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American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences

Special Issue:
Neo-Orientalism and Islamophobia: Post-9/11

Association of Muslim Social Scientists
International Institute of Islamic Thought
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CONTENTS

Editorial ................................................................. i

Articles
Justifying Islamophobia: A Post-9/11 Consideration of the
   European Union and British Contexts
   Christopher Allen .................................................. 1

After 9/11: British South Asian Muslims, Islamophobia,
   Multiculturalism, and the State
   Tahir Abbas ....................................................... 26

Muslims and the Media after 9/11:
   A Muslim Discourse in the American Media?
   Halil Ibrahim Yenigun ........................................... 39

Liberating Afghan Women
   Nancy Gallagher .................................................. 70

“Citizens of Heaven” versus “The Islamic Peril”:
   The Anti-Islamic Rhetoric of Orlando’s
   Holy Land Experience Since 9/11/01
   Nancy L. Stockdale ................................................ 89

Anti-Islamophobia Education as Transformative Pedadogy:
   Reflections from the Educational Front Lines
   Jasmin Zine .................................................... 110

Review Essay
Warraq’s War: A Critical Review
   Ahrar Ahmad .................................................... 120

Book Reviews
After Shock: September 11, 2001 - Global Feminist Perspectives
   (by Susan Hawthorne and Brownwyn Winter, eds.)
   Bathseba M. Opini ................................................. 131

Losing Control: Global Security in the Twenty-first Century
   (by Paul Rogers)
   Munya G. Kabba .................................................. 134

Western Supremacy: The Triumph of an Idea?
   (by Sophie Bessis)
   Maliha Chishti .................................................... 136
Enemy Aliens: Double Standards and Constitutional Freedoms
in the War on Terrorism
(by David Cole)

Imad A. Ahmad ................................................................. 139

Fear and Anxiety in the Arab World
(by Michel G. Nehme)

Amber Haque ................................................................. 142

The Arab Mind
(by Raphael Patai)

Omer M. Mozaffar ........................................................... 144

Islamic Peril: Media and Global Violence
(by Karim H. Karim)

Laurent Bonnefoy ............................................................ 147

Islam and Dhimmitude: Where Civilizations Collide
(by Bat Ye’or; tr. Miriam Kochan and David Littman)

Imad A. Ahmad ................................................................. 149

Beyond Veil and Holy War: Islamic Teachings and
Muslim Practices with Biblical Comparisons
(by Saleem Ahmed)

Nevin Reda ................................................................. 152

Following Muhammad: Rethinking Islam
in the Contemporary World
(by Carl W. Ernst)

Amira K. Bennison ............................................................ 154

The Trouble with Islam: A Wake-Up Call for Honesty and Change
(by Irshad Manji)

Nerjis Mazid ................................................................. 157

Sword of Islam: Muslim Extremism from the Arab Conquest
to the Attack on America
(by John F. Murphy Jr.)

Rachad Antonius ............................................................ 159

Islamic Fundamentalism and the Doctrine of Jihad
(by A. J. Abraham)

Mikhail Ali ................................................................. 162

Pride, Faith, and Fear: Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa
(by Charlotte A. Quinn and Frederick Quinn)

Ali Mabrook ................................................................. 164

The Infidel Within: Muslims in Britain since 1800
(by Humayun Ansari)

Maria F. Curtis ............................................................ 167

Caravanserai: Journey among Australian Muslims
(by Hanifa Deen)

Katherine Bullock ........................................................... 169
Brick Lane
(by Monica Ali)
Wendy O'Shea Meddour ................................................................. 172

Forum
The Jewish Obligation to Stand Up against Islamophobia
in the United States
Lisabeth Kaplan and Paul Roochnik............................................. 175

Conference, Symposium, and Panel Reports
Legal and Practical Aspects of Participation by Women in Arab Societies
Marina de Regt .......................................................... 183
An Interfaith Perspective on Globalization for the Common Good
Suleman Dangor .......................................................... 185
Family and Households in History
Sherry Gad Elrab .......................................................... 188

Abstracts
Doctoral Dissertations .......................................................... 191
CALL FOR PAPERS

The 33rd Annual Conference of the Association of Muslim Social Scientists (AMSS)

Revisioning Modernity: Challenges and Possibilities for Islam

Cosponsored by: George Mason University: Center for Global Studies & Islamic Studies Program, Fairfax, Virginia
September 24 - 26, 2004

Deadlines:
Abstracts: May 28, 2004• Papers: August 27, 2004

The AMSS 33rd Annual Conference offers an exceptional forum to address the contemporary challenges of globalization and to analyze how the transnational flows of people, ideas, technologies, and commodities challenge fixed conceptions of identity and belonging, as well as traditional models of social and political organization. Since these same processes blur the contours, location, and social meaning of Islam – both in global spaces and closer to home – AMSS seeks to explore to what extent has contemporary global life exceeded the boundaries of modernity. What does it mean – in terms of both discourse and practice – to transcend modernity? How do Muslims from diverse subject locations engage, question, or challenge notions of modernity and post-modernity? What is it to be Muslim in a complex world of multiple identity affiliations and fractured subjectivities? We are looking for papers that engage, address, or integrate the following subthemes:

- The Decolonization & Politicization of Knowledge
- Multiple & Fractured Identities
- Discourse Ethics & Cosmopolitanism
- Diaspora: Integration, Assimilation, Resistance
- Islamic Feminism in Transnational Contexts
- Technology & Society
- International Security & Humanitarian Crises
- War, Migration & Refugees
- Human Rights/Civil Liberties
- Poverty/Economic Restructuring
- Center & Periphery: the Global Politics of Development & Governance
- Resisting Ethnic "Tribalism"
- Social Movements
- Peace Education, Anti-racism/Anti-Islamophobia Education
- The Politics of Difference & the Challenge of Solidarity
- Progressive Islam & Who Are Progressive Muslims
- Islamic Knowledge & Education: Future Directions

Abstracts (250 words) are due May 28, 2004. Accepted proposals will be announced within 21 days. Accepted papers must be submitted by August 27, 2004, to be included in the conference program.

Send abstracts to the Conference Coordinator, Ms. Layla Sein, at conferences@amss.net

Conference Chair: Dr. Peter Mandaville (George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia)

For details about AMSS and conference updates please visit http://www.amss.net
Editorial

This special issue was suggested to us by a reader during my term as AJISS book review editor. Soon after 9/11, many bookstores and popular websites, among them www.amazon.com, stocked up on Islam-bashing books whose main arguments were that Islam posed numerous threats to the United States, in particular, and to the West in general. Authors took umbrage with President Bush’s claim that the “war on terror” was not a war on Islam, and that, indeed, it was Islam that was the problem and the enemy of the modern age. How about making some scholarly responses to these books, our reader asked.

I was initially of two minds, for these books were not academic treatises. Should an academic journal spend time on non-academic books? On the other hand, given how important these books were (and are) in shaping public opinion about Islam and the presence of Muslims in the West, it seemed essential that Muslim intellectuals should respond. To do nothing in the face of the barrage of negative and hostile arguments ultimately seemed irresponsible. The Muslim community was under attack – spiritually and physically. If there were no intellectual counter-arguments from a Muslim perspective, what could an uninformed and curious reader rely on to hear from the other side? A non-response by Muslims would count as affirmation, because the reader would have no alternative sources with which to think about the issues being raised. Thus, we decided to provide scholarly responses to the Islam-bashing books from Muslim intellectuals (or non-Muslim scholars empathetic with Islam) that would do more than say “these books are inflammatory” by providing reasoned analysis and argumentation as to why such books were not only wrong and misguided, but also that they were actually inciting hatred toward Muslims.

Not everyone agreed with our thinking, and some Muslim academics felt it would be a waste of their time to review (hence give unwarranted credence to) nonacademic populist diatribes against Islam and Muslims. Others embraced the project with enthusiasm. A few reviewers who had initially consented found that in the end, they were unable to complete their assignments because they could not stomach such biased and non-academic books.

When I became editor of AJISS, we decided to devote an entire issue to Islamophobia and not just review a few influential Islam-bashing books. By this stage, enough time had passed for it to become obvious that Muslim-
bashing post-9/11 was not simply a passing phenomenon based on revenge, but a deeper-seated structural issue in western societies, from the UK to North America to Australia. In addition, the United States Congress, in a concerted effort, was threatening academic freedom, and neo-conservative academics were attempting to discredit Muslim voices (even being presumptuous enough to set up their own “Muslim” think tanks!), in hopes of silencing Muslim perspectives altogether. Thus, we issued a call for papers to address neo-Orientalism and Islamophobia since 9/11. This issue is the result of that. And we are pleased to offer you a strong and comprehensive special issue on the topic of Islamophobia and Orientalism post-9/11 with international dimensions. Jasmin Zine worked hard to have a wide range of books related to the issue’s theme reviewed, and I am sure you will find the book review section rich with considered critiques of both relevant populist and academic books.

Ahmed Ahrar has written a discerning extended review essay on Ibn Warraq, one of the most well-known populist Islam-bashing authors who has been having a field day since 9/11, courtesy of our “friends” at Prometheus Publishing house. He provides a timely and scholarly rebuttal of Ibn Warraq’s diatribes against Islam.

Two articles from the UK open the issue. Christopher Allen and Tahir Abbas seek to theorize Islamophobia, using Britain as a case study. Allen’s paper explores whether or not 9/11 has significantly altered the forms and structure of Islamophobia. He looks at the immediate post-9/11 period, begins with the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia’s “Summary Report into Islamophobia in the EU after 11 September 2001,” and then moves on to Britain as a case study. Allen finds that 9/11 has sharpened an already present Islamophobia, with the left and far-right coming together in their anti-Muslim pronouncements. He concludes, worryingly, that Islamophobia is being normalized across British society.

Abbas concurs, arguing that “British discourse on racialized minorities has transformed from ‘color’ in the 1950s and 1960s, ‘race’ in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, ‘ethnicity’ in the 1990s, to ‘religion’ in the present climate,” with religion meaning “Muslims.” Abbas maintains that in spite of the Muslim presence in the UK for generations, Muslim loyalties to Britain are still being questioned, and Muslims often feel forced to choose between “Islamic” or “British” identities on the one hand, or from inside the Muslim community “liberal” or “radical” on the other.

Both Allen and Abbas highlight the role of the media in helping to shape and form the public’s perception of Islam and Muslims. By and large, and in spite of numerous articles giving voice to Muslim perspectives, the
media’s images of Islam remain sensationalized and negative – with a main message to the general public that Islam and Muslims are violent, oppress women, and threaten western civilization.

Yenigun provides a sustained and theoretically informed study of the American media’s representation of Islam and Muslims in the immediate post-9/11 period and the subsequent war on Afghanistan. Not surprisingly, he argues that the representation of Islam replicates colonial and Orientalist themes; however, he concludes that a new theme emerged: the differentiation between “moderate” and “fundamentalist” Muslims. In the paper’s last section, he wonders if the unprecedented focus on Muslim voices allowed for a more nuanced understanding of the issues. In the end, he states, Muslim voices only replicated the mainstream media’s categories of “moderate” versus “fundamentalist” and that, therefore, Muslim voices simply reinforced negative stereotypes rather than help create a new discourse.

Gallagher takes us through a case study of Time magazine’s portrayal of Afghan women in the post-9/11 period to demonstrate the continuity of Orientalist themes of Muslims. She reflects on the Orientalist tradition in the United States, which viewed the Orient in a similar way to the Native American: the “noble savage,” whose very exoticness and savageness thrilled and attracted a bourgeois audience, but nevertheless reinforced the American sense of “Manifest Destiny” – a God-given right to rule. Like Halil’s study of the media portrayal of Afghanistan, Gallagher’s examination of Time magazine’s portrayal of Afghan women finds that these American Orientalist themes are still being perpetuated: Afghan women are being portrayed as the oppressed exotic “Other” who needs to be rescued by American soldiers and set on the right path to modernization under American tutelage.

Stockdale takes a look at a very specific site of Islamophobia in the United States – the Holy Land Experience (HLE) theme park in Orlando, Florida, that had opened in early 2001. The HLE theme park aims to win converts to its version of Christianity, with a particular focus on Jews. The HLE belief is that the end of time will be marked by a Jewish return to the Holy Land of the Bible and the conversion of world Jewry to Christianity. HLE hopes to speed things along this route by actively supporting the state of Israel and missionary work to world Jewry. Stockdale finds that prior to 9/11, Islam played an uncertain role in HLE’s cosmology, but that post-9/11, it has been brought in as a major focus. Islam is now being presented as a major threat to “Israel, Christianity, the United States, and the democratic free world.”

We see in the HLE representation of Islam, as well as comments by British leaders in the British press, a resurgence of medieval Christian
polemics against Islam, with many of the same ideas being recycled for the modern era: Islam as an imposter religion, predisposed to violence, and a threat to civilization (or “true”) values. Muslims are being recast into the old mold of a war-like threat.

These are extremely worrying trends. Hitler’s rise to power and subsequent genocide of German Jews, as well as other specific groups (e.g., Roma [Gypsies]), was predicated on a dormant anti-Semitism and feelings of German racial and moral superiority that Hitler was able to bring to the fore and exploit. The same is true of the genocide in Rwanda. Beginning in April 1994, Rwandan media outlets launched a propaganda barrage at the majority Hutu community about the “cockroaches,” members of the Tutsi minority, and then called upon the Hutus to do their “patriotic duty” and slaughter all of the Tutsi, family members included. The fact that during the following 3 months an estimated 800,000 Tutsis were murdered in cold blood, while the West closed its eyes, shows just how powerful and incendiary the media can be. The normalization of anti-Muslim sentiment is thus a dangerous trend that has, in the very recent past, led to ethnic cleansing.

Hence, the MENTOR’s anti-Islamophobia project, described by Jasmin Zine, our book review editor, is a vital and inspirational story about Muslim responses to Islamophobia. Most of us wear many hats, and one of her other hats is president and cofounder of MENTORS (Muslim Education, Network, Training and Outreach Service), a community-based group comprised of Muslim parents, educators, students, and community members that promotes projects supporting equity in education. With her fellow Muslim colleague, Suzanne Muir, currently diversity coordinator at the Halton District School Board, MENTORS developed multi-media resource kits for primary and secondary school children entitled “Toward Understanding: Moving Beyond Racism and Islamophobia.” The Canadian government and the Canadian Race Relations Foundation funded the initiative, and it recently won two prestigious awards: the J. S. Woodsworth Human Rights Award and the Ontario Elementary Teacher Federation Anti-Bias Curriculum Award. I hope that this project will stand as an example and inspiration to others to know that there are ways to combat Islamophobia that the public school system will embrace. May Allah (swt) reward them.

It is Muslims’ responsibility to combat Islamophobia intelligently, and we anticipate that this special issue achieves that goal admirably. Naturally this is not the end of our intellectual engagement with the issues raised by 9/11, so the reader can look forward to a continuing dialogue in the issues to come, in sha Allah.

Katherine Bullock
Justifying Islamophobia: A Post-9/11 Consideration of the European Union and British Contexts

Christopher Allen

Abstract

Immediately prior to the events of 9/11, the United Nations (UN) officially recognized the proliferating climate of anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic prejudice, discrimination, and hatred – Islamophobia – as being as equally repellent and unwanted as anti-Semitism and other global discriminatory phenomena. The 9/11 tragedy, however, somewhat overshadowed this recognition, resulting in the continued proliferation of anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic sentiment and expression.

This study explores how and why Islamophobia was manifested following 9/11, contextualizes how elite voices across British and European societies have considered Islamophobia to be fair and justified. In considering the wider findings of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia’s monitoring of Islamophobia, this study explores how “visual identifiers” have underpinned changes in attitude and reactions to Muslims across the fifteen European Union (EU) member nations at a largely pan-European level.

The second section develops these ideas, analyzing three of the report’s primary themes – Muslim visuality, political landscapes
(incorporating institutional political elites as well as grassroots politics), and the media – each one approached from the perspective of the United Kingdom. This study concludes by suggesting that 9/11 has made Islamophobia more acceptable, which has enabled its expressions, inferences, and manifestations to locate a newer and possibly more prevalent societal resonance and acceptability. Ultimately, this new development goes some way to justifying Islamophobia and negating the UN’s recognition of this problem.

Introduction

Just a few days before 9/11, an event occurred that has since been lost in the fog of urgent history and the rhetoric of hyperbolic overstatement: The UN’s formal recognition of Islamophobia, thereby establishing anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic prejudice, discrimination, and hatred and placing it alongside other equally discriminatory and exclusionary phenomena, such as anti-Semitism and anti-Roma. Therefore, prior to 9/11, Islamophobia was considered a growing global phenomenon that required immediate action to combat its spread. As the conference proceedings note, accepting anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic sentiments and attitudes was now being seen as normal. Consequently, and against the supposed norm of common perceptions today, anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic expression and hostility were as much a distinctly pre-9/11 phenomenon as a post-9/11 phenomenon. As such, much of what has been identified and recorded since that day was in evidence both before and after 9/11, albeit in varying degrees and manifestations. How official recognition of Islamophobia and various governmental and transglobal processes would have responded and fought such a growing climate of anti-Muslimism – a cancer, as one British politician has described it – can only now, in a completely different global context and order, be imagined.

In an attempt to further contextualize and balance current ideas and understandings of Islamophobia, this study asks how and why Islamophobia was manifested after 9/11 before contextualizing this in ways that consider how Islamophobia has, despite formal UN recognition, been seen to be fair and justified across different sectors of society. Split broadly into three interrelated sections, the first section focuses upon the research undertaken by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) and its Summary Report on Islamophobia in the EU after 11 September 2001.
Beginning with an overview of the report, this study highlights and considers its most relevant findings and conclusions gleaned from the fifteen EU member nations. Across the EU’s breadth, a vast difference of experience and manifestation became apparent, for there was no entirely homogenous “European” response to Muslims. However, since the research program was, and indeed remains, the largest project analyzing Islamophobia anywhere in the world, its findings are very relevant to identifying the phenomenon’s causes. The second section analyzes three of the report’s main themes, considered in terms of a mini-case study from a British perspective. The first explores Muslim visuality. The second analyzes political landscapes, incorporating institutional political elites as well as grassroots and street politics, before concluding briefly with an overview of the media. The middle section, therefore, considers how the macro-themes identified at a pan-European level translate into the micro-themes and manifestations in the national context.

The concluding section asks to what extent 9/11 has afforded Islamophobia a greater societal weight, whereby such expressions have located newer and a possibly more resonant societal acceptability. Ultimately, though, the conclusion answers whether Islamophobia has become increasingly justified since 9/11 and, if so, how. In this context, justify is employed in a literal way: that ideas, expressions, and attitudes are presented in ways that are seen to be just, right, or reasonable. As such, the question underpinning this section is: Has 9/11 – the event, its aftermath, and its legacy (i.e., understanding, interpretation, and response) – made expressions of anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic sentiment appear to be right and reasonable in a post-9/11 world? It is hoped that by doing so, the arguments supporting this study will provide the necessary clarity required to better frame the topic of Islamophobia in a post-9/11 world and stimulate further debate.

The EUMC Report

The EUMC Report was the synthesis of 75 nationally focused reports, five from each EU member state, that closely monitored reactions against, and any changes of attitude toward, Muslims following the 9/11 attacks. Of these reports, the first 15 were commissioned within 24 hours of the attacks, putting in place the necessary mechanisms to closely track the situation faced by Muslims across each EU member state. The project ended at the end of the 2001 calendar year. As there was little, if any, concrete evidence
at the beginning of the project’s implementation of any changes in attitude or anti-Muslim backlash, the immediacy of this response points to a sense of expectation, or even inevitability, that such a reaction would ensue.

In recognizing the response of the various European presidents and prime ministers who took immediate action to stress that neither “Islam” nor “Muslims” per se had perpetrated the attacks, the report noted an almost unspoken acknowledgement that a clear and unequivocal preemptive response was required. Unfortunately, despite the attempts by some of Europe’s political elite to diffuse the situation, the summary report concluded that “Muslims became indiscriminate victims of an upsurge of both verbal and physical attacks following the events of 11 September.” From its findings, a new dynamism emanating directly from the 9/11 attacks saw manifestations of anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic expression become more extreme, explicit, and widely tolerated.

Violence, Aggression, and Identified Changes in Attitude

Insofar as violence, aggression, and changes in attitude, the report concluded that across the EU spectrum, incidents involving a negative or discriminatory act against Muslims or a material entity associated with Islam were identified. Numerous mosques, cultural centers, and Islamic schools were either targeted or threatened. Probably the most distasteful incident occurred in Exeter, where seven pig heads were impaled on spikes outside of a mosque and what was purported to be pigs’ blood was smeared over its outside and entrance. What emerged across the EU, however, was that irrespective of the identified and documented levels of violence and aggression, the underlying causes were, as the report termed it, “visual identifiers” of either Muslims or Islam, or both. While these were not necessarily the reason for such changes or attacks, they were the single most predominant factor in determining who or what became the foci for any retaliatory action or reaction. The visual identifiers provided a seemingly societal stimulant that offered an outlet for the venting of rage, revenge, or any other denigratory sentiment or action.

It is no surprise, therefore, that when these visual identifiers held such primacy in determining who or what became targets for discrimination, abuse, violence, and aggression, Muslim women in particular – possibly the most visually identifiable religious adherents in contemporary Europe – became the primary target. In Britain, an 18-year-old Muslim woman in Slough was beaten by men wielding baseball bats for apparently no other
reason than being identified as a Muslim. At the same time, the British press was reporting that many women wearing hijab or other traditional Muslim attire had been spat upon and verbally abused.

The report also stated that other Islamophobic incidents could be identified in Denmark, where a Muslim woman was thrown from a moving taxi; in Germany, where Muslim women had their hijabs torn off; and in Italy, where a bus driver repeatedly shut the bus’ doors on a Muslim woman, much to the amusement of an onlooking and cheering crowd. Many similar instances were recorded elsewhere. Interestingly, in those countries where Muslim women rarely wear traditional attire (e.g., Luxembourg), no incidents were reported as being targeted toward women. In this particular setting, however, the focus shifted toward Islam’s more physical visual identifiers. For example, Luxembourg’s sole Islamic center was vandalized and attacked.

Nor were Muslim men exempted from this process. In line with the heavy media rotation of images of Usama bin Laden and the Taliban, turban-wearing men became indiscriminate targets, as people identified – somewhat inaccurately – turbans as a visual identifier of Muslims. As a result, the number of reported attacks against Sikh men rose. However, this can only be attributed to ignorance and misinterpretation, rather than any rise in anti-Sikh behavior or attitudes. Similarly, bearded men, again including Sikhs, were also attacked, although to a much lesser degree than other forms of targeting. Indeed, these are the everyday visual symbols across society that normally would be ignored or unnoticed. However, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, a London taxi driver who had some Islamic motifs in his car was hospitalized following a horrific attack by some of his passengers. Apparently, they visually identified and subsequently associated him with the 9/11 tragedy.

The last aspect relating to visual identifiers was the attacks on Islam’s physical entities (e.g., mosques, schools, cultural centers). Included in this were general threats, vandalism and material damage, and more serious concerns, such as bomb and death threats. Across Britain, as indeed elsewhere, many Islamic schools closed for several days due to the fear of threats being carried out or the possibility of spontaneous attack. At times of prayer also, many mosques increased security and many local police authorities agreed to increase patrols in response to requests from some Muslim communities that had received threats of violence and worse.

In conclusion, the report stated that prejudice and distrust appeared to extend to all individuals who somehow looked like Muslims, irrespective
of whether or not they were indeed Muslim. Consequently, the role of such visual aspects of Islam and Muslims cannot be overlooked, because embodied within the now readily recognized and acknowledged common identifiers is an underlying view that uni-dimensionalizes all Muslims through the common denominator of Islam. Moreover, this view simultaneously infers that all Muslims bear some form of collective and homogenous responsibility. One way of elaborating upon this, if somewhat coarsely, is to consider the old British racist adage that “all blacks look the same.” In the contemporary setting now emerging from the discourses and processes of this greater receptivity to Islamophobia, that same adage might more appropriately be reworded as: “All Muslims are the same.”

Measures of Anti-Islamic Actions and Reaction

The post-9/11 period in Europe also saw an upsurge in ethnic xenophobia, especially those that were either historical or preexistent to 9/11, as well as those that were either nationally or regionally constrained. Although this happened across the EU spectrum, different manifestations were identified in different settings based upon the Muslim communities themselves and their particular histories, nationalities, status, and ethnic backgrounds. As the report put it, 9/11 provided a catalyst of fear that sought to reaffirm and renew old – and, indeed, enhance new – prejudices that exaggerated the potential of the perceived “enemy within.” The impetus of a greater awareness, a previously unacknowledged vulnerability, and a fear and dread of both old and new enemies, all of which were being supported and reiterated in both the media and political spheres, contributed to and compounded the problem. The report, however, suggested that both latent and active prejudices found a catalytic reinvigoration. So in Spain, for example, the widespread survival in Spanish folklore of “el Moro” found greater credence, where a greater emphasis on “el Moro’s” Muslimness became readily apparent. Similarly in Greece, centuries old enemies that were previously described as either Turkish or Albanian were being described as Turkish Muslims or Albanian Muslims.

The distinctions between religion and ethnicity, therefore, became increasingly blurred, and the primacy of an enemy’s Muslimness, whether relevant or not, was stressed in order to reinvigorate and reaffirm historical foes, albeit in a contemporary frame of reference and understanding. Thus, these types of xenophobia were not anything new and were distinctly pre-9/11 phenomena. However, through the overlapping of Muslimness and the
previously racialized or ethnicized “Otherness” that such enemies previously had, those existing fears and attributes were subsequently reinforced and, transitionally, found an increased resonance through a seeming confirmation of those previous fears and beliefs, albeit somewhat inactive or suppressed. The atavistic stereotypes of historical enemies – the historical “Others” that much of Europe and European society had defined itself in opposition to – that were deeply embedded in the experience and culture of various races, nationalities, and communities were being reinvigorated, and possibly rejustified, by contemporary events.

Reactions by Opinion Leaders

As mentioned previously, most European leaders sought to preempt an expected anti-Muslim backlash in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 tragedy. Most assumed a high profile, especially the Irish Taoiseach Bertie Aherne, and the British and German prime ministers, Tony Blair and Gerhard Schroeder, respectively. Many were keen to stress that while Muslims had seemingly perpetrated the terrorist acts, those Muslims did not reflect or represent the peaceful nature of “true” Islam. Only one political leader, Italy’s Silvio Berlusoni, declared, but later retracted, his affirmation of western culture’s supremacy over its Islamic equivalent. Many of these same political leaders, among them President Bush, also emphasized that any retaliatory attack or the ensuing “war against terror” was neither a war against Islam nor a war against Muslims per se.

While some might suggest that such changes in attitude toward Muslims and any Islamophobic backlash against their communities across the EU might have been heightened by such circumstances, or indeed may need to be contextualized by the growing urgency of military retaliation, such arguments need to be countered by the numerous and quite categorical denials by political leaders of all nationalities and political persuasions to reassure Muslims and non-Muslims that any retaliation was not a “war” against either. Across much of the EU, public sentiment was largely against military action, so any suggestion that the context of war might have sought to justify Islamophobia during this period must be balanced by the leaders’ rhetoric and guidance at the time.

This positive situation immediately following 9/11, however, gradually changed as the unequivocal support for indigenous Muslim communities appeared to waiver when several mainstream political groups sought to exploit the climate of increased fear and mistrust for political gain. In
Denmark, the general elections that shortly followed the attacks focused on immigration and the role of “foreigners.” Due to the increasing acceptance in Denmark that the descriptors “Muslim” and “foreigner” were largely synonymous, the resulting situation was one of political rhetoric characterized by increasing Islamophobia, where anti-Muslim campaigning became rooted in the growing popularity of a societal need to protect Danish identity and culture. One consequence was that the Dansk Folkeparti was reported to the police for hate speech crimes. Similarly, in The Netherlands – and outside the remit of the EUMC Report – the assassinated Pim Fortuyn found posthumous political success largely by campaigning on the threat that Muslims posed to the Dutch not only because of their monolithically perceived collective responsibility for 9/11, but also because of the threat to the liberal Dutch lifestyles that Islamic culture was alleged to present.

While considering the role of opinion leaders, the report also noted the inroads that far-right and neo-Nazi groups made following 9/11 and their resulting influence on the shaping of political ideas and issues. While it is necessary to differentiate between the role of “street” political groups, such as in Spain, where loosely described political “skins” undertook “Muslim-bashings” as part of their racist ideology, other groups that were neither mainstream nor “street” found unprecedented success. The British National Party (BNP) is a particularly good example, for it emerged largely from the remnants of a disillusioned street political group: the NF. Over the past few years, however, it has attempted to shed that image in order to re-present itself in terms of a quasi-legitimate political force, particularly since 9/11. Its evolution and Islamophobic campaigns are considered later in this study.

Nonetheless, across the entire EU, far-right groups from “street” through “quasi-legitimate” to “mainstream” found a greater platform from which to publicize their views, messages, and arguments. A recurrent image in this resurgence was the suggestion that Europe’s “Christian” identity and heritage were being replaced by a far more covert Islamic one: Muslims were an internal threat who, through high birth rates, asylum seekers, and proliferating immigration, were insidiously attempting to infiltrate and conquer Europe. Trying to prove this, some groups began to use Berlusconi iconically as the only European leader brave enough to speak the truth about Muslims. Much of this was presented via the Internet and other electronic communicative mediums, where a dramatic rise in anti-Muslim, far-right-inspired activity was noted. As the report concluded, evidence suggested that the distance between the acceptability of the mainstream and the previous unacceptability of the more extreme far-right was decreasing, and that those
same highly inciting and dangerous anti-Muslim messages were finding a more consensual and sympathetic ear in many European societies.

The media were also included in the report’s discussion on opinion leaders, due to their contribution to the processes that shape and determine common opinions and ideas. Without providing too much depth, given that this research area has seen some excellent research over the past few years, the role of the media remains both contentious and highly debatable. The report itself, however, duly concluded that there was very little evidence that the media had a largely positive or negative impact, or any impact whatsoever. None of the 75 reports submitted clearly suggested that the media either directly or indirectly caused, or were responsible for, any reported or identified act of aggression or significant change in attitude.

However, and in spite of this, the media’s role should not be devalued, for they play a very important role in formulating and establishing popular perceptions and conceptions in the public sphere. This has been documented quite extensively in more detailed expositions of the media. So when certain media represent Muslims negatively or stereotypically – sometimes as an almost necessary and integral part of their coverage – in a climate that is already volatile and fraught with fear, issues of responsibility and accountability should be called to the fore. The report concluded that while no evidence suggested that the media was influentially causal, neither could it be completely dismissed nor removed from the equation.

Concluding the EUMC Report

When identifying the EUMC Report’s broad findings, it is imperative to note that while the report was the culmination of the largest-ever monitoring project of Islamophobia, it did have its failings. One of these may have been the exclusion of the context and setting provided by the then-emerging backdrop of the “war on terror.” However, while this is a valid observation, for the purpose of this study the focus is restricted solely to the report’s findings. While this means that some areas of identified concern and weakness will remain outside this study, it is hoped that the debates and concerns acknowledged here about Islamophobia, as well as its existing subjectivities and discourse, will be aired and responded to in greater detail elsewhere. Nonetheless, the report did highlight and pick out some very pertinent trends and themes that must be considered further in order to achieve a better understanding of the processes and manifestations of anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic sentiment and expression. This recognition underlies the second part of this paper.
The British Context
In the British context, some interesting correlations and considerations can be explored to assess the extent to which 9/11 has justified Islamophobia. In doing so, three particular themes emerge: visuality, political rhetoric, and the media.

They’re All the Same
In reflecting the wider European landscape, Muslim communities are the second largest faith community in Britain as well the most visually recognizable, for traditional Islamic attire is readily identifiable in most towns and cities. As has been noted elsewhere, this visual difference has caused a wider demarcation of difference that embodies a sense of otherness and inferiority to emerge: more precisely, an otherness and an inferiority to the “norms” of British society. At the same time, the socioreligious icons of Islam and Muslims with which this visual identification has evolved have also acquired a far greater immediacy of recognition, one that is contextualized and understood in almost entirely negative and detrimental frames. So, with the catalytic impetus of 9/11, this situation intensified and deteriorated simultaneously: intensifying because this same visual identification came under greater scrutiny at the same time as becoming increasingly recognizable, while simultaneously deteriorating because this same visual difference also became the focus underpinning the denigratory and violent attitudes and acts that began to manifest themselves. Such a process, therefore, would appear to both reinforce and, to some extent, perpetuate each phenomenon.

Those post-9/11 reificationary processes have both “newly established” and “reestablished” Muslims as chimerical “Others,” drawing upon recent events as well as the legacy of anti-Muslimism endemic to the wider European setting. Consequently, since 9/11 British Muslims have found themselves increasingly identified in predetermined and bipolar ways, and, more dangerously, have to do the same in terms of self-definition as well. As Ziauddin Sardar has suggested, Muslims are now identified as either “terrorists” warring against the West or “apologetics” defending Islam as a peaceful religion. However, society’s populist and widespread monolithic and negative immediacy of visual recognition of Muslims, in addition to the subsequent demarcation of difference that this recognition entails, has led to the following situation: Both types of Muslim in the post-9/11 climate have, through this uni-dimensional lens of acknowledgement and recognition,
become increasingly non-differentiated visually. As a result, the two poles have become virtually identical. Consequently, all Muslims are characterized by the same negative and stereotypical attributes of the first bipolar definition: All Muslims have the capability to either be terrorists or, at least, be supportive of terrorism.

The hyperbolic climate of fear and threat posed by 9/11 caused Muslims to be characterized, according to the same demarcation of difference, in terms of “them” and “us,” where a distinct lack of differentiation was allowed to permeate “them.” So, when the media reported the alleged threat posed by “sleepers” or “fifth columnists,” all Muslims were seen, due to their homogenously attributed “Otherness,” as both realistically and conceptually capable of posing such threats. This only exacerbated the climate of fear and suspicion. In fact, this occurred not only with the local proximity of British Muslims, but also with respect to the international scene with global proximity, where the largely external global perceived threat of the “green menace” or the “axis of evil” became as equally understandable and indistinguishable in the localized setting of Britain. Hence, Muslim men who resembled Usama bin Laden however insignificantly (i.e., having a beard or wearing a turban), were attacked thousands of miles away from his presumed location because that same visual difference transcended geographical boundaries and proximities. As a result, all Muslims, along with the visual identifiers of Islam, were transformed into legitimate targets for hatred and abuse.

In an attempt to offer some theoretical framework, I refer to Martin Barker’s authoritative work on “new racism.” Following the legislative protection afforded to minority communities and ethnic groups in the early 1980s – protection that is still not afforded to British Muslims because various governments have failed to close the anomaly in a law that does not accommodate multiethnic religious communities – people such as Barker began to acknowledge a shifting of foci away from the more traditional markers of race to the newer and legislatively unprotected markers based upon cultural and religious difference. This demarcation of difference has now attained an immediacy of recognition. However, unlike older forms of racism, this new racism sought to elaborate upon the differences identified in much less explicit ways. In other words, the markers of difference do not underpin explicit hatred and hostility; rather, they implicitly infer and establish direct challenges and threats, where “difference” challenges and threatens “our way of life.” This demarcation of difference, therefore, appears to be underpinned by differences that are either unacceptable or incompatible
with the “norms” of society, the norms relating to “us” and definitely not to “them.”

The evolution of such a theoretical understanding can be seen in the post-9/11 period, where the visuality of Islam and Muslims has been clearly presented in terms of being incompatible with the norms of “our” society and “our way of life.” In today’s populist understanding, the “threat” that Muslims are seen to present – not just in terms of terrorism or the widely convoluted “clash of civilizations” theory – is one that has myriad manifestations. As such, questions about state Islamic schools, freedom of speech, the role of women, radicalism or “bin Ladenism,” as such a phenomenon has recently been described, and community cohesion are now just a few of the issues that have caused the Muslim “difference” to be seen as threatening, or at least as challenging, the “British way of life.” Given that 9/11 has cast a vast shadow over these issues, and indeed continues to fog and confuse these and other situations, the seriousness of the British Muslims’ situation can be readily acknowledged.

The markers of difference that are seen as challenging the British way of life are also the same markers of difference that demarcate Muslims. As such, that which is different is also problematic, and that which is problematic is also challenging: a self-perpetuating and self-reinforcing cycle. Therefore, the impact of 9/11 has both heightened awareness of these differences or problems, depending upon one’s particular perspective, and has subsequently intensified the issues many times over. And so as the threats and challenges are now seen to be much greater than ever before, a sense of justification emerges, one that suggests that rather than Islamophobia being a sentiment of unfounded hostility, such anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic hostility and hatred are now an informed reality. So when anti-Muslimism is disseminated in the public domain, a greater receptivity to such ideas not only means that they have become increasingly normalized, but also that a greater rationalism has emerged. And with rationalism comes the understanding that such rationalism is founded upon beliefs and attitudes that appear to be correct.


Similar processes can be identified elsewhere, for ever since 9/11 the BNP has sought to bolster its own racist views and to acquire societal legitimacy. Both of these have been undertaken on the back of an increasing recep-
tivity to Islamophobia in the British, particularly English, domain. Much of this has consisted of such highly inciting behavior as encouraging insult, provocation, and abuse, as well as employing language and images that encourage and invigorate hatred. However, the BNP has always stressed the legality of its actions, referring to the legislative anomaly that allows a window of opportunity for explicit anti-Muslimism without prosecution.

Under its most successful political campaign, entitled “Islam out of Britain,” the BNP declared its clearest goal of exposing “the threat Islam and Muslims pose to Britain and British society” by publishing a leaflet entitled “The truth about I.S.L.A.M.” In this leaflet, “I.S.L.A.M.” was employed as an acronym for “Intolerance, Slaughter, Looting, Arson, and Molestation of Women.” Widely distributed, it used highly inflammatory reasons for justifying hatred toward Muslims, suggesting that “to find out what Islam really stands for, all you have to do is look at a copy of the Koran, and see for yourself … Islam really does stand for Intolerance, Slaughter, Looting, Arson, and Molestation of Women.” Dismissing those apologetics that Sardar identified as one-half of the bipolar representative Muslims, the BNP selectively quoted the Qur’an in order to paint the most despicable picture of Muslims, adding – in clear new racist rhetoric – that “no-one dares to tell the truth about Islam and the way that it threatens our democracy, traditional freedoms and identity.”

The BNP went on to suggest that understanding the Qur’an could provide a context for both the 2001 Bradford disturbances in the north of England and 9/11, two events that it stressed were inextricably linked. By clearly linking these events – the local and the global – the differences that were seen in one context became attributed to all. In addition, as with the globally and locally perceived threats that the BNP suggested that Muslims were posing to British norms and that were already being increasingly rationalized across society, as acknowledged by the EUMC Report, any differentiation became even more blurred.

The BNP also rooted this “problem” into the context of Islamic theology, where an “anti-kafir” framework sought to both reinforce and codify the demarcation of difference between “Muslims” and “kafirs” – in more simplistic terms, “them” and “us” – as being rather more derivative of Muslims or Islam than it was of the BNP. This shifting of focus was such that the BNP could suggest that this “them and us” dichotomy did not come from them or non-Muslims, but from the Muslims themselves. For the BNP, Islam caused the problems; the BNP was merely highlighting it for the benefit and well-being of British society. The functional capability of
“new racist” forms to focus on differences that allegedly challenge and pose threats as cover and smokescreens to actually perpetuate and encourage hostilities and hatreds, thus become clear.

As a direct consequence of the inroads made by the far-right and society’s deepening receptivity to anti-Muslim ideas and expressions, and in identifying how visual markers of difference were being used in the contemporary climate, Muslims were targeted by other minority communities. Following anecdotal evidence that youth groups of Indian descent in Manchester were adopting an overtly Hindu identity to deflect any potential anti-Muslim backlash, the BNP capitalized upon this and exploited intra-“Asian” tensions by issuing an audio resource entitled Islam: “A Threat to Us All.” This venture, undertaken in conjunction with fringe Sikh and Hindu organizations, was set up to provide “insider” validation (by which one must assume this means “Asian”) of both its own skewed view of Islam and the need to rid Britain of Muslims. As the press release stated, it sought to:

Give the lie to those who falsely claim that we are “racists” or “haters.” We sympathise and identify with every people in the world who want to secure or preserve a homeland for themselves, their traditions and their posterity. And we demand and strive for that same basic human right for the native English, Scots, Welsh, Irish and Ulster folk who together make up the British.

The markers of difference and the subsequent demarcation of Muslims from all others is both clearly present and in line with new racist theories, for in addition to focusing upon the differences that the BNP and others purport to be threatening “us” and “our way of life,” they also denounce any claims that they themselves are racists. The employment of new racist rhetoric and perspectives therefore allows disclaimers to be made that, initially, are difficult to refute. One way of seeing through this is to acknowledge that the BNP does not identify or include its Sikh and Hindu partners in what it defines to be “British.” Nonetheless, when communities that can be identified in terms of racialized markers unite to further demarcate Muslims, they highlight the hatred for Muslims that exists across contemporary British society while also locating an indicator to further suggest that an increasing receptivity toward Islamophobia is apparent.

Consequently, so great was the need to demarcate themselves from Muslims, that those Sikh and Hindu groups found adequate justification to join forces with an overtly racist organization that had, in very recent his-
tory, targeted Sikh and Hindu communities on the basis of their skin color, rather than their religion. So great was their unifying anti-Muslim hatred, a single common denominator, that other contentious and previously oppositional factors were ignored or overlooked. Islamophobia, therefore, whether from the perspective of the BNP, fringe Sikh or Hindu groups, or the growing numbers voting for the BNP, found within this anti-Muslim expression and rhetoric something that they felt was justified.

A justified Islamophobia in the post-9/11 period has been integral to the BNP’s recent unprecedented growth and success. Emanating entirely from the success of their openly anti-Muslim campaigns in areas close to or with heavily Muslim populated areas in the north of England, the BNP has found a much wider quasi-legitimacy. As a result, its members have seen their party’s popularity mushroom into one that seemingly presents a justified alternative and, more worryingly, an apparently real opportunity for success in local, national, and European elections. Targeting their seats directly and specifically, the BNP now has a total of 18 elected councillors across the United Kingdom, from Grays in the south, through Sandwell and Dudley in the Midlands, to its stronghold in Burnley in the north, where it holds eight seats on the local council. And on the back of these anti-Muslim successes, other far-right groups that previously had been largely ineffectual and primarily “street” focused have been reinvigorated. Consequently, such groups as the NF, Combat 18, the White Wolves, and the White Nationalist Party have developed similar anti-Muslim campaigns.

So, as the EUMC Report stated, the gap between the opposite poles of the extreme political right and the political left, at least when concerned with attitudes and perceptions of Muslims, appears to have become closer in the British context. With similar sentiments, the apparently center-left Home Secretary David Blunkett verbally attacked those young British Muslims in Bradford, who were campaigning peacefully against the harsh sentencing of their friends and family convicted of involvement in the 2001 disturbances, by openly calling them “whining maniacs.”

In addition, Blunkett ensured widespread media coverage when he aired his endorsement of the more “rational” claims of the assassinated Pim Fortuyn, suggesting that Muslims should accept and assimilate into “our culture” and “our ways,” and that immigrants and asylum seekers – a group that the EUMC Report suggested was becoming increasingly interchangeable and indistinguishable from Muslims in the post-9/11 period – were “swamping” our schools.23 Echoing similar suggestions made by the then-Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher some 20 or so years earlier, this particu-
lar statement by Thatcher was deemed to be a formative moment in the development and transition of the “new racist” ideologies of the early 1980s. Could Blunkett’s equivalent statement, therefore, be the precursor that confirms the phenomenon of anti-Muslimism as the “new” racist ideology emergent in the early twenty-first century?

Similar accusations of anti-Muslim rhetoric could be posited against other British politicians and politically evolved scenarios, including those such as Peter Hain MP, who suggested that it was the Muslim communities’ own isolationist behavior and customs that created the climate in which the far-right was able to expand and grow. Thus, the victims were responsible. Quite unprecedentedly, in this last statement Hain chose to describe Muslims as “immigrants,” despite their having been settled in Britain for at least the past three or four decades. It is also interesting that Blunkett used the descriptor of “immigrants” to refer to those communities that were “swamping” schools, possibly highlighting the interchange and ease of recognition of terminologies and identifiers now in circulation.

In addition, the British government’s post-9/11 Crime and Anti-Terrorism Bill 2001 has been used to instigate numerous unfounded, yet institutionally endorsed, dawn raids that have failed to produce results; overblow scares, including the uncertainty surrounding a ricin find; and agree to Muslims being imprisoned without trial in London’s Belmarsh prison and in Guantanamo. Furthermore, it has ensured that charges of a wider institutionalized and center-left-inspired anti-Muslim ideology have emerged in the British context. Conversely, however, some far-left political groups have found some unlikely bedfellows in several British Muslim groups that opposed the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and recently formed a political coalition under the banner of Respect.

While some of these examples are far from being as explicit and inciting as those that the BNP and others have made on the opposite, far-right political pole, it is clear that while political allegiance is different, the motivations and ideas underpinning the rhetoric is not, for the demarcated difference of Muslims lies at the root of the perceived “problem.” Whether such claims of institutionalized Islamophobia are valid remains open to debate or, even to an extent, irrelevant, due to the immediacy of recognition and the acknowledgement of difference. With the growing receptivity to anti-Muslim ideas and expressions, and the sense of justification, in line with the success of the BNP, it appears that what is being played out, either rhetorically or legislatively, seems to fit into a wider and societally consensual understanding of a justified hostility and suspicion toward Muslims.
and Islam. This observation appears to be confirmed by a poll, commissioned by the Islamic Society of Britain, that revealed that 84 percent of the British population was more suspicious of Muslims following 9/11. Such a widespread acceptance of this suspicion, when contextualized by the growing popularity of the BNP’s and similar claims, as well as the shifting rhetoric of the center-left government in a heightened climate of fear and mistrust, appears to suggest that such a view or belief would not be difficult to locate or to be something widely perceived as unjust, wrong, or unreasonable. On the contrary, many would suggest quite the opposite.

I Am an Islamophobe and Proud

The language, terminology, and ideas circulated in the public domain relating to Muslims did not emerge only from the political elites. However, as the EUMC Report suggested, the validity of the anti-Muslim messages that are disseminated through the media should not be underestimated. The contemporary representation of Muslims as largely monolithic and non-differentiated groups that stereotypically embody the same immediacies, differences, and demarcations as elsewhere, are quite relevant to how contemporary society views and understands them. Consequently, the media’s role in the immediate post-9/11 era must be considered in order to understand how it possibly sought to influence and shape popular British perceptions.

Baroness Thatcher’s condemnation of Muslim leaders in The London Times, for example, in which she insisted that all Muslims take responsibility for the attacks, expanded upon Sardar’s observation that all Muslims are interpreted in wholly bipolar understandings. For Thatcher, the assumption was that if you do not apologize, then you support terrorism, reflecting President Bush’s you are either “for us” or “against us,” and less explicitly, the “them” and “us” differentiation that the demarcation of Muslim difference embodies. Then, a few days later in the same newspaper, an article entitled “This war is not about terror, it’s about Islam” praised Thatcher’s stance and confirmed that “Western” fears about Islam were justified because “some three quarters of the world’s migrants in the last decade are said to have been Muslims,” and that these “escapees, victims, scapegoats, malefactors and ‘sleepers’ are awaiting their moment.”

Similarly, and in equally homogenous terms, it spoke of “the Islamic mind,” explaining that while westerners were honorable, “Islamic” fighters were not, for they combine “crude weapons” with “appalling violence” and prefer “ambush, surprise, treachery and deceit.” Rooted in Huntington’s
clash of civilizations thesis, while simultaneously employing Crusader and Orientalist terminology, it described the perpetrators of 9/11 as “appearing suddenly out of empty space like their desert raider ancestors,” the descendants of “the horse riding raiders before Mohammed.” Not only did the writer stress the contemporary climate’s differences, but, in so doing, he also stressed the uniformity and absence of change throughout history. In short, he was drawing upon an eternalized narrative in which the threat that Muslims and Islam are purported to have posed to “us” historically is again being posed today – the contemporary being a mere recurrence of an ongoing history and, in opposition to the rhetoric of political leaders, a “war” against Islam.

Other sections of the media highlighted different avenues of thought, such as how Muslim difference presented challenges to “our” liberal ways of life. In the Guardian, Polly Toynbee reiterated her distaste for Islam and Muslims in her “Last chance to speak out.” Having previously aired her views in the Independent by declaring “I am an Islamophobe and proud,” Toynbee mirrored the BNP, despite being politically on the polar opposite, by providing highly selective Qur’anic verses to reinforce her arguments. Having noted what she described as the “blood curdling words of the Prophet,” she employed exactly the same Qur’anic references as the BNP did in its “I.S.L.A.M.” leaflet to support her views as to why Muslims should be seen as a threat. A similar situation arose in a Daily Telegraph editorial, which reiterated the exact phraseology of the BNP’s “Islam: A Threat to Us All” leaflet in order to dismiss Islamophobia when it set out to give “the lie to this imaginary Islamophobia” by extolling the virtues of the British, who were much more “Islamophilic” instead.

Yet one article highlights perfectly the interaction and interchange of the immediacy and negative understandings associated with the demarcated difference projected onto Muslims, the implicitness of mainstream political rhetoric to identify and make the same inferences about Muslims as the far-right, and the role that the media plays in disseminating such ideas in the public domain: in other words, the justification of Islamophobia in the contemporary setting. In a Daily Telegraph article written by Norman Lamont, the former Conservative Chancellor of the Exchequer, he established that ongoing immigration was bringing about a loss of European identity, an assertion that he supported by praising the ideas of the assassinated Fortuyn.

Lamont then went on to deride Prime Minister Blair for carrying a Qur’an, due to the confusing impact that it had on the British about their own sense of identity. For Lamont, the Qur’an obviously did not fit into his con-
struct of what constitutes British identity, because, as he goes on to explain, “we are forced to accept that people living in Britain cannot adhere to the values of one community,” before adding that “individuals cannot be left alone in their chosen communities, if that involves forced marriages, polygamy, book-burning, supporting fatwas and even fighting against our armed forces.” He suggests that these obstacles – or demarcations of difference, to use terminology that has been used previously – are the stark dangers that certain communities pose to the British. In order to make his point absolutely clear, he states that it is not the “West Indians, Africans and Indians” that have failed in their part of building a successful multicultural society, nor is it these that are presenting a challenge to the “British way of life.” It is, instead, those communities that are left unnamed that Lamont clearly sees as being the primary threat and challenge to “our way of life.” Incidentally, Lamont does not specifically name Muslims or Islam once in this article.

Yet the article clearly refers to Muslims, for Lamont uses socioreligious icons – visual identifiers, for want of a better term – that are immediately recognizable in today’s society. Not surprisingly, they are also the same obstacles that are seen as presenting the challenges suggested by him. And while some might suggest that these icons could relate to Pakistani communities only, Lamont’s reference to the Qur’an and the other equally recognizable identifiers of “Muslims” and “Islam” insists that “Muslimness” is primary. And with that same “Muslimness” comes the homogenous and indistinguishable premise upon which contemporary understandings are founded. For Lamont, then, the failings and threat to “our” multicultural society are attributable to one community only: the Muslims, who challenge the very fabric of the British way of life.

Along with the lack of differentiation associated with populist perceptions of Muslims, Lamont’s article insists that all Muslims become incorporated into his particular frame of reference. Consequently, as was also the case with the BNP, the present government, and numerous other voices in the media, all Muslims become the problem not because Lamont has said so, but because of what he has not said. So immediate and embedded is the Muslims’ difference, as well as their homogeneity, that everything evolves from this very difference. The EUMC Report concluded that Muslim visuality did not explain why such individuals and communities became subject to prejudice, abuse, and violence, because of what is embedded and understood by this visual identification rooted in a demarcated difference. In fact, it is this same visuality and difference that underpins, rationalizes, and subsequently justifies such attitudes. The emergent line of thought is con-
sensual in both its premise and message, as well as in its means to substantiate its reasoning and justification.

Muslims, therefore, do not need to be named, but their difference does. Similarly, the *EUMC Report* indicates that the attacks occurred not because someone had to be Muslim or a building had to be Islamic, but merely because their visual identification – rooted in difference – suggested that they were. Thus, this difference neither explains nor justifies why Islamophobia occurred or occurs, but highlights how its embeddedness and receptivity affect understanding and recognition. Given this, Islamophobia – whether anti-Muslim, anti-Islamic or both – is not explained or better understood from this particular perspective. In fact, more theoretical deconstructions need to be undertaken in order to achieve this. However, it does offer an insight into the catalysts, processes, and motivations underlying and influencing such manifestations and attitudes.

**Just, Right, and Reasonable**

The situation since 9/11 is a complex one that cannot easily be conceptualized, one in which individual and group subjectivities continue to question, sometimes rightly, what might legitimately constitute Islamophobia and even whether such a thing as “Islamophobia” actually exists. Attitudes to the events themselves and their ongoing impact, however, quite clearly continue to catalytically underpin a climate of heightened tension, increased fear, and greater suspicion with the hyperbolic overstatement and overblown exaggeration that also continue to emerge from the metaphorical fog still rising from the Twin Towers and the ongoing military action and acts of terrorism.

The situation faced by European Muslims is such that they are increasingly under the spotlight, not only by the media and the political institutions, but also by the larger European community, especially in the wake of terrorist atrocities on the European mainland, irrespective of who is behind those and other attacks. Similar processes have also occurred in Britain, and Muslim communities have expressed their concern not only about the climate of hostility, but also about the way in which their lives and communities are increasingly framed in terms of problematization and criminalization. As was suggested following the disturbances in the north of England and the subsequent sentencing of those involved after the events of 9/11, many saw this as a clear illustration that Muslims and their communities were no longer going to be seen on purely equitable terms with other communities, and that everything connected to them would be dealt with in terms of law and order.35
With Islamophobia already causing global concern prior to 9/11, following the overshadowing influence of the attacks themselves and the ever widening post-9/11 receptivity to such ideas, much of what has emerged since has merely codified and reinforced ideas and attitudes that were already pre-existent across British and other societies. For many, contrary to the pre-9/11 Runnymede report on Islamophobia, which authoritatively stated that the phenomenon was a “dread … of all or most Muslims … [an] unfounded hostility towards Islam,” the Islamophobia contemporarily would appear, at least in some ways, to be nothing of the sort. Rather, it was a hostility according to which the fears, dreads, and hostilities appear to be largely seen as both wholly founded and largely justified. So while this disparity in understanding with the report’s conclusions may have been in evidence prior to the catalyst provided by 9/11, it has been further exacerbated since. In this scenario, therefore, one might conclude that negative views, understandings, and attitudes toward Muslims and Islam – while not reaching the actual level of abuse and violence – were already evident in some circles and understandings. From this, it might be reasonable to suggest that Islamophobia was already being justified irrespective of 9/11 anyway.

With regard to the visuality of Islam and Muslims, alongside the identifiers highlighted in the *EUMC Report*, in Britain these same identifiers have become clearly established and interpreted in ways that demarcate not only difference but also differences that are in contention with the norms of British society, as was seen at the time of *The Satanic Verses* affair and the First Gulf War. The success of the BNP and its anti-Muslim campaigns, therefore, has not been countered by the mainstream political parties through highlighting the failings and inaccuracies of its message, but rather by the BNP’s continued movement toward a more hard-line, almost xenophobic perspective.

This negative perspective has seen such issues as immigration and asylum seeking – both comprising individuals and communities that overlap with representations and understandings of Muslim communities – become daily and oft-repeated news stories that continue to increase the fears, threats, and suspicions that both politicians and the media have exaggerated and sensationalized in equal measure. For example, the news media has reported heavily on the growth and vociferousness of fringe Muslim groups with anti-western and isolationist ideologies that, in turn, have gone some way to both shape and simultaneously reaffirm public fears and concerns that have been subsequently – and quite inappropriately – attributed to all Muslims without discrimination.
As mentioned earlier with regard to the media, so embedded and natural are the negative frames of reference within which Muslims and Islam are understood, portrayed, and re-presented, that for many people in the media, grossly undifferentiated anti-Muslimism is in no way problematic. Across all of these spheres and domains in the British context – as indeed were identified across the broad spectrum of the EU too – the same messages and justifications underpin them: that it is Muslims, their inherent difference, uni-dimensionalism, and incompatibility with “normal” values and “normal” ways of life that are reason enough to view Islamophobia and anti-Muslimism as acceptable.

With greater receptivity comes greater acceptability and homogeneity, with greater acceptability and homogeneity comes normality across a wider sphere of understanding, with normality comes the recognition that something occurs naturally, and with issues of naturalization comes the commonsense adoption of such ideas as being the truth or reality. This truth then becomes universally diffused through society’s elites and across its diversity, sustained not only by the media and political rhetoric, as has been highlighted here, but also by the millions of daily speeches and acts that go far beyond the realms of this particular study. Reciprocally, this same embeddedness within society sees Muslim difference as natural and taken for granted, thereby normalizing Islamophobia. And, it is this normalization in the wider understanding that makes the continuation and suggestion of such anti-Muslim ideas and expressions acceptable. This acceptability of inherent difference then allows Muslims to be seen in entirely homogenous and uni-dimensional terms. Whichever way the process is observed, the result remains the same: Islamophobia embodies a distinct understanding of implicit justification.

Whether considered at the level of the UN, the EU, or at the more specifically localized level of the British context, the phenomenon of any post-9/11 Islamophobia appears to be consequentially problematic. Through 9/11’s occurrence, this one day became the rupture through which Islamophobia has become interpreted and framed, and has since been understood as the primary source of such sentiment – an understanding that has simultaneously sought to justify such sentiment, hostility, and hatred on this basis alone. This same rupture has also insisted that the acknowledgement and recognition given to this phenomena prior to 9/11’s tragic events be dismissed and overlooked, whereas the actions and undertakings of a few people have had highly detrimental consequences for all Muslims. Consequently, as the UN conference noted just days before 9/11,
Islamophobia was already a proliferating phenomenon that was harmful to all Muslims across the globe. At this time, though, this same proliferation would appear to be accepted an unchallenged.

Since the UN’s declaration and the subsequent intensification of anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic phenomena, the situation has clearly, and some would say, continued to deteriorate. Whether at the level of the UN, the EU, or of individual nations, the phenomenon of Islamophobia and anti-Muslimism need to be addressed as much today as they did prior to the events of September 2001. Consequently, the recognition proffered by the UN just three years ago must not go unheeded or ignored. Until the phenomenon is engaged with seriously and openly while pursuing a clear objectivity, the levels of anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic inference, hostility, and hatred may become ever more homogenously naturalized and normalized. Given that further acts of atrocity are likely, it is essential that action be taken across all levels of international, regional, and national governance, and that any future atrocity not be allowed to justify hinder, or detract from combating any form of prejudice, discrimination, or hatred. Indeed, it is essential that no form of prejudice, discrimination, or hatred be seen as right, reasonable, or just. Unfortunately, through the processes highlighted and the rupturing effect of global events, it would seem that Islamophobia – the prejudice, discrimination, and hatred of Muslims and Islam – is, in fact, starting to be seen as all of these.

Notes

4. Christopher Allen and Jorgen Nielsen, Summary Report into Islamophobia in the EU Following 11 September 2001 (Vienna: EUMC, 2002). This report will be referred to from hereon as the EUMC Report.
5. Ibid., 43
6. Taken from the EUMC’s press release at the launch of the report’s publication, 15 May 2002.

9. For a more detailed exposition of this section’s findings, see Allen and Nielsen, EUMC Report, 40-41.

10. Ibid., 40.


12. For a good introductory analysis into the institutional employment of such as “true” Islam in the post-9/11 setting see, Laurent Bonnefoy, “Public Institutions and Islam: A New Stigmatization?” ISIM Newsletter no.13, (2003), 22-23.

13. See, for example, the work undertaken by Elizabeth Poole as regards the representation of Muslims in the British media. Elizabeth Poole, Reporting Islam: Media Representations of British Muslims (London: IB Tauris, 2002). See also the website of the Forum against Islamophobia and Racism (FAIR) for information about their media monitoring of the British press and production of a daily digest for all relevant coverage, both positive and negative.

14. At the time of the Census in 2001, the UK’s Muslim population numbered 1,591,126, a total of 2.7 percent of the population. Thus, Muslims were the second largest religious population after Christians. For more information, see the Office of National Statistics website at www.statistics.gov.uk.

15. A good introduction to this area of research can be found in Pnina Werbner and Tariq Modood, eds. Debating Cultural Hybridity: Multi-cultural Identities and the Politics of Anti-Racism (London: Zed, 1997).


18. A term first identified as being in common use and understanding at the “Islamophobie en Suisse? Eclairages europeens” colloquium at the University of Geneva, 18 October 2003.

19. This leaflet was widely distributed across parts of the UK, where there was a high percentage of Muslim communities from early 2001 through mid-2002. It was also available at the party’s website, although it was removed once the BNP was reported to the House of Lords Select Committee on Religious Offences in October 2002. The BNP also removed all links to its “Islam out of Britain” campaign. In addition to this leaflet, a full range of other equally inciting literature was readily available at the website. At the beginning of 2004, the website contained several essays on “Islam” and “Muslims.” See www.bnp.org.uk.
20. Throughout the summer of 2001, several disturbances erupted across the north of England. The instigators were primarily young Muslim men of South Asian descent. These events occurred primarily in Bradford, Burnley, and Oldham; smaller occurrences were also witnessed in Hanley and Leeds. Despite various official reports on the disturbances, the role of the far-right (including the BNP) was largely dismissed as irrelevant to the tensions that emerged. However, the BNP was actively campaigning in all of these areas during these disturbances, and BNP leader Nick Griffin had been addressing a meeting of supporters in Bradford the night before the Bradford disturbances. Incidentally, these were the worst disturbances of their kind in recent British history. For a fuller consideration of the Bradford disturbances and its aftermath, see Christopher Allen, *Fair Justice: The Bradford Disturbances, the Sentencing, and the Impact* (London: FAIR, 2003).

21. This resource was widely distributed to the media and received significant media coverage throughout 2001 and 2002. At the present time, though, and as with the earlier mentioned anti-Muslim literature, this resource is very difficult to obtain due to the BNP’s actions following the House of Lords Select Committee.

25. “Attitudes towards British Muslims.” This poll was conducted by YouGov on behalf of the Islamic Society of Britain (London), on 4 November 2002.
27. Ibid., 7 October 2001.
After 9/11: British South Asian Muslims, Islamophobia, Multiculturalism, and the State

Tahir Abbas

Abstract

In light of the events of 9/11 and the subsequent actions and reactions on the part of nation-states in the West and “terrorists” in the East, this paper discusses the concepts of Islamophobia (political and media-manufactured) and multiculturalism in the British context. Rising Islamophobia, state actions, and media reactions to 9/11 have led to changing definitions of the “good multicultural society.” British Muslims are caught in a quagmire: Their loyalties are questioned by a society and polity that is still in the processes of establishing its “Englishness” from its “Britishness,” while growing Islamic political radicalism undermines the already precarious relations between British Muslims and the state.

Introduction

There has been a Muslim presence in Britain since the beginning of the nineteenth century, when Muslim seamen and traders from the Middle East began settling around the major British ports. Muslims from the British Raj
in India also came to England to study or trade. The community’s major growth, however, dates from the post-Second World War immigration of Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, and Indians to fill specific labor demands in declining industrial cities in the southeast, the Midlands, and the north.\(^2\) In the 1990s, there was an intake of eastern European and Middle Eastern Muslim refugees emanating from such places as Bosnia and Kosovo, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Iraq.

Although conceptual overlaps exist, the British discourse on racialized minorities has been transformed from “color” in the 1950s and 1960s\(^3\); to “race” in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s\(^4\); to “ethnicity” in the 1990s\(^5\); and to “religion” in the present climate.\(^6\) Here, Islam has the greatest profile. British popular discourse has shifted from seeing minorities as homogenous entities to discerning differences within and between “Blacks” and Asians; then, within South Asians, to differences among Indians, Pakistanis, and Bangladeshis; and finally among Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs. Religion has emerged as a major social signifier.

In Britain, the burgeoning interest in religion has come from both an awareness within the ethnic minority population of Islam and from its heightened international profile. Comprehensive demographic data on British Muslims became available only after a question on religion was included in the 2001 Census of the United Kingdom. Indeed, the vast majority of Britain’s 1.6 million Muslims are from South Asia (around 1 million, two-thirds of whom are from Pakistan, less than one-third from Bangladesh, and the remainder from India). The residual Muslim population is from North Africa, eastern Europe, and Southeast Asia. Around one-third of all British Muslims are under the age of fourteen. In addition, the Muslims remain concentrated in older post-industrial cities and conurbations in the southeast, the Midlands, and the north. Their population has grown from about 21,000 in 1951 to 1.6 million at present.\(^7\)

Today, these Muslim groups are more likely to be living in some of the most inferior housing stock, have the poorest health, tend to significantly underachieve in education, and are underemployed or, more likely, to be unemployed in the labor market when compared with their non-Muslim South Asian peers. Many of them, specifically those from the rural areas of Azad Kashmir (Pakistan) and Sylhet (northwest Bangladesh), are working in the declining or highly competitive manufacturing, textile, and catering sectors; living in inner city housing built at the turn of the twentieth century (which often needs substantial repairs and maintenance); and live as joint and extended families in restricted zones of ethnic and cultural maintenance.
They remain close to kith and kin, extending their religious and cultural manifestations of life, and thus help to shape their presence in Britain.\(^8\)

The present is also a period in which subsequent generations of British South Asian Muslims have begun to question their parents’ religious and cultural values. Furthermore, the increasing link between local and global capitalism is an important phenomenon to consider. Deindustrialization, technological innovation, and the internationalization of capital and labor have helped to ensure that many of them remain at the bottom of society. These patterns emerged early on in their immigration and settlement from the late 1950s right through to the early 1980s. However, these social divisions remain very much alive today – largely as a function of pernicious structural and cultural racism as well as the fact of increasingly competitive labor, education, housing, and health markets.\(^9\)

In terms of anti-discrimination legislation, British state policy toward Muslims has been inconsistent at best and patchy at worst. They are also becoming increasingly overrepresented in prisons. On the whole, Muslims from South Asia have come to represent a minimal contributory role within the socioeconomic and sociopolitical milieu of British society. Nevertheless, several positive elements have materialized, and it is important to build upon them: the provision of halal food and more sensitive dress codes in the army, and female members of London’s Metropolitan Police Service can wear the hijab (headscarf).\(^10\)

**Islamophobia: Definitions, Media, and Politics**

In Britain, notions of cultural and social identifications of the “Other” stem from an understanding and experience of imperialism and colonialism.\(^11\) Islamophobia is defined as the fear or dread of Islam or Muslims. Although the term is of relatively recent coinage, the idea is a well-established tradition in history. Since the genesis of Islam in 622, Europe’s awareness of Muslims has been overwhelmingly negative. During this long contact, the established European powers have found it convenient to portray Islam and Muslims in the worst possible light, so as to prevent conversion and to encourage European resistance to Muslim forces on the borders. Although there have been periods of learning and understanding on the part of the English, there has also been ignorance, conflict, and the demonization of Islam.\(^12\) Muslims have been portrayed as barbaric, ignorant, closed-minded semi-citizens, maddened terrorists, or intolerant religious zealots.\(^13\) Such negative characterizations are still present today, as seen in the negative
representation and treatment of the Muslim “Other,” which are designed to aggrandize the established powers and thereby legitimize existing systems of domination and subordination.

Just as present-day Islamophobia relies on history to fill in the substance of its stereotypes, the contemporary fear of Muslims has its own idiosyncratic features connecting it with the more recent experiences of colonialism, decolonization, immigration, and racism. The Runnymede Trust\(^\text{14}\) stated that Islamophobia is created analogously to xenophobia, the disdain or dislike of all things “foreign.” Seven features of Islamophobia were identified: Muslim cultures are seen as monolithic, Islamic cultures are substantially different from other cultures, Islam is perceived as implacably threatening, Islam’s adherents use their faith to gain political or military advantage, Muslim criticism of western cultures and societies is rejected out of hand, the fear of Islam is mixed with racist hostility to immigration, and Islamophobia is assumed to be natural and unproblematic.

However, it is important not to treat Muslims as an undifferentiated mass, for there are many ethnic, cultural, social, economic, and political differences between individuals and groups. This taxonomy of Islamophobia is very relevant today. But while racism on the basis of “race” continues, the anti-Muslim shift suggests markers of difference of a social and religiocultural nature. Furthermore, while traditional markers of “race” have been afforded legislative protection, the same does not hold for “religious” markers, where protection is restricted only to ethnically defined religious communities through case law, namely, members of the ethnic Jewish and ethnic Sikh communities in Britain. (However, it is understood that inciting religious hatred has been legislatively addressed, and a European directorate outlawing religious discrimination in employment took effect in December 2003.)

Despite Muslims being targeted by right-wing groups with “more subtle forms of racist prejudice and hatred” after 9/11, they nevertheless remain outside the domain of anti-racist legislation.\(^\text{15}\) Concurrently, recent events have also seen Muslims represented in a range of different media that have worked collectively to reinforce negative beliefs and perceptions. The social and religious foundations of Islam, as well as Muslims in general, have attained such a degree of notoriety that their “visibility” is immediately recognizable in entirely negative and detrimental frames of reference. Since 9/11, the situation has both deteriorated and intensified. Islamophobia has gained such a discursive prevalence that western European society is becoming even more uncritically receptive to an array of negative images and perceptions about Islam and Muslims.
Muslims in Britain feel that part of the reason for their continued existence as an unaccepted and often despised minority is based on the presence of the “evil demon”: the media. The charge of media bias needs to be taken seriously, as the coverage of “extremist groups” and “Islamic terrorism” has increased dramatically in recent periods. The language used to describe Muslims is often violent, thereby inferring that their movements are also violent. Arabic words have been appropriated into universal journalistic vocabulary and invested with new meaning, one that is generally extremist and aggressive. For example, jihad now signifies a military war waged by Islamists against the West, whereas its true Qur’anic meaning is, in fact, far broader and refers more to the idea of struggle. Words such as fundamentalist, extremist, and radical are regularly used in apocalyptic headlines across all sectors of the British press.

Indeed, the current portrayal of British Muslims is part of a “new racist discourse.” This “new” racism differs from the “old” racism in that it is more subtle but, at the same time, explicit in the direction it has taken. In the post-9/11 era, politicians have used the people’s fear of Islam for their own ends. By focusing on the “war on terror” instead of Islam, politicians use the existing anti-Muslim frame of reference but replace it with the idea of “terror.” This reporting is compounded by its focus on the “enemy within” or the loyalty of British Muslims to Britain. Reasons for the increased presence of these themes in newspaper reporting are symptomatic of the increased fear of the “Islamic terrorist” since the 9/11 attacks (and, subsequently, the bombings in Madrid on 11 March 2004).

Islamophobia is also present in British politics. In the summer of 2001, Britain witnessed some of its worst inner-city disturbances in nearly two decades. Young British South Asian Muslims, living in the deprived inner cities of Bradford, Oldham, and Burnley, clashed violently with local police. Their pent-up fury was a result of generations of socioeconomic exclusion, as well as a clever targeting of sensitized areas by right-wing groups working to manufacture ethno-religious tension. However, it was the government’s responses to the disturbances, in reports published soon after 9/11, which must be considered.

For example, an illustration of Islamophobia in politics can be seen in New Labour’s idea of “community cohesion.” In keeping with New Labour’s rhetoric of inclusion, this idea masks what is effectively a case of “blaming the victim.” Home Secretary David Blunkett MP, while promoting this idea, announced a test of allegiance. He referred to the problems of the “excess of cultural diversity and moral relativism” that prevents posi-
tive change, and also referred to English language issues and female circumcision in speeches soon after 9/11. In other words, he conflated many different behaviors and cultures with that of the South Asian Muslim community in northwest England. Although these are important issues in their own right, as well as part of a process of making civil society more democratically functional, these were not the factors behind the “riots.”

This segregation is thought to be self-imposed and the cause of racism, rather than a result of it. Although economically disadvantaged and socially marginalized they are, on the whole, willing to participate in society. Segregation is the result of racism and discrimination. But at the same time, identification with Islam is the reason given for segregation. It is relatively easy to blame people and their values while ignoring processes, institutions, and wider local area dynamics (though it is recognized that Muslim communities can mobilize class and ethnic resources to develop religiocultural, social, and economic infrastructures to support their existence).

As New Labour makes preparations for reelection in June 2005 and an unprecedented third term in power, and although there have been genuine shifts in its approach to multiculturalism, citizenship, and social justice, during its second term, the policy of assimilation has been rejuvenated. Blair’s Britain is defining a new ethnicity – Englishness as opposed to Britishness – in an era of globalization and devolution. Eager to embrace the capitalist project, New Labour is also at pains to offer answers to the economic, political, and social anxieties and tensions faced by Britain’s poor, many of whom are members of various ethnic minorities and Muslim. The young South Asian Muslim men of Oldham, Bradford, and Burnley who confronted the police in such dramatic scenes during the summer of 2001 do not suffer the problems of being “under-assimilated.” Indeed, their predicament is that of a society divided by racism, discrimination, and Islamophobia.

**Lessons from History and 9/11’s Impact**

Ever since the Iranian revolution of 1979, Muslims have become a focus of attention. Pictures of 3 million men and women on the streets of Tehran, shown on television screens all over the world, shocked many in western Europe. The Salman Rushdie affair of 1989 highlighted the extent to which the media and British Muslims (who vociferously opposed the book’s publication) became “emotionally unhinged” over the issue, and how Britain’s South Asian Muslims were shown to be weak and intolerant when, in fact, they were merely expressing their opinions on *The Satanic Verses.* This
piece of fiction, which deeply offended Muslims, gave rise to discussions of freedom of speech, blasphemy laws, and the protection of non-Christian religions in Britain.

In addition, the first Gulf War (1990-91), the genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1993-96), the Oklahoma bombing (1995), the Taliban in Afghanistan (1997-2002), Grozny and Kosovo (1999), the recent Palestinian Intifda (since September 2000), and the war on Iraq (2003) have all played a part in creating a transnational Muslim solidarity; a genuine and conscious identification with others of the same religion. Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis – positioning East and West, as well as Islam and Christianity, as diametrically opposed and irreconcilable has only served to build upon growing anti-American sentiment and increased Orientalism through oversimplification and generalization.

Nothing, however, could have prepared the world for the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Reactions were swift, and associations between Islam, terrorism, and the notion of a “Christian versus Islamic” conflict only served to further fuel anti-Islamic and anti-American sentiment. It gave rise to the efforts of British far-right groups to paint Muslims as epitomizing unwanted difference, and almost excused anti-Islamic violence. In the days following the attack, an Afghan taxi driver was attacked and left paralyzed in London. To the murderers, his beard and attire resembled those of Osama bin Laden – the man thought to be behind the 9/11 attacks. Since then, books and television programs about Islam, the Qur’an, jihad, international terrorism, international security, political Islam, radical Islam, and Islamic militancy have been published to explore and discuss the many elaborated – and often conflated – debates on Muslims and Islam. There appears to be genuine desire to learn more and deliberate the issues in relation to a religion that, for many, has remained relatively unfamiliar, although this is not always carried out without a value-, power-, or honor-free agenda.

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Prime Minister Tony Blair MP was keen to present the imminent action against al-Qa’ida as not a war on Islam (although President Bush’s comment that the war on terror would be a “crusade” left little doubt in the minds of British Muslims that political Islam was his main target). Blair’s dilemma was how “to balance the bombing of Muslims abroad with wooing them at home.” On 28 September 2001, a few hours after the attack on Afghanistan, a delegation from the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), Britain’s largest single Muslim pressure group (formalized by New Labour in 1999), was invited to Downing Street.
Paraded to the media were smiles and shaking hands. On 9 October 2001, the MCB issued a press release strongly denouncing the war, an action that incensed New Labour. Although the MCB did not support the anti-war demonstrations, it clearly did not want to further alienate the government – an important trade-off was taking place with politicians that would ultimately gain the upper hand. This led to the beginning of the end of MCB’s cozy relationship with Number Ten.

Furthermore, at the time, pressure was applied to the five British Muslim parliamentarians (namely, MPs Khalid Mahmood and Mohammed Sarwar, and the peers Lord Ahmed, Lord Patel, and Baroness Uddin) who apparently were “encouraged” to sign a letter denouncing the events of 9/11 and partly justifying the retaliatory bombings (Guardian, 13 November 2001). Khalid Mahmood MP soon denied, however, that he had signed any such letter (Guardian, 16 November 2001). Regardless of the accuracy of these claims, it is clear that challenging struggles are taking place over issues of consultation, dialogue, and the maintenance of the Muslim presence within New Labour.

Both external and internal forces affected the positions of British Muslims before the 9/11 events. After this tragedy, both external and internal factors have been exacerbated. Externally, the international agenda now dominates domestic politics, security and anti-terrorist measures have been tightened, and citizenship tests are required for new immigrants. It is also important to consider the disturbances in the north in 2001, as the government’s reaction to them has had direct implications for British South Asian Muslims. Internally, young Muslims are increasingly found in the precarious position of having to choose between one set of loyalties in relation to “the other” (Islamic verses British; liberal verses radical), and being impacted by radical Islamic politics on the one hand and developments related to British multicultural citizenship on the other. This creates tensions and issues, which encourage some to take up the “struggle” more vigorously, while others seek to adopt more western values, for example. Although a simplistic distinction, this observation does have a genuine value in the current climate. Further research is needed to help distinguish the depth and breadth of the issues involved here.

British multiculturalism is a distinctive philosophy that legitimizes demands upon unity and diversity, seeks to achieve political unity without cultural uniformity, and cultivates among its citizens both a common sense of belonging and a willingness to respect and cherish deep cultural differences. Although this is an admirable ambition, it is not easily achieved. In
fact, there are few examples one can use to verify its success. The New Labour experiment has had both high successes and low failures – the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000, the Human Rights Act 1998, the Stephen Lawrence Report (1999). But as a result of 9/11 and the northern “riots,” public policy has focused on domestic security and the war against terrorism.

Both of these have significant impacts on British Muslims. The important point to emphasize here is that the complicated story of integration and exclusion cannot be understood in the terms set by Home Secretary David Blunkett MP around “assimilation” and “integration.” Multiculturalism has strong limitations, because it rejects “cultures” that do not correspond to nation-states. Cultural nationalism is about present politics, not ancient memory, although that memory is used as an instrument. Developments to this philosophy suggest that while the categories of “British” and “English” are being formed and re-formed, Muslims in Britain are considered by their religion first and foremost. At the same time, many of them are disempowered, disenfranchised, disenchanted, and disaffected groups existing at the margins of Britain’s economy, society, and polity. Furthermore, there are issues at the inter-generational level, particularly in the current climate of globalization, that relate to how Islam (and Muslims) is currently being recognized, treated, and appreciated. In the post-9/11 climate, British Muslims are at the forefront of questions in relation to what it means to be British or English. The basis of this rests in issues on the global agenda as well as local area concerns in relation to community cohesion, citizenship, and multicultural philosophy.

Concluding Thoughts: A New Multicultural Citizenship

The 9/11 attacks and the subsequent reactions seem to have permeated many areas of everyday life for Muslims everywhere, and no less so than in Britain. As an event, it has implications that go far beyond merely “international terrorism.” In fact, these implications are linked to politics, religion, and issues of cultural differences in an effort to maintain harmonious societies and democracies in the West, which contain a significant number of Muslims (approximately 25 million). In the Middle East, as revealed in the aftermath of the war on Iraq, further unrest, political turmoil, and violent action and reaction are the main features of the current climate. In the near future, as western targets may well become increasingly targeted by extremist groups, relations between Muslims and their western hosts will continue to remain problematical, with discussions focusing on citizenship, civil soci-
ety, multiculturalism, and political representation and participation (as components of democracy), and identity, gender, inter-generational development, radicalism versus liberalism (as components of the individual).

Given that British South Asian Muslims have reached the third generation, issues of concern have shifted from cultural assimilation and social integration to religious identity and discrimination. The study of Islam and Muslims has become more vigorous, and greater emphasis is being placed on understanding the nature and orientation of British Muslims in more anthropological, sociological, theological, and political science perspectives. Indeed, the first generation of South Asian Muslims kept their religious practices and expressions well within private or community spheres. Subsequent generations have struggled with issues of integration and racism in the climate of the early 1960s; cultural pluralism in the 1970s; free-market economic determinism and the rolling back of the state’s frontiers in Thatcher’s and Major’s Britain from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s; and through to the “third way” center-left politics of assimilationist New Labour ever since then. At the same time, identification with Islam is gaining strength among some members of this latest generation, both as a reaction to racist hostility as well as a desire to understand Islam in more precise detail.

Distinguishing the multiplicity, fragility, and diversity of diaspora identities, and here both as South Asian and Muslim, it is important to appreciate that such a citizenship is not so unsophisticated. To many white British people, participating in this society as citizens is an uncomplicated fact, “a set of clothing that fits like a glove, put on at birth, taken off at death, viewed uncritically and unchallenged.” British Muslims have to address citizenship not only within the framework of their host country’s legal and political structures, with its emphasis on democracy, secularism, individual rights, and pluralism, but also decide how to negotiate and harmonize all of these in terms of Shari‘ah law and various interpretations of and practices in the Islamic state discourse. They have had to discover how to be “good Muslims” in a secular society and how to develop appropriate strategies for living as a minority in a non-Muslim society.

This task has not been easy, given the local, national, and international focus of attention since 9/11. In reality, it has been necessary to reconcile religion-based identity and citizenship, as well as individual rights and community rights, in a setting where the beliefs of others have dominated, without retreating into isolationism. Perhaps above all, they have needed to discover how to “participate in a society which has no need for Islam in its public life.” In addition, British South Asian Muslims have inherited the
colonial history of past relations with Britain. Combined with racism, which is endemic, this creates an atmosphere of mistrust.\textsuperscript{29} The recent “war on terror,” however, is not going to wither away, because it is a war that has no singularly defined enemy; only a set of ideologies, falsely appropriated and actualized by the “clash of fundamentalisms” thesis.\textsuperscript{30}

But this global picture is only part of the experience of Islam and Muslims here in Britain. More immediate are the everyday realities (i.e., poor housing, jobs, health, and education). Once many more British South Asian Muslims have a more determined economic and social presence in society, only then will their demands, needs, and requests be met. But to be in a viable position to reach this objective, the elimination of pernicious structural and cultural racism is crucial. The nature and orientation of British multiculturalism is undergoing a severe test, and it will be important to observe closely how Muslims experience it over the next few years. What is apparent, however, is that 9/11 has changed the world, and, along with it, how Muslims will be regarded, considered, and treated for the foreseeable future – possibly for the remainder of the twenty-first century, as Akbar S. Ahmed has argued recently.\textsuperscript{31}

What direction this will take is a function of nation-states and their policies toward different Muslim migrants, minorities, and citizens, as well as how Muslims work to adapt to a non-Muslim majority society by closely adopting some of its more central norms and values while challenging others to make their new home a more peaceful, interdependent, and secure place. British society has become even more sensitive to the threat of “Islamic terrorism,” while, at the same time, wider events in the world, including the “war on terror,” continue to shape the government’s attitude toward Muslim citizens as well as to serve as important foci for political, social, and policymaking discussions.

British South Asian Muslims are at a crossroads in their history of immigration to and settlement in Britain. At the same time, one striking feature of their structural experiences is their socioeconomic position. This group constitutes one of the most marginalized, alienated, isolated, discriminated against, and misunderstood groups in society (although there is a small but burgeoning British Muslim elite). They are negotiating a set of identities and realities that are constantly changing, and it will be important to see how they develop in the near future. As research questions continue in the areas of race, ethnicity, religion, and culture, as well as public policy concerns at the local, national, and international levels, the study of British Muslims will provide important and useful findings.
Notes


Muslims and the Media after 9/11: A Muslim Discourse in the American Media?

Halil Ibrahim Yenigun

Abstract
This paper seeks to answer two questions: Has there been a shift in the representation of Muslims by the American media in the wake of increasing number of Muslims living here, and could Muslims speak for themselves through an autonomous Muslim discourse in the post-9/11 period? Using the tools of postcolonial analysis, I analyze the coverage on Muslims in the mainstream media following the 9/11 attacks. I find that there was a shift, in the form of a differentiation between moderates and fundamentalists. Additionally, the same tropes used to represent Muslims in the colonial discourse were now employed to the fundamentalist “Other.” Muslims could speak up; however, this could not avoid reproducing the dominant discourse. Yet, the presence of a significant Muslim minority offers opportunities for broadened boundaries of “American” citizenry that can be realized by growing activism to this end.

Introduction
It has been a while since “Islamophobia” became the Muslims’ dominant perception of the American media’s coverage of Islam and Muslims. In this
paper, I will go beyond simply probing the veracity of this widespread perception of American media bias against Islam and Muslims. My fundamental concern is the current shape that the discourse on Muslims takes when its “Other” came to reside within the same territorial boundaries. It is noteworthy that the phrase “the fastest growing religion in the U.S.” has become another catch phrase in the media for Islam, right alongside its enormous anti-Islamic content.

Does this imply a radical transformation of the discourse? I believe that this everyday observation calls out for a critical revision of the literature dealing with the media’s portrayal of Muslims. Indeed, the challenging question today is the prospect of essentializing the Oriental and, in turn, the western identity subsequent to the massive scale of immigration to the West from the “Orient.” If the West has an unceasing need for the Orient in order to construct its own identity, how will it maintain this identity’s integrity if the Orient infuses within it today? Has this development affected how the media represent Islam?

Even before the mounting public visibility of Muslims in the West, the ongoing Palestinian question was severe enough to occupy a focal place on the news. But after the Gulf War, and especially after the World Trade Center attack of 1993 and the embassy bombings in 1998, coverage of Muslims started to occupy an important place in the news. Thus, the American public was constantly exposed to a negative image of Islam and Muslims. Consequently, the image of American Muslims took shape alongside the images of Muslims on television. This Muslim image is known to anybody: irrational terrorists, airplane hijackers, and suicide bombers who wage war against “civilization” and “democracy” in the name of jihad (holy war) to establish the Islamic way of life against the unbelievers to be either converted or killed.

Beyond all of that, the 9/11 attacks were perhaps the single most important turning point in the American Muslim experience. Apart from its negative consequences on their daily lives, the media’s coverage of Islam reached an unprecedented intensity. This demands a thoughtful inquiry: Does this new wave of representation simply follow from the previous decades? The crucial component of this question’s answer is the role of the new actors in the American public sphere, namely, American Muslims. How do American Muslims relate to this picture? We have seen many more Muslims on television or in the newspapers after 9/11 than ever. Is it possible to discern a general pattern, a common discourse in how Muslims responded to this event, or are there more ruptures than commonalities? In
essence, how did the Muslims respond to the 9/11 tragedy? Is it now possible to talk of a “Muslim discourse” in the American media as a site of resistance, or were statements made by Muslims easily appropriated by the mainstream media to underpin the dominant discourse?

Therefore, my research is twofold: On the one hand, I will seek to find out whether there is anything novel in the representation of Islam and Muslims in the current American media that differs from the colonial discourse. And, if so, does this have anything to do with the Muslim presence in the United States? That is to say, could Muslims construct a Muslim discourse that affects how the media represents them?

This set of questions is pivotal for me, because I consider an independent discourse of Muslims in the American public sphere to be existential. It is a leading indicator of whether the Muslims’ existence in the United States is still an auxiliary to the American way of life, in the form of consumers of American culture, or active participants in and contributors to it with its enriching way of life. The moment we can choose the latter, we can look at the future of Muslims in the United States with confidence.

The theoretical framework to address these issues is given below. Subsequent to this part, methodological concerns will be presented. Thus, media material on 9/11 will be scrutinized from two angles: The American media’s dominant patterns will be identified, and the Muslim response to it will follow suit. In the end, I will discuss my findings for the prospects of Muslims in the New World.

Theoretical Considerations

It has become conventional to start all analyses of the Orient with a reference to Edward Said’s path-breaking *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage, 1979). In fact, Said was not the first to present this challenge to Orientalism. His peculiarity lies in the fact that he adapted the theories of Foucault and Gramsci to colonial literature in order to show how the regime of disciplinary power inscribed in Orientalism transforms the “real” East into a discursive “Orient,” or rather substitutes the one for the other. This influence is apparent when he defines Orientalism through its four aspects: as academic, a style of thought based on an “essential” distinction between East and West, a discourse, and a hegemony. Gramsci’s influence on this definition is more about how the cultural hegemony at work gives it durability and strength, and the civil domain of cultural relations as the medium through which power operates most effec-
Foucault’s impact, on the other hand, is more related to how power, as an impersonal force, makes its subjects the objects of power through knowledge and Orientalist “discourse,” thereby producing the Orient as not only essentially distinct but also inferior. This, in turn, reinforces the West’s own image of itself as a superior civilization.⁷

Media representation of other cultures should be analyzed within this theoretical framework. Scholars involved in media studies now commonly refer to what they call a large gap between what news producers claim their work to be and what social scientists call it. News producers claim that news stories reflect reality, whereas social scientists speak of “constructing the news.”⁸ There is an ideology of journalism made up of such elements as “freedom of the press,” “objectivity,” “fairness,” “impartiality,” “balance,” “the reflection of reality,” “true representation,” fact vs. opinion, and so on,⁹ as if there were no cultural mediation between what journalists transmit and what the audience perceives. The standpoint I adopt here, known as the “culturological view,” pays attention to the force of broad cultural symbol systems, semiotic analyses of journalism, and journalistic ideologies. This approach claims that “[a]n event is not just a happening in the world; it is a relation between a certain happening and a given symbolic system.”¹⁰ From this perspective, “the basic definition of the situation that underpins the news reporting of political events, very largely coincides with the definition provided and legitimated by the power holders.”¹¹

In short, the fact that journalists think that they “record the events,” and that there is a distance between fact and fiction in news production is nothing more than an ideal. Correspondingly, the study of narrative and fiction is becoming increasingly important, where the emphasis is more on texts as cultural constructions. As Bird and Derdenne write: “Cultural anthropologists have not only rediscovered narrative as an important element in the cultures they examine, but have also begun reflexively to rethink their ethnographic narratives – their news stories – which had long been treated as objective accounts of reality.”¹² In other words, the proper way is to treat a genre as a particular kind of symbolic system and to look at news as narratives and stories. In this symbolic system, the facts, names, and details change almost daily; however, the framework into which they fit (the symbolic system) is more enduring. For, as Bird and Derdenne state, “… it could be argued that the totality of news as an enduring symbolic system ‘teaches’ audiences more than any of its component parts, no matter whether these parts are intended to inform, irritate,
or entertain.” Arguing that news stories, like myths, do not “tell it like it is,” but rather tell it “like it means,” insinuates the existence of an ideal story, which is an archetype that does not exist but that is recreated in individual tellings.

To sum up, given the power-culture link that demystifies the cultural sphere’s claim to autonomy from politics, as represented by Said and his sourcebook *Orientalism*, I subscribe to the view that the mass media’s products, as part and parcel of Gramsci’s civil society, are entrenched with relations of power and serve to perpetuate and confirm the hegemonic order. Therefore, what the particular news stories tell is the grand narrative that is positioned in the dominant discourse. In the case of the American media, as Said has shown in *Covering Islam* (New York: Vintage, 1997), what is represented is defined in terms of whether it is for or against American interests.

Muslims have always complained about how the media represent them, but until recently, an extensive literature had not been developed on this subject. More recently, however, apart from a limited number of books, some articles have opened up this field. Many of these works draw on Orientalism to frame their approach. Thus, the Orientalist perceptions in depicting Muslims are overtly emphasized. Some, such as Christopher Allen’s article and Mahboub Hashem’s piece in Yahya Kamalipour’s edition, also seek to identify the catch phrases and tropes. What matters most for this paper is that almost all of them share the argument that the media’s representation of Islam is unitary, atavistic, struck in the past, violent, and anti-woman. Coverage of the Oklahoma bombing served as an exemplary case for this point. Until Melani McAlister’s challenge, though, this conviction was not shattered by means of a new theoretical understanding of the current representations, although there were sporadic referrals to differences between Muslims.

The main difference of my approach is my attempt to account for the differentiation among Muslims as portrayed in the post-9/11 media and to identify its theoretical relevance. Following McAlister, I contend that Orientalism’s binary opposition between the Orient and the West does not completely hold true now. However, I also believe that Orientalism still provides the best tools with which to understand the western portrayal of Islam and Muslims. In other words, for the most part, how the West has understood and portrayed the Orient still has relevance. My attempt will also include the revision to this framework.
**Methodological Considerations**

Since Islam has been a topic of central concern in the news for quite a long time, it would entail a much greater project to cover all of this period in order to present a complete picture of the media’s coverage of Islam and Muslims during the relevant period. Therefore, I did not scan all of the media articles or take a random selection of news stories that could be more appropriate for purely empirical researches. Instead, I took certain snapshots throughout the first few months after 9/11 and looked at how the mainstream media covered these specific moments. Moreover, some catchwords that we heard frequently during those days served as a point of departure for searching the news sources.

Today, the term *media* does not denote only television channels, newspapers, and magazines, but also the Internet. For this reason, my material includes highly visited news sites. In contrast to the few Muslim professionals in the mainstream media sources, it is easy to find many Muslim organizations, along with their press releases, on the web. Given this fact, focusing on the Internet media seemed to be a far more appropriate way to approach this whole issue. More importantly, thanks to the Internet’s development, news stories in the printed and visual media can now be accessed, thereby making the Internet an all-encompassing media source.

Consequently, my primary source of information was the Internet. For this research, I focused more on the mainstream media rather than the tabloid magazines and radical publications of the right and the left. Sources like PBS, MSNBC, CNN, the *New York Times*, and the *Washington Post* were scrutinized during the first few weeks after 9/11. Additionally, in order to hear Muslim voices, the web sites of leading Muslim organizations were selected. In this regard, particular attention was paid to www.islamonline.net, which is one of the leading news sources targeting American Muslims.

It should be mentioned that MSNBC’s website, which also includes the material broadcast on NBC or published in *Newsweek*, contains the highest number of articles cited in this research. Hashem found more relevant articles in *Time* than *Newsweek* in his research; however, the reverse is true for my study. In some cases, this was a deliberate choice on my part. I picked the best examples of the tropes out of several different news sources, and MSNBC proved to have more valuable articles in this regard. My study also differs from Hashem’s study and others that employ content analysis, which can be argued to be “more scientific.” But, given that I seek to iden-
tify common tropes rather than locating frequent catch phrases, this is not a major flaw of my method. After all, the exact effect of media coverage on different audiences remains a mystery.

One final word should be said about the seemingly disproportionate weight of Internet articles. First, most of those articles were also published in the relevant news magazines or broadcast on television channels of the same media conglomerates. So, I do not think that my method is biased against those other media. Those media conglomerates are aware of the fact that some audiences prefer television while others follow the news more on the Internet. Therefore, they try to reach out to all of these different audience segments by providing the same material through different media.

Needless to say, my research is based upon textual analysis. While I go through these sources, I look for those rhetorical strategies of the media that seek to represent Islam or Muslims. Although Said does not specify such tropes in making his points, David Spurr’s *The Rhetoric of Empire* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993) has been my primary source of inspiration. While Spurr identifies 12 tropes in colonial representation of the “Other,” four of them were more essential for my research: debasement, surveillance, appropriation, and affirmation. As will be seen later, these categories provide a powerful tool for unpacking American media representations of Afghanistan.

**The American Media’s Islam and Muslims**

The American media no longer present a monolithic discourse. Yet, this does not rule out the possibility of identifying at least a contested space between some patterns. Given the fact that the American public had never been exposed to such a massive coverage on Muslims in such a limited time, it is extremely difficult to gather everything that was said about Islam and Muslims. Nevertheless, I will present some basic tropes that were readily available and quite effective in perception formation.

As we remember, even on the first night of the events, blame was laid squarely on some Muslims, mainly Osama bin Laden and his organization. But it was difficult to know whether this was because of the material evidence present at the time or because it was just the most likely thing. The story made complete sense to the American public: A different sort of suicide mission, one involving hijacking airplanes, had been carried out by Islamic terrorists. Yet, when events unfolded in a swift manner to include the war on Afghanistan, the media engaged in an enormous coverage of
Muslims abroad. In this context, American Muslims for the first time appeared extensively on the screen. This is where we can pursue the answers for the questions at hand.

For quite a long time, “western” academia has perceived the non-western world with a crude modernist stance. This should be considered along with the relationship between academia and media, which constitutes one of the significant topics in Covering Islam, and academia’s effects on the media. In the modernist view, whatever the West experienced during its own modernization process constitutes the basic standards that any kind of subsequent modernization attempts in the underdeveloped world should follow. This quite ethnocentric unilinear view of modernity still prevails in much of the social science literature on area studies. Along these lines, I expect that the civilizing narrative of colonial discourse should have played itself out through the rhetorical strategies used to cover the war on Afghanistan. Therefore, what follows is an attempt to identify the tropes that were employed while covering 9/11 and the war on Afghanistan.

Rhetorical Strategies in the Coverage of 9/11 and the War on Afghanistan

Differentiation: The most remarkable shift in the representation of Muslims was the media’s departure from the monolithic representation of Muslims, one of Said’s main criticisms, toward a fragmented perception. The mainstream American media stopped essentializing the Muslim world as a monolithic bloc whose basic character of Islam overrode all of its inner differences and proved that these differences were irrelevant. Instead, a differentiation strategy between two types of Muslims was pursued: Fundamentalists (ie., Muslim extremists, Islamists, Islamic radicals) vs. moderate Muslims. The mainstream media, following the government, was careful to maintain a fine line between these two groups. While moderate Muslims were not considered a threat to American interests, fundamentalists/extremists were considered enemies, and generally called “terrorists.” As a catch word, many media outlets preferred the term Islamic terrorist.

Newspapers, magazines, and television channels used certain images to characterize fundamentalism: hijackers, suicide bombers, or anybody who acts on the political sphere with an Islamic discourse, whether he or she resorts to violence or not. Kamalipour rightfully understands the West’s
definition as referring to “those states, leaders, and organizations that have challenged many of the presuppositions of the Western ideologies regarding secularism and development theories.”

This meaning seems to have underlined the media’s dominant perception. In general, all sorts of Islamic revivalism were labeled “fundamentalism.” Although there were some dissenting voices on the margins, such as Oliver Roy’s differentiation between neo-fundamentalism and Islamism, the former usage prevailed.

This differentiation strategy provided the media with great flexibility both to denigrate the enemy, as embodied by Osama bin Laden and the Taliban, and, at the same time, not to jeopardize relations with Muslim groups at home or with “Muslim allies” abroad. This double-faced strategy operated on two levels: on the one hand, (moderate) Muslims were portrayed as American patriots if they were American residents or sympathizers with the 9/11 tragedy. In the first case, these Muslims were often depicted as “targets of misdirected anger.” The victimization of Muslims was, in most cases, accompanied by the catch phrase of Islam being the “fastest growing religion in the U.S.” These were Muslims who were saddened by 9/11, just like their fellow citizens, who participated in blood drives and categorically condemned the attacks. These Muslims were said to “make an incredibly valuable contribution to our country.” They even go to war for the American cause, which is the best proof that they are as American as any other fellow citizens. In short, they were “ambassadors of Islam” in the United States.

Opposed to this group was the radical branch, and President Bush clearly drew the line between these two separate entities:

The terrorists are traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself. The enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends; it is not our many Arab friends. Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists, and every government that supports them.

How did the media represent those people who “practice a fringe form of Islamic extremism that has been rejected by Muslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics”? What are their aims and why do they have these aims? These questions and the many catch phrases that we heard in that speech formed the public discourse’s agenda during the subsequent weeks. Following President Bush, who provided his own answers, the mainstream media became very preoccupied with these questions. For the most part, they gave their answers with reference to the scenes of people from the Islamic world. But no better example fleshed out the picture of
fundamentalism than the Taliban regime, which is the main subject of the following section.

Afganistan: A Story of Civilization and the White Man’s Burden

It is not surprising to see the media championing the modernist outlook in their coverage of the non-western world. When Said wrote his *Covering Islam*, Islam was represented as simply a resurgent atavism. But today, when the dominant differentiation strategy is taken into account, a different picture of the non-western (namely, Muslim) world is noticeable. The Muslim world is no longer represented as a coherent, monolithic entity; to the contrary, it is represented as a world torn by a harsh clash. One side includes fundamentalists who try to overthrow the current secular regimes (mostly the friends of the United States), substitute the civil code with the Shari`ah and wage war to destroy Israel (the only democratic country in the Middle East), eradicate religious minorities, and oppress women by forcing them to cover from head to toe. The other side is made up of moderate Muslims, especially women, who suffer from current – or fear prospective – oppression by those fundamentalists and thus struggle against their attempt to take control of Muslim countries.

During the time under review, while scenes of angry mobs burning American flags to protest the United States illustrated these fundamentalists, Pakistan’s General Musharraf, who opened his country for American operations, represented moderate Muslims. These two camps clashed everywhere from Morocco to Malaysia. In the United States, while most American Muslims were depicted as representing moderate Muslims, the existence of factions funded by Saudi extremist organizations is acknowledged and is even voiced by an American Muslim.

The war on Afghanistan, on the other hand, was presented in order to reproduce the modernization narrative from the beginning to the end: At the outset, the Taliban and its barbarism fed the violence; then, the white man brings civilization and we end up with emancipation. In the first place, the Taliban was the real symbol of fundamentalism, whereas the Northern Alliance represented moderate Islam, despite the fact that the burqa was first enforced by its government, headed by Burhanuddin Rabbani (1992-96). Furthermore, a representative of this former government stated that they had the same roots as the Taliban and did not disagree with the Taliban on enforcing the Shari`ah. Yet, this blurred past of the Northern Alliance was simply forgotten.
REPRESENTING AFGHANISTAN: A NEW PAGE OF THE COLONIAL DISCOURSE

The war on Afghanistan was not covered as simply the elimination of those who harbor terrorism. There was a larger latent story underlying it: The white man was bringing civilization to the oppressed people by overthrowing a medieval theocracy. In a sense, the war did not get its moral justification just from retaliating against terrorists who carried out 9/11 and killed thousands of “innocent civilians” and their sponsors, who are equally responsible for them by harboring those terrorists. It was also justified as a civilized nation’s duty to emancipate the people, especially women, from the oppression of an atavistic government. Any kind of media news or article about the suffering of people under the Taliban would reproduce this latent story. Alternatively, every symbol or action that would link Afghanistan with modern countries, such as television, radio, the unveiling of women, and theateric activities, would count in favor of the civilizing mission.

To this end, following Spurr’s categorization, I will show how Taliban-ruled Afghanistan was negated through its horrifying conditions (debasement); how it was made visible to the western gaze (surveillance); how vast resources were wasted and humanity was deprived of them just because of this government, and, therefore, need to be put in the service of humanity (appropriation); and how American involvement reversed Afghanistan’s bad luck (affirmation).

SURVEILLANCE: The Taliban, who had ruled the country since 1996, were not brought to the visual attention of the western gaze. Even at the time of the alleged massacre in Mazar-e-Sharif, the media kept their silence. Although the Taliban did make the news from time to time with its devastating policies (e.g., the destruction of the giant Buddha statues in Bamiyan in 2001 and its treatment of women), these events were just familiar events from the Muslim world, with its inherent religious intolerance and oppression of women. In one exceptional instance, a news story by Preston Mendelhall brought Afghanistan to the public attention: “Afghanistan is in eye of beholder: A country torn apart by war maintains its pride, hospitality.”

After 9/11, American public opinion was suddenly bombarded with the tragedy of the Afghan people. Many events that had not been covered sufficiently at the time they happened were found to be noteworthy just prior to the war. In a sense, Afghanistan was brought under the western gaze when the United States assumed the mission of emancipating and civilizing that country. At that time, it was quite easy to find an enormous number of
articles on every aspect of Afghanistan. Once the media adopted this attitude, western eyes turned their attention to Afghanistan and it came under surveillance, only the first step toward appropriation.

**A P P R O P R I A T I O N:** There is no longer any classical colonial relationship in which a colonizer formally appropriates the natural resources of the colonized. However, the interests of world powers involve treaties with natural resource-rich countries designed to exploit those resources. In the colonial literature, the colonized states’ natural abundance is the subject of desire for the “western man,” but this is represented as a “response to a putative appeal on the part of the colonized land and people” that “awaits creative hand of technology.”

In the media’s coverage of Afghanistan, we find analyses focusing on its strategic location for the route of a natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan. In an article with a self-revealing title, “Businesses see opportunities in new Afghanistan,” the journalist says:

The prospect of peace also is triggering hope for a multibillion dollar project to build an 890-mile pipeline that would carry natural gas across Afghanistan, linking central Asia to Pakistan … A main attraction for global companies is the nation’s location between central Asia and the growing economies of south Asia.

Afghanistan’s natural resources certainly should not remain untapped; accordingly, the author does not conceal the intentions of American companies for the post-war order:

Several American companies have called me in the past two months to find out more about the prospects for post-war mining and hydrocarbon acquisition. … From this mixture of developmental actions built upon humanitarian foundations, a new Afghanistan can rise out of the ashes.

Thus, a picture of Afghanistan that was under the western gaze and had vast resources from which humanity could benefit was drawn. As the article’s title suggests, it is a call to help Afghanistan exploit its riches: only a humanitarian aim designed to help a poor country. The next step was to depict the miserable conditions under which its people lived because of the Islamic theocratic emirate’s primitivism and barbarity. The following strategy (e.g., debasement) will illustrate that point.

**D E B A S E M E N T:** Afghanistan was a war-torn country in the grip of rival factions and suffering from every kind of adverse condition. The people’s
misery was already so explicit that there was no need to exaggerate things.
Yet the effect created by the news stories was that the whole country was
experiencing this catastrophic situation, because Afghanistan was under
Taliban rule. This was all that these fundamentalists could offer as a form of
government. They were morally responsible for 9/11 and also responsible
for their mismanagement of Afghanistan. That is why the civilized world
had to intervene both to eliminate future attacks against the United States
and to liberate the people from oppression. As Yuka Tachibana claimed:
They were tired and desperate, their clothes shabby and covered in dust. The
children’s faces were unwashed. They were Afghanistan's invisible people.\footnote{44}
In general, in the words of Sean Federico-O’Murchu, the Taliban regime
offered the following scene: “... A portrait of tribal feuding, endless cycles
of revenge and bloody massacres.”\footnote{45}
The situation of women under the Taliban served as the symbol of this
more generalized aspect of debasement. From the very beginning of Taliban
rule, this was the hottest topic for news agencies. The symbol of their
oppression was the burqa, which became a crucial indicator that was seen to
represent the trajectory of civilization or modernization for the Afghan peo-
ple. Hence, it also provided the entire moral justification for the war. In a
sense, it was as if the whole war was designed to emancipate women from
the burqa, to remove the veil:

Anyone who has paid attention to the situation of women in Afghanistan
should not have been surprised to learn that the Taliban are complicit in
terrorism. When radical Muslim movements are on the rise, women are
the canaries in the mines. The very visible repression of forced veiling
and loss of hard-won freedoms coexists naturally with a general disre-
spect for human rights. This repression of women is not about religion;
it is a political tool for achieving and consolidating power.\footnote{46}

Replicating a colonial theme that western imperialism was necessary to
save Muslim women from their oppressive cultures, Afghan women were
presented as waiting for a hero to emancipate them:

After five years under the Taliban-enforced burqa, these women are wait-
ing, they acknowledge, for someone to announce that it’s OK to take off
the once-mandatory covering.\footnote{47}

Still, the task was tough. After all, this was the second confrontation of
medieval barbarism with civilization. In the first one (the Soviet invasion),
the civilized side could not succeed:
No math in the world, no body counting, can substitute for an understanding of the local populace, local traditions. You cannot break their resolve. They aspire to die for Allah in their understanding. This is paramount, and unlike the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, the whole civilized world is behind the United States. We should not miss this opportunity. America has a great chance to finish the job that the Soviets failed for one reason or another.  

And the course of events had proved civilization absolutely powerless in this land as elsewhere in the Muslim world, at the hands of fundamentalists:

Perhaps it was naive, but like many foreigners there, my parents and their friends hoped to give Afghanistan exposure to the best of the West — its legal codes and literature, its engineering training and medical technology — without messing up the local culture or imposing their own. Before the Iranian Revolution, it seemed so clear what “development” was — a steady march toward improved education and health, with the gradual embrace of Westernization and secularization. How wrong they were: when the mullahs toppled the Westernized, secularized Shah of Iran, it popped the stock development myth of a steady march toward Westernization in the Muslim World.

**AFFIRMATION:** Then comes the intervention and attainment of the civilizing mission: helping the country exploit its resources, ensuring stability and ending ethnic violence, and, most important of all, emancipating the women. The whole narrative is encapsulated in the symbolic action of removing the burqa:

And the mustached commander had lived in a modern villa with a pool, multiple satellite phones, and an armored Cadillac. Zakki, who has communicated since the Taliban retreat with Dostum and citizens in Mazar by satellite phone, said, “Men are shaving their beards. Women are burning their burqas. All of these things are happening in Mazar-e-Sharif.” While these reports also could not be confirmed independently, the mood on the street in Pakistan among Afghan refugees who came from Mazar-e-Sharif was jubilant. “I’m so happy. When Dostum was in Mazar we had dance clubs and women wore pants — even short pants. It was just like living in America,” said a Dari-speaking female entertainer from Mazar who now lives in Peshawar. “It’s time to burn our burqas; my hometown is free!”

In another instance, Hillary Clinton wrote a notable article that epitomizes these points altogether. Even its title suffices to reveal the mind-set of the “liberators”:
New Hope for Afghanistan’s Women: As liberators, the U.S. has an opportunity – and an obligation – to insist on an equal role for women in Afghanistan’s future. ... I am reminded what she said that day as I watch women in Afghanistan begin to emerge from the oppression of the Taliban. Some are choosing to remove the burqas they had been required to wear in public. Some are becoming journalists again, their voices heard on radio, their faces seen on television.\textsuperscript{51}

Education, which is very much in line with civilization and modernity, was now possible after American intervention. Dreams of little girls could now come true:

Twelve-year-old Parisa Barai brushes stray strands of hair from her face, tucking them beneath her brightly colored veil, and speaks of her dream of becoming a surgeon, a dream that until a month ago was all but inconceivable. … That women and girls have returned to classrooms in Kandahar is a visible sign of progress in this city that just a month ago was the spiritual home of the Taliban. But there’s still much more work to be done.\textsuperscript{52}

Thus, the mainstream American media has told us all about the war on Afghanistan: what kind enemy the Taliban were, and how they threatened the free civilized world externally and also their own people. So, what does this have to do with the other Muslims? Can the Taliban be picked as representatives of all Muslims? It goes without saying that, as stated at the outset, a totalizing picture of Islam is no longer the case, for we have witnessed a change in the American media’s strategy to represent Muslims. They do not essentialize the diversity within Islam; in contrast, they portray the whole Muslim world as torn between two poles: moderate Muslims vs. extremist Muslims. Still, we observe another essentialization. Now, the media have two “Islams” instead of one. What they depict as “fundamentalist” is uniform all over the Muslim world. The following strategy identifies how the media employed this mode of representation.

Essentialization and Globalization: Now the media had only one kind of Islamic fundamentalism/Islamic terrorism, and its essential characteristic was not resorting to violence to kill innocent civilians. Rather, it was characterized by an anti-imperialist attitude, whether it was a terrorist organization or a peaceful Islamic organization that promoted self-rule in the Muslim world and, to this end, tried to replace “the friends of the U.S.” by popularly elected leaders. As we recall, in Bush’s words, these were also the people who “want to overthrow existing governments in many Muslim
countries, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan.” One could wonder why this cannot be considered a legitimate goal from the perspective of those who believe in democratic values.

This vision covers up all kinds of ideological differences between the Taliban, who were, in one view, simply strict followers and implementers of the Hanafi sect rooted in the traditional Indian madrasahs and other Islamic movements. In fact, in almost every Muslim country there has been a persistent cleavage between Islamist intellectuals who want to formulate a more dynamic view of the Shari’ah, and traditional ulama who oppose any kind of critical reflection on the legacy of Islamic jurisprudence. This historical cleavage has always been ignored, except by such people as Oliver Roy, who differentiates between neo-fundamentalists (e.g., the Taliban) and such Islamists as the figures mentioned above.

Through this strategy, it becomes unclear just where fundamentalism begins and moderate Islam ends. This blurred line makes every Muslim a potential fundamentalist and puts the burden of proof on Muslims to show that they are not fundamentalists. Moreover, it gives the media the freedom to represent certain practices of ordinary Muslims as indications of fundamentalism. As a result, the media can target even the absence of such practices as dating as an instance of atavism and, in turn, fundamentalism.

In accordance with this totalizing picture of Islamism, one of the basic concerns that occupied media columns was the causes for the 9/11 attacks. Along with the catch phrase “hijacking Islam,” Bush’s question on this issue opened up a new discussion and provided the media with another catch phrase: “Why do they hate us?” Bush is clear about his stance on this question. For him, the perpetrators of this crime hate the United States because:

They hate what we see right here in this chamber – a democratically elected government. Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our freedoms – our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other. 

Once Bush broached this question, all of the media followed suit. Apparently, there were two different sides: the external stimulants and the internal problems of Muslim societies that produced such a culture of hate. When scrutinized in detail, media articles show some clear patterns. On the one hand, Bush’s argument amounts to saying that these fundamentalists’ bigotry and hatred of freedom make them enemies of all freedom-loving countries. This outlook also makes all “Arab and Muslim friends of the
U.S.” correct and justified in their suppression of the opposition, as if those “freedom loving” governments were protecting themselves against the threat of fundamentalist tyranny.

Alternatively, those who look at the “roots of Islamic rage” highlighted either American foreign policy in the Middle East, especially its unconditional support for Israel and sanctions against Iraq, or such internal problems as rulers, failed ideas, and the rise of fundamentalism. Yet, the tension between the two camps is retained in these arguments. In most of those articles, even though those who feel resented were not always portrayed as condoning extremism, they still urge the United States to realize that there is fertile soil for fundamentalists as long as their frustration with the United States continues.

All in all, what is not questioned is the monolithic structure of Muslim fundamentalists. It was all over the world, from American Islamic centers to Pakistan, where American flags were burned, and to Gaza, as the Washington Post reported in its “Bin-Laden Poster Seen at Gaza Rally.”

After all, surrounded by fundamentalists, Israelis were used to living with this terror:

Looking for a glimpse of what may be in store for Americans in the age of global terror? Take a ride to Tel Aviv’s Ben Gurion Airport, where security measures are probably the tightest in the world.

CNN, while reporting world reactions to terrorist attacks, makes an interesting hierarchy of leaders. After the statements of several leaders, statements of Palestinian organizations were given, and all of those statements carried a sense of revenge:

Sheikh Yassin, leader of the Islamic militant group Hamas, said: “No doubt this is a result of injustice the U.S practices against the weak in the world.”

This is not surprising, for CNN also repeatedly broadcasted scenes of rejoicing Palestinians after the 9/11 attacks. In another instance:

A tide of religious and nationalistic fanaticism is on the rise throughout Islam, from the Philippines to Gaza and Libya and Algeria, from Afghanistan and Iran and Iraq to Lebanon and Sudan. Here in Israel we have been on the receiving end of this lethal fanatic tide: almost every day we witness the link between hateful incitement and mass murders, between religious sermons that celebrate jihad and its fulfillment in suicide bombs against innocent civilians.
Thus, Islamic fundamentalism was essentialized, and an image of its monolithic nature without any internal contradictions was created. All kinds of Islamic movements throughout the Muslim world were lumped together, without any concern about whether they were traditional or modern, violent or peaceful. The covert message was evident: The world was now facing a global wave of Islamic terrorism that had to be eliminated for the sake of world peace. Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, suicide bombings in Palestine, the Kashmiri independence movement, and Muslim-run relief organizations were all different faces of Islamic fundamentalism. In this perspective, any kind of civil rights movement by Islamically oriented people against oppressive practices can easily be labeled as the outer face of hidden agendas, not a struggle for democracy. Hence, all kinds of dissent will be suppressed in the name of suppressing a totalitarian ideology; in other words, of saving the country from a medieval theocracy.

So far, I have identified the mainstream American media’s general mode of representation of Islam and Muslims after 9/11. If we go back to the foundations, Said is often criticized for neglecting ruptures within the discourse. This is not the case with Spurr, who dedicated the last part of his book to areas of resistance within the colonial discourse, following Foucault’s appropriation of Heidegger’s theory of language. In his words:

> It is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined, but this juncture is imperfect; discourse can be not only an instrument or an effect of power, but also a point of resistance. “Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it” (1980:101).

Along these lines, I will discuss whether there is an alternative Muslim discourse in an alternative public sphere that serves as a site of resistance to the dominant discourse.

**The American Muslim Response to 9/11: Muslims Speaking for Themselves**

In the colonial discourse, the colonized peoples do not speak for themselves. Rather, they are only the object of representation on which power is to be exercised. Said’s example in *Orientalism*, where, on an issue related to the Palestinian conflict, the Israeli side is represented by an Israeli lawyer...
while a former ambassador in an Arab country who has no formal training in Oriental studies speaks for the Arab side, can be recalled here. From that time until the 9/11 attacks, the American Muslim community underwent drastic changes. For one thing, Muslims now had many leading organizations to represent themselves at the governmental level. In the media, even though there was no nationwide Muslim-owned or -run newspaper or weekly newsmagazine, some Muslim journalists began to write for the daily newspapers and weekly journals.

Right after the attacks, when some people from the Middle East were proclaimed to be the alleged perpetrators, Muslim speakers began to appear on television programs. Afterwards, many interviews with Muslim leaders and scholars appeared in the newspapers. American Muslims were no longer silent. In fact, the web sites of Muslim organizations posted press releases day after day, Muslims were writing articles to explain their standpoint, and some news reports were even prepared by Muslim journalists.

This is not to say that a monolithic Muslim bloc was expressing a collective viewpoint. The only point that brought these various organizations and people together was their categorical condemnation of the attacks and rejection of any kind of connotation whatsoever between Islam and terrorism. This was strongly welcomed by the American media. Furthermore, the American media were quite eager to host Muslim leaders, intellectuals, and scholars who wanted to express their opinion about the incident. Most of their questions were about the meaning of jihad and martyrdom, the relationship between Islam and violence, and the causes for the clear anti-American sentiment among Muslims. Apart from these interviews, many Muslims wrote articles in daily newspapers and weekly newsmagazines. Lastly, Muslim views appeared on media releases of the web sites of several Muslim organizations and as articles on Islamic web sites. Taken altogether, these opinion pieces in no way gave the impression of a common American Muslim discourse. To the contrary, my conclusion is that they reinforced the dominant discourse of two-tiered Muslims.

For the purposes of my research, the most appropriate way seems to be setting apart the standpoints adopted by certain groups and their points of disagreement with other Muslims on basic questions that the American public has addressed.
Categorizing Muslim Standpoints: A pologists, Dissidents, and Critics

This fragmented set of standpoints did not escape the attention of some Muslims. One of them identifies two extremes in these responses: those who fall prey to conspiracy theories and others who are filled with an unwarranted guilt complex and so became apologetic. Actually, with this kind of analysis, it is proper to delineate a third group of opinion leaders, who have a more balanced position. Thus, we can talk about three “ideal types” in a Weberian sense.

Dissidents were predominantly active on the Internet rather than in the other media. They questioned everything in the official story. The media were wrong by blaming Muslims without any evidence about the perpetrators’ identity. But they were quite sure that it was committed either by MOSSAD or the CIA. There was a hidden agenda going on, and that was the pipeline story. The United States had already planned to attack Afghanistan in order to control the pipelines; the rest of the story was just to save face. The United States had no superior moral position with which to judge Osama bin Ladin; after all, he was on the CIA’s payroll. The Taliban was also an American creation, in collaboration with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency. The real global terrorist was the United States, who was now paying the price for its terrorist actions. In a sense, Osama was the man who woke Americans up and made them aware of their government’s wicked policy in the Muslim world.

The Taliban was the Americans’ enemy just because it was trying to implement Islam in its totality. The United States’ allies, the Northern Alliance, was composed of war criminals who stood accused of pre-Taliban atrocities in Afghanistan. Yet, these people are quite reluctant to remember what the Muslim world or Islamic groups worldwide had done for the suffering people during those times, and to question if the Taliban were in a superior position when compared with the Northern Alliance insofar as atrocities are concerned.

Ironically, this view both defamed and praised Osama bin Ladin or the Taliban. On the other hand, it also had no concern about the mindset that justified civilian massacres. Some even claimed that the American people deserved this because they were supporters of the United States’ worldwide state terrorism. After all, in Afghanistan the same number of people were killed by American bombs as had been killed in the 9/11 attacks … that this war was simply a war against Islam, and not against terrorism as always
phrased. There was nobody to define the difference between Islamic fundamentalism and Islam.70 Advocates of this standpoint never thought about asking themselves if Muslims were ever responsible for any of the negative images of them produced by the largely corporate-controlled American media.

When taken separately, some arguments of this position are reasonable; however, when they all come together they lead to self-righteousness and hinder self-criticism. Indeed, even such a tragic massacre did not help some of these people question whether there were any problems within Islamic societies that produced such an insensitivity toward civilian lives. In this vein, it is wrong to assume that there is any difference between them and those Americans who scapegoated Islamic civilization as a whole and held the culture of Islamic societies responsible for fomenting hatred toward non-Muslims, almost always referred to as infidels. For those Americans, Muslims were attacking the United States because they were enemies of the freedoms found in the “civilized world,” while for those Muslims, Americans deserved that revenge because only the West was responsible for the Muslim world’s suffering, as though the Muslim world was completely innocent in this regard. The following passage exemplifies many of these points, although the article’s general argument may not be representative of this stance:

If anything, Osama bin Laden exposed the lies of American idealism and values of freedom, self-determination, pursuit of democracy and justice around the world, and brought to light a bankrupt foreign policy, and lack of respect for human rights and the rule of law. Bin Laden exposed the hypocrisy of American values and idealism that are evoked publicly, but pursued with a vengeance to serve the economic and political national interest of domestic lobbies, from the Jewish lobby to the corporate military-industrial complex and the oil lobby.71

The second group of people, mainly consisting of the leaders of various Islamic organizations, adopted the opposite stance. In the first place, they accepted that this crime had been committed by Muslims.72 They totally neglected American policies abroad and behaved more patriotically than many Americans, to such an extent that they never accepted any criticism of American foreign policy by Muslims and even concealed such facts as the Taliban’s collaboration with the United States.73 If the officials believed that some Muslims were behind these attacks, they would not question it.74 Perpetrators of these crimes were not only violating Islamic principles, but
they were also not Muslims. Moreover, they were in no way martyrs, because martyrdom could only be possible under the rule of caliphate, which had ceased to exist long ago, or only during wars between states.

If Muslims were living in the United States, this group asserted, they had to adopt the American stance and place their citizenship before any feeling for fellow Muslims abroad. In addition, politics was not a business for Muslims. Extremism was a more serious problem for them than for Americans, and the reason for the continued turbulence in the Middle East was this extremism. The United States was a great country of freedom, and it had best values of humanity. All American Muslims should stand shoulder to shoulder with the American government in its fight against terrorism, and, if called to serve in its armed forces, should not hesitate to join.

The third group of people, who criticized both stances, consisted of some Muslims who were shocked by the events and, as a result, felt the need to question their culture and social structure. Although they did not fail to acknowledge the frustration of Muslims with American foreign policy, their main goal was to call fellow Muslims to self-criticism. They acknowledged the difficulty of being American Muslims, of struggling at home with the false images, which drives them to be role models and detach themselves from any kind of violent action, while at the same time being aware of their responsibility to their fellow Muslims abroad. A statement by Ingrid Mattson, vice president of ISNA-US, is worth quoting, since it recaps many of these points:

But frankly, American Muslims have generally been more critical of injustices committed by the American government than of injustices committed by Muslims. ... For the last few years, I have been speaking publicly in Muslim forums against the injustice of the Taliban. This criticism of a self-styled Muslim regime has not always been well-received … our legitimacy in the Muslim world is intimately linked with American foreign policy. …We have to speak against oppressive interpretations of Islam and against emotional, superficial, and violent apocalyptic depictions of a world divided. And in our desire to show ourselves to be patriotic Americans, we cannot suppress our criticisms of the United States when we have them.

That is why they were opposed to the idea of launching a war against Afghanistan, which would only escalate the violence. Yet, they strongly supported bringing those people to justice and punishing them after a fair
trial. The most typical example of this balanced attitude is that of Muqtedar Khan. Among many of his articles, two stand out: “Memo to American Muslims” and “Memo to Americans.” Taken separately, they give the impression that the first one represents an apologetic attitude while the second one exemplifies self-righteousness. However, a careful reader can find sensitivity in him about the suffering of Muslims all over the world as well as a call to self-criticism for both Muslims and Americans. He joins those who seek to answer the question: “Why do they hate us?” but the answer in his memo to Americans is:

There are several theories being advanced by various commentators explaining why Muslims generally hate the United States. The silliest of them is the one that the Bush administration and the conservative elements in America entertain. They insist that Bin Laden and other Islamic militants hate America because they hate American values of freedom and democracy. … It is not a hatred of democracy and freedom but the desire for one that has made many Muslims hate the U.S., whom they blame for the perpetuation of undemocratic polities in their world. Surely there are some Muslims who argue that democracy like everything Western is un-Islamic and evil.

Although it is very difficult to find even one example that represents a certain group’s entire set of attitudes, Muslim stances could be described along these crude lines. The only strategy that all Muslims employed altogether was their detachment from violence. Accordingly, they tried to save Islamic concepts from the “hijackers of Islam,” by rejecting that the perpetrators were martyrs or engaged in jihad.

To sum up the Muslim response to 9/11, it has to be said at the outset that Muslims had never had such an opportunity to speak up for themselves and to tell the American public about Islam. Condemnation of the violence was a common position, and it seems that it really had the desired effect on certain segments of society. Actually, this was what the American media also intended. They needed to represent “moderate Muslims” to the American public, as opposed to fundamentalists, and these figures were good examples. Thus, Muslims were incorporated into the mainstream American discourse.

An alternative approach might suggest that Muslims themselves created the differentiation between moderates and radicals that the media would pick up later. Though this is a question of empirical research, it seems to me that since this appeared as the most viable strategy toward the Muslim world in
the international arena, the media simply followed the government. When Islam appeared as an alternative discourse for Muslims in recent decades, the previous political strategy of deemphasizing Islam ceased to be a viable policy. Thus, as is most explicit in today’s Greater Middle East project, Islam would be a target of those political projects that seek to turn it into a subservient religion. Yet, as I pointed out earlier, the common attitude among Muslims to detach themselves from extremism has undeniably contributed to the media’s strategy.

Still, inasmuch as some criticisms appeared in the Muslim-owned media against the United States that seemed to hold it responsible, not to mention the wide-ranging opposition of Muslims to the idea of war, some Muslims were represented as not being sufficiently condemnatory of the incidents and, therefore, supporters of the fundamentalists. This assertion allowed the basic differentiation strategy to be perpetuated. Since the effects of the media on the public’s attitudes may be another topic of research, any argument concerning the influence of the Muslims’ appearance in the American media on the image of Muslims will be speculative. Nonetheless, the proliferation of favorable opinions about Islam and Muslims among the American public may be an outcome of this Muslim appearance.

**Conclusion**

American Muslims are in a struggle for existence as an essential part of American society. Challenges of both historical and contemporary relations between “the West” and the Muslim “Others” led to an identity crisis on both sides. Throughout its history, the West has constructed its identity by opposing itself to its “Other”: Islam. Although it is not fair to say that the United States, which did not have a direct confrontation with Muslims up until very recent times, did inherit the western legacy of colonialism and conflict totally, it can be argued that this cultural heritage had a great effect on forming its perceptions of Muslims. After all, for Paul Findley’s elementary school teacher, the defining feature of Muslims was: “They aren’t like us.” Now that this “Other” is not a total outsider anymore, but has been far more visible with its Islamic centers and Islamic organizations, with its women in hijabs and men in turbans; and now that Islam is always called the “fastest-growing religion in the U.S.,” “American identity” is in need of redefinition.

Similarly, Muslims who have traditionally felt antagonistic toward “the West” in general, and the United States in particular after Israel was estab-
lished at the cost of lives and properties of their fellow Muslims, are aware that they are no longer a marginal minority. Native-born generations and converts have become an important segment of the American Muslim community, and more and more Muslims now hold important societal positions. This has crucial implications: On the one hand, it complicates the traditional conceptions of Muslims worldwide about the West and the Westerners who they used to perceive in antagonistic terms. On the other hand, American Muslims feel the need to define themselves vis-à-vis the United States and their fellow Muslims.

The September 11, 2001, attacks against the symbol of American economic and political might, which also targeted thousands of civilians, were attributed to people who had Muslim origins. Regardless of the extent of the official story’s truth, Muslims knew that there was no way to keep silent. On the other hand, the mainstream media’s coverage of 9/11 did not disparage Islam itself; rather, the media followed a complicated course by praising Islam as a peaceful religion while simultaneously defaming “fundamentalism,” whose meaning was left intentionally fuzzy. The whole media coverage can be read from this essential distinction between (moderate) Islam and fundamentalism.

Moreover, these two groups of Muslims were not portrayed as having a serene relationship. To the contrary, every part of the Muslim world was portrayed as experiencing a deep cleavage between these two groups trying to shape the Muslims’ future. Underlying this dominant mode of representation was a modernizationist outlook, and the well-worn modernization narrative was reproduced when covering the war against the Taliban, which was a prototype of the fundamentalists. The clash was constructed as a war between civilization and barbarism. What the coverage on the Taliban added to this picture was the embodiment of barbarism. This turned the war on Afghanistan into a movement to liberate women from medieval barbarity, where the burqa symbolized their oppression. In this struggle, the Northern Alliance represented the moderate Muslims. From there on, an essentialization strategy was employed to lump together all kinds of fundamentalisms.

American Muslims were not a monolithic bloc that could respond to events in the world and the dominant representations of Muslims. Although they were united in condemning the attacks and in their attempt to prove that Islam had nothing to do with terrorism, they differed in all other respects. For one thing, American Muslims finally began to speak for themselves. But what they said usually could not override the recent dominant
discourse on Islam. The more profound effect of the Muslim presence in the West, namely, the negotiation of Muslim and western identities, has yet to be seen.

Notes

1. For contrasting images of Palestinians, see R. S. Zaharna, “The Palestinian Leadership and the American Media: Changing Images, Conflicting Results,” in The U.S. Media and the Middle East: Image and Perception, ed. Yahya Kamalipour (Westport, CT: Greeenwood Press, 1997), 37-47. Despite the relatively positive portrayal during the first Intifada, there is no question that the negative image of Palestinians as terrorists remained dominant, as many public opinions surveys confirmed.


3. Foucault develops a powerful argument linking all forms of the will to knowledge and all modes of cultural representation of the “Other,” or marginal constituencies, more or less explicitly to the exercise of power. Second, his understanding of “discourse” – the medium that constitutes power and through which it is exercised – “constructs” the objects of its knowledge. In other words, discourse produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. Bart Moore-Gilbert, Postcolonial Theory: Contexts, Practices, Politics (London and New York: Verso: 1997), 36.

4. Ibid., 36-37.

5. It simply means going beyond direct forms of political control (dominio), and unveiling the complex interlocking of political, social, and cultural forces that enables and perpetuates authority. In this picture, it is culture where the struggle for hegemony (“war of position”) takes place. Hegemony is “in the strongest sense ‘a culture,’ which is also the lived dominance and subordination of particular classes.” Raymond Williams, “Hegemony” and “Traditions, Institutions and Formations” in Marxism and Literature (1976), 8.

6. Ibid., 37-38.

7. Ibid., 39.


11. Ibid.,11.


13. Ibid., 335.

14. Ibid., 337.


Melani McAlister is the most important scholar to challenge the binary opposition between the West and Islam as the ultimate determinant of this representation. She argues that “in the last fifty years, the meanings of the Middle East in the United States have been far more flexible, and rich than the Orientalism binary would allow.” Ibid., 270.

Hashem, for instance, refers to the radical vs. moderate dichotomy drawn in *Time* and *Newsweek*, but this does not lead him to incorporate this fact into his theory. Ibid., 157.


25. Aftab, What does fundamentalism really mean?”
31. This phrase also constituted one of the most common catch phrases and was used as the title of many articles.
33. Bush, from the same speech.
37. “In general, however, the Mazar massacre was brushed aside by the international media, and in particular by the influential American press. The New York Times confined the killings to a few paragraphs in a story about Iran on Sept. 16. A reporter in Islamabad offered Newsweek a 1,500-word article that was finally reduced to a 150-word snippet.” Rupert C. Colville. “One Massacre That Didn’t Grab the World’s Attention,” International Herald Tribune (Paris), 7 August 1999.
43. Spurr, The Rhetoric of Empire.
48. Steven Shabad, “Don’t Overestimate Your Superiority,” 21 September 02. www.msnbc.com/news/632545.asp. It is interesting to note that even the Soviet invasion was used to serve the United States’ portrayal of the war as a war against barbarians. The whole threat of the spread of communism, which led the United States to support the Mujahedeen at that time, was replaced by a renewed representation of a struggle between civilization and barbarism.
54. As Ali Bulaç argues in his column in the Turkish daily Zaman, members of Taliban were vigilantly distinguishing themselves from the contemporary intellectual movements of the Muslim world. They did not consider Mawdudi, one of the most important figures of Islamic revivalism, as a genuine scholar, let alone Seyyid Qutb, who is more distant to the traditional madrasah Islam. They even excommunicated Hasan Turabi because of his stance in a religious debate. “Taliban Üzerine” (On the Taliban), Zaman, 20 November 2001. www.zaman.com/2001/11/20/yazarlar/AliBULAC.htm.
56. Bush, from his 20 September 2001 address.


64. For a list of Muslim responses to attacks, see: http://groups.colgate.edu/aaris-lam/response.htm; www.arches.uga.edu/~godlas/nineeleven.html; http://home.wlu.edu/~lubint/islamonWTC.htm; and www.unc.edu/~kurzman/terror.htm.

65. Said, 1979, 293.


67. I need to mention that these groups refer to attitudes, not necessarily to groups of people. In this regard, a spokesperson for a Muslim community might employ one standpoint in a certain setting and a conflicting one in another.

68. Ibid.


75. Ibid. Yet, it is difficult to prove that committing massacre makes anybody blasphemous.

77. Ibid.


82. Ibid.


84. “The attacks were designed to cause as many deaths as possible, and havoc, and to be a big slap for America on American soil.” Ascribed to a senior al-Qaeda operative. “Al-Qaeda Planned to Hit Nuclear Plants, Congress: Arab Journalist,” 9 September 2002. www.islamonline.net/english/News/2002-09/09/article45.shtml.
Liberating Afghan Women

Nancy Gallagher

Abstract

Public opinion in the United States and elsewhere celebrated the liberation of Afghan women following the defeat of the Taliban government. The United States promised to stay in Afghanistan and foster security, economic development, and human rights for all, especially women. After years of funding various anti-Soviet Mujahidin warlords, the United States had agreed to help reconstruct the country once before in 1992, when the Soviet-backed government fell, but had lost interest when the warlords began to fight among themselves. This time, however, it was going to be different.

To date, however, conditions have not improved for most Afghan women and reconstruction has barely begun. How did this happen? This article explores media presentations of Afghan women and then compares them with recent reports from human rights organizations and other eyewitness accounts. It argues that the media depictions were built on earlier conceptions of Muslim societies and allowed us to adopt a romantic view that disguised or covered up the more complex historical context of Afghan history and American involvement in it. We allowed ourselves to believe that Afghans were exotic characters who were modernizing or progressing toward a western way of life, despite the temporary setback imposed by the Taliban government.

In Afghanistan, however, there was a new trope: the feminist Afghan woman activist. Images of prominent Afghan women
sans burqa were much favored by the mass media and American policymakers. The result, however, was not a new focus on funding feminist political organizations or making women’s rights a foreign policy priority; rather, it was an unwillingness to fulfill obligations incurred during decades of American-funded mujahidin warfare, to face the existence of deteriorating conditions for women, resumed opium cultivation, and a resurgent Taliban, or to commit to a multilateral approach that would bring in the funds and expertise needed to sustain a long-term process of reconstruction.

**Historical Background**

Afghanistan is a loosely governed country of about 24 million people with diverse linguistic, religious, and ethnic groups whose identity boundaries are far more blurred than in typical journalistic representations. Women’s rights have long been a flashpoint for religious conservative forces. In 1929, King Amanullah abolished female seclusion and veiling and introduced coeducation; his government collapsed in the ensuing fallout. In 1959, a reforming prime minister, Mohammad Daoud, tried to abolish female seclusion and encouraged women to enter higher education and the professions, but religious conservatives and their followers forced him from power. In 1973, Daoud, in power once again, reintroduced some of his reforms; instability again ensued.

Afghans endured years of upheaval while Soviet-supported governments attempted to force coeducation on the populace and eliminate the bride price, often the main economic exchange in rural areas. Jihadi forces resisting the Soviet-backed Afghan government often said they were trying to protect their families from the un-Islamic, and hence immoral, communist forces. In 1978, a small group of urban leftist Afghans deposed Daoud and tried to force a program of land redistribution, secular education, and modernization on uncomprehending villagers. Afghanistan had made public education free and compulsory in 1935, and by 1979 all provinces had girls’ primary schools. But most girls did not go to school. In 1979, at the beginning of the Soviet era, the literacy rate was about 4 percent for girls and 30 percent for boys.

The pro-Soviet Afghan regime had little popular support, and factions within it struggled for power. The United States, with Pakistan’s support, began arming one of the opposing Mujahidin (religious forces) groups. When another faction called on the Soviet Union for direct assis-
tance in gaining power, Afghanistan became the cold war’s final battle-
ground. The Mujahidin forces called for a jihad against the godless
Soviet-supported government, and Washington cheerfully proclaimed
them freedom fighters nobly and fearlessly struggling against the “evil
empire.”

The United States, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and other governments
increased their support and armed, funded, and trained Mujahidin groups.
The Soviets spent about $45 billion supporting the pro-Soviet Afghan gov-
ernment, while the United States, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and other west-
ern and Muslim nations spend over $10 billion supporting the Mujahidin
forces. The resulting 20 years of war caused an estimated 1.5 million deaths
and devastated Afghanistan politically, socially, culturally, economically,
and environmentally. Soviet troops withdrew in 1989, the Soviet-backed
Afghan government fell in 1992, and a coalition of rival Mujahidin forces
came to power.¹

Regional and international interests continued to back one of the vari-
ous Mujahidin forces. Pakistan, which did not want a strong Afghan gov-
ernment that might challenge its regional predominance, usually supported
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a warlord backed by Saudi Arabia and the United
States. Hekmatyar was remembered for having organized gangs to throw
acid on women students at Kabul University if they were judged not prop-
erly attired. Iran backed the Shi`i Hazaras; France backed Ahmad Shah
Masud, head of the Northern Alliance of Tajiks; and Russia backed General
Dostum, an Uzbek warlord. When Hekmatyar proved unreliable, Pakistan
shifted to the Taliban, Afghan students trained in religious schools in
Pakistan.²

The United States abandoned Afghanistan to the warlords who, in their
internecine power struggles, destroyed much of Kabul, decimated the civil-
ian population, and further devastated the already weak economy. Since the
former Soviet-backed government had expanded women’s secular educa-
tion and encouraged women to take professional positions vacant in wartime
conditions, the Mujahidin forces intensified their insistence on women’s
near total seclusion from public life. With the exception of the Kalashnikov,
four-wheel vehicles, and other imports useful for military purposes, they
considered anything connected with the Soviet Union or the United States to
be un-Islamic and immoral. Conditions for women deteriorated rapidly,
especially in Kabul, but also in other cities and towns where corruption and
violence against women spiraled out of control. The Mujahidin leaders
announced decrees requiring women to wear the burqa and restricted their
access to education by requiring, in many cases, sex-segregated venues that were often not available.

The Pakistan-backed Taliban vowed to stop the warfare and corruption of the Mujahidin forces and to establish their own version of Shari’ah (Islamic law) in Afghanistan. The Taliban were militantly opposed to modernizing trends in Islamic thought, which they taught had led to corruption and immorality and thus were undermining the foundations of Islam. On September 27, 1996, the Taliban conquered Kabul. Some nongovernmental organizations, including various United Nations agencies, initially welcomed their arrival, hoping that they would bring security at last. The Taliban immediately closed the public schools, which had 250,000 students (100,000 of whom were girls) and Kabul University, which had 10,000 students (4,000 of whom were women).³

In all, about 40,000 women, not only professionals but also bakers and domestic workers, lost their jobs. Many of them, war widows who had no means to support themselves and their children, were reduced to begging. According to a widely read Physicians for Human Rights report, women suffered a high rate of depression and some committed suicide.⁴ Western women activists launched unprecedented and successful campaigns to prevent western governments from recognizing the Taliban government and Unocal from building a pipeline through Afghan territory. With the 1998 bombing of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, apparently by militants based in Afghanistan and closely associated with the Taliban, any possibility of diplomatic recognition ground to a halt. Afghanistan faded from the world stage until the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. With the “war on terrorism” launched in October 2001, the liberation of Afghan women became a central feature in the American media’s coverage of the war and its aftermath.

**American Orientalism and Media**

**Depictions of Afghan Women**

Edward Said famously argued that western representations of eastern or Oriental peoples resulted from and reinforced western political, social, and economic power. Mohja Kahf showed that while post-eighteenth-century depictions of the Muslim woman often featured an odalisque, a victim, or a veiled dancer, or a reclusive figure, pre-eighteenth-century depictions tended to show plucky, unveiled, and often scheming and devious Muslim
women. Before the eighteenth century, western conceptions of Muslim women, though distinctly negative, reflected a relatively equal balance of power. Kahf concluded that the image of Muslim women in western culture is not “natural, timeless, and uniform,” but rather “shifting, contingent, and heterogeneous.” Kahf is right: Current media depictions of Afghan women are indeed “shifting, contingent, and heterogeneous.” They reflect several familiar tropes of the oppressed woman, the victim, the Muslim woman saved by western (male) intervention, and the popular new theme of the Afghan woman activist. The images reflect several narratives in popular American culture: American Orientalist narratives, westernizing or progressive narratives, and feminist narratives.

American Orientalism, a complex phenomenon usually associated with the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, is equally potent in the present. In the nineteenth century, travelers sought to retrace the steps of Biblical figures by locating and visiting places named in the Bible, experience the exotic, and acquire the luxury goods of the Orient. Domination for political, economic, cultural, and religious purposes characterized the western Orientalist project. Oleg Grabar, the noted Islamic art historian, wrote: “(for many Americans) the Orient only matters as providing illustrations for some significant moments in the long history that led to the American Promised Land, and its very misery is a demonstration of the latter’s success.” Artists routinely depicted an exotic, colorful Orient with luxurious harems and nude women in indolent poses, picturesque atrocities, mystery, and danger. Native Americans were often depicted in similar ways, with the “noble savage” a favorite theme.

The viewers were flattered that they were outside of such scenes and felt little connection to them or to the political arrangements that underlay the inequalities and degradation depicted in them. Unlike the French Orientalist painters who depicted the power and glory of a masculine France and the exotic qualities of a semi-nude feminized Orient under French imperial rule, mid-nineteenth-century American Protestant painters preferred Oriental landscapes often with properly clothed, though beautiful and reticent, women. Timelessness, emptiness, and the desolation of ruins nearly devoid of people in Egypt and the Holy Land were major themes. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, with the rise in American power, American popular culture discovered the Orient and sensuality based on power relations became a major theme.

Men and women spectators wanted to escape from their boring lives and experience the mysterious East and its secret pleasures from a safe
distance and a position of power. Orientals were semi-civilized, superstitious, corrupt, shrewd, fractious, and violent, but also colorful and attractive. The Orient meant Barbary pirates and cruel despots, in contrast to the honest democrats of the United States. More than a few western men found Oriental women to be romantic and exotic, in contrast to the strident and demanding American women activists. The image of the beloved American hero, the cowboy, the lonely scout, and the master of horses and natives merged with the image of the desert shaykh. Later, the Shriners and other Americans influenced by Lowell Thomas’s slide show depictions of T. E. Lawrence enjoyed dressing up like Orientals to explore new identities. The Orient might be feminine in its passivity and indolence, but, contradictorily, the warriors of the desert became symbols of masculinity.

At the turn of the nineteenth century, politically minded Americans expected that their country would become a power in the Orient, displacing the British and the French. Missionary-minded Americans knew that the Orient included India and China, but believed that Protestantism was destined to prevail mainly in the Muslim and Eastern Christian regions of the Near East. In the post-World War I era, Hollywood ran away with the image of the exotic Orient in movies like “The Sheik” (1921), “The Thief of Baghdad” (1940), “Ali Baba and the Forty Thieves” (1944), and “Lawrence of Arabia” (1962). “Exotic” came to mean different and exceptional, colorful and luxurious, but not subject to the same standards, expectations, or rights as proper “western” culture. There was always an underlying assumption of power with the designator of “exotica” being in the position of control and those dubbed “exotic” occupying a suspect and morally dubious position.

Even as western powers reinforced the powers of local tribal and royal leaders, they argued that the expansion of western political and economic domination would free Muslim women and men from the oppression of their traditional cultures. Under western influence, Muslim women adopted western fashions and lifestyles. Many in the West concluded that Afghan women, like other non-western women, must become western and, therefore, modern in appearance and culture to advance their interests. Westernizing narratives often portrayed Afghan women as having emerged from the darkness of the past into the light of the present. These narratives generally cheered on the American invasion of Afghanistan. The Orientalist narrative led directly to the idea that western powers had an obligation to save the Orientals from themselves.
**Time Magazine and Afghan Women**

In November 2001, *Time Asia* published an issue and a popular Web series, “Through the Ages: Afghan Women from the 1960s to the Present Day,” that emphasized Afghan women’s progress, decline, and recovery. The article explained that in the 1960s and 1970s, Afghanistan had been a typical developing country with slowly increasing rights for women. A 1970 photo showed Afghan girl and boy scouts happily parading together at a Kabul youth gathering. A 1989 photo showed a group of happy, laughing, middle-class young Afghan women, all in western dress, walking in Kabul. The photo was taken during the Soviet era, just before the Soviet-backed government collapsed and the warlords destroyed Kabul. The women wore stylish boots, slacks, and fashionable wraps.

The photos suggested that Afghanistan was making progress in women’s rights. In contrast, the next photo was of a propaganda leaflet dropped by American and British jets in Taliban-controlled territory during the 2001 war. The Taliban often beat women with steel cables as punishment for petty crimes. The image was taken from a RAWA (Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan) leaflet but without attribution. A photo shot during the Taliban regime portrayed women waiting in a doctor’s office.

The final photo in both the *Time Asia* essays depicted a
beautiful woman lifting her burqa to view her daughter as they fled the battle-ravaged northern city of Kunduz on November 19, 2001.

The caption said: “With the Taliban gone, there is now fresh hope for the women of Afghanistan.” There was love and hope in the mother’s face and readers want to cheer her newfound freedom.

The December 3, 2001, issue of *Time* featured a photo essay entitled “Lifting the Veil.” On the cover was a striking photograph of an unveiled Afghan woman that, of course, was meant to attract readers. The photo essay featured a haunting photograph of a lonely woman in the desolate ruins of Kabul. The woman was colorful, isolated, and depersonalized, while the ruins were uninhabited and distant. The article reinforced western public opinion at the time, that with the fall of the Taliban, freedom had returned.

Yet how could women, by themselves, be expected to make headway in this ruined land? Did the West not take any responsibility for the devastation? Readers learned that Afghan women were taking their future into their hands. Dr. Sima Samar, an Afghan physician and human rights activist, became a favorite of the Bush regime. Samar, who was appointed minister for women’s Affairs in the interim Afghan government, ran four hospitals, ten clinics, and rural schools for girls and boys in Afghanistan and Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan through her non-governmental organization, Shuhada.

Soraya Parlika, an Afghan feminist activist based in Kabul, also became well-known in western media outlets. *Time* called Parlika “a fiery and feisty woman, and very passionate, who spent time in prison under the Taliban’s rule.” Photos of feminist Afghan women abounded. *Time* saw photos of a group of over thirty women meeting...
secretly in Soraya’s home to plan future campaigns for women’s rights. The women wear kerchiefs, but not the burqa. There is no hint of the victim or the odalisque here, and these are the women *Time* wants us to support. Yet the next photograph, showing a man selling burqas to a veiled woman shopper, made the woman appear strange and distant, almost indistinguishable from the racks of burqas. We had just learned that Afghan women had had their freedoms restored, so perhaps it is too early to celebrate their liberation. The next photograph depicted Shakaba Amid, an unveiled woman television announcer, in her second day on the air after the Taliban’s fall.

The theme of freedom restored for both women and men continued. The men’s new-found freedom was suggested by a photo of a man looking at postcards of women, mostly Indians, now for sale in liberated Kabul. The caption read: “These men haven’t seen any photographs depicting the human form since the arrival of the Taliban seven years ago.” The photographer commented: “Selling such items is allowed again now, and women in Afghanistan are still wearing burqas, so there’s this great demand for pictures of women in full view.” *Time*’s readers found themselves gazing at the gazer of women’s photographs. Indian women were now objects for the men and for the magazine reader.

Readers then met with a group of men playing with a blond hula doll. Afghan men gazed at a female doll crowned with blond hair, unlike most indigenous Polynesian women, dressed in a grass hula skirt, itself a creation of the tourist industry and Hollywood/television myth- and image-making. The photographer then introduced readers to a crowded bazaar where women were shopping for once-forbidden make-up. They were all wearing the burqa. The viewer was meant to chuckle, since the make-up presumably would not be visible to the public. The make-up would, of course, be worn at women’s gatherings, weddings, and other celebrations, but few general readers would understand the richness of women’s private lives. Other photos in the series depicted intimate family scenes that were both distant and forbidding, much like nineteenth-century Orientalist paintings.

Finally, *Time* presented a photo shot from the backseat of a taxicab. Veiled women with children were begging from the passenger-photographer. It was a sad scene with power relations between the women and the passenger depicted clearly: He is male, they are female; he is western, they are Afghan; he is riding, they are standing; he is inside, they are outside; he has money, they do not. Optimistically, *Time*, like *Time Asia*, featured the photo of the woman in Kunduz lifting her veil to view her daughter.
The Modernization of Afghan Women

While the media celebrated the American liberation of Afghan women, it also glorified the masculinity of Afghan society and the militarization of American society. Newspapers carried photos of American troops playing *buzkashi*, the national game of Afghanistan, partaking with their Afghan counterparts in the romance of the desert warrior.24 Ahmad Karzai, president of Afghanistan, became a familiar fashion statement in his *pakul* and cape.25 The media made Afghanistan the exotic Orient seen in films and paintings, novels and travelers’ accounts. Afghan women and men were beautiful, distant, lonely, unattainable, and hopelessly different from and inferior to the western viewer. Americans were their heroic rescuers.

On February 9, 2002, veteran *New York Times* journalist John Burns visited Kabul University, where hundreds of women were sitting for entrance exams. Burns celebrated the fall of the Taliban and the new opportunities for Afghan women. He wrote: “In the hallways, the burka, the head-to-toe shroud that became an emblem of Taliban repression, was now a fashion statement tossed backward from the candidates’ heads as if to say, ‘Take a hike, Mr. Mullah.’” As the journalist left, the chief librarian ran after him to say: “We say hello to the educated people in the Western countries, and we ask them, kindly, if you have any books about the technical and scientific world, engineering, literature – anything – please send them to us. The Afghan people are in darkness, and we ask the Western countries to help us shine some light.”26

On November 17, 2001, Laura Bush became the first “First Lady” to give the presidential Saturday radio talk. She spoke out on behalf of Afghan women and the poverty, poor health, and illiteracy in Afghanistan and said that “because of our recent military gains in much of Afghanistan, women are no longer imprisoned in their homes. They can listen to music and teach their daughters without fear of punishment. But the terrorists who helped rule that country now plot and plan in many countries. And they must be stopped. The fight against terrorism is also a fight for the rights and dignity of women.”27 Widespread governmental attention to selected Afghan
women followed the speech. On November 29, a group of Afghan women living in the United States were feted in Washington. They met the First Lady and had dinner with UN secretary general Kofi Annan. They received training in how to respond in interviews, were interviewed by Good Housekeeping magazine, and dined with Madeline Albright, the former secretary of state who had earlier spoken out on behalf of Afghan women. Hilary Clinton held a hearing with Afghan women on Capitol Hill. For a time, it became popular to be associated with Afghan women.

Still, not all were unimpressed. The Christian Science Monitor ran a story called “Voices from behind the Veil” by Nicole Gaouette. Gaouette interviewed Heba Attieh, a Saudi physician, who argued that First Lady Laura Bush’s radio address on Afghan women was meant to provide the United States with an excuse “to keep bombing. It’s not for women in the US to say Afghan women are oppressed and should take off the veil,” she says. “If an Afghan woman is upset about her situation, she should change it, not you.” Gaouette commented: “History gives her good reason to be suspicious. European nations often used Muslim women to justify their intrusions into Islamic countries. French charities in late 19th-century Algeria would dispense free oil and flour to the poor, but only if they removed their veils.”

Muslim women recalled that during Algeria’s war of independence (1954-62), French authorities insisted that women present themselves unveiled for emergency relief; many women send their servants. The veil became a symbol of nationalist resistance. In the late 1800s, the English envoy, Evelyn Baring (later Lord Cromer) urged his superiors to colonize Egypt on behalf of the country’s downtrodden women. Meanwhile, back in England, he was a founding member of the Men’s League for Opposing Women’s Suffrage.

The Bush administration similarly celebrated the liberation of Afghan women while supporting a regressive policy toward women’s rights at home. At no time did the Bush administration carry out a foreign or a domestic policy that was in any way feminist, despite the triumphalist imagery of happy and colorful Afghan women and children. The war in Afghanistan heightened a sense of patriotic militarism within the United States that did little to advance the rights of women and minorities. It also served to deflect public attention from the ongoing domestic crises. In the post 9/11 era, American women experienced severe cutbacks in unemployment compensation, disability insurance, health benefits, and access to reproductive choice. The gap between rich and poor widened with women and children at the bottom of the hierarchy. More women joined the ranks
of the working poor and were threatened by unemployment, homelessness, malnutrition, and poor health.

The media was nearly silent when, in 2002, religious conservatives accused Sima Samar, the minister for Women’s Affairs, with blasphemy for allegedly saying in an interview with an Iranian newspaper in Canada that she did not believe in Shari`ah law, which she insisted she did not say. On June 25, 2002, Afghanistan’s Supreme Court dropped the blasphemy charge saying that there was no evidence, but President Karzai did not reappoint her to her ministerial job. Samar is currently chair of the Independent Afghanistan Human Rights Commission and remains active in Shuhada, the humanitarian organization that she founded.

**Afghan Women’s Human Rights**

Conditions for Afghan women have worsened. Amnesty International reported that the Northern Alliance had committed more documented cases of rape than had the Taliban. Few women shed their burqas and revenge attacks and rapes of enemy women continued. Indeed many women insisted that they did not mind the burqa as much as the poverty and the lack of security, schools, and jobs. In the fall of 2002, Human Rights Watch reported that a revived Vice and Virtue squad (renamed “Islamic Teaching”) was harassing women for improper dress and behavior. Even during the widely publicized *loya jirga* process, in which Afghans were to form a new government, warlords and local commanders threatened women delegates and candidates and allowed their troops to harass women and girls in areas under their control. Militants attacked with rockets or set girls’ schools in Kandahar, Sar-e Pol, Zabul, Logar, and Wardak provinces on fire. In Herat, local commanders pressured women not to work for foreign organizations. Troops loyal to the government or to warlords forbade music and dancing at weddings, and musicians and guests have been beaten. The report observed that women’s human rights were being routinely abused and that conditions were not conducive for redress.

A subsequent Human Rights Watch report released in July 2003 documented the widespread and continuing abuse of women and children. While customs varied from region to region, many Afghan women and girls did not have the right to seek education, work, or move about at will before the Mujahidin forces or the Taliban came to power. The reforming and Soviet-backed governments carried out certain policies favorable to women, but these were largely limited to urban areas and the higher social classes. The
level of violence against women, however, was unprecedented. It was entirely unacceptable for the authorities to beat a man’s female relatives because they were not appropriately attired. Local tribal or regional leaders protected women under their patronage. The abduction and rape of women and girls was unprecedented. Both the long-standing seclusion of women, the denial of equal access to education and women, and to freedom of movement, and, of course, violence against women are all abuses of human rights, whether they are customary or unprecedented practices.31

In Kabul, many private English language schools have opened because English is increasingly necessary in the workplace. Human Rights Watch learned, however, that a uniformed police officer beat a male teacher for speaking with a female student in his class. The officer claimed that the teacher was “against Islam.” Another witness claimed that the officer slapped the teacher, took him out of class, and punched him in the nose. Other witnesses said that after police officers began harassing students and teachers, some girls stopped coming to the school. In 2003, the minister of education announced that schools were to be gender-segregated and that men were not permitted to teach girls, although women would be allowed to teach boys.

Adeena Niazi, president of the Afghan Women’s Association, stated: “People in the West blame the Afghans [sic], the Mujahideen, the Taliban for what is happening in Afghanistan, they do not see how they are implicated, they do not see that their political and economic interests and their politicians, as well as the interests of Afghanistan’s neighbours, have created the Afghanistan of today. They will not accept responsibility for how they are implicated in the plight of Afghanistan and the conditions of Afghan women.”32 Should we “blame the West?” Many insisted that Taliban and others had not been exposed to the real Afghan culture and that their policies were “from outer space,” as one RAWA representative stated.

There were many candidates to blame, including the United States, the Soviet Union, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the Mujahidin and Taliban warlords, and longstanding misogynous traditions that prevailed in most regions of Afghanistan, including the territories of the Northern Alliance. Western feminists should not overlook the fact that harsh patriarchal norms have prevailed throughout much of both rural and urban Afghanistan, and not just during the Mujahidin and Taliban eras. Time Asia did not point out that the happiest photo in its series was taken in 1989, during the Soviet era, that most of the destruction in Kabul occurred after the Soviets withdrew under
the American-sponsored Mujahidin coalition, or that the violence against women has continued.

Since the fall of the Taliban government, most international aid has gone for emergency relief rather than to long-term reconstruction. After repeated warnings that the warlords were reasserting themselves, the U.S. Congress, toward the end of 2002, passed legislation authorizing the government to increase funding for the reconstruction of Afghanistan’s roads and infrastructure, for women’s programs, and for the expansion of international peacekeeping forces in and around Kabul. It did not, however, establish a mechanism for appropriating the funds. Today, unstable conditions prevail throughout Afghanistan. The Taliban and the Mujahidin forces have regrouped and are waging a guerilla war against the American-supported government in Kabul.

Before the Taliban came to power, most Afghan women and girls did not have access to education, freedom of movement, the right to work at an occupation of their own choosing, the right to choose or not choose a spouse, or the right to seek medical care without the mediation of male relatives or guardians. In addition, governments currently supported by the United States, such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, discriminate against women in very similar ways. In Pakistan, women who claim that they have been raped can be prosecuted for committing a sexual crime. The United States remains indifferent.

In Afghanistan and other Muslim societies, as in many other parts of the world, governments manipulated religious traditions for their own purposes. Muslim human rights groups actively worked for reform, but their governments often repressed them with arms supplied by the United States and other western powers interested more in stability, security, and a safe atmosphere for business than human rights. Yet many girls remain unable to take classes, forced to focus on survival in a society devastated by two decades of war. As of May 2003, the Bush administration had allocated $2.5 million for Afghan women’s programs. Fourteen women’s centers were built, but the centers received no additional funds for education or job training.13

Masuda Sultan, an Afghan-American, visited Afghanistan in September 2003. She reported: “When I visited Kabul and Kandahar this September, women asked me why my government was so quick to send bombs to liberate them but so tardy in sending them the aid they were promised.” Sultan went to Kandahar to help organize a conference on women and the constitution. She met with forty-five women leaders who wrote the Afghan Women’s Bill of Rights,14 which called for human rights
for women, national disarmament, curtailment of warlords, and trials for war criminals.35

The *loya jirga* (grand council) met in December 2003 to work out a constitution for Afghanistan. One of the women delegates, Malalai Joya, took the microphone to protest the treatment of women and the prevalence of warlords and drug dealing throughout the country. Security police promptly threw her out of the assembly. After intensive and heated discussions and backroom logrolling, the *loya jirga* announced the long-awaited Constitution of Afghanistan on January 4, 2004. Internal and international pressure resulted in the inclusion of a statement calling for equal rights for women and the doubling of seats for women in the new Parliament. Under the new quota system, women were to hold 25 percent of the total number of seats. Yet the poverty and lack of security and underlying ethnic and gender tensions will make implementing the constitution difficult, if not impossible. International peacekeeping troops still patrol only Kabul and the warlords control the rest of the country.

The United States wants to hold presidential elections in time for the American elections, but the United Nations voter registration project has not been able to register more than a minority of voters. In many regions, local leaders have excluded women from the lists. Following heavy criticism for having defeated the Taliban government and then abandoned the Afghans to their fate, the American government proposed an increase in its aid commitment, but far less than needed. American forces are trying to establish Afghan Provincial Reconstruction Teams in the Pashtun regions, but they are underfunded and too few in number to defeat the regrouping Taliban forces.

The unilateralist American government has not understood the complexity of the Afghan political, social, and economic contexts, and Europe and Japan have been reluctant to give aid under the terms set by the United States. UN efforts to demobilize the warlord’s militias; the World Bank’s plan to fund rural reconstruction of Afghanistan’s 32 provinces; and the American program to train a national army, police force, civil service, and judiciary all are underfunded and lag way behind schedule. Non-governmental organizations, schools, and social services run by Afghan women and men complain of a lack of funding and security.

Opium cultivation is back in force. The UN estimates that Afghanistan currently produces 75 percent of the world’s opium, about 4,000 tons a year. Profits from the drug trade fund the warlords’ militias and the resurgent Taliban forces, which have better pay and arms and more motivation than
trainees in the national army. The White House Office of National Drug Control Policy estimates that the area of cultivation has grown from 1,685 hectares in 2001 to 61,000 hectares in 2003. Deadly attacks on foreign aid workers have increased. American warplanes continue to kill Afghan civilians, often women and children. Warlords have been fighting internecine battles in Herat and other areas. Of the $4.5 billion in foreign aid originally for reconstruction and long-term development projects, $2.2 billion has been diverted to military projects and emergency relief. The American military distributes relief supplies to those who give information on the whereabouts of Taliban forces, which has further endangered relief workers. The streets of Kabul are no longer safe, and foreigners travel in convoys. Taliban attacks have damaged power lines and irrigation projects.

Fearing for the stability of the Karzai government, the United States has chosen to look the other way and negotiate with Taliban leaders. Eventually, peacekeepers will have to confront the druglords and warlords to ensure the rule of law and the advancement of women’s basic needs. The U.S. State Department proudly declared in its mission statement on human rights:

The protection of fundamental human rights was a foundation stone in the establishment of the United States over 200 years ago. Since then, a central goal of U.S. foreign policy has been the promotion of respect for human rights, as embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The United States understands that the existence of human rights helps secure the peace, deter aggression, promote the rule of law, combat crime and corruption, strengthen democracies, and prevent humanitarian crises. Because the promotion of human rights is an important national interest, the United States seeks to: Hold governments accountable to their obligations under universal human rights norms and international human rights instruments; Promote greater respect for human rights, including freedom from torture, freedom of expression, press freedom, women’s rights, children’s rights, and the protection of minorities; Promote the rule of law, seek accountability, and change cultures of impunity; Assist efforts to reform and strengthen the institutional capacity of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN Commission on Human Rights; and Coordinate human rights activities with important allies, including the EU, and regional organizations.

In the aftermath of the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, American policymakers forgot these words.
Conclusion

For the first time, such mass media outlets as *Time* and *Time Asia* made Muslim feminist activists a central feature of their coverage, and the public loved it. Yet the compelling images of Muslim women lifting the burqa enabled the West to celebrate its victory without confronting its long-standing commitment to ensure the Afghan people’s basic human rights. The local and international political, economic, and social relations that created the horrific inequalities in Afghanistan seemed far too complex to confront. The triumphalist depictions lulled the public into ignoring the fact that the abuses of women’s human rights continued and, in some cases, increased under the American-backed government. While the media exploited the color and picturesque misery of Afghan women, the unprecedented focus on Afghan women activists should have led public opinion to insist that the United States fulfill its obligations to give substantial and long-term funding to Afghan women’s human rights organizations. Yet in the end, the media made the Afghanistan war seem like an action-packed movie. When the show was over, the audience left.

Notes

2. Ibid., 210.
3. Ibid., 108.
19. Ibid.
29. Ibid.


Nancy L. Stockdale

Abstract
In early 2001, the Holy Land Experience (HLE) theme park opened in Orlando, Florida. Before 9/11, Islam was merely a shadowy figure at the HLE; after 9/11, however, the park has promoted a vision of Islam and Muslims that fosters hate among American Protestant visitors. This paper argues that the HLE is a site of extreme potential danger, for it espouses holy war and dissent between American Christians, Jews, and Muslims.

Introduction
Orlando, Florida, is the most popular tourist destination on Earth, receiving over 50 million visitors each year. With so many American and foreign tourists lured to the middle of the Florida peninsula, many entrepreneurs have planned attractions designed to cash in on the tourist trade. Very few tourism projects, however, have been as controversial as the Holy Land Experience (HLE), which opened in early 2001. Embedded in an active
Christian ministry dedicated to converting world Jewry to Christianity, the HLE – officially a non-profit organization with 501(c)(3) status – uses its theme park to promote the Christian gospel in an effort to win converts as well as financial and political supporters both for itself and its political agenda. A muddled mixture of historical revisionism and fanciful whimsy, the park serves as an American evangelical version of the actual Holy Land, currently configured as the Israeli state and the territories it occupies, and is decidedly un-Protestant.

The park, its supplementary literature, and its operatives in the United States and Israel not only engage in spreading the Christian gospel to convert more to their faith; they also promote the belief that world Jewry and the largely secular nation-state of Israel exist only to serve as proofs of Christian prophecy. In this way, the HLE asserts a posed philo-Semitism that, in fact, is highly anti-Semitic. It craves the negation of an independent Jewish religion and culture, and sits in anticipation of the destruction of all Jews who reject Christianity in the longed-for period of the End Times. Central to this, in the interim period before the assumed Second Coming, it works to actively destroy Palestinian aspirations for autonomy by spreading anti-Arab and anti-Islamic propaganda among its supporters in the name of supporting Israel. This effort increased dramatically after the 9/11 tragedy.

In the first months after the park’s opening, visitors were not explicitly exposed to attitudes about Islam. But after 9/11, something changed. Until then no more than a shadowy figure in the HLE drama, the park soon began to use its activities and publications to promote a vision of Islam and Muslims that fosters hate among American Protestant visitors. Although the HLE theme park may appear innocuous or, at times, even silly to people outside the belief system, it is, in fact, a site of extreme potential danger due to its espousal of holy war and dissent between American Christians, Jews, and Muslims. What may appear to be just another simulacrum in the sea of Orlando’s many simulacra is presented as an authentic portrait of the place it claims to replicate: a sacred space that must be protected from Islam’s contaminating influence. Through its not-so-subtle anti-Islamic message, the HLE negates the existential claims of the vast majority of people living in the Middle East, shapes Israel according to how American evangelicals would like to see it, and reads all contemporary and historical events in the Middle East through Biblical prophecy.
Experiencing the Holy Land Experience

The HLE’s cosmology is familiar to those who study active and historical evangelical missions: At the end of time as we know it, all believers in the redemptive quality of Jesus as the Christ will be granted eternal life, while those who do not will be alienated from God for all perpetuity. Like millions of other American Christians, the HLE’s founders believe that current events reveal signals for the fulfillment of prophecies made in the New Testament’s Book of Revelation. The cryptic notions of the Rapture, Armageddon, the Millennium, and the End Times detailed in Christian scripture, which have been read through this lens for centuries, have had tremendous weight in the theology of many Protestant sects, particularly in the United States. Paul S. Boyer has written very eloquently about how this eschatology has been expanded upon and shaped by American and British theologians, such as John Darby, the nineteenth-century Briton who codified the foundations of modern premillennial dispensationalism, and Cyrus Scofield, who wove Darby’s interpretations into his best-selling *Scofield’s Reference Bible* in 1909.¹

As it has been with many other groups, the return of Jews to the Holy Land of the Bible and a subsequent conversion of world Jewry to Christianity are fundamental to the HLE’s way of recognizing the end of time. As a consequence, the establishment of Israel as a Jewish national state in 1948 is viewed as a symbol in God’s ultimate plan and is a precursor to a series of events that will hasten the millennium. The HLE has approached this issue directly with vigor. Crucial to accelerating this conversion is an active mission to world Jewry, particularly to Jews already living in Israel. Known as Zion’s Hope, it has several missionary operatives living in Israel, proselytizing to Jews, which is against Israeli law, in an effort to negate Judaism. The accounts of such missionaries as “Jacob in the Holy Land” and “David in Jerusalem” regularly appear in Zion’s Hope literature.

Although Israel was largely founded on the Zionist principles of socialism and secularism, its existence has been heralded by many evangelicals as the beginning point of the Jews’ return to the Holy Land, which is necessary for the Second Coming (of Jesus). Drawing on Hal Lindsey’s *The Late, Great Planet Earth* movement of the 1970s and the mainstreaming of evangelicalism in the 1980s by the likes of Jerry Falwell and Jim and Tammy Faye Bakker, Zion’s Hope joined many other Christian organizations in the 1990s in promoting the marriage of Jewish tradition and support of Israel with Christian mission and prophecy. This came to a head recently in the
wake of 9/11 and the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States and Great Britain. Now that the Soviet Union is no longer the primary enemy to be branded as the “Antichrist,” Islam and Muslims have been granted this unholy status in the ideology of millions.²

However, there is a fierce competition for followers and funds among the leaders of Christian movements committed to this worldview. Beyond the most famous names espousing versions of premillennial dispensationalism, such as Tim LaHaye and Jerry Jenkins, countless pastors are eager to make their names as important theologians who accurately read the signs pointing to the End Times. Zion’s Hope founder Marvin Rosenthal determined that his organization could make a unique mark on the crowded evangelical scene by establishing a Christian-themed amusement park in the center of Orlando’s I-4 entertainment and tourism corridor. The result, the HLE, has thus far attracted over 500,000 visitors.³

When the HLE was opened to the public on February 5, 2001, it attracted massive media attention throughout the world, and a large amount of that attention was focused on Rosenthal’s high profile desires to preach directly to Jews. Himself a Jewish convert to Christianity, Rosenthal founded Zion’s Hope in the late 1980s and remains its executive director. The park is a strange assemblage of Jerusalem landmarks completely out of scale to the real city, although both the management and many of the patrons insist on its “authenticity.” In this way, it draws on a long-standing tradition of virtual Christian pilgrimage to Holy Land exhibitions, stand-ins for those who either cannot or will not travel to Palestine.⁴ By conflating ancient Biblical narrative and prophecy with contrived and expurgated versions of the genuine modern article, these exhibitions have been modeled in the image of what the believers creating them wish the Holy Land could be.

In the case of the HLE, Jerusalem becomes rather like a soundstage for the movie “Ben Hur,” with dramatic, epic music wafting from speakers hidden in species of flora mentioned in the Bible and the occasional Roman soldier walking around, interrogating tourists’ loyalty to the Roman state or the nature of photographic equipment. Most actors are dressed in a combination of loose-fitting, layered, linen robes and Naot-brand sandals⁵ meant to represent Biblical-era dress in Palestine, and all employees greet patrons with “shalom” rather than “hello” or any other style of salutation, in an effort to at once mark the site as Jewish and assert a Christian alliance with the Israeli political cause.

With that first “shalom” heard upon entering into the HLE, patrons are crossing into a space both ancient and contemporary, a Jerusalem con-
trolled by Jews but imperiled by false political and spiritual counter-claims and on the verge of annihilation. The park constructs a dual temporal moment: The crucifixion of Jesus and his rejection as the Messiah by Jews signals Rome’s destruction of their Temple and life in the Holy Land, and the current Israeli-Palestinian conflict signals that the final days of history have arrived and that the Second Coming is nigh.

The entrance to the park is an Ottoman-era gate modeled after the walls surrounding the Old City today. But inside, there is nothing to remind visitors of contemporary Jerusalem. Upon entering the compound, visitors first encounter a “Jerusalem street market,” which is actually a gift-shop selling HLE souvenirs, a few products from Israel (such as Safed candles, Ahava Dead Sea cosmetics, and Palphiot tourism books), and American evangelical literature and multimedia products. There is also a “wilderness tabernacle” within a “Bedouin tent,” which contains a multimedia and live-action presentation linking the ancient Jewish sacrificial system with the story of Jesus, as well as a recreation of the Garden Tomb.

This display depicts the site in Jerusalem’s Shariah Nablus, outside the Damascus Gate, where nineteenth-century British Protestants decided that Jesus was buried and resurrected, in defiance of Orthodox and Catholic tradition marking the site at the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. Here there are a variety of events each day, including passion plays, lectures about Jesus’ resurrection, and musical events. Each patron is encouraged to go inside the tomb and see a slab with an empty burial shroud and a plaque above it proclaiming: “He is not here, He is risen.” Outside the tomb is a manger area with sheep, lambs, goats, and camels, and the occasional flock of doves swirling overhead, released to coincide with the dramatic climaxes of the musical events.

In a recreation of the Second Temple, which is really a movie theatre, patrons view the 25-minute “The Seed of Promise,” a drama filmed on location in Israel that details the near-sacrifice of Isaac, the crucifixion of Jesus, and the Second Coming. In front of the Temple is the “Plaza of the Nations,” where dramatic 30-minute musical performances are held on such topics as how Jewish festivals are really cryptic messages proclaiming the truth of Jesus as the Messiah and reenactments of the Christmas story. The HLE also has an indoor worship area for scripture lessons and musical performances featuring Century, the house musical ensemble. The music they perform is in line with the contemporary Christian format and is a mixture of live and prerecorded music lip-synced by a carefully selected group of men and women representing the United States’ many ethnic communi-
ties. When visitors get hungry, they can visit the Oasis Palms café, where such foods as “Goliath burgers,” “Persian pita wraps,” and “milk and honey ice cream” are sold. They also can study a large and very inaccurate model of Jerusalem in the year 66, which plays host to 30-minute lectures linking the city’s geography to Biblical prophecy and history.

The most recent HLE addition is the Scriptorium, an “early church Byzantine style” museum housing “the largest privately owned collection of biblical manuscripts and artifacts in the world.” Opened in August 2002, this building plays host to a 55-minute-long multimedia presentation designed by the ITEC Entertainment Corporation. Billed as “one of the most culturally significant events in the history of Orlando,” it traces the history of writing since the invention of cuneiform to the development of the Protestant interpretation of the Bible and the distribution of its message. This part of the park has spawned its own consumer-driven gift shop, complete with special Scriptorium-inspired Bibles as well as books about the making of the attraction, its artwork, and its artifacts. Since the park’s inauguration, a replica of the Qumran Caves has stood empty near the park’s entrance and is closed-off to visitors. No one at Zion’s Hope seems to know what it will house or when it will open, despite a sign proclaiming it as a future attraction.

As interesting as the above-mentioned attractions may be, equally compelling are those sites of the actual Jerusalem that are not represented in the park, despite its surrounding Ottoman-era wall: No Islamic artifacts are visible and, before 9/11, I did not witness any discussion about Islam or Muslims. I do not feel that the absence of Islam was an oversight – quite the contrary. However, I find its absence striking in light of the HLE after 9/11, because Islam has come to play a prominent role in the rhetoric and cosmology of Zion’s Hope and has been subtly incorporated into the HLE’s presentations and performances. This new emphasis on Islam is still being worked out by the ideologues of Zion’s Hope, just as the story of 9/11’s impact is still a work in progress. However, the HLE’s political agenda is not only – and often not primarily – expressed in the park itself, but rather in the literature of Zion’s Hope and its political activism.

The theme park’s cosmology is mirrored by and expanded upon in the publication *Zion’s Fire*. These two elements cannot be separated, because each visitor has the opportunity to sign up for a free year-long subscription. Being on the mailing list also brings constant updates on HLE events as well as regular letters from Marvin Rosenthal that, addressed to “Dear Citizen of Heaven,” espouse a variety of religious and political agendas.
Indeed, if Rosenthal’s cited statistics are accurate, Zion’s Hope reaches out to large numbers in this way. Attendance at the park in December 2001 totaled 30,000 visitors, compared with 275,000 visitors between February and October 2001, and is now being hailed at over half a million. Already by June 2001, subscriptions to the magazine numbered over 131,000, and by the May/June 2002 issue, 186,000 copies were being printed. When figures were released for May/June 2003, there was a slight decrease: only 171,583 copies had been printed. However, “paid and/or requested subscriptions” were reported to number 164,365, with 4,764 additional copies distributed through other free means.

Islam and the Holy Land Experience after 9/11

Before 9/11, Islam played a nebulous, back-seat role in the cosmology of Zion’s Fire. A review of the pre-9/11 issues shows that the following themes were emphasized: stories of Jewish believers in Christianity in relation to the desire to see all of Israeli and world Jewry convert; explaining the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in terms of prophecy, declarations of the illegitimacy of Palestinian claims, and assertions that the peace process will fail due to Israel’s rejection of Jesus as the Jewish messiah; travel accounts to locations in Israel and the Occupied Territories mentioned in the Bible; and how the HLE in Orlando will be/is used as a tool to spread the Gospel to the millions of tourists visiting the region each year, as well as the millions of central Floridians living in the region.

It was the HLE park itself that distinguished Zion’s Hope from any number of other Christian groups obsessed with reading the signs for the forthcoming millennium from the news, and coming up with the same conclusions about Jews, Israel, and Palestinians mentioned above. One topic that was remarkably absent from most of the pre-9/11 issues was Islam and how it fit into the park’s intricate cosmology, despite the fact that every issue of the magazine has a Middle East news section that often decries the anti-Israeli policies of such Muslim countries as Iran and Libya.

A major shift occurred, however, after the hijacking of the four doomed airliners on 9/11. In the earliest days after the attacks, HLE leaders were as befuddled as the rest of us about how to interpret and understand these events. The first word came in the form of a letter from Rosenthal dated October 8, reassuring HLE supporters that their faith was correct, while, at the same time, trying to undo the pro-Islamic public relations in which American politicians were engaging:
Believers should always strive to be good and courageous citizens of our country, but we must never forget that our ultimate citizenship is in heaven. It is so important that we keep that perspective always before us. We are secure in our Savior. No other people can properly make that claim. … To be sure, our war is with Islamic extremists and not moderate Muslims. However, at the same time, it should not be thought that Islam is an amicable and loving religion. At times, throughout history, they have conquered by the sword, treated women barbarically, and tolerated no religious dissent. In our proper desire to protect millions of Muslims in America who had no part in the terrorism, we must be careful that we do not overstate the case and give to the Islamic religion a status it most assuredly does not deserve. It is a religion opposed not only to Judaism, but also to Christianity. It is much of the Judeo/Christian culture of the West that it so vehemently hates. … I believe that unless there is a recognition of our grievous national sin, a genuine repentance that brings us to our knees in shame before a holy God and a turning to the Lord Jesus Christ as Savior and Lord, patriotism will dwindle, unity will unravel, and heroism will fade in the difficult days ahead.17

In this same letter, Rosenthal also told his followers that he was unsure if the events were a signal of the End Times.

By the November 2001 issue of Zion’s Fire, however, there was no mystery for Rosenthal or his staff that 9/11 was a symbol of prophetic times ahead. The deliberate plane crashes in New York City, Washington, DC, and Pennsylvania were, coupled with the rising violence in Israel and the Occupied Territories, dramatic evidence that the Second Coming is fast approaching. The magazine’s cover boldly presented the Biblical Four Horses of the Apocalypse with the headline: “Where are we Prophetically?” Inside, the lead story, penned by Rosenthal, was entitled: “The Islamic Peril.”18 In this article, he used Biblical exegesis as well as historically inaccurate information to discredit not only Islam’s validity – an issue that is irrelevant to my argument, for I am not interested in proving or disproving either Christianity or Islam – but also promoting a violent and inflammatory sentiment toward Muslims, and, ultimately, all people living in so-called “Third World” countries.

The article’s primary argument was that Islam is really a bastardized version of the ancient Babylonian polytheism decried in Revelations 17:5 (“The mother of harlots and abominations of the Earth”), and that Islam is founded on anti-Semitism because the Jews of Madinah rejected Muhammad as a prophet and Ishmael as “the Seed of Promise.”19 Thus, Americans and other Christians must now engage in a holy war to prevent Islam from
“destroy[ing] Israel, Christianity, America, and the democratic free world – to bring us to our knees and replace our way of life with a fundamentalist Islamic world order.”

Rosenthal encouraged Americans to support the “War on Terrorism” efforts as well as a general war against Islam:

I must part company with our leaders who suggest we are not at war with Islam – only with the terrorists who have prostituted Islamic teaching. … They need to be reminded that it is never right to do wrong to do right.

Fundamental to victory, he claimed, is a recognition of this conflict’s prophetic nature, as well as a firm commitment to Zion’s Hope’s version of Christianity. Rosenthal told his followers:

And most of all, we will not win this war unless there is a genuine, widespread, in-depth repentance of our national sin and a calling out to God for mercy, strength, and wisdom, and that the Four Horses of the Apocalypse could be readily seen in current events: War equals the “War on Terrorism,” Pestilence equals Anthrax, Famine equals the famine in Afghanistan, and False Religion equals Islam.

Curiously, he also made it a point to divorce Islam from the Arab world, stating that Iraqis are not Arabs but “Babylonians,” and that Egyptians are not Arabs but “Egyptians,” in an effort to tie these two nations and their varying levels of anti-American and anti-Israeli rhetoric into Biblical prophecy as well. Rosenthal assured his readers that it is normal for human beings to want their religion to rule the world, as Muslims like ‘Usama bin Laden do, but that the only legitimate religion meant to rule the world is his own, Christianity. Thus, Muslims must be stopped. All of this was inextricably tied to the Israel-Palestine conflict, which, Rosenthal wrote, “is preeminently spiritual in nature.”

This is a point that Zion’s Hope has made its mantra, easily accessible in CDs and videos sold at the HLE, such as the epic 6-hour series “The World in Conflict: The Truth about the Israeli-Palestinian Crisis.” Palestinians and the rest of the Arab world, stripped of any historical legitimacy as residents of the region, have been linked to Biblical prophecies as the pawns of Satan. For example, in the May/June 2002 issue of Zion’s Fire, the prophecies of Zechariah were interpreted in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in an article with the potent title: “In the End: Israel Wins.” In the September 2002 issue, Isaiah was reread in this light in an article entitled: “Future Israel: From Sorrow to Glory.”
David Ettinger, the author of both pieces, explained to his readers that the Palestinian *intifada* – a term, incidentally, very rarely used by Zion’s Hope – against Israeli occupation is merely the first stage in the long process of destroying two-thirds of world Jewry in preparation for the End Times. Palestinians were compared to rabid animals in a dramatic act of dehumanization. Evoking Isaiah 35:9 (“No lion shall be there, nor any ravenous beast shall go up thereon, it shall not be found there; but the redeemed shall walk there”\(^{25}\)), Ettinger wrote:

> During Isaiah’s day, Israel was filled with wild beasts and it was not unusual to be attacked by one while in the streets. …Today, however, actual attacks by animals are rare. Nonetheless, if the reader would allow for a spiritual application to a literal verse, modern-day Israel has plenty of human predators of its own …\(^{26}\)

Even in the face of this pro-Israeli stance, however, contemporary Israeli secularism has been explained as part of God’s plan for the Jews in spite of themselves.\(^{27}\) The terrorism against Israel that is decried so vehemently in the above passage is, nevertheless, a priceless part of the HLE cosmology. Ettinger wrote:

> The gathering of the nations against Israel will result in tragedy as two-thirds of Israel’s population will be wiped out. However, this massive loss of life is for the purpose of refining the remaining third, which will then repent and turn its affections to God.\(^{28}\)

At once, the HLE has managed to construct a worldview that associates Palestinians and Islam with terror of End Times proportions and replicate hundreds of years of Christian anti-Semitism that is explained and legitimated by theology.

Interestingly, Ettinger deflects this anti-Semitism by displacing it onto other groups. For instance, in an attack on a 2003 European Union poll that showed large numbers of Europeans believing that Israel was the primary national threat to international peace, Ettinger wrote:

> On the surface … anti-Semitism can always be suspected as the leading cause. Sadly, however, the reason for such EU gibberish is not anti-Semitism itself, but, rather, the cause for the anti-Semitism: Satan’s insatiable desire to wipe the Jewish nation off the face of the earth.\(^{29}\)

Indeed, he sees the Europeans as the unwitting victims of Satan as well, revealing much about his feelings toward the nations who rejected the call to
join the so-called “Coalition of the Willing” against Iraq in the winter of 2003:

Despite the fact that Israel’s European opponents put on the face of compassion, saying they are only trying to protect the afflicted and outnumbered Palestinians, their real motives for siding with the Palestinians is their desire to tap into the vast resources of Arab oil. This is hardly a well-kept secret. However, what is a secret is the spiritual darkness that shrouds Europe. The world’s hatred for Israel and the Jewish people is fueled by Satan. These spiritually stupefied Europeans – though claiming to be the bastions of sophistication – have absolutely no idea that they are mere pawns in Satan’s diabolical chess game.

With such thinking, Ettinger has condemned a generic category of “Europeans” for harboring a Satan-driven anti-Semitism. At the same time, he reified his own anti-Semitic desires to see the population of world Jewry dramatically reduced as a necessary precursor of the End Times, for the HLE’s worldview is predicated on the destruction of world Jewry as a prerequisite for the fulfillment of prophecy.

Along with the centrality of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the perceived ideas about the roots of anti-Semitism, “Islamic terrorism” has become a popular theme for the HLE ideologues’ interpretation of Christian prophecy. In “Where is God in the Face of Evil?” Ettinger reread Psalms 10 to understand the events of 9/11. In this and many other articles distributed by the mission, the motivations of Zion’s Hope are clearly revealed. First, Ettinger presented the Psalms 10:8: “He sitteth in the lurking places of the villages: in the secret places doth he murder the innocent: his eyes are privily set against the poor” (this is his given translation, from the King James’ Bible). Then he explained its contemporary significance thus:

… the wicked of this world hide in the shadows. They are hard to find as they skulk their ways through Third World nations scheming their sinister plans. Indeed, bin Laden’s tentacles spread far and wide, primarily to some of the most obscure places on the globe. Consider the list of nations where bin Laden has had both a military and monetary impact: Algeria, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechniya [sic], Egypt, Eritrea, Jordan, Libya, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Tunisia, and Yemen. Though a few of these nations are well known and well visited, most of them are absolute enigmas to most of the western world. And yet, bin Laden and terrorists associated with him have made them their primary base of operations, havens where they may be “lurking” in “the secret places.”
In this dramatic passage, the so-called Third World was portrayed as the polar opposite of the West – dark, evil, perpetually alienated from Heaven, and completely unworthy of being known by the West and its inhabitants. Ironically, the fact that the attacks seem to have been planned in Germany and the United States goes unmentioned. Finally, he ended his article with a call of support for President George W. Bush’s policy against Afghanistan, going so far as to compare Bush’s actions to those of Isaiah:

Following the tragedy, President Bush declared that ‘this evil will not stand.’ The President was only echoing that which was written thousands of years ago by the prophet Isaiah.  

The post-9/11 prophetic exegesis promoted by the HLE sets out to remove Palestinians from their long-standing history in the Holy Land. For example, a November 2001 article entitled “Exploring Biblical Places: The West Bank and the Gaza Strip” by Bill Jones, another regular contributor to the Zion’s Hope literature, explained to readers that the Palestinian cause is both contrary to Biblical prophecy and historically irrelevant. Jones wrote: “Never in history has there been a Palestinian state, culture, or language,” and that the ability of Jewish settlers after World War II to transform the land into a productive place was a sign of God’s favor upon Israel.

Indeed, while many who deny the existence of the Palestinian people before Zionism cannot ignore such historical nationalist events as the Arab uprisings of the 1930s, Jones does. He wrote, ridiculously: “By the end of World War II, the land was largely vacant and unused. There were a few Jewish settlements and some nomadic Arab people there.” With such statements, he not only negated Palestinian existence but also revealed a significant ignorance of Zionist history. Once again, Jews and Arabs alike are relevant only as characters in an eschatological drama played out for the benefit of the HLE and its ideology. Their complex histories are simplistically rewritten to fit the interpretations, even to a point of inanity.

Jones’ article was a segue to the next issue of Zion’s Fire, distributed in December 2001. The cover featured a map of the Middle East with the heading: “Islam and Israel in Conflict at the End of an Age.” This map associated contemporary Middle Eastern nations with Biblical locales and portrayed them as invading Israel. In the cover article, Marvin Rosenthal argued that Israel’s existence shows the beginning of the fulfillment of prophecy, first manifested in the Zionist settlers’ ability to develop the land in a western style:
Through the centuries that followed [the Roman era], many powers claimed control of the land of Israel, among them the Byzantines, Muslims, Seljuks, Mamluks, Crusaders, Turks, and British. Most used the land for selfish purposes, taking from the land but never giving back. None of these nations took the land to their bosom and loved her. And just as sure as they came, with the passing of time, the land belched all of these conquerors out.39

The way in which 2,000 years of history in Palestine was portrayed in this passage – as subject to parasitical leadership – was met by a contrasting claim that belies the need for any leadership at all. Rosenthal claimed that, despite this cavalcade of conquests, the land was nearly empty throughout this 2,000-year period: “Only a handful of Bedouins and an occasional sickly village could be found throughout the length and breadth of the land,”40 until Zionist settlement in the early twentieth century. Current tensions between Israel and its Muslim neighbors – the roots of which lie in Arab jealousy of Israel and anti-Semitism, as well God’s punishment for the Jews who reject Jesus as their Messiah – will, inevitably, result in the surrounding countries invading Israel, a signal that the End Times are near. Rosenthal ended his discourse with a final rallying point for his readers: “Terrorists and Jihads notwithstanding, Islam will not conquer the world or defeat Israel. And the glory, which belongs to Christ and His heavenly Father alone, will not be given to Allah.”41

Such ideas have come to full fruition in the wake of the conflict between the United States and Iraq. The October 2002 issue of Zion’s Fire featured a photo of Baghdad, framed by a blood-red sky, with the headline: “Babylon: Nimrod, Nebuchadnezzar, Saddam Hussein” and the subtitle: “Do unfolding events in Iraq have direct prophetic implications?”42 In this issue, Rosenthal explained that: “If the city of Jerusalem is the city of God, then the city of Babylon can properly be identified as the city of Satan.”43 Keeping this in mind, he interpreted the Old Testament’s Book of Daniel, second chapter, in terms of modern Middle Eastern crises and came to the conclusion that Israel will soon be faced with invasion by a coalition of former empires that have challenged the Jews in the past: the Romans (now represented by the United Nations), the Greeks (now led by Syria), the Persians (currently known as Iran), and, most dangerous of all, the Babylonians, led by Saddam Hussein.44

This idea continues to be perpetuated, particularly in the marketing of a new two-cassette lecture by Rosenthal entitled: “Iraq, Saddam Hussein, and the Prophetic Word.”45 The great appeal of this tape lies in its declaration that
Hussein is “satanically-driven” and “counts Nebuchadnezzar as one of his heroes.” Supporters who purchase it are instructed that Saddam Hussein and Iraq are “quite literally the source of all false religion (Revelations 17: 1-6), and the catalyst[s] for the movements toward a one-world government to be ruled by [the] Antichrist.”

Even in the wake of the quick toppling of Saddam Hussein by the American/British invasion of March 2003, Rosenthal and Zion’s Fire continue to use political events in the Middle East as a launching pad for striking out against Muslims, portraying them as a constant, imminent threat to Israel and Christianity. The cover of the May/June 2003 issue of Zion’s Fire featured the bold headline: “Road Map to Peace or Highway to [the] Antichrist and War?” Behind these words was a collage featuring a map of the Middle East with a Star of David superimposed upon it and the city of Jerusalem marked in bold, along with pictures of American troops marching on the Iraqi portion of the map. At the bottom, tiny representations of the European Union flag, as well as those of the Arab nations and Iran, were placed together near a larger image of the UN’s symbol.

In an interview published in this issue, Rosenthal at once lashed out at Islam, as a theological system, and Muslims throughout the world, including Orlando’s local Islamic community. Although claiming to distinguish between “extremist” Muslims and “peace-loving” ones, Rosenthal was clear about his attitude toward Islam and its adherents:

According to the clear teaching of the Islamic religion – and I’m concerned because politically the attempt is not to condemn the entire Islamic world, but to make a distinction between the extremists and peace-loving Islamic people – the reality is that there are tens-of-millions of fundamentalist Muslims in the world who, by virtue of their religion, have a hatred of the Jewish people. I would argue that this hatred goes all the way back to the beginning of Genesis, with Abraham and his sons, Isaac and Ishmael. It’s a deep-seated, widespread hatred. This hatred is spiritual in nature and stands in opposition to the true and living God and to His Son, the Lord Jesus. It is in opposition to God’s plan and program for redemption, which revolves around the Jewish people, who were the instrument to bring Christ to the world the first time, and it is to that people that He will come as King the second time.

After dismissing the Jews’ existence as nothing more than the “instrument” for Jesus’ birth, and divorcing Islam completely from its shared prophetic tradition with Judaism and Christianity, Rosenthal demonstrated his hostility to “peace-loving” Muslims by launching into a diatribe against
the non-profit status of Orlando’s local mosques. His rant conflated the entire Islamic world with an uncritical vision of the Saudi legal system:

The truth is that if a Christian goes to Saudi Arabia and gives out a tract, he can go to jail for a long time. Give out a Bible or print a Bible and you’ll go to jail for a longer time. Try to buy property to build a church, and it will never happen. But the flip side of that is Muslims can come to America, buy property, and build Islamic mosques. I find it ironic that there are three Islamic mosques in the greater Orlando area that are religious, not-for-profit entities that don’t have to pay property taxes. And here we are, Zion’s Hope and The Holy Land Experience – a Christian, Bible-believing mission that clearly conforms to U.S. not-for-profit laws committed to sharing the Gospel of Christ – and we’re in a court battle right now to appeal the property appraiser’s attempt to revoke our existing property tax exemption. So, Muslims can come here, build mosques and distribute literature, print the Koran, and propagate their faith, and be tax exempt, but we can’t do any of that in the Islamic world. Talk about a level playing field, this is about as unlevel [sic] as you can get.

This attack on his Muslim neighbors, which denounced the freedoms of religion and expression guaranteed by the American Constitution, was directly followed by Rosenthal’s statement that Orlando’s Muslims, along with millions of Muslims throughout the world and some European nations, are part of a larger Satanic, yet prophetic, plan of destruction:

… Much of Islam hates Israel in particular and the democracies of the West in general – the former because of the Old Testament, and the latter because of the New Testament. Islam’s hatred of Israel and the West is spiritual in nature. I’m convinced that when you talk about the final attack against Israel and the end of the age, contrary to a lot of Bible teachers and theologians, I don’t believe it’s going to predominantly be an attack that comes from Rome or a revived Roman Empire. Rather, it’s going to primarily be an Islamic coalition. Ezekiel 38 and 39 give us some of the nations involved. I think there may be an alliance between Islamic countries, some Western European nations like Germany and France, and Russia. It will be a uniting of the iron and clay depicted in the feet and toes of Daniel’s image (Daniel, chapter 2) … the “Road Map” [to Peace] will not achieve peace … but a highway to [the] Antichrist and war.

Rosenthal’s disgust with the French and German decision not to support the American-led invasion of Iraq is apparent here, as it was in
Ettinger’s attack on the EU cited above. Including Russia in this recipe for war harkens back to the cold war era, when such premillennial thinkers as Hal Lindsey saw the Soviet Union as the Antichrist. However, the most vitriolic of all post-9/11 discourse coming from the HLE’s ideologues has been reserved for Islam and its adherents. Muslims have been elevated to the status of preeminent spiritual enemies for those Christians waiting for the End of Time, and all righteous Christians need to stop their advances.

Keeping Rosenthal’s discourse in mind, I will now explain how these ideas have been incorporated into the HLE’s activities as well as other events sponsored by Zion’s Hope. In my four trips to the park since 9/11, I have seen employees draw connections between the terrorists who perpetrated the attacks and the Roman soldiers occupying Jerusalem who were responsible for Jesus’ crucifixion. I also have witnessed the issues of terrorism and sin be brought up at the Wilderness Tabernacle as an example of Satan’s acts, as well as the need to accept Jesus as a substitute for ancient Hebrew sacrifice as an atonement of sin against those acts. I have been surrounded by visitors who have been emotionally overcome by how “authentic” the place seems to them, in reference to their interpretations of the Bible and their assumptions about what the “real” Israel is like, and have heard people refer to Islam as the opposite of the HLE – evil, sinister, untrustworthy, and directed by Satan.

This idea is being promoted in traveling banquets, sponsored nationwide by Zion’s Hope, that feature Rosenthal speaking on such subjects as “Terrorism, Israel, and the End of the Age” and “Is War Coming to the Middle East?” At these events, the HLE is presented as a location where Christians can join together and prepare for the holy war against Islam and its perceived destruction of the western way of life. This is also a prominent theme in HLE-sponsored vacations, such as the “Land and Sea Prophetic Bible Conference Cruise” to the Bahamas (November 2003) and the scheduled “Journey to Jerusalem” tour of Israel (September 2004), which comes complete with “terrorism insurance” for wary pilgrims. In this way, the HLE is a strange utopian refuge for some segments of the American population, a sacred space of pilgrimage where political and religious agendas can merge with social validation and authoritative guidance. But for those who stand outside its worldview, and particularly for those targeted by Zion’s Hope for spiritual and political elimination, the HLE is intensely dystopic.
Conclusion

So, why does any of this matter? Perhaps this is just a case of American civil liberties in action? Yes, in part, I do think that is exactly what the Holy Land Experience is, an example of the freedom of religion eagerly expressed by so many varied communities within the United States. This is true, even as the HLE condemns others for practicing their civil liberties around them. But I believe that the HLE’s events and ideology are disconcerting, at best. The information about Israel, the Middle East conflict, and the historical and contemporary experience of Islam are highly distorted and spurious.

HLE writers are not only part of a long trend of eschatological speculation within Christianity that focuses on current events to interpret cryptic Biblical prophecy, but also use the language of a decadent and sinister East in the same way that nineteenth-century European imperialists did. This is being done in order to discount the attitudes and opinions of millions of Middle Easterners – Arabs, Israelis, Persians, Turks, and others – and without any sense of trying to dialogue with or understand their perspective. Since they root their racism in the language of religious prophecy, there is no way that people outside their belief system can confront this rhetoric and be taken seriously.

Moreover, each time that I have visited the HLE, I have met people who walked away feeling that the Middle East conflict, which appeared so confusing and chaotic in the sound-bytes on CNN before they arrived, is now totally comprehensible and easily solvable, if only American Christians would interfere and force their solution upon the parties directly involved. I have even been told by more than a few patrons that the experience was equally as powerful to their faith as actual pilgrimages to the authentic Holy Land that they had made.

Although the HLE’s impact remains a work in progress, I would like to reiterate that its message, especially since 9/11, has been clearly presented to park visitors as well as readers of Zion’s Fire as:

1. The events of 9/11 were not just the work of some fanatics, but representative of most Muslims throughout the world, symbolic of their hatred for “our” way of life: democracy and Christianity;
2. The Middle East is a sinister, satanic region, embodied by the despotism of Saddam Hussein and the terrorist activities of ‘Usama bin Laden;
3. The Palestinian people do not exist and therefore do not deserve a state;
4. Israel and the Arab nations are fighting because of the Jews’ rejection of Jesus as their Messiah; but, paradoxically, the nation of Israel and any violence against it are signs that the Final Days are near; and

5. The events of 9/11 demonstrate that Christians must fight a new holy war against Islam, a bastardized version of ancient Babylonian polytheism with no relation to either Judaism or Christianity.

The potential ramifications of such messages, distributed in the context of an amusement park, should be frightening to those who struggle to understand the historical roots of the Middle Eastern conflict, who seek to educate others about these roots, and who strive to build an American society that is pluralistic and tolerant of all belief systems.

Notes


3. This is the number commonly cited by HLE founder Marvin Rosenthal. See, for example, a letter by him to followers dated 23 September 2002.


5. Naots are Israeli-made sandals that are often referred to as “the Israeli Birkenstocks.”

6. At one point, the café featured “the Holy Land Sampler,” the only vegetarian option on the menu and the only food of discernable Middle Eastern origin. This platter consisted of hummus, falafel, tabouleh, and mini-pitas. However, it seems to have disappeared sometime in 2002. The menu changes at the café and current menus may be viewed at http://holylandexperience.com/map/index.html. In a letter to subscribers of Zion’s Fire dated 27 June 2003, Marv Rosenthal quoted from a comment that he claims to have received from a visitor about the restaurant: “… Being a family of six, we don’t often eat out. We found your restaurant, Oasis Palms Café, to be the best eatery we have ever enjoyed! We each enjoyed different foods, and were amused by the names like ‘Goliath Burger.’ It really was a ‘giant’ of a burger.”

7. The model is usually presented with a 30-minute explanatory lecture by Tom Ellenburg, a member of the Zion’s Hope Executive Committee, which now
can be purchased as the video “Jerusalem at the Time of Christ” for $22.95. According to Ellenburg, the model was constructed by volunteers over the course of a year, with supplies purchased at Home Depot using donated funds. The model presents the city as well-ordered, with a significant distance between houses and with the Temple as a centerpiece, juxtaposed with Roman garrisons and villas. Ellenburg continually stresses how “accurate” and “authentic” the model is, explaining that they chose the year 66 because it was the year in which Jerusalem was at its largest and most densely populated before the Romans destroyed it in 70. He then goes on to say, nonsensically, that actually the city was so densely populated that all of the buildings touched, and that you could walk from one side to the other on rooftops without any struggle. However, the HLE decided to make the model with large spaces between the city “so that you [the guests] could see how the people really lived.” Heard by the author during the lecture presentation on 25 August 2001.

10. I visited the park on 25 August 2001; and have since returned on 12 December 2001; 13 March 2002; 9 May 2002; and 13 October 2002.
13. See, for example, the advertisement for the video “Jerusalem at the Time of Christ,” Zion’s Fire, September 2002, 3. A letter to the Zion’s Fire mailing list from Marvin Rosenthal, dated 4 December 2002, also claimed a readership for Zion’s Fire “of about one half million.” In another letter to sponsors, dated 27 June 2003, he stated at one point that “we are hosting about a quarter-of-a-million visitors a year,” whereas at another point, he wrote: “In excess of 175,000 guests annually sit under the teaching of our pastoral staff.” See pages 5 and 6, respectively.
17. Letter from Rosenthal to the Zion’s Hope mailing list, dated 8 October 2001. In a letter dated 7 October 2002, he marked the anniversary of 9/11 with the following: “And there still remains the desperate need for Americans to acknowledge our personal and national sin. Prayer, church attendance, and an interest in spiritual matters increased across the nation for a few months
following September 11, but it was like a river ‘a hundred miles wide and a
quarter of an inch deep.’ With little depth, it did not last.”
19. Ibid., 4.
20. Ibid., 6.
21. Ibid., 5.
22. Ibid., 6.
23. This, despite the fact that it is common for such HLE officials as Rosenthal
to refer to Iranians as “Arabs.” See, for example, David Ettinger, “Road Map
to Peace, or Highway to Antichrist and War? An Interview with Marvin J.
Rosenthal.” *Zion’s Fire*, May/June 2003. Available online at: www.zions-
fire.org/articles/roadmap_to_peace.html
September 2002, 12.
26. Ibid.
28. Ibid., 10.
November/December 2003, 22.
30. Ibid.
31. David Ettinger, “Where is God in the Face of Evil?” *Zion’s Fire*, November
2001, 10-14.
32. Ibid., 12.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid., 14.
36. Ibid., 20.
37. Ibid.
38. Gomer (West Turkey), Togarman (East Turkey), Magog (former USSR),
Persia (Iran), Cush (Ethiopia), Punt (Libya). See the cover of *Zion’s Fire*,
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid., 6.
42. See the cover of *Zion’s Fire*, October 2002.
44. Ibid., 6-7.
45. These tapes are available together from Zion’s Hope for $12.95 and, as of
spring 2003, were being given away to subscribers of *Zion’s Fire* when they
renewed for 2 years.
46. This is from a circular advertisement received in the mail by Zion’s Fire subscribers in March 2003.
48. See the cover of Zion’s Fire, May/June 2003.
49. “Road Map to Peace or Highway to Antichrist and War? An Interview with Marv Rosenthal,” Zion’s Fire, May/June 2003, 5.
50. The HLE is currently at the losing end of a battle with Orange County, Florida, over whether or not it has to pay property taxes. The county says yes, it must pay such taxes just as all other theme parks must pay, but the HLE is claiming a tax-free status because it is registered as a religious institution. So far, the HLE must, in the words of the Orlando Sentinel, “render unto Caesar.” However, the battle appears far from over. During my last trip to the HLE, for example, I noticed that the park was not collecting sales taxes on any products.
51. “Road Map to Peace,” 7.
52. Ibid.
53. Title of a banquet lecture held in Indialantic, Florida, on 26 January 2002, at the Melbourne Beach Hilton Hotel.
54. Title of a banquet lecture held at the above-cited hotel on 25 January 2003.
55. This is from a circular advertisement sent through the mail to members of the Zion’s Hope mailing list in August 2003.
56. Advertised online as of 12 March 2004, at www.zionshope.org/tour/. The advertisement reads: “NEW: Terrorism Insurance – The travel insurance policy also includes cancellation due to acts of terrorism within 30 days prior to the scheduled departure date occurring in any of the cities listed in the itinerary. A complete explanation of coverage, along with forms that you must fill out, will be sent once you register.”
Anti-Islamophobia Education as Transformative Pedagogy: Reflections from the Educational Front Lines

Jasmin Zine

Abstract

The aftermath of 9/11 and the corresponding rise of global militarism and imperialism have had deep consequences for the realities of Muslims around the world. The reemergence of Orientalist representations have provided the ideological justifications for military incursions. This short reflective article outlines the challenge that critical educators faced in developing an epistemological and pedagogical framework and resources for anti-Islamophobia education in response to the resurgence of neo-Orientalist politics and representations.

Voices from the Aftermath of 9/11

“After September 11 my teacher told me I should change my name from Muhammed, because it was not a good name.”

“Other kids keep telling me to go back where I came from.”

“When landlords hear my Muslim name when I call for an apartment, suddenly there’s no vacancy.”

“My Muslim clients have stopped coming to homeless drop-in centres, and Muslim women are withdrawing from community programs.”

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“My son said, ‘Mom, we came from a war and now we are not safe or wanted in this country.’”

“After September 11, we stopped being seen as Canadian citizens and became the enemy.”

These statements were collected from students, parents, and service providers in the Greater Toronto area after the tragic events of 9/11 changed the sociopolitical landscape for Muslims across North America. As a scholar, researcher, educator, and activist, I gathered these testimonies during my research in schools and among Muslim immigrants and refugees facing the continuing realities of poverty and homelessness in Canada, and who now had to contend with the added challenge of Islamophobia. I heard impassioned narratives that spoke poignantly about the lived experiences of racial exclusion, religious discrimination, and xenophobia. For racially and religiously marginalized Muslims, being part of a common framework of citizenship and “Canadianness” quickly became a fragile reality, as we were increasingly being pushed outside the carefully guarded boundaries of nation and community. Our bodies were positioned as alien and suspect, our national loyalties were questioned, and we were subjected to harassment and state-sanctioned policies of racial profiling.

Across the globe, Muslims have faced individual and systemic acts of discrimination and violence after 9/11 as a form of retaliation for the collective guilt ascribed to followers of Islam and anyone who resembled them. In Toronto, a city dubbed the “most multicultural city in the world,” hate crimes escalated. The type of incidents reported ranged from verbal abuse to physical threat, violence, and the destruction of property. According to a report by the Toronto Police Services, there was a 66 percent increase in hate crimes in 2001. The largest increase was against Muslims.

Hate crime incidents in Toronto included the stabbing of a Muslim man, the beating and subsequent hospitalization of a 15-year-old boy, and drivers who attempted to run down Muslim women as they crossed the street. Mosques, which often house Islamic schools, received threats. Outside of Toronto, a Hindu temple was firebombed after being mistaken for a mosque. In other examples of widespread discrimination, the Refugee Housing Task Force in Toronto noted that numerous landlords were refusing to rent to Muslims after 9/11. A recent study I conducted on homelessness among Muslims in Toronto also revealed the lived experiences of housing discrimination based on both race and religious identity. Another Toronto-based
study identified significant barriers to veiled Muslim women trying to get jobs. Therefore, not only was the safety of Muslims (and those mistaken as Muslims) being compromised, but so was their ability to access such basic needs as employment, housing, and social service support.

In local schools, parents and students reported numerous incidents of racism, Islamophobia, and harassment. Many parents spoke of the harassment they faced when coming to the schoolyard to pick up their children. My own son, whose name is “Usama,” was routinely referred to as “Bin Laden” at school, and was called a “terrorist” and told that his house should be blown up. In other incidents, schoolgirls wearing hijabs had stones thrown at them as they walked to and from school.

As a result of these circumstances and the broader related factors of globalization, trans-nationalism, and the changing geopolitical landscape, new challenges are being posed for education in a pluralistic society. Within the current political context of war and the rise of military and economic imperialism, the role of critical educators committed to antiracism, equity, and social justice becomes increasingly salient.

Mapping the Discursive Foundations for Anti-Islamophobia Education

As an anti-racism scholar and educator, fellow colleagues and I realized from as early as September 12 that there was an urgency to frame a critical pedagogical response to address and challenge the rampant Islamophobia affecting the realities of Muslims from all walks of life and social conditions. Among the most vulnerable were children and youth, who received little support from schools in dealing with the backlash that many were experiencing on a routine basis. Most schools were reluctant to engage in any response beyond the politically neutral arena of “crisis management.” Among the school districts that I was in contact with, there was a clear resistance to addressing or even naming issues of racism and Islamophobia. In fact, the discursive language to name and define the experiences that Muslims were encountering on a day-to-day basis did not even exist within the educational discourse. While schools were reluctant to name specific incidents as racism – part of an all-too-common denial – the notion of “Islamophobia” did not have any currency at all. In fact, it was not a part of the language or conceptual constructs commonly used by educators, even by those committed to multicultural and antiracist pedagogy.
I realized the urgency to map a new epistemological and pedagogical terrain by creating an educational framework for addressing Islamophobia. Within the existing equity-based educational frameworks, one could find the conceptual and pedagogical tools to address issues of racism, classism, sexism, homophobia, ableism, and anti-Semitism. However, the discursive foundations for dealing with Islamophobia and the accompanying educational resources simply did not exist.

Developing a new framework to fill this gap involved coining a new term: “Anti-Islamophobia Education.” Being able to name and define the experience of Muslims as the result of Islamophobia was critical to shaping the kind of interventions that would take place from a critical educational standpoint. Before outlining a methodology for conducting anti-Islamophobia education, it was necessary to develop some discursive foundations, arrive at a definition of Islamophobia, and create an understanding of what it was that we sought to challenge and resist.

From a socio-psychological standpoint, the notion of Islamophobia is often loosely translated as an “attitude of fear, mistrust, or hatred of Islam and its adherents.” However, this definition presents a narrow conceptual framework and does not take into account the social, structural, and ideological dimensions through which forms of oppression are operationalized and enacted. Applying a more holistic analysis, far from being based on mere “ignorance,” Islamophobic attitudes are, in fact, part of a rational system of power and domination that manifests as individual, ideological, and systemic forms of discrimination and oppression. The idea that discrimination, be it based on race, class, gender, sexuality, ability, or religion, simply stems from “ignorance” allows those engaged in oppressive acts and policies to claim a space of innocence. By labeling Islamophobia as an essentially “irrational” fear, this conception denies the logic and rationality of social dominance and oppression, which operates on multiple social, ideological, and systemic levels.

Therefore, to capture the complex dimensions through which Islamophobia operates, it is necessary to extend the definition from its limited conception as a “fear and hatred of Islam and Muslims” and acknowledge that these attitudes are intrinsically linked to individual, ideological, and systemic forms of oppression that support the logic and rationale of specific power relations. For example, individual acts of oppression include such practices as name-calling or personal assault, while systemic forms of oppression refer to the structural conditions of inequality regulated through such institutional practices as racial profiling or denying jobs or housing...
opportunities. These exclusionary practices are shored up by specific ideological underpinnings, among them the purveyed notions designed to pathologize Muslims as “terrorists” and impending threats to public safety. Understanding the dimensions of how systems of oppression such as Islamophobia operate socially, ideologically, and systemically became a key component of developing educational tools that would help build the critical skills needed to analyze and challenge these dynamics.

From a discursive standpoint, I locate anti-Islamophobia education within an integrative anti-racism framework that views systems of oppression based on race, class, gender, sexuality, ability, and religion as part of a multiple and interlocking nexus that reinforce and sustain one another. Based on this understanding, I have mapped some key epistemological foundations for anti-Islamophobia education. This includes the need to “reclaim the stage” through which Islam is represented from the specter of terrorists and suicide bombers to a platform of peace and social justice. “Reclaiming the stage” requires adopting a pedagogical approach that shifts the popular media discourse away from the negative, essentialized referents and tropes of abject “Otherness” ascribed to Muslims. This move involves presenting a critical counter-narrative in order to reframe the Manichean worldview and “clash of civilizations” narratives typically being purveyed in order to present a more nuanced, reasoned, and critical perspective of the global sociopolitical realities that Muslim individuals and societies are confronting, engaging, and challenging.

Another foundational aspect of anti-Islamophobia education involves interrogating the systemic mechanisms through which Islamophobia is reinforced, by analytically unraveling the dynamics of power in society that sustain social inequality. Racial profiling, which targets groups on the basis of their race, ethnicity, faith, or other aspects of social difference, and similar issues are major systemic barriers that criminalize and pathologize entire communities.

In schools, the practice of “color-coded streaming,” whereby a disproportionate number of racially and ethnically marginalized youth are channeled into lower non-academic level streams, is another example of institutionalized racism. Negative perceptions held by teachers and guidance counselors toward racialized students have often led to assumptions of failure or limited chances for success, based on such false stereotypes as the notion that “Islam doesn’t value education for girls” or “Black students won’t succeed.” These negative attitudes are relayed to students through the “hidden curriculum” of schooling and lead to lower expectations being
placed upon youth from specific communities. Developing critical pedagogical tools to analyze and develop challenges to these systems of domination is part of building a transformative and liberatory pedagogy, one geared toward achieving greater social justice in both schools and society.

Another key goal of anti-Islamophobia education involves the need to demystify stereotypes. Since 9/11, renewed Orientalist constructions of difference have permeated the representation of Muslims in media and popular culture. Images of fanatical terrorists and burqa-clad women are seen as the primary markers of the Muslim world. Deconstructing and demystifying these stereotypes is vital to helping students develop a critical literacy of the politics of media and image-making. Critically examining the destructive impact of how these images create the social and ideological divide between “us” and “them” is important to exposing how power operates through the politics of representation.

Creating a Transformative Pedagogy: Unpacking New Anti-Islamophobia Resource Kits

Through an innovative program called “Toward Understanding: Moving beyond Racism and Islamophobia,” developed by MENTORS (Muslim Educational Network, Training, and OutReach Service) and funded by the Ministry of Canadian Heritage Multiculturalism Program and the Canadian Race Relations Foundation, the opportunity to develop critical educational tools to challenge Islamophobia finally became possible. As part of a post-9/11 funding initiative, the project sought to develop multimedia resource kits, including posters, videos, and lesson plans for interactive activities that would help students understand and challenge racism and Islamophobia. The lessons also incorporate activities to help students comprehend the broader mechanisms of oppression as interlocking systems based on racism, classism, sexism, homophobia, ableism, and faithism.

Notably, the MENTORS resource kits, codeveloped by myself and diversity educator and consultant Suzanne Muir, are the first-ever comprehensive, multimedia resources designed to address Islamophobia at both the primary and secondary school levels. During the 18 months of the project, MENTORS completed 75 anti-Islamophobia workshops in schools across Ontario. Marking its success, the project recently received the prestigious J. S. Woodsworth Human Rights Award and the Ontario Elementary Teacher Federation Anti-Bias Curriculum Award.
Using a popular education approach, the anti-Islamophobia workshops provide age-appropriate and youth-friendly materials, activities, and strategies that engage learning about Islamophobia and racism in creative and interactive ways, such as through role-play and simulation activities. For example, one simulation activity examines such little-known aspects of Islamic history as the arrival of West African Mandingos in North America prior to Columbus and the political roles of Muslim women during the Crusades. For example, Shajarat al-Dhurr, the wife of a thirteenth-century Egyptian ruler, secretly governed the country and the army after her husband’s death and thwarted the invading Crusader armies. Students work in groups to role-play these and other historical scenarios, among them life in matriarchal Muslim societies in Indonesia, Uthman dan Fodio’s contributions to Islamic social development in Nigeria, stories of African Muslim slaves, the travels of the Chinese Muslim explorer Cheng Ho, and the arrival of the first Muslims in Canada who came from Scotland in the mid-nineteenth century. Through these historical vignettes, students gain a broader understanding of Muslim societies and their contributions to world culture and knowledge. This understanding, in turn, provides a critical counter-narrative to the negative constructions of Muslims they encounter in popular media.

The historical foundations of Islamophobia are also addressed as a part of this critical pedagogical enterprise. Islamophobia did not begin on 12 September 2001; rather, it has a long history that well predates the current context. Tracing Islamophobia’s genealogy through interactive role-play activities takes students back to seventh-century Arabia, where members of the young Muslim community were persecuted and exiled for their beliefs. Through mapping the trajectory of Islamophobia, students learn how Islamophobic discourses were activated at particular historical moments: during the Crusades, the expulsion of the Muslim Moors in sixteenth-century Spain, and European colonization of Muslim societies. These history lessons demonstrate how Islamophobic representations have been constructed as ideological tools to legitimate campaigns of political, social, economic, and military domination. Unraveling Islamophobia’s historical roots is critical to deconstructing how contemporary discursive practices sustain and legitimate the current conditions of global militarism and imperialism.

As part of a media literacy activity, students also interrogate images in contemporary political cartoons relating to Islam and Muslims in order to decode and analyze the politics of these representations, how they create an
ideological basis for sustaining conditions of power and domination, and help legitimate campaigns of violence. These are important analytical tools to help youth develop a critical media and political literacy.

In countering what I term gendered Islamophobia, other lessons attempt to rupture the stereotypes of passive and backward Muslim women. For example, at the beginning of the workshop, students are shown an image of a young Muslim woman wearing hijab with a caption that reads: “If you were a movie producer, how would you cast her in a role?” Responses from students as young as 8 years old invariably cast her as a “terrorist,” “foreigner,” or someone “escaping from her husband.” She is acknowledged as a marginal player, not as someone featured in a dominant narrative or starring role. After this part of the activity, the young woman’s true identity is revealed: She is actually the captain of a Muslim women’s soccer team in the United Kingdom. This activity generates a great deal of surprise from students, who do not recognize this role as one normally associated with Muslim women. In popular culture, Muslim women are routinely represented as being passive rather than active agents in their lives. This activity is a powerful vehicle for opening up critical dialogues that begin to interrogate why so few counter-narratives present Muslim women in more multidimensional ways, as opposed to the narrow Orientalist tropes of backwardness, victimization, and passivity.

The danger of presenting an uncritical romanticized view of women’s conditions within Muslim societies is balanced by a role-play scenario that depicts the denial of women’s rights under the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. However, it also shows how Afghan women’s organizations resisted their marginalization and transgressed the arbitrary injunctions imposed on them by secretly videotaping human rights abuses and running underground schools for girls. This allows Muslim women’s agency in the face of repression to be centered.

In another pedagogically and politically rich activity for the primary level, students receive a color poster that shows women, men, and children of different racial backgrounds, with some (but not all) of the women wearing hijab, engaged in various activities and roles, including a police officer, doctor, musician, school bus driver, a man cooking in the kitchen, a woman and a girl playing sports, and a film director. The caption on the poster reads: “Who Am I?” Students are first asked to identify those who are “Canadian.” In most instances, blonde-haired and fair-skinned people are identified (even in multiethnic classrooms) as being “Canadian.” Students are then asked to identify the “Muslims.” In most cases, it is the darker-
skinned people or women wearing hijab. Finally, it is revealed that everyone in the picture is both Canadian and Muslim.

This activity creates an important entry point for interrogating a student’s understanding of citizenship, belonging, and “Otherness.” The “teachable moment” that this activity opens up allows for the space to critically examine, reframe, and expand the boundaries that define “Canadianness.” The examples underscore the diversity among Muslims in terms of ethnicity, occupations, and roles in society, once again rupturing the narrow and limiting stereotypes about who Muslims are, what they look like, and what they do. Seeing Muslims in a variety of social roles and occupations also opens up the range of narratives that those Muslim children who may be participating in the activity can aspire to in their own lives.

The anti-Islamophobia activities also use humor to diffuse the tension and discomfort that often occur when dealing with difficult issues relating to marginality, social exclusion, and discrimination. For example, some of the video resources provided in the kits, among them “BBQ Muslims” and “Death Threat” (produced by Canadian filmmaker Zarqa Nawaz), use humor and satire to address the dominant stereotypes of Muslims as terrorists and fanatics. These videos also show a lighter side to the Muslim persona, which is often perceived as overly serious and incapable of playful irreverence or self-deprecating levity.

The resource kits also include an original video called “At First Glance...,” which was developed and coproduced by MENTORS and geared toward primary school children. The video presents three short vignettes depicting scenarios of Islamophobia based on stereotypical preconceptions and biases, and shows how these situations and attitudes are eventually ruptured and resolved.

With the current heightened public interest in learning about Islam and the plethora of neo-Orientalist and blatantly Islamophobic books and resources in the market, the MENTORS anti-Islamophobia resources provide important pedagogical tools for children and youth to become critical consumers of culture and knowledge. As a transformative pedagogical praxis, anti-Islamophobia education engages an important entry point for shattering the myths and legacies of oppression and helping students develop a higher level of cultural and political literacy.

Notes

Review Essay

Warraq’s War: A Critical Review

Ahrar Ahmad


Among other consequences of the horrific tragedy of 9/11 is the generation of a veritable cottage industry in books about Islam and Muslims. There had always existed a void regarding such books. In spite of its Abrahamic roots and its long, if somewhat troubled, encounters with the West, the significance of Arab countries in terms of western economic interests and the steady growth of diasporic Muslims settling in the developed world (easily surpassing the Jewish presence, probably even in the United States), Islam had remained a residual category entirely peripheral to American intellectual or cultural life.

The unprecedented nature and the brutality of the event that led to the Muslim “explosion” into the public consciousness exposed the woeful indifference about Islam and reinforced the Orientalist stereotypes of Muslims as mysterious, backward, and menacing. There was a predictable appetite among the public to know about Muslims, who had traditionally been pictured as quaint and dreadful “others” but were now increasingly being presented as angry and threatening “fanatics.” Some of the books rushed to print were works of genuine scholarship, demonstrating experience, knowledge, and elegance. Others were obviously driven by commer-

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cial considerations rather than academic, and some were, indeed, shallow, trite, and often misleading.

In the latter genre, two classes of books, both critical of Islam, quickly became popular: those written from an alarmist western perspective by such authors as Steven Emerson, Daniel Pipes, and Robert Spencer, and others that were supposedly “insider” exposés and interrogations issuing from such critics as Irshad Manji, the brothers Irgun Mehmet and Emir Fathi Caner, and Mohammad Mohaddessin. The doyen of the latter group is, undoubtedly, Ibn Warraq.

Ibn Warraq, a pseudonym allegedly assumed for purposes of personal safety, literally means the “son of scribes” and is possibly derived from the name of Abu `Isa Muhammad ibn Harun al-Warraq, an `Abbasid-era free-thinker and skeptic of Mu`tazilite orientations who died, in 909, in exile. Ibn Warraq was born in Rajkot in India and moved with his religiously conservative family to Pakistan during the confusions and migrations that attended India’s partition in 1947. He studied in Pakistan and at the University of Edinburgh, where he met Montgomery Watt, a widely respected scholar of Islam known for his sensitive approach to his subject, and against whom Ibn Warraq reserves his most caustic judgments.

He worked at various times as a primary school teacher, restaurateur, and tour guide; chafed under the rigors and “limitations” of Islam; had an “epiphany” of sorts during the Rushdie affair, when his long-smoldering doubts and discomforts blossomed into resentment and bitterness against Islam and led to his now famous book, *Why I Am Not a Muslim*, published in 1995 (reissued by Prometheus Books in 2003). That book, with its sneering impatience, shrill polemic, knowing tone, and ferocious indictment, made him a *cause célèbre* in the Islam-bashing environment of the post-9/11 world. He remains shrouded in relative personal anonymity (appearing in public, even on television, in obvious disguises), and has devoted himself to debunking the “myth” of Islam through his books, his website, and organizational efforts.

Since Ibn Warraq’s fame (or infamy) rests with his first book, *Why I Am Not a Muslim*, it is perhaps appropriate to indicate its basic argument. Its title is taken from Bertrand Russell’s book on Christianity. But while Russell made a philosophical argument, Ibn Warraq engages in a virtual broadside against Islam in a no-holds-barred attack. His arguments are not new. He suggests that Islam, through its text, tradition, and history, is inherently violent, intolerant, and misogynist. The problems and pathologies that certain parts of the Islamic world are currently confronting are not a result
of “fundamentalist Islam,” but have their roots in Islam itself. In fact, he suggests that the ideas of “Islamic civilization” or “Islamic philosophy” are really a contradiction in terms (p. 261) and are meaningless constructs, because no concepts of beauty, creativity, theological richness, legal subtlety, or moral clarity could have proceeded from Islam. If the Islamic world has sometimes demonstrated some of these features, this has been in spite of Islam, not because of it (p. 1). He concedes that there may be moderate Muslims, but firmly holds that there cannot be any moderate Islam.

Before he assails the message of Islam, he smears Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) by reducing him to some of the vilest stereotypes prevalent in the West. He is considered to be a sexual monster, a cunning manipulator of people and events, narcissistic and crude, even epileptic, schizophrenic, and pathological (pp. 89-90). The Prophet’s marriages and military campaigns, as well as the betrayals and cruelties he supposedly inflicted on others (particularly Jews and Christians), provide the grist for Ibn Warraq’s mill. He recycles, often without attribution or reference and usually in lurid and pornographic detail, many of the demonizing myths perpetrated by critics of Islam, which had gained currency due to medieval Christian writers, without making any effort to examine their evidence or provide a balanced narrative.

Any claim of seriousness that the book could have demanded is severely compromised by the attitude, material, and language he employed while discussing the Prophet. There are scholarly critiques about the Prophet’s life and decisions, and learned books and essays about him in English (e.g., Muhammad Haykal, Michael Cook, Martin Lings, W. Montgomery Watt, Anne Marie Schimmel, John Archer, R. Bodley, Karen Armstrong, etc., not to mention the extensive material available in the sirah literature), but Ibn Warraq’s knowledge or curiosity about them is minimal, at best. To seek to refute his portrayal of the Prophet is only to go into the gutter with him.

His critique of Islam itself is relatively more substantive, but still neither scholarly nor fair. In Why I Am Not a Muslim, he quotes from the Qur’an (utilizing a variety of translations) and demonstrates some familiarity with various authors and critics. In fact his affinity, indeed his dependence, on such authors is more than what can be accepted in academic discourse. His book often reads like a series of quotations culled from different sources. This is precisely why the book is so unoriginal and unimaginative. But more than that, it is fundamentally flawed and dishonest. There are several reasons for making this severe judgment.
First, such genuine scholars of Islam as R. A. Nicholson, D. S. Margoliouth, G. H. Bousquet, Ignaz Goldziher, T. Noldeke, Bernard Lewis, Maxime Rodinson, and Joseph Shacht, many of whom have fairly strong and critical things to say about certain aspects of Islam, are reduced, through selective quotations, to nothing more than foot soldiers serving Ibn Warraq’s cause. Their reservations, clarifications, or intellectual contributions are not hinted at in Ibn Warraq’s narrative. By the same token, scholars (e.g., Montgomery Watt, Norman Daniel, John Esposito, Edward Mortimer, etc) who are more sympathetic to Islam or plead for and seek greater understanding of the faith are excoriated as hand-wringing apologists. Moreover, using certain sources to buttress his diatribe against Islam is plainly suspect. For example, relying on Daniel Pipes to criticize Muslims is like quoting from a Ku Klux Klan screed to argue about the asserted “inferiority” of African-Americans.

Second, he tends to argue that anything problematic or objectionable that happens in Muslim countries (e.g., the horrible cruelty of female circumcision or slavery in certain parts of Africa, the deplorable condition of women in Pakistan, the tragedy of internal conflicts in Sudan and Indonesia) are all “caused” by Islam. The fact that female circumcision or slavery are localized tribal practices not exclusive to Muslims in some regions in Africa, or that honor killings in Pakistan have absolutely nothing to do with Islam, or the fact that internal conflicts occur throughout the world (Rwanda? Sri Lanka? Northern Ireland?) because of a complex welter of conditions and circumstances, does not cross his mind. This is akin to blaming Christianity for the Vietnam War, global warming, or mindless consumerism, without drawing any concrete or logical connections between one and the others.

Third, he makes observations throughout the book that are as startling as they are incomprehensible. For example, with reference to the supposed “pagan” origins of Islam, he says that “the worship of the moon is attested to by proper names of people such as Hilal, a crescent, or Qamar, a moon, and so on” (p. 40). It is not clear how the simple act of naming someone after a natural object can, by itself, become evidence of idolatrous behavior, any more so than naming someone `Abdullah (servant of God) necessarily indicates his Islamic commitment. Similarly he relies on the authority of “several eminent scholars” to prove that the constitution of Madinah “showed that right from the start Muhammad meant to move against the Jews” (p. 92). He actually refers to only one source, and does not include any quotations from the constitution itself (which is widely available) to
make his point. He also suggests that “the traditions are full of Muhammad’s miracles, curing the ill, feeding a thousand people on one kid [a young goat], etc.” (p. 143). Yet, he ignores the simple humanness that the Prophet always claimed, and that miracles (attributed to Jesus or Moses, which are accepted in Islam) have generally been considered irrelevant to demonstrate the Prophet’s unique status.

He refers to the greatness of British rule in India, which “gave back to all Indians – Muslim, Hindu, Sikh, Jain, Buddhist – their own culture” to the extent that “imperialists like Lord Curzon saved many of India’s architectural monuments, including the Taj Mahal, from ruin” (p. 209). While the first part of the sentence is entirely questionable, the last part should, at least, be predicated upon the fact that while Curzon may have “saved” the Taj Mahal it was, after all, the Muslims who “built” it. He describes the persecution and execution of the mystic al-Hallaj in 922 and suggests that it was “all because he advocated personal piety rather than dry legalism, and tried to bring dogma into harmony with Greek philosophy on the basis of mystic experience” (p. 278). Anyone with a modicum of knowledge about the case would know that the situation was far more complex than the simple reductionism implied here.

Fourth, there are many contradictions in this book. For example, he denounces Islam for its supposed fascist, totalitarian, and puritanical ethos, and then criticizes it “for the greater tolerance of homosexuality in the Islamic world” (p. 340). Similarly he suggests that Gibbon’s view of Islam as a “rational priest-free religion … enormously influenced the way Europeans perceived their sister religion for years to come” (p. 21), but then fails to identify even one such supportive intellectual or publication or to explain the unbridled hostility toward Islam throughout most of European history. He judges and soundly criticizes Carlyle’s treatment of the Prophet as “the first truly sympathetic account of the Islamic leader” (p. 22), and then proceeds to quote extensively from him to make exactly the opposite point. He approvingly quotes Karl Popper to indicate the nature of the scientific method (p. 193), but obviously does not realize that his own chaotic formulation is incapable of disproof (one of the essential conditions of Popperian logic). Also, it is a bit intriguing to note that while he stridently decries the “sexual obsessions” in Islam, he nonetheless refers to erotic materials from such hedonistic skeptics as Abu Nuwas or Sheikh Nefzawi (pp. 1, 105, 253, 331-32, 342-43), without clearly establishing why this inclusion was necessary or appropriate.

However, the essential intellectual problem of Ibn Warraq’s work is his myopic approach. Even the possibility of a different interpretation or
the acknowledgement that an issue is controversial (meaning that there may be another perspective) is anathema to him. Consequently, the hijab is condemned as the ultimate symbol of women’s oppression. The fact that many women wear it voluntarily and proudly, or that some women may actually feel that it allows them identity, safety, and equality is not even considered worthy of mention. (Why is it necessarily more “liberating” for a woman to expose herself to men, be judged on physical criteria according to men’s demands, and be slaves to the fashion industry and beauty myths, rather than compelling men to accept her in terms that she dictates?) He laments women’s disempowerment in many Muslim lands, but cannot explain why the largest Muslim countries (e.g., Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Turkey) have elected women to lead them. He movingly describes the violence and vulnerabilities that women in Pakistan face, but not the objectification, trivialization, and brutality (90,000 reported rapes annually in the United States alone, not to mention other kinds of harassment) that women in the West have to endure. This is not necessarily a defense of the hijab or a denial that the position of women in many Muslim countries is absolutely abhorrent, but simply to demand a more nuanced discussion of the problem.

One central preoccupation of Why I Am Not a Muslim – Islam’s alleged intolerance of others, particularly Jews and Christians – demonstrates similar limitations. It is easy and convenient to take some selective quotations out of the Qur’an, without referring to the circumstance or ethos within which they were placed, to “prove” Islam’s inherently militant and hateful tendencies. Verses from Surat al-Anfal (8:39) and Surat at-Tawba (9:5) usually serve this purpose. But the context of these verses makes it clear that the Muslims were in a dangerous and defensive situation, and that violence was not being promoted as the first or best choice. For example, 8:38 says “Tell those who do not believe that if they cease the persecution of believers, that which is past will be forgiven them,” and in 9:5 after saying that the idolaters (essentially those pagan Makkans who had broken treaties and persecuted the believers) should be slain “wherever you find them,” the very next sentence says that “if they repent, establish worship, and pay the poor-due, then leave them free.”

Much is made of the jizyah tax imposed on non-Muslims (9:29), but not why it was imposed: They did not have to pay zakat, which is mandatory for all Muslims, or serve in the armed forces. It must also be pointed out that while the West trumpets the cause of Judeo-Christian solidarity, Islam does not have the same textual, historical, literary, or theological problems that
Jews and Christians have with each other. Of course there have been many misunderstandings and savage encounters between the Muslims and the Jews and Christians in Islamic history, but they were episodic and driven by circumstance, and not systematic or compelled by doctrine.

On reading Ibn Warraq’s account, one would never guess that Islam accepts Moses and Jesus as prophets, acknowledges their miracles (including Jesus’ miraculous birth), shares the same stories and legends of humanity’s origin (e.g., humanity deriving from Adam and Eve), and spiritual lineage (Abraham); has very similar ideas of the virtuous life and the Hereafter; and repeatedly mentions Jews and Christians as “People of the Book” who, if they follow their religion and live righteously, “will not fear … or grieve” (a refrain that appears in both 2:62 and 5:72). One would never know that the Qur’an explicitly states: “And do not dispute with the People of the Book (except in cases of wrong or injury), but say: ‘We believe in the revelation that has come down to us and in that which has come down to you. Our God and your God is one, and it is to Him we bow in Islam’” (29:45).

In fact, Islam places itself self-consciously within a prophetic tradition, not as a novel beginning or a rupture, but as a continuation and a completion of God’s messages. One would never understand the expansiveness of the Qur’an’s spirit when it says “to each among you have we prescribed a law and an open way” (5:51); that “if God so willed, He could make you all one people” but He did not, so that “you all may strive as in a race for virtue” (16:93); that “there is no compulsion in religion” (2:256); that the Truth has been conveyed and “let who will believe and let who will reject” (18:29); and, finally, that “I worship not that which you worship, nor will you worship what I worship. To you your way and to me mine” (109:1-4). It is not the Qur’an that is petty and hateful – it is Warraq’s reading that is.

Similarly his blanket condemnation of Islam as inherently undemocratic is both misplaced and misleading. Democratic implications are underscored in Surat al-Shura, where it is suggested that only those people “who conduct their affairs by mutual consultation” (42:38) are dear to God. This is sometimes interpreted to refer to consultation among a select group of advisors, family members, or the ulama. But the chapter itself indicates no such limitation. In fact, Surat Al-Imran suggests that Muslims should try to forgive and pray for those who have demonstrated weak faith and judgment, and even “consult them in affairs of the moment” (3:159). Consequently, no test of virtue or intellect limits the franchise or restricts people from participation.
Moreover, the Qur’an emphasizes the significance of human agency as a transforming force. It reminds the faithful that “verily, never will God change the condition of a people unless they change what is in themselves” (13:3). Thus, the believers are not supposed to be passive or timid recipients of a ruler’s dictates, but active participants seeking to improve their lives and communities. Muslims are not merely permitted but are encouraged “not to be cowed, but to defend themselves” against any oppression. Any blame for such action is “only against those who oppress humanity with wrong-doing and insolently transgress beyond bounds through the land defying right and justice” (42:41-42).

It is also noteworthy that injunctions to “fulfill your contract (or obligations)” (5:1), not to “devour each others property” and allow “traffic and trade in mutual goodwill” (4:29), and that nobody can bear the burden of another because “every soul draws the meed of its acts on none but itself” (6:164) all seem to indicate a system of individual integrity and social responsibility that is wholly consistent with democratic norms. Moreover, Islam’s opposition to monarchy, its robust egalitarianism, and its concern for social justice and legal legitimacy (What other religion has allowed five different jurisprudential schools to coexist and flourish?) make it possible to argue that undemocratic regimes exist in many Muslim countries today not because of Islam, but in spite of it.

Admittedly, while Ibn Warraq’s agenda remains the same, the language in the introductions to his next two books, The Quest for the Historical Muhammad and What the Koran Really Says: Language, Text, and Commentary becomes less abrasive, his tone less mocking. In these compilations, he assembles a variety of writings, many rather dated (from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries), some obscure, some impressive, some very long (contributions from Henri Lammens extend to 167 pages in the first book) and some very short (only one or two pages as in Claude Cahen and Michael Schub’s contributions in the second). Many of the essays about the Prophet make the point that Islamic historiography should be more firmly based on evidence and logic and try to avoid the hagiographic enthusiasms and circularity that sometimes inform Islamic scholarship. There are several essays (e.g., by Lawrence Conrad, Andrew Rippin, F. E. Peters, J. Koren, and D. Nevo) on sources, methods, debates, approaches, and analytic frameworks regarding Islam’s early history. Others are devoted to the work of John Wansbrough, the iconoclastic and provocative theorist writing on early Islam.
What the Koran Really Says has the ambitious objective to “desacralize” (to use the term coined on p. 13) the Arabic language, script, and scripture. He seems to think that simply placing Islam in the Middle Eastern milieu in terms of language, social influences, intellectual origins, or theological affinities with other religions and rituals is enough to question its authenticity. One is left wondering why that would necessarily be so, since nobody has suggested that Islam developed in a vacuum. One is further puzzled why discussions of a particular word in the Qur’an and its varied interpretations (e.g., the words an yadin elicit three separate chapters), elaborations on the Qur’an’s strophic structure (two chapters), or whether its organization in the established `Uthmanic codex or rescension is chronologically or thematically consistent or not (nobody claimed that it was), would, ipso facto, destroy its legitimacy and authority.

The fourth book, Leaving Islam: Apostates Speak Out, contains “testimonials” sent to his organization – the Institute for the Secularization of Islamic Societies – about why people have left Islam. They are mind-numbingly repetitive and cliché-ridden, varying little from Ibn Warraq’s own themes. The keener early chapters describe Islam’s supposedly intolerant and violent response to apostasy. But, it is curious to note that instead of praising the openness of the `Abbasid period in which five schools of law, many Sufi orders, huge translation projects, and Mu`tazilite skepticism were all possible (in fact, classical Greek scholarship found its way into the European lexicon through the agency of Arab intellectual mediation), he only mentions people who faced persecution.

Was any other society at that time any more tolerant than Islam? Should Islam be faulted (as he seems to argue) because some early Arab thinkers and poets were not believers? Moreover, some of his poster-children for persecution are dubious examples at best. For instance, al-Rawandi was “expelled by the Mutazilites,” not persecuted by the Muslim rulers (p. 51); al-Razi’s strident criticism of religion was actually “witness to a remarkably tolerant culture and society” (p. 56); and al-Ma`ari was charged with heresy but “never prosecuted or punished” (p. 71). He points out that people are leaving Islam (“225 baptized in France alone in 2000,” p. 99; “many” in India; and “tens of thousands over the last twenty years” in Indonesia, p. 101) to underscore his argument about the alienating suffocation that Islam is supposed to represent. By that same line of reasoning, would he argue or accept the fact that since, by all accounts, Islam is the fastest growing religion in the world, therefore it is the most emotionally enriching and the spiritually uplifting religion in existence today?
If Ibn Warraq’s arguments were limited to pointing out that Muslims need to be more intellectually engaged in their understanding and practice of religion; that Muslims need to foster an environment that allows critical enquiry and dissident discourse; that Islam must be rescued from the grip of sometimes narrow-minded and bigoted mullahs and madrassahs; that Islam’s awkward embrace of modernity must evolve in directions that encourage scientific learning, progressive thinking, and pluralist orientations; that Muslims must overcome their tendency to blame others for problems they face; that Muslims must transcend their petty squabbles and unite for nobler causes, and so on, then surely even many Muslims would agree with him.

There is a long tradition of Muslim critics and reformers, such as Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406), Rifa`a al-Tahtawi (d. 1873), Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (d. 1897), Sir Syed Ahmed Khan (d. 1898), Muhammad `Abduh (d. 1905), Qasim Amin (d. 1908), al-Muwailih (d. 1930), Muhammad Iqbal (d. 1938), Muhammad Hussein Haykal (d. 1956), `Abd al-Raziq (d. 1966), Taha Husain (d. 1973), Ali Shari`ati (d. 1977), Fazlur Rahman (d. 1988), and others who, with varying passions and priorities, have tried to address similar issues. In today’s world, scores of Muslim scholars and thinkers are participating in a rich and vibrant discussion about the identity, doctrinal imperatives, and the future of Muslims in a turbulent and challenging world. But Ibn Warraq will have none of that; he wants to throw the baby out with the bath water. Instead of a finger-wagging lecture to educate and inspire Muslims, he simply lifts a finger in a rude gesture.

Ibn Warraq is no Luther exposing the corruptions and distractions of the Catholic Church. Neither is he a Voltaire arguing for the privatization of religion. He is merely a posture of defiance sustained by intellectual hubris, more reckless than courageous, more heckling than wise. Islam privileges the concept of “intention” over action or consequence. His intention is neither scholarly nor humanistic, but malicious and vindictive. He quotes from al-Ma`ari in his Leaving Islam: Apostates Speak Out: “We mortals are composed of two great schools, enlightened knaves or religious fools” (p. 65). Clearly, Ibn Warraq is no religious fool. To what extent he is “enlightened” is less clear.

Notes

1. The title of this essay is taken from a sentence in his Why I am Not a Muslim, where he says that the book “is my war effort” (p. xiii).
2. On page xv, he acknowledges his debt to Pipes for the entire first chapter.
3. How was it possible for the eighteenth century to have “so readily adopted the myth of Muhammad as a wise and tolerant ruler” (p. 19) if Carlyle’s book, published in 1841, was the first “sympathetic account of the Islamic leader” (p. 22)?

4. It should be pointed out that it was not the Muslims who slaughtered the Jews in 1099 after the conquest of Jerusalem by the Crusaders. Saladin, in fact, invited them back after he reconquered Jerusalem in 1187. Nor did the Muslims expel the Jews from Spain in 1492 after the Spanish reconquista. In fact, the Ottomans welcomed them into their empire in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. And, it was not Muslims who brutally exterminated almost 6 million Jews in the Holocaust in the 1940s or send back ships full of Jewish refugees from their shores. It is also noteworthy that there is very little in the Islamic world that can compare to the viciousness and contempt shown toward the Jews by the Catholic Church (or even by Reformers such as Martin Luther), or the dark and hateful caricature of Jews so abundant in western literature (expressed even in Shakespeare and T. S. Eliot).

5. Incidentally, he has a penchant for borrowing titles from others. His first book took its title from one by Bertrand Russell, The Quest for the Historical Muhammad reflects the title of Albert Schweitzer’s book on Jesus, and What the Koran Really Says echoes the title of Manfred Barthell’s book on the Bible.

6. The number of Muslims engaged in this discussion is most impressive. We list just a few of them here: Khaled Abou Fadl, Abdul Karim Soroush, Muhammad Arkoun, Fethullah Gülen, Taha al-‘Alwani, Tarek Ramadan, Bassam Tibi, Fatima Mernissi, Abdulaziz Sachedina, al-Ashmawi, Farid Esack, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Amina Wadud, Abdullahi an-Naim, and Rachid Ghanouchi. Their perspectives are not necessarily the same.
Book Reviews

After Shock: September 11, 2001 – Global Feminist Perspectives
Susan Hawthorne and Brownwyn Winter, eds.

This anthology, a feminist standpoint on the 9/11 terrorist attacks, engages critical feminist voices to counteract the United States’ specious justifications of hatred, violence, and vengeance against Afghanistan and Muslims in general following the tragedy. The authors relate the preeminence and politics of the West to violence in the Middle East, parts of Asia, Africa, and South and Central America. Their objective is to deconstruct the hypocrisy entangled in the West’s politics, particularly the Bush administration’s unilateral, patriarchal, misogynist, and masculinist foreign policies and actions that help create and sustain terrorism. The authors also seek to show that 9/11 is not the only act of terrorism; rather, there are different acts of terror inflicted on innocent people globally.

While many writings have condemned 9/11, only a few depict women’s perspectives. Much of the literature focuses on men’s views about the war. Moreover, non-western women have hardly written anything that could be said to document feminist viewpoints on the war. After Shock: September 11, 2001 – Global Feminist Perspectives reveals the invisibility of women’s voices in condemning terrorism and in formulating responses to the terrorist attacks. The anthology utilizes the voices of women from different nationalities, professions, and cultural backgrounds, and thus fills a significant gap: feminist voices on terror and war. This book is one of the most welcome developments in voicing women’s perspectives on terrorism.

The anthology is divided into two parts. Part 1, “Reactions,” has three sections framed by three questions: “Whose Terrorism? 12 September to 7 October; Whose War? 8 October to 13 November; and Whose Peace? 14 November to 8 March.” Captivating pieces in the first section include Robin
Morgan’s “New York City: The Day After,” which connects 9/11 to the negation of voices, generational sufferings, and patriarchy (p. 36). In “Afghani Women’s Resistance Organization: Bin Laden is not Afghanistan,” the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan [RAWA] criticize the bombing of Afghanistan and advocate peaceful resolutions. RAWA emphasizes that the United States should differentiate between the “terrorist Jihadi and Talibans” and the poor, innocent, and devastated people of Afghanistan.

In “Transnational Feminist Practices against War,” the authors link contemporary global problems to gendered and racialized nationalism, religious and ethnic fundamentalism, capitalism, and globalization. They conclude that terror roams the world in many guises and that feminists should stand against American militarism and patriarchal fundamentalism (p. 90). Sunera Thobani’s “It’s Bloody Thirsty Vengeance” shows how the West continues to colonize and exploit the Third World economically. Globalization continues to be rooted in the colonization of Aboriginal and Third World peoples and spawn immeasurable injustice and inequality. According to Thobani, the so-called “new war” against terrorism is nothing new. The West is cognizant of whom the fight is against – Muslims – and targets them.

The essays in the second section unearth the United States’ violation of human rights and undemocratic behaviour. Barbara Kingsolver’s “No Glory in Unjust War on the Weak” analyses the Afghan bombings and asserts that “we can’t beat cancer by killing every cell in the body” (p. 136). The United States should use the law to bring criminals to justice. Vandana Shiva’s “Globalisation and Talibanisation” examines how 9/11 has been used to validate the demonization of Islam. Shiva explains that terrorism is a global problem and not specific to any religion. Given that terrorism and fundamentalism are rooted in undemocratic and unjust societal systems, ending terrorism requires addressing the lack of democracy. In her “Is This a Feminist War?” Jennie Ruby rebuffs the idea that bombing Afghanistan is a war to empower Afghan women by calling it a war against fundamentalist patriarchy and American capitalist patriarchy (p. 178).

The third section analyzes the global marginalization, tokenization, and silencing of women in politics, economics, peace negotiations, and international relations. Anuradha Chenoy’s “Forever Victims” reviews the token inclusion of women in Afghanistan’s interim government. She reiterates that peace, like war, is not gender-neutral and has interests that affect men and women differently. Chenoy advocates for women’s inclusion in
peace processes (p. 229). In related contexts, Bat Shalom’s piece, “Declaration on the Occasion of International Women’s Day 2002,” calls for an end to the Israel military occupation of Palestinian land as a prerequisite to securing peace (p. 256).

Part 2, “Reflections,” advances the reactions and experiences documented in the first part. The authors connect war and violence to global capitalism and to the West’s politics. Valentine Moghadam, author of “Women, the Taliban, and the Politics of Public Space in Afghanistan,” examines masculinism and feminist resistances in Afghanistan. She analyzes constraints to Afghani women’s rights, calls for investing in Afghan women and girls, and institutionalizing their civil, political and social rights in the post-Taliban government. Karen Talbot’s “Afghanistan, Central Asia, Georgia: Key to Oil Profits” underscores the United States’ imperialist military actions in Afghanistan. She asserts that the war in Afghanistan is key to reaping oil profits from the Middle East and Southeast Asia.

In her “The Algebra of Infinite Justice,” Arundhati Roy discusses the American war rhetoric of “protecting their freedom” (p. 364). She parallels terrorism to American militarism and globalization, endeavors that seek to amass wealth for the West. She argues that this presumptuous arrogance is not a choice that people need to make (p. 372). Susan Hawthorne’s reflection on “Fundamentalism, Violence, and Disconnection” reviews questions of identity, violence, fundamentalism, power, and masculinity in a globalized world. She interrogates the accountability of American actions, which are driven by false options, and calls for strategies to counter war.

Nahla Abdo, author of “Eurocentrism, Orientalism, and Essentialism: Some Reflections on September 11 and Beyond,” draws connections between 9/11 and the Middle East crisis. She stresses that the West, and especially North American imperialist, racist, and hate-based policies toward the Middle East, are not new; rather, they represent a renaissance of the West’s strategic needs and interests in the region. Abdo also examines the inflated Eurocentric and Oriental essentialization of Muslims, Arabs, and Middle Easterners after 9/11. In discussing alternative feminism to emancipate Muslim women, the author challenges Orientalism and Eurocentrism’s “reactive” approaches, which serve to maintain and reproduce stereotypes against Muslim women.

Evelyn Accad’s “The Phallus of September 11” assesses the degenerating state of affairs in the Middle East as a result of 9/11. Accad argues for a discourse on sexuality when formulating a revolutionary feminist theory. The last essay in the book, “If Women Really Mattered …,” discusses the
devastating condition of women and children in Afghanistan. Bronwyn Winter argues that the United States has no particular interest in addressing the domination of women. In contrast, it has vested interests in maintaining it and supporting those who use and abuse women (p. 519).

This book provides an important political and academic forum for the inclusion of women’s otherwise marginalized voices in all discussions surrounding the current context of war, globalization, imperialism, and neo-Orientalism, all of which are shaping the post-9/11 world order.

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Losing Control: Global Security in the Twenty-first Century
Paul Rogers

This book belongs to the field of international relations. Its specialization is in the subfield of international security, with a critique of the realist paradigm – or power and control orientation in international politics. Its main argument is that the dominant realist approach in international security is unsustainable due to the equalizing effects of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The dangerous “revolts at the margins” threaten the status quo. The book is a plea to state officials in the Middle East, the United States, Europe, Russia, transnational corporations, and international organizations to adopt attitudes conducive to justice.

Since Rogers is questioning the extant realist orientation, one would expect him to outline the basic alternative principles for conducting international politics that could ensure justice, peace, and stability. Perhaps his heavy engagement with how the West tries to maintain control of the international order – as seen from the book’s title and discussions – weakened this perspective. The basic tension of what ought to be the correct rational structure of international interdependence, that which could enable this system “break out of the narrow view” or one-sided “perceptions” (p. 38), is not clarified. In short, what Rogers sees as replacing the old paradox (the cold war) for the present one (“violent peace”) is actually a continuation of
the same strategic logic in international politics: Both paradoxes emphasize the armed resolution of conflict.

He spends the first six chapters (2-7), discussing the realist paradigm since the cold war, highlighting the unsustainable nature of its logic of “liddism” (suppressing the address of reasons for dissent). From the title of chapter 5, “The New Security Paradigm,” one begins to anticipate a discussion of the new paradigm that would clarify the normative questions of justice and equality. However, the sense of the “ought” is not explicated systematically in this chapter. Chapter 7, “Shifting the Paradigm,” moves a bit more toward his implied normative framework. At the end of the book, predictions on whether this realist paradigm will undergo change were ambiguous and not grounded enough (p. 150).

Also, Rogers’ postcolonial approach to colonialism creates a contradiction. Early on, he links the international wealth division shaped by liberalism (e.g., trade patterns, debt crisis, and labor) to the colonial experience and the colonial era (p. 82). However, he argues later on that the present liberal system does not imply a direct neocolonial control of the world, but “just a shaping … a world economy and polity in [the] US[’s] image (p. 139).” Shaping one society in the image of another violates self-determination, unless such a shaping proceeds with the expressed consent of the society being shaped.

Despite the above concerns, Rogers seems to correctly identify what could amount to a “new paradigm”– the issue of undeniable risk to the extant order posed by environmental changes, unsustainable trade relations, and resource conflicts. These issues seriously concern scholars like Rogers, and the world public – considering the persistent protest against summits of the G8 and the WTO (World Trade Organization). He shows his commitment to this new paradigm by calling for the resurrection of the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Band Treaty), the prevention of WMD proliferation, fair world trade, debt cancellation, and good governance. In addition, he points out that an attitude transformation is crucial to any paradigm shift (p. 121).

Two further insights on the contemporary security question require praise. First, he argues that the shift to a new paradigm is not idealistic, but one based on necessity and the West’s survival interests. This survival interest would give birth to a new way of thinking and acting when the West has to deal with matters of security. Though one would be skeptical that such a realization does not necessarily translate into policy overnight, the evolution of a security discourse and practice seem to point in this direction. He also causes us to rethink security in fundamental ways by highlighting the
fact that 9/11 was carried out with knives and paper cutters. These weapons were effective only because of how the terrorists used them. Such a realization has caused deep worries in the United States and the whole world, forcing a rethinking of security in terms of the sociopsychological dimensions of reality: human will, alienation, and frustration.

To conclude, Rogers’ plea for a new paradigm requires moving from power-driven bargaining to rational dialogue in international relations, an arena in which actors can focus on questions of what is equally acceptable to everyone or every society (the moral point of view). Islam’s “universal desire” to address eternal questions of justice accords with Rogers’ argument for the new paradigm, one that holds that a peaceful international order is possible only through justice.

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Western Supremacy: The Triumph of an Idea?

Sophie Bessis


This book traces the journey of western domination from the conquest of the Americas to the current forms and practices of globalization and development. Bessis contends that the West, unlike other empires of the past, is the only one to have produced a theoretical (philosophical, moral, and scientific) apparatus to legitimate its supremacy and hegemony around the world. While making her case, she explores what she terms as the ultimate paradox of the West: its ability to produce and even violently promote universals (e.g., democracy, justice, and human rights) and yet, at the same time, exert an inexhaustible capacity to self-justify its own violations of these very universals. It is precisely this capacity to disassociate what it says from what it does, the author asserts, that makes the West both unintelligent and illegitimate to the world. This book, divided into three parts with 12 chapters, provides the reader with an excellent introductory overview of the nature and extent of western domination, as well as the relationship it has fostered with the rest of the world.

Part 1, “The Formation of a Culture,” sets out the West’s historicopolitical formation, tracing its birth to the turn of the sixteenth century.
Chapters 1 through 5 offer a historical account, albeit in broad strokes, of how the West built its hegemony upon the twin processes of exclusion and appropriation. These chapters highlight how the West’s exclusively Greco-Roman founding myth enabled it to erase non-Christian and oriental influences from western European civilization. Europe reinvented itself by excluding the historical, intellectual, cultural, and scientific contributions made to it by the Babylonian, Egyptian, Indian, and Islamic (Arab) civilizations, among others, in order to believe, and then persuade others to accept, that the West built itself and owes its greatness only to its own efforts. The forced expulsion of Jews and Muslims from Spain, for example, declared a new political territory of the West and was matched by the expulsion of Jewish-Muslim thought from Europe’s intellectual territory.

The exclusion of “Others” was paralleled by the appropriation of their lands, which, as Bessis explains, led Europe to carry out the first large-scale genocide in history. She explores how the rapid depopulation of the Americas and the trans-Atlantic slave trade were rationalized by an ideology of domination that legitimized the idea of racial superiority and the West’s self-election as the only full human beings. In addition, she explores how new myths appear and histories are rewritten to validate this history on the West’s insistence that its expansion was necessary in order to introduce the world to freedom and liberty and to promote human rights.

In Part 2, “The Way of the World,” chapters 6 through 9 move into a critical analysis of the development discourse and the world’s partition into the Global South and the Global North. Overviewing the history of development and the West’s modernization agenda, the author explains how the monolithic blueprint for the world to “catch up” to the minority-world was intrinsically set up for failure. As yet another example of the discrepancy between what the West proposes and what it does, Bessis insists that development ideology exhorted the world to embrace the universality and inevitability of modernity and progress – but only on the condition that their development and modernization do not interfere with the West’s interests.

In this section, Bessis explores how the West manages and dominates the “post”-colonial era through a sequence of double standards and outright hypocrisy. She points out the underlying deception in development ideology, whereby a single path to growth is promoted ostensibly to mimic the West, even though it is, in fact, unattainable for the rest of the world because the same rules of appropriation and exploitation of lands, resources, and the
freedom to migrate no longer apply. In this sense, the South raced to reproduce the model, while the North fiercely opposed alternative models and devised new strategies to control and dominate so that it would eventually yield more of its power. Accounting for the disconnect between what the West states and what it does is made glaringly evident: Only the West has benefited, in terms of increased wealth and power, from the failure of the development decades from the 1960s onward.

Part 3, “Two Sides of the Mirror,” explores the new face of the West’s old civilizing mission: to promote and protect universal human rights. Here, again, the book’s common thread is revisited as Bessis explains how the West, in its historical and current contexts, covers up its own violations as often as it appropriates to itself the right to be the sole protector and guarantor of democracy, modernity, and human rights. Once again, societies are forced to shape and mold themselves into the West’s image, which is identified as the uncontested model of a “civilized” society that the rest must transform into but will never fully become.

Reforming and rescuing the “Other” to make it more closely resemble the West is the ultimate goal of the new forms of intervention and imperialism. According to the author, the West’s inability to embrace pluralism and multivocality undermines its very strength and the rightful existence and legitimate place that non-western peoples have in the world. Bessis concludes by asking the poignant question of how do we collectively move from a unitary domination by the West to a body of ideas and a discourse in which all members of humanity can recognize themselves and share in its construction. In her final analyses, Bessis concedes that although the West does not want to admit or submit to this direction, it inevitably will be pushed, either willingly or unwillingly, to finally locate itself realistically in the world.

This rather passionate polemical critique leaves the reader with the impression that in the face of this totalizing entity described as the West, the rest of the world is rendered powerless and silenced into submission. The major shortcoming of this book is that it does not provide a warranted discussion of the diverse ways in which non-western people historically and presently seek to rupture, dismantle, resist, and recreate themselves and their societies in both the heartland and hinterlands of the West. The author also fails to explore how the West’s intrusion has instigated diverse forms of resistance and transformations that are opening up the very alternative paradigms that she herself hints are needed urgently. Nevertheless, this book is an important introductory read that is well researched and passionately written. It offers a concise overview of western hegemony that is
appropriate and useful for undergraduate level courses in Third World studies, international development, and sociology.

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Enemy Aliens: Double Standards and Constitutional Freedoms in the War on Terrorism

David Cole  

David Cole, a professor at the Georgetown University Law Center, is a brilliant constitutional attorney and an outstanding advocate of civil liberty. In *Enemy Aliens*, he articulates the case that Attorney General John Ashcroft’s abridgements of the civil liberties of non-citizens and alleged “enemy combatants” in the name of the war on terrorism is at once part of an old strategy of establishing such constitutionally questionable actions against those people least politically able to defend themselves and, at the same time, the first step to expanding such incursions against civil rights into the population at large.

Cole writes with the meticulous care appropriate to a legal mind of the first caliber and with a graceful and literate rhetorical style. “The line between citizen and foreigner, so natural during wartime,” he writes (p. 5), “is not only easy to exploit when restrictive measures are introduced, but also easy to breach when the government later finds it convenient to do so.” Cole writes with authority on facts of which too many Americans are completely ignorant: selective detention and deportation based on religion or national origin, secret trials (or no trials), prolonged interrogation “under highly coercive, incommunicado conditions ... and without access to lawyers,” and “indefinite detention on the attorney general’s say-so” (p. 5).

Cole presents the historical precedents that justify his thesis. In 1988, President Ronald Reagan signed a bill apologizing for the appalling detention of Japanese-Americans during World War II. However, that internment was an extension of the Enemy Alien Act of 1798, “driven by nativist fears of radical French and Irish immigrants” (p. 7), but still on the books. The “Palmer Raids” of the early twentieth century, wherein thousands of for-
eign nationals were rounded up for their “suspected political associations,” implemented legislation that J. Edgar Hoover and A. Mitchell Palmer had wanted to see applied to citizens as well. With the onset of the cold war, “Hoover got what he had wanted” (p. 8). He documents how this pattern has been followed in the current climate, for example, with the freezing of American charities’ assets. A draft of the proposed toughening of the Patriot Act would “turn even native-born citizens accused of ties with terrorist groups into ‘aliens’ by stripping them of their citizenship” (p. 8).

Cole addresses sociological and diplomatic issues, as well as moral and legal ones. If you suspect that there are terrorists among a community, it makes more sense to work with a law-abiding community to help identify potential threats than to alienate them (p. 9). Behavior indicating that we see no need to adhere to international standards has placed “our credibility on matters of international law and human rights ... at low ebb” (p. 10).

The book is divided into four parts. Five chapters on “Responding to 9/11” demonstrate the role that the fear inspired by the terror attacks of 9/11 has played. Seven chapters on “History Lessons” explore how the bogeymen of communism and terrorism have been used to advance the encroachment on civil liberties, starting with aliens and then moving on to citizens. A single chapter each on “Security” and “The Right Thing to Do,” plus a conclusion on “Breaking the Cycle,” form the final two parts of the book.

The government has argued that uncovering terrorist plots is “akin to the construction of a mosaic” (p. 20). Since the individual pieces of even the most sinister mosaic may themselves be innocuous, this model provides the justification for access to every bit of data on anyone, especially since potential terrorists may lead “quiet, law-abiding lives until they receive the call to strike” (p. 20). This could justify “the detention of virtually anyone” (p. 21), holding them without bond, even when the person is neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community. Knowing how freedom-loving American citizens might react to this awesome authority, the government has been careful to exercise it mainly against non-citizens for now (p. 21).

Within weeks of 9/11, John Ashcroft had rounded up over 1,000 foreigners (mainly Muslims and/or Arabs, not one of whom was charged with terrorism) for “preventative detention,” a program “shrouded in mystery,” (p. 25) despite the fact that “most of the judges who have reviewed the government’s secrecy policy have found it unlawful” (p. 30). “The government has refused to provide even the most basic information, beginning with how many people it has locked up,” let alone their names (p. 25). Of the over
5,000 people “preventatively” detained by May 2003, “not one has been charged with any involvement” with the 9/11 attacks (pp. 25-26). Cole uses numerous examples to detail how the government has managed to circumvent legal protections like bond, presumption of innocence, and a public and speedy trial. Where no pretext can be found for suspicion, people are held as material witnesses “based solely on a prediction about their reluctance to testify” (p. 37). Cole documents harsh treatment of witnesses and government lies used to obtain warrants (p. 38).

In chapter 2, Cole shows how the “disappearance” of people, notorious in Latin American dictatorships, has come to the United States. Chapter 3 documents how, despite George W. Bush’s campaign pledge against it, ethnic profiling has been expanded. Chapter 4 reveals the duplicity of the Patriot Act in distinguishing between domestic terrorism, narrowly defined in commonsense terms, and terrorism by foreign nationals defined to include not only ordinary violent crimes but also nonviolent and otherwise lawful activities. The criminalization of guilt by association with “disfavored political organizations” is the “centerpiece” of the act (pp. 58 ff). Chapters 5 through 11 explore how even American citizens have become vulnerable. Chapter 11 looks at specific cases of guilt by association and secret evidence. Chapters 12 through 14 demonstrate how terrorism has replaced communism as the pretext for expansion of state authority and discretion, and how double standards facilitate the process.

Selective enforcement effectively gives the state the power to chill political speech otherwise uncompromisingly protected by the Constitution. To those who ask if there is an alternative to a police state in fighting terrorism, Cole notes that the withdrawal of troops from places like Saudi Arabia, a less lopsided policy in Palestine/Israel, and “a commitment to the rule of law at home and abroad” could only help in the long run (p. 206). Cole is rightly concerned that any measure of safety yielded by double standards is more than offset by a loss of credibility (p. 207). “The Bill of Rights were viewed not as a set of optional contractual provisions enforceable because they were agreed upon by a group of states and extending only to the contracting parties, but as inalienable natural rights that found their provenance in God” (p. 214).

With keen scholarship and eloquent voice, David Cole has identified and articulated the ways in which the United States is becoming more like the dictatorial regimes to which it seeks to “bring democracy.” This is a must-have book for both Muslim reformers who would like to see the
Muslim world gain liberty and for Americans who seek to prevent their country from losing hers.

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Fear and Anxiety in the Arab World

Michel G. Nehme


The title is certainly catchy, as not much has been written on fears and anxieties in the Arab world. Much, however, has been written on Muslims and Islam post-9/11. While some writers genuinely try to understand the various Islamic ideologies and Muslim cultures, others seek to paint a rather dim and depressing picture of Muslim societies. This book attempts to describe Arabs, as well as their fears and anxieties, in the garb of “interdisciplinary research.” It is divided into seven chapters and contains a section on notes, a bibliography, and an index. The chapters address issues related to Arab politics (e.g., political identity, nationalism, and minority issues) and more general areas (e.g., religion and Arab culture). The author is a professor of political science and diplomacy at the Notre Dame University in Lebanon.

In the preface and opening chapter, Nehme introduces the growing field of political psychology, which draws upon various psychological theories to interpret human political behavior. Although he admits that the best results can be obtained through collaborative research between experts in each discipline, he dares to make an independent attempt to analyze Arab fears and anxieties from a Freudian perspective.

The book’s first few pages are quite a turn-off, as many preposterous statements are made. Playing psychologist, Nehme asserts that world events are themselves natural experiments and, therefore, his assumptions are “empirically based” (p. 2). He diagnoses the problem of violence among Arabs as resulting from a “built-in consistency of anxiety” (p. 3), “most Arabs no longer appeal to God … instead, they call on their governments for relief” (p. 4), “they are afraid of everything” (p. 7), “Arab men are afraid that their wives will be sexually attracted to other men if they leave home to work” (p. 8), and so on. He goes on to characterize suicidal tendencies among Arabs as a “death wish” that is not new in Arab history, as it develops their inner power … through acquiring weapons, and states
that “Arabs need enemies … otherwise they will destroy themselves!” (p. 18). The first three chapters are devoted to demeaning Arabs by using psychoanalytic jargon that is often unclear and confusing.

Nehme is so fixated on Freud that, in chapter 4, he attempts to explain Arab nationalism in Freudian terms. He states that nationalism’s central concerns are “fear, anxiety, and the conceptualization of self” and that “the great enigma that has to be accounted for once we find ourselves within the imaginary representative is molten rock of the unconscious” (p. 61). In simpler terms, he criticizes the Arab world’s lack of political development, which became more evident after communism collapsed, and goes on to blame Arab nationalism for divisions, sectarianism, and even Islamic fundamentalism in the Arab world, including Iran and Afghanistan. He claims that Arab nationalism is, in fact, a myth, because of the Arabs’ diversity as well as their ethnic, communal, regional, and religious disputes. Islamism, on the other hand, is on the rise and is trying to replace Arabism as a political ideology; however, Islamism is insufficient to redress valid solutions and suffers from flaws similar to Arabism.

Compelled to explain authoritarianism, ethnic and minority uprisings, and religious fundamentalism in the Middle East, he opines that Arab fears are like an “obsessional or paranoid system translated into methods whereby normal feelings of sympathy are denatured, numbed, or killed so that people can act with cruelty toward others. ... The victim is dehumanized, being a source of fear, and converted into a subhuman; a despised animal” (p. 86). This analysis of how Arabs treat minorities extends to almost all political factions, religious groups, women, languages, and ethnicities. He claims that almost all minorities in Arab states are considered alien in nationality or origin. Nehme blames the Islamic view of nature that “does not encourage a breakthrough to a modern scientific worldview” (p. 95) and its “individualism” and “supernatural reliance” for Arab society’s delayed growth. Although his criticisms of Arabs and Islam are free-flowing, his assessment of the West’s role in Middle East politics is almost nonexistent.

Nehme contends that psychology, as a discipline, is “completely ambiguous” in studying religion (p. 109), but continues to analyze Arab fears in the realm of religion by referring to Freudian writings. He claims that “kings and presidents in the Arab world have the power to act and speak like gods, and they are obeyed as gods; ordinary people saying they are gods are regarded as madmen and locked up in asylums, even when they are harmless” (p. 111), and, on the other hand, that “Most Arabs’ concept of God is never clear” (p. 121). The closing chapter mentions the value
of empirical surveys; but, like earlier chapters, it draws on Freudian and a few other psychoanalytic ideas to explain Arab self-image and culture.

At least for the lay person, it is important to know that Freud’s work was discarded by his own disciples due to a lack of objectivity in his theory and an overemphasis on sexuality and aggression. Freud personally suffered from the Oedipus complex and Nazi aggression that shaped his theory of human nature. Much of what he wrote was based on his interactions with a handful of young and upper-class European women, and so does not necessarily pertain to people of other cultures. Even for people in the West, Freudian theory is outdated and has been revised over the years by neo-Freudians and modern psychoanalysts.

Nehme, being a political scientist, seems to be unaware of this and has taken liberties in overgeneralizing aspects of Arab politics to the entire Arab population. However, if one agrees with his premise that fear and anxiety exist in the Arab world, one also would have to agree with his suggestion that such a topic should be brought to center stage and studied from an interdisciplinary perspective. Hopefully, this will result in a more objective assessment of the situation and a positive outcome for the Arab people. But this may also be true of many other cultures and societies in the non-Arab world, including the West.

A review of the notes and references suggests that besides Freud and a few other psychoanalysts whose writings are based mostly on western experiences, some references are from “scholars” who have a reputation for distorting the Arab image. What is truly regrettable is that such a book, which is intent upon slandering and promoting ethnic stereotypes, gets published without a proper check for academic honesty and by a press that is run with the taxpayers’ money.

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The Arab Mind
Raphael Patai
rev. ed. 466 pages.

It is Raphael Patai’s ambition to chart the fundamental components of the Arab worldview that most compels the reader to leaf through the 400 pages
of The Arab Mind. In one text, in less than 20 brief chapters, he seeks to provide the elements that define the culture and mindset of the entire half-billion-strong Arab world. For many readers, this enormous goal provokes enough skepticism to prevent any hope for objectivity before reading a single word. In this new printing, however, Norvell B. DeAtkine (director of Middle East Studies, JFK Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, NC) provides a foreword that offers the highest praise for Patai’s work. For instance, he acknowledges that this book provides the foundation for his own instruction and coursework.

Hatherleigh Press, the publisher of this revised edition, is known for its Body Sculpting Bible series, its Living With line of health books, and its Flex series of athletic books. A more unlikely pairing reveals itself when we discover that the original edition of The Arab Mind appeared in 1973, the same year as Clifford Geertz’s groundbreaking The Interpretation of Cultures. Though Patai republished this book a decade later, and this new, current edition appears less than a decade after his death, it is clear that despite his familiarity with Geertz’s writings, he chose not to embrace Geertz’s methods. Though none can deny the width and depth of Patai’s insights, his own methods provide more problems than solutions.

To define “the Arab,” Patai cites Gamal Abd al-Nasser’s three circles: language, geography, and Islam. Although he dedicates nearly a tenth of his book to analyzing the Arabic language, he states – to the reader’s shock – that culturally, Islam is meaningless to the Arabs. Moreover, he manifests this opinion by providing only one 13-page chapter on Islam’s role in the Arab mind. The amount of effort that he spends on Islam here and in other negligible references throughout the book is squandered by narrating a few theological (kalam) arguments, occasional references to ethics, some mention of language, and erroneous citations from Islamic law. Islamic history is absent, save for a few citations to Prophet Muhammad and his generation. The Umayyads and `Abbasids boast one reference each … in quotations from other writings.

Furthermore, Patai states that Bedouins comprise less than 10 percent of the Arab population, and then dedicates the largest sections of his book to analyzing their psyche. His approach reveals more methodological problems. In his opinion, Bedouins are a foundation for Arab society, ethos, and mythology. However, he does not distinguish between what is authentically Bedouin and what is part of the myth that the Arabs may be imposing on their memories of the Bedouins. If Bedouins, as Patai asserts, represent the
Arabs’ “heroic age” (as opposed to any of the Arab-Islamic empires that dominated the region), then he needs to distinguish between romanticism and reality. He does not.

Instead, Patai’s analysis mimics his analysis of every other aspect of the Arab psyche. He relies on anecdotal evidence to support sweeping universals. Perhaps the most memorable (and humorous) anecdote involves a series of conversations between President Nasser and King Hussein during the Six Day War. Nasser repeatedly responds to Hussein’s inquiries with lies, pretending that Egypt is dominating the Israelis, while the opposite is happening. Patai uses this dialogue to show that Bedouins—and consequently all Arabs—must always save face in their dealings. The reader may consider it an odd choice to have a politician’s wartime statements represent the worldview of an entire population. The reader must also wonder if, following the same logic, the rest of the world defines the American psyche as being based on any of the memorable Bushisms. Most of all, the reader must wonder why Nasser’s deceitful statements represent all Arabs, while Hussein’s inquiry (representing a search for information and truth) does not.

In selecting this anecdote, I have perhaps used Patai’s own method to refute his entire text. This anecdote reveals that Patai’s book is less of a scholarly work in cultural anthropology and more of an ideological tract driven by a particularly antagonistic agenda. I found myself wondering if his paragraphs containing unnecessary information (like listing all of the letters in the Arabic alphabet and then explaining how they are pronounced) were anything but filler. I was puzzled by his repeated practice of twisting every single trait in the Arab psyche into something manifested as a flaw. For example, he notes the importance placed on self-respect, but then states that Arabs lack self-respect, that an Arab must respond to any unfavorable comments made against him with greater insults, and that Arabs somehow base their own self-respect on their women’s chastity. In his section on language, he cites the importance placed on language as something that forms a personality that partakes in making empty threats.

I have not discussed the largest sections of his book, his portrayal of the savage intensity of Arab sexuality and his reductionist analysis of Arabic stagnation, because the former is the most famous aspect of his text and the latter contains little analysis and many quotations. What is most troubling about this book, however, is not its contents or that he seems to disregard both Geertz and Edward Said’s Orientalism (as illustrated in a childhood anecdote about his meeting with Ignaz Goldziher), but, as DeAtkine mentions, that this
book is the Bible for military leaders and laypersons seeking to understand Arabs. In our era of war, can the result be anything but trouble?

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Islamic Peril: Media and Global Violence
Karim H. Karim

At the junction of history, international relations, political science, and communication studies, Karim H. Karim’s Islamic Peril provides serious and in-depth research on the media coverage of violence involving Muslim individuals and groups. This updated edition of the book, first published in 2000, adds a preface and an afterword that briefly account for 9/11 and its aftermath. While studying the construction of Islam as the primary “Other” in Canada’s main print media since the beginning of the 1980s, the author argues that the numerous (mis)representations and stereotypes of Muslims are based on a lack of religious, sociological, political, and historical knowledge rather than on what Karim calls a “centrally organized journalistic conspiracy against Islam” (p. 4).

The author concentrates on the construction, flow, and reproduction of globally dominant interpretations through relations of power and domination between the North and the South, but also inside the North’s media. His focus on journalism’s internal mechanisms (e.g., dependence on a limited number of sources, the need for simplification, and the clash of interests between information and business) and the wider sociopolitical domination processes (e.g., the end of the cold war or unipolarity) prevents the analysis from being overtly simplistic and adopting a victim mentality. The author does not just highlight the (mis)representations; he also tries to analyze them. His approach is optimistic, for it implies there is no fatality in reproducing stigmatization and stereotypes.

Karim studies what could be called the “Islamization of representations”: the social construction of the linkage between facts of violence that are historically and sociologically rooted and the notion of Islam as an essence. His analysis does not revolutionise the approach toward discourses on Islam, for one can feel how much he was influenced by the founding
works of such scholars as Edward Said or Fred Halliday to whom, among others, references are frequently made). Yet this lack of theoretical originality is balanced by the impressive amount of documentation gathered and the different events covered and analyzed, including some that few readers might recall: the hijacking of a TWA plane in 1985 or the Azeri-Armenian war over Nagorno-Karabakh in 1992.

Indeed, this research gathers original facts and examples that confirm several perceptions that many people share about how Muslims and Islam are portrayed in dominant discourses but are not always able to formulate. On that matter, his analysis of the construction of jihad as a martial concept or of the way Saddam Hussein emerged during the 1990-91 Gulf war as an Islamic figure, although he appeared as a secularist leader in the 1980s, are particularly convincing. The emphasis on the role of certain intellectuals, whom Karim calls “ideologues” (p. 139), such as Bernard Lewis, V. S. Naipaul, or Daniel Pipes, in spreading and legitimizing stereotypes of Muslims is truly interesting. Yet it also strengthens the impression that the author sometimes loses sight of the Canadian print media and wishes to tackle the whole question of constructing representations.

The main weakness of the analysis is its lack of a dynamic approach. Throughout the 20 years of the study, which saw, among other things, the end of the cold war, Karim does not seem to point out any fundamental transformation in the dominant (mis)representations of Muslims and Islam. Only in his final chapter does he announce the possibility of going beyond the dominant stereotypes on Islam and of doing “conscientious reporting.” Nevertheless, the author’s starting point and conclusions do not differ from those that Edward Said conceptualized in *Covering Islam* (1981) and, to some extent, in *Orientalism* (1978). Have things not changed at all? Are the props of stigmatization always the same?

In any western society, and at any time, one could probably find in the media, within governments, and among experts and scholars many examples of essentialist discourses that portray Islam as the primary “Other” and that directly link it to violence. As *Islamic Peril* does, these stigmatizing and stereotyped discourses then could be brilliantly analyzed and deconstructed. Yet, that approach seems to leave out a fundamental question: Are these essentialist discourses on Islam the only ones and/or the most significant ones throughout time and space? If one cannot deny the existence of what could be called Islamophobia (Karim never uses the word), are we sure that it is always characterized in the same way and that it is still the dominant discourse on Islam?
The dissemination of information over the Internet, the multiplication of alternative sources of information, and the rise of the South’s global media, of which Al-Jazeera is just an example, most probably change the mechanisms of domination and, therefore, influence how the representations of Muslims are constructed. In addition, the ambiguous effects of 9/11, which Karim briefly acknowledges in his afterword, probably have eased the spread of different forms of the stigmatization of Muslims that are not based primarily on a global approach toward Islam, but rather on a distinction between “good” and “bad” Muslims.

This still essentialist binary vision, which many in the media and governments adopt when they claim that the war on terror is being waged against terrorists and not Islam, therefore considers the clash to be inside Islam and not between “Islam” and the “West.” Obviously, highlighting the spread of the good/bad distinction does not mean that other forms of stigmatization (including those studied in *Islamic Peril*) are deemed irrelevant; it only advocates for a dynamic and a contextualized analysis of the media’s coverage of Islam and Muslims that, unfortunately, Karim does not put at the center of his investigation. The over-multiplication of sources, angles, events, and levels of analysis, as well as the lack of dynamism, do not, however, question the relevance and seriousness of this research, which everyone should be encouraged to read.

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*Islam and Dhimmitude: Where Civilizations Collide*

Bat Ye’or; tr. Miriam Kochan and David Littman

*Islam and Dhimmitude* is an attempt to confute the concept of “protected minority” (under which Islamic civilization established what was, up to its time, the most successful model of pluralistic society) with the worst aberrations from that model. The subtitle “Where Civilizations Collide” indicates how the author expects her polemic to serve the current wave of neo-imperialism. The book seeks to recruit Christians in support of the Zionist project by explaining away Christian expressions of appreciation of Muslim tolerance as a false consciousness inspired by a self-hatred she
calls dhimmitude, meaning a state of mind that acquiesces, even promotes, the victim’s own subjugation.

The book’s first half is devoted to proposing a paradigm in which Qur’anic verses in favor of human rights are ignored, official acts to the benefit of dhimmis are brushed off as machinations to breed resentment between dhimmi groups, and injustices against Muslims are figments of the imagination invented to whitewash the Islamic master plan for subjugating the non-Islamic world into a state of dhimmitude. The second half works within this paradigm to vilify Christian anti-Zionists (including Europeans as well as Arabs) as dhimmis pawns of Muslim oppressors. (Curiously, she does not attempt to dismiss Jewish critics of Israel in the same manner.)

The author declares that “the terms ‘religious minorities’ and ‘Islamic tolerance’ should be completely excluded from serious research in this field” (p. 22). She also cuts short quotations when their context undermines her thesis. Thus, “whoever obeys the messenger obeys Allah” (p. 36) is cut off from its essential conclusion “but if any turns away, we have not sent thee to watch over their (evil deeds)” (Qur’an 4:80).

By omitting any evidence that would undermine her premise, Bat Ye’or turns a collection of alleged persecutions into a claim of a persistent persecuted status. She forces her discussion into a context of harbi and jihadi (e.g., pp. 27, 38) stereotypes that might delight Osama bin Ladin but will leave knowledgeable scholars and the majority of lay Muslims astonished at how she has alienated the discussion from mainstream Islamic thought and the reality of Muslim practice. Contradicting both mainstream Islamic jurisprudence and the Qur’an (e.g., 2:193), she defines jihâd as “inviting non-Muslims to convert to Islam, then, if they refused, to fight them until victory” (p. 38).

The author defines dhimmitude to include “Christian anti-Judaism” (p. 28). She also shows little respect for the historical record. In mentioning Muhammad’s (pbuh) conflict with the Jews of Madinah, she dismisses (without identifying) the accusations of treachery leveled against the Jews. The judgment against the Banu Qurayza, taken from the Jewish law by their erstwhile ally Sa’d ibn Mu’adh, whom they insisted judge their case instead of Muhammad, is labeled as “part of a strategy of conflicts or alliances with the Arab tribes, aimed at unifying them under Muhammad’s command” (p. 37).

The author relies on context-dropping, cut-and-paste quotations from scholars aimed at putting the most malicious spin on their arguments, omitting or glossing over nuances that might require qualification of her claims, and a bias toward those scholars with the harshest views on dhimmis. She
considers an-Nawawi’s view that a Muslim cannot be executed for the murder of a dhimmī a more representative statement of Islamic law than the fact that Muhammad ordered a Muslim executed for just such a crime (p. 75). She prefers al-Mawardi over ʿUmar ibn al-Khattab as the authority on Islamic law, and asserts her indifference to the objections that other Islamic authorities may have to al-Mawardi’s views (p. 350).

The survival of dhimmī communities and the appointment of dhimmīs to high administrative positions is dismissed as the “inevitable result of the Islamic conquests which reserved the military sector to warlike Muslim tribes, and assigned the administration of the vanquished Christian peoples to their coreligionists” (p. 75). She argues that the very fact that Christians prospered under Islam was because they were collaborators and traitors to their own faith community, playing on inter-Christian rivalry to serve personal ambitions, and attempting to blame the suffering of Christians on anonymous Jews (p. 110). She tops this off by claiming that European persecution of Jews became worse after the rise of Islam both because Europeans learned new techniques of persecution from Muslims (p. 113 ff.) and because Jews were blamed for collaborating with Muslims during the Crusades (p. 117).

According to the author, fedeyeen (which Wehr’s English-Arabic dictionary defines as “one who sacrifices his life, especially for his country”) is “literally a fighter against Christians for the triumph of Islam” (p. 319). She claims that “the ‘enemies of God’ [is] an expression very common in the Koran to describe Jews, Christians and other non-Muslims” (p. 349), although the phrase is never used in the Qur’an to denote Christians. Moreover, the only time it is used in connection with Jews is a reference to particular Jews who identified themselves as enemies of Gabriel (2:98), which is no different in its use to describe Muslims who engage in hypocrisy (63:1). She objects that the movement to substitute the phrase “Abrahamic civilization” for “Judeo-Christian civilization” is exclusive of Jews and Christians, because Muslims think of Abraham as a Muslim.

Protests of Eastern Christians against the Vatican’s decision to remove the charge of deicide against Jews are blamed on a desire to please Muslims (pp. 272-72), despite the fact that the author knows full well that the Qur’an rejects the claim of deicide (p. 272). As her agenda prohibits her from admitting that Palestinian Christians and Muslims have a shared cause as victims of Israeli persecution, she claims that Arab Christian anti-Zionism is dhimmī submission to Muslim masters. Even the Israeli murder of Christians is the fault of Muslims (pp. 278, 386).
At least the author documents her sources. Thus, anyone seeking to use her allegations as a starting point for a serious study of this subject may go to the original sources to determine what actually happened and explore, with sound research and a more scholarly attitude, whether the persecution was inspired by, or in violation of, Islamic principles and the spirit of minority protection. Beyond that, this book has little to offer serious scholars of Islam or of world civilizations. It has much to offer propagandists who seek rhetorical ammunition to increase, rather than decrease, the hatred and strife in the world.

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**Beyond Veil and Holy War: Islamic Teachings and Muslim Practices with Biblical Comparisons**

*Saleem Ahmed*


In the aftermath of 9/11, Muslims grappled with the shock of seeing the horrific attacks and their attribution to so-called Muslim fundamentalists. Some questioned whether indeed there was anything in the Qur’an that could condone such acts and whether negative portrayals were in any way indicative of their religion. Others struggled with accusations as non-Muslims similarly groped for answers. *Beyond Veil and Holy War* exemplifies one such struggle.

Written in a question-and-answer format, the book answers many of these questions and calls for *ijtihād*, or objective soul-searching, in order to differentiate between behaviors that Islam preaches and the practices that some Muslims follow. The intended audience is non-Muslims looking for answers, as well as Muslims searching for reasons for the dubious behavior of fellow Muslims.

The book presents an Islam that celebrates religious pluralism and is compassionate toward human weaknesses. It is divided into two parts: the current situation and a vision for the future. The first part contains 13 chapters and provides a background in contemporary issues relating to Islam. The first three chapters deal with the Muslims’ basic beliefs and sources of guidance. The author relies on the primary sources alone – the Qur’ān more so than the Hadith – to support his arguments throughout the book.
Whereas he is critical of the Hadith, he presents proofs for the modern analytical mind that the Qur’an is indeed the word of God. These are verses containing “predictions,” in the form of descriptions of natural phenomena, that anticipated recent scientific discoveries. This reflects present day i`jaz discourse, the theory of the Qur’an’s inimitability, that has transcended the medieval discourse of language. A brief historical overview of the major sects also is included. The author argues against defining Islam through its various sects and advocates broadening it to epitomize faith in a single God, equal respect of all prophets, affirmation of the equality of all races and the doing of righteous deeds.

Chapter 4, “The Universality of God’s Message,” argues for including the founders of the world’s major religions under the broad umbrella of “unnamed prophets” of Islam. Chapter 5 is devoted to the more practical duties of Muslims and stresses the importance of belief, righteous actions, and duties to others over Islam’s ritualistic aspects.

Chapters 6 to 13 examine various controversial issues within contemporary Islam, among them jihad, the status of women, marriage, divorce, female circumcision, inheritance, adultery, homosexuality, lesbianism, food, alcohol, gambling, usury, slavery, orphans, amusement, music, dance, and the punishments for crimes. In these chapters, the author brings forward evidence from the Qur’an and the Hadith that points to Islam’s more compassionate and broad-minded practice. In the chapter “Jihad and Violence,” the author examines some of the issues relating to the Middle East conflict. The author also seems to accede to the neo-orientalist claim that Islam spread primarily by the sword, although many historians no longer ascribe to it.

Noteworthy about the book are the Biblical comparisons. These consist of Biblical passages that correspond to Qur’anic ones, which provides a cultural and religious context for the Qur’anic verses. Included are brief explanatory notes by Rabbi Avi Magid of Honolulu’s Temple Emanu-El and Regina Pfeiffer, a Biblical studies instructor at Honolulu’s Chaminade University.

_Beyond Veil and Holy War_ comes with a forward in which a Muslim, a Jewish, and a Christian perspective are presented. The Muslim perspective is given by Dr. Fida Muhammad Khan, the Jewish perspective by Gregg J. Kinkley, and the Christian perspective by Regina Rossi Pfeiffer. Kinkley’s and Pfeiffer’s perspectives are quite helpful, especially in explaining how Jewish law has gone beyond the Torah and the importance of the rabbinic contributions. This information is useful in explaining Rabbi Magid’s comments, which otherwise may seem short and dismissive of the Torah’s laws.
The second part contains three chapters. The first is an introspective analysis in which Ahmed tries to find a reason for the variance between Qur’anic teachings and some Muslim practices based on the Hadith. He hypothesizes that the Prophet may have been following Biblical practices prior to receiving the Qur’anic injunctions. Chapter 15 is a prospective synthesis. “Based on Qur’anic injunctions, this future-looking chapter underscores that we are all creatures of the same God and that, while our respective messengers may have been different, the Message has always been the same: Believe in One Almighty God and then lead a righteous life.” It closes with an invitation for the reader to visit the website at www.believersall.net.

The last chapter is a summary of the book.

The author has succeeded in presenting a strong case for tolerance and compassion in Islam based on the primary sources. The main weakness is his failure to note that Islamic practice and law has overstepped the Qur’an and even the Hadith, and has relied more and more on the work of scholars, especially of the medieval period. This accounts for some of the discrepancies between the Qur’anic text and Muslim practices. The author seems to be advocating a return to basics.

The book is not a scholarly work and contains some minor mistakes, especially in the transliteration of Arabic words. It reflects a contemporary view of Islam and is pleasantly accessible to the general reader. Its main strength is the inclusion of Biblical comparisons and the contribution of Christians and Jews. Thus, it exemplifies outstretched hands of friendship uniting people of various faiths.

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Following Muhammad: Rethinking Islam in the Contemporary World

Carl W. Ernst

Following Muhammad is a scholarly, but not academic, book directed at the general reading public. Written by a religious studies scholar with an evident sympathy for Islam, it seeks to address western prejudices about
Islam by presenting a clear, concise, and accessible picture of the faith in context. Although the author explores Islam’s historical evolution, his primary focus is to balance this with insights into how Muslims themselves understand their religion in contemporary as well as historical times. Although primarily directed toward non-Muslims, whose essentialist media-driven assumptions about Islam are constantly lamented by Ernst, it is also of interest to the Muslim reading public as a refreshing departure from standard accounts of Muslims and Islam. Although not a textbook, it could be profitably used as a text for discussion in a variety of courses.

Two key issues to which Ernst returns repeatedly are, first, the erroneous western tendency of assuming that fundamentalists are the “true” representatives of Islam, and, second, the importance of recognizing the part colonialism has played in shaping contemporary developments in the Muslim world. By drawing comparisons with Christianity, Judaism, and other faiths, he highlights the unacceptability – and indeed absurdity – of many generic assumptions about Islam and Muslims. Instead, he stresses the importance of non-Muslims recognizing the diversity of faith and practice in time and space that characterizes Islam, just as it does all other world religions.

The book is divided into six chapters organized in a thematic rather than a chronological manner in order to reflect the author’s self-proclaimed emphasis on “rethinking” Islam today. Chapter 1 explores western perceptions of, and prejudices toward, Islam in modern and medieval times and suggests ways to avoid such prejudices in our own time. Chapter 2 looks at what is meant by the term religion and how evolving western definitions of religion have shaped western perceptions of other faiths, including Islam. This is counterbalanced by a survey of how Muslims have defined Islam by assessing its historical vocabulary and the vocabulary used by present-day Muslims.

Chapter 3 looks at Islam’s sources: Prophet Muhammad and the Qur’an. Ernst avoids giving a standard biography and instead presents the Prophet as an exemplar through reference to his life story. He justifies his approach by drawing comparisons with the Buddha and Jesus as figures of faith as well as history. He compares and contrasts the Qur’an to other scriptures, pointing to its unique status as the Word of God, which is comparable not to the Bible but to Jesus, who is also described as the Word of God in the Christian tradition. This chapter both grants Islam its own unique character and places it within the context of world religions.
Chapter 4 investigates the development of Islamic ethics on the foundations provided by the Qur’an and the Hadith literature, and their elaboration through interaction with other traditions, including Greek philosophy. Key here is Ernst’s point that, in fact, both western and Islamic civilizations rest on the same foundations: Semitic prophetic revelation and Greek philosophical knowledge. It also looks at the impact of colonialism upon Islamic ethics and how Muslims have responded to the founding of modern nation-states, the rise of science, and such other issues as gender equality. Chapter 5 looks at Islamic spirituality in the form of Sufism and Shi‘i spirituality and discusses Islamic art and the value of such a designation. In the concluding chapter, Ernst gives his view of how Islam might be reimagined in the twenty-first century to create a dialogue between Muslims and non-Muslims and disempower those on both sides who wish to promote the idea of a clash of civilizations.

The book is well-written and lucid. Although the organization of contents appears idiosyncratic at first glance, the book’s narrative flow is generally masterful. Ernst successfully moves from present to past and back again in a manner that is both logical and clear to follow. The only section where this breaks down slightly is in his discussion of Islamic art, which sits rather uncomfortably in the chapter on spirituality.

In many ways, Following Muhammad is a highly personal work. It does not seek to present ground-breaking research or proffer original material to experts in Islamic studies. However, it is an elegant and masterful presentation of a religious tradition in an accessible manner, as well as a heartfelt plea for non-Muslims to understand it. It is clearly based on great erudition and knowledge not just of Islam, but also of other faiths. This makes it possible for Ernst to offer new perspectives for non-Muslims and illustrate the naivety of making monolithic assumptions about millions of people. He successfully brings Islam into the fold of world religions while also maintaining the specificity and diversity of Muslim praxis. Following Muhammad is a worthy contribution to the field of contemporary commentaries on what Islam is and an original introduction to that faith for non-Muslims.

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The Trouble with Islam: A Wake-Up Call for Honesty and Change

Irshad Manji


Set up as an open letter to Muslims, Irshad Manji’s book contains one letter, nine chapters, six pages of recommended readings, and three pages of acknowledgement. Together the 247 pages charge that “[t]otalitarian impulses lurk in mainstream Islam” (p. 3, original emphasis) and reform is crucial for the world’s security. Her open letter informs readers that “Islam is on very thin ice” (p. 1) with her, and asks for her charges to be heard. She then provides an autobiographical narrative that jumps from her days as a youngster in a Baptist after school program to a madressa and junior high school. It moves to her career as a journalist pioneering QueerTelevision then to 9/11 and its aftermath. Interwoven between these brief accounts are her indictments of Islam and Muslims. She ends the book with her bid for reform.

In a colloquial style, Manji lays her heavy charge: mainstream Muslims are “intellectually atrophied and morally impaired” (p. 55). Regardless of their location, they are universally homophobic, anti-Semitic, and misogynistic. Those arguing otherwise are ignorant, fraudulently cry racism or injustice when criticized, and are compliant in all the gross human rights violations occurring in Muslim countries. Muslims who promote Islam’s egalitarian message and reconcile contradictions by engaging in discourse and contextualizing the Qur’an, the Shari`ah, and the Hadith, or cite cultural influence to renounce stoning, rape laws, or discrimination are not, according to her, following mainstream Islam as they would like to think. Rather, they are acting despite it. Islam, according to Manji, is “really” a tribal religion that is centrally controlled by Arabs who interpret the “Koran,” a contradictory book suffering from “a mountain range of moods” (p. 228), to propagate “desert Islam.” Globally, Muslims cling to “fundamentalism,” a glorification of the Islam of the past, which actually was not as egalitarian as they claim. This, along with Arab imperialism, are responsible for the social ills of Muslims, not western imperialism, colonialism, or “the Jewish conspiracy.”

Nonetheless, with Orientalist tropes and her western-cultivated commitment to fairness and the individual, which, she informs, did not evolve from Islam, Manji says there is room for Islam – as long as it reforms. “Operation Ijtihad” involves questioning Islam, its tenets, and proponents by reviving
the concept of *ijtihād* (independent reasoning); empowering women financially; and, ultimately, using western democratic ideals, including recruiting Oprah to head a western-based media coalition in the Middle East, to screen and develop pluralistic Islam. The result would be elevated Muslims and less “fundamentalism” in the world.

Throughout her diatribe, Manji poses legitimate questions regarding stoning, rape laws, women being barred from mosques, anti-Semitism, homophobia, the Shari‘ah, and Muslim-on-Muslim oppression. However, she uses totalistic language and presents her suppositions as binary oppositions, which ultimately antagonize the reader. To confront anti-Semitism, which does rear its ugly head among some (but not all) Muslims, she trivializes the oppression faced by Palestinians, arguing that potential freedoms under Israeli law are better than what religious minorities have in Muslim countries. In other words, the oppression suffered by a disempowered individual is meaningless if they are Muslim. To highlight western tolerance, she downplays racism and discrimination, cautioning that unchecked multiculturalism will ultimately threaten western freedom. She urges non-Muslims to speak up and criticize Islam, but nowhere does she encourage them to do it with humility or respect. In her binary world, the West is fair and should police Islam.

What is most perplexing is that as Manji berates Muslims for lacking *ijtihād*, her book, ironically, prevents Muslims from engaging in any meaningful dialogue with her. She dismisses scholars, activists, and anyone who contextualizes the Qur’an or calls oppression un-Islamic cultural deviations. She further bars dialogue by writing that Islam is how Muslims behave, not the theory; therefore, she prevents any pro-faith rebuttals. It does not matter that the Qur’an advocates equality, because Muslims do not practice it. The Qur’an has no potential, because, Manji argues, it is vague. Moreover, as a rant she describes as a struggle to control and as a colloquial letter, she leaves no room for counterarguments. She acknowledges her reader’s frustration through dismissive rhetorical questions, but silences her reader through insults (hijab is a condom that “inoculate[s] ... from ‘unsafe’ intellectual activity ...” p. 12) and by blaming Muslims for the oppression they experience. While not all Muslims are oppressed, this should not negate the experiences of those who are. Consequently Muslims, particularly those who are invested in *ijtihād*, are put on the defensive in order to fight for legitimacy. Manji ultimately slams shut the door to dialogue that she claims to be fighting to open.
Interestingly Manji, who identifies herself as a tentative Muslim, has found the Qur’anic theme of humility encouraging. Humility, she states, “sets us free to ponder God’s will – without any obligation to toe the dictated line” (p. 228). It is a key component of her self-labeled, dramatic call for reform. But humility, the revival of *ijtihād*, and applying it to the Qur’an and the Shari`ah are not new. Pro-faith Muslim scholars and activists have urged – and are urging – such engagement. Ironically, this is a commonality that she shares with them. However, a pro-faith perspective seeks perfection within Islam not from outside of it, and the contradictions that Manji sneers at are the grounds for engagement and reform. Moreover, the Qur’an states in several places that it is a problematic text, that the best of the believers will seek the best meaning, and that those bent on spreading mischief will not. But Manji’s rules of pluralism do not make any room for this type of discussion.

Despite its numerous shortcomings, Manji’s book should be a required reading. Meaningful and educated engagement is part of *ijtihād*, and Muslims, especially scholars coming from a pro-faith or activist background, need to continue to confront Orientalism and neo-Orientalism head on and seek answers to address such questions. Such questions are not a challenge to faith, but a way to assert it.

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*Sword of Islam: Muslim Extremism from the Arab Conquest to the Attack on America*

*John F. Murphy Jr.*


This book presents itself as an academic work, with 14 pages of endnotes, a 12-page bibliography, and a detailed 18-page index. While pretending to distinguish between Islam as a religion and Muslims on the one hand, and Islamic extremism on the other, these elements are mixed up throughout the book. In addition, every instance of Arab or Muslim resistance to occupation or oppression is put under the global category of “Muslim extremism,” a term that has already acquired a connotation of violence due to the book’s title.

The book is a collection of anecdotal evidence, personal opinions, hearsay, and interviews and quotes from “anonymous sources” that are pre-
sumably available to the author, who is engaged in intelligence work. Although filled with details about political violence and terrorism (without distinguishing between the two terms) that can be found in the popular press, it is, however, full of gross mistakes and errors. Thus, the information found in it is unreliable. Moreover, the overall interpretation of events reflects a deep ignorance of the meanings of historical events for the people concerned. Some quotations will illustrate this brief assessment.

On the question of the author’s proclaimed intention, the back cover states: “This book is not an indictment of Islam, one of the three beautiful religions which bloomed in this desert land. It is an indictment of those who took from Islam its most uncompromising tenets, forgetting the message of love that accompanies them …” The author even denounces the stereotyped image of Arabs and Muslims that dominate the American scene, and the reader can find such passages as the one given below:

Another factor which inflames Arab opinion – among Christian Arabs and Muslims (yes, there are Christian Arabs, not only in Syria and Lebanon but in Egypt as well) is the defamatory image of Arabs which continually appears in American books, newspapers, on television, and in the movies. […] The thoughtless stereotyping of Arabs in motion pictures as rabid religious fanatics, caring nothing for human lives, has angered and humiliated Arabs both here and abroad. Anyone seeing such films could easily believe that Islam gives its blessings to the acts of the terrorists who act in its name!’ (p. 361)

So, the book is not problematic at the level of intention and is not overtly antagonistic to Islam, as the work of, say, a Daniel Pipes would be. Rather, it is deficient at the level of factual information, a defect that calls Murphy’s knowledge, understanding, and interpretation of facts into severe question.

To illustrate this assessment, consider the following: On page 360, the author explains the term mujahidin as “soldiers of the faith” and goes on to explain that the suffix -din means “faith.” Besides ignoring that this suffix simply indicates the plural of mujahid, the definition reduces the term to only one of its dimensions. On two occasions (pages 22 and 25), the author confuses North and South Yemen, asserting that North Yemen, instead of South Yemen, was a Marxist state. Referring to the 1956 war against Egypt, the author forgets that France was an active participant, along with Britain and Israel (p. 23). On page 28, he translates the term “Al Qaeda” as “the Center” instead of “the Base.”
One finds such errors or inaccuracies on almost every page. In fact, I finally stopped making a systematic list of such errors, as they were too numerous. Even in the glossary, Murphy gets mixed up between *raqiyyah* and *baqiyyah*. The effect of these errors is so great that the reader cannot rely on any piece of information. Thus, because the general reader cannot determine which events and terms are correctly reported and which are not, the book is useless as a source of knowledge.

The cumulative effect of the author’s misinterpretation of these details is reflected in his lack of understanding of more general political events. Indeed, Murphy has simply adopted the Israeli narrative as is, uncritically, to describe and understand events. Consider the following statement:

> However, the violence in the occupied territories continued, again carried out by the population itself, not by the hitmen of the PLO. Fighting civilians was something that the citizen soldiers of the IDF had not been trained to do, and the day-to-day hostilities were taking a toll of them. (p. 59)

In other words, an army of occupation, one that is heavily armed and one of the strongest in the world, which is in the occupied territories precisely to subdue a civilian population (there is no Palestinian army…) and control the land for the benefit of Jewish Israelis is not carrying out violent repression itself. Rather, it is being victimized by the local unarmed population. This sentence probably says it all, as it is symptomatic of the whole book.

The reader who ignores these irritants and continues reading will find a great amount of details about the movements of a suspected terrorist or about the contacts or cooperation between such “terrorists.” But without an overall structure to give some meaning to this collection of empirical facts, and without the assurance that they are correctly reported, how is this information to be processed? Not having the patience to do it, I skipped many pages of such details and thus failed to identify more factual mistakes.

In short, this book is totally useless and maybe even harmful in its overall effect, as it reinforces the Orientalist paradigm: Extremism and violence are constant features of Islam, and the Arab conquests to the attacks on America are all part of one and the same phenomenon. In spite of Murphy’s verbal precautions, the book will probably be understood by its readers as an overall indictment of Islam, based on gross factual errors and a total lack of understanding of the phenomenon of political violence. Fortunately, the
Author does not have the credentials needed to market this book as an academic piece of work, and it is hoped that the book will simply be ignored.

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**Islamic Fundamentalism and the Doctrine of Jihad**

*A. J. Abraham*


A. J. Abraham, a professor at CUNY and the New York Institute of Technology, as well as a scholar of Near and Middle Eastern History, accurately states that the “Islamic Tendency” has been a significant phenomenon in contemporary times and has “attracted a great deal of negative attention” (p. 2). This compendium packages two prior works: *The Warriors of God: Jihad (Holy War) and the Fundamentalists of Islam* and a monograph entitled *Khoumani and Islamic Fundamentalism: Contributions of Islamic Sciences to Modern Civilization*. The former is based largely on thesis material coauthored with George I. Haddad at Princeton; the latter is a monograph presented during the 1979 hostage crisis in Iran. The intent of bringing these two works together is ambitious: to foster a “sympathetic” but objective lay understanding of jihad (p. 2) that excludes the sensationalist views exploited by all factions for political aspirations. The author’s premise, as noted in the preface, is the need for “balanced yet opposing points of view” (p. 3).

The first work provides a background and insight on jihad that delves beyond the “holy war versus internal struggle” discussion. A methodological breakdown of jihad into seven chapter topics, starting with the hermeneutical “Doctrine of Jihad” and ending with the legalistic “Status of Non-Moslems,” follows a logical pedagogy in the conventional understanding of jihad from an ideological framework to an actual interpreted law. Abraham also acknowledges factors leading to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism (p. 12), and thereby provides a succinct framework for further discussion. Inasmuch as these factors could have been more seamlessly tied to current developments across the Middle East, Abraham treats the defunct clash between the Islamic world and the Soviet empire as more a symptom of “resisting secularism” than of addressing the actual appeal of Islamic fundamentalism itself to individuals and the collective Muslim psyche (p.
In a similar manner, it is perplexing and hardly trivial that, while sensitive to the need to keep the presentation current and relevant, the author did not update the use of “Moslem” throughout the work.

One suspects that the academic framework for Abraham and Haddad in the original *The Doctrine of Jihad in Islam* precluded alternate views of jihad being the principal “instrument to expand Islam throughout the entire world” (p. 67), although alternate reasoning for its appeal and entrenchment in the masses of the so-called Muslim world is encouraged in the concluding remarks that follow the monograph.

The second part of the volume, Abraham’s monograph, will be more appealing to general audiences in its flow and subject matter, because its purpose is to foster mutual understanding between Muslims and Christians. The monograph consists of three short chapters that elaborate upon the dialogue and interaction between the Christian and Muslim schools of thought. Starting with a short historical synopsis (aptly titled “Translation and Transition”), it then discusses the theocratic Islamic state and its relationship to other concepts, such as democracy and social liberalism (“The Islamic Ideal and the Modern World”) and concludes with an analysis of contemporary issues between the secular, non-Muslim world and the Islamic world (“Tensions and Resolutions for the Future”).

The work encapsulated in the monograph exemplifies the “sympathetic” element of the understanding of jihad mentioned in the volume’s foreword. The author provides supporting notes and references that are invaluable to the lay reader who wants to understand how Muslims perceive the Christian Trinity (p. 91), and is a useful insight into the concepts communicated in the compendium’s first part with regard to the distinctions between the types of “non-Moslems” and their status and role within the Islamic world (p. 60).

The rationale for an Islamic understanding of Christianity is eloquently highlighted by examples in the monograph. This is the author’s indelible contribution to the canon of interfaith dialogue. A “sympathetic” insight into the Prophet’s adaptation of Islamic law actually shows Islam as a dynamic and inclusive doctrine and conveys Abraham’s appreciation of the Islamic state as being more of a proactive approach to social justice than a monolithic response to the influence of non-Arab societies (p. 98). Surprisingly, his concluding remarks framing the compendium do not address these implications, for he does not contrast the basic tenets of Islamic teachings from the Prophet’s time with the current psyche of Islamic nations. Furthermore, the author’s analysis, even within
the context of developments in Iran at the time, tends toward broad generalizations: By convenient use of the term fundamentalism to describe the Islamic world, but by not exploring the response of the nonfundamentalist Islamic world beyond the postcolonialist, secular response to modernization, Abraham creates broad ramifications. A more comprehensive analysis of Islamic fundamentalism as a continuum would strengthen his arguments. Also, the premise of a “revolution in reverse” would be effective, had the link between the failures of secularism in the contemporary Islamic world and the conventional interpretation of Islamic doctrines been qualified, rather than epitomized as the fundamentalists’ view of a penultimate, encroaching “cultural evolution of modern societies” (p. 114).

In short, *Islamic Fundamentalism and the Doctrine of Jihad* is an attempt at a fair representation of a doctrine and its influence on the Islamic state. The essence of a balanced view is substantial, but the relationship between the two discrete works, as well as their relevance to the post-9/11 world, could have been discussed more explicitly. Abraham successfully provides insights into the “Moslem” mindset and its origins, for in both works the motivation behind the interpretations is laid out within a historical context, especially with regard to Muslim interactions with the Christian world. Readers will appreciate the dialogue between the Christian and Muslim worlds in the accompanying notes. The compendium ends with a positive perspective that, however controversial a premise, Islamic fundamentalism will evolve due to its interaction with the secular and Christian worlds (p. 114).

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**Pride, Faith, and Fear: Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa**

*Charlotte A. Quinn and Frederick Quinn*


If the real value of a book – any book – comes from its ability to present itself as a subject of various, but not contradictory, readings, this book undoubtedly fulfils that value. From the point of view of a Muslim and non-western reader, the book reflects the western fear of Islam as a power in crisis but adopts a line of argument against mainstream western writings on
Islam. In other words, it argues against the prevalent claim that Islam, especially after the collapse of communism, represents the most dangerous threat to western values. Further, the book suggests that “opportunities for positive engagement with Africa’s Muslim communities and states abound on the political, social, religious, economic, and cultural level” (p. 150).

Motivated by the need “to find a reasonable avenue of exploration and accommodation with countries and cultures that differ from our own (the Western culture),” the book unveils the mutual misunderstanding between the West and the Muslim world. Thus, it argues that the “Muslim world is treated (by the West) as having a single dimension, as if Muslims in general had bonded with Osama bin Laden” (p. 4). It also argues that the West sees Muslims as “stubbornly holding the idea that Christians have not abandoned the Crusaders’ mentality, zealously trying to destroy all traces of Muslim civilizations in their entirety” (p. 4). Being aware of the harmful impacts of these misleading images not only on the media, but also – and this is the most dangerous – on the “contemporary (academic) analysis,” the book invites the People of the Book (ahl al-kitāb) to work together toward peace and reconciliation, emphasizing that “it will be a difficult but not impossible road.” Without this effort to make peace, the book suggests, there will be chaos and violence.

Addressing the crisis of Islam or of Muslims, in fact, the book does not neglect the glorious past of Islam in Africa. For the authors of the book, it was Islam, or rather Muslim trade, “that linked Africa (earlier in the eleventh century) to the wider world and put it on the maps of time” (p. 18).

One of the main goals of the book is to draw our attention to the fact that the attempts made by the reformists and jihadists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to solve their societies’ problems were failures. Their recipes could neither respond creatively to modern challenges nor absorb the most human and progressive implications of recent world developments.

In practical terms, the book focuses on the problems that Muslims are facing in five African countries, problems that might develop into a suitable environment for violence and disorder. The main characteristics of these problems are seen to be economic in nature, for all African countries (not only the five countries being analyzed) suffer from an economic decline that the authors assert is linked to governmental corruption and inefficiency. This justifies the happy solution adopted by authors: These problems can be solved by replacing corrupt regimes with uncorrupted ones. Within this context, the West’s only responsibilities are to provide economic and technical
assistance to the African people and improve economic conditions by creating jobs so that unemployed youths will not become the fuel for terrorism.

Speaking of terrorism, the West, after long centuries of plundering and exploiting Africa’s resources is now, supposedly, going to see Africa through sympathetic and helpful eyes. But that is only because of its own fear of terrorism. In my judgement, insofar as relations between the current western interest in Africa and the fear of terrorism can be established, it can be said that Islam also brings Africa to our maps once again. But while Islam in the past was a means to civilize and urbanize Africa, it is now an instrument to create violence and protest.

The book asserts that violent protests in Africa must be seen as the product of its local circumstances and not as an extension of Middle Eastern violence. But in doing this, the book tries to isolate African Muslims (“black” Islam) from its Arabic source. Paradoxically, it seems that Africa is beginning to resemble the Middle East as an arena of confrontation between Islam and the West. So, the book calls for a strategy to “save Africa” through economic and technical aid programs devised and funded by the West. Such an undertaking, the authors claim, will help Africa fight the penetration of so-called “Arab” terrorism.

The five countries analyzed, except for South Africa, continue to suffer from political and economic decline. Muslims, especially in countries where they are the majority, believe that the only way to remove this problem is to implement the Shari‘ah. This has led to the emergence of transforming the Shari‘ah into a political program. By applying Islamic law, Sudan, for example, has established benchmarks for peace and stability, which, in turn, has encouraged trade and the enrichment of its domain (p. 19). However, in many countries, among them Nigeria and Sudan, the Shari‘ah has been politicized, while elsewhere (e.g., Kenya and South Africa), it was only implemented as a personal family law (p. 11). In both cases, however, the Shari‘ah can be seen as a political ideology or a sign of identity that “assumes a major importance for Muslims, representing the glue that holds society (or community) together.”

Finally, speaking historically, the book contends that Islam was the religion that linked Africa to the wider world and put it on the maps of the time (p. 18).

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The Infidel Within: Muslims in Britain since 1800

Humayun Ansari


While written from a solid historical methodological approach, Ansari’s *The Infidel Within* will surely appeal across disciplines to professors and students of Islam in the West, the social sciences, colonial and postcolonial studies, and ethnic and minority studies. This work is encyclopedic with regard to its many references to well-known and obscure pockets of Muslim communities that thrived and/or disappeared since Islam began to take root in Britain. Therefore, it will be an important tool for future advanced research and very helpful for the beginning student. This work combines astute social analysis with primary and secondary sources, including early Muslim newspapers in Britain, political speeches, and first-person narratives. Perhaps one of the book’s greatest contributions is its dense quotations from first-person historical sources, which give the reader an authentic sense of what it must have been like to be a Muslim in Britain struggling with various cultural and religious issues.

The underlying question of this book is, simply put, considering the many waves of Muslim immigration, intermarriage, and evidence of indigenous conversion: Can there be a single British Muslim identity? Throughout the work, we are introduced to the many individuals who contributed to British Muslim heritage: poor immigrant seamen from every corner of the British Empire, high-ranking South Asian Muslims who intermingled with British high society, the more eccentric members of Muslim countries who came to Britain as visitors and became enduring caricatures in the popular British press, English converts who tried to universalize Islam along Unitarian theological lines, as well as the many charismatic Muslim leaders from various ethnic groups who promulgated Islam according to their own rejection of and/or adherence to their particular culture’s manifestation of the Islamic experience.

Ansari’s central premise is that understanding a community’s development cannot occur without understanding the many cultural, class, ethnic, racial, and economic forces that are simultaneously at work within that community. From such a standpoint, the author traces the path of various Muslim communities as they took root throughout Britain at different class and ethnic levels. Furthermore, Ansari refuses to settle for any easy model that would explain the emergence of given communities. In fact, he situates
his discussion of both Muslim communities as well as indigenous English responses to them within a grounded historical framework tied to the waxing and waning of the British colonial endeavor. The book is divided into two main sections: Muslim communities before World War II, and those communities’ subsequent development.

Particularly noteworthy sections of the author’s argument take shape around discussions of notions of race, or “blackness,” as well as gender, as it was often articulated with regard to examples of Muslim men marrying white women. Indigenous English reactions to Muslim communities were undoubtedly impacted by national economic circumstances. When Muslim men took up the important tasks done by British soldiers away at war, they acquired some economic stability and social acceptance. However, during times of relative economic hardship and the reintegration of English soldiers in the interwar periods, indigenous British reactions to Muslim populations became increasingly sharper. Popular discourse manifested itself in frenzied discussions of “saving” white women from marrying “black” (i.e., non-English) men. This discussion mirrored the fear of the empire’s collapse and was symbolic of disintegrating power structures wherein “black” men were no longer entirely subordinate to white men. Ansari’s analysis of this phenomenon recalls such classic works on “blackness” as those articulated by Frantz Fanon, Homi Bhabha, and other social theorists writing about the many ironies of the postcolonial subject’s experience of living in the former colonial metropole.

As Muslim reactions to 9/11 have varied throughout the world, so too do they vary in Britain. It is perhaps in the variety of responses to this event that the distinctions among British Muslim communities become clear in a contemporary context. Despite great strides in education, higher socioeconomic standards of living, and the existence of Muslim institutions and their increased participation in British society and the political realm, 9/11 stirred up centuries-old discrimination against Muslims. Ansari points out that a marginal group of British Muslims do, in fact, subscribe to a “jihadist” mentality out of general sense of lost hope with regard to life in Britain. However, their marginalization is often not noted in the media, and younger generations of Muslims now face some of the same discrimination that previous generations of immigrants had to endure.

While young British Muslims today are far more apt to point out their rights as British citizens than their ancestors were, the fact that they
must still formulate ways to survive in a discriminatory environment raises the question of whether or not Muslims will ever be fully accepted in British society. While survival strategies a century ago often included modernization projects to incorporate Islam more thoroughly into western modes of living, today’s generation questions not only Islam, but also the goals of modernity. Ansari concludes that today’s younger generation actively questions traditional authority and is more willing to accept the hybrid nature of a pluralistic Islamic identity. This pluralism characterizes a transnational concept of an Islamic ummah that is less bound to nation and ethnicity, and is more concerned with an overarching Islamic ethic.

While the author’s perspective that British Muslims today still face great hurdles in gaining acceptance from their non-Muslim counterparts is somewhat pessimistic, there is space for hope in his acknowledgement that members of today’s generation have more resources and experience at their disposal to ensure that their voices may be heard more clearly than they might have been a century ago.

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**Caravanserai: Journey among Australian Muslims**  
*Hanifa Deen*  

A cavaranserai was an inn where travelling Muslim merchants would gather at night to relax after a hard day’s journey, share meals, and tell stories to each other. These themes of travelling and storytelling set the scene for Hanifa Deen’s wonderful book about these people, who, originally travellers themselves, arrived on the continent around the eighteenth century. Moreover, the book is a story of Deen’s journey around Australia to collect the stories of her fellow Muslim compatriots.

*Caravanserai* was originally published in 1995. The impetus behind the book was Deen’s sense during the first Gulf War (1991) that Muslims in Australia did not have a human face – they were known by the general public only through negative stereotypes. She sought to tell some of their stories to show that Muslims, just like any other group, were human
beings who “mow their lawns, are preoccupied with losing weight, worry about their jobs and mortgages, play sport, swap jokes or tell their children bedtime stories” (p. 8). She set out across Australia to collect their stories.

At the time, Deen found that Muslims were making their way in Australia, becoming more accepted by the wider community and established as one of many others in Australia’s multiethnic, multireligious society. The 9/11 tragedy changed all that, and Muslims in Australia, as in other western countries, found themselves treated as “enemy aliens.” Believing that the clock had been set back, the author felt an urgent need to retrace her steps to find out how her country’s Muslim communities were faring. The result of the second journey appears as part 4, and its three long chapters make up nearly one-third of the book.

Deen writes that she was asked time and again what kind of book she was writing and, surprisingly, found that answering this question was rather difficult. As she travelled, met people, and collected their stories, the style of Caravanserai emerged: part storytelling and part commentary. This combination has served her well, for her renditions of her interviewees’ stories are beautifully written. She describes the people she meets, the scene and ambiance of their meeting, and her thoughts and emotions as she retells their stories. She writes so well that I often felt that I was in the room with her, interacting with the people around her. This was all the more poignant for me, since I am an Australian from Perth, like her, but who became Muslim only after emigrating to Canada. Deen’s stories connected me with the Muslim community in Australia that I have never known.

Caravanserai is not an academic book, but her commentary and insights into the state of the Muslim community are penetrating and therefore make the book exceedingly useful for any academic study of Muslims. Time and again I found myself nodding at her analysis of the situation of Muslims in Australia, since they echoed with academic observations of Muslims in North America and Europe: the different strands of Islamic practice and belief; the infighting and turf wars; the struggles with keeping an Islamic identity in a secular, multicultural environment that is largely hostile to Islam even as it promotes tolerance and multiculturalism; and the immigrants’ struggles to settle into their new abode.

On the other hand, her descriptions of Muslims show that Muslim communities in the West are not uniformly the same. I was fascinated by her description of Eid al-Adha in Lakemba, the largest Muslim community in
Australia. Located in suburban Sydney, this predominately Lebanese-Australian community gathered from dawn on the street facing the mosque:

Flocks of young men stood around like peacocks or, from time to time, cruised a little, posed a little, and sent out their messages in non-verbal code. What resembled the old 1940s zoot suit – wide padded shoulders, long jackets and trousers – came in the most amazing hues: deep purples, brilliant emerald greens, mustard yellows and oleander pinks. Lebanese boys, with their modish hair styles and shiny shoes, displayed a style of formal dressing that I had not seen en masse for many a year – “cool” was everywhere. (p. 162)

Carpets are brought outside for the overflow from the mosque to pray on, and a village-like festival occurs. Non-Muslim Australians are gathered on their balconies, watching the spectacle.

The last section of the book, written after 9/11, has an entirely different tone from the rest of the book. Deen explores how a gang rape case in Sydney, in which 14 Lebanese-Australian boys gang raped seven white girls, became a lightening rod for Islamophobia, as part of the backlash by non-Muslim Australians to 9/11 and the Bali bombings. Australia’s mainstream society and media presented this incident as an example of what is wrong with Arab and Muslim culture. And, Muslim voices condemning the rapes were treated as suspect. The book closes with a distressing picture of how Australia treats its refugees: They are put into mandatory detention center surrounded by barbed wire and called by numbers rather than their names (not surprising, given that these centers are operated by a for-profit company that runs prisons in the United States).

Although Deen is still telling stories in this section, the commentary aspect has a stronger hand and, in fact, overshadows the storytelling aspect evoked by a caravansera. The commentary is a rather harsh analysis of Australian society and its seeming inability to deal humanely with its Muslim citizens. The book’s initial goal of showing the Muslims’ human face is somewhat lost in these last pages – here the aim is to try and sensitize a community that is going down a racist track to the sufferings of Muslims. However, her tone may well alienate well-meaning, but ignorant, white Australians and undo the bridges built through the first part of the book.

I thoroughly recommend Caravansera to anyone interested in Muslims in the West.

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Monica Ali’s debut novel *Brick Lane* has been met with critical acclaim. Not only was Ali selected as one of Granta’s Best Young British Novelists, her novel was short-listed for the Man Booker Prize. *Brick Lane* centers on the life of a young Bengali Muslim woman, Nazneen, who moves to London in order to live with her new husband, Chanu. At the beginning of the novel, Nazneen is a devout but docile and uninspiring character. By the end of the novel, she has journeyed “towards self-realisation,” had an affair, separated from her husband, and decided to bring up her two daughters alone.

Much of the praise that *Brick Lane* has elicited focuses on its “authenticity.” Reputable critics have praised Ali for her “timely insights,” and her novel has been judged to offer a “terrifically subtle portrait” of a Muslim marriage and provide “an insight into a religion that people often find confusing.” Articles that commend Ali for her “honest” and “precisely observed” descriptions of Muslims attest to her perceived status as a “native informant.” Although literary critics frequently warn that texts should not be read as transparent mediums through which you can drag “the real,” this is frequently forgotten when the author is someone from an ethnic or religious minority. Those critical of the current trend to read *Brick Lane* as a “window” through which to view the Muslim “Other” have been dismissed with alarming efficiency. Despite recent concurrent developments in literary theory, challenges to this assumed “transparency” have been dismissed as the opinions of “mullahs,” “Islamic fundamentalists,” or people who have “probably never read the book.”

Unfortunately, cliché-ridden characterization and clumsy stylistic weaknesses have been overlooked in the rush to applaud Ali for her “fascinating” depiction of what has been referred to as a hitherto “invisible” Muslim community. So why should we be concerned that her Muslim characters have been judged to be authentic? One could look at the dark hole that is Bangladesh, in which, according to the novel, Muslim men do little else but beat, pimp, or rape women. Or, one could focus on the central female character’s journey toward “self-realisation.” This journey panders to a 1960s style of western feminism. The fatalistic and passive Nazneen, having spent years praying in a “drugged”-like fashion and tending to her
husband’s corns and nasal hair, eventually becomes strong and independent. In order to do so, she has an affair, listens to a bit of pop music, and goes ice-skating.

If only the plot had been more daring and provocative. Nazneen could have insisted on learning English at college with Razia before heading off into a glittering teaching career. She could have helped one of her daughters become the first “hijabed” bus driver or car mechanic in Tower Hamlets. Or, she could have just found out what her rights as a Muslim woman actually were. Having discovered that the Prophet Muhammad helped with the housework, mended his own shoes, and defended women’s rights, Nazneen could at least have avoided her corn-duties.

*Brick Lane* has been welcomed precisely because it fails to challenge established prejudices about Muslims. The women are mostly bullied by their husbands and consider their marriages to be “good” if they are not “beaten.” *Brick Lane* perpetuates the myth that Muslim women can become assertive and confident only by becoming more westernized and less Muslim. Regrettably, many would consider the story of a Muslim woman who discovers and starts exercising her Islamic rights as “unconvincing.” That Nazneen, a passive and weak character who is infuriatingly unwilling to challenge her husband in matters of trivia, is happy to engage in an illicit sexual relationship that she believes will risk not only her husband’s anger but eternal damnation is considered far more convincing. Although many feminist critics congratulate Ali for writing the story of a Muslim woman who finds “her proper place in the world,” it is a shame that none question the assumption that a Muslim woman’s “proper place” can only be found in the full embrace of western liberalism.

Ali’s “Muslim meetings” constitute another area that has been commended for its accuracy. These meetings are full of stock Muslim characters that owe much to the unflattering portrayal of the “Arabs” populating Disney and Hollywood productions. For example, the Bengali Islamist character (who rivals Nazneen’s lover at these meetings) is “Arabised” in Hollywood fashion due to his political stance. This character, who is referred to only as “the Questioner,” has the “dangerous face of an enthusiast” and is a deathly skeletal figure. “Consumed by passion,” his clothes hang from his body like an “unnecessary extravagance.” His “flesh” is also “unnecessary,” and the “only extravagance” is “his nose, which was large.” Serious points made about suffering in the Muslim world are undermined by the fact that they are voiced by this unsavory caricature.
The Questioner is far from being the only figure of ridicule at these meetings. The “recently imported” imam hardly inspires respect. The narrative voice centers on his hypocrisy: He does not let his “little conference on sharia interfere with his consumption of a very large, lavishly glazed pastry.” His physical presence is equally unimpressive: wearing a pair of women’s shoes, he repeatedly wets and licks his lips, “has no idea what is going on,” and is “duly elected as Spiritual Leader.” Unfortunately these passages, clearly loaded with caricature, melodrama, and satire, have been read as “realist” in style and “authentic” in content.

Muslim concerns about representation cannot be dismissed by the argument that Brick Lane “is only a fiction” while critics continue to praise Ali for her “social observations” and “private insights.” That reviewers have been so quick to judge her unsympathetic “Muslim” characters as “precisely observed” tells us more about the existing prejudices than about the novel’s literary worth. Ali does not “capture” the “experience” of Muslim women in Britain; she just mobilizes familiar clichés that many are tired of hearing.

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The Jewish Obligation to Stand Up against Islamophobia in the United States

Lisabeth Kaplan and Paul Roochnik

First they came for the communists, and I did not speak out – because I was not a communist;
Then they came for the socialists, and I did not speak out – because I was not a socialist;
Then they came for the trade unionists, and I did not speak out – because I was not a trade unionist;
Then they came for the Jews, and I did not speak out – because I was not a Jew;
Then they came for me – and there was no one left to speak out for me.

The German anti-Nazi Protestant minister, Martin Niemoeller, spoke these poignant words following the end of World War II. Pastor Niemoeller reminds us that whenever society singles out a specific minority for abuse, the rest of society must resist. What folly it is to believe that during a time of insecurity and suspicion, any minority – religious, ethnic, or political – can long enjoy immunity from oppression. The Jewish people, perhaps more than other minorities, has an intimate familiarity with the plight of the scapegoat, a 2,000 year history of diaspora and minority status, with all the cruelty and violence that has accompanied this experience. In this work, we will cite Biblical sources, cultural traditions, and rabbinic teach-

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ings to express the inescapable obligation of Jews to stand in solidarity with Muslims in their time of need.

Make no mistake about it: Muslims now confront unprecedented discrimination and harassment in the United States. In a recent report, the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC) reports a significant increase in the frequency of hate crimes and acts of discrimination perpetrated against Arabs (both Muslims and Christians) and non-Arab Muslims. The list includes hundreds of acts of physical violence, some 60 incidents of Arab or Muslim passengers being prevented from traveling on airlines simply because of their “profile,” several hundred employment discrimination cases, and serious concerns arising from the USA Patriot Act. Tabloid media and bigoted radio talk show hosts contribute to an atmosphere of Islamophobia, and some Americans associate the word “Muslim” or “Arab” with “terrorist.” Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, conservative pundit Ann Coulter, commenting on Arab and Muslim countries, suggested that “we should invade their countries, kill their leaders and convert them to Christianity.” An Islamophobic atmosphere has taken hold in the United States, targeting Muslims not for any crime, but merely for being Muslims.

**Biblical Sources**

What is the proper Jewish reaction to Islamophobia? What does God command us to do? What does history teach us to do? To begin with, again and again in the Torah (the first five books of the Hebrew scriptures), God prohibits oppression: “You shall not wrong a stranger or oppress him, for you were strangers in the land of Egypt.” A few verses later, God takes the argument a step further and requires empathy on the part of the Israelites: “You shall not oppress a stranger, since you yourselves know the feelings of a stranger, for you were strangers in the land of Egypt.” In the first of the Ten Commandments, God identifies Himself to the children of Israel at Sinai not as the Creator of the universe, but as the God who set them free from slavery: “The Lord your God who took you out of Egypt, the house of bondage.” And regarding their former taskmasters, God commands the Israelites: “You shall not abhor an Egyptian, for you were a stranger in his land.” These amount to a small fraction of instances in which God makes it abundantly clear that He will not permit xenophobia (disdain for the foreigner, disdain for the “other”). Islamophobia certainly falls under the rubric of xenophobia.
Cultural Traditions

It could be argued that just because the Torah proclaims a precept, this does not necessarily indicate that the “People of the Book” hear these words or heed them. Nevertheless, the rabbinic tradition perceived the centrality of the principles mentioned above and wove them into practice and ritual. A few examples will elucidate this.

During the Passover seder, the ritual that commemorates the liberation of the Israelites from Egyptian slavery, Jews are commanded to read aloud the ten plagues that God visited upon Pharaoh and Egypt as part of the process to win our freedom. With the recitation of each plague, we pour a drop of wine from our goblets. Wine symbolizes our joy; in spilling from our wine, we are literally removing a portion of our joy. Later in the narrative, we successfully cross the Sea of Reeds, but the pursuing Egyptian army is drowned. The Midrash (rabbinic commentary) tells us that at that instant, the angels wished to rejoice, but God rebuked them, saying: “The works of My hands are drowning in the sea, and you would utter song in My presence??”

Once a week we celebrate the Sabbath, a symbol of the culmination of the creation story. We welcome the Sabbath with a blessing over the wine, which specifically reminds us of our exodus from Egypt. According to Rabbi Nancy Fuchs-Kremer, it is our experience of slavery that forms the core from which moral obligations to other people are derived. If we are to enjoy the sanctity of this day, we must not forget our former enslavement and its subsequent lessons.

On Yom Kippur, the fasting Day of Atonement, we read from the prophet Isaiah, where he points out the hypocrisy of the man who ceases eating or drinking for a day but continues to oppress others: “Is not this what I require of you as a fast: to loose the fetters of injustice, to untie the knots of the yoke, to snap every yoke and set free those who have been crushed? ... If you cease to pervert justice ... then your light will rise like dawn out of darkness.” Fasting on this most holy of days becomes an empty gesture if not accompanied by just behavior in the greater society.

The festival of Chanukah (“dedication” in Hebrew) commemorates our victory over the Syrian Greeks in 165 BCE for freedom to identify and practice as Jews. Shortly after this anniversary established itself in our calendar, the sages of that time, concerned that we would use this annual celebration to glorify war, intentionally shifted the emphasis away from the battle by focusing instead on the rededication of the Temple and the freedom to be Jewish openly and safely.
But what good are these holidays, teachings, and scriptural citations if we do not act on them? Can we as Jews value our own freedom while ignoring the plight of our Muslim neighbors who face difficulties? No. Judaism is a religion based not on doctrine but on action. It is our tradition and within our teachings to work for social justice, take a stand against oppression, support the liberation of the downtrodden ... in other words, to behave according to the ethics of our inheritance. To digress from this path specifically when the Muslims are the oppressed is a twofold offense, for it involves not following the ethical obligations of our tradition and singling out Muslims as being uniquely unworthy of our support, which we might otherwise extend to other oppressed groups.

**Rabbinic Teachings**

We do not merely read scripture and observe holy days. We live in and act in the world. Jewish teachers and leaders from ancient to modern times have emphasized our obligation to connect the lessons of our heritage to our actions inside and outside of our religious community.

Hillel, one of the founders of the rabbinic tradition, studied and taught some 2,000 years ago in Jerusalem.

Hillel’s greatest legacy was his forceful intellect, which directed Judaism toward the goal of *tikkun olam*, the ethical bettering (literally, repairing) of the world. In the most famous tale told about Hillel, a non-Jew approaches and asks him to define the essence of Judaism while standing on one foot. “What is hateful unto you, do not do unto your neighbor,” Hillel replies. “The rest is commentary – now go and study.”

The rabbinic tradition taught that the purpose of Jewish existence is nothing less than:

... to perfect the world under the rule of God, which is reiterated three times a day in the *Aleinu* prayer, which closes the morning, afternoon, and evening prayer services ... In Jewish teachings, both clauses – the world’s ethical perfection and the rule of God – are equally important. Human beings are obligated to bring mankind to a knowledge of God, whose primary demand of human beings is moral behavior.

According to *Pirkei Avot* (Ethics of the Fathers, a collection of moral advice and insights of leading rabbinic scholars), Hillel used to say: “If I am not for myself, who will be for me? If I am only for myself, what am I? And if not now, when?” Regarding the second of Hillel’s questions, Louis
Kaplan taught: “If you are only for yourself, you cease to be a real human being, and you become no longer a ‘who’ but a ‘what’.”

Naftali Tsvi Horowitz of Ropczyce, Poland, a Jewish mystic born in 1760, reinterpreted the Biblical account of the Torah’s revelation to construct a basic ethical principle. Drawing on Biblical verses, the Midrash, words from his own teacher, and mystical practices, he suggests that what was revealed was the name of God, mirrored on every human face: “When a person continually keeps this idea (that God is in the face of every other human being), then he will not easily be inclined to go astray.”

In 1955, the Union of American Hebrew Congregations (UAHC), the organization of North American Reform Judaism, issued its “First Statement of Basic Principles on the Synagogue and Social Action.” That document includes the following statements:

Judaism insists that we must apply constantly the sharp ethical insights of the prophets to specific social problems of our generation ... A synagogue which isolates itself from the fundamental issues of social justice confronting the community and the nation is false to the deepest traditions and values of the Jewish heritage ... As Jews and as Americans dedicated to the democratic tradition, we are impelled to join with our fellows in overcoming bigotry and prejudice; in seeking through education and legislation the elimination of discrimination and segregation because of race, religion, or national origin.

The 1976 Centenary Perspective of the Central Conference of American Rabbis continued to emphasize these points, stating that “Judaism emphasizes action rather than creed as the primary expression of a religious life, the means by which we strive to achieve universal justice and peace.” And although “a universal concern for humanity unaccompanied by a devotion to our particular people is self-destructive, a passion for our people without involvement in humankind contradicts what the prophets have meant to us.”

The Platforms of Reform Judaism issued by the UAHC in 1999 included the aim to:

Seek dialogue and joint action with people of other faiths in the hope that together we can bring peace, freedom, and justice to our world. We are obligated to pursue tzedek (justice and righteousness) ... to act against discrimination and oppression, to pursue peace, to welcome the stranger ... and to redeem those in physical, economic, and spiritual bondage. In so doing, we reaffirm social action and social justice as a central prophetic focus of traditional Reform Jewish belief and practice.
In a statement released in March 2004, the Commission on Social Action of Reform Judaism highlighted the post-9/11 rise in human rights abuses against Arabs and Muslims in this country, stating that:

As Jews, we realize that we have a particularly important and indeed difficult role to play in this effort ... all of us in the Jewish community must remember that, with regard to our Muslim neighbors, there is more in our history and theology to unite us than divide us, and we have more to gain from building partnerships than from ignoring each other or, worse yet, from breaking ties or allowing hostility to foment. We must not forget that we are all God’s children, all inheritors of the Abrahamic tradition ... There is enough at stake that we must be willing to extend our hands and hearts to them in an honest gesture of goodwill, cooperation, and respect. And if not now, when?

Finally, Rabbi Mattithia, son of Heresh, said, “Be beforehand in the salutation of peace to all men.” This last quotation places the crux of the whole issue in focus: when it comes to doing the right thing, do not delay. Faith, study, and prayer are all indispensable, but they do not suffice. Act.

**Conclusion**

Islamophobia, like any prejudice, assumes an unreasonable homogeneity of the group targeted. The ignorance – literally, a lack of familiarity – that allows us to generalize about a particular group in turn prohibits us from recognizing that a group is comprised of individuals. Blindness to individual humanity releases us of the responsibility to treat others as we would be treated, since that blindness has conditioned us to see not the individuals but only the generic soul-less label.

Generalization is not a Jewish tendency; it is a human one. We as Jews, however, know the wide spectrum of opinions and beliefs and appearances within our own “label”; we know that the political views of a Chasidic rabbi cannot be deduced from a conversation with a secular Jewish woman and vice versa. As Jews, on occasion we choose to set our differences aside, but we readily protest the ignorance that would lump us all together for the purpose of target practice. Thus we have no business supporting, either actively or passively, this same treatment of others.

“Post-9/11” has been a fertile time for insecurity, fear, withdrawal, and collective angst. The Jewish people are historically familiar with the link between a wounded society and its search for a scapegoat; specifically, we have been that scapegoat on countless occasions. Just as our Torah and our
sages teach us to be kind to the stranger “for you were strangers,” so our own experience as the downtrodden demands that we view and approach the current situation of Muslims in this country with heightened sensitivity and true empathy.

Here in the United States, Jews and Muslims, despite our historical and current experiences, live in relative comfort. We have an extraordinary opportunity to initiate a healing process and to make an effort to know one another, as individuals and as organized communities. Rabbis and lay leaders, shaykhs and imams, can establish regular communication and reciprocal visits. Teachers of the Jewish and Islamic religions can organize meetings between their respective students. Finally, and most importantly, individual Jews and Muslims at work, school, and in the neighborhood can meet and get to know members of the other faith. Hatred derives from fear. Fear is born of ignorance. The more we get to know one another, the more we will discover our commonality and understand our differences, the less we will fear, and together we will act on behalf of peace.

Notes

7. One law for stranger and citizen alike (Exodus 12:49 and Leviticus 24:22); Do not subvert the rights of strangers (Deuteronomy 24:17-18, 27:19); Befriend the stranger, (Deuteronomy 10:19); Afflict not the wretched (Proverbs 22:16; 22:22).
9. Rabbi Elyse Goldstein, ed. The Women’s Torah Commentary.
10. Isaiah 58:6-10.
12. Ibid. (emphasis added by author)
13. Pirkei Avot, 1:14
14. Rabbi Joseph Telushkin, Jewish Literacy, 478. Louis Kaplan, born in 1902 in Russia, authored A New Approach to the Teachings of the Torah. He espoused
a view of Jewish education as an instrument for helping the individual find his/her place in the larger society of which he/she is a part.


17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. “Resolution on Reaching Out to Arab and Muslim Neighbors,” *Commission on Social Action of Reform Judaism*, March 2004

Legal and Practical Aspects of Participation by Women in Arab Societies

Many Arab and Muslim countries have a long history of women’s activism. Depending on location and historical moment, women activists have drawn inspiration from a wide array of sources, including both religious and secular discourses. In all cases, however, one main issue is how legal systems and processes of legal reform on the one hand, and social relations and everyday life on the other hand, relate to each other.

At this conference, held in The Hague, The Netherlands, on March 4-5, 2004, the tensions between legal systems and social life were discussed. The conference was organized by the Arabic Dutch Women Circle (ANVK) in cooperation with the municipality of The Hague and the International Dialogues Foundation (IDF). The ANVK is a Dutch non-profit organization dedicated to promoting cultural exchange between Dutch and Arab societies, and, in particular, between Dutch and Arab women. The ANVK organizes conferences, meetings, debates, and exhibitions to stimulate dialogue and exchange.

Among other things, the conference sought to clarify that class, ethnicity, political system, history, and cultural factors are of wider influence than just law or religious factors themselves. The constitutions of almost all Arab and Muslim countries proclaim equal rights for all, regardless of race, sex, language, and religion. However, the implementation of these rights is often a problem. By inviting a group of women activists and academics from the Middle East, as well as representatives of various sectors of Dutch society and of the Arab and Muslim communities in The Netherlands, the conference also aimed at stimulating discussion about Arab women’s rights and practices.

The conference was chaired by Professor Annelies Moors, chair of the International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM) at the University of Amsterdam. The first day was open to the general public and consisted of a plenary session in which four papers were presented,
while the second day was meant as a workshop and open for a selected group of people. Around 190 people attended the first day, and about 40 people attended the second day.

Dr. Tomador Meihuizen-Hassoun, president of the ANVK; Dr. Dick de Zeeuw, chairman of the IDF; and Professor Annelies Moors, who explained the conference’s aim and program, opened the conference. Then the film “Women and Democracy in Yemen,” made by Khadija al-Salami, film director and cultural attaché at the Yemeni Embassy in Paris, was shown. In this film, three female candidates in Yemen’s parliamentary election of April 2003 were followed, and the difficulties encountered by women seeking to be elected were portrayed. Even though women in Yemen have the right to stand as candidates, very few of them are eventually elected. The film led to a lively discussion.

The first speaker was Shirin Ershadi, of Iranian background and assistant professor at the Center for the Study of Women of UCLA. She argued that honor killings should be viewed as crimes against humanity and that, therefore, states that legalize such killings in their constitutions (e.g., Jordan and Iran) should be brought to trial before the International Criminal Court. The second speaker was Maha Najjar, a lawyer of Palestinian background and researcher about the relations between the European Union and the Middle East. She focused on the three different legal systems present in the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem, as well as Palestinian women’s struggle for a progressive family law.

The third presenter was Leila Jordens-Cotran, a legal expert specializing in Moroccan family law and its relationship with Dutch law. She discussed the recent reforms in Moroccan family law (the Mudawanna) and the possible consequences for Moroccan women living in The Netherlands. The last speaker was Mona Fadl, former businesswoman and president of the Bahrain Young Ladies Association, the first women’s organization in the Gulf. Fadl spoke about women’s status and labor laws in Bahrain. While the constitution stipulates equality between men and women and the labor law grants women many rights, women often earn less than men for the same type of work, are often forced to resume work before their official maternity leave has ended, and face a lack of nurseries at work sites.

On the second day, cases from different countries were presented. The first speaker was Bedour Zaki, a lawyer and president of the Iraqi Women’s Rights Organization in London. Zaki discussed the Iraq’s 1959 family law, one of the most progressive in the Middle East, and the possible legal changes that may occur in post-war Iraq. The second speaker was Nahda
Younis, a Palestinian researcher at the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague who has done extensive fieldwork in Gaza City’s Shari‘ah courts. Her main argument was that judges [qūdah] are more than implementers of Shari‘ah law: They play an important role in protecting female litigants by making flexible use of the different sources available to them, such as the family law and customary law.

The third speaker was Dr. Asya al-Lamki, assistant dean of Research and Post-graduate Studies at the College of Commerce and Economics, Sultan Qaboos University, Muscat, Oman. She presented the outcomes of her research on Omani women working as professionals and their perceptions about their position at work. While the Arab Human Development Report states that many Arab women suffer from discrimination at work, al-Lamki’s research was less conclusive. The fourth speaker was Amina al-Rasheed, a Sudanese political scientist, women’s activist, and currently a researcher at the University of Utrecht, The Netherlands. She gave a brief overview of the position of women in Sudan and focused on how the Islamist government in power since 1989 has affected them. Laws restricting their movement and mandating compulsory veiling, as well as establishing a police force primarily targeting women’s conduct, are examples. The last speaker was Wadad Chakhtoura, president of the Rassemblement Démocratique des Femmes Libanaises (RDLF) in Beirut. She explained Lebanon’s complicated legal system, in which each of the nineteen religious groups has its own personal status law, and the problems that derive from this. One of her organization’s main aims is to devise a unified civil law.

After these presentations, a lively discussion took place between the speakers and the audience about the different issues that had come to the fore during the two days. The conference was very successful in bringing together people of different countries and backgrounds, and was evaluated very positively by the participants.

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An Interfaith Perspective on Globalization
for the Common Good

The third Annual International Conference on Globalization for the Common Good was held on 27-31 March 2004 at the Bustan Rotana hotel,
Dubai, the United Arab Emirates. More than thirty participants, representing academics, peace activists, theologians, environmentalists, and businessmen from the United States, Europe, Japan, the Gulf region, Australia, and South Africa attended the eleven plenary sessions. These were divided under the following headings: Muslim-Christian Dialogue for the Common Good; Religions and Social Justice; Profit and the Common Good: Conflict or Convergence?; Religions and the Common Good; Urbanization and Cities in a Global Age; Globalization and Civilizations; Ethical Perspectives on Globalization; Interfaith Dialogue and Peace-building; Natural Resources, Ecology and Development; Youth in a Global Age; and Science and Technology in a Global Age. The conference was officially opened by the founder and chief convenor of the Interfaith Perspective on Globalization for the Common Good, Dr Kamran Mofid of the United Kingdom.

Dr William Lesher (Lutheran School of Theology, Chicago) in his “Pathways to Peace” identified the major factors supporting globalization and showed how global trends become indigenized through the process of glocalization. Sister Beatrice Mariotti’s (St. Mary’s Catholic High School, Dubai) “Globalization and Christian-Muslim Spiritual Dialogue in Dubai” dealt with three challenges to cultural identity: consumerism, the Internet, and isolationism. Markus Glatz-Schmallegger (Catholic Social Academy of Austria) argued in his “Religions Acting for ‘Bridging and Linking Social Capital’ in the Context of Globalization,” that religion, as an organ of civil society, can contribute significantly to social capital.

In the session on “Profit and the Common Good: Conflict or Convergence?” Kamran Mofid outlined both the negative and positive aspects of globalization. This was followed by a lively discussion on how globalization’s benefits could be extended to all and not confined to a minority of individuals, multinationals, and states. Suleman Dangor (University of Kwazulu-Natal, South Africa) outlined the positive and negative features of globalization, and then elaborated on the role that religions could play in ensuring that its benefits are spread equitably while developing nations are protected from its negative impact.

Jakob von Uexkull (The Right Livelihood Awards, London, UK), in his “Global Values and Global Stability,” made a case for equitable access to the world’s natural resources. The possibility of this happening is greater now that we are moving to a post-secular world. Keyvan Tabari emphasized the importance of national sovereignty. Since the demise of the USSR
as a global power, the US has attempted to “manage” the world through the injection of capital, provision of services and recruitment of labor.

However, there are serious disagreements between the US and other nations over the following issues: conservation of the environment, conditions of assistance from the World Bank and the IMF, definition of international crimes, modality of dispute resolution, rules of warfare, human rights, and reformation of existing domestic legal systems.

Annick de Witt (University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands), Peter Milward SJ (Renaissance Institute, Sofia University, Japan), and Audrey Kitagawa (Advisor: Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict, United Nations) spoke on environmental issues. George Katodrytis (American University of Sharjah) and Wayne Green (Global Affairs, United Kingdom) discussed the issue of urbanization in a Global Age. Tara Stuart (Keene State College, USA) and Jeffery Smith (Forum on Geonomics, USA) gave an ethical perspective on globalization.

Bhai Sahib Mohinder Singh (Guru Nanak Nishkam Sewak Jatha, Birmingham, UK), Michael Bos (Al-Amana Centre, Oman), Judith Jensen (Oregon Institute of Technology, USA), Athar Murtuza (Seton Hall University, USA), Jim Kenney (Interreligious Engagement Project, USA), Alan Race (St Andrews Church, Leicester, UK), Toh Swee-Hin (Griffith University, Australia), Jane Samuels (Cultural Development Consultant, UK), Lawrence Woods (American University of Sharjah), and Hazar Ibdah (American University of Sharjah) focused on interfaith issues. Josef Boehle (University of Birmingham, UK), David Coleman (Chaminade University of Honolulu, Hawaii), and Kathleen Kevany (United Nations University, Japan) proposed ways in which religion could contribute to the common good.

Najdia Diane Hamden (Leadership Programs, USA) and Agnetta Borgman (Research Social Worker, Dubai) spoke on youth and women in a global age, respectively. Christopher Houghton Budd (Centre for Associative Economics, Canterbury, UK) deliberated on business ethics, and Raymond Hamden (Comprehensive Medical Centre, Dubai) focused on science in a global age.

One major criticism that could be leveled at the conference is that many participants did not relate their papers to the topic, but rather confined them to interfaith relations. Furthermore, several major aspects of globalization were not dealt with in any of the presentations. Nonetheless, the conference provided a platform for an exchange of ideas as well as for networking.
Hopefully, the next conference in Kenya, whose leitmotif is the Quest for Justice and Peace, will focus more substantially on globalization’s impact on Africa.

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**Family and Households in History**

From March 18-20, 2004, the American University in Cairo (AUC) hosted its annual history seminar entitled “Family and Households in History.” Dr. Nelly Hanna, chair of the Arab Studies department, welcomed the participants and audience and explained that the sessions would cover the institution of family from various perspectives and present its different roles and patterns throughout history.

The first session dealt with the family both philosophically and legally. Wolf Gazo (philosophy professor, AUC) tackled the issue of individual freedom and the concept of family morality. He compared the family in the Orient with that of Europe and North America, as well as each pattern’s flexibility, including individual freedom. Edward Metenier (Institute Français du Proche Orient, Damascus) studied the pattern of one Iraqi family and made it his model for analyzing the strong ties between family members. He also focused on how one member’s achievement of major prestige affected other members by raising them to high social positions. Thus, this one family enjoyed a high status for the whole nineteenth century, despite the political and economic changes in Iraq during that time.

After a coffee break, Judith Tucker (Georgetown University, USA) presented a paper on redefining the family and marital relations after modernization. According to her, legal reforms during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which were inspired by the western model, did not really revolutionize the family or redefine marital relations. Rather, these reforms transformed the most rigid Islamic traditions into laws that would be difficult to change. The seminar also considered different family patterns in other parts of the world. Thus, Sonia Tamimy (Centre d’Etudes et de Documentation Economiques, Juridiques et Sociales [CEDEJ], Cairo) presented the views of famous French historians on the family and showed that the view of family changed according to changes in society and its morals.
Turning from theoretical to real-life views, the third session concentrated on Arab family patterns throughout history. T. J. Fitzgerald, Harvard University, based his study of families and *waqf* in Aleppo on the seventeenth-century documents found in one of Aleppo’s courts and dealing with the *waqf* deeds of one family after the changes brought about by the transfer of power from the Mamluks to the Ottomans after their conquest of Egypt and Syria in the sixteenth century. Sherry Gad Elrab (American University of Cairo) concentrated on the role of harem members, such as wives, daughters, and slave girls of the later `Abbasid caliphs, in shaping the policy of the caliphate, which was deteriorating due to the rise of other powers, such as the Buwayhids and the Seljuks.

On the second day, the sessions analyzed the growth of the Arab family during the nineteenth century. Alain Mikhail (California University) dealt with the issue of medicalizing the Egyptian family. Mikhail concentrated on the theories of Qasim Amin, known in Egypt as “the liberator of women,” as expounded upon in his *The New Woman*. In his book, Amin encouraged women to become teachers or medical professionals. Basing his paper on Foucault’s theory of power and medicine, Mikhail studies Amin’s theory and the concentration of power in the family through the theory of its medicalization versus the state. In other words, this phenomenon at the turn of the century, within the context of the medical profession’s growth and the spread of hospitals during the nineteenth century reveal the spread of the medical profession and hospitals in Egypt at that time, and show how it was both an integral part of Egyptian modernity and a form of resistance against it.

Studying the Egyptian family and its power relations with the state, Hanan Khloussy (New York University) studied the nuclearization of the family during the nineteenth century as the model for an ideal family set by the press and the state, despite the continuity of polygamy and extended families. Khloussy described this struggle between the state and the traditional family patterns as an attempt by the state to destroy any power rival, such as the extended family.

Dealing with another theme, the family as a trade institution, Pascale Ghazaleh presented a paper in which she discovered how import-export merchants in the first half of the nineteenth century chose to control who would inherit their wealth so that it would not necessarily go to their families, Qur’anic heirs, or agnates. Different strategies were discussed (e.g., endogamy, pious endowments, bequests and the use of patronage rights) to highlight the merchants’ heirs and the implications of the process.
The next session concentrated on the rise of large families in Egypt. The first paper dealt with Egypt’s famous Coptic Wissa family. The Wissa brothers started as sellers of pins and ended up as major landowners in a period of rapid change during the nineteenth century. The paper studied the family’s strategies for keeping its prestige intact through intermarrying with other noble families as well as forming binding ties with the state.

Noha Mokhtar, a graduate at Cairo University, dealt with how education and various influences affected the life of elite youth during the twentieth century. Mokhtar dealt with the western education received by the elite classes, how they reflected Egyptian society, and how they were seen by Egyptians. Sayed Ashmai (Cairo University) based his paper upon his examination of the Badrawi Ashour family, which was the largest landowner before the 1952 revolution. The paper examined the relations between the family and the state since the time of Khedive Ismail (1830-95), as well as the relation between the family and the peasants. The discussion turned more interesting with the presence of a professor of history, a descendant who presented the long-unheard voice of the landowning families since the revolution.

The last day witnessed two sessions under the theme of various family patterns. Mustafa el Labbad (Sharq Nameh magazine) discussed family power, which was one of the most important factors behind the Iranian revolution’s success. The importance of the Shi`ah family, that might have roots in different countries, still plays a crucial role in current Iranian politics. Dr. Tatania Summers (University of Alabama) discussed the ideal wife as presented in Homer’s Odyssey, which went through different types of women, all rejected by Odysseus, to be the wife of a Greek man. Only Penelope, a weak and obedient wife who could subdue her power and property for the sake of her son, was considered a proper wife. Summers tried in her paper the characteristics of an ideal wife in archaic Greek culture.

The last paper, presented by Shawqi AlGamal (Institute of African Studies, Cairo University), discussed the colonial European historians’ view of African families as barbaric. AlGamal presented the other view: the African family as seen by African historians.

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In the days after September 11th, 2001, the Bush administration pledged to fight a “new” War on Terror to make Americans more secure. This study evaluates the public arguments advanced to support the administration’s War on Terror and the subsequent homeland security initiatives. The study details how homeland security policies such as the U.S.A. Patriot Act constituted symbolic actions in the War on Terror. The study also reveals that President Bush and his advisors crafted a rhetorical “homeland security” campaign to maintain a political environment that insulated these policies from strong criticism. As a result, the formal and informal spaces for deliberation on homeland security measures were constrained after September 11th, and the public was prevented from deliberations about the wisdom of these new policies.

Second, this study examines how the need to protect homeland security was used to justify a shift in national security strategy and the creation of a “pre-emptive” war doctrine. The Bush doctrine tapped into America’s historical support for exceptionalist ideology to fight the “new” global war. The War on Terror supported a casus belli for invading Iraq. Relying on argument a fortiori, the administration’s war rhetoric cast Iraq as a dangerous node within a network of global terrorism. Although the Bush administration’s arguments for war were supported by deceptive intelligence data, the data received insufficient testing in a public forum. The administration’s strategy in the creation of its homeland security policies diminished the vitality of the public sphere. Furthermore, the hasty and secretive creation of these policies prevented a search for more innovative political and moral solutions to security concerns. As a result, war became the only “thinkable” response.

This study of public argument over homeland security illustrates both the United States’ attempts to escape from deliberating upon the complexities of secu-
rity concerns and the potential pitfalls of the Bush doctrine’s legacy in international affairs. It argues that the failure to consider why so many people abroad consider the United States an arrogant and hostile nation may pose problems for U.S. public diplomacy in the years ahead.

The September 11th terrorist attacks on the United States brought Islam into the American focus. The subsequent public discussion of Islam and terrorism is replete with competing moral claims and sensitivity to which views are socially acceptable, against a backdrop of war and survival for the American way of life with a high need for security. This issue therefore provides an ideal context within which to test hypotheses derived from Noelle-Neumann’s spiral of silence theory.

This research has focused on the relationship between personal views on Islam’s peacefulness and beliefs about the views of others. Participants generally believed that others consider Islam less peaceful than they themselves do and tended to fear negative consequences for publicly speaking beliefs, however tenuous, about Islam. However, participants also demonstrated apprehension that Muslims in America might experience unfair treatment post-September 11th, although they generally believed that American Muslims had been treated fairly since the September 11th attacks. In addition, participants generally believed that television news media downplayed the Islam-terrorism connection.

There appears to be tension between the two mediated presentations of Islam – the “party line” by officials and the media that Islam is a peaceful religion and news reports showing Islamic terrorism. Results of this research indicate that participants may understand that this is a complex issue and that they have not entirely determined their own beliefs about Islam.

A study on the cross-national transfer of images portraying the September 11 attacks and the war in Afghanistan was conducted. Results of a content analysis of English and Arabic transnational newspapers show the dominant photographs in both newspapers did not differ. Findings suggest both newspapers conformed to the journalistic standards of newsworthiness by consistently allowing the accompanying image of the top story to be covered in the most prominent manner. Results also show that while the news coverage of the English newspaper emphasized guilt in the September 11 attacks by showing visual messages that humanized the victims, it de-emphasized the bombing of Afghanistan by showing visual messages that focused least on the victims and more on aid, patriotism arsenal and weaponry, thus framing the Afghan war in a technical frame.
On a similar level, the news coverage of the Arabic newspaper emphasized guilt in the Afghan war by showing visual messages that humanized the victims. It deemphasized the September 11 attacks by showing visual messages that focused least on the victims and more on material destruction and planes crashing into the buildings, thus also framing the terrorist attacks in a more technical frame. The vast majority of photographs analyzed were from the three main western news agencies, suggesting framing differences identified do not reflect patterns of information flow but patterns of information use.

To compliment the findings, results of a web-based survey of visual professionals associated with the National Press Photographers Association (NPPA) reveal the majority of visual journalists support the use of graphic imagery. Respondents however reported the context of news, influenced photo selection of graphic imagery. The lack of necessary access to photograph the war in Afghanistan was noted. Further, personal experiences and background characteristics had minimal effect on news practitioners’ perceptions of the visual coverage.


This study explored the psychological dynamics of terrorism based on a structured comparison of the documents issued by groups that did and did not engage in terrorism. Thirteen terrorist groups with a wide range of ideologies were matched with intra-system and/or extra-system control groups that came from the same historical contexts and endorsed similar ideologies, but did not engage in terrorism. A total of 180 speeches, interviews, and manifestos representing the groups’ purposes and goals were content-analyzed for motive imagery, activity inhibition, and values by trained, reliable coders who were blind to the documents’ origins and the study’s hypotheses. Various statistical analyses explored whether terrorist and non-terrorist groups differed on variables that previously have been linked to group conflict.

As hypothesized, there was evidence that terrorist groups were higher in the power motive relative to intra-system control groups and attributed higher dominance and morality values to themselves relative to both types of control group. Further, these differences were significant when analyzing the documents terrorist groups issued before launching their initial attacks, indicating that these variables may also be predictive of terrorism. Results for the affiliation motive, which has been associated with a willingness to negotiate, were surprising:

While, as predicted, terrorist groups tended to be lower than intra-system controls in the affiliation motive, terrorist groups were actually higher than extra-system controls. This finding may be explained by terrorist groups’ tendency to feel a strong connection with the larger groups whom they claim to defend, thus linking affiliation with violence. The data did not offer strong support for the hypotheses that relative to control groups, terrorist groups would attribute higher dominance
and lower morality values to their opponents. In fact, both terrorist and control groups tended to view their opponents as high in dominance and low in morality values.

Finally, with few exceptions, these findings generalized across terrorist groups ranging from the post-Civil War Ku Klux Klan to Al Qaeda, providing little evidence that ethnic-nationalist, right-wing, left-wing, and religious terrorist groups differ from each other in the motives and values that distinguish them from their non-terrorist counterparts.

The British Government has been engaged for more than thirty years in a struggle with terrorism related to Northern Ireland. During what is euphemistically called the Troubles, the British government has implemented a series of special emergency laws to address the violence. Drawing upon the political context and debate surrounding the implementation and development of the emergency legislation this research examines the overall effect of British anti-terrorism legislation on both respect for civil liberties and the government’s ability to fight campaigns of violence.

Drawing heavily upon primary sources, high profile cases of miscarriages of justice and accusation of an official “shoot to kill” policy this project explores three distinct areas related to a government’s balancing of the exigencies of individual liberty and societal order. First, accusations of an erosion of civil liberties are examined in relation to the war on terrorism. Second, it is argued three decades of special emergency legislation has led to the normalization of policies used to fight terrorism. Third, the powers created to deal with a unique crisis situation have expanded dramatically in scope and have continued to do so even as violence associated with the Troubles diminishes. The research concludes by exploring the project’s findings and what the lessons the British experience may have for other liberal democracies dealing with sustained campaigns of violence.

The first two decades of Husni Mubarak’s presidency witnessed increased sectarian conflict between Egypt’s Muslim and Christian communities, a by-product of rising religious identification in Egypt during the 1980s and 1990s. Even in a context of sectarian conflict, however, intercommunal cooperation in various sociopolitical settings continued. It was during this period that intense debate over the viability of civil society in the Arab world took place. Issues of
toleration and citizenship were at the forefront of the debate, and tied directly into discussion about the relationship between majority and minority religious communities.

This project examines these concepts from a theoretical perspective, and Christian-Muslim relations in Egypt historically, before shifting to the heart of the study. The primary purpose of this project is to demonstrate empirically that toleration and cooperation were exhibited in rhetoric and in deed during the 1980s and 1990s. Various strata of Egypt’s sociopolitical life (i.e., the Egyptian government, official religious institutions, various political parties, and some notable non-governmental organizations) were actively engaged in efforts that affirmed Egypt’s bi-religious population, even in the midst of heightened tension between the two communities. This toleration is illustrated through examinations of government efforts to foster national unity; of the words and actions of Egypt’s religious elite, including the mufti and shaykh of al-Azhar, and the pope of the Coptic Orthodox Church and the head of the Protestant community in Egypt; of the Labor Party and the proposed Hizb al-Wasat; and of the Ibn Khaldun Center for Developmental Studies and the Coptic Evangelical Organization for Social Services.

In order to reveal adequately the latent tension between the Muslim and Christian communities during the period in question, and the struggle between conflict and cooperation, three divisive cases are then discussed: a conference on minorities in the Middle East, U.S. legislation on international freedom from religious persecution, and the intercommunal violence in the Upper Egyptian village of al-Kusheh. Through the efforts of the actors discussed, not only is toleration between Egypt’s Christian and Muslim social and political communities fostered, but civil society is also asserted.


This study analyzes the experiences of liberalization in Egypt and Jordan as well as democratization in Yemen. The initiation and the reverse of these processes are explained by focusing on the role of the ruling elites in the three countries and the choices they made at different historical junctures. The move toward either liberalization or democratization, this study argues, occurred in a context in which the ruling elites perceived these processes as a means to buttress their domestic, regional, and international acceptance and legitimacy.

However, initiating these processes in the three cases led to the proliferation of political parties, the rise of the Islamists as strong contenders for power, and the expansion of civil society. Seeing these developments as challenges to their authority, the ruling elites gradually reversed these processes. To do so, they relied on a variety of methods, including subtle changes in policy as well as more obvious legal, electoral, and security measures.

The rise of religious movements across civilizations has challenged long-held expectations concerning the ultimate separation of religion and politics. The predominance of Islamic movements in Turkey is especially puzzling, given that it is arguably the most secularized country in the Middle East. Scholars of Islamism who have focused on cultural identity, political economy, and social movement dynamics have broadened our understanding of new articulations between Islam and modern politics.

This dissertation aims to combine the insights of these approaches by analyzing the interactions between subordinate sectors of Turkish society and Islamism. I demonstrate that studying the urban poor support for Islamism reveals the connections between cultural, material, and “agental” (organizational and ideological) factors better than culturalist, political, economic, and social movement approaches have done so far in isolation from each other. Two years of ethnographic research in the poorest district of Istanbul with the highest Islamist votes reveals that the supporters of the Islamist movement are hybrid products of a dialogic religious field, which consists of mutual tension, intervention and resistance among communal traditionalism, secularism, and Islamism. Being the outcomes of this field, their beliefs and practices are neither exclusively traditional and religious, nor completely modern and secular, as some scholars have argued. Islamist politics is successful only to the extent that it develops relevant strategies to approach the complex field of tension, intervention, and resistance analyzed in this dissertation.

The urban poor support for Islamism also has a spatial dimension. Islamism successfully develops and transforms the ways in which poor rural-to-urban migrants interpret, gain control over, and find their place in urban space. Nevertheless, bereft of the means and ends with which to mobilize the poor in times of political and economic crisis, the Islamist party fails to transform mass backing into militant action on its behalf. Consequently, despite massive support, it is not able to resist military pressures from the secularist Turkish state and sustain its ideological line. This inability, which is partially related to the reluctance of Islamists to engage modernity more critically, renders the movement incapable of thoroughly changing Turkish society.


For over two decades, U.S. policy toward Iran has consisted of containment, isolation, and the imposition of increasingly tougher sanctions. The policy aims at changing Iran’s behavior in three areas of primary concern to American decision makers: alleged state sponsorship of terrorism, pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, and violent opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process.
This study asks how it is possible for U.S. legislators to defend and maintain a policy which does not accomplish its goals, alienates U.S. allies, fails most cost-benefit analyses, and neglects crucial national interests. I find that U.S.-Iran relations, as reflected in Congressional hearings on Iran, are the result of a struggle to define the dominant American identity narrative, for which postrevolutionary Iran represents a radically new challenge. The 1979 overthrow of the U.S.-backed shah, the Iranian revolution, and the hostage crisis were collective traumas that linger in the American psyche. For Congress and successive administrations, the Iran-Contra scandal continues to haunt disputes regarding each branch’s prerogative, evokes old misgivings, and shapes U.S. policy toward Iran.

Despite two decades of isolation and sanctions, Iran has refused reincorporation into the American-led world order and continues to inspire and assist other “bad actors,” especially those violently opposed to the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. As Congress and the administration debate the best way to handle this “rogue” state, they attempt to define America’s character and purpose, including its rights and obligations, vis-à-vis other international agents. In this sense, Iran represents the foremost challenge to American identity, if not to world security. This struggle over identity is compounded by a deeply flawed process of deliberation, which produces suboptimal solutions and policy effects opposite to those intended. Consideration of these procedural and deliberative dysfunctions is a major part of this study.


In the anthropological study of ethnic conflict, there has been an increasing call to look beyond the riot, to turn from a top-down, state-centered approach, to a nationalism of the street or neighborhood, to travel “the everyday highways and byways of ongoing social relationships.” This dissertation is a response to that call.

In 1996-97, I lived and conducted fieldwork in a multiethnic, newly middle-class apartment building in Karachi, a city that has suffered devastating and disabling ethnic violence since the early 1980s. Drawing on recent reframings of intimacy, I position the local, face-to-face, intensely affective relations of the apartment building as fully permeated by – and generative of – broader forces of ethnic enmity and national imaginings. While the bulk of anthropological literature on ethnic conflict casts women as incidental to the drama of collective violence, my research attempts to rethink the nature and political implications of women’s social labors in everyday local and domestic contexts.

In the dissertation, I argue that cultural notions about gender differences in the experience, expression, and consequence of anger (ghussa) and “tension” give rise to a situation in which women are cast as necessary peacemakers and mediators of local life. I examine women’s routine neighbor exchange practices – borrowing, helping, visiting – as a form of peacemaking that rests on an ethic of suspense, where social/cultural tension is laboriously sustained, rather than resolved. Participation in
this exchange, I argue, requires the emergence of a new kind of subject: one that can bear tension, as an inner event. These peacemaking labors are politically significant, effecting a visible containment of local violence, as well as pointing us to alternative metaphors for a phenomenology or microphysics of peace. But at the same time, they are reproductive of a system of gender difference and power that ultimately constrains women, as well as buttressing a naturalized and normative discourse of violent masculinity that makes women’s – and men’s – lives more dangerous.


This dissertation introduces a gendered variable into the field of security studies by addressing the concept of security from an Arab feminist perspective. Women from five geographically diverse communities that reflect the various lifestyles and living standards of the Middle Eastern country of Jordan present their views on the concept of security. The intent was to broaden the parameters of what security entails by introducing a cultural feminist perspective to militarized conceptualizations of security.

The theoretical framework for this study is based on three approaches geared toward social transformation and is guided by three corresponding assumptions. The first theoretical approach stems from the ideals and principles embedded in critical feminist theory as an analytical tool for transforming sexist societies toward gender equality and justice. The second approach derives from the principles asserted by the Women’s International Network on Gender and Human Security (WINGHS) human security paradigm as a means of transforming militarized societies toward more civil-oriented societies. The third, peace education, links all three together as a pedagogical framework for transforming violent and aggressive attitudes and behaviors, namely, sexism and militarism, toward nonviolent, non-militaristic, and equitable approaches to security and conflict.

Maneuvering in Narrow Spaces: An Analysis of Emergent Identity, Subjectivity, and Political Institutions among Palestinian Citizens in Israel.


This dissertation is an ethnography of citizenship. It analyzes affect, political identity, moral structures and social organization among a non-assimilating minority community Palestinian citizens of Israel in Nazareth, the largest all-Arab city in Israel. This study elucidates the relational construction of the person, the social and political shaping of subjectivities, and the emergent forms of political rhetoric and political institutions in Nazareth between 1975 and 1993.

Although marginalized by state discourse, policies, and legislation defining them as “outside the rules of the political game,” Palestinians in Israel are also
empowered by Israeli democratic institutions, practices, and emphases on individual rights to elaborate political discourses and forge political institutions that are unique in the Arab world. Unlike most recent social scientific works on Palestinian citizens of Israel, which describe this community as either “Israelizing” or “Palestinizing,” this ethnography demonstrates that political identity and institutions are emergent, constructed, hybrid, and contingent by examining the matrices of belonging, meaning, and identity – local, regional and global – that Palestinians invoke to make sense of their position and potential within the Israeli state.

In examining how Palestinian citizens of Israel maneuver within the political and ethic boundaries constructed by Zionist ideologies, this ethnography demonstrates how the cultural construction and political positioning of Israel’s non-Jewish citizens reaffirms the Jewish character of the state. This dissertation concludes with an assessment of Palestinian Israelis’ political rhetoric and practice in light of an emerging “post-Zionist” critique of citizenship, equality, and democracy in Israel.


Everyone in Israel wants peace, yet it remains an elusive goal. Fieldwork was conducted with Jewish Israeli women and women who are Palestinian citizens of Israel to access their perspectives regarding issues related to peace in Israel, including national unity, security and identity. Although their voices have been excluded from the discourse surrounding peace negotiations, Israeli women’s narratives articulate Israelis’ concerns over failed peace initiatives and the Israeli/Palestinian war.

Information from audio and video taped semi-structured interviews, conducted in a myriad of public and private forums, provides a clear and accurate representation of Israeli women’s discourse. Subaltern practice theory and a distributive model of culture inform the author’s approach to field methods. The Israeli women represented offer solutions to the Israeli/Palestinian war and use their power and agency to engage in practices that promote their perspectives. The voices of women who are members of the New Profile Movement, Women in Black, Women in Green, and those women who reserve their narratives for private spaces, are privileged to provide insight into the multi-generational political, historical and contemporary discourse surrounding the Israeli search for peace.


This is a study of how Islam is locally perceived by men in a traditional Moroccan city. Through the use of interviews, case studies, and participant observation, the religious perceptions and practices of two generations of Moroccan men were examined and compared to understand their religious views and to determine the extent to which their religious worldviews have changed or remained constant. In
particular, attention was given to the various forms of religious education the men experienced. It was by observing how the men were educated religiously that their Islamic perceptions were understood. Religious education included both formal education received in schools and non-formal education as experienced through the observance and practice of religious rituals such as prayer, fasting in the month of Ramadan, and the sheep sacrifice ('Id El Kebir).

This study found that the underlying religious perceptions of the younger and older generations of men varied little, in spite of many observable changes in the culture at large. Religious practice was found to be nearly uniform as well, except that older men were observed to pray more frequently than the younger men. As to the men’s religious perceptions, attention was given to the meanings they attached to religious rituals and to the primary components of their religious worldviews. For example, the men’s views of salvation in Islam were both found to be a multi-layered, instrumental, works-oriented system in which spiritual points of merit called hassenets were an important ingredient. Relatively little has been written about hassenets in anthropological literature to date.

The religious education the men received strongly emphasized proper practice of religious rituals (orthopraxy) as compared to correct belief (orthodoxy). This correlated well with their understanding that religion is a test of one’s faithfulness in correctly performing religiously prescribed behaviors. The primary method of religious instruction through which the men learned about Islam was understood to be ritual practice. In fact, even formal education was found to be a type of religious ritual.


This work examines how Tunisians construct understandings of the local and global, and how these understandings are contested and manipulated. The theoretical focus is not on globalization per se, but on perceptions of globalization, using the lens of foreign language learning. There are markedly different approaches to language mastery, and these reflect disagreements about the goals of the nation (and its citizens) and how nations should interact on the world stage. The positions can be broadly divided into the ideal types of “civilization” and “globalization.” Civilization includes a belief in the importance of standardized and centralized academic schooling that emphasizes the elite cultural products of recognizable and distinct civilizations. By contrast, the globalization position in Tunisia stresses decentralized, informal learning (often outside of schools) and emphasizes the pragmatic usefulness of skills learned in a comparatively homogenous global market.

In popular perception, English represents globalization, while (among foreign languages) French represents civilization. The debates about learning languages in Tunisia preglobalization, at least as it is generally periodized, and are more the result of the formation of nation-states and of modernization as an ideological construct than anything else. While this debate does not depend on globalization per se, glob-
alization is the broad context in which it takes place. It provides the style and character of the conversation, of something to be championed, or something to be avoided (or both). While the conflict is at least 100 years old, in popular perception the crisis of education is forever young (by no means an exclusively Tunisian trait). To draw out the change over time, the dissertation analyzes the interaction of language ideology and institutions, suggesting that the structure and forms of institutions (in this case, schools) have a real impact on language ideology (although not necessarily in the direct way that policy makers imagine).


This dissertation examines the interaction between anti-communism and ideologies of development in the construction of U.S.-Indonesian relations during the 1960s. It argues that the political strategies of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations for Indonesia were grounded not just in anti-communism and geopolitics but in a discourse of modernization, which provided both a cultural and ideological frame of reference and a set of policy prescriptions considered appropriate for Indonesia’s “stage” of economic and political development and its role in the world economy.

Utilizing a wealth of newly declassified documents, I explore the Kennedy administration’s efforts to lure Sukarno into closer political and economic relations with the West, the gradual collapse of U.S.-Indonesian relations from 1963 to 1965, and the Johnson administration’s embrace of the New Order regime of General Suharto. I demonstrate how, both prior to and following Suharto’s rise to power and the destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party in late 1965, U.S. officials and broader constituencies, such as foreign investors, justified their support for a military-dominated government as a means for modernizing Indonesia. I argue, however, that Washington failed to reconcile the conflict between its rhetorical commitment to modernizing Indonesia and its support for a corrupt, statist, authoritarian regime which in many ways posed the greatest obstacles to economic and political reform.

This project contributes to the study of U.S.-Indonesian relations by highlighting the persistence of Washington’s commitment to authoritarian modernization throughout the 1960s, a mutual commitment many Indonesians shared and which shaped the trajectory of Indonesian history for decades to come. It also engages broader discussions about the role of ideology in U.S. foreign policy and U.S. economic and political development policies during the Cold War.


The everyday politics of political communities may involve nationalism, religion, or education in the formation of a common political identity. Emphasizing the prac-
tices of political community uncovers central political narratives necessary for the coherence of political community.

This dissertation introduces the concept of location into the study of political community in order to explore this coherence of community in the ethnically heterogeneous politics of Muslim political community in southern Thailand. In rethinking of the role of location in classical and contemporary political thought, this dissertation begins with a discussion of the *topoi* in Aristotle and Giambattista Vico’s treatment of rhetoric. *Topoi* are the mental locations of rhetoric organized by the speaker that, I argue, extend beyond the speaker to the audience and reflect the constitution of a political community through discourse. I also consider Emmanuel Levinas’s development of the concept of “dwelling” in *totality and infinity*. Dwelling not only provides the phenomenological grounding for a subject’s existence, but also is a crucial figure of location for Levinas’s framework of an ethical relation with an other.

This theoretical elaboration of location is grounded in an ethnographic analysis of the practices of Muslim political community in three villages in Satun, Thailand. Methodologically, my fieldwork involved a “multi-sited” ethnography focused on the politics of Islamic and public education. From these educational practices, narratives of political community emerge. Narratives reflect how differences in traditions of religious education as well as language use become common markers for differences among nine Muslims living in Satun and Muslims living on the southeast coast of southern Thailand. Such differences are grafted onto broad categories of location, which, in political narratives, serve as references for ethnic difference, nationalist sentiment or strictness of religious practice. Questioning how location frames the coming together of political community demonstrates the ways in which minority political communities are multiple and continuously contested, rather than homogenous and static. In offering an analysis of political narratives and practices beyond political violence, my dissertation broadens the discussion of Islamic politics in southern Thailand and calls attention to the complexities involved in the formation of its political community.

The Imagined versus the Real Other: Multiculturalism and the Representation of Muslims in Sweden. Carlbom, Aje, Ph.D. Lunds Universitet (Sweden), 2003. 234 pages. Publication Number: Not Available from UMI.

Are Muslims so different from other citizens in Sweden, that they have to live in segregation and be separated from the rest of society? What is a Muslim, and who is to define this category? This thesis presents the main actors in this discussion and their ideological positions. The multiculturalist ideology is hegemonic in Sweden on issues concerned with cultural diversity, and intellectuals in various fields of knowledge subscribe to the main moral dictates of this ideology. In the thesis, it is claimed that the use of multiculturalist ideals when dealing with the “Other” masks essential cultural and social aspects and processes, and that the hegemony of multicultural-
ism, as in all ideological systems, is reproduced through various material and symbolic affirmations and sanctions. Actors who criticize the ideology run the risk of being classified as racists, and consequently excommunicated from the community of ideologically right-minded citizens.

The statements in this hegemonic multiculturalist discourse about what is and ought to be when it comes to Muslim integration are contrasted to empirical data gathered through anthropological fieldwork in Rosengård, a Muslim neighborhood in Malmö, the third largest city in Sweden. The shows that the discourse, which is guided by multiculturalist ideals, leaves out important fields of knowledge that are crucial to an understanding of Muslim integration. The hegemony of multiculturalism, it is argued, is an obstacle to understanding multicultural society. The unintended consequences of good intentions, inherent in the multiculturalist ideology, may actually contribute to excluding Muslims from fully participating in Swedish society.


Through a multi-faceted research strategy incorporating ethnographic, literary, and historical exploration, the dissertation documents living and literary Qadiri; traditions and popular traditions of devotion to Sufi saint Muhyiuddin `Abdul Qadir al-Gilani in the Tamil-speaking region of South Asia. Part 1, the ethnographic portion of the dissertation, describes the special characteristics and annual `urs (saint’s death anniversary) celebrations at four regional shrine-like sites devoted to the saint, and presents an indepth description of Qadiri traditions in the Tamil Nadu coastal maraikkayar (Arab-settled) town of Kayalpattanam. Part 2 presents profiles of important Kayalpattanam Qadiriyyat from the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries, as well as Qadiri literary traditions of devotion to Saint Muhyiuddn. Part 3, “Analyzing Islamization,” first highlights the theoretical contributions of Catherine Bell on ritual theory and Paul Connerton on social memory, in an attempt to shed new light on the relationship of ritual practice to historical processes of Islamization.

Research findings suggest that commemorative ceremonies, bodily habit, and ritual creativity have played critical roles in “Islamizing” processes. Next, the important role of Tamil Qadiri literary traditions in the Islamization of the Tamil region is analyzed with reference to other South Asian regions. Evidence suggests that Qadiri scholars engaged whole-heartedly in well-established Tamil literary traditions, emulating and adapting extant literary works and genres to fit their own devotional and didactic agendas. Lives of the Kayalpattanam Qadiri community leaders suggest that basic Islamic scholarship and educational efforts – integrated with a Qadiri Sufi worldview – and an emphasis on Islamic reform, especially reform agendas directed toward Muslim women, preoccupied Qadiri scholars
from at least the seventeenth century. Interest in “conversion” of non-Muslims is only faintly discernible in our sources.

Finally, a critique of Susan Bayly’s 1989 Saints, Goddesses and Kings: Muslims and Christians in South Indian Society 1700–1900 suggests that scholar’s pioneering study of conversion to Islam in Tamil Nadu presents a valuable, but incomplete explanation of “Islamization” in the region.


This is an historical ethnography of the Uyghurs of the Ili valley, a stateless Muslim nation lodged between Russian and Chinese spheres of influence in Central Asia. The central questions that the study addresses are how and why peoples such as the Uyghurs persist in asserting their sense of nationhood without sovereign statehood in our present world system. In tackling these questions, the study does not only increase our understanding of the phenomenon of the stateless nation. It also asserts that through an understanding of the motivations and activities of disempowered and deterritorialized people, especially in international borderlands, we can better understand the roles of power, identity, and territory in our modern world system.

The study combines ethnographic and historical methodology in an attempt to transcend the perspectives of both disciplines. While it is divided into ethnographic past and ethnographic present sections, the text seeks to problematize the divisions between the past and present as well as between the disciplines of history and anthropology.

The study concentrates on this community’s local engagement with global processes, charting both the Ili valley Uyghurs’ marginalization in the world system and their resistance to this marginalization. One of its central themes is the importance of the production of locality to this borderland community’s survival as a unique people whose social life transcends the border dividing them and resists the homogenizing forces of modernity. In particular, the study concentrates on the importance of community rituals as a means of inscribing social space and creating local subjects, both of which defy the prescriptions of the states in which they live.

In its examination of the twentieth century, the study also accent the importance of the production of a Uyghur national identity that is negotiated through the practices of local Uyghur communities and is unified by a mediated culture of books, newspapers, and other media that convey a specific narrative of the nation.

This thesis investigates the Mongol Ilkhan Ahmad Teguder’s (r. 1282–84 CE) conversion to Islam, and the repercussions of this event in the Muslim narrative traditions. Ahmad Teguder was the first Muslim Ilkhan in Iran. His conversion was part of the larger process of the Islamization of the Mongol elite during the second half of the 13th century CE, a few generations after the Mongols’ conquest of the area.

The first chapter lays out the historical and historiographical background of the issue, and introduces the existing scholarship. It also explains the sources and methods used in this thesis. Chapter 2 examines conversion to Islam among the Mongol elite before Ahmad Teguder’s conversion. It contextualizes his case within the larger process of the Islamization of the Ilkhanate (1256–1335 CE), involving marriage politics, competing Sufi saints, and conversion to Islam among the Mongol elites prior to the royal Ilkhanid family.

Chapter 3 focuses on the issues important for understanding the “double rapprochement” of Muslims and Mongols in the Ilkhanid society. These include patrilineal vs. lateral succession in a corporate dynasty such as the Ilkhanids; the role of Islam in Ahmad Teguder’s succession and deposition; the interaction of the local and Mongol elites in the administration of the Ilkhanate; and the effect of Ahmad Teguder’s conversion to Islam on his politics. With its focus on the internal dynamics of the Ilkhanate, this chapter also investigates, as far as the sources allow for it, “the Mongol perspective” on these events. Chapter 4 is devoted to conversion narratives in the Muslim narrative traditions, retracing Ahmad Teguder’s various transformations from the villain and pretender, as he is portrayed in some of the contemporary sources, to the first convert, converter, reformer, and martyr for Islam as who emerges in some of the later accounts.

The changing contents and nature of these narratives in different socio-historical contexts provide important insights into the tension between history and myth as tools of constructing and modeling the image of the Mongols over time, integrating them into the larger narrative of Muslim history and imagination.


The dissertation seek to establish three theses. First, if secularism (defined as the separation of religious and political institutions) is a realistic and valid model for regulating the interaction of religious and political institutions, the extension of its usefulness is severely circumscribed, due to empirical conditions in the diverse societies of the world, most prominently the existence of religious beliefs and practices incompatible with secularism. Of the major religious traditions, Islam is the central religion that poses practical obstacles to the successful implementation of secularism, which the present work addresses.

The dissertation explicates recent Arabic works, mostly emanating from an avowedly Muslim perspective, which are critical of secularism, and assesses their respective significance and merit. Second, building upon selected objections in the
Arabic works, the dissertation argues that secularism, as a principle, is seriously flawed; these flaws are conceptual, normative, and semantic in nature. This critique aims to demonstrate that even if secularism could be perfectly implemented, serious moral objections, particularly concerning religious freedom, would remain.

The third thesis consists in the construction of an alternative to secularism: the principle of equidistance. Equidistance represents an argument against secularism insofar as it improves upon the dominant principle, avoiding its failures and offering distinctive normative advantages. Equidistance requires that the state maintain a position of impartiality vis-à-vis the religious groups under its jurisdiction. In other words, the state must avoid favoritism or prejudice toward religious groups.

Three conditions determine which model will best satisfy the principle of equidistance: the number of religious groups existing in society, the demand these groups make for religious involvement in politics, and the capacity of the state to dispense aid and recognition equally. Depending upon these conditions, equidistance requires one of four models: separation (which most closely resembles the secularism advanced by liberal theorists), accommodation, equal aid and recognition, or establishment. These three theses support the conclusion of the entire work: secularism, as a principle for the regulation of the religious and the political, must be rejected.