere in the Muslim world have Muslim intellectuals engaged the ideas of democracy, civil society, pluralism, and the rule of law with a vigor and confidence equal to that of Indonesian Muslims.

NU and Muhammadiyah were essential midwives in Indonesia’s democratic transition. As moderate Muslim leader, Ulil Abshar Abdallah put it in early 2002: “I strongly believe that democracy in Indonesia will not be strengthened or take strong root without the strong support of Islamic society.” Muslim leaders were seen as uncorrupted by the New Order regime, and had nation-wide appeal. Their moral authority both got people into the streets and prevented the country from descending into anarchy. As institutions, these mass organizations had nationwide networks, in stark contrast to the many hastily formed political parties. Indeed, to exploit this advantage, the leaders of both organizations established loosely affiliated political parties. Abdurrahman Wahid and the NU leadership founded.
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the Nation Awakening Party (PKB), while Amien Rais founded the National Mandate Party (PAN) from Muhammadiyah members. These parties, though, were avowedly secular and pro-pancasila. Were it not for the robust Muslim civil society, and their party offshoots, democracy would have been still born with the fall of Suharto.

Democratization also opened the door for the establishment of Islamist parties. Corruption was so endemic that Islamist politicians were able to present themselves as the only clean political leaders in the country and the number of Islamic-based parties mushroomed. Most were small and served as “vehicles” rather than parties in the truest sense. In 1998, Muslim-oriented parties (some with a token Muslim identity, some hard-line Islamists) accounted for 15 out of the 80 standing political parties, though most were small and had little chance of electoral success. Some, such as Abdurrahman Wahid’s PKB, represented those Muslims who desired a greater role for Islam in Indonesian society, while supporting the notion of Indonesia’s role as a pluralist multi-confessional state. While all competed, some made clear their disdain for democracy, believing it to be anathema to Islam.

At the time, three major parties which can be characterized as Islamist, committed to the implementation of Islamic law, emerged in the 1999 elections with nationwide followings, together winning 14 percent of the popular vote and holding 16 percent of the seats in the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (House of People’s Representatives, or DPR). While the United Development Party (PPP), the Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent Moon and Star Party, or PBB), and the Partai Keadilan (Justice Party, or PK) all capitalized on the perception that their religiosity made them less susceptible to corruption, these parties represented three distinct Islamic demographics, that is some from the Modernist tradition, some from the Traditionalist tradition. Moreover, despite similar stances in favor of implementing Islamic law for Muslims, personal rivalries and political disagreements inhibited them from presenting a united front.

Of all the Islamist parties, only the PPP had existed during Suharto’s New Order. The PPP assumed the role of an umbrella party for Muslims, including both traditionalists and modernists. Because of this, it was the only Islamist party in 1999 with a nationwide network. Although it was rife with factionalism, this network helped the PPP win 10.7 percent of the seats in parliament, yet this result was half what the PPP polled in the last election of the New Order era in 1997, in part due to the proliferation of other parties, such as the PKB, PBB, and PK. Simply, despite its Islamist rhetoric and goals, it was too tainted by its relationship to the New Order regime. As Harold Crouch has noted, the PPP was nothing more than a “nation-wide patronage dispensing machine” and, to that end, supporters of Islamist rule had many other choices untainted by corruption.

The PK, founded in 1998, emerged from a network of Islamic study groups on university campuses; KAMMI was the most important which modeled themselves on the cellular network of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. The party was founded by 52 leaders of the Dakwah movement, many from the Muslim Brotherhood
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orientated student group, KAMMI. Importantly, there were no founding members from the Old Order regime. Thus, from the start, the party has built its reputation around a popular anti-corruption stance. The PK was a cadre-based party in which 10 person cells or study groups were established, with members expected to recruit their own members. Members had to be known in their communities as both pious and committed to service within their communities. The party was known for internal discipline and intense education of its members regarding the party’s line and ideology. The PK leadership announced that it would not accept post-election offers of cabinet positions in either the Abdurrahman Wahid or the Megawati Sukarnoputri administrations in order to maintain party integrity. The party’s first leader, Nur Mahmudi Ismail, was forced to resign from the party when he accepted the position of Minister of Forestry and Plantations. PK also refused to engage in vote buying, nor would it take donations from corrupt donors. In several instances, PK leaders returned funds when the source of the money was in question. The PK, likewise, would not accept government funding, although it has taken money from foreign sources, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia. PK leaders have stated that one of their top priorities is maintaining internal discipline and morality: “PK is a party that is very strict about morals and morality, and we will reject those who tarnish the party.” The PK also had some of the best grass-roots organization with a core of dedicated supporters. The party, which began with only 60,000 members, was able to win 1.4 million votes in the 1999 election, mainly in urban areas on Java, and garner one percent of the seats in parliament. It performed especially well in districts that included major state universities. Perhaps the most significant factor explaining the rise of the PK was that, unlike many of the other political parties, there was little internal strife within the party. By 2003, it had some 300,000 members.

The PBB, headed by Yusril Ihza Mahendra, appealed to modernist Muslims associated with the DDII, asserting that it was the direct descendent of Masyumi. Like the PK, though, it was small and based primarily on Java. Unlike the PK, the PBB had a weak organizational structure and was riddled with factionalism. It won only 1.9 percent of the popular vote in the 1999 poll, although this gained them two seats in parliament. The PBB alarmed many of Indonesia’s minorities, as party leaders spoke of redistributing wealth from ethnic-Chinese Indonesians, whom the party contends have disproportionately dominated business, and have supported a Malaysian-style affirmative-action policy to favor smaller Muslim-owned businesses. Although these three Islamist parties were small and only represented a small percentage of the popular vote in 1999, coalition politics enabled them to exert greater influence over policy by aligning with other small secular and moderate Muslim parties. Despite together holding only 16 percent of parliamentary seats, the PPP, PK, and PBB joined forces with Wahid’s PKB and Amien Rais’ Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party, or PAN) in an alliance known as the Central Axis (Poros Tengah), which controlled 33 percent
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of the seats in the DPR and proved instrumental in elevating Wahid, rather than the leader of the largest party in parliament, the PDI-P’s Megawati Sukarnoputri, to the presidency. In 2000, however, the Central Axis dissolved due to internal rivalries.

At the time, many analysts wrote off the Islamist parties who had polled poorly in the first post-Suharto election, garnering only 14 percent, and performed significantly worse than the Muslim parties of the 1955 election who had won 40 percent of the seats—and that is only if you include the NU with the Masyumi. The Masyumi alone only won 21 percent. Commentators such as Greg Fealy argued that Islamic parties were “election only” parties that were “moribund at the local level, unable to develop an effective and sizeable cadre of elites.” Moreover, few had strong identifiable platforms, and those platforms that did exist were “hollow.”

For some of the Islamist parties, still beset by internal divisions, this was clearly the case. By 2003, the PBB had split into two discernable camps, while the PPP remained divided between its modernist and traditionalist wings. The PPP eventually split when members wanted to distance themselves from the New Order tainted party and established the Partai Bintang Reformasi (PBR). Even the more secularly oriented PAN and PKB could not appear to determine what kind of party they wanted to be. While PKB remained committed to secularism, PAN adopted policies and platforms to court the Islamist vote. None of the Islamist parties were able to get beyond their immediate constituencies and grow, however. PKB largely remained the party of NU members, PAN the party of the urban middle class of Muhammadiyah, while PBB appealed to DDII and more radical members of Muhammadiyah. Only the PK set out an aggressive platform to tap into new constituencies and grow. The centerpiece was a political platform based on the morality of Islam.

For other analysts, the results of the 1999 election were more troubling for they indicated the return to “identity politics” that plagued the country in the 1950s. Mark Woodward, for example, was concerned at the time that voter patterns reflected “primordial loyalties” to ethnicity and religion.

Despite their limited political and parliamentary power, some Islamist parties continued to fight for the inclusion of Islamic law in the constitution. In September 2002, the PPP, PBB, and the small Daulatul Ummah Party (PDU) pushed for a parliamentary vote on the incorporation of the Jakarta Charter, arguing that “Muslims must be obliged by the sharia.” As momentum gathered, a number of other small parties jumped on the bandwagon to score political mileage with their Muslim constituencies (although the PK supported the Medina Charter rather than the Jakarta Charter, which offered greater protection to minorities). Although they were defeated by a large margin, the vote in itself was significant simply for the fact that it had happened after debate on the issue had been stifled for 55 years.

Meanwhile, Wahid was squandering his political capital through incompetence, poor administration, and the mishandling of the economy, as well as failing
to secure the support of the military in accepting the independence of East Timor. He was impeached in August 2001 and was replaced by his Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri. The head of the PPP, Hamzah Haz, who 2 years earlier had blocked Megawati’s ascension stating he could never support a female president, was elected her vice president by the DPR. The internecine squabbling of the secular politicians played into the hands of the Islamist parties. The secular leaders were mired in corruption and elite conflicts, unconcerned about the plight of the people. Their incompetent policies had diminished faith in secular institutions that were no longer providing for the people, still suffering from the Asian Economic Crisis. The Islamist parties now stood not only for clean governance and the morality of Islam, but also for social justice and the provision of social goods.

The consolidation of Islamist politics: The 2004 elections

Based on the Islamist parties’ performance in the 1999 elections, many commentators concluded that “very few Indonesians are attracted to Islamism, much less radicalism.” Mujani and Liddle estimated the number of Islamists in Indonesia at 14 percent, and predicted that Islamist parties would poll in the 2004 legislative elections at roughly the same numbers as they did in 1999. In actuality, the four Islamist parties, PKS, PPP, PBB, and PBR, won 20.5 percent of the vote. This is roughly the same as the Masyumi did in 1955, and a 50 percent increase over 1999. However, in the April 2004 parliamentary elections, the large established parties were not able to expand their vote and, in some cases, suffered significant setbacks. The PDI-P, for example, won approximately half the number of votes it did in 1999, with its share dropping from 34 to 19 percent. Golkar remained steady at 22 percent of the vote in both elections. The mostly secular PAN and moderate Muslim PKB failed to expand their electoral base, and so saw their share of the vote drop somewhat. Even the Islamist PPP, headed by incumbent Vice President Hamzah Haz, registered a drop in popular votes, though not in seats (Table 2.2). This indicates a high degree of popular frustration with the potential incumbents and the status quo as people’s standards of living remained low.

The two best performing parties in the 2004 parliamentary polls were Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s Partai Demokrat (Democratic Party, or PD) and the now renamed PK, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party, or PKS). Founded hastily in September 2003, the secular Democratic Party was able to win 7.5 percent of the parliamentary vote in April 2004, though this was only a fraction of the votes Yudhoyono later received in the two rounds of presidential polling. Nonetheless, the PD remains little more than a vehicle for its founder and lacks the nationwide network of branches and local candidates.

The second party to gain significantly in the election was the PKS. Anthony Smith contends that the PKS “drew votes from more established Islamist parties who have all engaged in bitter infighting, and, in the eyes of some
Table 2.2 Indonesia’s parliamentary elections (1999 compared with 2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1999</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PDI-P</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>PDI-P</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKB</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>PKB</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBB</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>PBB</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PK</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>PKS</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Parties</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>Other Parties</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


hardliners, compromised themselves in political arrangements with other parties and leaders.” The PKS won more than 7 percent of the total overall vote.

The PKS was successful in many ways by downplaying its Islamist message and focusing on an anti-corruption platform popular with secular-minded voters, and it was able to effectively appeal to many who, as the results suggest, probably voted for secular parties in 1999. The party was the largest vote-taker in Jakarta, capturing 22.9 percent of the total, where it won support from students and others for actively engaging in charitable works and addressing the issues that affect the poor.

Yet, despite removing calls for the implementation of *sharia* from its campaign platform, there are fears that the PKS’s shift of focus is tactical rather than genuine. As Greg Fealy says, “When you read [PKS] party training documents you find their attitudes toward Christians and the West is suspicious, far more wary. There is a concealed agenda.” In a later work, Fealy noted that the PKS’s focus on governance was not a rejection of their Islamist goals, but simply an acknowledgement that “it was premature and ultimately counter-productive to take such issues to the broader electorate.” The PKS has a double agenda: a public agenda that focuses on good works, anti-corruption, and good governance and a private agenda that focuses on Islamic purity, internal discipline, and *sharia*.

The position of the other two Islamist parties remained relatively unchanged. Even though its share of the vote fell in 2004, the PPP still controls 10 percent of seats in the DPR. The PBB won 2.6 percent of the vote, a slight increase from the 2 percent it garnered in 1999, though its share of DPR seats fell from 3 to 2 percent. The only Islamist presidential candidate, however, Hamzah Haz, fared exceptionally poorly, garnering only 3 percent of the vote in the first round of the presidential election held in the summer of 2004. PPP supporters were relatively evenly distributed among the five presidential candidates, with Hamzah Haz receiving only 29 percent of the vote from his own base.
Looking at the 2004 election results—and in particular the success of the PKS, the implosion of PDI-P, and the relative stagnation of Golkar, PAN, PKB, the PPP and PBB—one can conclude that the growth of political Islam has been somewhat undeveloped. The success of the PKS—which de-emphasized Islamism and campaigned on non-Islamist political issues such as corruption—had great appeal to Indonesian voters in 2004. The Islamic morality agenda rather than sharia appealed to a large percentage of the electorate, fed up with corruption, poor governance, elites pre-occupied with their own conflicts, and a lack of social justice. Coupled with the success of the new Democratic Party, the gains by the PKS also suggest that many voters are attracted to parties not associated with established elites. It is not yet clear how this will affect parliamentary politics, but it is highly likely that other parties might copy the model of the PKS.

In July 2004, the first round of presidential polling was held. With five candidates, it was not expected that any one candidate would gain a sheer majority of the vote to avoid a run-off. Similar trends as in the previous month’s parliamentary elections were evident in the first round of the presidential election, such as a strong anti-incumbent bias. The single largest vote-winner was Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, with 33.6 percent of the vote. Megawati Sukarnoputri, the incumbent president only garnered 26.6 percent of the vote. The Golkar candidate Wiranto, too, was in many ways an anti-establishment vote, as he defeated the party elite’s own choice, Akbar Tanjung (Table 2.3). For political Islam, the vote was significant in that it fared poorly at the national level. Only the PPP’s Hamzah Haz contended the election, and he won a paltry 3 percent, significantly below his party’s 8.2 percent of the vote. Indeed, it could also be that Haz is simply not deemed “Islamic” due to his longstanding ties to the New Order regime as well as his relationship with Megawati.

Table 2.3 First round of 2004 presidential elections (compared with party strength)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Parliamentary poll (held on 5 April 2004—% of popular vote)</th>
<th>Presidential candidate</th>
<th>Presidential poll (first round held on 5 July 2004—% of popular vote)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PD</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono*</td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDI-P</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>Megawati Sukarnoputri*</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>Wiranto</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>Amien Rais</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>Hamzah Haz</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: www.ifes.org/eguide/resultsum/indonesia_pres04.htm#B.
* Qualified for the second round of presidential elections in September 2004.
Indonesia’s Islamic parties have not yet proven that they are able to cooperate effectively. In the short term, the Islamist and moderate Muslim parties will likely remain divided, as personal rivalries and fundamental policy differences keep the parties from working together. The PPP and PBB, for example, are highly critical of the PKS leadership and have been too influenced by foreigners, as much of their leadership being Saudi educated. The PBB is less committed to democracy than the PKS appears to be. The PPP, for its part, is woefully factionalized and divided. As has been noted above, once the Central Axis settled on Abdurrahman Wahid as president in 1999, the grouping fell apart by 2000. There was an attempt in the spring of 2004 to forge a new coalition, known as the Salvation Front, but it collapsed because it was seen by many as little more than a vehicle to get Amien Rais elected president. Given the poor performance of Hamzah Haz, it is evident that there is little support at the national level for an Islamist president. Nor are they likely to try before the 2014 election.

On the other hand, the Islamist parties—driven by the success of the PKS—have done significantly better than anticipated in the 2004 parliamentary election. Together the PKS, PPP, and PBB won 18 percent of the popular vote and holds 21 percent of parliamentary seats. These are modest gains, but ones that most analysts had not predicted. The prevailing wisdom was that the Islamist parties would fare no better or worse than they did in 1999. There are a number of reasons that suggest, despite their performance in the 2004 legislative and presidential elections, the Islamist parties will remain a significant political force in the current parliament and might play a prominent role in the 2009 elections.

They have been courted by Yudhoyono, given his Democratic Party’s limited strength in parliament. President Yudhoyono reached out to the Islamists and gave them 5 seats in his 36-member cabinet, while nominating another, Hidayat Nur Wahid, to the position of the speaker of the upper house of parliament. The PPP, PBB, and PKS remain key members of Yudhoyono’s People’s Coalition in the parliament. The Yudhoyono administration has depended on the Islamist parties to succeed in passing legislation, this has opened the door for them to include some of their own initiatives. The parties might push for change through a legislative agenda that slowly attempts to undermine the secular tenets of the Indonesian state. On the other hand, the Islamist parties might also benefit if the parliament is too fractious to push through legislation, or if the government fails to meet popular expectations. If there is mass discontent with perceived self-serving elites and civil servants, or if the economy fails to return to rapid growth, then people may “begin entertaining ‘less liberal’ alternatives to the pluralistic nation state.”

Islamists are committed to gradually winning over the majority that supports moderate Islamic or secular agendas. To that end, they employ a number of
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strategies: building up their parliamentary base and strengthening their parties and grass-roots networks, implementing their agenda through public policy, and governing effectively in certain regions to build a track record.

Party building

The three Islamist parties (PPP, PKS, and PBB) anticipate significant gains in the 2009 election. Indeed, Zulkieflimansyah, a leader of PKS, has boldly asserted that “We even believe that we are ready to lead Indonesia in 2014.”69 The PKS probably believes it can gain from the government’s continued inability to enact meaningful economic reforms to fight corruption. They will likely seek to capitalize on growing popular frustration with secular political parties that continually fail to deliver for the people. Economic recovery and, in particular, job creation have lagged, while the government’s inability to improve the provision of social services has frustrated many. Self-serving secular elites, caught up in their own political conflicts in Jakarta and beholden to their own special interests, have shown an appalling lack of concern for the populace.

But most of their efforts will be focused on party building. By most measures, the Islamist parties are some of the best-organized political parties in Indonesia and have developed some of the best grass-roots organization. We can expect the PKS will continue to develop its cellular-cadre system, whereby activist members are instructed to either recruit or persuade between five and ten people to vote for the PKS.70 The PKS is highly disciplined, continuously educating its members on the party line and disciplining those who stray. It will also actively organize and recruit through the university-based organizations such as KAMMI. But the PKS will be limited in as much as it is still an urban party dominated by educated youth in an overwhelmingly uneducated and rural society. Though it quintupled its vote between 1999 and 2003 in the cities, it has no rural platform. When I put this question to Hidayat Nur Wahid, he said that PKS would not adopt one, but would slowly win over rural voters by commitment to its line, being free of corruption, and ruling with integrity.71 The PKS has no rural agenda or plan to increase its recruitment in the countryside. Yet, until it develops a rural cadre that can tap into the NU and Muhammadiyah peasants and networks, it will remain a small party. It will try to counter this by providing social services and relief work when they get opportunities, such as the 2004 flooding in Java or the December 2004 Tsunami in Aceh. As Bubalo and Fealy note, “As a result of these measures, PKS has acquired a reputation as one of the few parties whose rhetoric of social concern is backed up by regular grassroots assistance programs.”72

There is no doubt about the Islamist agenda of PKS. This lack of transparency about their intentions is troubling. What they say to a public audience is very different than the internal message to their members. Rather than focusing on *sharia* immediately, they will continue to focus on the moral qualities of Islam and the gradual Islamization of society. That they have downplayed *sharia* is
tactical. For now, their goal is to Islamize society, by serving as examples. PKS leaders believe that greater piety will lead to greater acceptance of *sharia*. But there are signs of an interesting debate within PKS. Hidayat Nur Wahid anticipates an increase in around 200 percent of their share of the popular vote in the 2009 election. Their stated goal is to win 25–30 percent of the first round of the popular vote in the 2014 election, which is enough to win them the presidency. Some in the organization seem to worry that if they grow too quickly they will lose their ideological purity. There are concerns that what to date has been a very professional and disciplined party will lose some of that, and hence their public appeal. They argue that the party should stay pure and accept its position in the national polity—with roughly one-fifth of the vote. Other more impatient members want to grow quickly so they can implement change quickly.

The party that needs to focus most efforts on party building is the PPP, which was the only Islamist party to suffer losses between the 1999 and 2004 elections. Moreover, there was very little organizational support for the PPP’s own presidential candidate, former Vice President Hamzah Haz. While the PBB and the PKS have very charismatic leaders like Yusril Ihza Mahendra and Hidayat Nur Wahid, respectively, many in the PPP argue that it is time for their party to elect a new generation of leaders to motivate their core supporters and to prevent further splintering, as happened with the PBR which took 2.4 percent of the vote in 2004. There is intense dissatisfaction with the party elite by rank and file members. In their seminal work on political violence, a team of researchers discovered that a large percentage of political violence in certain regions in the 2004 legislative elections was caused by intra-party conflict over control of the party lists. This was particularly true with the PPP.

There is likely to be a flurry of alliance formation, as those parties that received less than 5 percent of the vote in 2004 election will be unable to compete in the 2009 contest. Thus the PBB will have to bridge some of its ideological schisms and political differences with either the PPP or the PKS, or form an alliance with a more mainstream party such as the PAN.

**Islamist tactics**

As has been discussed previously, Indonesia’s founding ideology, *Pancasila*, explicitly rejected the creation of an Islamic state, dropping demands, known as the Jakarta Charter, or Muslims to be obliged to follow *sharia*. In the fall of 2002, then Vice President Haz led a coalition of Islamist parties (including the PKS and PBB) to force a vote over a constitutional amendment to insert the Jakarta Charter: “with obligation to follow Islamic *sharia* law for its adherents,” arguing that “Muslims must be obliged by the *sharia*.” The vote was decidedly against the inclusion of the Jakarta Charter, with the amendment unable to gather even a third of the necessary support, but the vote itself was significant for the fact that it happened after debate had been stifled for 60 years.
But something more profound may have happened since then. The PKS’s shift away from a pro-Jakarta Charter position to an anti-corruption platform likely indicates a change in tactics rather than ideology. Instead of trying to fundamentally alter the nature of the Indonesian law with one single constitutional amendment, they appear to have adopted a gradualist approach to Islamicizing society. Since the failure of the Jakarta Charter vote, many key pieces of social legislation considered in parliament has had an Islamic component to it. For example, Islamists proposed amending the 1974 marriage law to make interfaith marriages and adoptions, already prohibited within the administrative procedures of the Ministry of Religion, carrying a penalty of up to 3 years imprisonment.79 In June 2003, the National Assembly passed a new education law that makes the teaching of religion compulsory in both public and private schools, while all schools must build Muslim prayer rooms.80 Thus schools will have to divert scarce resources to hire additional religious instructors and construct places for worship.81 Moreover, under legislation proposed by the PBB’s Yusril Izha Mahendra all Muslim students must be taught by Muslims, even if they are sent to a Christian school, or if they are in a Muslim minority region.82 A proposed new medical law gives all Muslims the right to be treated by a Muslim doctor and would bar doctors from treating people of a different religion.83 The draft pornography bill, sponsored by the PBB, calls for the establishment of a national anti-pornography agency to study activities considered to be erotic. The draft criminal code has also tried to criminalize homosexuality, sodomy, and other “immoral acts.”84 The draft “Law on Inter-Religious Toleration” requires people “to uphold the teachings and values of his respective religion” and forbid views “not aligned with the principal teaching of such religion.” Likewise, according to the draft, speech or writing “repugnant . . . to a religion” could bring a 5-year sentence. The Indonesian Criminal Code (KUHP) is very vague when it comes to religious interpretation. For example, article 156(a) imposes a jail term of up to 5 years for “disgracing” a religion, without defining what that entails.85 In an obvious affront to the nation’s Hindus and animists, any such speech or writing leading people not to follow “any religion that is based on the belief in one God” could likewise bring a 5-year sentence.86 Currently the DPR has drafted a new “morality law” that, among other things, bans kissing in public, makes cohabitation a crime punishable with a R30 million fine and up to 2 years of jail term and, more alarming, gives authorities the right to investigate.87

The same legislators who spoke out so forcefully against the defeated inclusion of the Jakarta Charter have shown no willingness to expend the political capital to challenge the Islamic components of these bills. Senior politicians such as Golkar’s Marzuki Darusman are worried that too much tolerance of the Islamists’ agenda is “dangerous.” He contends that their efforts, coupled with a “more Islamically inclined bureaucracy” that is more willing to implement the laws, will lead to significant shifts in legislation.88 As one Indonesian commentator wrote, “Failing to have the sharia re-inserted into the constitution, they may continue to
imburse legislation with the spirit of the *sharia*, if without once making mention of the ‘*sharia*’ itself.”

The Islamist parties will likely be able to exercise more influence over public policy with the appointment of the PKS leader Hidayat Nur Wahid as the speaker of the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People’s Consultative Assembly, or MPR)—the upper house of parliament. Nur Wahid, who rallied behind SBY and the Democratic Party in the 2004 election was offered a post in Yudhoyono’s cabinet, but turned it down, preferring the speaker’s position as an important platform. Though it is a less powerful position and the MPR is less important legislatively than the lower house, the DPR, can impeach the president and amend the constitution. Most importantly, it is a high profile legislative position for the country’s leading Islamist politician.

**Islands of Islam**

Whereas the Islamist parties tend to do fairly poorly in national elections, we must consider their positive performance in certain locations, such as West Java. The surprise success of the PKS in the Jakarta region during the April 2004 parliamentary election, where it won 22.9 percent of the vote, shows that Islamist parties do have regional strongholds. Islamists parties generally fared best in the urban areas, where they can better tailor their message of anti-corruption, anti-poverty, and social justice, as well as appeal to the idealism of the youth and the growing religiosity of students and the middle class. The PKS has laid claim to the “governorship of Jakarta and five mayoralties with a view to making these positions pilot projects that prove PKS effectiveness.” They also won in Aceh where the former governor was ousted for embezzling almost a half million dollars in state funds and in undergoing the country’s first major anti-corruption trial under SBY.

Since the 2004 elections, there are 30 districts that are implementing *sharia* to some degree. Local councils have already begun banning the sale of alcohol and forcing businesses to be closed during Ramadan through local edicts and administrative notices. The new Islamic codes are often enforced by vigilante gangs, but not always. Already some have seen a backlash: Greg Fealy, for example, notes that in parts of East Java there have been “*abangan revivals,*” and that some *sharia* restrictions have been eased.

This development must be seen in the context of a decentralization program that has given local governments unprecedented power to influence public policy. As Goenawan Mohammed, poet and founder of *Tempo* magazine, explained: “This is the first election following decentralization,” and the emphasis in Indonesian politics has shifted to the sub-provincial level, “the place where public policy can be made.” Islamist parties have already focused on implementing their social agenda through public policy, and now they will be able to do so in certain areas where they have a political plurality, or where they are building their grass-roots base.
There is some limited evidence available about how Islamists might govern. The regency of Temanggung, Central Java, stated that women’s dress was a “cornerstone of good governance.” Women who do not abide by injunctions and decrees concerning their dress are increasingly harassed, and some locations have already seen the emergence of “morals police.” In South Sulawesi, the local legislature was so impressed with Aceh’s Islamic legal code (allowed due to its special autonomy) that it passed its own Islamic criminal law; although they are on the books, the provincial legislature has no power to implement them. Banten likewise is following suit.

As they gain experience in government, some analysts believe that parties like the PKS will in time become more secular as they gain a vested interest in the secular state. Indeed, PKS members downplay their religiosity and focus on social welfare and social justice. As Hidayat Nur Wahid recently said, “We don’t talk about an Islamic state, we talk about an Islamic society, Islamic principles, civil society. The problem is too many people talk about sharia and they mean cutting hands and wearing (head) scarves. Our main program is how to make people better off, how to get justice.” PKS has identified the weak nature of the Indonesian state—the lack of provision of social goods and services—as the government’s key vulnerability that PKS seeks to exploit. It is not that they have forgotten or abandoned their Islamic agenda, they simply have identified areas that can be effectively exploited through good works. That is why the PKS, before the 2004 elections, was engaged in flood relief, or why after the December 2004 Tsunami, they immediately dispatched 1,000 cadres to Aceh to engage in relief work. In both cases, they were on the ground before government agencies were, and their relief efforts were not mired in corruption or their funds embezzled.

Yet there is considerable concern that the Islamist parties lack transparency regarding their ultimate goals. Part of the reason for this is the organizational nature of the PKS itself: it is a cadre-based party that is organized along secretive and highly disciplined cells. It is not known for transparency, but rather internal discipline. Some observers suspect that the PKS has not truly moderated its views, but played up its position on secular issues out of political expediency. As two election observers reported: “PKS was well organized, cleaned up after its election rallies, publicly turned down bribes, and deemphasized its support for sharia law. The big question in the future would be whether it would modify its Islamic agenda to rise above the seven percent it had won.” It is also possible that the PKS might move from its current centrist position to a more extreme posture; Islamists remain the party’s core constituency, and it is highly probable that the PKS will remain loyal to them. As mentioned above, there is an internal party debate regarding how mainstream to go in order to win votes, and whether this will lead to a breakdown in a party renowned for its unparalleled internal cohesion. Its 6,000 cadres are evaluated on a regular basis during Koranic recitations and party meetings. When asked whether PKS would implement sharia were he to become president in 2009 or 2014, Hidayat Nur Wahid replied that he would...
support the inclusion of the Medina Charter, which is meant to offer minorities living under Muslim rule greater protection. When asked by a Tempo magazine reporter whether he would work for Islamization in all sectors, Wahid evaded the question, simply stating that “Islam is a blessing for the whole world.” He did, however, pledge that in his new capacity as the speaker of the upper house of parliament he would not revive the debate over the Jakarta Charter. The PKS also has a very anti-leftist agenda that alarms both the political left and the secularists. There are a few other reasons why PKS deserves a closer look. In 1999, PKS published a white paper on the Malukus in which they accused the government of downplaying the deaths of Muslims and not doing enough to defend the interests of the Muslim community. While PKS did not join groups such as KISDI or KAMMI in sending members to the conflict zones, this white paper gave tacit support for the sectarian bloodletting. Second is the party’s unwillingness to deal with the issue of Islamic terrorism. While the party’s leaders always issue a pro-forma statement condemning acts of terrorism, it does not go much beyond that. More alarming, though, was the high profile visit he paid to the alleged spiritual head of Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, who was in prison on charges of supporting terrorism. Following the October 2005 bombings in Bali, Hidayat Nur Wahid attributed the bombings to competition in the tourism sector.

To date, the Islamists’ success has been based in urban areas, especially in cities with large numbers of universities. PKS leaders have stated that their over-reliance on youthful voters is a liability as “Indonesians do not really trust the young,” and that they must begin to broaden their appeal to middle-aged voters. PKS is interested in developing a program that will appeal to the rural electorate; fully aware of the santrization that is taking place and the religious conservatism of rural voters. The PKS is cognizant that they cannot grow and reach their aspirations without broadening their appeal in the countryside. At the same time, the PKS does not want to be a mass-based party comprised of members ignorant of Islam. Religious teaching and dakwah are likely to remain the basis of their recruitment.

Further complicating the political situation is the question of what role the military might play in the 2004–2009 period. The new military law passed on 30 September 2004 made some reforms, but did not remove the TNI’s political role altogether. Although it abolished the military’s 38 seats in the two houses of parliament, the new law allows active duty officers to serve in the civilian bureaucracy if the “position requires military skills” and, most importantly, leaves intact the territorial system that gives military leaders an active role in local politics. Moreover, Yudhoyono, who in his last military position headed the territorial command system, has promised to keep the system intact, thereby ensuring the dominant role for the military in provinces. Since September 2005, the TNI has pushed to re-implement the territorial command structure in support of counter-terror efforts. Of interest will be to see whether the TNI chooses to cooperate with the Islamist political parties or compete with them for influence with Yudhoyono’s government. As many officers are stepping down
to enter local politics, it will be critical in the next 5 years to watch who they decide to support.\textsuperscript{110}

As noted above, there was a close alliance between some senior leaders of the TNI and Islamic conservatives at the end of the New Order period. Of particular note was the relationship between Lieutenant General Prabowo Subianto (Suharto’s son-in-law) and the KISDI leader Ahmad Sumargono. Together they targeted and discredited moderate Muslims who were challenging the Suharto regime’s legitimacy. A military think tank, the Center for Policy and Development Studies (CPDS), became a key intellectual and tactical link between Islamic conservatives such as Sumargono and the emerging “green” faction of the TNI.\textsuperscript{111}

The TNI supported militia groups such as the Laskar Jihad in the late 1990s (discussed in detail in Chapter 4), when it was fighting Christian-led secessionists in Maluku. Whether a sin of omission or commission, the TNI assisted the Laskar Jihad’s efforts. It is not clear that it did so because it supported the Laskar Jihad’s Islamist agenda, or because it wanted to support efforts to hold the country together in the wake of East Timor’s independence.

There is much little evidence available on which to assess support for Islamic— and Islamist—political organizations within the TNI. In fact, since TNI chief General Endriarto Sutarto issued a ruling in early 2004 that banned all military personnel from voting in the three rounds of the 2004 elections, we do not know much about the political orientation of the majority of TNI members.\textsuperscript{112}

In neighboring Malaysia, there was evidence of considerable support within the rank and file of the military—though not the officer corps—for the opposition Parti Islam Se Malaysia (Islamic Party of Malaysia, or PAS) in the 1999 election, though it diminished in the 2004 election. Moreover, when several officers were discovered to be members of JI and Al Qaeda, the Malaysian military required all of their officers to take courses to lessen the influence of Islamic extremism.\textsuperscript{113}

While the TNI has always been the standard bearer of \textit{pancasila}, the “green” faction is thought to have adopted a more Islamist view of Indonesian nationalism. Today’s Islamist political parties also tend to be highly nationalistic and supportive of the TNI’s efforts to hold the country together, making an alliance between the two not unfeasible. Although the PKS has called on the military to stay out of politics, top officials Hidayat Nur Wahid and Zulkieflimansyah wrote: “We will work hand in hand with all Indonesians to prevent the country from breaking apart, and descending into chaos and insecurity. PKS also wants to be a pioneer in upholding Islamic values within a framework of national unity and integrity.”\textsuperscript{114} Again, there is a leitmotif in Indonesian politics since the 1965 coup that the Islamists often envision a closer political alliance with the military.

\textbf{Conclusion}

Under Suharto, Islam was unable to become an independent political force. Now, however, it is not only a viable political force, but is moving into Indonesia’s mainstream political life as it was in the pre-authoritarian era. Contrary to many
expectations, political Islam appears to be growing in popularity and influence. Islamist leaders have been able to effectively link Islam to nationalism, and they have focused on issues of anti-corruption and governance to broaden their appeal. Their stance on sharia and the inculcation of Islamic values in society varies from party to party, from explicit to tacit support.

In many ways, the 20 percent of parliament seats that the Islamist parties won in the 2004 election represents a steep decline from 1955, when they held 40 percent of the seats. When democracy emerged in 1998, a host of new parties emerged, many of them Islamic-oriented, and all had little in the way of nation-wide networks, organizations, or nationally recognized leaders. Despite these disadvantages, they have done surprisingly well. They have been able to appeal to the increasing religiosity of society, what Robert Hefner refers to as the “purification” of society. They have been able to capitalize on growing frustration with corruption, economic stagnation, and diminished expectations of Indonesia’s democratic transition. “Islam is the answer” has become a constant refrain. Islamism has a strong, coherent message, and its leaders are perceived to be more moral, less corrupt, and cognizant that political power is not an end in itself: “For Muslims, political activity is not to gain power but to serve the people. Power is not an end in itself.” Its leaders have held themselves to higher moral and ethical standards, while focusing on social welfare. Compared to the corruption, nepotism, political infighting, of secular politicians in the post-Suharto period, it is no wonder that they are gaining popularity. In the Weberian sense, they have been good political parties; their long-term commitment to democracy is less clear.

With its second democratic election since the fall of Suharto in May 1998, Indonesia has passed an important milestone in its process of democratization. Popular commitment to democratic principles appears to have taken root, and the cornerstones of democracy, such as free and fair elections, are becoming regularized. Nevertheless, many political institutions remain weak, or engaged in a zero-sum competition with rival institutions. Nonetheless, the Indonesian state remains relatively weak and unable to provide necessary social goods and services in a timely or efficient way. Corruption remains endemic while the economy has been fairly stagnant. The political weakness of established secular parties makes democratic transition susceptible to increasing Islamist influence.

What does this suggest for the next 5 years? First, we need to scrutinize laws and bills for Islamist content. It became common practice for the Islamist parties to include riders to push their social agenda. Specifically, we need to scrutinize their treatment of women, as the gender issue is one which divides Islamists and the secular-minded. Second, we need to carefully analyze their party building and efforts to broaden their appeal. Will they be able to develop a platform appealing to rural voters? Will they begin to broaden their base of support outside of urban youth? Can they appeal to older generations and farmers? Third, what relationship will they have to reactive and pro-active jihadists? Will they condone their violence? To what degree will leaders such as Wahid use their power to
intercede and break agreements when sectarian conflicts re-emerge? Will political leaders, such as Hidayat Nur Wahid continue to support Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, and make it more politically difficult for the government to crack down on JI and other violence-prone groups? Fourth, we need to study the changing relationship between the Islamist parties and the moderate Muslim groups such as NU and Muhammadiyah; will they remain committed to the pluralistic and secular nature of the Indonesian state? Or will they either begin to be co-opted by the Islamists or become more Islamist themselves, so as to preclude the hemorrhaging of their own supporters? Finally, we should listen to what they are saying about the West in general and the United States in particular. The war on terror remains a sensitive issue in Indonesia, and until the final run-off in September 2004, all presidential candidates were reticent about the war on terror and the degree to which they would cooperate with the United States and continue to crack down on Islamic militants.
Although Islamist political parties are likely to grow in power and influence, there is considerable debate about the significance of this trend. Some argue that as long as the Islamist parties remain committed to the secular, democratic state, there is no cause for concern. Others worry that this phenomenon will broaden the pool of support for people at the opposite end of the political spectrum: those committed to creating an Islamist state, but willing to use violence to achieve this goal. Beyond this debate, Islamist terrorism represents the most serious security threat in Indonesia today—a challenge to both Western interests in Southeast Asia and Indonesia’s democratic transition.

Indonesia has been the victim of four major terrorist attacks since 11 September 2001 that have killed more than 240 people: the bombing of two nightclubs popular with foreigners on the crowded tourist island of Bali (October 2002), the bombing of the J.W. Marriott hotel in Jakarta (August 2003), the bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta (September 2004), and the triple suicide bombings in Balinese restaurants (October 2005). In all, there have been seven suicide bombers—in a country where before 2000, it seemed inconceivable. The perpetrator of these attacks, JI, a loose affiliate of Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda organization, remains the single greatest security threat to Indonesia.

While Indonesian and international counter-terrorist operations have not been able to stop JI from mounting sophisticated attacks, the group nevertheless is now operating under increasing constraints as a result. More than 350 arrests have been made across Southeast Asia since September 2001, with some 200 arrests in Indonesia alone. Some observers, moreover, believe that JI has broken into two distinct factions, including one which opposes the current bombing campaign.\(^1\)

This chapter will explore JI’s origins, growth, and how the organization has survived during the war on terrorism. It will also assess how effective Indonesian counter-terrorist initiatives against JI have been, and what this means for Indonesia, ASEAN, and the West. JI’s establishment and perpetuation are very much the product of the overall political environment, and must be understood in the overall context of the situation of political Islam. JI’s appeal is in part derived from the growing Salafist ideology in society, which seeks to portray the Muslim community as weak and vulnerable to Western and secular assaults,
and the state as having abdicated its responsibility to defend the interests of the Muslim population.

The origins and current state of Jemaah Islamiyah

Jemaah Islamiyah is a terrorist organization whose stated goals are to turn Indonesia into an Islamic state and then to ultimately create a pan-Islamic state in Southeast Asia that would also include Malaysia, southern Thailand, Brunei, and the southern Philippines. It was founded in 1992 or 1993 by two Indonesian clerics Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir who lived in exile in Malaysia.2 The two were veterans of the DI movement and founders of the Al Mukmin Islamic school in Ngruki, Solo, in 1972. The two were frustrated with DI’s passivity and became members of Jamaah Mujahidin Anshorullah, the antecedent of JI. In 1978, the two radical clerics were detained under Suharto’s Anti-Subversion Law. While released on an appeal, the two fled to Malaysia, in 1984, where they became influential clerics amongst the large Indonesian population. They traveled throughout Southeast Asia and Australia, fund-raising and proselytizing. They established a sister school of Al Mukmin in Johor, Malaysia, the Tarbiyah Luqmanul Hakiem school, that served as JI’s base of operations for recruitment and indoctrination. They dispatched many students to the Middle East and South Asia for further training, many of whom joined the anti-Soviet Mujiheddin. Sungkar met with Osama bin Laden during that time and secured moral and material support for the establishment of the organization.

The organization itself was put together and administered by Riduan Isamuddin, better known as Hambali, an Indonesian who had fought with the Afghan Mujihidin against the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Hambali was a senior Al Qaeda operative, who served in the information and military councils of the terrorist organization. Following his return to Southeast Asia in the early 1990s, Hambali spent the remainder of the decade patiently building up a network of cells, establishing madrassas that would serve as centers of recruitment, training new members, and dispatching them to Al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan and later to MILF camps in the southern Philippines. JI was divided into four different mantiqis (geographical commands), each of which seemed to focus on a specific task or function. Mantiqi 1, based in Malaysia, provided much of its funding and senior leaders, while Mantiqi 2, based in Java, provided many of the organization’s recruits. Mantiqi 3, which included Sulawesi and the Philippines, was an important source of weapons and explosives as well as a key battleground. Mantiqi 4, which included Australia, was less of a focus for the organization.3 Beneath the Mantiqis were sub-regional divisions called Wakalah and beneath them fiah or individual cells.

Throughout this period, JI worked under the auspices of Al Qaeda, establishing front companies and bank accounts, forging documents, procuring weapons, and laundering money.4 But the 9/11 Commission report makes clear that Hambali kept JI operationally autonomous. In 1999, Hambali decided to get involved in
the jihad in Maluku (and later Central Sulawesi). 5 Two paramilitary organizations headed by key JI leaders, Laskar Mujahidin and Laskar Jundullah, received logistical support and financing from JI through funds diverted from Saudi charities, such as al Haramain, the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), and the Medical Emergency Relief Charity (MERC) to wage jihad. 6 At that time, Reda Seyam, an Egyptian-German national believed to be one of Al Qaeda’s chief propagandists, traveled to Ambon to collect footage from the Maluku conflict for Al Qaeda’s use to recruit and raise funds. 7

In addition to helping escalate the violence in Maluku and Sulawesi, JI operatives in the late 1990s had also assisted in the planning of several Al Qaeda terrorist plots against the United States, including the bombing of the USS Cole and the September 11 attacks. 8 In 2000, JI cells started planning and conducting their own terrorist actions, including attacks on churches in Medan in May, the August bombing of the residence of the Philippine ambassador to Indonesia, the Christmas Day church bombings across Indonesia, and the December 30 bombing in Manila. 9 At the time, investigators were unaware of JI’s existence and no connections were made between these attacks. Following the US invasion of Afghanistan and the assault on the Al Qaeda leadership in 2001–2002, Hambali was given money and ordered to execute a major attack in Southeast Asia, which resulted in the 12 October 2002 bomb attacks on two nightclubs in Bali, popular with Western tourists. 10 Al Qaeda was so pleased with the results of the attack that it transferred another $100,000 to Hambali for further attacks, the first of which was the 5 August 2003 attack on the J.W. Marriott hotel in Jakarta. 11 On 9 September 2004, JI operatives once again demonstrated their capacity to launch attacks by detonating a truck bomb outside of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta. On 1 October 2005, three young men detonated bombs in their backpacks in three separate restaurants and cafes in Bali killing 24.

Jemaah Islamiyah has the capacity and the resources, both human and material, to perpetrate one major attack per year. One of the ringleaders of the Australian Embassy bombing, Rois, following his arrest, admitted that Dr Azahari bin Hussin and Noordin Mohammad Top expressed a desire to increase the tempo of the bombings. The smaller bombs used in the Bali II attacks were indicative of this. They were smaller though no less lethal. Indeed, when Indonesian police finally raided Azahari’s safe house and killed him on 9 November 2005, they found 35 suicide vests in the final stages of completion, and it was the arrest of a courier transporting a suicide vest that led the police to Azahari. 12 The bombs were also more cost-effective than a large truck bomb. This may also indicate that the financial pipeline from Al Qaeda has dried up significantly, though State Intelligence Agency (BIN) chief Major General (ret.) Syamsir Siregar contends that at least $75,000 has been “channeled to the terror groups in the country in the past few years.” 13

Sidney Jones of the International Crisis Group (ICG) has argued that JI’s leadership is divided on whether or not these bomb attacks are productive. Jones believes that the perpetrators of these attacks were members of a Malaysia-based
faction of Jemaah Islamiyah led by Hambali and closely tied to Al Qaeda. This faction was led by Noordin Mohammad Mop Top and Dr Azahari bin Hussin, who according to the ICG were operating outside of JI’s central command and control structure and recruiting their own cells of suicide bombers, the Thoifah Muqatilah. A second Indonesian faction, she contends, sees those high profile attacks as symbolic but counter-productive in view of JI’s long-term goals. This faction, more heavily steeped in the DI tradition, advocates greater emphasis on building a national network of cadres in order to transform Indonesia into an Islamic state by the target year of 2025.

While Jones’ analysis is rich in detail, she might overstate the depth of the ideological differences between JI’s factions. Any organization will have differences of opinion over strategy, tactics, and timing. But in terms of factional divisions, whereby groups are operating in a zero-sum environment, to the disadvantage of one another, it is overstated. JI’s first problem is that they have no functioning amir or spiritual leader. When Sungkar died, he was replaced by Ba’asyir, whom many were angered was not militant enough. In 2000, he established an over civil society grouping, the Mujiheddin Congress of Indonesia, which worked within the democratic environment in pushing for an Islamic state. Ba’asyir is currently in prison and though he gets sermons out to his followers, he is not an effective amir. His replacement Abu Dujana was arrested soon after his appointment. So JI has had a weak leadership from the top since 1999, and especially since 2002.

Schisms are also likely the result of deteriorating communication among compartmentalized cells spread out across vast regions, especially as the JI leadership’s ability to command has been badly hurt by the regional crackdown on the organization’s activities. More than 350 JI members have been arrested throughout Southeast Asia, more than 200 of whom have been in Indonesia—roughly one-tenth of the estimated size of JI in Indonesia. Indeed, following the October 2005 Bali attacks, Indonesian police argued that the responsible cell is a “new group.” “A new generation means that they are not known by the old group.” Yet, this is not a new group, a distinct organization, with its own command system, hierarchy, and goals. JI is just a very horizontal and exception-ally compartmentalized organization. It has a very rigid cell structure that places paramount importance on operational security. Of course leaders do not know who cell members are. That is the point of a cellular-based organization; so that the police can never arrest more than a handful of other members. These cell members often form their own organizations (Kompak in Ambon, for example) that simply have a more local geographical range of operations and activities. But that does not mean that they are completely autonomous or that they are working at odds against JI’s goals. JI is just a very loose horizontal organization.

Moreover, the two strategies—targeting western interests and engaging in sectarian conflict—are not mutually exclusive, as the ICG contends, but rather mutually reinforcing. What is interesting is that on 2 May 2005, Indonesian police arrested three suspects, in a small village outside of Poso, Sulawesi, wanted in conjunction with the August 2003 bombing of the J.W. Marriott in Jakarta.
All three, as well as a fourth who escaped, were involved in not only the sectarian bloodletting in Ambon in 1999–2000, but also the 24 April attacks in Mamasa. Thus we have a clear connection between the same people engaged in both “international jihad” and sectarian conflict. They are simply different tactics employed at different times. JI has demonstrated an ability to learn and react to changing security environments. Sectarian violence attracts less attention from the security forces—especially from the United States and Australia.

Explaining Jemaah Islamiyah’s resiliency

In late September 2005, the former foreign minister of Australia, and current president of the highly respected International Crisis Group, Gareth Evans, gave a speech in Australia in which he stated: “the JI regional division that covered Australia has been effectively smashed, and that JI as such no longer constitutes the serious threat to Australia and Australian interests that it previously did.”

Only a few days later 24 people were killed in triple bombings in Bali. The cell that was responsible for the attacks was in the final stages of preparing for some 35 suicide bombings.

Jemaah Islamiyah has proven to be a remarkably resilient organization. Despite the large number of arrests of its leaders and cadres throughout the region, JI has shown itself capable of perpetrating at least one large-scale terrorist attack in Indonesia per year. This suggests that the organization has been able to replenish its ranks to some degree. There are several reasons why this might be, but the most important are the appeal of its particular Salafist ideology to radical Islamists and the disenfranchised, the structural dynamics of the organization, family and kinship ties binding its cadres to one another, and its ability to learn from its mistakes and evolve after setbacks.

The appeal of Jemaah Islamiyah’s religious ideology

In the fall of 2003, Pakistani officials arrested a 19-member cell of JI members, known as Al Ghuraba, who were studying in a madrassa run by a South Asian militant group Lashkar-e-Toiba. Of the 19 members, 11 are currently in jail in their home countries (Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia) and two have been released from Malaysian custody. Thirteen of the nineteen members were the children or siblings of senior JI members, including Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s son and Hambali’s brother. This group was to be the core of the next generation of JJ’s leadership and was sent to Pakistan for advanced religious training. Although there is evidence that Hambali called on them to provide operational assistance to JI and Al Qaeda, they were primarily a religious study group. One of the Al Ghuraba members, Ba’asyir’s son, Abdul Rahim, stated that the group was formed “purely for religious study and discussion. [Other] senior Jemaah Islamiyah members ‘saw the urgency of regeneration in the movement’ and sent their sons and their students to Pakistan to study to become ulamas.”
It is interesting to note that JI has used religious study as a necessary element in training a new generation of leaders. The *Pedoman Umam Perjungan Al-Jemaah Al-Islamiyah* (the General Guidebook for the Struggle of Jemaah Islamiyah, or PUPJI) outlines much of JI’s philosophy, structure, and modus operandi. Written by two of the organization’s most militant clerics, Ali Ghufron (Mukhlas) and Abu Rusdan, the PUPJI is a far more overtly religious document than the known Al Qaeda training manuals.\(^22\) It is not necessarily a practical guide on conducting terrorist operations, but a document steeped in Islamic principles and teachings.\(^23\) It makes clear that the cornerstone of JI’s ideology is, first and foremost, the understanding and practice of a fundamentalist form of Islam, containing almost nothing about violent jihad.\(^24\)

The writings and statements of jailed JI members—including the three volumes written by Mukhlas while in jail—also display a good deal of religious training. Indeed, an American expert on Indonesian Islam, Mark Woodward, who has reviewed the manuscripts in detail, found Mukhlas’ writings to be “surprisingly sophisticated” and displayed a nuanced understanding of the Koran.\(^25\) Moreover, the writings put the movement ideologically in the historical trajectory linking DI to Al Qaeda. The most respected people within JI, as in Al Qaeda, are not the Afghan *mujahidin* or operatives with “street credibility,” but highly esteemed religious leaders. It is likely that JI leaders must be able to defend the religious precepts underlying their justification for violence, in order to convince recruits to subordinate their own judgment to that of a charismatic and omnipotent leadership, as generally occurs within terrorist organizations.\(^26\)

What JI offers recruits is a volatile mix of religion and political radicalism bound by an urgent sense that Islam is under attack by the West and its surrogates. Much of the basis for this comes from radical intellectuals like the Egyptian Sayyd Qutb and Palestinian Abdullah Azzam. Qutb saw the world as a stark choice between Islam and *jahiliyya* (in Islam, the dark period before Muhammed), between rule by Allah’s divine law and rule by corrupt human beings.\(^27\) Azzam, a leader of the “Afghan-Arabs” in the fight against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, saw global jihad as necessary to the defense of Islam: “Thus duty shall not lapse with victory in Afghanistan, and the jihad will remain an individual obligation until all other lands which were formally Muslim come back to us and Islam reigns within them once again. Before us lie Palestine, Bukhara, Lebanon, Chad, Eritrea, Somalia, the Philippines, Burma, South Yemen, Tashkent, and Andalusia.”\(^28\)

Detained JI suspects speak of a similar veneration of jihad and a desire to become martyrs for the cause of Islam. Detained JI suspects speak of the glorification of jihad and their unwavering religious faith. “Every time there’s a meeting, we always try to keep reminding each other: to uphold Allah’s will and glory.”\(^29\) Religious violence, in this context, can be seen as an act of absolution, a cleansing of sins. This is significant because many JI members were criminals before their involvement with the organization.\(^30\) Like *Fi’ā* (committing a crime in the name of Islam), JI members justify violence through their desire to achieve “purity.”
JEMAHAH ISLAMIYAH AND ISLAMIST TERRORISM

Martyrdom represents another possible form of absolution. Imam Samudra, the Bali bomber, for example, told a journalist: “Be certain that I am on the road of istiqomah [the state of being straight and steadfast], the road of jihad. Even if I die, I’ll die a martyr.” Members believe in the righteousness of their cause, and—as Samudra argued—are convinced that others will take their place:

What we’ve done is not the first. People out there have done it way before us. Take for example the ones in the Middle East. We can also see the ones in Darhan, the first World Trade Center in 1993. Yosef Ramzi. Then, there’s the second World Trade Center in 2001. In Darhan in 2002, also in Alqobar, in Yemen, it’s the same operation. Just different places. Different places. The motives are the same. The basic law is the same.32

And the driving force is to avenge the deaths of fellow Muslims. “It’s mandatory for Moslems to defend oppressed fellow Moslems. It’s a duty. Perhaps it’s more concretely explained in jihad laws. So in the context of the Bali Bombing it is a defense for Moslems,” explained Imam Samudra. In his works, Mukhlas theoretically broadened the concept of a “defensive jihad.”

It is obvious that JI—as much or more than other Islamist terrorist organizations—bases its membership on religious conviction. Discussing the Bali bombing, Mukhlas said that the “jihad concept won’t be understood if you start from a secular point of view... because jihad is part of an Islamic system, jihad is exquisite.” Samudra concurred, justifying jihad by faith alone: “Our acts are based on conviction. Not anything relating to matters of the stomach, nor below the stomach, let alone for economic matters. None. It is purely for our beliefs.”

Few have shown any remorse or recanted. The exceptions have been Ali Imron, one of the Bali bombers, and Nasir bin Abbas, who now work with the Indonesian police to re-educate captured members. But these individuals have been the rare exceptions. “When we talked about the [Australian Embassy] bombing afterwards,” said Said Abdul Hassan during his trial, “we never felt any remorse.” Considering that all 10 people who died in this were Indonesians, not westerners, JI has a broad concept of acceptable collateral damage: they died because of “Allah’s will.”

Like Al Qaeda, JI sees the United States as the embodiment of jahiliyya, despised for both its policies and its decadence. During his interrogation, Samudra declared: “I hate America because it is the real center of international terrorism, which has already repeatedly tyrannized Islam.” He claimed to have carried out jihad because “it is the duty of a Muslim to avenge, so [that] the American terrorists and their allies understand that the blood of the Muslim community is not shed for nothing.” In his 13 justifications for the Bali bombing, seven directly mention the United States, while several others mention Christians and the West in general. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir made clear that “this fight” against America
is “compulsory,” and that “Muslims who don’t hate America sin . . . There is no imam [belief] if one doesn’t hate America.”

I call those who carried out these actions all mujahid. They all had a good intention, that is, Jihad in Allah’s way, the aim of the jihad is to look for blessing from Allah. They are right that America is the proper target because America fights Islam. So in terms of their objectives, they are right, and the target of their attacks was right also.

There is some fear that JI may be able to tap into record levels of anti-American sentiment in Indonesia (owing to the US-led war on terrorism, the invasion of Iraq, support for Israel and its lack of support for the Palestinians, anger over US and Australian support for an independent East Timor, and a visa policy that most Indonesians consider to be racist). Further, many Indonesians continue to suspect that the United States supported regional rebellions, Suharto’s 1965–1966 coup and the subsequent mass murder of real and suspected PKI members.

Across the political spectrum, therefore, various groups feel aggrieved toward the United States and mistrust its intentions, although it is unlikely that most would support the actions of JI. Among some Islamists, however, there is a deep-rooted suspicion that the bombings were actually perpetrated by Western intelligence services in order to force the Indonesian government, which hitherto had been a reluctant partner, into the war on terrorism. Such reluctance among Islamists to accept that JI was responsible for the bombings—in the face of overwhelming evidence—represents an indirect show of support for the organization, one which gives JI a certain level of political cover and inhibits the government’s ability to attack it effectively.

**Jemaah Islamiyah’s structural dynamics**

JI’s organizational structure has suffered since the war on terror against it began. Though it remains backed by strict discipline, the hierarchy that was employed in the 1990s and outlined in the PUPJI, with a regional *mantiqi* structure comprised of sub-regional groups, or *wakalah*, has given way to a more amorphous cell structure. The *mantiqi*-level leadership has been decimated and no longer exists. While new *wakalah* leaders have been tapped, the lack of an *amir* and a *shura* that can meet on a regular basis, has left in place a very horizontal network of autonomous cells.

The PUPJI, which is based on the doctrines of the Egyptian Ga’ma’at Islamiyah, outlines JI’s authority structure, organization, goals, and rights and duties of its members. It calls on members to adopt Salafi practices, pure Islam devoid of corruption, innovation, or deviation. The PUPJI is divided into four main sections: Preamble, the *General Manual for Operations*, the *Nidhom Asasi*, which outlines the organization’s hierarchy, rules, and procedures, and a section on explanations and clarifications. Chapter III of the *Nidhom Asasi* states that the
organization is led by an elected amir (chieftain with both religious and political authority) and assisted by a majelis (council) that he can appoint and dismiss. The most important function of the amir is the spiritual education of the members. Chapter IV (9) outlines how an amir can be replaced. Chapter V outlines the selection and responsibilities of the councils that advise the amir. Chapter VI identifies the shura, the leadership council. Chapter X identifies the criteria for membership, and the responsibilities and rights of those who are eligible. Membership criteria include piousness, understanding of Islam, comprehension of the teachings of Allah, and bayat (a pledge of loyalty to the amir). Responsibilities include living a life solely according to Islamic principles, obeying the PUPJI, obeying the amir and shura, defending and protecting the amir and brothers, and to not perform any act that endangers the jemaah (community of believers). Rights include social welfare, to participate in discussion and debate, to be elected and appointed to new positions, and to be protected by the jemaah.

Yet, in reality, this formal structure was never rigidly applied below the mantiqi level, contributing in part to JI’s resiliency. This was for two primary reasons. First, the structure outlined in the PUPJI can be seen as more as a proto-constitution of the Islamic state that JI hopes to create, rather than the regulations for daily operations. Second, many of the leaders who established the PUPJI were arrested. The formal structure could not quickly adapt to the arrests. While cells remained in place, it became either less necessary or too dangerous to tap supra-cell leaders.

At the cell level, things were quite different. In his interrogation, Samudra tried to explain: “In Islam, as we perform our alms, there is no terminology for superiors or subordinates. . . . no, there’s no structure to it [JI]. No structure. I know there are attempts to describe our organization as a structured one. I understand that. The truth is, there is no structure.”45 When asked how the organization functions without a structure, Samudra responded: “Of course it works, why wouldn’t it? Allah wills it to work that way, so it works. In fact, such organizations are better, the ones like that, not rigid, very flexible. That’s the truth. We have meetings, talked a bit, and there is a plan.”46

On top of a loose cell structure is a commitment to internal security. The PUPJI instructs members that JI is a clandestine organization (tanzim sir), and does not allow for public discussion or dissemination. Moreover, JI is highly compartmentalized and they have learnt from past security lapses that led to arrests. As Imam Samudra explained:

I have ethics, in this movement we never ask this, or that. None. We just know the names, That’s it. [You] do not want to ask about wife, children, do not want to ask anything different. We have and maintain such ethics. Because we are conscious that our movement is, indeed, an underground movement. So be it. The more you know about a problem, the heavier the risk is. That’s how it is.47
The loose network and authority structure beneath the mantiqi level, coupled with a very disciplined cell structure, have made both penetrating JI and tracking down other members named by detainees very difficult.

The importance of family and kinship networks

Although estimates of JI’s size vary from several hundred to several thousand, it is not a large organization. Mantiqi II, in its prime, was thought to have 2,000 members with roughly the same number as part of its “support base.” But if we think of the hardcore militants, there are probably only several hundreds. By their very definition, terrorist organizations are elite, rather than mass-based. For their survival, such groups have to be highly selective about who they take into their ranks. Adherence to Salafi principles and commitment to JI’s cause have been the key factors. Beyond that, JI has solved this problem by carefully binding its members together through kinship, in some cases recruiting whole families. For example, Mukhlas is the older brother of Ali Imron and Amrozi Nurhasyim, two other accomplices of the Bali bombers. Amrozi’s wife is related to Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, a senior JI operative in the Philippines. His younger brother, Muhajir, was also a JI instructor at Camp Hudaibiyah in Mindanao. JI is strongest in traditional DI communities where there is a history—often the family’s own history—of radicalization. Exposure to Salafi ideals within the family is one of the most important indicators of membership.

Where familial networks do not exist, JI has promoted marriage among members’ families, creating kinship bonds that reduce the likelihood of infiltration. Malaysian intelligence concluded that more than 100 marriages “involving families of key JI leaders” comprise the core of the organization’s membership. Indonesian investigators think that JI’s kinship network is even larger: “[That] figure is just the tip of the iceberg. We believe the number of marriages involved is certainly much higher judging from the information we have continued to gather.” These marriages were arranged to forge bonds between Malaysian and Indonesian JI members during the 1980s and 1990s, when many of JI’s members were in Malaysia seeking refuge from the Suharto regime.

Captured JI leader Mohamed Nasir bin Abbas has argued that this was a coincidence rather than an over-arching plan. He denied there was a rule that JI members could only marry into JI families, or that there was a marriage of convenience program: “I am not aware of such a plan and I myself am not married to the daughter of any JI member.” However, his own family tree shows deep kinship connections within JI. Nasir acknowledged that his father, Abbas Yusof, was a JI sympathizer, and became a student of Abdullah Sungkar while serving as a cook at the Luqmanul Hakiem school. One of Nasir’s eight siblings, Hashim, was also involved in the bombings in Pekan Baru and Batam with Imam Samudra. One of his sisters, Faridah, is married to Mukhlas. She was a teacher at the Luqmanul Hakiem school where Mukhlas was the master.
Nurhayati, married Shamsul Bahri Hussein, another JI member under arrest. Another sister, Aliza, took over a JI front company, Gulf Shores SDN BHD, when its owners—Abdul Nasir Bin Anwarul and Amran Bin Mansour, both JI members—were arrested. Malaysian JI leader Noordin Mohammad Top is married to Rahmah Rusdi a sister of another JI suspect, Rais. The younger sister of Dul Matin, JI’s most prolific bomber, is married to the sister of JI member, Hery Kuncoro.

The extent to which the spouses were full-fledged JI members is unclear. Women are active in JI, though not in operations or leadership. Women are involved in fund-raising, accounting, providing shelter to JI members, and teaching and propaganda at JI-run madrassas. Noralwizah Lee Abdullah, Hambali’s wife, also studied at the Lukmanul Hakiem school. As one Indonesian intelligence official was quoted as saying, “Noralwizah is suspected to have held the purse strings of JI and had organized activities for JI women members.” Her sister, Norfadilah Lee Abdullah, also married into the JI leadership: she married Dadang (aka Abu Yusuf), who is now believed to be a senior leader of the JI central command, and the head of the Selangor and Kuala Lumpur JI cells. Mira Augustina, the daughter of a top JI and Laskar Mujiheddin member, Fadillah Harris, was quickly married off to Omar al-Farouq, the top Al Qaeda leader in Southeast Asia in the late 1990s.

In addition to financial and kinship ties, mosques play an important role in JI. While there are no specific, central mosques that have been epicenters of JI recruitment, JI “talent scouts” look for pious Muslims of a certain age who come to pray five times a day, every day. They are invited to private “study sessions,” in which they are slowly indoctrinated. Religiosity is the paramount trait that the JI leaders look for in their recruits. For example, Ali Imron spoke of the Al Fatah Mosque in Maluku as a center for indoctrination and recruitment. We know JI has established several madrassas in order to recruit and educate new members. Several of these have now been shut down, though none in Indonesia. However, Indonesian intelligence and police officials are studying the entire network of graduates of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s Al Mukmin (aka Ngruki) pesantren (Muslim boarding schools). In all there is a network of some 60–100 pesantren that Indonesian security forces believe are used for JI recruitment, most of which are run or staffed by Ngruki alums. When Indonesian investigators raided a JI safe house in Solo in late 2002, they found a list of 141 Islamic schools in Java that detailed which would be the most susceptible or could be primed for recruitment. The degree to which JI actively tried to penetrate these schools is unclear.

As Kumar Ramakrishna has written, one has to understand the intensity of the contact between the pupils and the masters within these schools. These are closed worlds, in which there is strict discipline and no questioning of the interpretations of the teachers. The masters are able to completely mold the youths. Ramakrishna argues that this is a process of slow conditioning over a long period of time “driven by cold passion” that creates intense in-group solidarity.
Finally, friendship seems to be the final variable in recruitment, especially into the two paramilitary organizations linked to JI: Laskar Mujahidin and Laskar Jundullah. Membership in those organizations—and participation in jihad in Maluku and Sulawesi—was not the same as membership in JI, but it was an important recruitment pool that JI drew from. In general, there seems to be a greater desire to conform with the “in group,” a common phenomenon in terrorist organizations, where small group dynamics stress the importance of conformity and consensus that tends to result in groupthink, and a socialization process that forges a strong sense of belonging.\(^\text{59}\)

What has taken most investigators by surprise is the degree to which the JI network has been built upon the DI network of their fathers. Though it is not the same organization, it is comprised of many of the same families. Darul Islam was thought to have been destroyed or so splintered, yet it has emerged in a slightly different, and arguably more lethal form.

**Tapping into new networks**

JI has been able to effectively tap into new networks, which has given it substantial strength. This runs counter to the analysis of the ICG, which contends that as JI had been seriously weakened, it had to tap into new networks for manpower. For example, in the ICG analysis of the Marriott bombing, it was concluded that as the bombers themselves were members of Darul Islam and not JI, it confirmed that JI was a weakened organization with a diminished pool of recruits. That they had to tap into another organization’s networks proved that JI did not have the human or the material resources to carry out the attack on their own.\(^\text{60}\)

Yet a new study by Ami Pedhazur of the University of Texas who analyzed the social networks of Palestinian suicide bombers found a common behavior. He found that the suicide bombers in Al Aqsa, or Hamas, or Palestinian Islamic Jihad rarely, if ever, came from within the organization in whose name the operation was carried out; and this is within Palestinian organizations that are vertical, rather than horizontal organizations like JI. His conclusions were that tapping into the social networks of other organizations for operations, strengthened the terrorist organization: it provided them operational security, complicated the after-operation investigation, did not deplete ranks within the organization, and sapped the resources of competing organizations. This is an intentional strategy done primarily for organizational and operational security.\(^\text{61}\)

In a subsequent report on the resurgence in sectarian violence in the Malukus and Poso, beginning in 2005, the ICG concludes that the likely suspects of attacks were very new and were carried out by locally based groups, such as Mujihahidin Kayamanya, Bulan Sabit Merah, Anak Tanah Runtuh, and KOMPAK in Ambon.\(^\text{62}\) The ICG linked these groups either through dual membership or kinship to Darul Islam offshoots or former JI component organizations. In early 2006, Malaysian authorities arrested a 12-man DI cell who were providing logistical
support for JI. Outsiders have been able to manipulate or simply rely on these organizations to foment violence. What is clear is that JI spawns new organizations and groups based on geographical and functional purposes at an appalling rate. JI members are encouraged to form their own organization—some overt and others covert—to further the cause of jihad. Some of these organizations are more engaged in social services: Abu Jibril’s Laskar Mujiheddin or Abdul Rahim’s Camp Taochi Foundation, or Kompak in Ambon—an outgrowth of the DDII charity Kompak. That cell members form their own organizations that simply have a local geographical range of operations and activities does not mean that they are completely autonomous or that they are working at odds against JI’s goals. This is just a very loose horizontal organization and all are committed to the same goals. JI will always be able to tap into these new cells and organizations that are engaged in the ideological indoctrination.

How Jemaah Islamiyah learns from its actions/mistakes

In the PUPJI, a section details the four-stages of operations: (1) planning, (2) execution, (3) reporting, and (4) evaluation. Emphasis is placed on education, meticulous planning, and learning from past acts (including mistakes). For example, over the years JI has evolved by adopting the tactics of other transnational terrorist organizations, particularly in the use of suicide bombers. To date, there have been seven known suicide bombers in Indonesia. Interrogations in Malaysia revealed that Hambali had recruited some six individuals for martyrdom missions. On 30 June 2004, Indonesian police arrested six members of a suicide squad who, according to Ansyad Mbai, were “awaiting orders from their bosses, Azahari bin Husin and Noordin Mohammed Top.” Indonesian police officials intercepted a letter dated 24 November 2004 written in poor Arabic that informed the intended recipient that a 12-man suicide cell was ready in Palimbang, Riau, and that they had stockpiled the necessary materials. Azahari and Noordin established a new cell Thoifah Muqatilah, while Zulkarnaen is believed to have his own suicide cell, the Laskar Khos. As mentioned above, at the time of his death, Dr Azahari had prepared some 35 suicide vests and, in all actuality, he probably had that many willing martyrs. A former member of Darul Islam, which in many ways was a precursor to JI, stated, “Suicide bombings are a new development in Jemaah Islamiyah activities. When I was in the movement, we never had the concept. But what we did have is the understanding that we will face death in our struggle.” Compare that to the glorification of martyrdom spoken by Imam Samudra: “Be certain that I am on the road of istiqomah, the road of jihad. Even if I die, I’ll die a martyr.” What is so alarming is the nonchalance that JI members attribute to suicide bombing. When asked how he could convince Iqbal to become a suicide bomber, Imam Samudra described the “recruitment” process as a natural act, without any long Koranic indoctrination. It is notable in its banality. Iqbal and Samudra
were introduced by “our initiator”: “We met in Solo, exchanged stories. Chatted. There was no indoctrination. We were on the same path, similar purpose. So we proceed. The only precondition is that we account for our action in the afterlife. That’s how it was.” Mukhlas has commented on the ease of recruitment.

Why does the advent of suicide bombing matter? Suicide bombing is not simply another tool in the tool box. It is not a means to an end; instead, it becomes an end in its own right. As David Brooks succinctly writes:

Suicide bombing is the crack cocaine of warfare. It doesn’t just inflict death and terror on its victims; it intoxicates the people who sponsor it. It unleashes the deepest and most addictive human passions—the thirst for vengeance, the desire for religious purity, the longing for earthly glory and eternal salvation. Suicide bombing isn’t just a tactic in a larger war; it overwhelms the political goals it is meant to serve. It creates its own logic and transforms the culture of those who employ it.

Jemaah Islamiyah has demonstrated learning in a number of other ways. JI members may also have altered the way in which they build their bombs to reflect changing circumstances. The bomb used in the 2003 J.W. Marriott hotel attack was encased with lye and gasoline in order to create a massive fireball, while the one used in the 2004 Australian Embassy bombing did not. It is possible that JI hoped to lessen the number of bystanders killed and thus limit any possible outcry. Both the choice of target and the timing of the Australian Embassy bombing could also indicate that JI hoped to copy the Madrid train bombings in March 2003, which had the eventual effect—whether directly or indirectly—of influencing the subsequent Spanish elections that led a new government to pull Spanish soldiers out of Iraq. The timing of the attack on the embassy suggests that it might have been intended to influence the final round of the Indonesian presidential elections and/or the Australian parliamentary elections. A statement posted on the Internet soon after the bombing—purportedly by JI—stated that the goal was to drive Australia out of Iraq. In language reminiscent of the Madrid bombings, the statement read:

We decided to make Australia pay in Jakarta today when one of the mujahedeen brothers carried out a martyrdom operation at the Australian embassy. We advise all Australians to get out of Indonesia, or we will make it a grave for them… and the Australian government to get out of Iraq—and if it doesn’t, we will direct a number of painful blows.

The attacks at the time of writing, the triple suicide bombings in Bali, again demonstrate learning. While of a smaller scale indicate both diminished resources and a desire to increase the tempo of the bombings, they also suggest that the bombers were learning and adapting to changing security environments. Security officials were on the lookout for large purchases of truck bomb materials: ammonium nitrate, potassium chlorate, and aluminum, all not small amounts of
high explosives. While the bombs were smaller, they were no less lethal—indeed as many people were killed than in the previous two truck bombs in Jakarta.

JI has also tried to use the Internet to teach members and supporters. In the fall of 2005, a suspect in the Bali attacks, Abdul Aziz, was approached by JI members to design a website that included instruction material on how to launch a hand grenade and conduct drive-by shootings against foreigners. The website www.anshar.net, by Anshar el Muslimin, was shut down, but indicates directions JI is moving in.

We have seen demonstrated learning by JI in other ways, in particular learning from other organizations. Three JI leaders traveled to Chechnya where they not only forged links to the Chechen militants, but also studied bomb-making and tactics. At the time of writing, Indonesian TV broadcasted video footage of a masked man—believed to be one of JI’s top leaders, Noordin Mohammad Top—who explicitly threatened the West: “As long as you keep your troops in Iraq and Afghanistan and intimidate Muslim people, you will feel our intimidation and our terror . . . America, Australia, England and Italy. You will be the target of our next attack.” While this type of video statement/threat is commonplace in the Middle East and South Asia, it has never been used in Southeast Asia. The video also included “martyr’s statements” by one of the Bali bombers. Again, this is not unusual in the Middle East, but almost unprecedented in Southeast Asia. The statement is further evidence that JI is trying to develop a cult of martyrdom.

“My brother and wife, God willing, when you see this recording I’ll already be in heaven.” The other two suicide bombers in the Bali attacks were also shown in the video, and appear alarmingly nonchalant.

**Whither Jemaah Islamiyah?**

Following the Australian Embassy bombing, press reports suggested that the intelligence community believed a second cell of suicide bombers was poised to attack again. JI’s track record suggested that this was unlikely. Following the January 2002 Bangkok meeting, at which Hambali gave the order to target venues in which Westerners would be the primary victims, it took 9 months to plan and execute the Bali bombing, and an additional 10 months to carry out the bombing of the J.W. Marriott. The embassy attack came slightly more than a year later, and the Bali II attacks a year after that. Although there was a good deal of fear that JI was planning to unleash a wave of attacks in Jakarta in December 2003, these did not materialize. Likewise, one of the Australian Embassy bombing cell leaders, Rois, admitted to police investigators that Dr Azahari was trying to increase the tempo of bombings to every 6 months. Again, JI proved not to have the resources to accomplish this, but Jakarta was on heightened alert from April to June 2005. When Azahari was killed in November 2005, 35 suicide suits were found in his safehouse—giving further credence to this shift. What this suggests is that there is something of a natural timetable for attacks: time allotted to procure chemicals, explosives, and equipment; find and indoctrinate
willing recruits; and reconnoiter suitable targets. It is not clear whether the death of Dr Azahari Husin, the Malaysian JI leader accused of planning and executing the embassy attack, who was killed in East Java in November 2005, will disrupt this timetable.

Jemaah Islamiyah takes a long term, strategic view of its operations. Hambali has revealed that there was a debate within the organization about whether to continue the pace of attacks or concentrate on rebuilding in the wake of the post-Bali arrests. The PUPJI, after all, provides a 30-year time-frame for jihad and outlines a schema for guerrilla war: “View, analyze and explore all aspects of life in the enemy’s body and in the environment . . . View carefully and honestly all our potential strengths and effective powers we posses . . . Determine points of target and the environment to be handled in relation with our goals.” At the rate that cells have been uncovered, JI will most likely carry out only one or two bombings in the short term. Intelligence officials have also concurred that the arrest of some ten individuals—including Zulkarnaen, Noordin Mohamed Top, Abu Dujana, Umar Patek, Ali Fauzi and Dulmatin—would cripple the Hambali faction linked to Al Qaeda.

Jemaah Islamiyah has already suffered a number of serious blows through the arrests of its operatives. Each arrest has led to subsequent arrests, making a rebuilding program critical to JI’s continued existence. JI will likely attempt to re-ignite sectarian conflicts in Indonesia’s outlying provinces, engage in a campaign of religious purification against what it perceives as improper practices, and solidify transnational ties with terrorist and other sympathetic organizations in an attempt to reinvigorate itself.

**Sectarian violence**

Since early 2004, there has been an upsurge in communal violence in the troubled cities of Poso and Ambon. This harkens back to the period before September 11 and the Bali bombings, when JI was preoccupied with these regional conflicts and not terrorism. These communal conflicts provided JI with a way to indoctrinate a group of people, to give them a taste of jihad, and the experience of defending their religion through armed struggle. It created a sense of identity and a pool of willing recruits. It has also allowed them to forge a common cause with overt Islamist organizations in society, groups such as Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (DDII), the Ulamas’ Council of Indonesia (MUI), Mujahidin Council of Indonesia (MMI), and other organizations that have endorsed the sectarian conflicts and encouraged militants to defend Muslim interests and defeat Christian secessionist aspirations.

JI likely wants to stir up sectarian conflict in order to motivate radical Muslims to once again take up arms and defend their religion. Sidney Jones argues that sectarian conflict will probably be the focus of JI in the coming years. It remains to be seen whether the Indonesian government is going to take the threat of sectarian violence seriously. Although it finally did intervene and broke the
two Malino peace declarations to end the earlier bouts of sectarian violence, the government and military presence in Maluku and Sulawesi has not proven strong enough to stop murders, bombings, and intimidation, while few refugees have returned to their pre-conflict homes. Despite the fact that there are 3,000 troops in Poso alone, there has been no resolution to the conflict and attacks have continued unabated. Indeed several of the attacks have become even more appalling, such as the triple beheadings of three schoolgirls in November 2005. One thousand additional security forces were dispatched to the region following the beheadings. Tension in Maluku and Sulawesi remains high, and it would probably take little for a new, large-scale conflict to begin. “The terror motive in Palu is apparent. They want people to feel insecure,” said Brig. Gen. Oegroseno, the police chief in Central Sulawesi province. The government’s will to intervene has repeatedly been called into question, and it remains to be seen whether politicians will be willing to provoke a backlash from Islamists by appearing to take the side of Christians in the remote provinces.

The attacks have become more sophisticated and bloody, and they have often at times been very sophisticated in their targeting, for example the assassinations of witnesses in criminal trials against Islamic militants, or events to terrify a community—such as the beheadings of three schoolgirls. There has also been a range of violence employed: from assassinations to more sophisticated bombings.

In October 2004, 123 improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were discovered in a cache hidden in a cemetery in Moengko village outside of Poso. Later that month, 15 IEDs were put in a Christian church in Ambon. In November 2004, a bomb killed 16. In December 2004, a church was bombed and shot at in Palu, Central Sulawesi. In February 2005, two people were killed when gunmen in motorboats attacked a beachside café in Ambon. That same month, two more people were injured when their boat was attacked by militants in motorboats. On 28 March 2005, police raided safehouses used by Islamic militants in Ambon, seizing a cache of some 95 IEDs and ammunition. That month, there were two separate hand grenade attacks in Ambon. On 24 April, another sectarian conflict flared in Mamasa, West Sulawesi. A gang of Muslim “Kommandos” torched houses in a Christian community, killing six. The arrest of one was followed by two bombings in April at Poso, including one several meters from the police chief’s house. Mamasa has been plagued by sectarian violence since the government divided the regency of Polewali Mamasa into two, leaving three Muslim districts within the majority Christian regency of Mamasa. On 16 May 2005, six to eight militants raided a Brimob (mobile police brigade—a paramilitary arm of the police) post on Seram Island in the Malukus, killing five police and three civilians. The attackers arrived in speedboats and killed the police with shots to the head, indicating sufficient training. The Maluku police chief asserted, “I have long states that the incidents were the work of well-trained people and I was right. They are civilians with extraordinary capabilities. But they also use local people in carrying out their missions. They have relations with a number of terrorists currently wanted by the security authorities, like Dr. Azahari.” One assailant was killed, two were arrested, the first of whom was an active duty police
officer.\textsuperscript{85} Three of the assailants were from Poso, while the others were “involved in attacks in Sulawesi and Ambon.”\textsuperscript{86} On 25 May, clashes erupted in West Tenggara Regency in the Malukus, killing 3 people and injuring more than 50 others.\textsuperscript{87} On 28 May, simultaneous bombings in Tentana killed 22 and injured more than 30.\textsuperscript{88} In June 2005, there were two more bombings, without casualties. On 28 July, police seized three bombs from Tagolu Village of Poso.\textsuperscript{89} On 5 August 2005, two men, both were witnesses in an upcoming trial about violence in Poso, were gunned down.\textsuperscript{90} Days after Indonesian authorities announced that they were withdrawing more than two battalions (1,300 troops) from the Malukus because of the “improved security situation,”\textsuperscript{91} a bomb ripped through a crowded market in Ambon on 25 August, injured nine but killed no one. The police arrested four members of a group they call Mujahidin Ambon.\textsuperscript{92} On 29 October 2005, three schoolgirls, aged 15–17, were beheaded by six men as they walked to school in Poso.\textsuperscript{93} On 17 October, a bomb was detonated on a crowded minivan in Toboli Village, Poso, injuring two people.\textsuperscript{94} Machete-wielding assailants killed one woman and seriously wounded another in Central Sulawesi on 19 November, while a cache of 19 IEDs was found in southeastern Sulawesi.\textsuperscript{95}

Although the police quickly sent hundreds of reinforcements with each outbreak of communal violence in Indonesia, officials expect outbreaks of violence to continue.\textsuperscript{96} There is legitimate concern that some of the security forces are complicit in the violence.\textsuperscript{97} Their greatest concern remained that such conflicts might be exacerbated by outside provocateurs. Ansyad M’bai, the National Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, has asserted that a leading JI member, who was a key participant in the Bali bombing “played an important role” in the October 2003 attacks in Poso that killed ten people and coincided with the anniversary of the Bali bombing.\textsuperscript{98} Likewise, on 2 May 2005, Indonesian police arrested three suspects wanted in conjunction with the August 2003 bombing of the J.W. Marriott in Jakarta, in a small village outside of Poso, Sulawesi. All three, Suryadi (32), Saifullah (38), and Sucipto (37), as well as a fourth who escaped, were involved in not only the sectarian bloodletting in Ambon in 1999–2000, but also the 24 April attacks in Mamasa.\textsuperscript{99} In late May 2005, both the Vice President and the Indonesian National Police announced that the group responsible for the 28 May Tentana bombings had clear links to the JI cell in Solo.\textsuperscript{100} We have a clear connection between the same people engaged in both “international jihad” and sectarian conflict.

Jones contends that the larger faction of JI sees high profile terrorist attacks as symbolic but counter-productive. This faction, more heavily steeped in the Darul Islam tradition, advocates greater emphasis on sectarian conflict and a more domestic focus in its attempt to transform Indonesia into an Islamic state. These divisions are tactical not strategic. Moreover, we have clear evidence that the same individuals will often engage in both activities: they attack what they can at a given time. They are flexible in their targeting and sensitive to changes in their external security environment. Moreover, attacks on sectarian conflicts and internationally styled jihadi attacks on Western targets are not mutually exclusive, but rather mutually reinforcing.
Religious purification

In the 1970s and 1980s, Muslim fundamentalists and leaders of the Dakwah movements, many of whom had returned home from studies in the Middle East, began to develop a network of madrassas and study groups in mosques across Indonesia, creating a generation of worshippers following a stricter and more puritanical form of Islam than that traditionally found in the country. Saudi and Gulf funding for scholarships, mosque construction and madrassas, which all increased in response to the Iranian revolution, facilitated this change in religious climate. For example, the IIRO constructed 309 mosques in Indonesia, while Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab (LIPIA), a branch of the Al-Imam Muhammad bin Saud University in Riyadh, opened in Indonesia in 1980, whose Arab-language Salafi curriculum is taught primarily by Arab instructors. Among the Salafi advocates were Ba’asyir and Sungkar. They—and others—have been able to elicit donations from like-minded Saudi and Persian Gulf-based charities to fund the spread of Salafi Islam through construction of Middle-Eastern style mosques and madrassas. A report by the ICG, however, contends that Salafi groups in Indonesia are actually less prone to jihadist violence; indeed “the best recruits from jihadist organizations come from outside the Salafi ambit altogether.” According to Jones, the Salafi community views itself first and foremost in religious, rather than political, terms, and eschews both politics and violence because they “divert attention from study of the faith and propagation of Salafi principles.” On the other hand, JI has always justified its existence in purely religious terms; its appeal comes in large part from its ability to use Islamic scripture and its combination of Salafi fundamentalism with Sayyid Qutb’s radicalism and Abdullah Azzam’s jihadism. Dakwah alone was not enough to take on the powers of a state, violence had to be employed.

To that end, JI has focused much of its attention on Muslims who do not follow a fundamentalist interpretation of the Koran and Sunnah (prophetic tradition), labeling them as murtad (apostates). This idea—takfiri—or the ability to brand someone an apostate or not even a Muslim at all—has now entered the rhetorical debate in Southeast Asia in general and Indonesia in particular. JI’s second goal is to target what it sees as the corrupt and secular regimes in the region that hold back the implementation of sharia. Indonesia has been the primary target, but major cells have also been discovered in Malaysia and Singapore. For example, in early 2004, Malaysian authorities uncovered a large cache of explosives, hinting that they too are on JI’s target list. Indonesia continues to be named by Al Qaeda in its statements as an apostate state and puppet regime of the United States. When Samudra was asked about his feelings about being captured, he responded:

There’s one thing that made me sad. I mean: obviously the Americans are happy that I was caught. Americans and their allies. That’s obvious. But the thing that made me sad was that it was also Moslems who caught me. Fellow Moslems. How, how could they have been ordered to capture me? They didn’t realize that they were provided documents,
Jemaah Islamiyah, as most terrorist groups do, hopes to provoke a heavy-handed government response. While a core group of constituents will always remain committed to JI and its goals, the leadership seeks to broaden the organization’s appeal. In short, JI may be looking to transform itself from an elite terrorist organization of would-be martyrs into a martyr-organization. That is, one which elicits great sympathy among conservative and fundamentalist Muslims and which turns them against the secular order. To their credit, the states in the region have responded to JI with uncharacteristic restraint. Since October 2001, there have been only 300 arrests across the region, far fewer than in Europe or the United States after September 11. Regional governments have been cognizant that one of the key motivations for terrorists can be anger at coercive policies and authoritarian practices. Using the war on terror to arrest and imprison *bonafide* political opponents and repressing peaceful Muslim groups risk radicalizing segments of the population while legitimizing radical causes. As a Malaysian JI member quipped, “We stopped believing in the democratic process. So we felt that *jihad* was the only way to change the government.”

Jemaah Islamiyah is seeking to inculcate fundamentalist Islamic values in Southeast Asians; and it is clearly tapping into the rapid growth of conservative Islamic values that have spread across the region. Southeast Asians, through greater media coverage and the so-called “Al Jazeera effect” are identifying more with the plights of their co-religionists around the Islamic world, especially the Iraqis and Palestinians. The Palestinians have become a metaphor for injustice around the region. The Pew Global Attitudes poll found that the number of Muslims in Indonesia who believed that Islam was under siege almost doubled in 1 year, rising from 33 percent in 2002 to 59 percent in 2003; though it fell to 46 percent in 2005. Moreover, 80 percent of the respondents felt more solidarity with the Islamic world than they did in the past. In the July 2005 Pew poll, more Indonesian’s self-identified as Muslims (39 percent) than as Indonesians (35 percent) and 64 percent of Indonesian respondents believed it was “very important” for “Islam to have an important role in the world.”

Reaffirming Jemaah Islamiyah’s role in the “global jihad”

The single most important reason that JI members have provided to their police interrogators as to why they engage in terrorism is to exact revenge for Western attacks on their co-religionists and in defense of perceived attacks on Islam. As Noordin Mohammad Top warned in his November 2005 video statement: “As long as you keep your troops in Iraq and Afghanistan and intimidate Muslim people, you will feel our intimidation and our terror... America, Australia, England and Italy. You will be the target of our next attack.” “They see themselves as fighting a new world battle... They say, we can attack civilians...
JEMA'AH ISLAMIYAH AND ISLAMIST TERRORISM

anywhere, just as Americans attack Muslim civilians all over the world,” said Nasir bin Abbas, the former JI leader. Thus the third goal of JI is to form a sense of solidarity with other extremist organizations. Southeast Asian radicals have always been angered by the perception that Southeast Asia is on the “Islamic periphery” and that they are less “pure” than their co-religionists elsewhere. Radicals in the region have constantly sought to bring their struggles into the “global jihad,” to make clear the fact that they are as intent on defending their religion as any militant group in South Asia or the Middle East. This has itself played out in a number of ways. For instance, we know from the interrogations of Mohammad Mansour Jabarah and Hambali that the Bali bombing, while not micro-managed by Al Qaeda, was ordered by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, to distract the United States from the war in Afghanistan. There is also evidence to suggest that the Singapore cell was particularly attracted to the Chechen cause; an early JI plan involved an attempt to hijack an Aeroflot jetliner from Bangkok and crash it in Singapore to show “solidarity” with the Chechens. Some reports have suggested that major JI leaders have traveled to Chechnya in the last few years.

In his interrogation, Samudra chastised interviewers for disassociating Bali from the global jihad: “Islam isn’t limited to states, it is not geographically limited . . . Be that Kashmir, Indonesia, or Afghanistan, it’s all the same. It’s not limited to the frame of nationalism.” Imam Samudra also tried to put the Indonesian jihad into a global context by referencing other places where Islam was under attack, declaring, “Let it be acknowledged that every single drop of Muslim blood, be it from any nationality and from any place, will be remembered and accounted for.” The website continued, “This has resulted in Muslim cleansing in Moro [southern Philippines], Ambon, Poso and surrounding areas . . . Blood will be redeemed by blood. A life for a life. One Muslim to another is like a single body. If one part is in pain, the other part will also feel it.”

JI’s closest regional partners have traditionally been the radical separatists groups in the southern Philippines. While JI established large-scale training facilities in Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) camps in the mid-1990s, training allegedly continues there today, albeit on a much smaller scale. There is no firm data regarding the number of JI members in the Philippines but a senior Philippine intelligence official estimated the number to be about 40. Those who do not are believed to return to Indonesia and Malaysia to become trainers in their own right. Based on information gleaned from the capture of two JI operatives in Malaysia and Indonesia, Philippine intelligence officials believe that a third class of JI operatives has recently “graduated.” Although the estimate is rough, when I put the question to an MILF official, he concurred: “30 or 40, 50 at most.”

Training has also been possible because of renewed ties between JI and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). While there were working ties between the two in the early to mid-1990s, the ties lapsed as the Abu Sayyaf degenerated into a kidnap for a ransom gang. With the death of Abu Subaya and the capture
of Ghalib Andang, Khadaffy Janjani has attempted to consolidate power and reorient the group back to its national liberation aims.\textsuperscript{125} To that end, Janjalani has forged closer ties with the MILF.\textsuperscript{126} In the past year, Abu Sayyaf has carried out or attempted a number of terrorist attacks including the bombing of the Super Ferry that killed more than 100 people.\textsuperscript{127} Two ASG members were arrested in Manila in March with a large cache of explosives that they hoped to put in backpack bombs to be detonated in malls. In June 2004, six more ASG members were arrested for possessing explosives. Philippine intelligence officials believe that this cell was plotting another round of attacks on SuperFerries in July.\textsuperscript{128} Philippine intelligence reports said Abu Sayyaf had established an urban assassination squad in Zamboanga in March, allegedly with the help of JI members.\textsuperscript{129} At the same time, almost all kidnapping incidents by Abu Sayyaf have ceased.

The reorientation of Abu Sayyaf raises questions of whether there are exogenous factors at work. We know that JI and Al Qaeda operatives were always trying to forge an alliance between the two Philippine groups.\textsuperscript{130} Nasir, captured leader of JI’s Mantiqi 3 (which includes Mindanao), admitted that in February 2004 JI’s acting \textit{amir}, Abu Rusdan, ordered him to establish ties with Abu Sayyaf.\textsuperscript{131} Nasir ordered his subordinate Zulkifli, an Indonesian JI member and long-standing JI trainer in MILF, to establish ties with Khadaffy Janjalani.\textsuperscript{132} Abu Sophia (aka Ahmad al-Ghozi and the brother of a senior Indonesian JI operative Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi) was the group’s emissary in the southern Philippines and was also charged with brokering talks between Abu Sayyaf and MILF.\textsuperscript{133} The ICG reported that “Khadaffy Janjalani had long wanted to send men for training at Camp Hudaibiyah but the MILF rejected the idea.”\textsuperscript{134} Further evidence of renewed ties between Abu Sayyaf and JI and Al Qaeda emerged in April–May 2004, with the arrest of two financiers—Khair Malzam Mundus and Jordan Mamso Abdullah.\textsuperscript{135}

The Indonesia–Philippine connection is quite fascinating, and a number of arrests have shed important light on the relationship. On 14 December 2004, Philippine police arrested three Indonesian JI members, Ted Yolanda (Dedy Rusdiana), Mohamed Nassir Hamid, and Mohamad Yusuf Karin Faiz (aka Abdullah Faiz aka Faiz Saifuddin)\textsuperscript{136} along with a local ASG contact who was to escort them to an MILF camp in Butig.\textsuperscript{137} The group was arrested in Zamboanga, having entered the country through Tawi-Tawi. The group was caught with US$7,000, 10 terrorist manuals, Al Qaeda VCDs, and other materials. The four were on their way to MILF camps in Mindanao to conduct training. According to the head of PNP Intelligence, Chief Superintendent Ismael Rafnan, “They were planning to go into car bombs. They have reached that level of sophistication. They are ready to do it.”\textsuperscript{138} Abdullah Faiz told his Philippine interrogators that the three had been sent to Mindanao for training by two people in the Central Java cell: Abdullah Sunata and Encen Kurnia. Abdullah Sunata was the head of a JI-affiliated organization called “KOMPAK in Ambon,” an organization that morphed out of the original KOMPAK office in Ambon established in
1998–1999. (KOMPAK is an independent charitable arm of the Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia. It had 13 regional offices) Encen Kurnia was thought to be part of an old Darul Islam group, Negara Islam Indonesia. Both (along with two other members of the cell) had received military training in MILF camps in the late 1990s. Sunata and Kurnia appeared to be the main figures in getting people to Mindanao and were the liaisons for two of the top JI leaders at large in the southern Philippines, Dulmatin and Umar Patek. Kurnia has admitted that two of the people he dispatched, Ahmad and Abu Nida, made it to Mindanao, but that the three-person Abdullah Faiz cell arrested in December 2004, and a two man cell that the Malaysian police arrested in Sandakan, Malaysia on 9 June, was on a tip off from Indonesians police. The two, Maulana Musa and Salman, were on their way into Mindanao to receive training to become suicide bombers. When Abdullah Faiz’s cell was arrested in December 2004 and with the Malaysian arrests in June 2005, Indonesians moved in on the Central Java cell. In total 17 people were arrested in June and July; 11 in Solo and the remaining 6 in Jakarta. This cell, which included Sunata and Kurnia, was thought to be planning an attack on Indonesian police headquarters amongst others. Members of this cell, especially Sunata, were also thought to be involved in the September 2004 Australian Embassy attack. Members of this cell were known to have helped Azahari and Noordin. There are unconfirmed reports that this investigation was botched because of competition and a lack of communication between different Indonesian security forces. In the safehouses raided, Indonesian police found many of the materials that were used in the 1 October 2002 suicide attacks in Bali, including TNT, detonating cord, ball bearings, and so on. So there were plenty of clues as early as June and July to suggest that JI was going to shift to smaller suicide bombers, rather than truck bombs, which of course is what they did. Also found was potassium chlorate, electrical bomb circuits, bullets, and four pistols.

The most important items that were captured at the time of the raid, however, were communications between Abdullah Sunata and Umar Patek, in Mindanao. In his interrogation, Sunata admitted, “he was tasked by Patek to solicit funds for terror attacks in the Philippines and recruit suicide bombers in Indonesia to be sent to central Mindanao.” The communications revealed a number of things. First, Umar Patek wanted Indonesian suicide bombers to be used in the Philippines. The five people who were arrested trying to enter or get into Mindanao in December 2004 and June 2005 fit the bill for this request. Second, JI and ASG are trying to solicit funds from Arab patrons to finance further attacks and to purchase more weapons. According to the Associated Press (AP), “The letter gave the quantity and type of arms, including light machine-guns and anti-tank weapons, that Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah rebels sought to battle Philippine troops and police.” It is clear that the JI–ASG group wanted the Indonesian cell to assist with fund-raising. The AP reported that the letter warned that the ASG might revert to kidnappings if they could not get funds from external supporters—something that the ASG has eschewed since 2002–2003. Third, the Indonesian cell wanted
assistance in purchasing explosives as well as increased training for members in the southern Philippines. At the time of writing, recent evidence of this were seen. On 13 October 2005, Indonesian authorities arrested three Malaysians and an Indonesian who were caught smuggling 175 kilograms of ammonium nitrate, 900 detonators and fuses, entering Nunukan from Sabah. It is believed that these materials came from the southern Philippines.

In sum, JI has been able to survive because it has been able to link its jihad with that of other militant organizations in the region. JI has been able to forge a common cause, in the name of a global jihad, and this has led to exchanges of techniques, training, money, and support.

**Indonesian counter-terrorism efforts**

Another major factor determining JI’s future development is the effectiveness of Indonesian and regional counter-terrorism efforts. The results of this to date have been mixed. On the one hand, there have been more than two hundred arrests of suspected JI members in Indonesia alone. The special police CT unit Detachment 88 has had some spectacular successes, including the death of Dr Azahari. Moreover, Jakarta’s counter-terrorism efforts have been respectful of human rights and the rule of law, considering the country’s authoritarian past. Suspects have been charged and tried in open legal proceedings. At the same time, the Indonesian security apparatus has not been able to stop JI from continuing its bombing campaign following the October 2002 Bali bombings. The greatest weakness in Indonesia’s CT efforts have been a stubborn unwillingness to go after JI’s social organizations because of political support from Muslim organizations and Islamist parties and political figures. Any counter-terror strategy that is based on “decapitation” will fail. Effective counter-terror strategies must be holistic and attack not just individual cells but the pools of recruitment, whether uncivil society organizations, paramilitaries, or madrassas.

Regional and Western security services seem satisfied about the quality and quantity of intelligence garnered from detainees and agents who have started to infiltrate JI’s ranks. But while important, new intelligence may not be adequate to stop JI. Individual cells are highly compartmentalized and dispersed. A counter-terrorism strategy based on “decapitation” (arrests of key leaders) is not going to eliminate JI and will, at best, degrade its capabilities. However, the arrests have led to a much greater understanding of the organization, how and from which madrassas they recruit, and how familial/kinship networks act as bonds among members. Moreover, Indonesian security officials are now cognizant that there is a strong and positive correlation between sectarian violence and terrorism. Yet they are often unable to effectively act because of political pressure from Islamist parties and political elites.

But even with arrests and more effective intelligence, there have been legal setbacks to Indonesia’s counter-terrorism efforts. On 23 July 2004, Indonesia’s Constitutional Court ruled that the retroactive use of the 2003 Anti-Terror Law
No. 16 to cover the Bali bombings was unconstitutional, while making an exception for the Bali bombing. “This decision does not annul the convictions against Amrozi and his friends, but in the future, the anti-terrorism law will no longer be [retroactively] enforceable after this decision,” announced the Constitutional Court’s clerk, Muhammad Asrun. Lawyers for those already sentenced in connection with the event have said that the exception is outrageous and argued that their clients’ convictions should be overturned. Indonesia’s justice minister has insisted that the ruling would not annul the convictions of the 32 people who had already been tried and convicted under this law, but it does open another avenue for appeals to the Supreme Court. The Anti-Terror Law No. 16 remains in force, as does related Law No. 15. However, both can now only be applied to crimes committed after their passage. While retroactivity is abhorrent, and these rulings were important for the development of the rule of law and protection of human rights, they were counter-productive in the case against Abu Bakar Ba’asyir.

The trial of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir was one of the most political, sensitive legal-security issues in Indonesia. Under pressure from the United States and its ASEAN allies, Indonesian authorities detained Ba’asyir after the October 2002 Bali bombing, and eventually put him on trial. His prosecution was botched, despite damning video testimony from a Malaysian JI member Faiz bin Abu Bakar Bafana that linked Ba’asyir directly to Al Qaeda. In September 2003, the court found Ba’asyir guilty for involvement in a JI plot to overthrow the government but said there was no proof he led the JI network. An appeals court overturned Ba’asyir’s treason conviction but ruled that he had to serve 3 years for immigration-related offences. In March 2004, the Supreme Court announced that his sentence would be reduced to 18 months; roughly the time already served. On 30 April 2004, as he was released from prison, Ba’asyir was re-arrested on retroactive terrorism charges. Though he was visited by several key Muslim leaders, including former Vice President Hamzah Haz, Din Syamsuddin, and Hidayat Nur Wahid, the head of the Prosperous Justice Party, who have all protested his re-arrest, the police and the state prosecutor’s office were confident that this time they could build up a stronger case against him, using intelligence gleaned from Hambali (though Indonesian officials have still not been given direct access to him) and the testimony of senior JI member Mohammed Nasir bin Abas, who has renounced JI and cooperated with the Indonesian police. As a result of the Constitutional Court’s ruling regarding Anti-Terror Law No. 16, the police announced that they were dropping all charges against Ba’asyir that linked him to the Bali bombing, but that he would still be charged with:

- Planning and inciting acts of terrorism—including the establishment of a training camp on the Philippine island of Mindanao;
- Using his position to influence/persuade others;
- Conspiring to commit acts of terrorism;
Withholding information about acts of terrorism—specifically the indictment says that he gave permission to key Bali bomber Amrozi to go ahead with the plan.\textsuperscript{154}

Ba’asyir pled innocent and was sentenced to a three and a half year term.\textsuperscript{155} While he was not linked to any one terrorist incident, the court did find that Ba’asyir was the spiritual chief of JI. Ba’asyir was released in June 2006 after serving a 25-month sentence.

Arguably the most difficult security issue facing President Yudhoyono is proscription of JI. At present, JI is still not an illegal organization in Indonesia and mere membership is not a crime; one has to be directly tied to an attack to be detained. The principle reason why JI has not been outlawed is parliamentary opposition, as Islamists do not believe JI exists or secularists see the effort to ban it as a throwback to the Suharto era’s crackdown on NGOs. Indonesian officials have hid behind ludicrous claims that since JI is not registered, it cannot be banned, nor can they claim that it is pointless to ban something that “is not a formal organization with card-carrying members.” President Yudhoyono says that he is willing to submit legislation to parliament that could lead to the proscription of JI, but only after seeing proof that the organization exists. As he told Time magazine, “If there are explanations and proof that JI as an organization does exist in Indonesia, and if it is legally proved that its members are involved in terrorist activities, then it will be declared a banned organization. We will use the legal process in order for this to become a legal and law enforcement issue, not a political one.”\textsuperscript{156} Indonesian officials have tried to focus on the small component groups of JI, the regional organizations established by members. As the current Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, Admiral Widodo A.S., insisted, “As a formal organization, Jemaah Islamiyah has never existed.”\textsuperscript{157} We must be cognizant that if the government is going to ban any organization, it cannot be called “Jemaah Islamiyah,” but must be a new “fringe group.” Despite the intense lobbying by both domestic security officials and by the international community on the Indonesian government to ban JI, few politicians in the world’s largest Muslim community have the political courage to ban an organization that (a) simply translates as “Islamic community” and (b) many Muslims do not believe that it really exists. “The reason this is not being done immediately [banning JI],” explained Ansyaad Mbaai, “is because the political situation is still very sensitive.”\textsuperscript{158}

There are a number of other impediments to Indonesia’s counter-terrorism efforts. The most important remains intense bureaucratic competition amongst the various security services. “The scale and intractability of Indonesia’s internal security problems” and “Resistance from within Indonesia’s factionalised and demoralized security forces . . . also undermined Jakarta’s willingness and ability to cooperate.”\textsuperscript{159} Since 2003, the lead counter-terror institution has been the police; and in particular, the special CT unit, Detachment-88 that has received the lion’s share of foreign assistance. This infuriated Indonesia’s intelligence service (Badan Intelijen Negara, or BIN), which accused the police of denying the
existence of Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah cells before the Bali bombing. The rivalries among various security services and law enforcement agencies has been compounded by competition over the large amount of international assistance from the United States, Australia, the EU, and Japan.\textsuperscript{160}

While this inter-service rivalry is neither going to dissipate nor be quickly resolved, there are a few reasons to be cautiously optimistic. Yudhoyono can be expected to use his political mandate to enforce more cooperation. Second, BIN’s chief, A.M. Hendropriyono stepped down. The reshuffling of leaders at the key security institutions has allowed them to start from a clean slate. The new leaders will not have the history of personal rivalries and animosity that has hampered cooperation in the past 5 years. There has been a greater attempt to improve and institutionalize cooperation between the police, BIN, and the military. In September 2004, the government established the Counter-Terror Task Force.\textsuperscript{161}

This body, which will be under the auspices of BIN, will coordinate intelligence operations between not just the Police’s anti-terrorism unit and BIN, but also with the special forces of Indonesia’s three military service arms. According to interim defense minister Hari Sabarno, “The framework is still the same. But the military intelligence units will now be more involved in the whole process.”\textsuperscript{162} While the security services have improved in both their capability and professionalism, there is still much room for improvement. The security forces remain too wedded to coercive powers rather than nuanced and surgical approaches, which tend to reinforce the ideology of the militants.

The Indonesian government has finally begun to wage a war of ideas to counter JI’s message. Its efforts are appalling late—especially when one considers the vast reservoir of moderate clerics who are opposed to the radical ideology. Vice President Yusuf Kalla has recently enlisted the support of Muslim clerics to lead the ideological battle.\textsuperscript{163} Yet, one of the leading moderate thinkers, Dr Azumardi Azra has expressed some concern that to date the moderate Muslim organizations have been too passive. “Islamic organizations in Indonesia tend to be defensive. They only give statements that terror should not be linked to Islam and that terror is a conspiracy of Western countries to corner Islam, while it is clear that all those involved are people connected [to Islam].”\textsuperscript{164}

The greatest failing in the government’s CT efforts has been their unwillingness to target JI’s social network. While top government officials have insisted, “We shall apply legal measures against all bombing perpetrators from every organization,”\textsuperscript{165} they are unwilling to target JI’s large network of NGOs, humanitarian organizations, madrassas, and civil society groupings. Indonesian authorities have used the full force of the law to prosecute people directly linked to terrorist attacks, but have done appallingly little toward members of JI who recruit, fund-raise, and establish (un)civil society organizations that espouse hatred and provoke sectarian conflicts. The clearest example of this is the revival of Abu Jibril’s Laskar Mujihidin. Not only was the government not concerned about this group’s revival, but it allowed them to go to Aceh aboard Indonesian government planes. While the TNI expelled 19 MMI members from Aceh, on
11 January 2005, few in the government have been concerned about the activities of these groups. Moreover, this proliferation of JI-linked organizations has a strategic rationale: They form these small organizations because if the government does eventually ban JI, they will not take on these seemingly small social service organizations—especially in areas where people know the government is not providing those social services. In addition to Al Mukmin, there are some one dozen madrassa that have clear ties to JI, which advocate extremism and have recruited members to engage in acts of terrorism and violence. These include, Darusy Syahadah Pesantren in Solo, Pesantren Al-Islam in Tenggulan, East Java, Al Zaytun Pesantren in Indraymu, East Java, Hidayatullah Pesantren Network (which has 150 separate pesantren spread around the country) in Balikpapan, East Kalimantan, Iskarima Pesantren in Karangpandan, Central Java, Ulul Albab Pesantren in Sukharjo, Central Java, Ma’had Al-Islam Pesantren in Solo, Central Java, Islam, Islam Al-Muttaqien in Sowano, Lepara, Central Java, Al Mujahidin Pesantren in Balikpapan, East Kalimantan, Ilhyus Sunnah Pesantren in Yogyakarta, the Al-Rahman Pesantren and Pesantren Istiqomah. While these schools are under much greater scrutiny, there is little evidence that their teachings have changed at all. Moreover, the key indoctrination and recruitment has tended to occur in private and informal sessions. While Indonesian officials insist that shutting these schools down would be counter-productive as it would simply drive the ideologically predisposed underground, it is indicative of their overall unwillingness to think about how to counter JI’s vast social networks.

Conclusion

There is a lingering fear among diplomats and international policy-makers that Indonesia has not been thoroughly committed to the war on terrorism, despite Indonesian protestations to the contrary. Foreign observers often perceive a degree of complacency among Indonesian investigators and politicians once there have been important arrests of suspected JI members. This assessment is not altogether fair. Indonesian investigators have continued to follow leads and make arrests, although most are low key and are not played up in the media. There are, however, lingering doubts about whether Indonesia—especially under Megawati, but still to a much lesser degree under President Yudhoyono—has possesses the political will to prevail in the fight against terrorism.

The international community has been terribly frustrated by the difficulty that Indonesian prosecutors had in the criminal case against Ba’asyir, which was drawn out over 3 years, and who is now free. There has also been concern that other senior JI members received light sentences. Abu Jibril, for example, was a founder of JI and one of its paramilitaries in the Malukus, the Laskar Mujihidin, responsible for the deaths of hundreds if not thousands of people during the sectarian bloodletting. He was only sentenced to 5 months in prison for immigration offenses upon being returned to Indonesia from Malaysia where he had been detained under the Internal Security Act for almost 3 years. Indonesian
authorities asserted that they did not have enough evidence to link Jibril to any terrorist attacks, and downplayed his involvement with Laskar Mujahidin.\textsuperscript{168} Despite his designation by the UN Security Council as a terrorist financier, he remains free and able to re-organize his former group.

Much of these concerns have been allayed by the election of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, whom the international community hopes will make tackling terrorism a higher priority for the government. Yudhoyono, however, is confronted by a daunting economic situation and is cognizant of the fact that until political violence is curtailed, foreign investment and economic development will lag. Furthermore, if the center of Indonesian politics continues to shift to a more Islamist position, coupled with a rise in protests and demonstrations, the government might find its hands tied.

Government counter-measures against JI have been moderately effective; it remains a strong organization that, despite arrests of much of its leadership, is able to recruit and indoctrinate new members. Its cellular structure and strict discipline made the organization difficult to eliminate. JI maintains the capability to mount attacks, which are likely to continue, since Indonesia is named by Al Qaeda leaders as a moderate Muslim state that is collaborating with the United States, and is therefore a target. The organization is patient and has a long-term agenda, which makes it a difficult target for security forces. As JI seeks to regroup and train a new generation of recruits, it will likely refocus its energies on fomenting sectarian violence, as it did in the late 1990s. However, JI is likely to also focus on rebuilding its depleted ranks, especially through religious training (and practical training abroad), which tends to fall beneath the radar of many security services. JI is also likely to continue using issues of concern to radical Muslims (e.g., the US occupation of Iraq, the Palestinian struggle against Israel, and the Chechen struggle against Russia) to attract recruits and elicit the support of broader segments of the population. Since these issues are not likely to be resolved in the foreseeable future, we can expect JI to continue to pose a significant security threat, as well as Indonesia’s most graphic illustration of Islamist violence.
Between the Islamist political parties, which for now remain committed to the existing political-legal system, and radical terrorists such as Jemaah Islamiyah lies an eclectic category of Islamist groups that have “limited” political goals, and which range from student action groups and criminal gangs to organized militias such as Laskar Jihad. These sub-state actors have a long history in Indonesian politics. Kevin O’Rourke notes that groups have acted as “assistants” to the government doing “regime maintenance” chores.1 The difference is that in the post-Suharto period, many of these new actors are Islamic in nature, and have some commitment to creating an Islamic state and antipathy toward democracy.

This chapter will focus on groups that, by and large, believe Indonesia should be governed by Islamic law and that democracy may be anathema to their goals, but are not yet ready to engage in extra-constitutional means to bring about social and economic change. These groups range from those that are unwilling to use violence to those that will use violence for a limited and defined political outcome. These groups are not homogenous, often differing from one another in their goals, the sophistication and articulation of their vision of an Islamic state, and the degree to which they will resort to violence. This chapter will look at what these groups have in common, how they differ, how they use religion to justify their actions, and most importantly, what they are trying to achieve. It will also examine their connections to Islamist political parties and JI. These groups exist, in large part, because of the weakness of the Indonesian state as well as the lack of political will to crack down on such groups, even when they perpetrate mass violence.

One question worth noting from the outset is whether these groups are even truly Islamist organizations, or whether they combine militant Islam with nationalism in order to justify their actions. One Islamist group, the FPI, received criticism that “it was little more than a band of criminal extortionists in religious garb.”2 Nonetheless, these groups form an essential part of the spectrum of radical Islam in Indonesia, and in some ways serve as a nexus between Islamist political parties and terrorist groups such as JI. Ultimately, they share some of the same goals, if not the means.
This category of Muslim militants can be further divided into four separate groupings, the first of which are the Muslim militias (or *laskars*), who use violence, but tend to do so in a limited way. They can be described as “reactive jihadists” in that they use violence in response to a certain situation or event. There are differences between them, though, in that some are simply trying to act where they feel the state has abrogated its responsibilities, while others want to supplant the state altogether. A second grouping includes militant “Islamist” groups that engage in a more sporadic, mob-style violence and whose ultimate knowledge and interpretation of Islam tend to be somewhat rudimentary. The third grouping consists of radical student and university-based organizations that organize anti-Western protests and whose members may sympathize with more radical causes. Finally, there are pure Salafi organizations and *dakwah* organizations, such as the Hizb ut-Tahrir, which see political and military action as a distraction from their goal of religious purification.

While some of these groups have been around since the New Order era, most were established after the fall of Suharto in 1998. The collapse of the authoritarian regime allowed civil society to flourish, providing political space for such groups, including “uncivil” ones, that preached hatred and intolerance and engaged in violence to operate. Arguably the most important factor in the development of today’s militant Islam in Indonesia was the spread of sectarian bloodletting in Maluku and Sulawesi. These jihads were the single most significant formative experience for the participants, not unlike the way the jihad in Afghanistan against the Soviets was for the Group of 272 (the number of Indonesian *mujahidin* that returned from Afghanistan).

While some commentators have contended that after the rapid proliferation of these groups in the immediate post-Suharto period, there has been a reversal since 2003 because of a backlash against terrorist acts. The clear example of this is the Laskar Jihad that disbanded around the time of the first Bali bombing in October 2002. Yet, not only has there not been a reversal, it is clear that many of these organizations are searching for political space and trying to grow themselves after several quiet years. The 26 December Tsunami, that killed more than 120,000 people in Aceh, gave many of these groups such an opportunity. The political party PKS, as well as a number of militant and/or JI-linked organizations including FPI, Laskar Mujahidin, MER-C and MMI, were involved in post-Tsunami aid work, with government support.

**Muslim militias in Maluku and Sulawesi—The rise of the Laskars**

*The emergence of Laskar Jihad*

One of the more disturbing aspects of the sectarian violence that engulfed Maluku and Central Sulawesi after the fall of Suharto is the emergence of a number of armed and seemingly well-trained mujahidin groups. The largest of these groups
was Laskar Jihad, founded by Jafar Umar Thalib in January 2000 in response to sectarian violence in Ambon. Jafar, an orthodox Salafi, had studied at the Saudi-funded Institute for Islamic and Arabic Studies before receiving a scholarship from DDII to study at the Al-Maududi Institute in Lahore, Pakistan. In 1987, Jafar met Osama bin Laden in Peshawar, though he dismissed bin Laden as a “spiritually empty man” who has “no religious knowledge.” In 1989, Jafar returned to Java as a member of the influential Group of 272 and became a critic of the New Order regime and secular rule: “We don’t like *pancasila* because it means that Islam is the same as other religions. This is not so. We believe that Islam is the highest religion and the best.” He even argued that “There is no way for Muslims to get respect from non-Muslims except through jihad.”

The fact that the Wahid government did not curtail their activities seemed only to embolden them. Jafar painted the Wahid government as anti-Islamic: “It is positioned to oppress Muslim interests and protect those of the infidels.” Against the backdrop of the 1999 independence in East Timor, Jafar claimed there was a conspiracy among the Christian-majority regions of Indonesia to secede. With this call for support, he attracted thousands of followers, who were trained at camps in Bogor. He also found considerable backing from non-Islamist politicians and military leaders angered at the loss of East Timor and afraid that Indonesia might break up. Furthermore, there have been persistent allegations that Laskar Jihad operated with the express approval of the TNI’s “green” faction. Robert Hefner writes that “Jafar was approached in January 2000 by Islamist sympathizers in the military with the message that they approved of his plans to escalate the armed campaign against the Christians in Maluku.” Indeed, when he disbanded the group in October 2002, Jafar asserted “there was no pressure on us from military” to stop.

Despite government pledges that they would not be allowed to leave Java, Laskar Jihad paramilitaries traveled with ease to Ambon in mid-2000, where they tipped the balance of the conflict in favor of the Muslims in Maluku. For example, Laskar Jihad militants were able to drive Christians from Ternate, the North Maluku capital. At the height of the conflict, close to 6,000 Laskar Jihad troops were fighting in Maluku. In June 2000, they overran a Brimob station and seized firearms, ammunition, police trucks, and other equipment. In March 2001, Jafar declared the establishment of Islamic law in Maluku, and personally led the stoning of an adulterer.

Many mainstream politicians, as well as senior military leaders, endorsed the actions of Jafar’s forces. Because of Laskar Jihad’s deep anti-secessionist and “green” nationalist orientation, many nationalist Muslims viewed Jafar sympathetically. Former members of the New Order regime, such as Din Syamsuddin, the vice chairman of the Ulamas’ Council of Indonesia (MUI) and now head of Muhammadiyah, encouraged Laskar Jihad to fight on behalf of the Muslims in Maluku. Moreover, with such widespread political backing Jafar has enjoyed considerable protection and impunity. Although briefly detained for ordering the stoning to
death of an adulterer in mid-2001, he was released immediately. Following a March 2002 truce, there were a number of attacks and bombings attributed to Laskar Jihad in an attempt to sabotage the agreement. In April 2002, Jafar went to Ambon, where he made an inflammatory statement that Muslims would destroy Christians in Ambon. He was again arrested, this time for his allegation that the Megawati regime was cooperating with the Netherlands-based Republik Maluku Selatan (Republic of South Maluku, or RMS) secessionist group. Even then, the country’s Vice President Hamzah Haz spent an hour and a half with him in jail in an apparent display of solidarity. Fighting flared in August 2002 and Thalib then dispatched 100 fighters to West Papua. In January 2003, Jafar was acquitted of all charges that he incited violence in Maluku.

Because of its jihad in Maluku, Laskar Jihad grew in popularity and claimed to have some 10,000 members. But on 16 October 2002, 4 days after the Bali bombings, Laskar Jihad announced that it was disbanding and that Jafar would focus on his students and writing. The announcement was met with suspicion as Jafar is known to have acute political antennae and may have been told by his patrons to lie low. However, Sidney Jones has argued that Laskar Jihad’s dissolution stems from the removal of a fatwa supporting his jihad by Salafi clerics in Saudi Arabia. However, even if Jafar never reconstitutes his militia, the Laskar Jihad network could still become an important—and dangerous—political force. Jafar, after all, has strong ties to Saudi Arabia and its clerical elite, opposes democracy, which he considers “incompatible with Islam,” and does not endorse any existing political party. Yet Jafar’s ability to mobilize forces and reconstitute groups such as the Forum Komunikasi and the Laskar Jihad make him an important figure in the country. He is courted by politicians and is a leading Salafi in a country where Salafisim is slowly gaining ground.

Ties between Al Qaeda and Laskar Jihad have long been suspected, but Jafar has denied any connection. He has admitted that Al Qaeda representatives visited him, but claims that he turned them away. He has gone to great pains to distance himself from the Al Qaeda network, stating “Laskar Jihad does not have ties with Al Qaeda or any other organizations that are associated with Osama bin Laden or any form or part of his network.” Hefner asserts that while Jafar supported bin Laden’s jihad against the West and did not condemn the September 11 attacks on the United States, he disagreed with bin Laden’s opposition to the Saudi-based Salafi clerical elite.

Moreover, while Jafar believes “defensive” jihad is permissible, in line with orthodox Salafi teachings, he does not agree with the position of Sayyd Qutb and the Muslim Brotherhood—or Qutbists like bin Laden, Ba’asyir, or Mukhlas—that jihad can be pre-emptive or offensive in nature.

Laskar Mujahidin and Laskar Jundullah
The Laskar Jihad was a reactive organization, waging holy war in what it saw as the legitimate defense of beleaguered Muslims. It was established to deal with the
threat of Christian secessionism, a threat that Thalib felt the government was not addressing. One reading of its disbandment is that since no Christian republics were formed and the integrity of the Muslim-dominated Indonesian state had been secured, it no longer needed to operate. Unlike the Laskar Jihad, though, two paramilitary organizations established by the JI leadership had much greater goals and did not want to simply bolster the state, but to ultimately replace it.

Two small but well-organized paramilitary groups, Laskar Mujahidin and Laskar Jundullah, emerged from the sectarian violence in Maluku and Sulawesi alongside Laskar Jihad. Laskar Mujahidin was established in 1999 when a member of JI’s shura, Abu Jibril, began to recruit Indonesian exiles living in Malaysia to return home to fight a holy war. Jibril first traveled to Maluku in January 2000 leading several hundred jihadis, and “introduced a centralized command structure” to the organization that was led by Haris Fadillah (aka Abu Dzar), the father-in-law of a senior Al Qaeda operative Omar al-Farouq.27

Laskar Jundullah was founded by M. Kolono and Agus Dwikarna in October 2000 as the armed wing of Dwikarna’s civil society organization, the Makassar-based Komite Persiapan Penegakkan Syariat Islam (Committee to Prepare for the Upholding of Islamic Law, or KPPSI) that was committed to implementing sharia.28 Dwikarna was also the regional head of the DDII-linked charity Komite Aksi Penanggulangan Akibat Krisis (Action Committee for Crisis Response, or KOMPAK), the executor agency of the Saudi Charity, Al Haramain. Laskar Jundullah established itself as the major paramilitary force in Central Sulawesi.30

Laskar Mujahidin and Laskar Jundullah were quite small; there were only about 500 Laskar Mujahidin fighters in Maluku and around 300–400 Laskar Jundullah in Central Sulawesi. Yet they were far better armed and disciplined than the larger Laskar Jihad, which fielded some 3,000 poorly armed (until they raided a police armory) radical students. Laskar Mujahidin was equipped with high-speed boats and automatic weapons. In one massacre, on 19 July 2000, 250 Christians in the town of Galela were killed in a well-coordinated attack.31 The group had close links with the JI cell in the Philippines, which has supplied them with small arms and automatic weapons.32 Jibril’s forces also liaised closely with Al Qaeda operatives who were funding and filming the Maluku crisis for propaganda and recruiting purposes.33 The Laskar Mujahidin and Laskar Jundullah were joined by radical Islamists from around the world. For example, about 200 Afghan, Pakistani, and Malays were present in Maluku. Abu Abdul Aziz and one other bin Laden’s lieutenant were dispatched to Ambon in the height of the crisis. A top Al Qaeda operative, known as Rashid, is seen in videos produced at the time.34

While these two groups were separate entities from JI, that is, one’s participation in the jihad did not signify membership in JI, the leaders of both—Abu Jibril, Haris Fadillah, and Agus Dwikarna—were all JI leaders. They used these small organizations as recruitment pathways for JI membership and to psychologically condition young men into the mindset of holy war. As noted above, the conflicts in Maluku and Poso were therefore a turning point for JI’s development in that they helped it develop a support network and give field training to militants.
JI used these local conflicts to develop a network that trained, funded, and established the financial infrastructure to make militant groups self-sustaining. These two organizations were forced underground in the aftermath of September 11. Following Dwikarna’s arrest in the Philippines in early 2002, Laskar Jundullah was taken over by Abdullah Sungkar’s son-in-law, Ustadz Yassin Syawal, who had been trained in Afghanistan in the late 1980s or early 1990s. He remains at large.

Malaysian authorities detained Abu Jibril on 30 June 2001 and deported him to Indonesia in the summer of 2004, where he was detained on immigration offenses but quietly acquitted and released in October 2004, after serving five and a half months. Indonesian authorities asserted that they did not have enough evidence to link Jibril to any terrorist attacks, and downplayed his involvement with Laskar Mujahidin, which he headed, and his role as the number two official in JI, described as the organization’s “top recruiter.” Indeed, in one recruiting film produced by the MMI, he can be seen calling on his congregants to wage a militant jihad. Armed with a pistol extended into the air he exclaimed, “You can’t just have the Koran, without the steel. You will bring down the steel.” He is now free and has since reconstituted the Laskar Mujahidin. Following the 26 December 2004 Tsunami, Jibril dispatched some 250 personnel to Aceh, over 50 of whom were ferried to Aceh aboard Indonesian military planes. They established four base camps in the province including one outside of the airport, adjacent to the camps of other domestic and international relief organizations, beneath a sign that reads, “Islamic Law Enforcement.” Unlike the MMI, which was more concerned with providing “spiritual guidance” and restoring “infrastructure in places of religious duties,” the Laskar Mujahidin was involved in relief work, including the distribution of aid and the burial of corpses.

While this humanitarian relief is important, that it was being conducted by Jibril’s Laskar Mujahidin with apparent government support is troubling. For one, Jibril was designated by both the United Nations Security Council and the US Treasury as a specially Designated Global Terrorist, and any fund-raising attempts is illegal. Second, clearly Jibril is looking for ways to revitalize and promote these two organizations, to find political space in which to operate. He has not tempered his message. In a 2005 sermon in a Jakarta Mosque he said that Muslims were obliged to join the jihad against the secular regime: “Those who say jihad is not necessary are speaking nonsense.”

Militant Islamist groups

The second category of concern consists of a number of militant organizations committed to implementing sharia and imposing hard-line Islamist values on society. Although committed in name to establishing sharia and (in some cases) an Islamic state, their members appear to have thought little about achieving that end. Indeed, different views of an Islamic state exist. Despite fiery orators among the leadership, rank and file members seem to have less knowledge and
commitment to their goals, and their actions tend to be based more on orders from charismatic leaders than on personal faith and conviction.

These organizations have shown a willingness to find political patrons and supporters within the body politic, and have in some cases resorted to violence. First and foremost among these are the Islamic Youth Movement (GPI) and the Defenders of Islam (FPI), known for attacking nightclubs and bars. While many commentators write these groups off as “amateurish” or “thuggish,” pointing to their simplistic use of religion and less political stance, they nevertheless present a serious security threat. They have been active in leading anti-American demonstrations and, most troubling, they have become a pool of recruits for Jemaah Islamiyah. Some of these groups have a clear tie to the military and police. In some cases the military has used them to do their dirty work. In other cases, police use these groups to extort protection money from businessmen. Former President Abdurrahman Wahid has warned: “If the new government lets up, these groups can turn very active.”

**Gerakan Pemuda Islam**

The Western media tends to discount Gerakan Pemuda Islam (Islamic Youth Movement, or GPI) as a group of marauding students. The GPI has been active on campuses and emerged out of the *dakwah* movement on the university campuses in the 1980s and 1990s. The group made headlines in the fall of 2001, when it recruited and dispatched 300 members to go to Afghanistan to fight alongside the Taliban against the US attack. The GPI was also involved in anti-American demonstrations prior to the US-led war in Iraq in early 2003. Its leader, Syuaib Didu, has ties to both the PPP’s Hamzah Haz and the PKS’s Hidayat Nur Wahid. Indonesian intelligence and police suspect that the GPI serves as a talent scout for JI. It has been active in recruiting for foreign *jihads*, including Afghanistan and Chechnya. The funding for these operations has come from the Saudi-based charity World Assembly for Muslim Youth (WAMY), which has long been suspected of involvement in diverting funds for Al Qaeda. The GPI is committed to establishing an Islamic state, though it has not clearly laid out how it defines an Islamic state nor how it seeks to achieve that. Its position on democracy is, likewise, opaque. While it has not regularly engaged in violence, its teachings and practices are intolerant toward a multi-ethnic and denominational Indonesia. Yet many political leaders see no reason for concern with such groups, which gives them the political cover they need to continue their activities.

**Front Pembela Islam**

Like GPI, the Defenders of Islam (FPI) are often downplayed as *premen* (thugs), who alternatively clash with local police or are in cahoots with them. Without question, FPI members have been responsible for high profile “sweeps” and the destruction of bars and restaurants that stay open during Ramadan. The thuggish
nature of rank and file members tends to dispel their Islamic assertions. Yet this analysis is faulty.

Formed in August 1998, by Misbahul Alam and Habib Rizieq, the FPI became the largest overt radical Muslim group in the country with an estimated 100,000 members in 22 provinces, and has shown itself willing to use violence. The original goal of the FPI was to become a “nation-wide support base for the Muslim United Development Party (PPP)” of Hamzah Haz, but when that failed it “redefine[d] itself as a street-level ‘anti-vice’ movement.” The FPI has engaged in sporadic violence, including coercion and intimidation of opposing groups, the destruction of personal property, and mob violence. Most notoriously, it is known for conducting “sweeps” at the start of Ramadan, intimidating the owners of restaurants and other venues to shut their doors during the holy month. Even from prison Rizieq was defiant: “As long as my followers go out on raids to uphold the law and their faith, why should I stop them?” The FPI has already started to test the new Yudhoyono administration, and launched a number of raids on tempat maksiat (places of immorality) in several key cities, including the elite residential district of Kemang in Jakarta, during Ramadan.

The FPI has made the issue of public morality its central issue, and in doing so it has been able to take swipes at the secular democratic government. As Rizieq stated, “if the morals and the character are not reformed then it would be useless to talk about reform in the economy, political affairs and law.” But the organization’s real goal is to act as morals vigilantes to discredit the secular state that is too weak to crack down on vice. The pious have the right to step in where the state has abdicated its responsibility.

While FPI is more often than not involved in thuggery, it has a substantial Islamist side, particularly among its leadership. Its rank and file tend to be poorly educated youth, but its leaders are not. Before returning to Indonesia, FPI leader al-Habib Muhammad Rizieq bin Hussein Syihab, an Indonesian of Yemeni extraction, studied Islam at the University of King Saud in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Mishbahul Alam is a NU-trained cleric. The FPI has a strong network on university campuses, and has played a liaison role with the PPP and the PBB, especially in terms of mobilizing popular support and campaigning for the inclusion of the Jakarta Charter.

FPI organized demonstrations of over 10,000 people in Jakarta in October 2001 to condemn the US invasion of Afghanistan, and has led large demonstrations against the US war in Iraq. Habib Rizieq has repeatedly demanded that the government cut all its ties and cooperation with the United States.

One of the biggest concerns about the FPI is its ability to incite violence. It was quick to play up the sudden violence that erupted in Maluku in April 2004, and Rizieq announced that he, along with the head of the Muslim Brotherhood, would send 7,000 jihad fighters to Ambon. This appeared to be a mere bluster, as none were reported to have been sent. Rizieq effectively used popular anger at the American invasion of Iraq to get back into the political limelight: “I consider the attack on Iraq an attack on Islam,” Rizeiq stated in demonstrations in front of the US
Embassy. In one of his more bombastic statements he menacingly stated: “We are campaigning for the public to besiege and take over the U.S. Embassy if war breaks out.”

Rizieq not only recruited individuals to fight the United States in Iraq, but was detained by US forces there in April 2003 when he was trying to join an international *jihad*. He was returned to Indonesia where he was charged, but is unlikely to stand trial, despite breaking his house arrest to go to Iraq.

What is interesting is that despite several arrests, Rizieq has barely served any prison term because of political allies in the top echelons of the government and parliament. As Wilson notes, “Even while charging Rizieq, the state was still conciliatory, reflected in the reduction of the penalty for the offenses by the state prosecutor from the maximum of seven years to seven months on the grounds that Rizieq had ‘merely intended to improve the morality of Indonesian society.’ ”

Moreover, while Indonesian officials thought that his incarcerations, albeit brief, would serve to weaken the organization, the exact opposite happened. A late 2003 congress, following Rizieq’s November 2003 release from prison, allowed the leadership to refocus the organization and its strategies. The group has refocused on its religious identity and has tried to purge the more “uncontrolled and undesirable elements.” As Wilson notes, “If Rizieq’s imprisonment has the intention of undermining the group, the opposite was the case. FPI responded by tightening its ranks, centralizing control over its component units, and upgrading its discipline and training of its recruits moving from an unruly bunch of thugs in religious garb to a far more disciplined and ideologically motivated paramilitary force.” Since late 2003, FPI has really been a more focused and disciplined organization. It has chosen when and how it would enter the political fray and limelight carefully.

For example, FPI has also been at the forefront of attacks against Muslim sects, such as Jemaah Ahmadiyah. In early July 2005, several hundred FPI members led a group of 1,000 vigilantes to attack the Ahmadiyah annual congress that was being held in Bogor. The FPI has also led attacks and threatened the physical safety of members of the Liberal Islam Network. These two cases will be discussed in the following chapter.

The FPI also took a high profile position in Aceh. The group dispatched 250 activists to Aceh and promised to send an additional 800. “FPI is not only an organization that destroys bars and discos in major Java cities, it has a humanitarian side as well that the media is not happy to expose,” asserted Hilmy Bakar Alascaty, the head of the FPI’s contingent in Aceh. Alascaty stated that the military had provided the group with air transport and that Vice President Jusuf Kalla had arranged for FPI members to travel on a government-chartered plane. He announced that in addition to providing aid and burying corpses, his group would ensure that foreign soldiers did not undermine or violate Islamic law. “We can work together. But if they come here with some hidden agenda, colonialism, imperialism, or missionary, I think this is very, very dangerous.” The FPI constantly warned of attempts by foreign troops to “Christianize” Acehnese Muslims. Interestingly, the Acehnese who by and large were not too welcoming
of militant groups from Java appear to have been more welcoming to the FPI. Unwitting of their vigilante nature, Acehnese tended to support the FPI, which engaged in the gruesome task of recovery and Islamic burial of corpses. The success of these actions portend the future direction of FPI.

Though Rizieq’s organization is often derided as “thuggish,” he himself is a passionate orator who has the ability to mobilize mass support. At age 40, he is young and charismatic and he effectively propagandizes issues that are particularly salient to his constituency. Alarmingly he has called on the FPI to not only demonstrate against the Thai government’s handling of the unrest in southern Thailand. The FPI is also one of the only groups that has used violence against political parties, in an attempt to intimidate them. The FPI has been described as a “shadow of its former self” because it is not seen in high profile “sweeps,” which attracted media attention. What the FPI is doing is much more insidious and targeted. And as FPI shifts from a less overtly violent to a more religious and ideological stance, the government will be even less willing to target the group.

**Radical student groups**

A third category of groups—including the Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam (Indonesian Committee for Solidarity of the Islamic World, or KISDI), Himpunan Mahasiswa Muslim Antar Kampus (Association of Inter-Campus Muslim Student Action, or HAMMAS), and student organizations like the Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Students Action Front, or KAMMI), and the Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah (Muhammad Students Association, or IMM)—represent a more politicized middle ground between the militias and the terrorists on one side, and the non-violent Islamist political parties on the other. These groups are a significant presence on Indonesian university campuses, though they are much smaller than the more mainstream Muhammadiyah or NU-linked student organizations such as the Modernist Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (Muslim Student Association—HMI) or the traditionalist Indonesian Muslim Student Union (PMII).

Members of these groups are known to have ties to the fundamentalist Tarbiyah movement that became popular among students during the late 1980s. The Tarbiyah movement is the oldest and most established Wahhabi organization in Indonesia, and is very influential amongst the Arab minority. The goal of the Tarbiyah movement is the creation of an Islamic state. In addition to its network of pesantren, the movement has been active on university campuses in Jakarta and Bandung since the 1980s. It has since extended its network throughout Java and on other islands.

**Komite Indonesia Untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam**

Ahmad Sumargono, a conservative leader of the DDII, founded Komite Indonesia Untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam (the Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with the
Islamic World, written here as KISDI) in 1987. It was one of the first *dakwah* organizations, which either laid low or were underground in the Suharto era, to emerge as an overtly political organization. It was able to do this because at first KISDI focused on injustices to Muslims in other parts of the world, notably in Bosnia and Palestine, that tended to be less threatening to the Suharto regime. Sumargono encouraged a greater identification by Indonesians with their co-religionists elsewhere. KISDI came to the fore at a rally for solidarity with Bosnian Muslims in mid-February 1994. The group sent volunteers to wage a jihad in Bosnia-Herzegovina and tried to raise funds to build a mosque in Sarajevo. Hefner notes that at the time, KISDI “made no effort to hide the fact that their central ambition was to create a conservative Islamic constituency capable of challenging the Suharto regime.” However, as the New Order floundered, KISDI got into bed with members of the Suharto regime for fear of a secular democracy taking root. By the end of the Suharto regime, KISDI, through its ties to Prabowo and other “green” generals, became important defenders of the regime. Sumargono was at first a vociferous critic of democratization, but then saw democracy as being the most effective means of getting political power for Muslims. With the Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia, Sumargono used the political unrest to launch vicious polemical attacks on the Chinese and Christian communities. Sumargono, along with the DDII’s Din Syamsuddin, was one of the leading voices for the jihad in Maluku, which he saw as part of an international conspiracy to carve out a Christian republic in the heart of Indonesia and “Christianize” the nation.

At first, KISDI supported Suharto’s successor, B.J. Habibie, who tried to bolster his Islamist credentials in the 1990s with the founding of ICMI. Yet Sumargono and KISDI soon turned on the Habibie administration, as being only a “symbol of Islam.” While he ultimately supported Abdurrahman Wahid’s election in 1999, this was more to prevent Megawati acceding to the presidency, something that he stated was “unacceptable.” He contended that Wahid had sacrificed the faith to excessive tolerance and attacked Wahid’s plan to establish diplomatic relations with Israel.

Today, KISDI’s influence appears to have diminished. For one thing, it was tarnished by its relationship with members of the TNI and New Order regime. Sumargono was removed as chairman in 2002, and the group is less active now than in the past, although there is lingering concern that the group continues to be used to channel money from Suharto’s circle of supporters to militant groups in order to discredit his successor regimes. He remains a prominent MP for the PBB. He is a senior member of the Indonesian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, and has been an outspoken defender of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and has used his legislative platform to attack the campaign against JI: “This is not different from the method used by the New Order regime to arrest activists.” Sumargono and KISDI have lingering influence amongst the political elite, and through that influence, especially in Parliament, they have afforded other *dakwah* organizations and militant groups political space for their activities.
HAMMAS, KAMMI, IMM, and AUIS

Tarbiyah established a strong following among students linked to the HAMMAS, KAMMI, and IMM. HAMMAS—The Association of Inter-Campus Muslim Student Action—was established in October 1998 in an attempt to coordinate and harness the disparate student groups that played such a critical role in Suharto’s downfall. HAMMAS was never a strong organization, though its rhetorical calls for jihad were shouted often.

HAMMAS’s origins lie in the teachings of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwanul Muslimin). Like the PKS, it is a cadre-based organization, with individual cells responsible for education, guidance, and recruitment of new cells. Again like PKS, the Ikhwan tradition instilled significant internal discipline and cohesion. KAMMI was founded around 1978 and began to engage in political demonstrations. It was quickly banned by the New Order regime. Rounds of arrests forced the organization to go underground and to focus on dakwah (propagation) and tarbiyah (education). Student members of KAMMI translated many Arabic books into Indonesian and were an important means of transmission of contemporary Islamist thinking from the Middle East. An increasing number of KAMMI members have studied in the Middle East, especially at the International Islamic University in Medina.

KAMMI returned to public life with the collapse of the Suharto regime. KAMMI has been active in demonstrations against the United States and in drumming up popular support for the jihad in Maluku. KAMMI has also been a major source of party workers mainly for the PKS, though some are active with the PPP. “Both KAMMI and PK[S] are the expressions of a new generation of Muslims who promote an ‘uncompromising’ purification of Islamic belief and strict adherence to religious morals, while simultaneously pushing for political modernization.” They have been adamant in their belief of an Islamic state but their position on democracy has been less clear. As a former KAMMI activist and now a PKS MP put it, the two movements’ objective is a “state based on Islamic law. Today democracy is our playing field but we cannot abandon our religious objectives.”

KAMMI has given vocal support for the sectarian conflicts and encouraged Muslims to defend themselves. KAMMI has also been vociferous in its criticism of the government for not stepping in and defending the interests of the Muslim population. KAMMI members have also supported JI’s Abu Bakar Ba’asyir.

The Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah (Muhammadiyah Students Association, or IMM) is a splinter of the mainstream than the mainstream Muhammadiyah-backed student organization, the Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (Muslim Student Association, or HMI). Hefner contends that HMI, which was the largest student organization in the 1970s, became very critical of the modernist leadership’s insistence that Islam required an Islamic state and supported a tolerant multi-denominational pluralist state. The IMM rejected this direction and continued to advocate for the establishment of an Islamic state.
The Solo-based Aliansi Ummat Islam Surakat was established on 5 December 2000 as an alliance of some 25 pro-\textit{sharia} organizations and groups. Like the FPI, it serves as a vigilante morals police.\textsuperscript{90} The AUIS was never able to expand beyond the city of Solo and gain traction.

\textbf{Hizb ut-Tahrir: A transnational outlier?}

Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Liberation Party, is a branch of the South Asian and Middle Eastern movement of the same name.\textsuperscript{91} Hizb ut-Tahrir is a “transnational movement that has served as radical Sunni Islam’s ideological vanguard,” and described as a “conveyor belt for terrorists” that “indoctrinates people, priming them for recruitment by more extreme organizations where they can take part in actual operations.”\textsuperscript{92} The highly cellular organization that is committed to the broad goal of uniting all Muslims and getting them committed to the ideal of the Caliphate is banned in most of the world. Yet in Indonesia, it is treated as an apolitical, non-violent, and quietist organization.

Bubalo and Fealy note that unlike Europe and Central Asia where Hizb’ut “has a reputation for strident radicalism,” the Indonesian branch “has a record of peaceful predication and intellectual activity which avoids the inflammatory rhetoric of some of its overseas counterparts.”\textsuperscript{93} Hizb ut-Tahrir is a Salafi \textit{dakwah} organization that calls for the Indonesian nation-state to be abolished and replaced by an Islamic caliphate.\textsuperscript{94} It came to Indonesia in the 1980s, when the head of Hizb’ut Tahrir in Australia moved to Bogor. Hizb’ut Tahrir quickly emerged as an important \textit{dakwah} movement on university campuses; but for the most part was an underground movement.

Hizb’ut Tahrir is quick to blame societies failings on the non-application of \textit{sharia}. Hizb ut-Tahrir patently rejects both democracy and the nation-state, which it believes is incompatible with its goals of an Islamic caliphate. Like KAMMI, Hizb ut-Tahrir is most active on university campuses and it is an important feeder group for the PKS. But unlike many of the other Taribiyah groups, Hizb ut-Tahrir has neither engaged in nor advocated political violence. Following the 9 September 2004 bombing of the Australian Embassy, the head of Hizb ut-Tahrir, Muhammad Ismail Yusanto, issued a statement in which he asserted: “This bombing is extraordinarily evil. Islamic \textit{sharia} strictly bans Muslims from killing others whatever the reasons may be, from damaging private and public property, and from spreading fear and terror.”\textsuperscript{95} However, he refused to condemn JI or acknowledge that the bombing was likely perpetrated by JI. Rather, he adopted a conspiracy theory approach, stating that bombing may have been perpetrated by groups that wanted to discredit Islam for their own political ends.

Hizb ut-Tahrir has been vociferous in its condemnation of the United States and the war on terrorism. On 22 February 2002, it issued a public statement asserting that the war on terror was a war on Islam: “America and her allies have rebelled against Allah. Not only that they have waged a war against Allah, His Messenger and the Muslim masses under the pretext of fighting terrorism.”\textsuperscript{96}
The statement continued: “It has demonstrated that she only strives to colonize and plunder the resources and not to spread peace and security.” Though the group has refused to endorse a violent jihad against the United States and her allies, there is growing concern that the Hizb ut-Tahrir has engaged in violence in the central Asian republics.

While Hizb ut-Tahrir is an overt organization in Indonesia, it is a highly secretive and disciplined party. Ariel Cohen states that it is “totalitarian . . . akin to a disciplined Marxist-Leninist party, in which internal dissent is neither encouraged nor tolerated.” Members are given a strict 2-year curriculum, but only after serving a 3 to 6 month apprenticeship and, like PKS cadres, they are constantly tested for their spiritual beliefs. Hizb ut-Tahrir believes that it can achieve its goals through peaceful means, and has outlined a three-stage strategy: The first stage involves party-building through recruitment, indoctrination, and propaganda. The second stage is to “create tension between the government and the peoples.” When antagonism reaches its peak, the third stage, the Islamic revolution and takeover is set. Hizb’ut Tahrir rejects democracy; its revolution and social change are all top-down.

Hizb ut-Tahrir also maintained a high-profile position in Aceh following the Tsunami to ensure that Islamic laws are upheld and that the West did not use this as an attempt to proselytize. They raised money for mosque reconstruction through their website and other media organs.

To date it is a small organization, though real figures are unknown. It certainly is growing in both its size and reputation. There is some concern that the radicalism of Hizb’ut-Tahrir cells in Europe and Central Asia will manifest in Indonesia, but to date it has not happened.

**Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s Civic Branch**

One organization that straddles the divide between violence and non-violence is the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Mujahidin Council of Indonesia, or MMI). MMI was founded by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir after his return from exile in Malaysia as an umbrella organization for all of the political parties, NGOs, civil society organizations, and individuals committed to turning Indonesia into an Islamic state. As Ba’asyir said, “MMI is an institution where a lot of people from a lot of Muslim groups . . . discuss how to get our vision of sharia implemented into national laws . . . The long-term strategy is to get Indonesia 100 percent based on sharia. As long as Muslims are the majority, the country should be ruled by sharia.” The organization has an office in Yogyakarta, publishes books through its Wihdah Press, lobbies political officials, and has held two high-profile national conferences in 2001 and 2003. The MMI does not endorse candidates or parties but as Ba’asyir told me, “Our members know how to vote.”

Publicly MMI eschews violence, and it does not lead or organize militant groups. This may, however, be changing. At the start of Ramadan, in the fall of
2004, bands of individuals conducted “sweeps” of restaurants and other venues that stayed open during the holy month—all in MMI’s name. Another reason for questioning MMI’s disavowal of violence is that many MMI members and constituent organizations are explicitly involved in political and sectarian violence. These include Agus Dwikarna and his Laskar Jundullah, Abu Jibril and his Laskar Mujahidin, and Umar Jafar Thalib and the Laskar Mujahidin. MMI is also arguably a civic front for JI, as many of its board members are prominent figures in JI. At one point, MMI’s board included Agus Dwikarna of KOMPAK and founder of Laskar Jundullah, as well as Mohammad Iqbal Rahman (Abu Jibril), a JI member and another key figure in the sectarian violence that engulfed Maluku and Sulawesi from 1999 to 2002. Jibril was detained by Malaysian authorities for more than 3 years before being sent back to Indonesia. When Jibril was freed by Indonesian authorities in October 2004, he attended an MMI-run prayer breakfast and has been using the MMI facilities since his release. MMI’s director of daily operations is Irfan Suryahardy Awwas, Abu Jibril’s younger brother.

Many of the MMI leaders were also in important positions (often concurrently) in Islamic charities and their Indonesian counterparts that were used to support militant activities. These include MERC, the IIRO and Al Haramain, as well as an Indonesian charity that served as their counterpart or executing agency, KOMPAK.

All of the groups in this category remain more or less committed to, if highly critical of, the current political system. Many do not like democracy, but they are using the existing political-legal framework to bring about sharia and eventually an Islamic state. They, for the most part, have not engaged in violence to bring about their goal of transforming Indonesian society and political life.

Like many of the other organizations described in this chapter, the MMI was very quick to move into Aceh after the devastating Tsunami. On 4 January 2005, the MMI dispatched the first group of 77 volunteers to Aceh, from their Jogyakarta-based headquarters. They were part of a 206-man contingent. The MMI was not active in providing relief or distributing aid, but rather was providing “spiritual guidance” and restoring “infrastructure in places of religious duties.” With Abu Jibril’s release from prison, his brother Irfan Awas has worked assiduously to raise the MMI’s profile that really took a hit in its popular support in 2003. Indeed, many Indonesia analysts had written the MMI off in August 2003. Days before the MMI was to have their second national congress, to include a key note speech by the then Vice President Hamzah Haz, the leader of the country’s largest Islamist party, JI operatives detonated a bomb in front of the J.W. Marriott hotel in Jakarta, killing 15 and wounding nearly 200. Hamzah Haz canceled his speech and few attended the congress, largely out of fear of being linked to JI by security forces and the press. The MMI maintained a lower profile for a brief period of time, but its current Executive Director Irfan S. Awas, a close personal aide to Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, opened over several dozen new offices across eight different provinces. Civil works and aid are at the core of this strategy, supplanting the weak Indonesian state.
Conclusion

While it would be a mistake to see all these groups as part of a single movement, as all have different goals and definitions of what an Islamic state should be, they are nonetheless part of a spectrum of religiously motivated political activism and extremism in Indonesia. These organizations have several key things in common. First, they are all committed to transforming Indonesia into an Islamic state to one degree or another. At the very least, all want sharia imposed and the Jakarta Charter included in the constitution. Second, all are committed to deepening Islamic values in society and ridding the country of corrupting morals of secularism and westernization. Third, all have engaged if not in overt violence, then in the intimidation and coercion of moderate Muslim groups, religious minorities, and secularists. Although most are quite small in membership, they have a disproportionate voice in Indonesian politics and society. Their ends and means are for the most part decried by the moderate majority, but too often they only react to the Islamists’ provocations. Vociferous and thoroughly committed to their causes, they tend to have good recruitment networks on university campuses and are increasingly being used by parties themselves to mobilize support, especially cadre-based parties such as the PKS. Organizations as diverse as KAMMI, FPI, and Laskar Jihad provide a middle ground of radical or militant Islam between the non-violent political Islam of PKS, PPP, and PBB and the revolutionary Islamist terrorism of JI. Moreover, a seemingly innocuous group may act as a place of recruitment for more violent groups, while members of one group may also join others. We now know that many JI members have also been members of a number of other Islamist organizations.

Sidney Jones, Anthony Bubalo, Greg Fealy, and others have made the case that the Salafi community holds the jihadists of Jemaah Islamiyah in contempt for a number of reasons. First, because pure Salafis should engage in dakwah, and that violence is a distraction from religious propagation. Second, jihadists pledge allegiance to the leaders of the clandestine movement, and not to the “commander of the faithful.” Third, because the jihadists support the violent overthrow of Muslim governments, from the House of Saud to the Indonesian government. And finally, because of the jihadists’ use of terrorism and suicide bombing that kills innocent people. Yet JI has been able to recruit from Salafi organizations—which have served as ideological conveyor belts for jihadist groups. Moreover, members of JI including Mukhlas have written dismissively about Salafis unwilling to undertake a violent jihad in defense of their religion. Indeed, Mukhlas has broadened the definition of a defensive jihad.

We are seeing both the breakdown of JI and an over-emphasis on the grouping. In its place has been a proliferation of small radical groups all committed to the same goal, but without any central command or coordination. As JI is shifting to a strategy that is more based on religious purification and indoctrination of its members and more emphasized on sectarian violence, these groups are shifting in the exact same way. While political violence has resulted in crackdowns by
the state, religious propagation keeps the state at bay. Unfortunately, support of sectarian violence does as well as so few in the polity are willing to speak out against it. Moreover, in both the cases of sectarian violence and the morals vigilantism, these groups are acting because they believe the state has abdicated its responsibilities. The state does not have either the resources or the political will to defend the interests of the Muslim majority, hence their intervention is justified. Increasingly, they are engaged in the provision of social services, filling in where the state is simply too weak to do so. Along the way, they are attempting to Islamize society, laying the ideological groundwork for an Islamic state.
Widespread outrage at the Madrid bombing in March 2004 that killed 191 and wounded countless others produced mass demonstrations across Spain. Indonesians, on the other hand, continue to view terrorism as a relatively minor problem, despite being the victims of four major terrorist attacks since 2002, and there have been no major demonstrations against terrorism. While public anger has grown with each new attack, the backlash has been quiet and private, with the exception of the Hindu island of Bali, where livelihoods have been devastated by terrorism. The Pew International Research Center for People and the Press, *Global Attitudes Survey, 2005*, noted a significant drop in support for suicide bombings against civilian targets. When asked if it was justified often or sometimes, support dipped from 27 percent in August 2002 to 15 percent in March 2005. Likewise, people who had a lot of confidence in Osama bin Laden dropped from 58 percent in May 2003 to 35 percent in March 2005. And for those who said it was never justified, the number increased from 54 to 66 percent respectively.¹ Yet, in the same poll, half of the respondents saw Islamic extremism as a threat and more than half supported counter-terrorist operations.² At the same time, the Indonesian electorate elected Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as president by a wide margin in September 2004, in some measure because the majority of people thought he could restore political stability and crack down on violence and lawlessness.

What this says about Indonesian society is unclear. At the very least, it suggests that a considerable number of Indonesians may be complacent, confident that moderates are in the majority and that there is little chance their way of life will be threatened by radical Islamism. Conversely, it might suggest that there is some sympathy within the population at large for the goals—if not the means—of terrorist groups like JI. We know that jihadists have worked with radical Muslim groups, student organizations, civic organizations, militias, and politicians. Whether or not those jihadists have been able to form broader ties to society as a whole is still unknown. Indeed, it is worth remembering that even with growing religious piety in society, the region is hardly a fertile ground for
dogmatic interpretations of Islam that the radicals are espousing. Still, organizations like JI do not need large numbers to be dangerous.

Preceding chapters have examined three distinct categories of radical Islamic groups: (1) Islamists, who believe that Indonesia should be governed by Islamic law, but who are willing to work through democratic institutions in order to bring about social change; (2) radical Muslim militants, who will use violence but only for a limited and defined political outcome (some—but not all—of whom believe democracy is anathema to Islam); and (3) Muslim terrorists, who employ indiscriminate violence for revolutionary change. While the people and organizations in these categories differ in terms of their willingness to use violence, they are all committed to, at the very least, establishing sharia courts and having Islamic laws apply to all Muslims. This means that they may cooperate in some instances where they share common interests. It also means that the success or failure of one group may positively or negatively affect the fortunes of the others. The purpose of this chapter will be to examine how these groupings are or might become linked to one another, and to analyze how the success or failure of some might impact the others.

Common motives

Implementation of sharia

Almost all Islamists, both modernist and traditionalist, are bound by the belief that Indonesia should be governed by Islamic law. This has led to certain tactical alliances among them during debates over the inclusion of the Jakarta Charter in Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution. Yet, beyond common calls for sharia, there are vast differences in interpretation over what sharia means, what components it entailed, and how and to whom it would be applied.

Islamist political parties in general support sharia, but the positions of some have raised concerns that they might disadvantage Indonesia’s minorities in the process of implementing it. The Crescent Star Party (PBB), whose leaders have engaged in anti-Chinese and anti-Christian tirades, has demanded a no-holds barred implementation of Islamic law. The leaders of the PKS, on the other hand, did not vote for the Jakarta Charter in the fall of 2002, nor did they explicitly support it. Hidayat Nur Wahid explained that he supported the “Medina Charter” that protects minority rights:

It’s true that the constitution of PKS is Islam. But concerning the implementation of the syariat, clarification is required. At a time when Article 29 [on religion] of the 1945 Constitution was being amended, we proposed the concept of the Medinah charter, not the Jakarta Charter. In the Medinah Charter the rights and responsibilities of all religions are protected in a just way. This is what happened in the time of the Prophet Mohammad when he made a peace agreement with the Jewish community in Medinah.
Such sentiments are probably little more than a tactical maneuver on the part of the PKS. “We know that people have a sort of phobia about the word *sharia*,” said Ferry Kuntoro, a PKS spokesman. Instead, according to Kuntoro, the PKS is “promoting Islamic values.” However, the PKS probably has not abandoned its hopes of implementing *sharia* in Indonesia. It is highly likely that instead it is simply using the democratic process to achieve this incrementally.

The Islamist political parties now appear to be focusing on advancing *sharia* through public policy, issue by issue. As described in Chapter 2, there have been *sharia* components in many key piece of public policy legislation, including the Marriage Law, Penal Code, Education Law, and Anti-Pornography Law. They tend to focus on the implementation of *sharia* provisions for issues specifically pertaining to women and family law, but have been less forceful about implementing *hukum hudud*—the Islamic criminal code. This is a crucial difference as they are working through legally democratic processes, rather than espousing a top-down cultural revolution. Yet these pieces of legislation are altering Indonesian society in profound ways.

The militant groups described in Chapter 4 are all committed to implementing a more extensive version of *sharia*. The *laskars* have done this by force, often implementing vigilante Islamic justice when given the opportunity or when they feel the state has abdicated its role. Islamist student groups have adhered more closely to democratic practices and, by and large, have supported Islamist political parties on the issue. Salafi groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir also support *sharia*, but they are ostensibly apolitical and do not support violence, focusing instead on religious indoctrination. They contend that both political and military action divert attention from the more important goal of purifying society. For Hizb ut-Tahrir, the implementation of Islamic law will strengthen society, making it more unified and morally resolute. Finally, militant groups such as the FPI and MMI see *sharia* as the only defense against globalization and the onslaught of Western values.

Jemaah Islamiyah, the most radical and violent of all Islamist groups in Indonesia, apparently aims to bring about the collapse of the Indonesian secular state and ultimately replace it with a pan-Islamic caliphate in the Malay world—a goal that really differentiates JI from other Islamist militants in Indonesia. But again that is their ultimate goal; their immediate goal is to bring about an Islamic state in Indonesia first that would serve as the nucleus.

**Purification of the religion**

The Sunni Islamists—both militant and peaceful—believe that one of their primary objectives must be to purify the religion of Islam from any impurities, such as Western thought and values from the outside and post-Prophetic innovation and interpretation from the inside. Indeed, many see the threat from impure Muslims as the greater of the two threats and the one that needs more urgent attention. For the militants, we can see that terrorist attacks serve three purposes: they
lessen the revenue of the _murtad_ regime, they drive away and kill foreigners and polytheists (Hindus in Bali), and they punish Muslims who are not living in true accordance with the _sharia_. For non-violent Islamists, Islamic purification is essential to their cause. Like the militants they do not believe that Islam can ever regain its zenith as long as it is corrupted with Western, secular impurities and ideological impurities. Indeed in the 2005 Pew survey, 35 percent of the Indonesian respondents ascribed the cause of Islamist extremism in the country due to growing immorality and 30 percent attributed it to a backlash against Western culture and influence.\(^8\) Islam can only triumph over the West when it is pure, free of any post-Prophetic interpretation—that is Salafi. In Indonesia, in the past few years, we have seen the rise in the “_Takfiri_”—the public condemnation of apostates and deviants. Increasingly, these condemnations have been interpreted as de facto approval if not justification for violence against the _takfiri_. The year 2005 saw several overlapping incidents that brought this to the fore.

What brought these incidents to the fore was the quadrennial meeting of the quasi-official Ulamas’ Council of Indonesia (MUI) in July 2005, that brought together some 400 clerics. On 28 July the MUI issued 11 _Fatwas_ that were unequivocally hard-line, and amongst other things banned liberal Islamic thought, secularism, religious pluralism, inter-faith marriage, inter-faith prayers led by non-Muslims, and women leading prayers attended by men. As Ma’aruf Amin, chief the MUI’s Fatwa Commission, warned, “This is a reminder for Muslims to follow the religion in a correct way and not to try to deviate from the principles.” The _fatwas_ had three specific target groups: Christians, the Liberal Islam Network (JIL) and, a Muslim sect, the Ahmadiyah.

The clerics were increasingly concerned at the proselytization efforts of Christian clergy—both Indonesian Christians and foreigners—in parts of the country and had been pushing for a bill in Parliament since 2003 to limit their activities. Although entitled the Bill on Religious Tolerance, the bill seeks to restrict the number of new Christian churches that can be built, obliges the government to scrutinize foreign aid for the churches, and bans apostasy and cross-religious adoptions.\(^9\) In a high-profile court case, the MUI brought three Christian women to trial for trying to convert Muslim children.\(^10\) If convicted, they would face five-year jail terms and Rp1 billion ($102,000) in fines. At the MUI meeting, regional delegates expressed concern that Christian activities were increasing: “The phenomenon of the construction of churches in the provinces is most disturbing,” said the MUI report.\(^11\) Most controversially Ma’aruf Amin took a swipe at the country’s long-held culture of religious pluralism: “Pluralism in that sense is _haram_ [forbidden under Islamic law], because it justifies other religions.”\(^12\) The 7th _fatwa_ could not have been more intolerant: “Muslims should view Islam as a true religion and other religions as wrong.” As a result of the _fatwa_ and fear of apostasy, a number of pro-_-sharia_ vigilante groups emerged and have led to the closure of some 23 churches.\(^13\) In September 2005, the Indonesian government decided to revisit a controversial old decree on the establishment of houses of worship.\(^14\) The 1969 decree states that the construction of houses of
worship can be done only with the support of local residents; something that puts the religious minorities who comprise under 15 percent of the population, at a distinct disadvantage.

The second target group was the Liberal Islam Network, comprised of scholars and theologians, mainly from NU backgrounds, who are at the forefront of promoting Indonesia’s culture of liberal Islamic theology, pluralism, and secularism. Founded in 2001, the group is committed to *ijtihad*—the application of reason and contextual analysis to the interpretation of religious texts, rather than dogmatic and literal interpretations. The group promotes not only pluralism and secularism, but the freedom of faith, including the right to not believe. For all these reasons, JIL has earned the hardliner’s scorn. The 7th *fatwa* was clear: “Islamic thought and teachings influenced by pluralism, secularism and liberalism are forbidden.” As Ma’aruf Amin said, “All of their teachings are deviant . . . No one should adhere to their beliefs. Their principles are dangerous and misleading, because they believe in only what they think is right and use pure rationale as justification.”

The third group, Jemaah Ahmadiyah, is a fringe Islamic sect that offends many Muslims—not just religious hardliners—for it believes that the Prophet Mohammad is not the last prophet of Allah. The MUI *fatwa* states that the group is “a heretical sect and its followers are *murtad* [apostates].” Even before the MUI *fatwa*, groups of Islamic vigilantes (mainly the FPI) had attacked Ahmadiyah temples. In early July 2005, police actually had to evacuate 100 Ahmadis to safety after mobs attacked the Kampus Mubarok Spiritual Center in Bogor. In September 2005, another Ahmadiyah Mosque was ransacked. As a result of the pressure by Muslim conservatives, the central government announced tentative plans to ban the sect. On 20 September 1984, the Ministry of Religious Affairs issued a circular declaring the Ahmadiyah to be misleading and against Islam, but fell far short of banning the group. The Ministry of Religious Affairs has refused to bring charges against the vigilantes, though Vice President Yusuf Kalla did declare that charges would be brought. There is palpable concern amongst the estimated 200,000–500,000 Ahmadiyah followers in their 542 branches, mosques, and preaching centers that they will continue to be the targets of violence and intimidation.

Do the MUI’s *fatwas* really matter? Many argue that they have no bearing whatsoever. They contend that the *fatwas* are non-binding as the MUI is only a quasi-official body. As Azumardi Azra commented: “The MUI is not a state institution. It can issue *fatwa* and orders to Muslims, but they are not binding and it does not have the authority to enforce them. Legal authorities in the government have no obligation to enforce the edicts while Muslims are not obliged to comply with them.” Yet this is a bit of a misnomer. The MUI was established in 1975 by Suharto’s New Order government. Today, it is the country’s highest Islamic authority, and has great influence over the country’s mosques. It has important representation from major Islamic organizations, including the NU and Muhammadiyah, whose senior leaders endorsed the *fatwas*, not just hard-line groups, such as the Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia, which allows its decisions
The 11 fatwas, moreover, were presented to the country’s vice president in the Istana. Moreover, there have been documented cases in which police have used the fatwa when they interfered in a religious ceremony. In the case of the attacks on the Ahmadiyah compound, police in Bogor arrested none of the assailants, but ordered the sect to stop their activities. The Attorney General, Abdul Rachman Saleh, threatened to use his authority to ban the Ahmadiyah as they were “disruptive to the public order”, that is the onus was on them, the victims.

Second, as Syafi’I Ma’arif, the former head of the Muhammadiyah warned: “The fatwas will embolden hard-line, power-hungry groups.” Vigilante morals police groups, such as the FPI, will unilaterally enforce the MUI fatwas: “Because the MUI has no authority to enforce the controversial fatwa, it is the hard-line groups, like the Islam Defenders Front (FPI) who appear at the frontline to pressure the authorities to enforce them. If they believe the authorities have failed, they (the hard-line groups) could directly come to the field to enforce them.”

We have already seen this. Vigilante gangs have forced Christian churches and Ahmadiyah mosques closed, and the government has stood by and not pressed charges against the perpetrators. As Ulil Abshar Abdallah, a leader of JIL, said about the Ahmadiayah: “This is not the first time that the [Ahmadiyah] has been attacked. The government should be held responsible. It did nothing to prevent or stop the attack.” Ulil, himself, was condemned to death in a 2003 fatwa by a pro-sharia group, Forum Ukuwah Umat Islam (FUUI), and groups like the FPI continue to threaten the JIL. The FPI has also tried to recruit nearby residents to help evict the JIL and its supporters, a radio station and think tank. It abandoned its threat to attack the office when the police surrounded it. This is a major affront to Indonesia’s civil liberties and culture of tolerance and pluralism. The JIL, to its credit, has welcomed the challenge posed by the FPI. In a very eloquent article by Mohammad Azoula posted on their website, that author contends, “the MUI fatwa and the unfolding JIL (Liberal Islam Network) crisis is a blessing in disguise”.

Yet Why? Because it lays all the cards out on the table. It calls us to define the issues at hand and to pressure the state to clamp down on the violent and coercive expression of radicalism by a fringe group of Islamists trying to dominate the cultural sphere through fear and religious extremism. It is a serious mistake for JIL and for the ordinary Indonesians to ignore and thus accommodate the “thugs in robes” because it will only further empower them.
But there is legitimate concern that the MUI’s fatwas sanction violence. As one commentator said about the edict against the Ahmadiyah, “The MUI must be held accountable because it issued an edict saying the blood of the Ahmadiyah congregation is halal.”

In short, the MUI fatwas must be seen in the context of the “creeping sharia-ization of Indonesia.” The MUI made clear that the “People who are against the edicts are munafikin [hypocrites] and are more dangerous than kafir [infidels] since they attack from inside Islam.” What is disconcerting is that this is coming from the Muslim mainstream, yet it mirrors what the Islamists are committed to doing. Islamists, militants, and terrorists share the goal of purifying their religion, and believe that Islam can triumph internationally and an Islamic state be imposed domestically only after it has been purified of western and secular concepts. To that end, all three groups have worked assiduously to indoctrinate and ideologically purify their ranks.

**Perception that Islam is under attack**

Islamists, militants, and terrorists have all sought to promote a sense of Islamic victimhood. The widespread belief that the war on terrorism is patently anti-Muslim has made it difficult for liberal Muslims to speak out forcefully against terrorism for fear of being branded pro-Western apologists. While it is true that several leaders did denounce the terrorist attacks in Bali and Jakarta, NU and Muhammadiyah were slow to actively challenge Islamist radicals after 11 September 2001. Since that time, individual voices—such as the late Nurcholish Majid, Hasyim Muzadi and Azyumardi Azra—have spoken out, but many also blamed the United States and its policies for the rise of Islamism and Muslim militancy. This was especially true following the March 2003 invasion of Iraq. Liberal Muslims, such as Ulil Abshar-Abdalla of the Liberal Islam Network, and the popular cleric Abdullah Gymnastiar led demonstrations against the United States; Gymnastiar also refused to meet with President Bush during his brief stopover in Bali in October 2003.

As has been noted in Chapter 3, JI’s leaders have constantly tried to portray theirs as a struggle for an Islam that is under attack. While Laskar Jihad’s Thalib has denied any connection to JI, the idea of Islam under siege is common to both groups. Thalib has consistently claimed that the conflict in Ambon was one pitting Indonesia and Islam against separatists backed by “world Christianity.”

Islamist politicians such as Sumargono and Mashadi gave Laskar Jihad’s efforts full support, while even the moderate politician Amien Rais attempted to capitalize politically from the conflict by linking himself to the struggle to “protect” the Muslim Ambonese. Thuggish groups such as GPI and FPI and civic organizations such as KISDI also have tied into JI’s anti-Americanism by organizing anti-American demonstrations, while FPI and GPI have issued calls for jihad against the United States and tried to recruit Indonesians to fight the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Opposition to separatism

Islamists and militants tend to believe that separatist movements like those in East Timor and Maluku were part of a global conspiracy to weaken Muslim countries. In some respects, this ties in with the concern that Islam itself is under attack, but places this fear within a specifically Indonesian context. It also allowed an alliance of convenience to form between Muslim radicals and secular nationalists, who saw separatism in the outer provinces as a conspiracy to weaken Indonesia specifically. Defending the territorial integrity of a Muslim land was an obligation. Religious nationalists, such as those of the TNI’s “green” faction, are thought to have covertly aided the Muslim militias fighting in Ambon, while New Order linked Muslim politicians like Din Syamsuddin were just as fervent in their calls for putting down Christian secessionism as militants such as Laskar Jihad’s Jafar Umar Thalib or JI’s Abu Jibril. As has been noted, moderate PAN leader Amien Rais also called for aid to the Muslims of Ambon, though this was arguably a cynical ploy to weaken Wahid’s presidency. Moreover, the anti-militarism of the immediate post-Suharto period and the international condemnation of the violence that accompanied East Timor’s independence made forceful intervention by the government or TNI unfeasible. This made militias like Laskar Jihad or Laskar Mujahidin useful to people such as Din Syamsuddin and the TNI’s “green” faction. In short, many nationalists have found common cause with more militant Islamist groups regarding territorial integrity. But more to the point, the militant groups have been used by the nationalists in many places to do the state’s work. In return they have been given political cover for their activities.

Muslim radicals, unlike secular nationalists, have generally focused on the fear of Muslim lands being occupied or divided by infidels, which explains their emphasis on Ambon, rather than Aceh, where separatists are Muslim. Despite displeasure at government suppression of Acehnese Muslims among some radicals, most militant groups remain opposed to Acehnese independence. For example, ICG reports that “For historical and political reasons, the interests of JI and military intelligence intersect in Aceh because both are opposed to the Acehnese rebel movement, Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or GAM.” GAM has also chosen to distance itself from radical Muslim groups, allegedly chasing Laskar Jihad out of Aceh in 2002 because, as one GAM leader put it, the group did not want “Aceh to become the base of a group which stirs up racial and religious sentiment.”

Opposition to globalization

Radical Islam is able to tap into the growing resistance among segments of the Indonesian populace to globalization and the spread of Western culture. While not anti-capitalist per se, Islamists oppose the excesses of capitalism and the inequitable distribution of wealth which they believe benefits the West and
corrupt secular elites. That can explain why the political party PKS, which scored such spectacular results in the 2004 election, had as its platform two concepts: bersih (clean, i.e., non-corrupt) and peduli (caring about social welfare and equity). While Indonesia’s economic performance has improved markedly in the past few years, most benefits have been at the macro level and in the financial sector. Economic growth has not translated into jobs and improved living standards for the vast majority of the people. In short, the state has failed to deliver, and that has played into the hands of the Islamist parties and organizations that have made social welfare their cornerstone.

A negative economic climate contributes to a ripe environment for terrorist recruitment. Indonesia’s economic recovery remains mixed. In absolute size, Indonesia’s economy remains lower than its 1996 level ($227 billion). The rupiah lost 7 percent of its value in the first half of 2004, and 5.4 percent from 2003 to 2004, a slump that led the government to downgrade its growth forecasts for 2004 to 4.8 percent. Foreign investment in the first quarter of 2004 fell by 30 percent to $2.3 billion amidst concerns over political instability and violence. Yet Indonesia’s real economic crisis is its surging unemployment and underemployment rates. Twenty-seven percent of Indonesia’s population live below the poverty line. While the government’s official statistics put the unemployment rate at 10.5 percent of the 100 million labor force, estimates of unemployed and underemployed are as high as 40 million. The economy has made a substantial recovery since 1998 at the macro level but that recovery has not translated into significant and sustained job creation. The World Bank recently reported that, unless foreign investment picked up solidly, Indonesia could not expect to achieve more than 4 percent growth. This percentage of growth is inadequate to absorb any significant amount of the surplus labor. Poverty has increased while the distribution of wealth and income has become more unequal. Moreover, the burden of servicing the country’s $133 billion in foreign debt limits the amount of money the government has to invest in critical infrastructure. Poverty, unemployment, and disenfranchisement all create conditions in which terrorism can flourish. In addition to frustration and aggression, economic difficulties often lead the impoverished to use the West as a scapegoat for their economic plight.

Islamist political parties are also able to capitalize on fears of social globalization that are seen as threats to cultural morals and religion. According to the Pew Global Attitudes Project, in the past three years, support for the United States, a symbol of globalization and a lightning-rod for its opponents, registered one of the most precipitous drops recorded among Indonesians. Whereas 75 and 61 percent of Indonesians had positive images of the United States in 2000 and 2002 respectively, only 15 percent did in 2003. That number jumped in 2005 to 38 percent, in large part due to America’s pronounced role in providing relief to victims of the Tsunami. Interestingly, while many in the West associate political Islam with extreme patriarchy, an upsurge in support for the Islamist parties in the past few years has come from women. According to polling data, many
mothers believe that under Islamist party rule, drug taking, teen pregnancies, and juvenile delinquency will decrease.\textsuperscript{49}

While these four trends represent common ground for many of the Islamists, their methods for achieving their objectives are more divergent. As we have seen, these range from peacefully using democratic institutions, to using large-scale terrorism. The Islamist political parties have tried to broaden their base of voter support so as to use legislative means to push through their social agenda and drive a wedge between Indonesia and the United States. As Hidayat Nur Wahid of the PKS said, “We want the party to become a pioneer in upholding Islamic values and we want to do that within the framework of democracy, national unity and integrity.” Student groups and other organizations have led mass demonstrations. More militant groups have taken matters into their own hands. As Habib Rizieq, the leader of the FPI said, “As long as my followers go out on raids to uphold the law and their faith, why should I stop them?”\textsuperscript{50} JI has explicitly targeted the United States and its allies, in particular Australia, in a suicide bombing campaign.

The growing influence of Islam in Indonesia

Islamists have so far been the most successful of the three groupings in broadening their appeal to the Indonesian populace. First, they have been able to tap into a rise in religiosity, as well as the spread of Salafi Islam. Second, the PKS has adopted an anti-corruption platform, which helps the party appeal to a number of voters who might not support calls for sharia. Obviously, this is not a tactic that all Islamist or radical groups can adopt. It is therefore likely that all these groups will try to take advantage of growing Islamic religiosity in Indonesia in order to increase their support bases.

Growing religiosity in society

Several well-respected opinion polls have tried to measure the growth of Islamic religiosity in Indonesian society in the last three years: the annual study by the Research Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM), the 2003 and 2005 studies by the Pew International Research Center for the People and the Press, and the Australian-based Freedom Institute’s 2004 poll (also conducted by Saiful Mujani).\textsuperscript{51} All the polls reveal that Indonesia has seen a rise in individual religiosity. However, the two polls had divergent results when it came to the state of democracy. First, while the majority (65 percent) believed Indonesia should be governed by a democratic regime, the Pew poll also found considerable frustration with democracy and questions over its efficacy in Indonesia, and found a sentimental yearning for strongman rule, as most people do not believe that democracy has led to any meaningful improvement in their lives. Second, the percentage of people who believed that Western-style democracy works in Indonesia fell from 64 percent in 2003 to 41 percent in 2003.\textsuperscript{52} Arguably, this
frustration stems from the country’s incomplete recovery from the economic crisis and continued to high levels of unemployment and underemployment, rather than a dismissal of democracy per se. However, with the successful 2004 parliamentary and presidential polls, support for democracy jumped to 77 percent in 2005. Third, the Pew poll revealed that Southeast Asians are identifying more frequently with the plight of their co-religionists in Iraq and Palestine: 80 percent of the respondents feel more solidarity with the Islamic world than they did in the past according to the 2003 poll.

Liddle and Mujani contend that while there is an upsurge in religiosity, for the majority of Muslims fealty is returning to the traditional Islamic traditions. By every measure, Indonesians are displaying more manifestations of their faith than in the past. Mosque attendance and Haj pilgrimages have increased, the study of Arabic has become more popular, and there has been an upsurge of visible manifestations of Islam, such as hijab and prayer caps. As Gerald Houseman writes:

The strong Islamic revival of the 1980s and 1990s is undeniable. It can be seen in the marked increase in the number of women who wear the tudong [Islamic head covering for women], or in the numbers, especially among young people, who visit Mecca in order to fulfill one of their important Islamic obligations. It can also be seen in the growth of religious schools, colleges, and universities, and—perhaps most striking—in the new and strong interest among members of the urban middle and upper classes in their religious life. The typical belief in the past was that religion was important in rural and village life, but not in the cities. Attendance at mosques has also gone up dramatically over these past two decades.

The polling data confirms this. The PPIM surveys show increases in the number of people who pray five times a day always or very often from 77 percent in 2001 to 82 percent in 2005. The survey found similar increases in manifestations of personal piety: reading the Koran, wearing the jilbab, and fasting during Ramadan.

Islamic revival is not the same thing as religious fanaticism, of course, but the most dangerous radicals and terrorists in post-Suharto Indonesia have all been marked by a strong sense of faith. Groups such as Laskar Jihad or JI have combed the ranks of the highly pious looking for recruits and, as discussed in Chapter 3 and 4, the leaders of both groups justify their actions in religious terms. All have exploited a sense of Muslim victimization, something that the 2003 Pew survey also found. The number of Muslims who believed that their religion was under siege in Indonesia almost doubled, from 33 percent in 2002 to 59 percent in 2003. In the 2005 Pew poll, 39 percent of the respondents identified themselves as Muslims first, Indonesian second, compared to 35 percent who listed national identification first.
It is the third poll that is the most troubling in this regard. Conducted with the help of Muhammadiyah, the poll found an alarming level of support for or ambivalence toward Islamist terrorism. Of the 40 percent of respondents who had heard of Jemaah Islamiyah, one third explicitly supported them. Sixteen percent of the respondents backed the bombing campaign if it was done to defend Islam, while 25 percent refused to explicitly disagree with the bombers’ means and ends. As Saiful Mujani said, “There is a significant number of Indonesians, at least half, [who] do not have a negative reaction to that and they agree with silence at least, or protect this kind of activity.”

The PPIM poll found similar results: 42 and 38 percent of the respondents knew of JI and FPI respectively, and 13 and 18 percent agreed with their goals and methods.

Other polling data is troubling. The 2004 PPIM survey found that 41 percent agreed with the statement that a woman cannot become president, more than 26 percent of those who agreed in 2002, and after the country had a female president. The number of people who agreed that adulterers could be stoned increased from 42 to 55 percent between 2001 and 2004; while the number of people who supported the amputation of thieves’ hands went from 29 to 40 percent at that time. This, however, must be seen in the context of spiraling crime rates and the police’s inability to stop the surge in criminality. But here again, people are willing to turn to institutions that were once the sole purview of the state, simply because the government has failed to deliver.

Despite the ICG’s contention to the contrary, the spread of the practice of Salafi Islam is of special concern. Militant leaders like Jafar are orthodox Salafis, while JI and other militant groups fuse Salafi fundamentalism with the aggressive radicalism of Sayyid Qutb and Abdullah Azzam, applying their theories of religious purification, violent jihad, attacks on apostates and polytheists, and attacks on jahilija to Southeast Asia. They used these writings to justify their violent jihad and their attacks on secular regimes and moderate co-religionists who do not follow a literal reading of the Koran.

**Elite responses**

The growth in religiosity in society has also had a discernable effect on politicians and elite opinion-makers. In their efforts to court the growing number of religiously motivated Muslim voters, and to maintain their social-religious credibility to enter into political alliances with Islamist parties, mainstream political leaders have been overly sensitive toward speaking out against political violence perpetrated in the name of Islam. In some cases, politicians have placated the Islamists because they have over-estimated their strength. This widespread unwillingness to speak out has influenced the body politic significantly.

Hopefully, this will change under the Yudhoyono administration. As Anthony Smith has written, “Yudhoyono, while a Cabinet minister, took the lead in speaking out against the terrorist threat, even in the face of a skeptical public, and seems committed to confronting the problem.” However, Yudhoyono’s stance
is uncommon, and for the most part there has been a disappointing reaction to the threat of terrorism and to sectarian violence. Even following the terrorist attacks in Bali, former President Megawati Sukarnoputri “did not so much as issue a public statement” condemning terrorism. Several mainstream politicians, such as Amien Rais, became far more outspoken in their condemnation of terrorism in Bali’s wake. Many other leaders, however, have come to Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s defense, and many continue to deny the existence of Jemaah Islamiyah.

Similarly, no mainstream political leaders ever came out and condemned Laskar Jihad or the other groups who were fighting in Maluku. Some gave active support, such as the then Vice President Hamzah Haz, while others encouraged militants through their own quiescence. For example, even though the moderate cleric Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) ordered the Laskar Jihad not to go to Maluku, he was unwilling to expend the political capital to stop them. Megawati was better able to calm the unrest, while still falling short of declaring Laskar Jihad illegal. Yudhoyono has been tougher on terrorists and, while he has not supported the extra-legal activities of militant Muslim groups fighting insurgents in Maluku or elsewhere, he has also not been vocal in his condemnation.

With the restoration of democracy in 1998, there was agreement by all political parties that politics was going to be inclusive, and that all political parties would be allowed, including the Islamists. Authoritarianism gave way to a culture of consensus and inclusion. There is clearly considerable support for Islam’s political role. As Meidyatama Suryodiningrat, editor of the *Jakarta Post,* succinctly put it, “It is only right that Islam have a proper representation in the national polity.” In the 2003 Pew poll, 82 percent agreed that Islam should play a role in politics, this figure rose to 88 percent in 2005. The accommodating nature of post-Suharto politics, at one level, sought to co-opt the Islamists by giving them a seat at the table.

Indonesian society’s unwillingness to stand up and counter the radicals can also be explained in part by the nature of the “silent majority.” Most Indonesians are moderate and secular, and simply assume that their values will be protected because they are in the majority; they have little concern that a fringe minority will ever have the strength to threaten their way of life. This sense of security in numbers has led to a degree of complacency. Islamists, through their stronger activism, have in many ways framed the political debate in post-Suharto Indonesia. They have, in fact, consistently outflanked moderate and secular Muslims on a number of issues.

**Political space created by Islamist politics**

Despite great differences among the three categories on when and how to employ violence, each affects the fortunes of the others. Since its founding, Indonesia has been a secular state; indeed, one of the most secular Muslim countries in the world. Yet in the past seven years we have witnessed three major shifts in Indonesian politics: democratization, the resurgence of political Islam, and the
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emergence of new groups opposed to democracy and the secular state. This last phenomenon is in part a result of the first: democratization also allows political space for people and groups opposed to democratic values, such as the equal treatment of minorities. In their eyes, democracy is anathema to an Islamic state. At the same time, the radicals have found how political Islamists have used democracy to broaden the appeal of a more Islamic society. Political Islam, moreover, can legitimize the goals of radical Islam, while acting as a shield for the more radical groups, blunting criticism and inhibiting prosecution.

For example, before the Bali bombing, Hamzah Haz had paid several high-profile visits to Ba’asyir’s Al Mukmin pesantren. “There are no terrorists here [Al Mukmin],” he said. “I guarantee that. If they exist, don’t arrest any Muslim clerics, arrest me.” Haz also went out of his way to meet with radical leaders such as Jafar and later interceded in a criminal case against the Laskar Jihad leader to get all charges dropped. Haz said: “I met these people [Ba’asyir and Jafar] personally, and it makes little sense to suspect them of being terrorists. If they were terrorists, shouldn’t they be playing their games underground, not out in the open? I said earlier, if they’re proven to be terrorists I will personally ask that they be arrested. But if they’re not, then I call on the authorities to arrest me first.” Haz moderated his stance on terrorism after the Bali bombing, saying that “[The Bali blast] was an act of terrorism. No one who is involved in terrorism, ordinary people, government officials or ulamas [Muslim religious leaders] has impunity from the law.” However, he was later chosen to be the keynote speaker at the second general meeting of Ba’asyir’s MMI in 2003, though he withdrew following the 5 August bombing of the J.W. Marriott hotel in Jakarta.

PKS leader Hidayat Nur Wahid paid a high-profile visit to Ba’asyir in prison, following his party’s notable success in the April 2004 elections, in order to protest what he called an “illegal detention” and unwarranted foreign pressure from the United States. “I am against terrorism and support the rule of law, but I object to any foreign intervention. I am worried that those who blindly accuse others of being terrorists without having evidence are the real radicals and terrorists.” Two senior PBB members, Sumargono and Hilmy Bakar Almascati, also visited Ba’asyir in April 2004, stating their willingness to become non-legal advocates for the jailed cleric, ostensibly meaning they would use their parliamentary powers to pressure the government to drop all charges against Ba’asyir.

More alarmingly, following the 1 October 2005 triple bombings in Bali, Hidayat Nur Wahid blamed the attacks on rivalry within the tourism industry: “I have valid information that these acts may be related to interstate competition in the tourism industry.” When top-level political leaders make such statements, it has a chilling effect on the law enforcement and judiciary. More important it sends very conflicting signals to the general public.

The most dangerous facet of this phenomenon is how it has silenced moderate Muslims. While it is true that several leaders did denounce the terrorist attacks
in Bali and Jakarta, the mainstream Muslim organizations, the NU and Muhammadiyah, were slow to perceive the threat of Islamic terrorism, especially in the year between the 11 September 2001 attacks and the Bali bombings. Since September 11, individuals such as the late Nurcholish Majid, Hasyim Muzadi, and Azizumardzi Azra have spoken out, but there has not been a coherent campaign to provide an ideological alternative to radical Islam. As Kristen Schulze argues, a “desire not to be ‘out-Islamicized’ by the radicals” has constricted moderate responses to militant Muslim violence. As Azizumardzi Azra lamented, “Islamic organizations in Indonesia tend to be defensive. They only give statements that terror should not be linked to Islam and terror is a conspiracy of western countries to corner Islam, while it is clear that all those involved [in the attacks] are people connected to Islam.” Radicals have certainly been emboldened by this. There are three primary explanations for how this situation came to be.

First, the moderates are atomized. NU and Muhammadiyah are factionalized, while many important moderate theologians, Muslim leaders, and NGOs are not working together. Some small NGOs and groups like International Center for Islam and Pluralism (ICIP) and Ulil Abshar-Abdalla’s Liberal Islam Network (JIL) have been important ideological counterweights to the radicals, but they are elite organizations limited by size, resources, and the perception that they are too close to the West. Second, a number of liberal or moderate Muslims display a clear fear of being attacked, with little faith that the state will protect them in the face of people who are predisposed to violence. On a different level, the United States has undermined the moderates, particularly through its policies in the Middle East and the war in Iraq. As mentioned above, some members of the Liberal Islam Network believe that an open conflict with the Islamists is necessary to get Indonesia off of its current sharia trajectory. Only by dragging the fight into the public domain will the radicalism be apparent to the over-all moderate populace.

In short, radicals have made considerable progress moving into the mainstream of Indonesian society. Although most Indonesians still find their means repugnant, society as a whole has been desensitized to violence in the past few years. Moreover, a growing number of Indonesians support Islamist political parties, who sympathize with the goals of the radicals, if not their means. The fact that Islamists make up an important voting block in parliament could possibly exacerbate this situation, hampering efforts by moderates to speak out against radical Muslim violence and giving radicals a political shield under which to hide.

There are some reasons to hope that this situation will improve. For example, Muhammadiyah called the 9 September 2004 bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta as “savage and inhuman,” saying that any form of violence was strictly against universal and religious values. Their statement, signed by chairman Ahmad Syafi Maarif, called on security authorities to intensify measures to combat terrorism. The Nahdlatul Ulama, likewise condemned the bombing and “urge[d] the police and legal authorities to thoroughly probe the
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incident and find the bombers, and to punish them severely.”

Yet the NU also apportioned some of the blame for terrorism on the United States, Australia, and Britain, saying that these countries should exercise “introspection” and consider that their foreign policies were the root cause. The statement signed by acting NU Chairman Masdar Farid Mas’udi chastised the West by saying that “Feeling oneself to have an monopoly on truth and power will benefit no one except the terrorists.”

A taste of things to come? Islamic governance in Malaysia and the lessons for Indonesia

To get a sense of direction political Islam might take in Indonesia, one needs to look no further than neighboring Malaysia. There one can see both the example of the Parti Islam Se Malaysia (PAS), which has intermittently governed Kelantan and Terengganu, and also that of the ruling secular United Malay National Organization (UMNO), which has Islamicized in response to the threat from PAS.

In Malaysia’s first post-independence election in 1959, PAS won control of the state governments of Terengganu and Kelantan. From 1980 on, PAS radicalized, becoming more strident about creating an Islamic state. UMNO responded to the challenge posed by PAS by co-opting many of PAS’s key issues. Since 1984, UMNO established an Islamic university, created an Islamic banking industry, and generally supported the “inculcation of Islamic values” in government. UMNO has had two options: to reinforce its secular policies to distance itself from PAS, or to become more Islamic itself, in an attempt to woo PAS supporters or prevent UMNO members from defecting to PAS. Notwithstanding, PAS has broadened their base of support. PAS, much like Indonesia’s PKS, has benefited from disgust with official corruption; and their leaders, such as Nik Aziz, always had a clean image in contrast to the corruption and cronynism associated with secular politicians.

PAS’s first attempt to implement sharia at a local level came in 1990, with their electoral victory in Kelantan State. Nik Aziz Nik Mat, the PAS state secretary, immediately banned gambling, closed nightclubs, and restricted the sale of alcohol. In 1991, the Kelantan state assembly passed a bill prescribing Islamic law, including the legalization of hukum hudud, but the federal government blocked its implementation in 1993. In March 2002, the Terengganu state government, also under PAS’ control, announced that it would amend its constitution to incorporate sharia and the hudud, despite challenges from the federal government. At the federal level, PAS proposed a bill in 1998 that mandated the death penalty for apostasy. Though the bill was easily defeated by the UMNO-led coalition, Barisan Nasional, it signaled the direction PAS intends to take the country given the electoral opportunity. In 2000, the Ulamas re-addressed the apostasy bill, this time supporting a mandatory one-year sentence in a “faith rehabilitation center,” rather than the death sentence. Again the law was not
passed, but it did win considerable support from not just PAS but also many UMNO politicians.

In the 2004 elections, under the first Prime Ministership of Abdullah Badawi, PAS experienced a serious setback: retaining only 7 of its 27 seats and losing control of Terengganu. Yet PAS took some comfort from the fact that their share of the absolute vote increased by 2 percent over the 1999 poll. PAS appears to have held onto the electorate that defected to them in 1999, despite the massive UMNO political machine, patronage networks, some electoral irregularities, and gerrymandering. PAS did lose an important by-election in 2005, and the party has elected a new generation of leadership to position the party for the next election.

What are the implications for Indonesia? First, the Islamist parties in Malaysia governed effectively, and were lauded for their anti-corruption stances and the simple lifestyles of their leaders. However, their economic performance was poor. While PAS articulated a vision based on social justice, they simply were unable to articulate effective development policies that led to economic growth and job creation, while their social policies scared away foreign investors. Second, PAS remained singularly focused on bringing about an Islamic state, governed by a strict interpretation of sharia. They never lost this goal or became complacent with their political power. Only the intervention by the strong central government stopped things such as hukum hudud from being implemented. It is doubtful that the Indonesian central government is powerful enough to impose its writ on the provinces as the Malaysian government could.

Third, PAS has steadily moved UMNO to the right; to try to win back supporters, the once secular party of UMNO had to become increasingly Islamist in its direction. The inculcation of Islamic values, the imposition of Islamic education, the redirection of foreign policy from ASEAN toward the OIC became cornerstones of UMNO in the beginning of the 1990s. Will the Islamist parties in Indonesia become more mainstream and secular to win votes, or will they maintain their Islamist direction knowing that the secular parties will have to adopt a more pro-Islam position to win back the electorate?

Fourth, PAS has been able to forge a coalition of both conservative rural voters and young urban Islamic modernists. However, splits are emerging between the ulama-dominated rural electorate and urbanized individuals with a more modernist outlook. This influences Indonesia in two ways. First, the young modernists of PAS are increasingly looking toward PKS for guidance and inspiration. Yet PAS’ ability to capitalize on rural conservatism to push forward its Islamist agenda is salient in Indonesia. This has particular relevance for parties such as the PKS in Indonesia as many find ways to get beyond their predominantly urbanized youth constituency.

The lessons of PAS, and their experience of governance of Kelant and Terengganu, have important implications for Indonesia, where for the first time Islamists are exercising executive functions at the local level. The experience of PAS shows that once in power, they will focus their resources and political capital
in pushing through their social agenda, Islamic morality, anti-corruption, and sharia law, while not doing much to develop an effective economic development strategy.

**Conclusion**

Indonesia is the world’s third largest democracy, and the largest of any Muslim country. A rapid political transition since 1998 means that institutions are stabilizing but are still fragile. In July and September 2004 it conducted its first-ever direct presidential election. The incumbent, Megawati, was defeated by her former security minister, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Yudhoyono ran on the only all-secular ticket, and won in large part because voters saw him as a strong figure who could restore stability. Indonesia should be proud of its accomplishment, but cautious at the same time. Its economic outlook is mixed, and Yudhoyono does not have a large base of support in parliament.

The parliamentary elections in April 2004 produced surprise gains for the Islamist PKS. With fellow Islamist parties holding steady, this gives Islamists control of 21 percent of parliament. The PKS was able to make headway in large part because they softened their calls for the implementation of sharia, and focused more on anti-corruption and social welfare. With a popular president governing with limited support in parliament, Islamist political parties are likely to exert their influence, possibly gaining a good deal of power as Yudhoyono’s allies. The Islamist parties likely expect to make substantial electoral gains in the 2009 election. Their campaign will likely continue to emphasize issues—such as the anti-corruption platform of the PKS—that resonate with more mainstream voters. For now, they are expected to focus on pushing their agenda through public policy, the administration of areas they control, and building up grass-roots support.

Support for the implementation of sharia is something Islamist political parties like the PKS share with a number of militant groups that have emerged in Indonesia, ranging from student organizations, who frequently protest US foreign policy, to thuggish groups like FPI that attack nightclubs and bars open during Ramadan. While none of these groups represent a serious security threat to the state, they are part of a wider shift toward a more aggressive form of Islam than that traditionally found in Indonesia, more clearly represented by the militias like Laskar Jihad and Laskar Jundullah. Jemaah Islamiyah is far and away the most dangerous radical group in Indonesia. Linked to Al Qaeda, JI has been responsible for several large-scale terrorist attacks on Indonesian soil. While certainly compromised by arrests of key leaders, JI is a wounded beast, not yet defeated and still dangerous.

The likely goal of JI and like-minded militant and terrorist groups is to rebuild their own ranks and to develop ties into the Islamist community. Judging from its track record, JI can also be expected to push its agenda through violence. The focus of JI, in particular, will likely shift to sectarian violence, in order to
create a sense of victimization, a sense that their religion is under attack and that the secular state is not doing anything to defend fellow Muslims. This violence could indoctrinate a new generation of members committed to the violent defense of their religion. There is still little support for the violence of the jihadists, despite the fact that there has been little sustained public outcry against them. The jihadists must find ways to broaden their appeal and to forge a common bond with the growing number of Islamists in the country. There is common cause between the groups, if in the ends and not the means.

Political Islam and violent Muslim militancy could influence Indonesia in a number of different ways in the near future. Islamist political power could either increase or decrease, as could jihadist violence. Laying these possibilities out on a matrix, four distinct hypothetical situations arise, and will be discussed in turn.

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In this first hypothetical situation, political Islam gains popularity and power, while violence from radical Islamic groups decreases. There are a number of ways in which this may happen. The Islamist parties could continue to move away from calls for the immediate implementation of *sharia* and focus more and more on popular issues like poverty reduction and anti-corruption. These are popular issues in Indonesia, and it is plausible that the Islamist parties could transform from pro-*sharia* religious parties to religiously informed conservative parties. In this situation, Islamist parties could support robust government responses against terrorists. Conversely, Islamist parties gaining power could co-opt radicals, moving them from supporting violent means to believing that political action could result in gains for Islamist agenda. In this situation, moderate and secular political parties would be in direct competition with Islamist parties for votes. While Yudhoyono would likely welcome such changes, PKB, PDI-P, and Golkar would likely resist them, as they might lessen their influence.

In the second hypothetical situation, Islamic political parties gain power and popularity while violence from radical Islamist groups increases. This might come about from an increase in sectarian violence manipulated by radical groups...
and supported by Islamist parties. It would entail the government losing control of the situation and the Islamist parties acting as a political shield for the jihadists, while manipulating the situation to create a sense of Islam being “under attack.” This nightmare scenario would mean that the Islamist parties have sidelined moderate groups like NU and Muhammadiyah. Because of this, the government might have to rely on the TNI to initiate a broad crackdown on Islamists, which might provoke an even greater crisis.

In the third scenario, Islamism fails to gain political power or popularity, while violence increases. There are two possible ways in which this might occur. First, if Islamist parties were to be marginalized, some of their members might radicalize, turning to violent means to achieve their goals. Second, a surge in jihadist violence could backfire, driving voters away from Islamist parties and either toward Yudhoyono or back to PDI-P and Golkar. The government, moderate and secular parties, and civic organizations would probably try to capitalize on this situation by cracking down on the violence and increasing their outreach, further marginalizing the Islamists and cracking down on militants.

Finally, the fourth hypothetical situation sees political Islam failing and violence decreasing. Secular and moderate parties and organizations could reassert themselves, backing robust government responses to violence. Key arrests of JI members could reveal damning connections with Islamist political figures or discredit the concept of Islamism. It is also possible that the popularity of Yudhoyono could undercut support for both Islamist political parties and militant organizations, allowing for a New Order style marginalization of political and radical Islam. This would mean the victory of secularism and moderate Islam over radical and political Islam, and bode well for Indonesia’s future as a liberal democracy.
Indonesia has made remarkable progress toward democratization, and there is hope that the new Yudhoyono administration will be able to effectively act against violence, both the indiscriminate violence of JI and the reactive violence of the laskars. At the same time, the challenges posed by Islamists, Muslim militants, and terrorists are considerable. Of further concern are potential crossovers in membership among these groups. If Islamism or violence by Muslim militants or terrorists grows during the 2006–2009 period, then Indonesia will pose an enormous security challenge to the West and to its ASEAN neighbors. Indonesia is the world’s largest Muslim country, as well as the third largest democracy, and lies at the heart of Southeast Asia. This position gives it special geopolitical significance, given the rise of China and consequent changes in the balance of power in Asia. It is also a major front in the war against terrorism, having experienced four major bombing attacks in as many years perpetrated by JI, a transnational organization with previously strong ties to Al Qaeda. Were Indonesia either to move further down the road toward becoming an Islamic state, or to descend into a state of chaos, the ramifications would be far-reaching.

Given these high stakes, there are a number of policy implications for interested parties ranging from the new Yudhoyono administration and secular opposition parties, to the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN), Australia, and the United States. All have a vested interest in the consolidation of Indonesia’s fledgling democracy and rule of law. All have a role to play in helping the Indonesian government develop its internal capabilities vis-à-vis Islamist militants. The problem, though, is that too much foreign interference will play into the strong senses of xenophobia, displayed by both the Islamists and Indonesia’s secular nationalists.

**Domestic considerations**

**Implications for the president**

How to cope with the threat posed by militant Islam is one of the most vexing issues for President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. His electoral mandate seems
to demonstrate that the majority of the population would like to see security be a priority of the administration. The fact that Yudhoyono is a former general who served as security minister under Megawati probably reassured the populace. Yet one of the most pressing matters for his government is not security from violence and terrorism, but economic security in the form of job creation. Indeed, during his inauguration address, Yudhoyono addressed the need for higher growth, debt reduction, greater investment, and job creation. Indonesia currently has an estimated 40 million unemployed and underemployed people, a level that is simply not sustainable and poses an enormous internal security threat.

Yet the devastating Boxing Day Tsunami that struck just 3 months into President Yudhoyono’s term is what has dominated his agenda. The Tsunami killed some 165,000 people in Aceh. The list of destruction is appalling: 350,000 buildings, 499 bridges, 1,000 kilometers of roads washed away, 40,000 hectares of farmland, 70 percent of the fishing fleet, 1,200 of 3,400 schools, thousands of kilometers of power lines, and 50 percent of health clinics. The Indonesian government estimates that reconstruction of lost facilities and infrastructure will be in the order of $4.5 billion. The Indonesian government, in early 2005, was only able to allocate $542 million for reconstruction. All in all, the Tsunami affected 2.2 percent of Indonesia’s economy—though 90 percent of Aceh’s.

If there was a silver lining to the Tsunami, it was that the government and the Acehnese rebel movement, Gerakan Aceh Meredeka (GAM), signed a peace accord on 15 August, ending the 30-year conflict. To date, both sides have remained committed to the accord’s implementation. Under the accord, GAM is required to disarm and demobilize its roughly 3,000 fighters by the end of 2006, while the government is obliged to withdraw several thousand troops and restrict its troop movements in the process. The government has offered an Amnesty to all GAM members—and since August 2005, some 1,500 have been released. It also establishes a human rights court and a truth and reconciliation commission. The agreement also amends the electoral law that states that all political parties must be national parties; this has allowed for GAM to transform itself from an insurgent group to a regional party. Finally, it gives Aceh control over 70 percent of the revenue from the province’s vast natural resources.

Beyond Aceh, President Yudhoyono has been serious about economic reform. First, he brought in a fairly well-respected economic team in order to inspire confidence at both home and abroad. Second, he significantly cut back costly government programs, most notably the politically sensitive fuel subsidies. Third, he has taken counter-terrorism seriously in order to stabilize the investment climate and lure back jittery foreign investors who fled Indonesia during the past 5 years.

These steps have not been easy or politically popular. Yudhoyono’s economic team—Coordinating Minister for the Economy Aburizal Bakrie, Trade Minister Mari Pangestu, and the head of the National Economic Planning Board Sri Mulyani Indrawatihas, who has close ties to the IMF—is reviled by many in the parliament. PKS ministers immediately condemned these choices for being too
pro-American. Cutting the popular fuel subsidies lost the president a great deal of political capital and popular goodwill, something he can ill-afford with the guaranteed backing of only 8 percent of parliamentary seats. And for the president to crack down on militant groups, he will have to give the security forces more authority and run the risk of alienating the Islamist parties, whose support he needs in parliament. At the same time, he will jeopardize his support from human rights groups and democracy activists, who see some counter-terrorism measures as a threat to their democratic gains and free speech.

Yudhoyono’s 36-member cabinet was clearly designed to establish a national consensus. It includes four former military officials, five of Megawati’s cabinet members (including Yusril Izha Mahendra of PBB), Golkar stalwarts, including Vice President Jussuf Kalla, and high-profile Islamists, such as Yusril Izha Mahendra. Clearly, Yudhoyono hoped to establish a national-unity cabinet. It contains only two members of his own Democratic Party. Although there are no PDI-P members in his cabinet, every other major party was represented, with two ministerships each for Golkar, PPP, PBB, PKB, and PAN, and one to the PKP. Even the PKS accepted one cabinet post despite turning down such offers in the past. Golkar, however, did not appear to have been appeased and asserted that it would remain an opposition party, and as the largest component of the National Coalition, a caucus in parliament, it quickly challenged Yudhoyono’s authority. This, however, changed with Golkar’s December 2004 election in which the incumbent Akbar Tanjung was surprisingly ousted and replaced by Vice President Jusuf Kalla. More than anything, his cabinet selection seemed to demonstrate political ambiguity.

As mentioned in Chapter 3, the first real counter-terror litmus test was the re-trial of JI spiritual chief Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, who received a 30-month sentence for conspiracy. But the more politically sensitive test will be the banning of JI, something that the president has said he would do, only “if there’s proof Jemaah Islamiyah as an organization exists in Indonesia...” Although the Indonesian police assert that JI exists, and it has been proven in the legal proceedings against Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, and despite the arrests of more than 200 people, including leaders who have admitted to the group’s existence, structure, and network, Yudhoyono still seems unconvinced and has created a high and elastic bar. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the security forces have cited the fractious nature of JI and its proliferation of component groups, to attribute attacks to organizations other than JI—but for political reasons.

The president must lead with authority and show more of a taste for governance than his predecessor; to that end, he will have to overcome his own purported indecisiveness. There are concerns among Yudhoyono’s advisors that if he puts counter-terrorism at the top of his agenda, he will be perceived by Islamists (as well as secular nationalists) as working on behalf of the United States. But he can overcome this label if he convinces the populace that taking a firm stance with the militants is the right thing for Indonesian society and is important economically. Success in this regard could do much to improve the economic
condition of the archipelago by reassuring the foreign investment community that fled Indonesia in droves after 1998. Yudhoyono has also stated his intention to restore Indonesia’s leading role in ASEAN, and could use the counter-terror issue as a way to achieve this. With ASEAN in its current leaderless state, he is well placed to accomplish this.

**Implications for the parliament**

Since the end of the New Order, Indonesia has faced the daunting task of creating an effective separation of powers after 33 years of authoritarian rule. To date, neither the parliament nor the executive has fully accepted the need for a system of checks and balances. The two entities tend to see power in zero-sum terms, which has led parliament to become parochial and self-serving. The parliament remains a bastion of what Meidyatama Surodiningrat calls “embedded elites,” holdovers from the New Order regime who are attempting to re-consolidate their power.20 Government efforts to reform the economy, such as plans to privatize state-owned industries under Megawati, have been repeatedly thwarted by parliament.

Over the next 4 years, parliament can be expected to continue to attempt to enhance its own power as an institution at the expense of the executive. However, parliamentarians will have to worry about public discontent, especially if they use their power excessively to block popular presidential initiatives. Additionally, some members of parliament are likely to portray any effort to enhance the power of security services as a threat to democracy, whether or not that is a fair allegation. Unlike the president, who must set the tone of public discourse with regard to militants, parliament is unlikely to expend the political capital to do so. The Islamist political parties, PKS (7), PBB (1), PPP (9), and the political parties associated with leaders of Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, PKB (11) and PAN (6), respectively, now control one third of parliament. That share can be expected to grow in the 2009 election as the parties all engage in grass-roots recruitment and party-building efforts. It is even possible that PDI-P, now in an opposition role, will mimic its parliamentary critics in order to undermine Yudhoyono and return to power in 2009. In any event, the absence of a single party controlling even one quarter of the seats means that policymaking is going to be fraught with difficulty. Weak and fractious coalitions, though needed to push through legislation, will probably give a disproportionate influence to smaller, ideologically based parties such as the PKS, particularly if they are able to maintain focus on core issues and avoid internal division.

Already the parliament has demonstrated its parochialism, as two primary factions—the Nationhood Coalition, dominated by Golkar and the PDI-P, and the People’s Coalition, comprised of supporters of Yudhoyono, which each control around 50 percent of the seats in the house—are unable to agree over which lawmakers should head parliament’s nine commissions.21 The two factions are refusing to meet and are planning to name their own commission heads.22 If
the deadlock continues, according to Ray Rangkuti, executive director of the Independent Committee for Election Monitoring, the president is “entitled to issue a decree to dissolve parliament.” However, he warned that “this would create a constitutional crisis.” Again, a crisis could be averted with the defeat of Akbar Tanjung by Jusuf Kalla as Golkar’s chairman. Kalla has re-oriented Golkar’s position to a position closer to that of President Yudhoyono. Regarding security, the more pressing issue has been the debate over the future of the TNI. Yudhoyono has stated that he will review the new TNI law that Megawati hastily signed just days before the new president’s inauguration. Moreover, Yudhoyono’s first dispute and power struggle with Parliament emerged at the end of October regarding this law. The law states that active military officers can serve as senior civilian defense and intelligence administrators. Parliament believed that it gave parliament the right to determine the succession of the TNI’s leadership, upon the recommendation of the president. Megawati submitted army chief General Ryamizard Ryacudu’s name to Parliament for approval. Although Yudhoyono withdrew the nomination, Parliament endorsed Ryacuda anyway. Yudhoyono was careful not to assert that Parliament does not have the right to approve candidates, but he rejected General Sutarto’s resignation, mandated by the new law, and indicated that he wanted to keep the TNI chief in his current position. While it looks as if Yudhoyono simply does not want to be bound by his predecessor’s choice, Parliament seemed unwilling to concede to the new president.

Implications for the judiciary

The judiciary is arguably the least-reformed institution of the government, but one with the most promise to complete substantial reforms in the coming years. Yudhoyono has placed judicial reform among his highest priorities, and it remains a top priority of bilateral and multilateral aid donors, such as the United States and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Moreover, Attorney General Abdul Rahman Saleh has a reputation for being incorruptible. As the only Supreme Court justice to rule against the Golkar party chief Akbar Tanjung in his 2002 corruption trial, he gained a reputation for judicial independence. While the Constitutional Court’s recent ruling on the retroactive application of the Counter-terrorism Law No. 15 was a setback for government prosecutors, it was a sound legal decision that bodes well for the development of the rule of law of the country.

In addition to necessary domestic reforms, the judiciary is also going to have to become more actively involved with its counterparts elsewhere in ASEAN to develop rules, regulations, and standardized procedures for dealing with terrorist suspects, gathering and using evidence overseas, rendering suspects, and allowing video-simulcast testimony in court cases. Despite the one case where this happened, with the video testimony of Faiz bin Abu Bakar Bafana from
detention in Singapore during the first trial of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir in 2003, there has been no progress in regularizing this practice.

Indonesian security officials and prosecutors may call for the introduction of an Internal Security Act (ISA), such as those found in Malaysia and Singapore, which would allow for the indefinite detention without trial of terrorist suspects. For decades Malaysia and Singapore have used the ISA not just against militants, but also against peaceful political dissidents. Such policies most likely arise from a lack of confidence in due process, as well as from the fear that trials would be a public forum for militants. An ISA in Indonesia could, in the wrong hands, become little more than a tool for political repression. Opposition groups would protest any detentions under an ISA with a moral authority that might have broad appeal. By giving terrorist suspects a free and fair trial, the government would be able to claim the moral high ground and appear “clean,” thus neutralizing the potential allegations of its political rivals. The passage of an ISA would thus undermine Indonesia’s important democratic gains and tarnish the government’s popular legitimacy.

Implications for the security services

The security services, police, and BIN should have the political backing to continue their counter-terror operations over the next 5 years. For the first time, they have a political leader who is committed to uprooting terrorists. Yudhoyono has appointed a personal friend and a longtime ally, Admiral Widodo Adisutjipto, as his coordinating minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, and is expected to give him considerable latitude in dealing with JI.

Although Yudhoyono did not publicly request it, BIN chief A.M. Hendropriyono resigned. This could be very helpful in the long term, as he is thought to have underestimated the threat of JI before the Bali bombings, and is strongly tied to Megawati and the PDI-P. While we should not expect any drastic changes in their operations, the new leadership might present an opportunity to improve coordination between the police and the BIN as the legacy of previous animosity and rivalry fades. As the former Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security Affairs, to whom both BIN and INP formally reported, Yudhoyono understands the degree to which bureaucratic competition between the two, and between them and the TNI, hampered counter-terror operations. We can expect that the greater attempt to institutionalize cooperation between the police, BIN, and the TNI, and the newly established counter-terror task force will continue. The task force, which supplants the coordinating role that was previously performed by the Coordinating Ministry of Politics and Security Affairs, will be under the auspices of BIN. Moreover, it will coordinate intelligence operations between the police’s anti-terror unit and BIN and also with the special forces of Indonesia’s three military service arms. This law (5/2002) was signed by outgoing President Megawati Sukarnoputri in August 2004 and Yudhoyono has indicated his support for it.
The murder of human rights activist, Munir, allegedly by BIN agents, has infuriated many in Indonesia, who see the security forces as unreformed and wedded to their extra-legal activities under the Suharto era. The ongoing investigations into Munir’s death have shown clear links to BIN.

**Implications for the TNI**

Under General Endriartono Sutarto, the TNI maintained an unprecedented degree of political neutrality in the 2004 elections to the extreme of serving military personnel being forbidden to vote, and there is still considerable support for Sutarto within the TNI. Yudhoyono has appointed Juwono Sudarsono, a civilian who held the post under Gus Dur at a time when the government was trying to depoliticize the military and remove its influence from everyday political affairs. Yudhoyono seems committed to placing the military firmly under civilian control. As he told *Time* Magazine:

This is a time of political transition. At the right time the military has to be placed beneath the Defense Ministry to ensure that politicians are the policymakers and that the Defense Minister determines the military policy and budget. But we have to make sure that a civilian Defense Minister knows how to separate military and political matters. As long as the military is not under the Defense Ministry, I will make sure that communication and coordination is solid between the defense minister and the military and that it is the defense minister’s formulating strategy and budget policy for the military. In the meantime the armed forces must follow policy set out by the president through the defense minister. What we don’t want is for the military to be used for any political interests. This will be counter-productive to the growth of democracy in Indonesia.

However, the controversial TNI bill signed by Megawati restores much of the TNI’s political power. While the new law abolished the military’s 38 seats in the 2 houses of parliament, it did not dismantle the territorial system that gave military leaders an active role in local politics. While Yudhoyono has questioned the provisions of the law, he has not challenged it in entirety; indeed he has promised to keep the system intact, thereby ensuring that the military continues to control the provinces.

In terms of combating Islamist militancy, the TNI has an important role to play. For example, military intelligence (BAIS) has traditionally had the best intelligence networks in the country, but has been loath to share information with the police or the State Intelligence Bureau. The government has tried to institutionalize cooperation between the police, BIN, and the military through law (5/2002). According to interim minister Hari Sabarno, “The framework is still the same. But the military intelligence units will now be more involved in
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The most important role that the TNI can play in counter-terror operations, arguably, is in assisting local police to quickly quell outbreaks of sectarian violence that JI exploits so effectively. The military has a rapid deployment capability that should be employed by the government to stabilize situations until the police can take effective control.

Kopassus Unit 81 is the military’s top counter-terror unit, and is considered to be the best equipped and trained unit for dealing with hijackings and hostage situations. The human rights violations of Kopassus, however, have severely limited the amount of aid and training that Kopassus has been able to have with its foreign counterparts, in particular Australia and the United States.

Nonetheless, the security organs remain bitter rivals regarding budgets, foreign assistance, and jurisdiction. Major jurisdictional squabbles between the police and the military regarding sectarian violence remain, and in many cases they could further complicate, rather than ameliorate such violence. The TNI is angered that foreign military assistance from the United States and others remains frozen due to legislative restrictions dating back to human rights abuses during East Timor’s independence, while the police and even BIN have received considerable assistance and training.

The TNI has tried to use counter-terrorism as a means to re-enter politics and domestic security. Law No. 34/2004 established an “anti-terror desk” within the TNI. But what really alarmed human rights activists is that the military leadership then ordered all eleven regional military commands to establish their own counter-terrorism desks. Critics are alarmed that the revival of the territorial command structure is simply meant to silence government critics. Usman Hamid, the coordinator of the National Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of the Violence, warned that the New Order was being revived in the name of “counterterrorism.”

Implications for the political parties

There were two major losers in the 2004 legislative election: Golkar and the PDI-P, both champions of Indonesia’s secular identity. To prevent a further hemorrhaging of votes in 2009, both parties will need to tap new leaders. Although Megawati deserves credit for putting into place a democratic system that led to the first peaceful transition of authority in Indonesia’s history, her reputation has since diminished due to the perception that she was uninterested in and ineffective at governing, as well as the fact that, since the presidential election, she never conceded defeat, congratulated Yudhoyono, or attended his inauguration. This makes her an unlikely candidate to lead the PDI-P out of its current malaise. The PDI-P must rework its platform and it will need new leadership to accomplish this.

In many ways, a harder job lies ahead for Golkar. Although the party did not lose its share of voters between the 1999 and 2004 elections, it remained stagnant despite major party-building efforts and enjoying the strongest archipelago-wide
network. Its former leader, Akbar Tanjung, deserves much of the blame. Tanjung was the embodiment of the “embedded elite” from the New Order era, and while he was acquitted of corruption in 2002, he remains a tainted figure. Golkar was woefully divided during the election: Jusuf Kalla and a sizeable faction left to join the Democratic Party, while Tanjung’s decision to ally Golkar with Megawati and the PDI-P in the second round of the presidential election polarized the party’s rank and file. Golkar remains the largest political party, but until Jusuf Kalla was elected its leader, it was adrift. Kalla’s election and effective leadership and leading role in key areas—such as internal security, the Acehnese peace process, and economic reform—have revitalized Golkar. The party will likely make considerable gains in the 2009 elections.

The PDI-P and Golkar remain the standard bearers for Pancasila, the secular nature of the Indonesian state. Despite their current position as the primary opposition parties, the defense of these parties would be best served by working with the Yudhoyono administration in combating Islamist militancy and providing a palatable secular alternative to Islamist political activism.

The other New Order era party, the PPP, likewise has much to do to regain its position as the dominant Islamist party. It too is fraught with factionalism and must look for new leaders. Unless there is a change in the leadership from the “embedded elites” of the Suharto era, the PPP will likely continue to lose voters to the ideologically motivated and “clean” PKS and PBB, both of which are led by more charismatic figures.

Although committed to democracy, PAN and PKB are unable to garner sizeable sections of the electorate despite the fact that they derive much of their support from Muhammadiyah and NU, respectively. The leaders of these parties have shifted their positions frequently and made too many politically expedient deals and alliances. The two parties have continuously failed to articulate clear and consistent political platforms—something they will need to do so in order to mount a comeback.34

The Democratic Party (DP) must transform itself quickly from being merely a vehicle for its founder, Yudhoyono, into a nationwide organization with a clear and appealing political platform. If it can do this successfully, it will be able to further carve into the secular nationalist bloc dominated by the PDI-P and Golkar. If it can move beyond the small percent of parliamentary seats it now holds, it will be less dependent on weak coalitions. The DP cannot rest on its presidential laurels—the party has serious building to do, especially outside of the cities of Java.

The small Islamist parties, PBB and PKS, in many ways have the most to gain—and to lose—in the years before the 2009 election. Both parties endorsed Yudhoyono in the presidential election and were both rewarded with positions in Yudhoyono’s cabinet. The PBB’s Mahendra was promoted to the influential position of State Secretary and the Minister of Forestry went to M.S. Kaban. The PKS received one cabinet position—Muhammad Yusuf Ashari became the Minister of Housing in the Yudhoyono cabinet. The PKS leader, Hidayat Nur Wahid, turned
down a cabinet position in favor of the higher profile appointment as speaker of the upper house of parliament. The PKS appears to have also been able to use its position as a Yudhoyono ally within the People’s Coalition to influence Yudhoyono’s choice of two other cabinet positions, that of Agriculture Minister Anton Apriyanonono and Youth Affairs and Sports Minister Adhyaksa Dault.35

Despite PKS’ support for Yudhoyono, it is not unconditional, and within days of his inauguration, PKS was protesting the president’s appointment of several cabinet ministers. The new PKS party chief announced that he opposed the appointment of Sri Mulyani Indrawati, the National Development Planning Minister, because of her ties to the IMF and the West.36 The PKS also allegedly used its influence to have Yudhoyono drop the appointment of Meuthia Farida Hatta-Swasono, the Minister of Women’s Empowerment. Apparently the PKS objected to her because her father, Indonesia’s first Vice President, Mohammed Hatta, had been instrumental in removing the Jakarta Charter from the 1946 Constitution. This suggests that the PKS has not, in fact, abandoned the importance of sharia in its political objectives.

Implications for the mainstream mass Muslim organizations

In many ways the war on terrorism is a war within Islam. This is a war the United States cannot win, and nor should it try.37 Any attempt to engage in theological engineering in Indonesia will likely backfire and play into the hands of the militants who argue that their religion is under attack from the West. The ideological counter to JI’s violent Islamism will need to come from within. Indonesia’s two largest mainstream Muslim organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, with some 50 million members between them and almost 14,000 madrassas across the archipelago, are two of the best-placed organizations to do this, as many of their theologians, such as Abdurrahman Wahid and Nurcholish Madjid, have made significant contributions to the question of how Islam can flourish in tandem with democracy, civil society, human rights, and women’s rights.38

While religious leaders have spoken out against terrorism and implored their congregations to reject the violence of JI and other militant groups, they have continued to be highly critical of US foreign policy in Iraq and the Middle East in particular. This might feed into the growing anti-Western tension exploited by JI in its recruiting drives. Moreover, many religious leaders continue to deny that JI exists or to acknowledge that Muslim groups have perpetrated acts of terrorism.

Nahdlatul Ulama has a large faction that used the elections to support the group’s former leader and Indonesian President Wahid, who was infuriated that NU Chairman Hasyim Muzadi did not support him during his impeachment.39 Muzadi became Megawati’s vice presidential running mate, while Wahid’s younger brother Solahuddin ran on Wiranto’s Golkar ticket, thus splitting the
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NU vote. These rifts are political and not ideological, which is not necessarily the case with Muhammadiyah.

There are elements of Muhammadiyah, such as those who support a revived Masyumi, that support the imposition of sharia law and the establishment of the Islamic state; these include groups founded by disaffected or radicalized Muhammadiyah members such as DDII and KOMPAK, which have been implicated in sectarian violence and terrorism. Moreover, many detained JI suspects have admitted to coming from the Muhammadiyah tradition. However, the majority of Muhammadiyah members are moderates, though there remains a strong, conservative faction. Whether or not Muhammadiyah becomes more conservative or stays moderate will in large part depend on who becomes the organization’s new leader. The former leader, Ahmad Syafii Maarif, was a moderate who denounced terrorism and supported the government’s efforts against militants. His successor, on the other hand, Din Syamsuddin, has supported and defended many militants and radical Islamists, including Ja’far Umar Thalib and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, as well as the role of Muslim militias in suppressing Christian communities. He is exceptionally janus-faced about his support for an Islamic state, and he tailors his remarks to each constituency. While not explicitly supporting sharia, he has repeatedly stated that he is all for “internal debate” on the possibilities of Indonesia adopting Islamic law. He likewise counsels against confronting radicals, preferring to accommodate them. (“It is unwise to confront the radicals—better to keep them inside.”) Din Syamsuddin’s 5-year term as head of the Muhammadiyah “probably signals a shift to the right by that organization,” as William Liddle noted.

International considerations

Implications for ASEAN

The nature, causes, and consequences of the growth of Islamism, Muslim militancy, and terrorism in Indonesia have profound implications for the other nine members of the ASEAN. Indonesia’s stability is of paramount importance for ASEAN. It is by far the largest country in the region—both in terms of size and population—and political instability and the growth of Islamist influence in Indonesia have regional ramifications.

While the majority of JI members are Indonesians, it is by no means a domestic organization. Indeed, its success and resilience is based on the fact that it is a transnational network. Malaysia remains an important location for JI activities, in terms of recruitment and back-office operations. It is also a target—several unreported but key arrests there in 2003–2006 may have prevented a major attack. Connections with the Philippine separatist MILF—in whose camps many JI members are alleged to have trained—may prove instrumental in its ability to survive. To that end, Indonesian security depends as much as on the outcome of
peace talks between the Moro rebels and the Philippine government as it does on border security with Malaysia.

In the face of continued terrorist threats, the states in Southeast Asia are going to have to work hard to overcome lingering senses of animosity and enhance bi- and multi-lateral cooperation.\(^{46}\) Still, we should not expect ASEAN to take center stage in the fight against JI and other regional terrorist threats. Prior to 11 September 2001, ASEAN had done little to combat terrorism, considering it only as a subset of transnational crime. States were “encourage[d] to expand their efforts in combating transnational crime,” without any legal commitments to do so.\(^{47}\) In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks, ASEAN issued a brief statement of condolence, made a vague call for “strengthening cooperation in combating terrorism around the world,” and all its member governments endorsed UN Security Council Resolution 1368 which pledged their support for the US-led effort to rout out Al Qaeda. Yet their individual responses varied greatly according to their immediate domestic political considerations. In November 2001, each ASEAN member state signed the Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism, in which they pledged to enhance cooperation in combating terrorism and to abide by other UN decisions.\(^{48}\) In particular, the Declaration pledged to “deepen cooperation among our front-line law enforcement agencies in combating terrorism and sharing ‘best practices.’ ”\(^{49}\) It also committed member states to “enhance information/intelligence exchange to facilitate the flow of information, in particular, on terrorists and terrorist organizations, their movement and funding, and any other information needed to protect lives, property, and the security of all modes of travel.”\(^{50}\) By May 2002, the ASEAN states had reached an agreement to try to standardize their criminal laws regarding transnational crimes, and ASEAN military leaders met to discuss ways in which they could fight terrorism. At the May 2002 Special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Kuala Lumpur, the ASEAN foreign ministers gave full support to the organization’s role in addressing the issue of combating terrorism. Yet it took several more months, until the July/August ASEAN Summit, before a consensus on a joint anti-terror declaration was reached, and then only with intense pressure from the United States.\(^{51}\) In short, vast differences of opinion have led to nominal support for counter-terrorism measures, but little in the way of concrete policies.

With the Bali attack in October 2002, Indonesian authorities realized the depth of the problem and the importance of international cooperation, which led to greater exchange of intelligence and a much higher level of cooperation among regional police forces.\(^{52}\) However, successes in arresting JI members and strides in breaking apart the organization have led to some complacency and a reversion to traditional secrecy.

Association of Southeast Nations has a very important role to play in terms of legal coordination for counter-terrorism. While ASEAN is unlikely to draft a multilateral extradition treaty in the short term, Indonesia might take the lead by drafting legislation that could be used to allow interrogation of suspects detained abroad, greater access to evidence, letters, video-conference testimony in courts,
and the rendering of suspects. But to prevail, governments are going to have to overcome narrow, parochial interests. For example, Singaporean JI leader Mas Selamat Kastari, who plotted to hijack an Aeroflot jetliner and crash it in Singapore, was captured in Indonesia. However, the Indonesian government refuses to extradite him because a number of Indonesians suspected of corruption and other crimes are living openly in Singapore, where they have been granted residence permits. Currently there is no extradition treaty between the two states, and Indonesia’s four formal requests for its citizens were repeatedly rebuffed by Singaporean authorities.

Implications for Australia

Australia’s security is inextricably linked to Indonesia, and the threat of Islamist terrorism remains Australia’s greatest security risk. Australia has been mentioned twice in Al Qaeda statements for its role in the independence of East Timor, the overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the war in Iraq. In his 3 November 2001 statement, bin Laden mentioned the “crusader Australian forces.” Australia clearly has also become a target of JI’s wrath, although at the time of the Bali blasts the bombers themselves seemed surprised to discover that Australians were the primary victims, and only then justified their targeting; stating that Australians had joined with the Americans in invading Afghanistan.

Following the Bali blast, the Australian and Indonesian governments signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Counter-Terrorism, which provided for Australian Federal Police presence in the investigations and the provision of technical assistance to the Indonesian National Police. Since then, the Australian Federal Police has played a prominent role in the Bali, Marriott, and Australian Embassy investigations, and has assisted in the arrests of key JI leaders. It has provided signals intelligence equipment and significant forensics training to the Indonesian police. Australia also provided most of the AUS$38 million funding for the newly established joint counter-terrorism center in Semarang, with the hopes that it will become a larger regional center in the coming years.

The Australian intelligence community’s failure to foresee the Bali bombings prompted a sweeping review of practices. Although the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security’s December 2002 report absolved the intelligence community, and the Senate’s report in August gave the intelligence community a chance to defend its actions and analysis, there is evidence that Australian intelligence had failed once again in its analysis of Indonesia (Australian analysts had also been taken by surprise by the independence of East Timor and the collapse of the New Order regime). As Dennis Richardson, the Secretary-General of ASIO stated in his written testimony to the Senate report, “The intelligence failure of Bali was the failure to identify the transition of Jemaah Islamiyah into a terrorist organisation some time after 1996. It was not on our radar screen as a terrorist organisation before December 2001.”
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The Office of National Assessments (ONA), Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO), and Defense Intelligence Organization (DIO) slowly changed their assessments from early 2002 based on intelligence shared with them by the United States and Singapore. It was not until June 2002 that a report from the ONA concluded that “Al Qaeda has a longstanding presence in Indonesia” and that “Al Qaeda has been fostering a relationship with Jemaah Islamiyah.” Australian intelligence analysts largely saw Indonesia as a progressive Muslim state and were slow to acknowledge the existence of radical elements, such as JI. The real failure at that time was both in intelligence collection and analysis, but Australian intelligence and police have a significantly enhanced understanding of JI, the organization, its modus operandi, recruitment, and targeting.

With the election of Yudhoyono and re-election of John Howard as prime minister, Australia announced that it wanted to sign a security treaty with Indonesia, an idea that Yudhoyono had originally raised during a previous trip to Australia. Although the Paul Keating and Suharto governments signed an “Agreement to Maintain Security” pact with Indonesia in 1995, the agreement was unilaterally abrogated by Indonesia when Australia intervened in East Timor. There was little desire to revive the old agreement, which was described by Foreign Minister Alexander Downer as “a fairly meaningless document.” The Australians now seem to want to build on the October 2002 agreement on counter-terrorism to create a broad-ranging pact that would perhaps also include maritime interdiction, human trafficking, as well as establish what Hugh White calls a sense of “shared strategic interests.”

Were it to be developed, such an agreement would do several things for Indonesia. At the practical level, it could lead to enhanced cooperation and the further institutionalization of ties between both countries’ police and security services. At the symbolic level, it is the first foreign policy initiative of the fourth Howard government and it puts Indonesia back at the center of Australia’s diplomatic efforts. Moreover, from Indonesia’s perspective, such an alignment might be seen as a constraint on John Howard’s increasingly close relations with the United States and often unilateral pronouncements on regional security concerns, both of which concern the political elites in Jakarta. As the former Chairman of Muhammadiyah Syafii Maarif told the Australian Broadcast Corporation, “We have to find out the root cause of terrorism. First is global injustice, and other the U.S. foreign imperialistic foreign policy... if we talk about terrorism, there are three kinds of terrorism—individual, group, and state terrorism. So to end terrorism, end state terrorism. Australia supporting the U.S. imperialistic foreign policy... [that is] state terrorism.”

Short of such an agreement, Australians were, by and large, delighted about Yudhoyono’s election, and Australia anticipates smoother communication and closer security cooperation with Indonesia than under his predecessor. Yudhoyono studied in Australia and Australian officials believe that he is more attuned to Australian norms and concerns. Both sides seem to be giving the bilateral relationship more attention. As John Howard said after a quick bilateral
meeting with Yudhoyono at the sideline of the November 2004 APEC meeting, “There is a determined view from both of us that relations between the two countries will be strengthened.”

Nonetheless, there have been frictions. In a mid-December 2004 visit to Jakarta, the Australian Minister of Defense Robert Hill infuriated his hosts by announcing that Australia planned to establish a 1,000 nautical mile “Maritime Identification Zone” to combat terrorism and transnational crime. Despite assurances from Australia that this was not an attempt “to claim extended jurisdiction,” the Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hassan Wirayuda, stated that Indonesia could never accept the plan because the zone would violate Indonesia’s territorial waters. If Australia wants to deepen their security relationship with Indonesia, they are going to have to be more sensitive to fundamental issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity, issues that Indonesian officials and the electorate are highly sensitive of.

Australia hoped to assuage concerns by Indonesian nationalists and Islamist critics of its policies with its exceptionally generous and robust response to the December 2004 Tsunami. Australia donated AUS$1 billion in assistance and dispatched combat troops in the immediate aftermath to assist in reconstruction.

Australia has been trying to develop deeper ties with Indonesia’s counter-terrorism forces. As mentioned above, Australia has been a key funder and supporter of the Indonesian National Police’s Detachment-88, based in Semerang. Australian officials have met with Kopassus leaders, including the head of Unit-88, the TNI’s key CT force, but are prevented from having a deeper relationship because of Kopassus’ egregious human rights violations.

More interesting has been Australia’s CT efforts in the Philippines, a place that had never received much attention from Canberra. The number of Australian Federal police based in Manila increased steadily since 9/11. Beginning in early 2005, AFP personnel were engaged in joint investigations/missions in the Southern Philippines, in a manner similar to their activities in Indonesia. The Australian Minister of Defense Robert Hill traveled to Manila in October 2005 to negotiate a status of forces agreement, to train Philippine forces in counter-terrorism/insurgency. Australia has dispatched an AP3-Orion to the Southern Philippines to assist the Philippines in conducting aerial surveillance and signals intelligence. The Australian navy dispatched two patrol boats to the waters between Indonesia–Malaysia and the Southern Philippines, a point where a number of JI members have been arrested, and deemed one of the terrorist group’s key vulnerabilities. In all, the Australian government has doubled its CT assistance to the Philippines to AUS$10 million.

The head of the Australian Federal Police met with his ASEAN counterparts in November 2005, and pledged “agreed to share intelligence information and simplify bureaucratic procedures in a bid to enhance efforts in combating terrorism.”

Australia’s CT efforts in Indonesia have in large part been shaped by public opinion. The Australian government has pressed Indonesia for stiff sentences
of JI members, especially in the case of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. Canberra was offended when Ba’asyir received only a 30-month sentence, and used much of its diplomatic capital to intercede when Ba’asyir’s sentence was cut by 4 months in a national-day amnesty. Jakarta promised Canberra not to remand Ba’asyir’s sentence again. Perhaps no other case symbolizes the tense nature of the bilateral relationship than the case of Schapelle Corby, a 27-year-old holiday-maker who was allegedly found with nine pounds of cannabis in her luggage. An Indonesian court sentenced Ms Corby to 20 years. Ms Corby has pleaded her innocence and most Australians in public opinion surveys believe she was innocent and call the decision a tragedy of justice. They point to the fact that there was no jury, merely a panel of three judges, though there was no Australian outcry when a similar court (Indonesia has no trial by jury) was used on the Bali bombers. It is the sovereign right of Indonesia to apply its laws regarding drug smuggling. But this case calls into question the larger issue of Indonesia’s political and legal will to continue prosecuting the war on terror. It is hard to justify a 20-year sentence for a drug smuggler when Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, JI’s spiritual leader, was sentenced to under 4 years in jail. Abu Jibril, received a mere four and a half month sentence. The Corby case dominated the Australian media for much of 2005, and it became the prism through which Australians saw Indonesia.

In short, while Australia has strong border security and JI has no capabilities at present to target Australia proper, Australian interests in the region in general and in Indonesia in particular remain vulnerable. To that end, deepened ties and a renewed commitment to Indonesia are essential for Australia’s national security. Australians are likely to increase cooperation with and the training of Indonesian police and security personnel. The joint counter-terrorism center in Semarang is likely to be expanded and opened to other states. They will likely go much further in restoring ties with the TNI than the United States. Most of all, Australia will likely try to expand their presence of Australian Federal Police throughout the archipelago and engage in joint operations, analysis, and intelligence sharing. Yet Australian foreign policy, particularly its close relationship with the United States, is unlikely to change. This may limit Australia’s ability to effectively fight with Islamic radicalism.

Implications for the United States

The United States has vast economic and commercial interests in Indonesia, such as those within the mining, energy, shipping, and agriculture sectors (among others), as well as strategic interests in Indonesia as the largest ASEAN member-state. This economic sector remains very vulnerable to both terrorist attacks and political unrest. The recent imbroglio over the alleged dumping of mercury by American mining firm PT Newmont is an example of how United States’ commercial interests can come under threat and suspicion, even in a majority Christian region of Indonesia. Other ventures are subject to the risk of operating in resource-rich areas beset by separatist violence, and as such have had to
forge working relationships with the TNI. For example, the mining firm Freeport McMoRan maintains close ties with the Indonesian military in West Papua, which is engaged in a counter insurgency campaign against the Free Papual Movement (OPM), while ExxonMobil, whose rich natural gas fields are in the heart of the insurgency in Aceh, require protection by the TNI. All three cases demonstrate the difficulties these firms, especially in the natural resource industry, face.

Additionally, any attack on commercial shipping in the Straits of Malacca, which Al Qaeda has threatened to do, would have a devastating impact on the world’s economy. The strait, which is 600 miles long but only 1.5 miles wide at its narrowest point, has over 50,000 large ships traveling through it annually. In 2002, between 40 and 50 oil tankers (carrying approximately 10 million barrels of oil) and 10–12 LNG tankers sailed in the Straits each day. These numbers are set to increase greatly as Asia’s economies, especially China’s, continue to grow and their energy imports surge. As half the world’s oil and much of its liquefied natural gas (LNG) passes through the Strait of Malacca, which is already a target for piracy and poorly policed by Indonesia’s navy, terrorists have it as an inviting target. Malaysia and Singapore also have naval vessels patrolling the Straits at this time, but their naval resources are limited, and Singapore’s calls for other interested parties—such as the United States, Japan, and India—to join them were rejected by Indonesia and Malaysia. In a statement issued on 13 October 2002, Al Qaeda said: “If a boat that did not cost $1,000 managed to devastate an oil tanker of that magnitude [referring to the French oil tanker the Lindburg], so imagine the extent of the danger that threatens the West’s commercial lifeline which is petroleum.”

The United States has a vast interest in Indonesia’s continued cooperation in the war on terrorism. JI has proven to be arguably the most professional and lethal of Al Qaeda’s affiliates, and it has perpetrated three major attacks on “Western targets” since October 2002. JI and Al Qaeda operatives also aborted a planned attack on the US Embassy in Jakarta. Indonesia continues to be mentioned by Al Qaeda in its statements, and will likely be the victim of future attacks. Indonesia’s waterways remain essential to the United States and global economy, and are vulnerable to attack. As important as Indonesia’s cooperation as a moderate Muslim country in the war on terrorism, the United States also hopes that Indonesia can be an important regional ally in countering the rise of China. The United States has a strong vested interest in ASEAN. At present ASEAN is a weak and divided organization, lacking any clear leader. It would be in US interests to support Indonesia’s natural leadership, which could revitalize the regional grouping so it can once again serve as a counter to the growing strength of China.

The United States also has a vested interest in Indonesia’s democratic transition and commitment to human rights and the rule of law. While Washington should support the new Yudhoyono administration, it should remember that he cannot be perceived as being a servant of US interests, and it must understand the president’s political constraints in parliament. US public policy abroad is highly symbolic,
and Indonesia cannot be expected to support all of Washington’s counter-terror operations as long as many Muslims believe that the war on terror is patently anti-Islamic. Were the United States to rekindle the Middle East peace process and begin to resolve the Iraq situation, one might expect greater cooperation in the war on terror from majority-Muslim states like Indonesia.

During President Bush’s brief stopover in Indonesia in 2003, he announced US$157 million in educational aid to improve Indonesia’s secular and non-secular schools, although much of this aid had already been pledged and committed. However, such aid will do little to diminish anti-American sentiment unless there are concurrent steps to increase trade, investment, lower tariffs, and import quotas on Southeast Asian goods to foster job creation and economic opportunities. High unemployment and underemployment represent potentially grave sources of instability. Diminished expectations, frustration, and aggression, especially amongst educated youth, will provide fertile recruitment grounds for terrorism in the years to come.

The United States has also had to rethink its military relationships with Indonesia, though this has aroused strong congressional opposition. The lightning rod in this debate was Indonesia’s IMET program that was suspended following Dili massacre. Critics of the TNI contend that IMET and other military assistance facilitated human rights abuses and political interference by the TNI. On the other side of the spectrum were those who argued that the IMET program had to be restored because, very simply, the Pentagon has little personal contact with TNI officers and there is an appalling shortage of Western-oriented and pro-reform members of the TNI. The restrictions on the sale of weapons and parts to Indonesia effectively forced Indonesia to find alternative sources of weapons. For example, Indonesia recently purchased a number of Russian-made Su-27 fighter jets, rather than its usual American-made fighters.

Restrictions on military ties are counter-productive at this point and in neither country’s long-term interests. In the fall of 2004, the new Indonesian Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono traveled to Washington in order to meet with Bush’s administration officials and to encourage them to alter current US policy, though he made little progress. His government hoped to capitalize on the generally positive view of Yudhoyono in Washington, as well as on new leads in the investigation of two US citizens murdered in Freeport, allegedly by Papuan separatists. Beginning in 2004, the US government got around the IMET stipulations by offering Indonesia “Extended IMET” programs under the Pentagon’s Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program, worth $599,000. In 2005 alone, Indonesia participated in roughly 130 events sponsored by the US Pacific Command. In February 2005, the United States revived Indonesia’s IMET program—though the gesture was more symbolic than substantive, as the E-IMET program dwarfs the normal IMET program.

The window of opportunity for the Indonesian government to strengthen relations with the United States was the December 2004 Tsunami. The US government immediately lifted restrictions on the sale of spare parts for Indonesia’s fleet...
of US-built cargo planes. Though the US Congress remained highly skeptical of the Indonesian government in general and the military in particular, the overwhelming human catastrophe made it imperative to restore military-military ties. On 22 November, the State Department lifted the FMS ban on defense exports to Indonesia. Admiral William Fallon, the commander of the Pacific Command stated that the decision is “in our best interests.” “The US remains committed to pressing for accountability for past human rights abuses,” the State Department said, “and US assistance will continue to be guided by Indonesia’s progress on democratic reform.”

The United States for its part, sent in two carrier groups to provide Tsunami relief. US forces flew round the clock missions to deliver aid and assistance, helped to reopen the airport in Banda Aceh and provided immediate medical assistance to thousands of survivors. The US government provided US$1 billion in assistance, and the US private sector as well as the US business community in Jakarta provided US$561 million dollars. While there was an immediate uptick in popular support for the United States, as reflected in public opinion polling, it was short-lived.

In terms of counter-terrorism, the United States should continue to support its training operations and legal sector educational efforts. The US intelligence network in Indonesia and Southeast Asia is relatively small. Moreover, US police and intelligence agents cannot work in these countries without the effective cooperation of their counterparts. To make better progress, the United States will need to act reciprocally. No example is more obvious than that of Hambali. In US custody since his capture in Thailand in 2003, US officials have denied regional security services all access, despite continuous Indonesian requests. Though US officials originally stated that Hambali would eventually be handed over to Indonesian authorities so that he could stand trial, dissatisfaction with some of the sentences handed down to JI members and the inconclusive trials of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir have cast doubt on whether the United States will ever turn him over. Furthermore, while US officials told their Indonesian counterparts that they would provide transcripts of Hambali’s debriefings, they have come in a slow and inconsistent manner. For example, with the imminent release of Ba’asyir from prison, the United States suddenly provided Indonesia with hours of transcripts and other intelligence, giving the impression that they had been withholding information promised previously. Despite the information provided by Hambali, the US government did not allow him to be called as a witness, which would entail giving Ba’asyir’s lawyers an opportunity to cross examine him.

There are several ways in which the United States could assist Indonesia’s fight against terrorism. First of all, the United States should increase funding for counter-terrorism training. It could do so through bilateral aid or by assisting the Australian-led counter-terrorism center in Semarang. Despite congressional restrictions on joint training and operations with the TNI, there are no similar restrictions with regard to the police and BIN. The United States should also
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increase funding for legal training and much-needed judicial reform—one sector in which the United States is well placed to assist. The United States should increase funding to Indonesia’s educational system, as well as expand educational exchange programs, for example by increasing the number of Fulbright grants given to Indonesian students. It should continue to fund work by civil society organizations such as the Asia Foundation that are working with Islamist parties to bring them into the political mainstream. Finally, Washington should also consider ways to stimulate the Indonesian economy and create jobs.

Conclusion

With the fall of Suharto came the simultaneous rise of violence and spread of Islamism—both political and social. Three distinct groupings emerged, the first of which includes political parties and formal political-social institution that remain committed to working within Indonesia’s current political-legal order, even if some of them are less committed to Indonesia’s secular orientation. This group eschews violence and remains committed to protecting minority rights. The second category includes groups that are highly committed to either transforming Indonesia to an Islamic state or at the very least imposing sharia law on the majority Muslim community. This group includes a range of organizations that are, to varying degrees, willing to use force to achieve their political goals. Some pure Salafi organizations eschew violence altogether in the belief that it distracts from their religious and proselytizing mission. Some groups, especially the youth dominated organizations, engage in coercion and intimidation of rivals, while others engage in mob violence, especially targeting private property. Finally, there are militias such as Laskar Jihad, which use violence but for a limited and defined objective against an identifiable target. The final grouping, dominated by Jemaah Islamiyah, includes organizations willing to use high levels of often-indiscriminate violence in order to terrorize the population. Their goal is not only to create an Islamic state in Indonesia, but to create a pan-Islamic caliphate in Southeast Asia.

These various groups have different goals and different methods, and for the most part they have remained distinct from one another. At times, there has been a certain amount of crossover among them, and we have to be alert to the potential for any convergence of means and ends. In terms of policy, we need to be cognizant that these are diverse groups that require distinct policy prescriptions; a one-size-fits-all policy approach will only drive these groups further together.

With this in mind, in the midst of the Yudhoyono presidency, we can imagine four possible scenarios for how political Islam and jihadist violence might develop in the 2005–2009 period. In one, Islamist political influence increases while jihadist violence declines. This would entail the Islamist parties using dissatisfaction with the traditional political elites to expand their power at the expense of secular parties. Jihadist violence declines either because JI is rooted out or because the government is able to quickly respond to new outbreaks of sectarian
violence. Popular support for the jihadists declines because there is a sense of efficacy among political Islamists. In the second, Islamist political influence increases while jihadist violence continues or increases. In this case, political support and sympathy for the jihadists’ goals continues to grow while Islamic identification and anger and disenchantment with the United States, the West, and other symbols of secularism surges. The moderate Muslim organizations are sidelined or, worse, co-opted. This might also signal that the secular authorities have lost control. In a third scenario, Islamist political influence declines, but at the same time jihadist violence continues or increases. This would suggest that some Islamists have lost faith in politics, rejected the existing legal-political order, and turned to violence to implement their socio-religious agenda. This would also make the success of the Islamist parties between 1998 and 2005 an anomaly. In the fourth scenario, both Islamist political influence and jihadist violence decline. This could be due to an increasingly popular and effective Yudhoyono administration, or the over-identification of political Islam with discredited radical violence. This scenario would suggest that the rise of Islamism and religiously motivated violence since the fall of Suharto was a blip on Indonesia’s historical trajectory as a moderate secular state.

Which outcome are we most likely to see in Indonesia? The fourth scenario does not seem likely, as it does not fully account for the fundamental changes that have transpired in Indonesian society in the past decade or more. The Indonesian public is not as moderate as it once was. The third scenario likewise seems unlikely because the Islamist parties are unlikely to lose so much political influence over the next 5–10 years; their growth, vision, organization, and determination indicate that this is not a one-time phenomenon. These parties are poised to grow, and there is little indication from current data that this will not happen. The second scenario—rising Islamist influence and continuing violence—in contrast, seems likely. Recent polling suggests a surprising amount of support for the jihadists, in both their ends and means. Despite this negative assessment, there is still ground for optimism. It is highly likely that JI can be defeated, although this will take time and the concerted effort of Indonesia and its allies. To achieve this, Indonesia will need to be more pro-active in dealing with sectarian conflicts and not allow them to fester so the laskars and JI can take advantage of them. In conclusion, then the first scenario—increasing Islamist influence but decreasing violence—seems most likely.

Of these four outcomes, only the least likely fourth scenario would be optimal, because the other three leave Indonesia weak, prone to anti-Americanism, xenophobic, and inward-looking. This outcome would maintain Indonesia as a place of multi-denominational tolerance and pluralism, with full respect for gender and minority rights. It would maintain Indonesia as a democratic model for the rest of the Muslim world that is always struggling between authoritarian secularism and radical Islamism.

In order to reach this desired outcome, Indonesia’s secular moderates must understand that political Islam is first and foremost about governance. That means
they have to take an active role in rooting out corruption and improving civil administration. They must focus on social equity and justice. Second, the moderates will have to stand up to the Islamists and challenge creeping Islamization. Third, they must actively create the means to ideologically rebuff Islamism; they can no longer let the Islamists dominate discourse.

The international community, in particular ASEAN, Australia, and the United States, can support these efforts. Through aid programs and technical assistance, they can improve Indonesia’s capacity for governance, help to reduce corruption, and further develop the economy, to help ensure that this optimal scenario is the one that transpires. But ultimately, support is the best that we can do; this is Indonesia’s future.
NOTES

1 Introduction

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12 Human Rights Watch, “Indonesia: The Violence in Ambon.”
13 Ibid.
16 Crouch, “Radical Islam in Indonesia,” p. 35.
17 The concept of Nusantara Raya is tied not only to the notion of an Islamic caliphate that would unite all Muslims, but also to the post-colonial sentiments of uniting the Malay race. See Pedoman Umum Perjuangan al-Jemaah al-Islamiyah (The General Guidebook for the Struggle of Jemaah Islamiyah), unpublished. For more discussion on the PUPJI, see Chapter 3.
20 Ibid.
22 Until 1997, the military and police held a bloc of 100 seats in parliament. After the fall of Suharto, their representation fell to 38 seats in 1999.
27 Such analysis often also downplays the Islamists’ agenda while explaining political Islam’s position on secular issues such as corruption. Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy, Between the Global and the Local: Islamism, the Middle East, and Indonesia, The Saban Center, The Brookings Institution, Analysis Paper no. 9 (October 2005), p. 30; Greg Fealy USINDO Election Year Series lecture at US–Indonesia Society, Washington, DC, 4 August 2004.
28 See, for example, the work of Greg Barton, Greg Fealy, and William Liddle.
29 Crouch, “Radical Islam in Indonesia,” p. 29.

2 Democratization and the rise of political Islam

1 Pancasila represents the five principles of the independent Indonesian state: belief in one supreme God, humanitarianism, nationalism expressed in the unity of Indonesia, consultative democracy, and social justice.

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4 One Islamist party which had set itself a goal of doubling its 1999 level of support (from 1.4 to 3 percent) ended up winning an astonishing 7.3 percent in the 2004 election.
5 See, for example, the development of Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice Development Party (AKP) in Turkey, in Robert D. Kaplan, “At the Gates of Brussels,” *Atlantic Monthly* (December 2004), pp. 44–48.
7 Ibid. This was significantly higher than in any other Muslim countries polled: Pakistan (48 percent), Lebanon (35 percent), Jordan (18 percent), Morocco (57 percent), and Turkey (47 percent).
8 Sarekat Islam called for “self government” in cooperation with the Dutch and demanded a share in the legislative power in the colony. The Dutch responded in 1918 by setting up the Volksraad—a powerless people’s council with advisory status.
9 Woodward, “Indonesia, Islam and the Prospect for Democracy.”
15 Remnants of Darul Islam survive today, and while it is not known how large or active the movement is, it is interesting to note that Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir both held leadership positions in Darul Islam before leaving to form Jemaah Islamiyah in 1992. Greg Fealy, “Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia: The Faltering Revival?” *Southeast Asian Affairs*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004, p. 112. Although it is still an illegal organization, it is tolerated and its members run for political office on the tickets of other parties. There are some 14 factions of the DI movement, each one claiming to be the true heir of Kartosuwirjo.
16 The PNI won 22.3 percent of votes and 22.2 percent of the seats in parliament, Masyumi won 20.9 percent of the votes and 22.2 percent of the seats in parliament, NU won 18.4 percent of votes and 17.5 percent of parliament, and the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) won 16.4 percent of the vote and 15.2 percent of parliament. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia Since c.1200*, p. 304.
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26 Schwartz, A Nation in Waiting, pp. 173–175.
29 This is despite the fact that the NU was the single-largest vote-getter for the PPP in each of the subsequent elections. Ricklef, A History of Modern Indonesia Since c. 1200, p. 378.
31 Schwartz, A Nation in Waiting, p. 164.
37 The traditionalist school of thought in Indonesian Islam are those who adhere to the Syafii School of Islamic jurisprudence, which instructs its adherents on nuanced legal interpretations of Islam through a network of mainly rural-based madrassas. “Modernists abjure classical schools of jurisprudence in favor of direct readings of the Koran and the Hadith.” As a group, modernists tend to be urban and more educated. The two schools of thought are each represented by an organization: modernism by Muhammadiyah and traditionalism by Nahdlatul Ulama. Mujani and Liddle, “Politics, Islam and Public Opinion,” p. 11.
38 The modernist Reform Star Party (PBR) broke away from the PPP to contest the 1999 election, results for which can be found at www.ifes.org/eguide/resulstsum/indonesiares.htm.
44 Damanik, Fenomena Partai Keadilan, p. 291.
46 Ibid., p. 20.
47 The 1999 polling results can be found at www.ifes.org/eguide/resultsum/indonesiarets.htm.
50 Ibid.
51 Woodward, “Indonesia, Islam and the Prospect for Democracy.”
54 Barton, “Islamism and Indonesia.”
57 The PK was renamed the PKS in order to slip through a loophole in the electoral law that prevented parties which received less than 2 percent of the vote in 1999 from standing in the 2004 election.
62 Bubalo and Fealy, Between the Global and the Local, p. 30.
63 The others voted for Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (28 percent), Amien Rais (15 percent), Megawati Sukarnoputri (14 percent), and Wiranto (14 percent).
70 The party, which began with only 200,000 members was able to win 1.4 million votes in the 1999 election, now has 8 million voters. Mujani and Liddle, “Politics, Islam and Public Opinion,” p. 118.

Bubalo and Fealy, *Between the Global and the Local*, p. 31.

I would like to thank William Liddle for making this point.

Haz garnered only 3 percent of the popular vote. Constituents of the PPP were “evenly distributed” among the five presidential candidates, with party candidate Haz receiving only 29 percent of the vote from his own base. The others voted for Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (28 percent), Amien Rais (15 percent), Megawati Sukarnoputri (14 percent), and Wiranto (14 percent).

Technically Hidayat Nur Wahid is no longer Chairman of the Party. He resigned upon his election as Speaker of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) in order to avoid conflict of interest. “The behavior of the elite must change, as we can’t expect a sweeping reform to come soon. They should concentrate on working for the public,” Hidayat said. He was temporarily replaced by Tifatul Sembiring, who headed PKS operations in Sumatra. A new chairman was elected at the April 2005 party.


In the draft Preamble to the 1945 Constitution, there is a statement that, while not turning Indonesia into an Islamic state, states that there is the legal “obligation to follow Islamic Sharia for its adherents.” This phrase, known as the Jakarta Charter, was omitted from the final draft of constitution that was passed on 18 August 1945.


According to the proposed law, sentences of 3–12 years for anal and oral sex and 1–7 years for homosexual sex would be imposed. The draft also proposed sentences of up to 2 years for any unmarried couple found guilty of cohabitation. Marianne Kearney, “Indonesia to outlaw gay sex with new moral code,” *South China Morning Post*, 1 October 2003.


Cited in Michael Vatikiotis, “The Struggle for Islam.”


Some political analysts are predicting that as parties such as the PKS set their sights on building a less localized political machine, they will begin to adopt a rural message in order to tap into the religious conservatism of the villages. Goenawan Mohammed, talk at Columbia University Weatherhead Center for Asian Studies, 12 May 2004.
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92 “Aceh Governor Arrested as Corruption Suspect,” Laksamana.net, 7 December 2004.
95 Goenawan Mohammed, talk at Columbia University Weatherhead Center for Asian Studies, 12 May 2004.
103 Liddle, “Indonesia: Islamism Constrained?” p. 35.
104 Gatra, 13 March 1999.
106 Ibid.
108 The new law simply renamed the territorial system as regional empowerment.
112 Richel Langit, “Indonesian Military—The Powers That Be.”

3 Jemaah Islamiyah and Islamist terrorism

NOTES

4 Abuza, Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia.
5 ICG, Indonesia Backgrounder.
6 Badan Intelligen Negara, Al Qaeda’s Infrastructure in Indonesia, Jakarta (February 2002).
7 Agus Dwikarna’s KOMPAK organization made such videos, allegedly with financing and assistance from Seyam. ICG, Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi, p. 4; Abuza, Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia, p. 32.
8 Although according to the 9/11 Commission, Hambali had tried to shield JI from Al Qaeda, cooperating only because he felt that Al Qaeda provided the support necessary to achieve JI’s goals. See National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, New York: W.W. Norton, 2004, pp. 150–152.
9 Ibid., p. 10.
10 Ibid., p. 151. For more information on the Bali attacks, see Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, pp. 164–167.
14 Ibid., pp. 2–3.
15 Ibid., p. 3.
17 The full text of his speech can be found at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3705&l=1.
18 Salafists, as opposed to Salafiyya, mix fundamentalist Salafi teachings with more radical jihadi texts such as those by Sayyd Qutb, which orthodox Salafiyya reject.
19 Almost all of the 13 have family ties to JI. The two Singaporeans are sons of JI and MILF, and the fathers of three of the five detained Malaysian students are JI members. Ellen Nakashima, “Indonesian Militants ‘Keep Regenerating,’” Washington Post, 25 March 2004.
21 Ellen Nakashima, “Indonesian Militants ‘Keep Regenerating.’”
22 Al Qaeda’s manuals can be found at www.fbi.gov.
23 The PUPJI does, however, talk about how operations should be conducted in the General Manual for Operations. It emphasizes planning and that “the operation should be planned and carried out according to plan.” It also outlines a schema for guerilla war, calling for four-stages in an operations: (1) planning, (2) execution, (3) reporting, and (4) evaluation. Emphasis is placed on education, meticulous planning, and learning from past acts (including mistakes). Later the document discusses how members should focus on intelligence operations, strength building operations, strength utilization operations, and fighting operations. Almost all emphasis is placed on strength building operations, which is defined as a lengthy process that includes spiritual and physical strengthening. The goals of this educational period include enlightenment, discipline, instilling a sense of loyalty, physical readiness, and skills to use weapons, tactical and strategic thinking, and leadership development.
24 JI requires its membership to be steeped in religious training and to be highly devout individuals. The PUPJI is broken down into four main sections: Preamble, the General Manual for Operations, the Nidhom Asasi, which outlines the organization’s hierarchy, rules, and procedures, and a section on explanations and clarifications. The document begins by outlining the ten core principles of the organization: (1) Our aim is only to seek Allah’s blessings by means which had been determined by Allah and his apostle; (2) Our belief is the belief of a Sunnah Wal Jama’ah
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‘Ala Minjis Salsfish Shalih Specialist; (3) Our understanding about Islam is Sumul following the understanding of As-Salifish Shalih; (4) The goal of our struggle is for men to serve only God by re-erecting Khalifah on earth; (5) Our road is creed, Hijrah and Jihad Fie Sabitillah; (6) Our provisions are knowledge and piety, conviction and trust in Allah, gratitude and patience, simple life and preference for a life hereafter, love for Jihad Fie Sabitillah and a Syahid [martyr’s] death; (7) Our Wala to Allah and his Apostle and faithful people; (8) Our enemy is the Devil’s evil spirit and human devils; (9) The ties of our jama’ah based upon the similarity of goals, faith and understanding of Ad-Dien; and (10) Our Islam charity is in a pure way and Kaffah with the Jama’ah system then the Daulah and then the Khalifah.

25 Personal correspondence.


28 Dore Gold, Hatred’s Kingdom, p. 98.

29 BBC Transcript, Tape 3, 30.

30 ICG, Indonesia Backgrounder, p. 8.

31 Kompas, 5 December 2002.

32 BBC Transcript, Tape 3, 30.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid., Tape 1, 2–3.

35 Ibid., Tape 2, 12.


37 Kompas, 28 November 2002.


40 Ibid.

41 Friend, Indonesian Destinies, pp. 116–119.

42 Interview with Achmad Michdan, Defense Attorney for Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Jakarta, 17 March 2004. In Atran’s interview with Ba’asyir, “In Bali where 200 people died, it was America’s bomb. That was a major attack and Amrozi [the Bali plotter who bought the explosives] doesn’t have the capability to do that.”

43 The document begins by outlining the ten core principles of the organization: (1) Our aim is only to seek Allah’s blessings by means which had been determined by Allah and his apostle; (2) Our belief is the belief of a Sunnah Wal Jama’ah ‘Ala Minjis Salsfish Shalih Specialist; (3) Our understanding about Islam is Sumul following the understanding of As-Salifish Shalih; (4) The goal of our struggle is for men to serve only God by re-erecting Khalifah on earth; (5) Our road is creed, Hijrah and Jihad Fie Sabitillah; (6) Our provisions are knowledge and piety, conviction and trust in Allah, gratitude and patience, simple life and preference for a life hereafter, love for Jihad Fie Sabitillah and a Syahid [martyr’s] death; (7) Our Wala to Allah and his Apostle and faithful people; (8) Our enemy is the Devil’s evil spirit and human devils; (9) The ties of our jama’ah based upon the similarity of goals, faith and understanding of Ad-Dien; and (10) Our Islam charity is in a pure way and Kaffah with the Jama’ah system then the Daulah and then the Khalifah.

44 PUPJI, Nidhom Asasi, III 6.1-2, IV 8.2.

45 BBC Transcript, Tape 2, 20.
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46 Ibid.
47 Ibid., Tape 3, 30.
48 The analysis of the International Crisis Group has concluded that these kinship ties including marital ties are the single most important determinant of JI membership. ICG, *Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia; ICG, Indonesia Backgrounder*.
50 Ibid.
52 Hashim is now detained in Singapore under the ISA.
54 She was arrested along with Hambali in Thailand in August 2003. Thai officials rendered her to Malaysian authorities. She is currently being detained under the Internal Security Act. Wai and Charles, “More than 100 Marriages Involve Key JI Members.”
55 BBC Transcripts, Tape 8, 98.
56 The Malaysians have shut down the Tarbiyah Luqmanul Hakiem school, Johor, and Sekolah Menengah Arab Darul Anuar, Kota Baru. The Cambodians have shut down the Om Al Qura foundation school.
57 Interview with a senior Indonesian National Police intelligence official, Jakarta, 10 March 2003. These include Mutaqin Jabarah in Central Java, Darul Syahadina and the Madrasah Luqmanul Hakiem in Kelantan, and the Hid yatullah network throughout East Kalimantan and South Sulawesi, which is where several of the Bali bombers were hiding when they were arrested. JI has also been able to recruit further afield in schools in Pakistan, Yemen, Egypt, and at the Islamic University of Medina, Saudi Arabia. Gold, *Hatred’s Kingdom*, p. 90.
63 Among the seven the three suicide bombers are Iqbal (Paddy’s Club, 12 October 2002), Ansar (J.W. Marriott, 5 August 2003), Heri Golun (Australian Embassy, 9 September 2004).
70 The statement was found on a hitherto unknown Al Qaeda-linked website, www.islamic-minbar.com/.
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76 Personal correspondence with an Indonesian security official, 23 October 2004.
77 Interview with a senior Indonesian National Police intelligence official, Jakarta, 10 March 2004.
78 As mentioned above, Sidney Jones of the International Crisis Group believes that sectarian conflict will be the modus operandi of JI in the coming years. She believes that JI is divided into two to three distinct factions, based on the precept that the perpetrators of the Bali and Marriott attacks were in the Hambali faction that had internationalist ties. ICG, Indonesia Backgrounder.
80 “5 Police Killed in Maluku Ambush,” Laksamana.net, 16 May 2005.
82 For a full treatment of the division of the regency and its impact on political and sectarian conflict, see ICG, “Decentralization and Conflict in Indonesia: The Mamasa Case,” Update Briefing, Asia Briefing, no. 37, 3 May 2005.
84 “Assailants in Indonesian Province Linked to Al Qaeda: Police,” DPA, 14 June 2005.
89 “3 Bombs Found at Scene of Religion Conflicts in Indonesia,” Xinhua, 28 July 2005.
90 “Mystery Sniper Shoots Two Witnesses in Poso,” Tempo Interactive, 5 August 2005.
95 Eva C. Komandjaja, “Police find more bombs terrorists to be buried soon,” Jakarta Post, 29 November 2005.
100 “Vice President: Dr. Azahari Behind Poso Bombing,” Tempo Interactive, 31 May 2005.
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101 For a thorough treatment of LIPIA, see Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy, *Between the Global and the Local: Islamism, the Middle East, and Indonesia*, The Saban Center, The Brookings Institution, Analysis Paper no. 9 (October 2005), pp. 21–24.


104 See, for example, *Time* magazine’s “Interview with Osama Bin Laden,” vol. 153, no. 1, 11 January 1999; Osama bin Laden’s audio statement broadcast on Al Jazeera satellite TV station, 3 November 2001; Abu Ghaith, “What Happened to America was Natural,” statement issued September 2002.

105 BBC Transcript, Tape 3, 29.

106 The Pew International, Research Center for the People and the Press, *Global Attitudes Survey, Views of a Changing World* (June 2003). One of the most surprising results showed a growing degree of Islamic conservatism was the figure that only 22 percent of Indonesians felt that women should be permitted to work outside the home; a sentiment that was shared closely by both men (20 percent) and women (24 percent). (P42–43) There is a sense that religion should be a personal issue, rather than a state imposed one: 86 percent of Indonesians believed that the decision to wear a hijab—the headscarf—should be made by women themselves; only 14 percent believed that it should be a legal policy. (P44) However, 99 percent of the respondents believed that it was necessary to believe in God in order to be moral. (P114)

107 Most believed that the United States favored the Israelis to the detriment of Palestinians and 58 percent of Indonesians polled believed that there was no way for an Israeli and Palestinian state to exist side by side. (P5)


116 BBC Transcript, Tape 2, 17.


119 Mohamed Nasir bin Abas has admitted to Indonesian police officials: “I helped establish Camp Hudaibiyah in Moro in 1994 by the order of Abdullah Sungkar. I trained MILF members. Funding came from Abdullah Sungkar. I was given 2000 RM. In 1996 I went home to Johor. There weren’t any JI cadets yet but the preparations were finished. I was succeeded by Umar Patek who was my junior in Afghanistan and who trained in Moro in 1995. In 1998, Camp Hudaibiyah began training 17 Indonesians from Java. I helped arrange their trips to Moro. I watched over the camp twice, once for two months in 1999 and once for three weeks in 2000. When I was there Abubakar Ba’asyir visited Camp Hudaibiyah and he was accompanied by Ustad
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120 This figure, from the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA), is based on the debriefing of Tawfiq Riefqi and several other detainees, and is derived from “class” size at places like Camp Cararao and Jabal Quba. Interview with a NICA Officer, San Juan, Manila, 1 July 2004.

121 Interview with a NICA Officer, San Juan, Manila, 12 September 2004.

122 Interview with a member of the MILF-CCCH-Secretariat, Cotabato, 27 June 2004.


125 Ibid.

126 Interview with a Senior NICA official, Quezon City, 28 June 2004.

127 Jainal Antel Sali, aka Abu Sulaiman, first claimed responsibility for the SuperFerry 14 bombing, though it was perpetrated by Redondo Cain Dellosa (a.k.a Armulfo Alvarado).

128 Interview with a NICA Officer, Quezon City, 15 September 2004. Further evidence that Abu Sayyaf was planning attacks on more ferries was demonstrated on 1 June 2004, when Naval intelligence officers arrested Alzhezar Salappudin Jila in Jolo, Sulu, with a cache of various explosives. “The raid was conducted based on a report from an informant saying the [Abu Sayyaf group] will bomb the fast craft Water Jet of Alleson Shipping Lines, which plies the Zamboanga-Jolo route,” said a Navy spokesman.


135 Interview with an NICA Officer, Cotabato, 12 June 2004.

136 Faiz was a student at Ngruki in Java for 4 years in the early to mid-1990s, though he did not graduate. In 2001(?), he attended Ibn Saud University in Saudi Arabia.

137 The ASG member, a Balik-Islam convert, was Muhair dela Merced.


139 Abuza, Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia.


141 Identified as Ahmad and Abu Nida.


143 Eva C. Komandjaja, “Police Search for Two JI Members in Philippines,” Jakarta Post, 16 August 2005.


145 Ibid.


147 Ibid.


149 In a five-to-four decision, the Constitutional Court upheld an appeal by Masyukur Abdul Kadir, who was sentenced to 15 years for assisting Bali mastermind Samudra,
who argued that Law No. 16 was retroactive and, therefore, unconstitutional. “Law No. 16 (2003) is against the 1945 Constitution; that the law, Number 16 (2003) has no binding power.” Three of the 32 incarcerated JI members were handed down death sentences for their role in the bombing; the remaining 29 have received sentences between 3 years and life imprisonment.

156 Simon Elegant, “I have to Face many Fundamental Issues” Exclusive Interview with Indonesia’s New President, Time Asia, 1 November 2004.
158 “Jemaah Islamiyah to be Banned,” Laksamana.net, 21 March 2005.
160 For a more complete study on Indonesia’s CT efforts, policies and organizations, see William Wise, “Indonesia’s War on Terror,” US–Indonesia Society (August 2005), at www.usindo.org/pdf/WarOnTerror.pdf.
161 Law No. 5/2002.
163 “Vice President Starts Ideological War Against Terrorism”, Tempo Interactive, 23 November 2005.
167 Indonesian authorities seem far too willing to give lenient treatment to JI members who renounce their militancy. Nasir is a good example of this. See Wong Chui Wan and Lourdes Charles, “Seeking Clues to JI-Chechen link,” The Star, 27 September 2004.

4 Radical Muslim groups and Islamist militias

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7 Ibid.
10 International Crisis Group (ICG), Indonesia: Overcoming Murder and Chaos in Maluku, Asia Report no. 10 (December 2000).
17 Haz dismissed claims of political interference into Thalib’s case and said his visit was based on “Muslim brotherhood.” Bill Guerin, “Wars and Enemies of the State,” Asia Times, 24 August 2002.
19 www.laskarjihad.org/.
20 Interview with Jafar Umar Thalib, Jakarta, 10 January 2003.
22 Jafar argues that any state should be governed by sharia rather than the law of individuals and that democracy should be replaced by a council of Islamic scholars (ahu hlai wal aqdi). This council would have the power to appoint the president and have control over government policy. Interview with Jafar Umar Thalib, Jakarta, 10 January 2003.
24 www.laskarjihad.org/.
29 Dwikarna stated that Laskar Jundullah was for the group’s “internal security” only. “I don’t have a history of violence. I am anti-violence. I am active in KOMPAK because that is a humanitarian organization. The activities of KPPSI always avoid violence, such as minimizing protests and demonstrations.” “I don’t Have a History of Violence,” interview with Agus Dwikarna, Tempo, 6 January 2003, pp. 38–41.
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31 Ibid., 1 May 2002.
34 The author has copies of these tapes.
39 Author’s interview with a senior Indonesian National Police intelligence official, Jakarta, 10 March 2004.
44 According to Suaib Dudi, the then chairman of GPI, “There are 150 of them in Kandahar and another 100 at the Pakistan–Afghanistan border. They have now broken into groups of five to wage a guerrilla warfare. Some of them are with the Taliban, and some are fighting on their own.” Amy Chew, “Indonesia Muslim Fighters ‘Safe,’” CNN, 20 November 2001.
46 Author’s interview with a senior Indonesian National Police intelligence official, Jakarta, 10 March 2004.
48 Author’s interview with a senior Indonesian National Police intelligence official, Jakarta, 10 March 2004.
49 The FPI website at walisongo.homestead.com/fpi.html no longer exists.
53 Ibid.
56 Guerin, “Indonesia’s Moral Defenders Taks a Swipe at Sin.”
58 “Indonesians stage mass prayer against war in Iraq,” Reuters, 10 March 2003.
60 Rizeq was arrested on 16 October 2004, for his role in an attack on a discotheque and two billiard centers by 400 FPI members on 4 October. He was released and
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placed under house arrest in November. He nonetheless flew to Kuala Lumpur and then Jordan en route to Baghdad, ostensibly on a “humanitarian mission” of the “Indonesian Red Crescent.” He was arrested upon his forced return to Indonesia on 30 April 2003. On 11 August 2003, he was sentenced to 7 months in prison. For more see, “FPI Threatens Ramadhan Bar Raids,” Laksamana.net, 14 October 2003. www.laksamana.net/vnews.cfm?ncat=44&news_id=6167.


62 Ibid., p. 20.

63 Ibid., pp. 20–21.

64 Ahmadiyah are a Muslim Sect that believe the Prophet Mohammad is not the final prophet. Most Muslims see them as heretical, and they have been victims of violence in Pakistan and elsewhere, as well as Indonesia.


71 On 7 December 2000, FPI members clashed with members of the PDI-P. Riddell, “Islamization and Creeping Shari’a in Indonesia,” p. 167.

72 http://members.fortunecity.com/hammasid.


74 Wahhabism is the official form of Islam in Saudi Arabia.


77 Ibid., p. 759.

78 Ibid., p. 757.

79 “Interview with Ahmad Sumargono,” Tempo Interaktif, 18 November 1998.

80 Ibid.

81 Ibid.

82 “Muslim leaders in Indonesia criticized the government’s decision to arrest 18 suspected Islamist militants in the country,” United Press International, 16 September 2003.


85 Author’s interview with a senior Indonesian National Police intelligence official, Jakarta, 10 March 2004.

86 Ibid.

87 Bernhard Platzdasch, “Radical or Reformist? How Islamic Will the New Movements Make Indonesia?” Inside Indonesia, no. 68 (October–December 2001).


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91 Hizb ut-Tahrir was founded in 1953 by a Palestinian named Taqiuddin Nabhani Filastyni. It has branches across the Muslim world, which are, for the most part, non-violent and engaged in propaganda and educational efforts to criticize secular regimes in Muslim countries that Hizb ut-Tahrir describes as kaffir (infidel). Its ultimate goal is to unite the Muslim ummah (community) and establish an Islamic caliphate. The loosely affiliated network has few concrete goals otherwise and has said little about the system of government it envisages under the caliphate. It simply calls on affiliated organizations to adhere to its tenets.
93 Bubalo and Fealy, Between the Global and the Local: Islamism, the Middle East, and Indonesia, The Saban Center, The Brookings Institution, Analysis Paper no. 9 (October 2005), p. 32.
95 Their official statement can be found at www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/english/indonesia/2004/sept0904.htm.
96 The statement can be found at www.islamic-state.org/leaflets/february2102.pdf.
98 Hizb ut-Tahrir has grown quickly in Central Asia and is thought to have 5,000–10,000 hard-core members, and many more supporters. For more see, Ariel Cohen, “Hizb ut-Tahrir: An Emerging Threat to U.S. Interests in Central Asia,” 30 May 2003, at www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=490.
100 Zeyno Baran, “Fighting the War of Ideas,” p. 69.
101 www.hidayatullah.com/.
102 Interview with Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Ngruki, Solo, 11 June 2002.
104 Interview with Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Ngruki, Solo, 11 June 2002.
106 Interview with Irfan Awwas, Yogyakarta, 13 July 2002.
107 For example, Agus Dwikarna, the fourth in command of the MMI, was the local representative of the Saudi Charity Al Haramain in Makassar in South Sulawesi, which, one Al Qaeda official admitted, was the largest single source of Al Qaeda funds into Indonesia, and also one of KOMPAK’s 13 branch officers. BIN Interrogation Report of Omar al-Faruq (June 2002). The office was in Makassar, Sulawesi. Also see, Romesh Ratnesar, “Confessions of an Al Qaeda Terrorist,” Time, 23 September 2003, pp. 34–41.
109 KOMPAK officials, while acknowledging that they operate in regions struck by sectarian conflict (Aceh, Poso, Malukus, and Bangunan Beton Sumatra), assert they are there to alleviate the crises and provide necessary relief. They denied any links to “jihad activities.” Interview with Dr H. Asep R. Jayanegara, Secretary, Komite Penanggulangan Krisis, Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia, Jakarta, 8 January 2003.
5 Common motives, divergent methods: The future of Islamism in Indonesia

2 Ibid.
14 “Indonesian Govt to Revise Religious Decree,” Xinhua, 8 September 2005.
20 Tom McCawley, “Tensions are Causing more Confrontation between Liberal and Conservative Groups.”
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23 Ibid.
24 Tom McCawley, “Tensions are Causing More Confrontation Between Liberal and Conservative Groups.”
26 Devi Asmarani, “Bid for Religious Curbs in Indonesia.”
30 Devi Asmarani, “Bid for Religious Curbs in Indonesia.”
33 The Hizb ut-Tahrir February 2002 statement can be found at www.islamic-state.org/leaflets/february2102.pdf.
36 See Chapter 4.
40 For example, see the Hizb ut-Tahrir statement of February 2002, p. 2. The statement can be found at www.islamic-state.org/leaflets/february2102.pdf.
42 “Indonesia’s Ropey Rupiah,” The Economist, 1 September 2005.
43 AFP, “Indonesia’s Foreign Investment Approvals Fall in January–April,” 19 May 2004.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid., 31 May 2004.
47 This, of course, has much to do with opposition to the Iraq war. Whereas 31 percent of Indonesians supported the global war of on terror in 2002, only 23 percent supported it in 2003, despite the deadly terrorist attacks in Indonesia in October 2002. PRCPP, Views of a Changing World, pp. 19, 28.
49 Interview with Tempo’s polling team, at INSIGHT Indonesia, Jakarta, 24 June 2003.
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54 Ibid., p. 46.
62 Author’s interview with NU leader (July 2004).
68 Laksamana.net, “Muslim Brotherhood or Political Brotherhood?” 8 May 2002.
69 Quoted in *Newsweek*, 1 July 2002.
74 Schulze, “Laskar Jihad and the Conflict in Ambon,” p. 68.
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77 “Religious Leaders Condemn Bombing, Call for Unity,” The Jakarta Post, 10 September 2004.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
81 Patricia Martinez, “The Islamic State or the State of Islam in Southeast Asia,” p. 481.
84 The Federal Government asserts that the *hudud* is unconstitutional as the Federal Government has jurisdiction of criminal law.

6 Conclusion: Policy implications

1 Yudhoyono also mentioned terrorism and separatism, but with much less emphasis than economic issues. See “Inauguration Speech of President Yudhoyono,” The Jakarta Post, 21 October 2004.
2 Underemployment describes the situation where people do not have steady work but derive income from limited economic activity, for example selling magazines to people in cars on major streets.
4 Ibid.
7 Yudhoyono’s cabinet includes former ministers Hassan Wirajuda (Foreign Affairs), Purnomo Yusgiantoro (Energy and Mineral Resources), and Bchtiar Chamsyah (Social Affairs), all of whom kept their portfolios.
8 They are Jero Wacik, Tourism and Culture Minister and Taufik Effendy, State Apparatus Efficiency Minister.
9 Golkar members Abdurizal Bakrie and Fahmi Idris will serve as Coordinating Minister for the Economy and Minister Manpower and Transmigration, respectively.
10 PPP members in the cabinet include Bchtiar Chamsyah, Minister of Social Affairs, and Suryadharma Ali, Minister of Cooperative and Small-Medium Enterprises.
11 PBB members in the cabinet include M.S. Kaban, Minister of Forestry, and Yusril Izha Mahendra, State Secretary/Minister.
12 PKB members in the cabinet include Alwi Shihab, Coordinating Minister for People’s Welfare and Syafullah Yusf, Minister for the Acceleration of Development in Less-Developed Regions.
13 PAN members in the cabinet include Hatta Rajasa, Minister of Transportation and Bambang Sudibyo, Minister of National Education.
14 The PKP members of the cabinet is Meuthia Farida Hatta-Swasono, Director of Women’s Empowerment.
15 The PKS member in the cabinet is Muhammad Yusuf Ashari, Minister of Housing.
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18 “We Need Shock Therapy: An Interview with Indonesia’s New President,” Time Asia, 8 November 2004.

19 Many observers would argue that Megawati’s true problem was that she was more concerned with the pomp and circumstance of office than actual policymaking.


21 Technically they are to be apportioned as a percentage of seats held. Nationhood Coalition members, who hold a slight majority, want them to be allocated following a vote.

22 The majority Nationhood Coalition wants to vote to determine the leaders of parliament’s nine Commissions whereas the People’s Coalition wants the commissions to be awarded proportionately according to the number of seats held by each party. “Indonesia’s Parliament in Deadlock,” The Age, 2 November 2004; “Tanjung’s Woes May Dampen House Crisis,” Laksamana.net, 3 November 2004.


29 “We Need Shock Therapy,” Time Asia.

30 Richel Langit, “Indonesian Military,” Asia Times.

31 Ibid.


34 Suryodiningrat, “Flirting with Democracy,” p. 5.


36 Ibid.


41 Zachary, Abuza, Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Network of Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya, NBR Analysis, vol. 14, no. 5 (December 2003), pp. 29–32.
42 Author’s interview with a senior Indonesian National Police intelligence official, Jakarta, 10 March 2004. See also “Interview with Amrozi,” BBC Transcript, Tape 4, 52, “Interview with Ali Imron,” BBC Transcript, Tape 5, pp. 71–72.
45 Author interview with Malaysian Special Branch Official, 25 August 2004.
47 Since December 1997, ASEAN held biennial meetings on transnational crime, in which the issues of drug trafficking, human smuggling, arms smuggling, terrorism, money laundering and piracy were discussed, but these meetings have been talk shops that have resulted in little meaningful policies and transnational cooperation. “ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime,” 1997, www.aseansec.org/5640.htm, and “Joint Communique of the Second ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime,” (1999), 23 June 1999, Yangon, Myanmar, www.aseansec.org/5632.htm.
48 The document can be found at www.aseansec.org/5620.htm.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 “The ASEAN–United States of America Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism,” 1 August 2002, can be found at www.aseansec.org/7424.htm.
52 Based on author interviews with intelligence services around the region. National police and intelligence service officers have complained that inter-state cooperation had not been regularized to the degree that it should have been.
55 Imam Samudra on BBC Transcript, Tape 2, 15.
57 An unclassified summary can be found at www.igis.gov.au/fs_statements.html.
59 Ibid.
60 Author interviews with Australian and American security officials.
62 Author interviews with Australian and American security officials.
63 Interview with Australian Federal Police officials, Jakarta, 10 March 2004.
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70 According to the announcement by Prime Minister John Howard, “On entering this zone, vessels proposing to enter Australian ports will be required to provide comprehensive information such as ship identity, crew, cargo, location, course, speed and intended port of arrival.” Matthew Moore, “Jakarta Slams PM’s ‘Illegal’ Sea Plan,” *The Age*, 18 December 2004.

71 Ibid.


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