Multiculturalism and Social Cohesion
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Potentials and Challenges of Diversity

with the collaboration of Mai B. Phan and Rupa Banerjee
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Chapter 1
Assessing Multiculturalism as a Behavioural Theory

Jeffrey G. Reitz

Is multiculturalism, as an approach to addressing questions of ethnic and cultural diversity in contemporary society, based on solid social premises or faulty ones? Multiculturalism has various forms, but is generally presented as an alternative to “assimilation” approaches prevalent in the past. Multiculturalism as a social philosophy and as a policy suggests that, in an attempt to shape a cohesive society from diverse ethnic and cultural groups, it is better to recognize and value that diversity, and not seek to downplay diversity, or to cast all groups within one single cultural mould. But is this based on correct social theory?

We suggest that inherent in the philosophy and policy of multiculturalism is a particular understanding of the basic social dynamics of inter-ethnic relations, in other words a social or behavioural theory, and it is important to ask whether this theory is valid in a social science sense. Is the basic behavioural theory of multiculturalism valid, or is it founded on idealistic assumptions which simply do not hold up in the real world? This is a key question in determining whether multiculturalism “works.”

Questions about multiculturalism are being asked in many countries where contemporary immigration has led to significant inter-ethnic tension and sometimes violent discord, and where multiculturalist ideas once embraced are now being seriously reconsidered. Some say multiculturalism is valid theoretically, and “works” if properly applied. Others argue that multiculturalism is fundamentally flawed, a recipe either for conflict or social malaise. Which view is correct?

A good place to start testing the social theory underlying multiculturalism might be Canada. Canada is in many ways the founder of multiculturalism as a formal government policy, and it is for Canada that the greatest successes of multiculturalism policies have been claimed. Since the Canadian government announced “multiculturalism” to address issues of ethnic and cultural diversity in 1971, the policy and the concepts behind it have been an object of international attention, and an upsurge in interest and experimentation occurred first in Australia and then across Europe and even in the United States. Now, however, this “affair” with multiculturalism has given rise to sober second thoughts in many countries, if not to an outright backlash and a retreat. There have been a number of instances of inter-ethnic tension and violence for which multiculturalism has been at least partly blamed. The critics of multiculturalism are now many, and they are asking with
ever greater urgency whether – whatever the moral or philosophical justifications – perhaps the most serious faults of multiculturalism are in its underlying assumptions about human behaviour.

As we will see, multiculturalism has been advocated by political philosophers on moral grounds. They argue that individuals have the right to maintain their cultural communities, and they argue that governments have a moral obligation to avoid or offset cultural biases inherent in state institutions. But these advocates also put forward sociological or psychological arguments, suggesting that recognition of diversity helps create positive self esteem and greater social unity. These are more strictly behavioural hypotheses, and it is important to ask about their empirical validity as part of the debate over multiculturalism. Does support for ethnic diversity bolster individual well-being and inter-ethnic cohesion as its advocates espoused, or does if foster tension and discord, as its critics contend?

This is a study of the empirical validity of basic assumptions behind multiculturalism and multicultural policies, focusing on the case of Canada. We will spell out these hypotheses later in this chapter. We believe that understanding the empirical validity of the assumptions behind multiculturalism is as important to the formulation of policy as whether the existing policy itself works, or the attitudes of the public toward multiculturalism over time. To adopt an effective multicultural policy, it is important to know the extent to which Canadian society actually functions in ways envisioned by the proponents of multiculturalism.

In order to explore behavioural assumptions behind the concept and policy multiculturalism as they might apply to its “founding country” – Canada – there is an extensive and quite unique body of evidence – a large nationally representative “Ethnic Diversity Survey” of over 41,000 Canadians conducted in 2002 by the government statistical agency Statistics Canada. We can use this vast storehouse of information about Canadian diversity to see whether inter-ethnic relations – at least in the case of Canada – in fact conform to empirical assumptions about human behaviour behind multiculturalism, or whether perhaps multiculturalism is based on social science precepts which are simply wrong.

Our analysis of this evidence provides perhaps the most extensive empirical examination yet available on the major behavioural assumptions at the root of the concept and policy of multiculturalism. Interestingly, what we find is what one often finds when ideological or philosophical debates are confronted with the real world: neither side is completely right nor completely wrong. There is support both for multiculturalism and for its critics. Some of the assumptions behind multiculturalism are confirmed, but some are refuted – even in Canada.

There are policy implications, too. We find reasons for believing that multiculturalism policies at least in Canada might be modified to retain the strengths while responding directly to the challenges. In other words, the basic precepts of multiculturalism are partly valid as they apply in the Canadian case, and existing policies can be adapted further to increase that validity. This would mean, to some extent, changing the way that Canadian society now works. We argue also that whether multiculturalism can be applied to good purposes in other countries where
it has been tried will depend on their own social and institutional context, which
determine and shape the underlying inter-ethnic dynamics.

This introductory chapter reviews the debate over multiculturalism, and its rise
and retreat in many countries, to show how and why the debate is not only about
political theory or philosophy. Social data and analysis are in fact essential to assess
some of the basic questions involved in the debate. Moreover, this empirical analysis
we argue should not be limited to “evaluation” of whether particular policies have
worked in particular countries. Partly because of lack of relevant evidence, such
evaluations have not been particularly persuasive, either for Canada where philoso-
phers such as Will Kymlicka claim that multiculturalism “works” in the sense that
it plays an important role in promoting Canada’s successful integration of immi-
grants, or for the Netherlands where some studies indicate that policies regarded as
reflecting “multiculturalism” in that country may not have been working.

We suggest that also useful, or perhaps even more useful than an evaluation of
specific policies, is an analysis of whether, or the extent to which, the underlying dy-
namic of inter-ethnic relations – social and psychological processes of inter-group
relations – match the behavioural assumptions of multicultural theories. We then
identify some specific behavioural hypotheses requiring answers, and we review
data from existing social and psychological studies relevant to the hypotheses, in-
cluding the widely debated study by Putnam (2007) on diversity and social capital,
as well as research in the UK and the Netherlands. We suggest these previous studies
are relevant but leave certain key questions still to be addressed.

In this chapter we focus mainly on the particular case of Canada, and how the
debate over multiculturalism has evolved within the country. We also describe how
the Ethnic Diversity Survey of Canada is useful in testing hypotheses about the
behavioural assumptions of multiculturalism. Some basic results will be presented
in this opening chapter. The subsequent four substantive chapters explore various
aspects of the issues raised, and this introduction also explains the approach taken
by these four chapters. A final concluding chapter provides an overview of the basic
conclusions reached and some of their implications for the multiculturalism debate.

**Migration, Diversity, and the International Vicissitudes of Canada’s “Multiculturalism”**

Most industrial countries today, not only the traditional immigration countries, ex-
perience significant immigration, producing increased ethnic diversity. The portion
of the world’s population living outside the borders of their country of birth in
2002 was estimated at 175 million (International Migration 2002, United Nations
Population Division), more than double the number 30 years previously, distributed
across Europe (56 million), Asia (50 million), and Northern America (41 million).
The proportion of the population of major industrial countries that are born outside
the country is now near 10% not only for the United States but also the United
Kingdom, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, and others, and the numbers
have reached near to or greater than 20% for Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and
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Fig 1.1 Immigrant population. Foreign-born as a percentage of total population, circa 2000

Switzerland (over 30% for Luxembourg; OECD 2005; see Fig. 1.1). International migration is a prominent feature of the contemporary world, increasing ethnic and racial diversity in a growing number of societies, and raising questions about the integration of ethnic and racial groups into a coherent and cohesive society.

The global prominence of migration today is likely to continue, since its underlying causes continue to gain strength. Economic development increases resources for migration. In turn, rapid economic change creates constant changes in labour demand not easily satisfied by local labour markets. This is especially the case because of low fertility levels in developed countries which also are likely to continue. Next, lower costs and greater ease of travel make it possible for more people to look beyond the borders of their countries for economic and other opportunities. Furthermore, progressive globalization of a range of institutions, including not only economic but also social, cultural, and political institutions, increases the awareness of opportunities both to migrate and to receive migrants. Finally, political conflicts create displaced populations that look farther afield for asylum and opportunities to build new lives, while greater liberalism has reduced political and legal barriers to international migration.

International migration in the contemporary world has dramatically increased the ethno-cultural and racial diversity of many modern industrial societies, and this has raised serious questions about whether in terms of their socio-cultural impact, such immigrants are an asset and a resource contributing to the strength and vitality of those societies, or whether they may pose a threat challenging the viability and long-term cohesiveness of those societies. Such questions are heard in the traditional immigration countries, such as the United States, Canada and Australia, as well as in European countries which have more or less reluctantly become countries of
immigration such as the United Kingdom, France, Germany and the Netherlands, or in other countries most recently experiencing significant new immigration such as Italy, Spain, Ireland, and Sweden.

**Diffusion of Multiculturalism**

Multiculturalism is not the first or most immediate policy issue arising from migration, of course; these immediate issues more often concern immigration policy itself, and questions of which immigrants are desired and how many. As well, the integration of immigrants into receiving societies, and questions related to rights of residence, acquisition of citizenship, and protection for human rights and equal treatment under the law are also a priority. The so-called traditional immigration countries, mainly the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, have developed extensive policies along these lines, and the newer countries of immigration in Europe and Asia have been encouraged to adopt them, and in many cases have done so.

Multiculturalism is a relatively recent development in ideas related to the social and cultural integration of immigrant groups, and applies not only to immigrants but also their descendants and in fact to other forms of cultural diversity as well. The idea of “cultural pluralism” and the right of minorities to maintain distinctive cultural communities through generations had also been discussed as a philosophical principle with attractive features, but to recognize group rights in formal government policy has only relatively recently attracted widespread interest at least in the case of immigrant groups.

Canada’s interest in, and formal adoption of, multiculturalism policy in 1971 is an additional response to diversity. The Canadian policy, which was introduced by Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau in a speech to Parliament, offered recognition and support for ethnic groups as social entities; it quickly received all-party support. The multiculturalism policy was prompted by the presence of demographically very significant immigrant populations, and was formulated with the view that in the interests of national unity, newcomers need not be required to “assimilate,” to shed their previous identities and culture, but rather, the recognition and encouragement of ethnic diversity may help build the country and have a quite positive impact on social cohesion, provided that a sufficient degree of social inclusion and equal participation are assured. This latter proviso – equal participation – is quite important to the Canadian approach and should be emphasized. Frequently debates over multiculturalism are restricted to issues of cultural recognition and retention, and yet very clearly, for cultural recognition to be meaningful, removing barriers to full participation in society also is necessary. As we will see, in the Canadian policy this means not only the acquisition of official language skills by immigrants, but also removing barriers to equality in the major institutions of society.

Multiculturalism in Canada was shaped decisively also by issues arising in the context of policy to accommodate Canada’s English-French linguistic duality. Canada’s history of ethnic and linguistic diversity has meant that such issues have
long been of great significance to the country. However, the so-called “Quiet Revolution,” the re-awakening of Quebec national identity in the 1960s supported by a more highly educated middle and upper-middle class, focused attention as never before on the accommodation of inter-ethnic differences as a way of building the society. A proposal to recognize French language and culture were examined by a national commission on “bilingualism and biculturalism,” and this prompted objections from some immigrant groups that an officially bicultural country created the potential for their own marginalization.

In effect, immigrant groups in Canada noted an inequity for immigrant groups inherent in adopting cultural recognition for a national minority. They requested multi-culturalism as a compromise. The compromise was accepted fairly immediately, although with reluctance among many francophone Canadians. They noticed the symbolic reduction in their own status involved in replacement of “bi” – where they were one of two – with “multi” where there become only one of many (Breton 1984). The reluctance in Quebec may be somewhat ironic, at least from the perspective of some outside Canada, who think of the English-French duality of Canada as the most prominent feature of Canadian multiculturalism (for example, the US historian Arthur Schlesinger 1992, p. 17). This is a misunderstanding, since multiculturalism in Canada primarily addresses ethnic minorities of immigrant origins, not English-French relations. It is nevertheless true, that the impulse for multiculturalism in Canada was rooted in the English-French duality. This is true in two aspects. First, the impulse for multiculturalism also was rooted in English-French duality in the sense that the enduring presence of two national groups, neither of which could expect to assimilate the other, required the acceptance and institutionalization of diversity in Canadian society to prevent its dissolution. And second, the impulse for the recognition of the “other” ethnic groups was part of the conflict over the allocation of status in the society, which raised the question of whether immigrant-origin groups were to be defined as “second-class citizens.”

The subsequent enthusiasm with which most Canadians have embraced the philosophy and policy of multiculturalism is remarkable, and has a singular place in the process of nation-building for Canada in its changing circumstances following World War II (Breton 1986). Although the francophone community in Quebec has been less enamoured of the specific word multiculturalisme, preferring other terms such as interculturalisme (substantively similar in goals though with differences in specifics¹), many Canadians on both sides of the English-French linguistic divide have developed a particular commitment to the idea that ethnic diversity becomes a basis for national identity and cohesion. The expectation that multiculturalism, as a philosophy and a policy, helps build Canadian society is now one of the major tenets in contemporary political thought across the country (Esses and Gardiner 1996). Canadian multiculturalism is today not only a policy, but is enshrined in the Canadian constitution (adopted in 1982) with additional obligations adopted in legislation (Multiculturalism Act 1988). It is adopted as policy at provincial and municipal levels of government, in many community organizations, and in school curricula. As Canadian pollster Michael Adams puts it, multiculturalism is not an
experiment, “It’s a national aspiration at the very core of Canadian idealism. It’s the Canadian Dream” (Adams 2007, p. 41).

From this Canadian base, the international ascendancy of multiculturalism was fairly rapid. Almost immediately, the Australian government expressed interest in the Canadian idea, and formally adopted a version of multiculturalism in 1978. In the 1980s and 1990s a number of European countries including the United Kingdom and the Netherlands also adopted policies described as representing multiculturalism, although each retains its own national version or “model.” Even in the United States, where governments never formally embraced any multiculturalism language, interest and support for ideas labelled multiculturalism increased to the point where the sociologist Nathan Glazer announced in 1997 that “we are all multiculturalists now” (Glazer 1997). “Multiculturalism and identity politics were in many ways born in Canada,” says Frances Fukuyama (2007), but “Multiculturalism – understood not just as tolerance of cultural diversity but as the demand for legal recognition of the rights of racial, religious or cultural groups – has now become established in virtually all modern liberal democracies.”

The philosophical foundations for multiculturalism within the context of liberal democracy, and the basis for recognizing group rights as well as individual rights, have developed also during this period, with Canada again a leading country producing some of the most prominent multiculturalism “theoreticians.” Taylor (1994) argued that ethnic identity is inherently political, resulting in a demand for official recognition and acknowledgement. “Misrecognition,” Taylor says, “shows not just a lack of due respect. It can inflict a grievous wound, saddling its victims with a crippling self-hatred. Due recognition is not just a courtesy we owe people. It is a vital human need” (op. cit., p. 26). Will Kymlicka (1995) put forward that multiculturalism is necessary to offset the inherent bias in government favouring majority ethnic cultures, and is in fact a natural extension of the principles of liberal democracy, representing more advanced realization of its equality ideals. The names of Taylor and Kymlicka have long been prominent internationally in discussions of the theoretical basis for multiculturalism, both in the academic literature and beyond, alongside others such as scholars from the United States (e.g. William Galston 2002) and Britain (e.g. Bhikhu Parekh 2006).

Retreat from Multiculturalism

Critics of multiculturalism have characterized multiculturalism as promoting a radical cultural relativism, so that if implemented the basic values of democracy and even Western culture generally are disrespected, compromised and devalued. These include principles of free speech, and equality of opportunity. Special rights for minorities may amount to privileges which could constitute a kind of reverse racism. Such themes are present in critiques in the US by Arthur Schlesinger (1992), the political theorist Brian Barry (2001), and as well as by Huntington (2004) among others, and in Europe by Amartya Sen (2006a, b; see Kelly 2002).
Concerns related to gender equality have been voiced particularly often (Okin 1999; Phillips 2007). Some argue that official status for minority cultures in which the status of women may be less well protected than in mainstream culture might constitute a reversal of hard-won women’s rights. Others argue that multiculturalism may support women, by providing more effective integration of minority groups into the mainstream society (Shachar 2001).

Multiculturalism also has its critics in Canada of course. Some doubts stem from a belief that rather than being part of Canadian identity, multiculturalism reflects and also reinforced the lack of any distinctive Canadian identity (Granatstein 2007, pp. 90–100). Some also argue that multiculturalism is divisive because it perpetuates marginality and inequality. This point was raised in Canada very early by the sociologist John Porter (1965, 1979), and more recently also in a book by the novelist Neil Bissoondath (1994) which created a media stir because Bissoondath is himself a member of a visible minority group. Many today point to evidence of the marginality of minorities, and mounting evidence of inequality and poverty, the growing size of some minority communities and the concomitant possibility of social isolation, and emerging social problems in certain minority communities despite multiculturalism. Although few predict a serious breakdown in social cohesion in Canada as a result of ethnic diversity, or the policy of multiculturalism, concern has been expressed both on the left and the right, by advocates for minority rights (Lewis 1992; Omidvar and Richmond 2003), and by advocates of reductions in immigration into Canada (Stoffman 2002; Collacott 2002; Francis 2002).

At the popular level, and in all developed countries as large-scale international migration has continued to grow and expand, so have concerns about its impact, with implications for political support for multiculturalism policies. Vertovec (2006) refers to a new “super-diversity” in Britain that is “distinguished by a dynamic interplay of variables among an increased number of new, small and scattered, multiple-origin, trans-nationally connected, socio-economically differentiated and legally stratified immigrants who have arrived over the last decade.” Although the formation of immigrant and ethnic communities is hardly a new phenomenon in modern societies, concerns about the impact of such dramatically increased immigration on social cohesion are based in part on the highly-visible formation or expansion of immigrant communities in the major cities in most countries, which seem to reflect a degree of separateness from the mainstream society, and are seen – rightly or wrongly – to symbolize a desire to remain separate. Multiculturalism may be criticized either on the basis that it encourages the formation of ethnic communities (whatever its actual effects may be in that regard) and associated cultures which may conflict in some respects with mainstream culture, or that because of “political correctness” it protects members of minority groups from criticism or responsibility for actions that might negatively affect other groups in society. Such concerns are based also on the responses of at least some within the host society, if there is hostility toward immigrants or minorities because of their presumed differences or their inability to become full members of society.
In the post-9/11 world, the issues often have focused on Muslims, with front-page news particularly of widespread disturbances in the Maghreb (mainly Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian) communities in France in November 2005, and before that the bombings in London on July 11, 2005, in Madrid on March 11, 2004, and the murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam on November 2, 2004. In Canada, a parallel controversy arose following the arrest of 17 alleged members of a purported Islamic terrorist cell in June 2006 (The Economist 2006a, b). The questions raised are part of more general concerns about how contemporary immigration, and the formation of minority communities, affects the cohesiveness of the social fabric.

Such concerns about immigration inevitably redound to undermine the political popularity of multiculturalism. Critics of multiculturalism have been many, and in recent years there has been a “retreat” from multiculturalism policies particularly in Europe but also in the United States and Australia (cf. Joppke 2004; Hansen 2007). In Australia there has been a progressive de-emphasis on multiculturalism, and some activities discontinued, particularly under the Howard government since the mid-1990s. In the Netherlands and Britain, where the policies were less formally entrenched, distancing was rather more easily accomplished.

Even in Canada, public opinion has expressed concern that at least some immigrants may not integrate successfully, nor adopt “Canadian values.” Many Canadians regard themselves as a rather unlikely target for a serious attack by Islamic fundamentalists, and although they share concerns about Islamic extremism in the world generally, they are relatively less concerned about how it affects Canada specifically (Pew Global Attitudes Project 2005, p. 3). The 17 Canadian Muslim youths arrested for that terrorist plot in June 2006 tended to be dismissed by the public as fairly harmless (only one has been convicted in court). Nevertheless, although the threat of terrorism is in the background, there has been a significant and growing Canadian debate about the social integration of the new minorities. In 2006, “two-thirds of Canadians were expressing anxiety about the cultural integration of newcomers,” according to pollster Michael Adams; his review of the public opinion data lead him to conclude that Canadians more often think that “something about multiculturalism is broken and that immigrants aren’t adequately adapting to life in Canada” (Adams 2007, p. 29).

The questions in Canada as elsewhere have focused on religion, whether certain religious minorities have values, beliefs or practices that are difficult to integrate into Canadian society because they clash with Canadian ideas about gender equality or secularism in public institutions (Ramadan 2007; Modood 2005; Abu-Laban 1995; Soysal 1997). The Ontario provincial government proposed the inclusion of Sharia law in Ontario family tribunals (Boyd 2007), but ultimately rejected it based on concerns raised about the threat such Islamic courts pose to Muslim women (Khan 2007), at the same time revoking parallel privileges previously available to Jews in an attempt to be consistent. Ontario also recently debated and rejected the extension of public funding to all religious schools, a benefit enjoyed only by Catholics. Opinion polls showed 71% of the population opposed (The Strategic Counsel 2007),
based largely on concerns about fostering segregation as well as about state encouragement of religion.\textsuperscript{4}

In Quebec, a government commission recently addressed multiculturalism in the form of an investigation of what constitutes “reasonable accommodation” for minorities. This was sparked by several events including most dramatically the publication of standards guiding the behaviour of immigrants to the small town of Hérouxville. These standards, while not addressing Muslims by name, targeted perceived gender practices of Islam, stipulating that women are allowed to do anything a man can do while specifically noting that “killing women in public beatings, or burning them alive are not part of our standards” (Hérouxville 2007; see Aubin and Gatehouse 2007). The government commission, chaired by Gérard Bouchard and Charles Taylor (both natives of Quebec), conducted hearings around the province and concluded that the issue had been blown out of proportion by the media (Bouchard and Taylor 2008). In effect, Bouchard and Taylor point to the possibility that there may be problems for the integration of minorities based not on their own cultural distinctiveness but rather on what some have called the “racialization” of religious status (Joshi 2006), that is to say the possibility that religious minorities are stigmatized and experience discrimination based on religion, and on a perception of religious minorities as a racialized “other.”

It is interesting that this contemporary concern about the impact of immigration on social cohesion, based on whether or not immigrants themselves are successfully integrated into society, does not include potential effects of diversity on cohesion because of its impact on or connection with other social divisions in society, such as those based on social class, region, or (particularly in the case of Canada) linguistic group. However, this type of impact was discussed prominently by social scientists before the most recent immigration became controversial. For example, Alford (1963) examined how voting expressed social class divisions in Britain, the United States, Canada and Australia, and showed that class voting was less in countries such as Canada in which important ethnic cleavages cut across social class lines. In this analysis, diversity enhances social cohesion not because of greater integration of minorities into the whole, but precisely because conflicts over diversity detract from other, potentially even more divisive, conflicts. Because ethnic loyalties offset or override class loyalties, ethnic divisions within middle or working class groups may reduce the salience of conflicts based on class. About the time of Alford’s study, the phenomenon of “cross-cutting” lines of conflict and the impact on social cohesion was being given significant attention by social theorists (e.g. Coser 1965). More recently the issue has been raised again in a critique of diversity politics by Michaels (2006).

The impact of any particular aspect of diversity on other conflicts is not necessarily positive, of course. For example, immigration in Canada has the potential to increase French-English conflict, based on a concern in Quebec that immigration strengthens the position of the English in the province and across Canada. This concern definitely has a basis in reality, given that immigrants historically had integrated into the Anglophone community in Quebec as in the rest of Canada. However, this particular effect has been mitigated to a degree by two factors. One is the agreement
between Quebec and the federal government, initiated in 1970 and strengthened over time, to give Quebec a significant role in the selection of immigrants destined for Quebec. Quebec has its own “points system” which gives greater emphasis on immigrant characteristics related to language. The other is language legislation in Quebec, passed under the Parti Québécois government of René Lévesque in 1977, under which English schools were restricted to those already in the Quebec system, obligating immigrants to educate their children in French. These two policies seem to have changed the linguistic orientation of immigrants in Quebec toward French (Breton 1998). Immigration in Quebec is undoubtedly less divisive as a source of English-French conflict in Canada as a result of these two measures.

Does Multiculturalism “Work”? : Philosophy, Policy Effects, and Behavioral Theory

Problems integrating immigrants might provide fuel for the critics of multiculturalism, but the viability of multiculturalism should not be decided automatically on this basis. Negative experiences in inter-group relations do not necessarily refute the value of the basic ideas and precepts of multiculturalism, or whether multiculturalism “works.” Neither do positive experiences prove the value of multiculturalism. The negative experiences in Europe certainly appear to have undermined support for multiculturalism in the affected countries. However, whether people in various countries with multicultural policies or practices in place are satisfied with the integration of their immigrant groups is hardly a good test of the validity of the basic precepts of multiculturalism. Swings in public opinion should not be the basis for any assessment of whether the underlying precepts of multiculturalism are valid.

In the case of Canada, the trend toward worries about the integration of immigrants (such as noted by Adams) has not, in fact, produced a substantial backlash against the multiculturalism policy itself. There has been general public support in Canada for multiculturalism and a belief in the validity of its underlying assumptions, as shown in a poll conducted at the end of 2001 (Table 1.1, from Jedwab 2002). Clear majorities think that promoting the multicultural heritages of Canadians promotes common values (77%), and removes barriers to equality (71%). Relatively few believe that it is a threat to social unity (32%). A poll conducted in 2003 showed that when presented with the proposition that “A society that has a variety of ethnic and cultural groups is more able to tackle new problems,” 49% agreed, and 8% disagreed, with the rest neutral. The level of agreement was actually slightly higher than in a parallel poll conducted in 1991 (Parkin 2003). An Angus Reid poll (2008, p. 5) showed that on the list of institutions and national characteristics that elicit feelings of pride among Canadians, multiculturalism (cited by 61%) ranks below the flag (86%), the armed forces (80%), and hockey (71%), and about at the same level as the economy (62%) and the state of democracy generally (57%), but above the vaunted national health care system (50%). So the retreat from multiculturalism internationally has been rapid, the philosophical debate goes on,
but within Canada support for multiculturalism in Canada still remains fairly strong, despite this international controversy.

In any case, public opinion is not the issue here. There are three different aspects to the question of the viability of multiculturalism. One is at the level of (i) political theory or philosophy. It can be asked whether the theory that multiculturalism is justified as an extension of equality principles in a liberal democracy, such as put forward by Kymlicka and debated widely, is convincing. Do states impose cultural requirements to a degree that minority groups should be compensated? Can group rights be consistent with individual equality? There is considerable debate on such questions.

The other two aspects are empirical, concerning what actually happens in the real world. There is a debate about the (ii) impact of specific policies regarded as reflecting multicultural principles; this is definitely an empirical question. Has multiculturalism in a country like Canada been successful in achieving its broader goals? Has it been a failure in other countries such as the UK or the Netherlands? Which specific policies produce those effects in each country? Have any countries really implemented multicultural policies having any significant impact?
These two topics may have received the most attention in debates over the “theory” of multiculturalism, as Joppke (2001) illustrates in his critique of Kymlicka. However, there is a third question concerning (iii) *behavioural theories and assumptions about inter-ethnic relations*. Here there are questions which are also empirical, as in the debate over the impact of multicultural policies, but they are related not to policy but to broader social dynamics assumed to operate in a multicultural society. As described some years ago by the sociologist John Rex (1987) who outlined “the concept of a multicultural society,” the question is whether the dynamics of inter-ethnic relations actually occur in the way that the behavioural aspect of multicultural theory suggests that they do. For example, when members of minority groups maintain strong ties within their minority community as might be expected in an ideal multicultural community, what are the consequences for their individual well-being socially or psychologically, or for their relation to the broader society? Multiculturalism as theory suggests that the effects are positive, so if this turns out to be empirically correct, then at least this aspect of the theory is validated. As a consequence, we might expect policies based on such assumptions to work. By the same token, if the effects are negative, then to this extent the theory is not valid. At a minimum, it would then be necessary to ask whether these negative effects arise from some particular conditions in society, and whether these conditions might be altered by some policy adjustment so a positive outcome ultimately might be obtained.

**Does Multiculturalism “Work” in Canada?**

An evaluation of multiculturalism policy in Canada would be very worthwhile, but is likely to be extremely difficult and complex. At least partly as a result, the Canadian government has never formally evaluated its multiculturalism policy, at least not in the social science sense of evaluation. The cabinet minister responsible for multiculturalism reports annually to Parliament on the operation of the policy, however, no extensive review has been carried out. It may be unrealistic to expect a major social impact for such a small program, the annual budget for which has been on the order of $21 million per year, or about 0.01% of total government expenditures (Canada, Department of Canadian Heritages 2005, p. 91).

Academic discussion of the impact of multiculturalism policies in Canada has been extensive, but again there is no real evaluation. The information base for such an evaluation is simply not there. Partly as a result, the analytic approach which has been adopted by some writers has been quite inadequate as a basis for drawing serious conclusions. Probably the best known example of these discussions for the case of Canada is actually in the writings of Will Kymlicka. To be sure, Kymlicka has recognized the difficulties in policy evaluation. In his 1998 book *Feeling our Way*, he asserts quite baldly that “whether we examine the trends within Canada since 1971, or compare Canada with other countries, the conclusion is the same: multiculturalism is working” (p. 22). But more recently he has become much more circumspect, and in his 2007 book *Multicultural Odysseys*, surveying international
experiences with multiculturalism, he observes much less confidently that “we cannot simply declare multiculturalism to be either a ‘success’ or a ‘failure’” (p. 165).

Such caution regarding the impact of multiculturalism policies is entirely justified. Principles of policy evaluation research are well-known in the social sciences (e.g. Rossi et al. 2004; Donaldson et al. 2008), and a quick review shows the inadequacy of available information about the impact of multiculturalism policy. There are three main research requirements for policy evaluation in the social sciences. First, it is necessary to define criteria for policy outcomes by which to judge success, and to specify how to measure key indicators of those outcomes. The second requirement is to describe the actual programs being evaluated and to document their implementation. And the third requirement is to provide evidence of cause and effect between the two, the extent to which the programs as implemented actually are affecting the desired goals and outcomes of the policy. Each of these requirements presents very large difficulties to overcome before any conclusion is possible that Canadian multiculturalism actually “works.”

The first requirement, defining criteria and indicators for policy success, may be the most readily addressed. The ultimate criteria for policy success, that is, the goals of multiculturalism, are the overall unity of society, and national cohesion. As indicators, it is reasonable to focus on the integration of individual immigrants and their descendants, in social, cultural, economic and political terms. Although the ultimate impact that ethnic diversity resulting from immigration may have on social cohesion will be affected by factors other than the integration of individual immigrants, such integration is likely to be important part of the picture, as we argue later in this chapter. Kymlicka suggests four criteria for integration:

- adopting a Canadian identity,
- participating in Canadian institutions,
- learning an official language, and
- having inter-ethnic friendships.

Clearly, there are additional aspects of immigrant integration which should be included. Trudeau’s 1971 speech articulated other goals of multiculturalism, including “cultural freedom” which suggests individual well-being. An emphasis on equality, including equality between men and women, also are important.5

A second requirement for policy evaluation is much more difficult: to spell out and measure the implementation of specific multiculturalism programs. There are many specific policies grouped under the heading of “multiculturalism,” making it difficult to sort out which are most essential to an overall judgement about the concept, and difficult to see which may be producing any observed effect. Kymlicka (1998, p. 42) identified no less than 13 policies and programs “discussed under the rubric of ‘multiculturalism’ in the Canadian public debate.” This list included funding for ethnic cultural festivals and ethnic studies programs, and heritage language courses in schools – two items often identified in Canada as the most concrete manifestations of multiculturalism. It also included a variety of others: affirmative action programs, employer accommodation with regard to work schedules and dress-codes related to religious minorities, media regulations regarding ethnic stereotypes, regul-
lations against verbal harassment of minorities in public places, revisions of educational curricula to give greater recognition to the historical and cultural contributions of minorities, anti-racism educational programs, black-focused schools, and several others. Whether these all reflect the philosophy of multiculturalism or the stated purposes of the Canadian policy (discussed below) to the same degree might be debated. The point is that it would be difficult to trace success or failure in the social integration of immigrant groups to any one of these, much less to the group of policies taken together or some subset of them. Adding to the complexity is the fact that the policies were not all implemented at one time. For example, fair employment practices legislation was introduced at the provincial level over the period 1951 (in Ontario) to 1964 (in Quebec) and at the federal level including the Canadian Bill of Rights in 1960 and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1985 (see Manzer 1985). In Kymlicka’s discussion, there was no attempt to describe the implementation of any of these policies in the Canadian case, so consequently it is really not possible to link empirically any of the specific policies to potential outcomes in terms of immigrant integration.

The third requirement for policy evaluation is likely the most daunting of all: providing evidence of cause and effect. Kymlicka’s statement that “multiculturalism is working” in Canada was based on observations he believes show that “immigrant groups integrate more quickly and more effectively today than they did before the adoption of multiculturalism policy, and they do so more successfully in Canada than in any other country that does not have such a policy” (Kymlicka 1998, p. 8). Even if such a statement about immigrant integration could be supported – and in some cases it may be extremely doubtful – there are many reasons other than multiculturalism which could explain trends in the integration of immigrants in Canada, or cross-national differences. One cannot draw conclusions about policy impacts simply based simply on analysis of trends “before-and-after” the policy was introduced, or based on comparison of trends in countries with and without multiculturalism policy; too many other factors are involved.

One of the most important “other factors” which could explain successful integration of immigrants in Canada is its skill-based immigrant selection policy. This so-called “points system” was implemented just a few years prior to the multiculturalism policy, and is often also given credit for the success of the overall Canadian immigration experience. Immigrants in Canada are on average more highly educated than Canadians generally, so that despite certain difficulties, they tend to have more favourable employment experience compared to their counterparts in the US or Europe. To attribute their successful integration entirely to multiculturalism obviously would be unwarranted.

Immigrant integration in Canada also is affected by public attitudes favourable to immigration, which may be affected by multiculturalism but also reflect the broader nation-building strategy behind Canadian immigration policy, and the belief that immigration boosts the Canadian economy (Reitz 2004). As a result of these favourable public attitudes, programs to promote the integration of immigrants – programs unrelated to multiculturalism – are comparatively well-funded, and include in particular official language training. Learning an official language
is one of the specific indicators of integration cited by Kymlicka (although without evidence of any trends since 1971), but it should not automatically be attributed to multiculturalism. Knowledge of an official language is one basis for the selection of immigrants in the points system, and is often further enhanced by specific language instruction programs. Canada’s programs of official language instruction for immigrants may be among the most important aspects of the overall immigrant settlement program. Lack of similar programs in other countries may be among their chief weaknesses.

Immigrant and minority integration in Canada since the 1970s also may have been affected by the sheer diversity of origins groups, with no one group dominating in inter-group relations. In Europe, non-European migrants tend to come from a small number of origins in the Middle East and North Africa. In Amsterdam, Moroccans are about one-quarter of the non-Western minorities, the Surinamese another one-quarter, and together with the Turks, the three groups comprise two-thirds of the non-Western minorities. In other European capitals, the minorities tend to come from just a small number of origins. In Canada’s most populous city Toronto, by contrast, although immigrants are quite numerous overall (45% of the population is foreign-born), and although there are also large groups that predominate – the Chinese, South Asian and blacks are comparable in relative size to the three largest groups in Amsterdam, each of the groups is characterized by considerable internal diversity (Reitz and Lum 2006, pp. 20–21).

The possible relevance of these various “other factors” applies to each specific outcome indicator cited by Kymlicka. To measure Canadian identity, Kymlicka pointed to the fact that since 1971, naturalization rates for immigrants have increased, and he suggested that this shows rising levels of commitment to Canada. Whether this is the case may be doubted, since naturalization may reflect reasons other than commitment to Canada. But in any case, naturalization trends may have many reasons, and Kymlicka gives no reason it should be attributed to multiculturalism policy alone. Regarding participation, Kymlicka cited evidence that minority representation in Parliament increased, that immigrants support Canada’s liberal democratic values, and that they tended to support the federalist side in the 1995 Quebec referendum. Again no evidence is presented linking these trends to multiculturalism. Regarding inter-ethnic relations, Kymlicka mentions that inter-ethnic marriages are on the rise. However, this trend is observed in every country, reflecting liberalizing attitudes toward inter-ethnic contacts.

Regarding differences between Canada and other countries without multicultural policy, Kymlicka cites evidence on only one such other country – namely the United States. Canadians often mention a supposed difference between its own multiculturalism and the American assimilationist “melting pot,” so it is striking that Kymlicka cites only one indicator suggesting a real difference, namely inter-ethnic marriages which are more common in Canada. However, this is an exceptional aspect, and virtually all other indicators of immigrant integration, including residential patterns, social equality, and economic opportunity and mobility show no consistent or pronounced difference between the two countries (see Reitz and Breton 1994). In any case, although the US does not have an official multiculturalism, it does have
many specific policies described as part of the multiculturalism framework such as affirmative action (Kymlicka 2007, p. 74).10

If evaluating specific multiculturalism programs is difficult,11 it would be almost impossible to evaluate the symbolic impact of the simple and repeated assertion of multiculturalism principles by Canadian government officials. Yet arguably, it may this symbolic aspect of the policy that has the greatest public impact.

**Multiculturalism: Policy Effects in Europe?**

If immigrant integration trends in Canada cannot be automatically attributed to multiculturalism, the same is true in Europe. Minority integration in various countries in Europe is currently debated with recognition that each country has a different mix of multicultural policies (Modood et al. 2006). Following the same point that policy evaluation cannot be based solely on cross-national differences, again it is difficult to know which policies have which effects, let alone the extent to which the basic ideas of multiculturalism might be discovered to be faulty. Recent controversies in Britain, the Netherlands, France and Germany have raised questions about these national “approaches” to diversity, such as various symbolic and legal forms of inclusion or exclusion, citizenship, “multiculturalism,” or “assimilationism.” Vertovec (1996) suggested that multiculturalism in Britain has sometimes tended to perpetuate exclusion and marginality because it has been improperly implemented, in subtle ways which express what he calls “new cultural racism.”

Koopmans et al. (2005, p. 240) have put forward that there may be an optimal approach, and that recognition of cultural difference is positive but beyond a certain point may lead to a social isolation of minorities. The relation of multiculturalism to the integration of immigrants may be “curvilinear.” In other words, multiculturalism has a “golden mean”: little or no multiculturalism is not good; multiculturalism in moderation may be good; but multiculturalism in excess again may be bad. The reference here is to the Netherlands as having the most extreme version of multiculturalism, with negative effects. A difficulty with this, noted by Kymlicka (2007, p. 158), is in deciding which policy is causing which effect, and which is really “multiculturalism.” According to Kymlicka, Canada and Australia actually have stronger versions of multiculturalism, and the policies causing difficulty in the Netherlands should not be considered multiculturalism at all. He refers here to two policies. One is the initial Dutch policy of encouraging immigrants to return to their country of origin, and not to integrate into Dutch society at all. The other is institutional “pillarization” – a form of pluralism for Protestants and Catholics – which according to Kymlicka “does not address the needs of ethnically and linguistically distinct newcomers.” Kymlicka suggests that to test the idea of multiculturalism, we should look at their effects in other countries with strong policies, such as Canada and Australia.

Using an even more international scope, Berry et al. (2005) conducted a 13-country12 study of the well-being of immigrant youth, and concluded that favourable
outcomes occur when the youth are integrated into both a minority community and
the mainstream society. But the critical question is how to achieve this result. Poli-
cies such as those pursued in Canada might seem to be supported, since Canadian
policy emphasizes the possibility and desirability of integration into the mainstream
society while maintaining attachments to a cultural background. However, such a
conclusion remains beyond the reach of available evidence.

We agree strongly with Joppke (2007), that evaluation of national policies on
minority status is extremely difficult. Hence it is doubtful to frame discussion of
minority integration exclusively – or even largely – in terms national “models” –
ethno-centric Germany, republican France, the different forms of multiculturalism
in the US and the Netherlands. The same applies to any assumption that “multi-
culturalism” frames the integration of minorities in Canada in any profound way.
Debating national models may distract from the more critical task of empirical study
of integration processes in various contexts. We suggest that this is the way to gain
an appreciation of the validity of the underlying precepts of multiculturalism. This
is what we attempt for Canada.

Behavioural Precepts of Multiculturalism: The Canadian Case

There are two points to make about Canadian multiculturalism as a background to
this study. First, the policy of multiculturalism as formulated in Canada is based
on certain underlying behavioural precepts or assumptions regarding the impact of
diversity on social cohesion. From our point of view these become research hypothe-
ses, and it is the purpose of this study to specify such hypotheses and to examine
the extent to which they reflect reality. This is a study of the validity of some of the
behavioural assumptions underlying the policy, not an assessment of the impact that
the policy has had. Second, the popularity of multicultural policy in Canada – which
has been high though it does vary somewhat in different parts of the population –
is in no way a measure of either the impact of the policy, or the validity of its
underlying assumptions. Canadian support for multiculturalism may be explained
by many forces in the society. Whether Canadian society actually functions in ways
envisioned by the policy is another matter. It is the latter topic which is the focus of
this study.

Canadian Multiculturalism Assumptions

As has been noted, multiculturalism as a policy and a political philosophy is
variously defined. What are some of the behavioural assumptions underlying the
policy in Canada? The Canadian philosophy of multiculturalism assumes that the
attachments of individuals to society are equally rooted in positive attachments to
one’s own group heritage and equality within major institutions. The basic idea was
clearly stated in Trudeau’s initial announcement of the policy of multiculturalism in
Parliament in 1971: ‘National unity, if it is to mean anything in the deeply personal sense, must be founded on the confidence in one’s own individual identity; out of this can grow respect for that of others and a willingness to share ideas, attitudes and assumptions’ (House of Commons 1971: 8545; see also Day 2000). As the policy aims both to assist cultural groups to grow and develop and to encourage equal participation in Canadian society, presumably these are pre-conditions for the cohesion of multicultural Canadian society.

That Canadian multiculturalism is clearly not simple cultural relativism, can be seen in Prime Minister Trudeau’s 1971 speech which emphasized the integration of individuals in the larger society:

A policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework commends itself to the government as the most suitable means of assuring the cultural freedom of Canadians... In implementing [this] policy, the government will provide support in four ways.

First, resources permitting, the government will seek to assist all Canadian cultural groups that have demonstrated a desire and effort to continue to develop a capacity to grow and contribute to Canada, and a clear need for assistance, the small and weak groups no less than the strong and highly organized.

Second, the government will assist members of all cultural groups to overcome cultural barriers to full participation in Canadian society.

Third, the government will promote creative encounters and interchange among all Canadian cultural groups, in the interest of national unity.

Fourth, the government will continue to assist immigrants to acquire at least one of Canada’s official languages in order to become full participants in Canadian society.

(Canada 1971: 8545–8546)

In the above statement, multiculturalism is equated with cultural freedom. At the same time, however, each of the four “supports” emphasizes the connection of minority groups to the whole, through contribution, participation, interchange, and language acquisition. In certain respects, most clearly regarding assistance in acquiring an official language, the emphasis on integration is more prominent than the emphasis on cultural recognition and group rights. Hence this policy might be called a multiculturalism/integration policy, rather than being simply multiculturalism as the term is normally used both in popular media and academic debate.

Over time since 1971, Canada’s multiculturalism policy has been extended and modified in significant ways, as mentioned above. Multiculturalism was affirmed as a principle in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, and was extended by passage of the Multiculturalism Act in 1988. This Act elaborated the policy, but retained an emphasis similar to the Trudeau speech cited above.

The focus on equality as a key objective and condition of the multicultural framework is clear in the second point regarding the removal of “cultural barriers” to full participation. However, as the racial diversity of the population has increased, this is increasingly seen as requiring an explicitly “anti-racist” component. Since the 1971 introduction of multiculturalism policy, continuing large-scale immigration in Canada has dramatically increased the racial diversity of the population, focusing new attention on the extent to which this now-traditional Canadian approach is adequate to rapidly-changing realities. Whereas in 1971, the proportion of the Canadian population of non-European origins (other than Aboriginal Canadians) was very
small, by 2006 it had grown to 16.2%, with projections that by 2017 it would jump to 20.6% (Statistics Canada 2008, 2005: 22–9), and with heavy concentration in major cities, particularly Toronto and Vancouver, but also Montreal.

Not surprisingly, perhaps, this shift in immigrant origins has been accompanied by an increase in the salience of issues of equality, equity, and social inclusion. Although equality was an objective in Canada’s multiculturalism initiative, it was sought primarily through cultural recognition. Because of such concerns, and following a report to Parliament Equality Now! (1984), an explicit “anti-racism” component was introduced into the policy. Racial equality is now also a focus of other policies, such as the federal Employment Equity policy first adopted in 1986. As noted above, Kymlicka included this policy as part of Canadian multiculturalism (under the heading of “affirmative action,” although employment equity in Canada has less effective enforcement provisions than affirmative action in the United States). Nevertheless, some now ask whether the cultural aspects of multiculturalism policy, by emphasizing ethnic identities, actually creates inequality and thereby divides the population rather than uniting it, as Bissoondath (1994) argued. Hence the question is not only the extent to which equality is reached, but the extent to which ethno-cultural distinctiveness promotes equality or inequality for specific minority groups.

Social Cohesion and the Integration of Ethnic Groups

In behavioural hypotheses underlying multiculturalism policy in Canada, one important “dependent” variable is the social integration of members of ethnic groups into the broader society, as Kymlicka had indicated. As well, the goal of national social cohesion is specified. However, since the concept of social cohesion itself cannot be directly measured in a survey, the focus of the hypotheses developed here is entirely on the social integration of individuals.

Integration and social cohesion are presumably related, although as mentioned above there are potential impacts of immigration and ethnic diversity on social cohesion that are unrelated to the extent of integration of individual immigrants and their descendants. In general terms, social cohesion refers to the capacity of a society to set goals and implement means for attaining them. On the one hand, a cohesive society can act as an effective unit. On the other hand, in a society which lacks cohesion, individuals or groups fail to contribute to effective collective action. Lack of unity may be reflected in conflict, which may or may not be violent. In discussions of immigrants and minorities often it is violent conflict that is the focus of attention. Instances of civil disorder involving immigrants or minorities in other countries have reinforced these concerns. So also have sharp differences between groups in interests, ideologies, or policy preferences. However, although obviously violent conflict or protest, or other forms of active opposition or obstruction, reflects lack of cohesion, it is also manifested in other less dramatic but still very important ways, including apathy and lack of interest, lack of participation in decision-making, withdrawal of support for decisions, and lack of organizational capacity to participate in constructive social activities.
Moreover, conflict in itself does not necessarily detract from cohesion but in fact since conflict may help solve inter-group problems, it may be an essential part of social life in a cohesive society. A group which is well integrated into society may be one in which the resources are present for the constructive resolution of conflicts. In many instances, conflicts may be necessary for the success of a cohesive society, helping to resolve issues and paving the way for greater unity.

Defined in this way, it is clear that cohesiveness depends on commitments of individuals to the collectivity and its interests. So this research focuses on the social integration of individual members of minority groups, differences among groups, and how social integration within Canadian society may be affected by inequalities as well as attachments within an ethnic minority group.

The interests of individuals as members of various groups based on social class, region, linguistic group, and including ethnic origins, may seem to be competing and may detract from attachments to the broader society. However, this is not necessarily so, since attachments to the broader society may also be seen as supporting the interests of one’s group.

Social integration refers to the extent to which individuals become vested in the core institutions of a society, participate in those institutions, and experience a sense of satisfaction. Individual commitments or attachments are reflected in various ways: a sense that one is fairly treated, that one’s contributions to society are recognized and appreciated, or that one’s well-being is dependent on the well-being of others. They are reflected in actual participation in society: in a sense of belonging to, and being a full participant in, society. The concept of social integration is multi-dimensional, and the impact of its various dimensions on social cohesion may not be the same. The assumption underlying this research is that all of these dimensions may be important, as is the overall pattern of relationships.

**Two Dimensions of Diversity**

Membership in an ethno-racial minority community may affect attachments to society in two ways. First, the existence of separate ethno-racial communities may affect commonalities of values, commitments, and social relations among individuals groups in society. Where minorities participate in cultures and social relations which are separate from those of the mainstream society, the question is raised how their capacity to relate to others in society may be affected. Second, where ethno-racial communities experience a degree of inequality, there may be effects on the sense of fairness that exists among group members. Those who feel unfairly treated may withdraw support from common activities in retaliation or as a measure of self-protection. Each dimension is important in its own right, and the two may interact in their effects on social cohesion. This study examines the impact of ethnic diversity on social cohesion related to both of these two dimensions, and some of the social and psychological processes underlying that impact.
Our behavioural hypotheses include attention to these two aspects of inter-ethnic relations. Regarding the first, the questions are: Does ethnic distinctiveness and the preservation of social and cultural attachments to a minority group foster attachments to the larger society, or does ethnic distinctiveness detract from such attachments? How are social ties and identities within and across groups related to social cohesion? Does formation of groups create inter-group unity by engendering stronger personal identity and self-confidence, or does it divide people, create conflict, and lead to a lack of attachment to society?

At the most practical level, advocates of multiculturalism in Canada have argued that the policy tells immigrants they do not have to choose between preserving their cultural heritage and participating in the broader society; they can do both. Therefore an important behavioral assumption to be tested is whether those who choose to preserve their cultural heritage actually do participate as fully in the broader society as those who choose not to do so.

The second aspect of diversity is the extent of inequality, since assumptions about inequality are clearly part of the underlying precepts of multiculturalism. How is social integration related to issues of ethnic inequality, discrimination and social justice? There are several aspects to this question. First, to what extent are the sense of ethnic distinctiveness and ethnic attachments themselves maintained because of inequalities experienced by ethnic group members within mainstream institutions? To what extent, or in what ways, do such inequalities affect the sense of fairness or justice that arises from these relations, and how does this in turn affect attachments to the society as a whole? What is the impact that inter-ethnic inequalities have on individual well-being? Do members of minority groups experiencing inequality tend to feel a reduction in their sense of self worth? If their self-esteem suffers, what are the consequences for social integration, and ultimately, for social cohesion? If ethnic group attachments foster positive inter-group ties for some minority groups, does the same hold for those groups that experience the most inequality? Or is ethnic attachment less positive for those groups occupying low status in society? How do the processes vary by gender, age, sexual orientation or other social statuses that affect social equality? Is ethnic distinctiveness more problematic under conditions of inequality, but less so otherwise?

These processes are expected to operate at both sociological and psychological levels. For example, in the multicultural vision, ethnic communities are hypothesized to promote successful social integration sociologically, because institutional pathways lead to participation in the mainstream society (the null hypothesis being they do not), and psychologically, because ethnic communities promote positive identity which protects individuals against feelings of marginality or exclusion (the null hypothesis being they do not).

Given the origins of Canadian multiculturalism in English-French relations, it is appropriate to ask whether these processes may differ between English and French Canada, or more specifically between Quebec and the rest of Canada. On the one hand, pressures for traditional assimilation may vary across settings, and as well the status of immigrant communities in social hierarchies. However, if ‘interculturalisme’ in Quebec embraces pluralism while encouraging immigrants to integrate
within the francophone community, the linguistic duality creates more options, potentially affecting the relation between ethnic distinctiveness and broader patterns of integration.

**Existing Research on Diversity and Social Integration**

The impact of minority groups on social cohesion in Canada is only beginning to be studied in systematic research. Studies by Soroka and colleagues (Soroka et al. 2007a, b; Soroka et al. 2007) suggest that the impact of ethnic minorities is variable depending on aspects of social integration considered. For example, minorities may be less trusting, or have less of a sense of belonging in Canada, but they may nevertheless reflect basic values such as equality values, and may be well engaged in the social life of the country. Citizenship acquisition is high for immigrant minorities in Canada compared to the United States (Bloemraad 2006), but at the same time, voting rates for visible minorities are below expectation based on that citizenship (Gidengil et al. 2004, pp. 109–110). Racial minorities are under-represented in Canadian politics, and many individuals in minority groups express feelings of exclusion (Megyery 1991; see also Black and Lakhani 1997; Black 2000, 2002; Black and Hicks 2006; Pal and Choudhry 2007).

The behavioural assumptions of multiculturalism policy, as identified above, requires that these effects of diversity should be examined as they are affected by ethnic attachments, and by the extent of inequality affecting minorities. We need to know not just whether diversity affects unity but why: whether or the extent to which any effects of diversity are affected by the variables which are the object of policy, such as attachments to a minority ethnic community.

Similar comments apply to Putnam’s (2007) analysis for the United States, Putnam suggests that ethnic diversity is associated with lower levels of social capital, a factor in group engagement and hence social cohesion. In ethnically diverse communities, people feel less trust in others, are more isolated from others, particularly from persons unlike themselves, and less likely to participate in politics. The significance of both ethnic communities and inequality for recent immigration in the US underscores its potential role in such an analysis, and suggests that for each country it is essential to disentangle the relations of diversity, inequality, and social commitments (Letki 2008), especially as they relate to the strength and resilience of society’s social fabric. Kesler and Bloemraad (2008) suggest that Putnam’s hypothesis may apply more in countries experiencing considerable degrees of ethnic inequality; diversity may have different, even opposite effects in countries with less inequality (see also Stolle et al. 2008; Phan 2008). Canada might qualify as a country with less inequality than is seen in the United States, though inequality in Canada is generally greater than in Europe. In addition, the experience of inequality by specific minorities also matters. Migrants in Europe are often relatively unskilled, and employment problems complicate the integration process. The analysis here includes attention both to the role of ethnic communities, and the way this interacts with social hierarchy and inequality.
The Ethnic Diversity Survey

Up to this point, understanding the extent to which processes of inter-group relations in Canada fit the ideals of its official multiculturalism as a social and political philosophy has been limited by lack of appropriate national data. However, now the landmark Ethnic Diversity Survey (EDS), conducted by Statistics Canada and the Department of Canadian Heritage in 2002, provides a large source of new information, making it possible to look more closely at the issue. The EDS is marshalled by this book to determine how multiculturalism works in Canada. Is it working as well for new immigrant groups from non-traditional sources as it may have worked for traditional immigrants from Europe? One of the prime objectives of the EDS was to “better understand how people’s backgrounds affect their participation in Canada’s social, economic and cultural life” (Statistics Canada 2002b, p. 2). In pursuing this objective, the survey has provided a wealth of information relevant to Canada’s multicultural makeup and the impact on society.\(^{16}\)

The Ethnic Diversity Survey is a post-censal telephone survey conducted between April and August of 2002. The target population was individuals aged 15 years or over living in private households in the 10 provinces of Canada. This target population did not include those living in collective dwellings, persons living on Aboriginal reserves, persons of Aboriginal origin living off-reserve, or persons living in Northern and remote areas.\(^{17}\)

EDS respondents were chosen from among those who completed the 2001 long census form, based on respondents’ answers to question about their ethnic origin, their place of birth, and their parents’ place of birth. Using the national census as a sampling frame made it more likely that the survey included individuals from many different ethnocultural backgrounds, some of whom may otherwise have been difficult to locate. The sample is in effect a two-phase stratified sample, designed to enhance representation of ethnic minorities, including racial minority immigrants and the second generation. Data reported here are based on sample weights to compensate for sampling disproportions, with bootstrap weights used to assist in statistical assessment.

The survey was administered via a 35 to 40 minute telephone interview, using Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI). Data collection for the main survey occurred from April 2002 to August 2002; Interviews were conducted in nine languages: English, French, Cantonese, Mandarin, Italian, Portuguese, Punjabi, Spanish, and Vietnamese. The final EDS sample included 41,666 respondents, representing a response rate of approximately 73\%.\(^{18}\) In most analyses the effective sample size is 39,473, the number of respondents for whom ethnic origins are known. Sampling and bootstrap weights were supplied to account for the complex sampling and non-response rates, and are applied to estimate correct standard errors.

The following paragraphs describe the interview items which were used to measure the four major concepts for our study: ethnic origin group affiliation, ethnic attachments, ethnic inequality, and attachments to Canada. For reference, the interview items and their use are presented in Table 1.2.
Table 1.2 Ethnic diversity survey questionnaire items used in this study (Source: Statistics Canada 2002a)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnical ancestry: (ID Q010) I would like to ask you about your ethnic ancestry heritage or background. What were the ethnic or cultural origins of your ancestors? (Note: respondents were not provided with examples. An “ancestor” was defined as “someone from whom you have descended and is usually more distant than a grandparent.” Further, “Ethnic or cultural ancestry refers to your ‘roots’ or cultural background and should not be confused with citizenship or nationality. Other than Aboriginal persons, most people can trace their origins to their ancestors on first coming to this continent.” Interviewers were instructed to record up to 8 responses. Those responding only Canadian/Canadien(ne) ancestry were asked a follow-up question: (ID Q020) “In addition to ‘Canadian’, what were the other ethnic or cultural origins of your ancestors on first coming to North America?”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Visible minority status: (BK Q110). People in Canada come from many racial or cultural groups. You may belong to more than one group in the following list. Are you… [Interviewers were asked to read all the categories and to record up to six responses: white, Chinese, South Asian (for example East Indian, Sri Lankan, etc.), Black, Filipino, Latin American, Southeast Asian (for example, Vietnamese, Cambodian, etc.), Arab, West Asian (for example, Iranian, Afghan, etc.), Japanese, Korean, Aboriginal (that is, North American Indian, Métis or Inuit), or another group?]. |

| Religion: (BK Q120). For some people, religion may be an important part of their ethnicity or culture, while for others it is not. What is your religion, if any? [Interviewers were instructed that respondent does not have to be practising.] |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic attachments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Importance of ethnic ancestry: (ID Q040) Using a scale of 1–5, where 1 is not important at all and 5 is very important, how important is your [reported group ancestry] ancestry to you? (Note: this question was asked in relation to each of the ancestries mentioned in the question on ancestry above.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Ethnic identity: ID Q100. I would now like you to think about your own identity, in ethnic or cultural terms. This identity may be the same as that of your parents, grandparents or ancestors, or it may be different. What is your ethnic or cultural identity. (Note: “Your own” was emphasized because the question followed a series on the origins of ancestors. Interviewers were instructed not to provide examples, although they could clarify that “Your ethnic or cultural identity is the ethnic or cultural group to which you feel you belong.” Up to 6 responses were recorded.) |

| Importance of ethnic identity: (ID Q130) Using a scale of 1–5, where 1 is not important at all and 5 is very important, how important is your [reported group identity] identity to you? |

| Importance of ethnic customs and traditions: (SN Q60) Respondents who reported one non-Canadian ancestry to which they attached importance of “4” or “5” in importance were asked: Using a scale of 1–5, where 1 is not important at all and 5 is very important, how important is it for you to carry on [reported ethnic group] customs and traditions, such as holidays and celebrations, food, clothing or art? (Note: were asked this question only for the two ethnic ancestries rated most highly in importance.) |

| Sense of belonging to ethnic group: (AT Q020) As part of a series of questions on belonging, respondents were asked: Using a scale of 1–5, where 1 is not strong at all and 5 is very strong, how strong is your sense of belonging to your ethnic or cultural group(s)? |

| Ethnic social networks: (SN Q020) As far as you know, how many of your friends have [main group ancestry] ancestry, is it… all of them (1) most of them (2) about half of them (3) a few of them (4) none of them? (5) |

| Ethnic social networks up until age 15: (SN Q030) Up until you were age 15, how many of your friends had [main group ancestry] ancestry, was it… all of them (1) most of them (2) about half of them (3) a few of them (4) none of them? (5) |
Table 1.2 (continued)

Ethnic inequality

**Household income**: (EC_Q330) What is your best estimate of the total income, before deductions, of all members of your household, from all sources in the past 12 months? (Note: respondents were instructed to include incomes from wages/salary, tips, commissions and bonuses, and that self-employment income should be reported after expenses but before taxes or other deductions. Respondents who refused to answer or said “Don’t know” were asked to estimate household income in terms of categories representing ranges of household income. For respondents who lived in one-person households, household income was determined from a question (EC_Q310) on total personal income.

**Feeling of discomfort because of background**: (IS_Q030) How often do you feel uncomfortable or out of place in Canada now because of your ethnicity, culture, race, skin colour, language, accent or religion? Is it ... all of the time (1), most of the time (2), some of the time (3), rarely (4), or never (5)? (Note: “Now” was emphasized because this question followed a similar question about experiences up to age 15.)

**Self-reported experiences of discrimination**: (IS_Q100) Discrimination may happen when people are treated unfairly because they are seen as being different from others: In the past 5 years [or, for respondents arriving within the past 5 years “since coming to Canada”], do you feel that you have experienced discrimination or been treated unfairly by others in Canada because of your ethnicity, culture, race, skin colour, language, accent or religion? (Note: For those answering “yes” there were follow-up questions about the frequency, context and reasons for such experiences.)

**Fear of attack**: (IS_Q230) Using a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is not worried at all and 5 is very worried, how worried are you about becoming the victim of a crime in Canada because of someone’s hatred of your ethnicity, culture, race, skin colour, language, accent or religion?

**Attachments to Canada**

**Trust in others**: (TS_Q020) Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people? (Note: in tables, respondents are considered to “Trust” if they reported that “most people are trustworthy.”)

**Life satisfaction**: (TS_Q010) All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? Respondents were asked to respond using a scale of 1–5, where 1 means not satisfied at all, and 5 means very satisfied. In tables, respondents are considered to be “Satisfied” if they scored 5 on the question of overall satisfaction.

**Belonging to Canada**: (AT_Q050) Using a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is not strong at all and 5 is very strong, how strong is your sense of belonging to Canada?

**Canadian identity**: (ID_Q100) I would now like you to think about your own identity, in ethnic or cultural terms. This identity may be the same as that of your parents, grandparents or ancestors or it may be different. What is your ethnic or cultural identity? (Note: This question is the same as ‘Ethnic Identity’ above. Interviewers were instructed to record up to 6 responses. Canadian self-identification is indicated by whether the respondent mentioned “Canadian” in any of the 6 responses.)

**Canadian citizenship**: (BK_Q090) Of what country, or countries, are you a citizen?

**Voting**: (PC_Q110) Did you vote in the last federal election?

**Volunteer activity**: (PC_Q060) At any time in the past 12 months, did you volunteer your time to help with the activities of your organization?
Ethnic Groups in Canada

It perhaps goes without saying that assessing the social integration of ethnic groups requires a delineation of the groups to be studied. In the discussion above, reference has been made to various groups based on national origins and racial background, and for empirical study, it is necessary to identify members of these groups. Since such membership is a social construction, survey data can provide relevant information at least regarding self-identification. The significance of the various group boundaries is partly a matter of individual behaviour, and partly a matter of the impact on social life.

Respondents in the survey were asked about their ethnic ancestry. The specific question was worded in such a way as to encourage respondents to report their true “roots,” so to speak – and not to indicate their own identity currently, which was the subject of another question. The specific wording was as follows: “I would like to ask you about your ethnic ancestry heritage or background. What were the ethnic or cultural origins of your ancestors? (see Table 1.2). To clarify the question, the word “ancestor” was defined as “someone from whom you have descended and is usually more distant than a grandparent.” Up to eight responses were recorded. In our analysis, only the first response was used as an indicator of ancestry (unless otherwise noted). Those few who mentioned “Canadian” were asked again about their ancestors.

The visible minority status of respondents was measured using a question similar to the one used by the census. The census question on visible minority status is required to comply with the Employment Equity Act, which defines visible minorities as “persons, other than Aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour.” The visible minority population, as defined by the Act, consists of the following groups: Arab, Black, Chinese, Filipino, Japanese, Korean, Latin American, Pacific Islander, South Asian, Southeast Asian, and West Asian. This question is not actually identical to the census question. The Canadian census question simply says “Are you . . .?” and provides respondents with the various options as above. The word “race” is not used explicitly. In the EDS, the word race is used, though in conjunction with the word “culture” which softens the language for those uncomfortable with the word “race.” This makes it somewhat more like the US census question “What is your race?” As in the US Census question on race, the response options include certain nationalities presumed to be recognized as racial minorities. Interviewers were instructed to mark up to six responses. The analyses in this study are based on the first answer recorded.

Religious affiliation was also measured in the Ethnic Diversity Survey. Effects of religion among minority groups were not examined in detail for this study. In some instances, we found that religion did not substantially affect integration for visible minorities. However, this important topic deserves special attention (see Reitz et al. 2009).

Table 1.3 presents the groups which are distinguished in the analysis based on the first response provided, and including unweighted sample numbers. Not all analyses can include all groups, because of the limits of sample sizes.
The integration of immigrants and minorities is a process which occurs over time and through generations, so it is important to measure immigrant cohort and generational status. Much of our analysis will distinguish members of these groups by immigrant cohort – the time of arrival or years since arrival in Canada, and by generation, with special interest in the second generation. In many of the analyses, recent immigrants – those arriving in the 10 years prior to the survey, i.e. between 1991 and 2001 – were distinguished from earlier immigrants. The second generation is defined as someone born in Canada with one or both parents born outside Canada.
And the third and higher generation is defined as someone with both parents born in Canada.

Table 1.3 also shows the distribution of the sample across immigrant cohort and generation (all data weighted except where indicated). The data clearly reflect Canada’s immigration history. Very few among the persons who are not “visible minorities” are recent immigrants; two out of three are third generation or higher. French, Anglo, and “Canadian” ancestries have the highest proportions of third and higher generations. North and West Europeans are most numerous in the second and higher generations. A number of other European categories show more “earlier” immigrants. Only the “Arab and West Asian” category has a significant number of recent immigrants. And only a few groups – the Arab and West Asian, Latin American, Greek and Portuguese in particular, have small third and higher generation groups. By contrast, more than half of the visible minorities are immigrants, and except for the Japanese, almost none are third generation or higher.

Religious Groups

Religion is an important part of community participation and ethnic ancestry for many persons. Whereas most of the immigrants to Canada from European origins are Christians, including Catholics, Protestants, and other Christian groups, and also Jewish, many of the more recent immigrant groups from outside Europe include other religious groups such as Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus and Sikhs. Table 1.4 shows that the vast majority of Christians, Jews, and those with no religion in Canada are whites (from 82 to 98% depending on the specific religion), and that most of the newer religious groups are visible minorities. Muslims are the most diverse in terms of ethnic and racial background. Among Muslims, 85% are visible minorities including 37.6% of South Asian ethnic origin, 35.6% of Arab or West Asian origins, and 7.8% blacks. Nearly half of the Buddhists (45.2%) were of Chinese background, and another large group were of Southeast Asian background. Over 88% of Hindus, and all of the Sikhs, were of South Asian origins.

Compared to the established Christian and Jewish groups, which contain large proportions of persons who are second, third, and higher generations in Canada, most of the Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists and Sikhs are immigrants, and many are quite recent immigrants (see Table 1.5). The Muslims, both visible minorities and whites, are most often recent immigrants.

Ethnic Attachments

The survey contained a variety of indicators of attachments to an ethnic community, and of the importance and significance of these attachments to an individual. Questions were asked explicitly about the significance of ethnic ancestry, ethnic
### Table 1.4 Religious groups, percent in each race and ancestry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Persons not visible minorities (by ancestry)</th>
<th>No religion</th>
<th>Catholic</th>
<th>Protestant</th>
<th>Other Christian</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Jewish</th>
<th>Buddhist</th>
<th>Hindu</th>
<th>Sikh</th>
<th>Other religion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canadian</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglo</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>33.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern and Western European</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian and Eastern European</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern European</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish and Israeli</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab/West Asian/North African</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin, Central and South American</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other European</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total non–visible minorities</td>
<td><strong>82.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>92.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>93.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>84.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>14.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>97.8</strong></td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td><strong>62.8</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Visible minorities                          |             |           |            |                 |        |        |         |       |      |                |
| Chinese                                     | 12.0        | 1.1      | 1.4       | 4.7             | –      | –      | 45.2    | –     | –    | –              |
| South Asian                                | 0.8         | 0.6      | 0.4       | 1.3             | 37.6   | –      | 2.9     | 88.6  | 100  | –              |
| Black                                      | 1.5         | 1.2      | 3.1       | 3.4             | 7.8    | –      | –       | –     | –    | –              |
| Filipino                                   | –           | 2.2      | 0.3       | 0.6             | –      | –      | –       | –     | –    | –              |
| Latin American                             | 0.5         | 1.3      | 0.3       | 0.9             | –      | –      | –       | –     | –    | –              |
| Southeast Asian                            | 0.8         | 0.3      | –         | 0.2             | –      | –      | 28.0    | –     | –    | –              |
| Arab and West Asian                        | 0.5         | 0.3      | –         | 1.9             | 35.6   | –      | –       | –     | –    | –              |
| Korean                                     | –           | 0.2      | 0.3       | 1.5             | –      | –      | –       | –     | –    | –              |
| Japanese                                   | 0.7         | –        | 0.2       | 0.4             | –      | –      | 4.1     | –     | –    | –              |
| Visible minority, n.i.e.                   | 0.2         | 0.2      | 0.3       | 0.6             | 2.5    | –      | –       | 11.4  | –    | –              |
| Multiple Visible Minorities                | 0.3         | 0.2      | –         | 0.2             | –      | –      | –       | –     | –    | –              |
| Total visible minority                     | **17.8**    | **7.6**  | **6.6**   | **15.8**        | **85.4**| **2.2** | **83.8**| **100**| **100**| **37.2**      |

| Total N (unweighted)                      | 7850        | 14630    | 11700     | 3410            | 840    | 680    | 570     | 530   | 650  | 130            |

Note: All percentages are weighted using population weights created by Statistics Canada. However, column N’s are unweighted and have been rounded. Some cells have been omitted because of cell sizes less than 30.
### Table 1.5 Religious groups by race, percent in each period of immigration and generation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Persons not visible minorities</th>
<th>Recent</th>
<th>Earlier</th>
<th>Second generation</th>
<th>Third and higher generations</th>
<th>N (unweighted)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Religion</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>5800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>12670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>10440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Christian</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>2580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total non-visible minorities</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>32290</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Visible minorities</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Religion</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>1250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Christian</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikh</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total visible minorities</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>8470</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All percentages are weighted using population weights created by Statistics Canada. Row N’s are unweighted and have been rounded. Some cells have been omitted because of cell sizes less than 30. * Second and third generation Muslims have been merged because of insufficient cell sizes.

identity, and specific ethnic customs and traditions, with the exact wording provided in Table 1.2. The question about importance was asked for each origin mentioned, and the maximum importance rating was examined in this analysis. One question was asked about the strength of the respondent’s sense of belonging in the ethnic group in Canada, and another question was asked about friends within the ethnic group. Table 1.6 provides the sample information.

Generally, all three indicators of ethnic attachments show stronger attachments for visible minorities than for the other groups. There is considerable group variation, and except for the distinctive “Canadian” group which is mostly third-and-higher generation and has a high proportion assigning importance to this ancestry, at least some of the group variations in strength of ethnic attachments is related to recent settlement in Canada. For example, among the non-visible minorities, the Greeks, Italians and Portuguese all are relatively recently-arrived, and all have relatively high proportions with strong ethnic attachments. Other factors matter as well; the Jewish group with few immigrants also has a high proportion with strong ethnic attachments. For visible minorities, all groups have stronger attachments than is typical for the non-visible minorities; the only exception is that fewer Japanese report a sense of belonging to their group, compared not only to other visible minorities but also compared even to some of the non-visible minorities.

Differences between men and women in these patterns are quite small. It would be important to examine these patterns according to gender within specific origins.
Table 1.6  Ethnic attachments among origins groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic attachments</th>
<th>Importance of ancestry*</th>
<th>Importance of customs*</th>
<th>Belonging to ethnic group</th>
<th>N (Unweighted)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Persons not visible minorities (by ancestry)</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian</td>
<td>77.07</td>
<td>16.34</td>
<td>56.83</td>
<td>1744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>59.12</td>
<td>37.45</td>
<td>59.75</td>
<td>4356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglo</td>
<td>46.56</td>
<td>22.60</td>
<td>42.68</td>
<td>10293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North and Western European</td>
<td>36.76</td>
<td>14.63</td>
<td>32.78</td>
<td>5893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian and East European</td>
<td>46.27</td>
<td>28.78</td>
<td>38.43</td>
<td>4109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other South European</td>
<td>59.27</td>
<td>28.79</td>
<td>45.53</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>69.80</td>
<td>56.68</td>
<td>66.19</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab and West Asian</td>
<td>58.69</td>
<td>37.11</td>
<td>46.47</td>
<td>592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin American</td>
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<td>57.82</td>
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<td>58.23</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
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<td>60.88</td>
<td>67.82</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other European</td>
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</table>

Source: Statistics Canada 2002 Ethnic Diversity Survey; percentages are based on weighted n’s.

* Indicates the percentage of respondents who scored either 4 or 5 out of 5 on each of these measures.

Note: The origins groups in the list of “persons not visible minorities” includes categories “Arab and West Asian”, and “Latin American” which also appear among the visible minorities. Those included as not visible minorities described themselves as “white” in response to the visible minority question. Those who did not identify any ancestry or visible minority group are excluded.

Note that ethnic attachment is multi-dimensional: these items are only weakly correlated with one another. No one item can be used to assess the involvement of individuals in their ethnic community, and the construction of a simple “index” of ethnic attachments would be for this reason misleading. In our analyses, these items are considered separately. Others might also have been included but are not, such as ethnic neighbourhood of residence.
The Ethnic Diversity Survey

**Ethnic Inequality**

The survey examined inequality in two dimensions. One is the degree of economic success measured as household income, representing income from all sources. The other is the respondent’s views about equality as a member of an ethnic group in Canada, as reflected in reported experiences of discrimination, feelings of discomfort in social situations in Canada or worry about the possibility of racial attacks.

These discomforts, levels of awareness and fears may be related to economic status, but of course not necessarily so. Both were considered as quite important to an assessment of how inequalities may alter the relation between ethnic attachments and integration into the broader society. Detailed results are presented in Chapter 5.

**Social Integration in Society**

The integration of minority groups in society is a matter of individual attitudes and behavior, and also group social organization and resources. Since this study is based on a survey of individuals, the analysis focuses on those individual attitudes and behaviors that would be expected in a cohesive society. The relevance of the specific interview items to the phenomenon of social cohesion is critical to this study, so must be considered carefully. Members of a group may be more likely to support group cooperation with institutional authorities to the extent that they feel some degree of attachment to society, and sense of membership, belonging and even national identification. In a cohesive society, it may be expected that individuals will devote energy to group activities, and to participate in group decision-making, including voting at election time. In a cohesive society, one might also expect individuals to have a general sense of trust in others, so that inter-group or communal cooperation is possible, and to have a reasonable degree of satisfaction with life in general and well-being so that contributions to the group are more likely. Finally, it may be expected that individuals devote energy to group activities, and participate in group decision-making.

The survey contained at least seven questions reflecting individual attachment to Canada, including personal relations, social belonging, and participation. Regarding personal relations, we examined feelings of “trust in others” and “life satisfaction.” These capture two important dimensions of personal well-being.

Regarding social belonging, three items are used. A direct question on belonging – How strong is your sense of belonging to Canada? – followed a series in which respondents were asked to rate their sense of belonging to family, ethnic or cultural groups, municipality, and province, rated on a 5 point scale from not strong at all to very strong. For this analysis, an index of belonging was created by combining belonging to municipality, province and Canada. In tables, respondents are considered to “belong” if they scored 4 or 5 on each of the components of the belongingness index.

Self-identification as “Canadian” was tapped based on responses to the question on current ethnic and cultural identity. After the question on ethnic ancestry
Assessing Multiculturalism as a Behavioural Theory

(respondents were asked about their own identity, in ethnic or cultural terms, the group “to which [they] feel [they] belong,” which may or may not be the same as the ancestry. A great many respondents – nearly two thirds – mentioned “Canadian” as one among the six possible responses. “Canadian” identity is defined as any response that includes “Canadian/Canadienne,” “French Canadian,” “Québécois,” “Acadian,” “Newfoundland,” or any regional identity. 20 Mentioning Canadian identity here clearly indicates that the respondent realizes that Canadian is an ethnic or cultural group, and wishes to underscore its significance in his or her own life.

And finally, there is the question of the acquisition of Canadian citizenship, which is an option for immigrants after a period of three years of residence in Canada. Some have expressed concern that immigrants may acquire citizenship only for pragmatic reasons, to gain certain advantages that flow from the formal status of citizenship. Nevertheless, the fact that formal citizenship is readily available for immigrants to Canada has long been regarded as one of the most important features of an inclusive society, so the question of whether an individual immigrant exercises that option is an important measure of their sense of belonging.

Full participation in the institutions of society also is a reflection of attachment to Canada, and in the Ethnic Diversity Survey two aspects were examined: voting in elections, and organizational participation. For voting, we focused on the last federal election as the most important indicator. Respondents were also asked about provincial and municipal elections; the responses were very highly correlated, but the analysis here focuses on federal election participation. As citizenship is a prerequisite to voting, and acquisition of citizenship reflects various circumstances, it is important to restrict analyses of voting to those who are Canadian citizens and were eligible to vote in the last federal election prior to the survey date. 21

Regarding organizational participation, a diverse array of organizations were queried, including sports clubs, religious groups, hobby clubs, charitable groups and the like. These were organizations in which the respondent was a member or in whose activities they had taken part. Our analysis focused on the extent to which respondents reported having volunteered time to help with the activities of the organization. Interviewers were instructed that only unpaid work, and not financial contribution, could be considered.

Table 1.7 provides information about attachments to Canada for the various origins groups. The pattern of group differences is not nearly as closely related either to recent arrival or visible minority status as was the case for ethnic attachments. It is very clearly the case that strong ethnic attachments in a group does not mean weak attachment to Canada, nor does strong attachment to Canada in a group mean weak ethnic attachments. This finding points to the need for careful analysis of the relation between these two to understand the orientations of particular ancestry groups.

Overall group differences in trust, life satisfaction, and sense of belonging are not related strongly to visible minority status. For example, those with high sense of trust in others include “Canadian”, Anglos, North Europeans, Portuguese, Chinese, and Japanese. Those with low sense of trust include Greeks, Italians, Latin
## Table 1.7 Attachments to Canada among origins groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attachments to Canada</th>
<th>Trust</th>
<th>Life satisfaction*</th>
<th>Belonging*</th>
<th>Canadian identity</th>
<th>Canadian citizenship</th>
<th>Federal voting</th>
<th>Volunteering</th>
<th>N (Unweighted)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>86.96</td>
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<td>77.52</td>
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<td>82.59</td>
<td>41.75</td>
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<td>80.02</td>
<td>36.98</td>
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<td>94.22</td>
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<tr>
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<td>77.21</td>
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<td>592</td>
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<td>57.12</td>
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<td>73.12</td>
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<td>66.24</td>
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<td>27.80</td>
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<td>79.5</td>
<td>32.2</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics Canada 2002 Ethnic Diversity Survey percentages are based on weighted N’s.

* Indicates the percentage of respondents who scored 5 out of 5 on each of these measures; a insufficient cell size to report

Note: The origins groups in the list of “persons not visible minorities” includes categories “Arab and West Asian”, and “Latin American” which also appear among the visible minorities. Those included as not visible minorities described themselves as “white” in response to the visible minority question. Respondents who did not identify any ancestry or visible minority group are excluded.
Americans, Southeast Asians, and Blacks. Those with a strong sense of belonging include “Canadians” Anglos, North Europeans, South Asians, and Filipinos. Those with a weaker sense of belonging include French, Chinese, and Southeast Asian.

For the remaining measures of attachment to Canada, these are stronger for whites than for visible minorities. The strongest difference between visible minorities and others is with respect to Canadian identification. On average, most of the non-visible minorities (except French) have a strong sense of Canadian identity; most of the visible minorities (except the Japanese) have a weaker sense of Canadian identity. Differences in citizenship are related to the immigration history of a group, of course, but there are also group differences in voting that are not entirely related to citizenship. For example, most groups of European origins have high proportions – almost all – as citizens, and the reported voting rate is nearly 80% (which is higher than actual voting rates, a phenomenon common to surveys). On the other hand, however, Blacks and Chinese have rates of citizenship higher than the Portuguese (which is only 78.85%), but rates of voting which are lower. Volunteering is also somewhat more common among those of European origins than among visible minorities.

For persons identified by religious group, patterns of attachment to Canada closely reflect what might be expected based on recency of immigration and visible minority status, so we expect that religious affiliation likely has little additional impact (see Table 1.8). Regarding trust, life satisfaction, and belonging, in most cases there are only small differences among religious groups. However, some differences are noteworthy. Catholics are somewhat less trusting, as are visible minority Protestants (many of whom are black), and Muslims whites (but not Muslims visible minorities). Buddhists, white Muslims, and persons with no religion have lower life satisfaction. Buddhists, Jews, and persons with no religion have somewhat weaker sense of belonging in Canada.

Most of the newer religions groups have a relatively weak sense of Canadian identity, to some extent reflecting their recent arrival in Canada. Most of these are visible minorities, but note that white Muslims, who are among the most recently arrived in Canada, also have a weak Canadian identity. Patterns of citizenship, voting, and volunteering also reflect recent immigrant status.

What is the Relation Between Ethnic Attachments and Integration into Canadian Society?

The survey results show that the relation between ethnic attachments and an individual’s social integration into Canadian society is mixed. One cannot say simply that the relation is positive, implying that ethnic attachments and social integration always go together, or that the relation is negative, implying that when ethnic attachments are maintained, social integration is delayed or obstructed. Instead, the relations are various depending on the aspect of social integration that is considered. They also vary by type of ethnic attachment, by whether one considers effects for recent immigrants, earlier immigrants or the children of immigrants, and they
### Table 1.8 Attachments to Canada, by race and religion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attachments to Canada</th>
<th>Persons not visible minorities</th>
<th>Visible minorities</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Jewish</td>
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<td>42.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>47.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Religion</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>29.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>46.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>46.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Christian</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>49.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
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<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>47.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikh</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>52.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Percentages are weighted using population weights created by Statistics Canada. Row N's are unweighted and have been rounded. $^a$For this indicator, the sample size is reduced since only those who were eligible to vote in the last federal election (over the age of 20 at the time of the survey) are included.
vary among origins groups. In thinking about the realities of diversity in Canada, it is important to consider all these variations to provide a proper perspective on the issue.

From the point of view of multiculturalism assumptions, our specific interest is the causal relation between ethnic attachments and integration in Canada, and to test this we must examine the relation between ethnic attachments and integration as these develop over time in the country, and by age and generation. In other words, our analysis must take into account the evolution of events over time. Ethnic attachments and integration in Canadian society both are affected by length of time in the country, by generation, and by age. For many immigrants, during the period immediately following arrival in Canada, ethnic community attachments are an important means for becoming settled, and in this sense they are automatically part of the process of integration into Canadian society. However, our interest is in the development of attachments to the society beyond the ethnic community. Over time, this process of integration into Canada proceeds to some degree, and the attachments to the ethnic community may weaken. What is of interest here is whether – or the extent to which – there is a relation between the two processes over time. Are those immigrants who retain the strongest attachments to their ethnic community and ethnic background more or less quickly to become integrated into Canadian society? Do ethnic community attachments actually facilitate integration into Canadian society? Or is there no clear link between these two processes?

To answer these questions of inter-relation over time requires an analysis that takes account of these time-related factors, and hence distinguishes immigrant cohorts and generations and considers the impact of specific year of arrival and age. For this purpose, the interest is in regression analyses which examine the relation of ethnic attachments and broader social integration, within cohorts and generational groups, and with controls time-related variables within those categories. Table 1.9 shows the results of regressions of indicators of social integration on various ethnic attachments, separately for two major immigrant cohorts and generation, and controlling for age and (for immigrants) years since arrival in Canada. The results also are presented separately for persons of European origins, and for those who are visible minorities. (Full regression results are available from the authors.)

These results show that ethnic attachments have both positive and negative relations to social integration. The specific aspects that are positive and those that are negative must be carefully distinguished, because the differences tell us much about the impact that ethnic diversity has on the social integration of immigrants.

There are consistently positive relations between ethnic involvements and two indicators: sense of belonging in Canada, and overall life satisfaction (the first two panels of Table 1.9). In these respects ethnic attachments seem to make a clearly positive contribution to individual well-being. Of the 36 regression effects for three measures of ethnic attachments on “belonging” and “life satisfaction” across whites and visible minorities, and immigrant cohorts and generations, 30 are positive and significant, and 15 of these – half – are substantial in size, between 0.20 and 0.52. Among variations in the strength of these relations, it is particularly noteworthy that the weakest effects are for recent white immigrants (only one significant effect out
Table 1.9 Effects of ethnic attachment on attachment to Canada, by immigrant cohort, generation, and visible minority status (regression coefficients with time-related characteristics controlled)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Recent immigrant</th>
<th>Earlier immigrant</th>
<th>Second generation</th>
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<td>VM N = 1867</td>
<td>White N = 12069</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>VM N = 3384</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belonging to Canada</td>
<td>Importance of ancestry</td>
<td>0.071 ns</td>
<td>0.122***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Importance of customs</td>
<td>0.144**</td>
<td>0.152***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnic belonging</td>
<td>0.157 ns</td>
<td>0.245***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life satisfaction</td>
<td>Importance of ancestry</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>0.066**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Importance of customs</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnic belonging</td>
<td>0.282***</td>
<td>0.089***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>Importance of ancestry</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>-0.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Importance of customs</td>
<td>0.231</td>
<td>-0.229***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnic belonging</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>-0.176**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian identity</td>
<td>Importance of ancestry</td>
<td>-0.524**</td>
<td>-0.593***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Logistic)</td>
<td>Importance of customs</td>
<td>-0.350</td>
<td>-0.635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnic belonging</td>
<td>-0.687***</td>
<td>-0.522***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting(^a) (Logistic)</td>
<td>Importance of ancestry</td>
<td>0.227</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Importance of customs</td>
<td>0.506</td>
<td>0.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnic belonging</td>
<td>0.330**</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainstream volunteering (Logistic)</td>
<td>Importance of ancestry</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>-0.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Importance of customs</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>-0.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnic belonging</td>
<td>-0.194</td>
<td>-0.137*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Citizenship (Logistic)</td>
<td>Importance of ancestry</td>
<td>-0.473**</td>
<td>-0.339***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Importance of customs</td>
<td>-0.337</td>
<td>-0.118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnic belonging</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.053</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: For dependent variables other than Voting, regression N’s are unweighted, and range from 673 to 769 for white recent immigrants; 1639–1866 for VM recent immigrants; 4269–5125 for white earlier immigrants; 2543–2867 for VM earlier immigrants; 11379–12059 for white second generation and 3207–3381 for VM second generation. Significance: \(^{*}p<.01; \(^{**}p<.05; \(^{***}p<.10\.

\(^a\)For Voting, only those over 20 who were eligible to vote were included. The regressions N’s range from 275 to 286 for white recent immigrants; 742–779 for VM recent immigrants; 3963–4182 for white earlier immigrants; 2295–2398 for VM earlier immigrants; 10428–10771 for white second generation; 2015–2044 for visible minority second generation.
of 6), and that many of the stronger effects are for immigrants with longer time in Canada, and for the second generation, including both whites and visible minorities. In other words, the effect of ethnic attachments on individual well-being is greater for those reflecting a longer experience in Canada.

Of course, these results do not indicate whether it is ethnic attachments which facilitate social integration, or whether it is social integration which facilitates ethnic attachments; probably both occur. What is clear is that they vary together in the course of the experiences of immigrants and their children in Canada.

Consistent with this, those with stronger ethnic attachments are somewhat more likely to volunteer their time to participate in the community (6th panel in Table 1.9). These regression effects are smaller than for the previous two criteria – belonging and life satisfaction. Eight of 18 are positive and significant (only one case involved a negative relation). Again the effects are negligible for recent white immigrants; in fact here the positive effects appear mainly for visible minorities; for whites it is significant only in one instance. Some of this effect arises because those who are involved in ethnic communities participate in ethnic organizations and religious institutions in their community. However, the effect remains even when the explicitly ethnic or religious organizations are excluded from the analysis.22

On the other hand, ethnic attachments seem to have a clearly negative relation to the emergence of a “Canadian” identity, and for immigrants to the acquisition of Canadian citizenship (4th and 7th panels in Table 1.9). Of the 30 regression effects, 19 are negative and significant. The most consistently negative effects are on Canadian identity. All 18 of the coefficients are negative, and 16 of them are statistically significant. They range in size from −0.29 to −0.87. The statistically notable negative effects on Citizenship acquisition for immigrants are for “importance of ancestry,” but over half of the other coefficients (for importance of customs and ethnic belonging) are also negative, though none are statistically significant. Overall, it would appear that even if involvement and commitment to a minority ethnic community provides some benefits for its members, for most it does not provide a strong link to matters that are explicitly “Canadian.” It seems to slow the development of an explicitly Canadian identity, and to some extent it also slows the acquisition of citizenship for immigrants. Fostering a sense of belonging within Canadian society and fostering a sense of being explicitly “Canadian” are two different things. The first refers to a feeling of being connected to one’s community, as a part of one’s experience in Canada, and is positively related to ethnic attachments. The second refers to a matter of applying a label to oneself, and is negatively related to ethnic attachments.

One way to summarize these findings might be to observe that ethnic attachments are positively related to well-being within a possibly circumscribed community context, but negatively related to at least some other attachments to the broader society. The negative effect on broader social attachments, and not simply on explicitly “Canadian” attachments, may be supported by another finding: ethnic attachments have a negative impact on the sense of trust in others (panel 3 in Table 1.9). This effect is significantly negative in 10 of the 18 correlations, and all but one of the others are also negative; there are no significantly positive effects. None of
the significant negative effects appear for recent immigrants; they are concentrated among immigrants who have spent more time in Canada, and among the children of immigrants. This finding indicates that the potentially negative impact of ethnic community attachments is not only in relation to matters of national identity. They may also restrict the development of attachments important to bonding with other groups in the community.

A further indicator of social integration examined in this research is voting. The relation between ethnic attachments and voting is generally positive, though not as strongly so as for other aspects of integration (panel 5 in Table 1.9). The analysis of voting focuses on federal elections, though the results are not markedly different if voting in provincial or municipal elections is examined. The analysis focuses on those who were eligible to vote in the federal election immediately preceding the 2002 survey – which was in 2000 – namely those who were citizens and were over the age of 18 at the time. The generally positive relation between ethnic attachments and voting – with 7 significantly positive effects out of 18 coefficients, most other coefficients also positive and no significant negative coefficients – suggests that ethnic communities may promote a sense of engagement in the political process, even while not strongly encouraging national identity or even acquisition of Canadian citizenship, which may seem ironic, since of course citizenship is a prerequisite to voting.

These various and complex implications of ethnic attachments – many positive effects on indicators of well-being, a number of negative effects on attachments across diverse social contexts, but then again positive effects on voting – vary somewhat among groups. What the data in Table 1.9 show in this regard, in general, is that there is little consistent or systematic difference between visible minorities and whites or those of European origin. Many of the positive effects of ethnic attachments are for both whites and visible minorities. This is potentially important because of concerns that have been expressed about the possibility that ethnic cultural retention is having different effects among the more recently arrived groups. The data from the survey indicate that the effects of ethnic community attachments on social integration within Canada are broadly similar for white ethnic groups and visible minorities. If anything, the largest positive correlations are for visible minorities, and the most negative correlations are for whites.

The data also show that where there is religious variation within ethnic origins or racial groups, that religious background makes little systematic difference. Table 1.10 focuses on those newer groups containing the most significant internal religious diversity, namely South Asians and the West Asian and Arab group. The table contains regression effects of specific religious affiliation on patterns of attachment to Canada, with controls for time-related factors including generation, age, and for immigrants years in Canada. For West Asians and Arabs, Muslims are better integrated than Catholics and Christians in some respects (for example Canadian identity and trust), but none of the differences are statistically significant. Of the 14 coefficients for South Asians, half are significant, some showing stronger attachments for Muslims than for Sikhs or Hindus.
Table 1.10 Effects of religion on seven indicators of social integration, for immigrants within selected visible minority groups (regression effects with time-related characteristics controlled)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OLS regression</th>
<th>Logistic regression</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient estimate</td>
<td>Odds ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Satisfaction</td>
<td>−0.066</td>
<td>0.56***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belonging</td>
<td>−0.187*</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.62**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>0.180</td>
<td>0.83**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting</td>
<td>−0.321</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteering</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

South Asian

Hindu

- Muslim (reference) 1071
  - N 961
  - 0.066 0.56*** 0.83 1.08 2.17** 1.67**
  - 0.187* 0.83
  - 0.037 0.48*** 0.62** 0.71 2.00* 0.66

Sikh

- 0.037 0.080 0.48*** 0.62** 0.71 2.00* 0.66

Muslim (reference)

- N 323
  - 0.080 −0.321 0.87 0.43 1.25 1.90
  - 0.478 0.185 0.62 0.63 1.01 0.89

West Asian and Arab

Catholic

- 0.080 −0.321 0.87 0.43 1.25 1.90

Other Christian

- −0.478 0.185 0.62 0.63 1.01 0.89

Muslim (reference)

- N 299
  - 0.080 −0.321 0.87 0.43 1.25 1.90
  - 0.478 0.185 0.62 0.63 1.01 0.89

Note: *Includes only those who were eligible to vote in the last federal election (citizens over the age of 20 at the time of the survey). Significance: ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; for logistic regressions, odds ratios (OR) are shown to ease interpretability. Odds ratios are calculated as exp(b), where b is the logistic regression coefficient. An OR of less than 1 indicates a negative relationship with integration, while an OR of greater than 1 indicates a positive relationship with integration; controlling for years since immigration.

and some showing weaker (for example voting). There is no general tendency for religion to affect the strength of attachments to Canada.24

The implications of these basic relations between diversity and social integration should be considered carefully. Both diversity and integration are complex phenomena, and the dimensions considered here are only some of those that might be considered. It is also useful to consider the relative importance of different dimensions. Some might say that for immigrants, developing a Canadian identity is most important, while others might say that community belonging and life satisfaction are most important. In any case, Canadian identity becomes stronger for those in Canada for longer periods of time. And for the children of immigrants, positive effects of diversity (on sense of belonging and life satisfaction) are consistently stronger, and negative effects (on Canadian identity) are weaker. The negative impact of ethnic attachments on trust in others is the strongest negative relation for the second generation. It cannot be stated whether it is ethnic attachments which undermine trust in others, or whether a lack of a sense of trust prompts many to maintain stronger ethnic attachments. In either case, the ethnic community seems to consist of those with less strong feelings of trust in others. This is at least as true for European ethnic communities as it is for visible minority communities.

Based on our findings, it might be concluded that the behavioural assumptions behind multiculturalism are only partly confirmed for Canada. In this sense, the scepticism expressed earlier about Kymlicka’s early announcement that “multiculturalism is working” in Canada would seem to be well-founded. Although we are not evaluating whether multiculturalism works, if the policy did encourage ethnic
attachments, then based on our findings it might suggested that the result would be to enhance life satisfaction and sense of belonging, but to slow the acquisition of a civic or Canadian identity. In this way, perhaps at least some of the goals of the policy as presently formulated might be promoted, while others may be unlikely to be achieved. This is a point to which we return in our concluding chapter, after more evidence has been reviewed.

The relationships reported above – both positive and negative – have significance for theory and for policy, but it is important not to exaggerate their strength. It appears that the assumptions of multiculturalism are confirmed in some ways, and refuted in others. The relationships are not deterministic, however. Together, they may be considered as broad tendencies, and there are many individuals whose experiences do not fit these broad tendencies. Ethnic community attachments are not necessarily the most powerful determinants of social integration, nor vice versa. Other factors must be considered including the extent of equality and economic opportunity experienced by minority groups, and as well access to participation in the institutions of mainstream society. These in turn may be affected by broader aspects of the society including labour market structures, the educational system, and availability of social services. These broader institutions may have an effect quite apart from any policies or practices related specifically to ethnicity or multiculturalism.

These findings should be regarded as reflecting empirical reality in one country – Canada – not as assessments of the relation between diversity and social integration in general. If the relations are negative in some cases, this may reflect certain aspects of the society in Canada at the present time, which may not be true in other societies, or which may not be true in Canada at another point in time. If the findings reflect the empirical reality of the moment, they are not necessarily the way things might be or could be in the future. Policy may be directed to bringing about changes. This study is not primarily a policy study, but when policy is considered, it might focus on the question of how ethnic communities could function to promote a stronger sense of what is explicitly “Canadian” in one’s experiences in Canada.

Exploring Social and Psychological Processes

In the next four chapters, the basic processes identified above, and some of the “hypotheses” underlying the philosophy of multiculturalism as outlined above, are examined further and in more detail, from both psychological and sociological perspectives, and probing the impact of inequalities. Ours has been a group effort, a series of projects designed with common themes in mind, but pursued independently. Hence, there will be four distinct investigations, one by each group of research collaborators, each with its own analytic agenda, yet framed by the broader perspective outlined above.

Chapters 2 and 3 address primarily psychological dimensions. From a psychological standpoint, ethnic inequalities may be associated with a sense that other groups
pose a threat to oneself or one’s group, or possibly with the opposite: feelings of absence of threat or even confidence in relation to other groups. These feelings may be reflected in experiences of discrimination based on one’s ethnic membership or affiliation. The research questions have to do with the prevalence of these feelings in different ethnic groups in Canada, and especially with their implications, both for ethnic attachments and for general well-being and attachments to the broader society.

Chapter 2 (by Karen Kisiel Dion and Mai B. Phan) focuses on implications for ethnic identity. The question is whether, or the extent to which, ethnic identification and ties are strengthened or weakened by a sense of threat. What are the contributions of in-group cohesion and inter-group threat, respectively, to ethnic identity? What different psychological functions are served by ethnic identity, and do these functions vary for members of different groups? For lower status minority groups, identification with the group might be reinforced by the sense that other groups pose a threat in some way, causing members to respond defensively and “close ranks” so to speak. Or it is possible that a sense of threat may cause members to seek an escape, the “jump ship” response? Either may be possible depending on the characteristics of the group, or for persons in different circumstances.

Chapter 3 (by Kenneth L. Dion, Karen Kisiel Dion and Rupa Banerjee) focuses on implications for integration into the broader society. First of all, feelings of threat may themselves affect the sense of well-being or social attachments to a society possibly regarded as the source of that threat. Beyond this, and what is perhaps even more interesting, is the question of how ethnic attachments may affect that response. Some have suggested that psychologically, ethnic affiliations reinforce the sense of grievance based on discriminatory treatment. Sociologically this would correspond to a “conflict group” phenomenon, where the group performs a consciousness-raising function, heightening a sense of injustice or grievance, leading to weakened attachments across groups. Another possibility is that ethnic groups become a refuge for those experiencing discrimination or other threatening behaviour, helping with confidence building and serving as a buffer and promoting integration across groups.

Chapters 4 and 5 address sociological dimensions and processes across major social groups, immigrant cohorts and generations.

The approach taken in Chapter 4 (by Mai B. Phan and Raymond Breton) explores in detail whether responses given to the items measuring ethnic and civic attachments form distinct patterns, and find that they do in similar ways in both Quebec and the rest of Canada. These patterns are interpreted as “ethnic,” “mainstream,” “pluralist,” and “marginalized.” The chapter looks at how each attachment type is related to well-being and participation, finding that the least adaptive is to have neither a sense of affiliation with the ethnic group nor Canadian society. The chapter also examines how these patterns are distributed at the group level, and differences in this distribution between Quebec and the rest of Canada. Generally, Canadians are shedding their ethnic attachments the longer they are in Canada, and adopting stronger attachments to the larger society. However, this process is more pronounced for whites, particularly those outside Quebec. Visible minorities across Canada are
more likely to adopt a “pluralist” orientation over time (strong attachment to both the ethnic and civic groups) and drop ethnic attachments more slowly, compared to white ancestry groups except the French.

These four types are then examined in terms of social group variations and contexts. In Canada there is particular interest in differences between Quebec and the rest of Canada. Given that Quebec has shown more ambivalence toward multiculturalism, and at least the word itself is less popular in that province, then one might have expected immigrants to integrate less quickly. However, Bourhis et al. (2007) showed that in Quebec, racial minorities report experiences of discrimination somewhat less often than in the rest of Canada, at least if their mother tongue is French. The impact of the Quebec context is explored further in Chapter 4. As well, the implications of these four types for social well-being are examined.

Inequalities also take the form of income differences related to employment, and Chapter 5 (by Jeffrey G. Reitz and Rupa Banerjee) examines the implications for the social integration of minorities. Their analysis also explores the process of change across immigrant cohorts and in the second generation.

In light of the findings of these various chapters, probing the impact of positive and negative experiences of inter-group relations on overall social integration, our concluding chapter returns to the original issues, and provide an overall and integrated summary. We also address the implications for multicultural policies: how can realities in Canada be improved?

Notes

1. See the discussion in Chapter 4.
2. As an extreme example, in Britain a mother of a 15-year old boy with brain damage caused by an attack by a 16-member Asian gang (purportedly using a claw hammer) blamed multiculturalism, because she believed the policy enabled bullying by promoting a “culture of timidity” among teachings, preventing them from taking action for fear of accusations of racism (The Sunday Times, April 13, 2008). http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article3736237.ece, accessed September 3, 2008.
3. Whereas Canadians were nearly as concerned about Islamic extremism in the world as respondents in the US, Britain, France and the Netherlands (between 41 and 46% “very concerned” in each of these countries, and between 79 and 89% “somewhat concerned” or “very concerned”), Canadians were less concerned about Islamic extremism in their own country (only 22% “very concerned,” compared to between 31 and 34% in the other countries, and 56% “somewhat concerned” or “very concerned” compared to 70 to 76% in the other countries (Pew Global Attitudes Project 2005, p. 3).
4. The Toronto school board recently approved plans for an Afro-centric (Black focused) school to open by September 2009. While special recognition on racial grounds appears palpable to elected politicians, recognition on religious grounds is not.
5. Kymlicka states that visible minorities experience significant discrimination, and that it is relevant to the goals of multiculturalism, but does not include these points in arguing that multiculturalism works (Kymlicka 1998, p. 89).
382,104 native Dutch, 104,742 western foreigners, 68,878 Surinamese, 66,256 Moroccans, 386,565 Turks, 11,290 Antilleans, and 71,269 other non-western foreigners.

7. Citizenship acquisition for immigrants confers the right to vote, and indicates Canadian identity in the sense of a desire to participate in Canadian political life. However, citizenship also confers other benefits not available to permanent residents, and increased Canadian citizenship acquisition after 1971 could be related to these other benefits. For example, citizenship confers the permanent right of residence in Canada, whereas so-called “permanent residents” are restricted in their right to leave and return to Canada. Access of Canadians to dual citizenship was liberalized in 1977. A criticism of the dual citizenship policy is that it allows immigrants to acquire Canadian citizenship as a “backup” status. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, some Hong Kong immigrants used Canadian citizenship law mainly as a hedge against political change in Hong Kong.

8. More recently Kymlicka (2007, pp. 156–157) cites the research by Bloemraad (2006) on this point; we discuss Bloemraad’s research below.

9. Kymlicka cited Reitz and Breton (1989) very selectively. The main point in Reitz and Breton is that the integration of immigrants in Canada and the United States is not nearly as different as implied by the popular Canadian imagery of the Canadian “mosaic” vs. the American “melting pot.” In this analysis a variety of indicators were used. Among these, the evidence on ethnic inter-marriage showing higher rates in Canada was an exception to the general pattern. Oddly, Kymlicka cited only this divergent pattern, making no mention of the findings across the more extensive range of indicators, which ran against his thesis of more effective immigrant integration in Canada.

10. Kymlicka mentions Australia as another multicultural country, stating that “the two countries that lead the world in the integration of immigrants are countries with official multiculturalism policies” (pp. 22–23). But this is asserted without even a single reference to evidence on the integration of immigrants in Australia.

11. An additional difficulty in Kymlicka’s discussion of Canadian multiculturalism policy effects is the ‘straw man’ problem. He takes up the debate with two Canadian opponents of multiculturalism in Canada: Neil Bissoondath and Richard Gwyn (a novelist and a journalist, respectively), and challenges the thesis that multiculturalism leads to “undeniable ghettozation” (from Bissoondath), and “an apartheid form of citizenship” (quoting Gwyn). Pursuing this, he underscores the lack of evidence for such negative trends. But this supports the conclusion of no effect, not policy effectiveness.

12. Included were the United States, Australia, Canada, Israel, New Zealand, France, Germany, Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Portugal.

13. Racial minorities were not reported as a category at that time. Based on data provided, the proportion of racial minorities might be estimated at approximately 1%.

14. In 2006, the proportion of the population which was a visible minority was 42.9% in Toronto, 41.7% in Vancouver, and 16.5% in Montreal (Statistics Canada 2008). A detailed projection for growth of racial minority populations to 2017 shows that Toronto and Vancouver will both become “majority-minority” cities. The proportions that will be visible minorities in that year will be 50.6% in Toronto, 49.3% in Vancouver, and 19.2% in Montreal.

15. It might also be asked whether diversity affects particular types of decisions that the society might make, such as whether society should support universal social programs. This is not necessarily the same as cohesiveness per se. For example, some ask whether diversity undermines the welfare state (Banting 2005; Banting and Kymlicka 2004, 2006; Soroka et al. 2007a). Alesina and Glaeser (2004) suggested for example that diversity in the US is one of the principle factors reducing commitment to the welfare state compared to Europe (see also Luttmer 2001).

16. The Ethnic Diversity Survey is also useful to examining social cohesion in Canada as it relates to French–English relations. This aspect is included to some degree in Chapter 4, but is not the main focus of the present study.
17. A separate post-censal survey was designed for Aboriginal peoples, the Aboriginal Peoples’ Survey, conducted in 2001 and 2002.
19. Analyses are available from the authors on request.
20. An exception is that in Chapter 5, regional responses are excluded and not tabulated as reflecting “Canadian” identity.
21. In this study, any individuals who reported that they were not eligible to vote were removed from the voting analysis. In addition, some individuals may have reported “no” to voting when in fact they were ineligible at the time of the last federal election before the survey (November 2000). In order to correct for this, all voting analyses are based on those over the age of 20 (and hence at the time of the last federal election in 2002 would have been over 18 and eligible to vote).
22. Analysis is available from authors on request.
23. In Table 1.7, of the 14 positive correlations larger than 0.3, 12 are for visible minorities. Of the 11 negative correlations below −0.3, only 4 are for visible minorities. Whatever the reasons for this pattern, it is clear that the negative effects are not more often for visible minorities.
24. Further results on religious groups are presented in Chapter 5, and in Reitz et al. (2009).
In ethnically diverse societies, there is considerable variation in the degree of policy and structural support for ethnic self-labelling, reflecting different models of cultural adaptation promoted and encouraged for immigrants and native-born members of various cultural groups. Within Canada for the past several decades, government policy has explicitly supported multiculturalism and provided various forms of support designed to acknowledge and encourage the contributions of the many cultural groups comprising Canadian society. At the societal level therefore, there is strong government support for the role of ethnocultural diversity as one important component contributing to the vitality of Canadian society. Moreover, attitude surveys concerning this policy suggest that multiculturalism has considerable support as an important aspect of Canada’s identity. For example, in one survey when asked whether “multiculturalism has contributed positively to the Canadian identity,” over 80% of respondents endorsed this statement (Jedwab 2003).

Given this structural support, how likely is it that at the personal level, ethnic ancestries/origins form a salient part of most individuals’ self-definition? What factors predict the likelihood that individuals will mention their ethnocultural ancestry when asked to describe themselves? Of particular importance, do these predictors imply that mentioning one or more ethnic self-descriptors when asked about one’s identity is an important individual-level marker of social vitality and social cohesion? These questions were the focus of our analyses presented here, using the data from the Ethnic Diversity Survey.

In Canada since 1971, multiculturalism has been an official government policy at the national level. This policy has included the recognition of ethnic diversity by acknowledging its importance within Canadian society and supporting diversity of cultural background through various cultural activities and heritage language programs. Moreover, multiculturalism policy in Canada not only endorses respect for cultural heritage, but also strongly endorses equal opportunity and inter-group attitudes of mutual respect. The Canadian Multiculturalism Act (Canada Multiculturalism and Citizenship 1990, 1991) stresses the importance of social justice and full societal participation for members of all communities (see Breton 1986; Esses and Gardiner 1996). Given government support at the level of policy statement and sponsored programs/events, the relevance and importance of ancestral background might
be expected to be more salient at the individual level. In effect, the government’s structural support could be viewed as a kind of societal-level “priming” of the value of one’s cultural heritage.

However, even in the presence of a supportive policy framework, the nature and the degree of actual support over time for multiculturalism are critical. Moreover, when Canadians endorse multiculturalism, what aspect(s) is (are) most strongly endorsed? A 1991 survey suggested that various components of multiculturalism received different levels of endorsement. A national survey undertaken by Multiculturalism and Citizenship Canada and conducted by Angus Reid (1991) assessed various aspects of attitudes towards multiculturalism. Among the different policy components of multiculturalism, promoting social justice was strongly endorsed (85% endorsing the promotion of equality; 85% supporting equality of employment opportunity (Angus Reid 1991, Chart 4)). By contrast, funding of cultural events (e.g., festivals) was strongly supported by 42% of those surveyed, with a similar trend occurring on that aspect of multiculturalism pertaining to heritage culture preservation which received endorsement from 43% of the respondents (Angus Reid 1991, Chart 5).

The findings from a more recent national survey (Jedwab 2002), conducted in 2001–2002, found a “generally favourable” response to multiculturalism; moreover, there was strong agreement by a substantial percentage of those surveyed across Canada (82%) that there should be government support of “the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians.” The above item was endorsed by those from both European and other cultural backgrounds (Jedwab 2002). When asked whether the above objective (cultural heritage preservation/enhancement) is “a threat to social unity and solidarity,” nearly two thirds (64%) disagreed with this statement; however, almost one third agreed with it (32%). The percentage of those agreeing with the statement that cultural preservation could threaten social unity was somewhat higher for those of European compared to other cultural backgrounds (40% compared to 32%, respectively).

Finally, in a 2004 survey (Jedwab 2004a), respondents were asked to consider whether multiculturalism in Canada helped or hindered societal integration. The majority endorsed multiculturalism as beneficial for social integration; however, a substantial minority (40%) of respondents believed that Canada’s multicultural policy was a hindrance towards full societal integration among members of some groups.

Considered together, the survey data pertaining to attitudes towards multiculturalism discussed in the preceding paragraphs document support for the policy at the most general level of principles/ideals, such as, respect for diversity, equal opportunity for individuals in Canadian society, equal treatment within social institutions for members from the many different groups constituting Canadian society. However, there is also evidence suggesting that some aspects of multiculturalism, in particular those pertaining to ethnic group cultural preservation, heritage culture maintenance and related issues elicit a more complex, “mixed message,” depending on the specific question asked, the ancestral background of respondents and other factors.
In light of this framework, to what extent do Canadians mention their ancestral/heritage background as part of their identity when asked to give a self-description in national surveys? Interestingly, based on their analyses of items pertaining to self-identity in the previously described 1991 nation-wide survey plus an earlier one conducted by Angus Reid, as well as research findings from the 1970s and 1980s, Kalin and Berry (1995) concluded that “ethnic identity in Canada does not have high salience” (p. 12). Instead they found that national identity was far more salient, especially in English-speaking regions of Canada, with most respondents outside Quebec describing themselves as Canadian when asked to choose among several options. In both surveys, national or civic identity (Canadian) was preferred as a self-descriptor. Moreover, in the 1991 survey, participants also answered a strength of identity question with respect to each of the listed identity categories, with similar results. Strength of reported identification was by far highest for the Canadian identity option in regions outside Quebec. In the 1991 survey, among individuals of British and Other Ethnic origin, the “large majority” (80% and 65%, respectively, Table 2.1) described themselves as Canadian/Canadien (Kalin and Berry 1995). Among those of French origin in the 1991 survey, the province-based identity was most often chosen by 47% (Kalin and Berry 1995, Table 1).

Although the predominant trend was to claim a national identity, a minority of those with an ancestral origin other than British or French (Other Ethnic) did describe themselves using a hyphenated identity label, including both ethnic and national identity (28% in 1974 sample and 20% in the 1991 sample). Moreover among all respondents from any ancestral origin who did describe themselves using hyphenated identity labels, their reported strength of attachment to each identity, ethnic and national, was high. Berry and Kalin (1995) noted therefore that strongly identifying with one’s ancestral origins did not preclude also strongly identifying with Canada.

Current social psychological models concerning the inter-relation between different group identities support the above assertion about the possibility of claiming both ethnic self-identity and national self-identity. For example, in a recent extension of the Common In-group Identity Model, Dovidio, Gaertner and Saguy (2007) proposed that one form might consist of “a dual identity in which original group memberships are salient but recognised within the context of a common in-group identity” (p. 319). Moreover, the ideals/values of different societies would be expected to contribute to how this dual identity is regarded. Thus if pluralism is valued, dual identity is “a cultural ideal in itself” (Dovidio et al. 2007).

Within a culturally diverse society, what factors increase the likelihood that an individual’s ethnic/cultural background is mentioned when she or he is asked to give a self-description? Previous research suggests that both immigrant generation and visible minority status are related to the salience of ethnic identity. Among immigrants, there is evidence of declining salience of this component of identity across generations (see Phinney 1990). Early models of cultural integration such as Gordon’s model (1964) proposed that ethnic identity gradually fades in importance as immigrants to a given society become more fully integrated at different structural levels. Gordon suggested that “the price of such assimilation, however,
is the disappearance of the ethnic group as a separate entity and the evaporation of its distinctive values” (Gordon 1964, p. 81). Accordingly, ethnic identity should be most salient to first generation immigrants, becoming progressively less salient to successive immigrant generations as individuals from various cultural backgrounds become structurally integrated. Hence they presumably come to feel part of the “mainstream,” national group rather than their respective cultural groups at the time of immigration.

Such analysis implies that ethnic identity has a protective, adaptive function which becomes increasingly less necessary as various kinds of societal integration occur for members of minority and/or immigrant groups. In this sense, ethnic identity can be viewed as serving as a kind of protective psychological shield helping individuals to cope with challenging external circumstances such as discrimination or economic disadvantage. The connection between ethnic identity and the presence of threat is explicit in the concept of “reactive identity,” that is, the heightened personal salience of one’s ethnicity in the presence of perceived threat to one’s group (Portes and Rumbaut 2001).

Martinez and Dukes (1997) found, in a sample of adolescents, that Native Americans and Whites scored lower on ethnic identity than did respondents from other groups (e.g., Black, Hispanic, Asian). In another study (Roberts et al. 1999) among young adolescents, those of European-American background reported lower levels of ethnic identity than all other groups (including African American, Mexican American, Vietnamese American, Chinese American, Indian American, among others). Thus there is evidence that ethnic identity is more likely to be mentioned for those from various cultural minority groups.

Reviewing the literature on ethnic identity, Phinney (1990) characterised the nature of ethnic identity among those from European immigrant backgrounds as “optional.” Interestingly, commenting on their study of ethnic identity with young adolescents from various groups, Roberts and his colleagues (Roberts et al. 1999) noted that even though students from European American backgrounds were attending ethnically diverse schools and might well be a numerical minority in some cases, nonetheless the results suggested that ethnicity was not as important to their sense of identity compared to students from other groups. This pattern of findings is consistent with the above point that for these students from different European backgrounds, ethnicity may be a more “optional” component of identity.

Tuan’s (2002) research documents the complexities of ethnic identity for members of visible minority groups. In California, a state with a long history of immigration from Asia, interviews were conducted with third, fourth and fifth generation respondents of Chinese and Japanese ethnicity. These interviews revealed that despite a long period of group presence in California, individuals of Asian descent confronted “a markedly more circumscribed set of identity options” (Tuan 2002, pp. 212–13). They, in essence, were perceived as outsiders; regardless of immigrant generational status, “an assumption of foreignness” was attributed to them (Tuan 2002, p. 216).

Findings from a very different research paradigm support the above point. Devos and Banaji (2005) examined whether there were ethnic group-related differences in being categorized as “American.” They conducted a series of studies with university
undergraduate students using different approaches to examine this issue. As Devos and Banaji noted, despite a strong national ideology endorsing egalitarian values, previous and ongoing relations among different ethnic/cultural groups in the United States indicates the presence of hierarchies. They suggested that the position of various groups in this hierarchy was related both to their immigration history and to their current ongoing experiences living in the United States.

As predicted, in Study 1, the strong majority view (over 80%) endorsed principles of equal treatment for members of all groups. Moreover when asked about the defining features of being “a true American,” democratic values (voting in elections, equal treatment of others from diverse backgrounds) were most strongly endorsed. In this same study, however, when asked to rate members of three cultural groups (African American, Asian American and White American) on the extent to which they could be viewed as American, the results revealed group differences. Although members of each cultural group depicted were described as native-born and citizens of the United States, minority group members nonetheless were rated as being less “American” than White Americans, with the difference being particularly strong for Asian Americans compared to White Americans.

In addition to assessing university students’ explicit beliefs using various structured rating scales, Devos and Banaji (2005) also examined students’ implicit beliefs, using the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald et al. 1998). As the name of this latter measure indicates, the IAT was designed to assess the nature of individuals’ underlying beliefs about different social categories, in this case, ethnic groups, by examining participants’ reaction time when asked to categorise various pairings (for example, national symbols and foreign symbols versus Asian Americans and White Americans) across a series of trials. Across several studies, they found “a very consistent and robust American = White association” (Devos and Banaji 2005, p. 463), on the measures assessing implicit associations. Under some circumstances, they found a divergence between university students’ explicit beliefs and implicit beliefs about group differences regarding being seen as American.

This discrepancy between national ideology and the past and current realities of intergroup hierarchies was evident in the pattern of results. Interpreting these findings, the authors suggested that “implicit associations are reflections of sociocultural realities” (p. 464), these realities being factors such as length of time in the United States, group size, and power structure. Devos and Banaji proposed an important implication of these findings; namely, it is easier for members of some ethnic groups than others to be seen as part of a “superordinate identity,” in this case, the national identity of being regarded as American.

Their findings suggest that it is more difficult for both immigrants and native-born members of various visible minority groups to be given “mainstream” status by others, in the above case, the likelihood of being perceived as American. If others consistently label an individual based on his or her apparent cultural background/heritage given visible cues, one would expect that this identity would be more likely to continue to be salient compared to the situation where a person is typically categorized as “one of us” based on a superordinate rather than a subgroup identity. This process might well occur independently of individuals’ degree of attachment to and involvement in their ethnocultural group.
There is evidence from Canadian survey data (Jedwab 2004b) suggesting that the likelihood of regarding oneself as part of the majority group or a cultural minority group increasingly is related not to “official language” spoken (specifically, English or French) but to membership in a European or non-European cultural group. When asked whether they felt that they belonged to either “the majority” or to “a cultural minority in society,” the percentage of those who said “the majority” were almost the same (78% versus 76%) comparing the two major historic geographical areas of language differences (Quebec compared with the rest of Canada, respectively). However, among respondents who were immigrants to Canada, the pattern was quite different as a function of having immigrated from Europe or from elsewhere. For European immigrants, most (70%) felt they were part of the majority group, while 26% saw themselves as minority group members. Among non-European immigrants, by contrast, 41% saw themselves as belonging to the majority while 57% felt they were part of a cultural minority (Jedwab 2004b).

According to Jedwab, the results for the non-Europeans might reflect that those who were non-white were more likely to feel part of a cultural minority group. Moreover, he suggested that this pattern of findings implied “a paradigm shift in Canada where visibility... is increasingly emerging as the principal marker of minority status” (Jedwab 2004b, p. 1). If so, an ongoing awareness of being part of a cultural minority should contribute to the continuing salience of one’s ethnic identity for members of visible minority groups.

Another factor that may contribute to the ongoing salience of ethnic identity for members of visible minority groups is a misperception on the part of majority group members about the former groups’ desire to participate in the larger society. For example, in research conducted in the Netherlands, van Oudenhoven et al.’s (1998) findings revealed an “assumption of foreignness” (to use the phrase cited earlier regarding Tuan’s findings) attributed to members of immigrant groups, particularly those with very different cultural traditions from majority group members. Dutch-speaking individuals appraised different types of cultural adaptation and also estimated which of four acculturation strategies were likely to be preferred by Turkish and Moroccan immigrants. Different scenarios were used to portray the various four forms of cultural adaptation based on Berry’s (1980) framework (assimilation, integration, separation and marginalization).

Although they evaluated assimilation and integration approaches most favourably, Dutch-speaking respondents believed that most Turkish and Moroccan immigrants would prefer separation (almost no interaction with Dutch people apart from one’s job and a strong preference for socializing with members of one’s own ethnic group). The majority group’s expectation contrasted with the finding from a separate sample of Moroccan and Turkish respondents who responded more positively to situations in which the person portrayed both had positive interactions/contact with majority group members and also maintained cultural practices/values from their society of origin.

However, ethnic identity serves other functions in addition to providing protection in adverse circumstances or as the outcome of labelling processes on the part of others. Other conceptual accounts of group-related identity suggest that positive
group-related factors, at both the individual level and the larger social level, contribute to the salience of social identities, including ethnic identity. Theories of intergroup relations, in particular, Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner 1985) stress the importance of positive social identity. Individuals’ reaction to group membership reflects this need. According to Social Identity Theory, responses resulting from social categorization include a preference for one’s own group, manifested in more favourable appraisals of one’s own group compared to others.

Consistent with this point, in the study previously described which was conducted in the Netherlands by van Oudenhoven and colleagues (1998), both Turkish and Moroccan participants appraised styles of cultural adaptation more favourably when the person portrayed valued maintaining his/her culture of origin’s traditions compared to modes of adaptation in which carrying on these traditions was not valued. Degree of identification, positive affective responses towards the person portrayed and expression of norms (how group members should behave) were all greater in the modes depicting “culture maintenance.”

Theoretical considerations and empirical analysis of ethnic identity within specific groups suggest the presence of several different functions. For example, in their discussion of African American identity, Cross and Strauss (1998) argue that this form of identification can have a buffering/protective function to deal with racism. It is this aspect they note that has received the most attention from social scientists. While acknowledging buffering as one important function, they also mention bonding, bridging, code-switching and individualism. Of particular relevance here, Cross and Strauss (1998, p. 271) comment that “one’s attachment and bonding to Black people, Black culture, and the historical and contemporary Black experience” define central features of Black identity. Manifestations of this bonding function are reflected in preferences and practices across different domains of one’s life both personal (food preferences, clothing), interpersonal (friendship choices; membership in cultural groups) and institutional (such as, church affiliation). Preliminary support was found for the importance of the bonding function with a small group of African American students who were asked about the importance of each identity function in their recent daily life experiences (Cross and Strauss 1998).

As mentioned above, the contribution of group-related bonds, attachment to one’s group, has been hypothesized as one important mechanism for dealing with the negative effects associated with being stigmatized by others and the target of discriminatory actions. Dion, Dion, and Banerjee (this volume) examined the role played by ethnic identity, defined as group belonging/attachment, as a potential buffer to help reduce the negative impact of experienced discrimination. Cross and Strauss (1998) label this type of bonding “reactive bonding.” They differentiate it from what they call “intrinsic bonding.” Intrinsic bonding reflects aspects of one’s ethnic/cultural group which have an inherent attraction and appeal, not dependent on actual or anticipated threats from others. Although they discuss identity functions with reference to African American identity, the points raised by Cross and Strauss are relevant for understanding ethnic identity in other groups, including immigrant groups.

Supporting the argument that ethnic identity is related to various positive group-related functions as well as serving coping and or protective functions, theory and
research on cultural adaptation document these factors across diverse groups. Immigrant families exert a strong, positive, formative impact on the development of identity in their adolescent and young adult daughters and sons (Dion 2006). Kibria (1993), for example, found that Vietnamese-Americans’ perception of highly cooperative family relationships contributed to ethnic pride. LaFromboise, Coleman, and Gerton (1993) suggested that a strong sense of cultural identity is an important component of bicultural competence.

In the present analysis, we examined both types of factors – bonding and threat – as predictors of the personal salience of one’s ethnic or cultural identity. We predicted that both make an independent contribution to increasing the likelihood of reporting an ethnic identity, as defined here by ethnic self-identification or ethnic self-categorization. In the present research, in-group bonding was defined as reporting a high proportion of friends from one’s own group. Strong own-group ties were expected to be a positive predictor of the likelihood of ethnic self-categorization. Group-related threat was defined as having experienced discrimination based on one or more of several group-related cues (for example, ethnicity, culture, religion, race). We predicted that experiencing discrimination should increase the likelihood of mentioning at least one ethnic self-identity.

We further expected that ethnic identity would be more likely to be mentioned among first generation, recent immigrants compared to first generation immigrants who arrived earlier and compared to respondents from the second generation. Also, the likelihood of mentioning one’s ethnic identity was predicted to be greater among members of visible minority groups compared to individuals who are not part of a visible minority (as defined by the Employment Equity Act). We also assessed whether immigrant generation interacted with visible minority status in predicting the likelihood of mentioning ethnic identity. The research discussed previously in this section suggests that the persistence of reporting one or more ethnic identities among individuals from different immigrant generations might vary, in part, as a function of visible minority group status.

**Measures of Variables**

**Ethnic Self-identity**

The focal variable of interest for all analyses was ethnic self-identity, defined as ethnic self-categorization in response to an open-ended interview question. This question asked about respondents’ own personal identity, not their ancestral background which also was queried separately in the survey. The specific question asked was the following: (ID-Q100): “I would now like you to think about your own identity, in ethnic or cultural terms. This identity may be the same as that of your parents, grandparents or ancestors or it may be different. What is your ethnic or cultural identity?” The respondent was allowed a maximum of six responses.

Coding for the present analysis was dichotomous: (0) no ethnic identity reported across any of the six possible responses and only Canadian or regional identity
mentioned; or (1) ethnic identity reported (non-Canadian/non-regional) identity among any of the six possible responses. Ethnic identity reported could include a hyphenated description (such as, Chinese-Canadian; Canadian-Italian) or ethnicity only (for example, Vietnamese; Greek).

It should be noted that this question was explicit in asking about “your own identity, in ethnic or cultural terms.” Moreover, respondents had several opportunities to mention this self-descriptor if they choose. Though given the chance to mention six identities, most people gave one or two responses. Finally, for those choosing to mention at least one ethnic identity, this did not preclude the possibility of mentioning a Canadian (or regional) identity as another one of the identity choices, either as part of a hyphenated term (each component coded separately) or as two separate choices.

**Visible Minority Status, Immigration, and Generational Cohort**

We were interested in the relation of visible minority group status and immigrant generation to ethnic identity, given the importance of both variables in the literature on ethnic identity as discussed earlier. The visible minority status of respondents (VISMINC), as defined in the Ethnic Diversity Survey followed the Employment Equity Act’s definition of visible minorities as “persons, other than Aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour.” The visible minority population, as defined by the Act, consists of the following groups: Arab, Black, Chinese, Filipino, Japanese, Korean, Latin American, Pacific Islander, South Asian, Southeast Asian, and West Asian, including those who report multiple group memberships. In the present analysis, this variable is dichotomously coded as the following: (0) not visible minority status; or (1) visible minority status.

Immigrant generation of respondent was examined using three different dummy variables, based on immigrant generation and time of arrival in Canada. The first variable, recent immigrant (RECENT), is coded as (1). This refers to an immigrant who arrived in Canada between 1991 and 2001. The second variable examines earlier immigration (EARLY), and is coded as (1). This is an immigrant who arrived in Canada before 1991. The third variable looks at second generation status (GEN2), and is coded as (1). It refers to the second immigrant generation, namely, Canadian-born respondents with at least one parent born outside Canada. For each of these three variables, the reference category is defined as the third immigrant generation or greater, with both parents born in Canada and at least one grandparent born in Canada.

**Own Group Ties and Inter-group Threat**

As mentioned earlier, reported inter-group threat as well as own group bonding and integration may contribute to the likelihood of mentioning ethnic identity. In either case, the measures concern reported behaviours or experiences.
Inter-group threat was assessed by whether or the respondent reported experiences of discrimination in the past five years. The specific question asked of all respondents taking part in this survey was the following: “In the past 5 years/since coming to Canada, do you feel that you have experienced discrimination or been treated unfairly by others in Canada because of your ethnicity, culture, race, skin colour, language, accent, or religion?” The response to this question was coded dichotomously as either (0) No or (1) Yes.

Own-group bonding was examined in the present analysis using reported bonds with own group members (current and childhood friendships ties). The specific question concerning own group friendships (current or in childhood) asked: “As far as you know, how many of your friends have (top two rated ancestry)?” This question was asked of respondents who indicated at least one ancestry other than Canadian. It was dichotomously coded in the present analysis as either (0) None, few or half from own group(s); or (1) Most or all from own group(s). The same coding was used for reported childhood friendships (up to age 15).²

Current friendship ties may reflect continuity with childhood relationships that are shaped by past family conditions and context, as well as decisions shaped by current contexts (McPherson et al. 2001). Parents’ social networks strongly shape with whom their children play and become friends. In addition, schools and neighbourhood composition shape children’s social networks, as they determine available playmates, and shape their propensity to form diverse (or homophilous) friendships in adulthood (Emerson et al. 2002). Immigrants (particularly from ethnically homogeneous countries) and children of parents whose social networks are ethnically homogeneous, are very likely to have childhood friendships that are also ethnically homogeneous. These relations during childhood may spill over into adult friendship networks, as relationships are maintained (Sigelman et al. 1996; Fong and Isajiw 2000). To separate the effects of relationships formed during childhood from those formed as adults, we control for childhood friendship composition in the analysis. Those who have most or all of their current friends of the same ancestry(ies) are considered to have high in-group bonding as adults.

Control Variables (Demographic)

There were several demographic control variables. Gender is coded as (0) Female, or (1) Male. Education focuses on whether or not the respondent has completed at least one university degree: coded as (0) no university degree; and (1) at least one university degree. Income was defined as household income earned from employment or self-employment as reported in the 2001 census variable, C_EMPIN, in units of $10,000. This variable is transformed in natural log to correct for a negative skew. Age in years is standardized.

Descriptive Findings

As noted previously, all analyses used sample weights.
**Ethnic Self-identity**

In the EDS, just over one third (33.5%) of respondents report at least one non-Canadian/non-regional ethnic self identity. Evidently, ethnic identity as assessed by spontaneous self-categorization does matter to some individuals, leading to the following question. For whom is ethnic identity more salient?

**Visible Minority Status and Ethnic Self-identity**

As mentioned above, we expected ethnic self-identity to be more salient to and therefore more likely to be mentioned by individuals who are members of a visible minority group. As is evident in Fig. 2.1, typically this pattern of findings occurred. However, it is apparent that there was considerable diversity across various groups.

Examining the distribution of ethnic self-identification by select visible minority and white ancestry groups in Fig. 2.1, we can see how responses vary within each set of groups (Whites and Visible Minorities). It should be noted that the white ancestry categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive; that is, respondents could report mixed ancestry backgrounds since they were allowed multiple answers to the ancestry question. Among Visible Minorities, respondents of Japanese ancestry had the lowest percentage reporting an ethnic identity (49%) while those of Filipino, Latin American, and Korean ancestry had the highest (78–79%).

![Fig 2.1 Percentage reporting an ethnic identity by white ethnic ancestry and visible minority groups](image)

*Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey 2002 (Statistics Canada and the Department of Canadian Heritage)*
Among members of different ethnic groups who were not visible minorities, the average proportion mentioning ethnic identity was quite variable, ranging from 24% to 68% among the groups depicted in the graph. Respondents of Jewish and Portuguese ancestry reported the highest rate of ethnic self-identification, followed by those of Greek and Italian ancestry. With regard to the relatively low proportion of respondents of French ancestry who reported an ethnic self-identity, it should be kept in mind that among individuals of French background in Canada, reporting a regional identity (for example, Québécois, Acadian) may be a preferred option as found in Kalin and Berry’s (1995) study discussed previously. In summary, most of the white ancestry groups are lower than the population average on ethnic self-identification, with the exception of Southern European and Jewish groups. Visible minorities, on the other hand, have markedly higher ethnic self-identification in comparison. These differences may reflect differences in immigration histories of these groups, and their relative recency in Canada.

**Immigrant Generation and Ethnic Identity**

As indicated by the models of cultural adaptation reviewed in the introduction, ethnic self-identity should be most salient to recent immigrants, declining in subsequent immigrant generations. Furthermore, changes to immigration policies and trends mean that visible minorities are more likely to be recent immigrants to Canada. As

![Fig 2.2 Percentage of ethnic self-identification by immigrant and generational cohort for whites and visible minorities](image)

*Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey 2002 (Statistics Canada and the Department of Canadian Heritage)*
shown in Fig. 2.2, consistent with this prediction, the proportion of those reporting ethnic self identity was very high among recent immigrants, namely those arriving in Canada during the decade prior to the survey. This occurred regardless of visible minority status.

However these descriptive data suggest that once past the initial period of immigration, both immigrant cohort and visible minority status contribute to ethnic self identity. Visible minorities maintained higher levels of ethnic self-identification across different cohorts than did whites. The percentage of respondents mentioning ethnic self-identity steadily declined across immigrant cohorts in Canada for whites, but declined much less across immigrant generations for those from various visible minority groups. This pattern will be apparent in the analyses to be discussed below.

Regression Analysis

We predicted that both recency of immigration and visible minority status contribute to ethnic self identity. Recent immigrants should be more likely to mention ethnic identity than those from later immigrant generations, and the likelihood of reporting an ethnic identity should be greater for members of visible minority groups. Among the two classes of social psychological factors, group-related threat (reported discrimination) was expected to increase the likelihood of reporting ethnic self identity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Parameter effects</th>
<th>Standard error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
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<td>0.091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>−0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>−0.118*</td>
<td>0.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University education</td>
<td>−0.174*</td>
<td>0.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household income</td>
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<td>0.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reported discrimination</td>
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<td>0.066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own group current friendship ties</td>
<td>0.113*</td>
<td>0.056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own group childhood friendship ties</td>
<td>0.349*</td>
<td>0.057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visible minority</td>
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<td>0.246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent immigrant</td>
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<td>0.130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early immigrant</td>
<td>1.286*</td>
<td>0.051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd generation</td>
<td>0.186*</td>
<td>0.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent immigrant* visible minorities</td>
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<td>0.288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early immigrant* visible minorities</td>
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<td>2nd generation* visible minorities</td>
<td>0.172</td>
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<td>Discrimination* visible minorities</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Own group childhood friendship ties* visible minorities</td>
<td>−0.192</td>
<td>0.116</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* statistically significant p < 0.05; Estrella R² = 0.18; Max-scaled R² = 0.22

Note: Regression unweighted N = 33,660. Response categories “Not asked,” “Not applicable,” “Don’t know,” or “Refused” were coded as missing. Those who did not have valid responses to any of the variables used (including control variables) were excluded.
But when this aspect of group-related threat is controlled, we expected group-related bonding factors (own group friendship ties) to increase the likelihood of reporting ethnic identity.

To test these hypotheses, we conducted logistic regression analysis with ethnic self-identity as the dichotomous criterion variable, and several predictor and control variables as previously described. As Table 2.1 shows, different aspects of immigrant cohort (recent immigration, earlier immigration, second generation status) were related in each case as predicted to ethnic self-identity when contrasted with later immigrant cohorts (third generation or greater). Compared to these later immigrant generations, recent immigrants were most likely to mention ethnic self-identity followed by earlier-arriving first generation immigrants, and then by the second generation immigrants. Also, as predicted, ethnic self-categorization was more likely to be reported by visible minority group members.

Of particular importance, this analysis supported the prediction that the likelihood of reporting ethnic self-categorization is related not only to the perception of threat but also to group-related bonding. Both types of factors increased the likelihood of respondents mentioning an ethnic identity. Interestingly, childhood friendship ties had a stronger effect on ethnic identity than current friendship ties, suggesting that early socialization by peer groups plays a significant role.

In addition to the above tests of main effects, in this regression analysis we tested the interaction between each of the three immigrant generation variables and visible minority status. Figure 2.3 shows the predicted probability of mentioning ethnic

![Predicted Probability Graph](image)

**Fig 2.3** Effect of immigrant cohort on the probability of ethnic self-identification by visible minority status.

*Note*: Regression unweighted N = 33,660

*Source*: Ethnic Diversity Survey 2002 (Statistics Canada and the Department of Canadian Heritage)
self-identity as related to immigrant generation and minority status, after controlling for the contribution of the remaining demographic factors, as well as reported own group bonds and inter-group threat. The graph allows us to interpret the interaction between immigrant cohort and visible minority more easily.

Across successive immigrant cohorts, mentioning ethnic identity declined regardless of visible minority status, but the decline was less pronounced among visible minority group members. The divergence between whites and visible minorities was most apparent among earlier immigrant cohorts and those from the second generation who are themselves Canadian-born. For these groups, visible minorities were much more likely to self-identify ethnically. However, recent immigrant whites were just as likely to self-identify as ethnic as their visible minority cohort counterparts.

We also tested the interaction between visible minority status and each of the group-related factors; namely, reported in-group friendship (current and childhood) as well as reported discrimination. Reported discrimination did not interact with visible minority status so there was no differential effect on the measure of reported group-related threat. On one of the measures of in-group bonding, there was evidence of a differential effect. As can be seen in Fig. 2.4, there was a greater likelihood of mentioning ethnic self-identity among visible minority group members who reported mostly own group ties among their current friends.

![Graph showing the effect of current own-group friendship ties on the probability of ethnic self-identification by visible minority status.](image)

**Fig 2.4** Effect of current own-group friendship ties on the probability of ethnic self-identification by visible minority status.

*Note: Regression unweighted N = 33, 660*

*Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey 2002 (Statistics Canada and the Department of Canadian Heritage)*
Discussion

Summary of Findings

As predicted, we found that several factors contributed to ethnic self-identity. Both recency of immigration and visible minority status predicted a greater likelihood of mentioning at least one ethnic identity. Although mentioning ethnic identity was less likely to occur among individuals from earlier immigrant cohorts and members of the second generation, this pattern of decline was more evident among those who were not from visible minority groups. By contrast, members of visible minority groups were more likely to report ethnic self-identity beyond the most recent immigrant cohort assessed in the Ethnic Diversity Survey. In other words, ethnic self-identity was more likely to persist across different immigrant cohorts for persons from visible minority groups.

We also found that ethnic self-identity was related to both positive (own group ties) and negative (reported discrimination) group-related factors, in each case increasing the likelihood of mentioning ethnic identity. Experiencing discrimination did not differentially contribute to ethnic self-identity in relation to visible minority status. However, there was some evidence suggesting a differential association on the positive group-related dimension, with individuals from visible minority groups who indicated strong own group ties (friendship bonds) being more likely to report an ethnic identity. This issue merits further examination looking at the contribution of both friendship ties and other indices of own group bonding to ethnic self-identity.

Ethnic Self-identity: Does It Matter?

Our findings indicate that yes, it matters to some. The question concerning ethnic self-identity on the Ethnic Diversity Survey was open-ended and clearly differentiated the respondent’s sense of her/his own ethnic/cultural identity from the cultural identity of parents, grandparents or ancestors. Both features were important. Since the question was open-ended, respondents were not being “primed” by a list of categories. The mere presence of a list could suggest to the respondent that they were expected to mention at least one cultural identity. Moreover, pointing out to the respondent that their own identity might be the same or different from other relatives indicated there was no “right” answer and made an explicit distinction between their own cultural identity and ancestral background. In addition, several different response options were provided thus allowing a person several opportunities to mention ethnic or cultural identity if he or she chose.

Under these conditions about a third of the sample mentioned one or more cultural/ethnic identities. One interpretation of this finding might be to conclude that ethnic cultural identity is not relevant for the majority of respondents. As mentioned at the start of this paper, this has been the conclusion reached in other Canadian surveys where by far the most frequent response was to mention national identity when asked for a self-description.
This conclusion, however, may underestimate the personal significance of heritage/ancestral background in Canada, both as contributing to individuals’ sense of self and to other important socially relevant phenomena. Our analyses in this paper focussed on ethnic/cultural self-labelling, one important aspect of ethnic identity. Ethnic identity is a multi-faceted construct and includes other components such as a sense of belonging to one’s ethnic/cultural group(s), maintaining heritage culture traditions and practices (see Phinney 1990). The inter-relation among these different components is complex (see Phinney 1990; Phan & Breton, this volume), as is the relation between specific components of ethnic identity (for example, feeling a sense of belonging to one’s cultural group) and other outcome variables (see Dion, Dion & Banerjee, this volume).

**Ethnic Self-identity: To Whom Does It Matter?**

What were the predictors of ethnic self-identity? Turning first to the demographic predictors, consistent with prior research, we found that more recent immigrants were more likely to claim an ethnic identity. Similarly, members of visible minority groups showed a greater likelihood of reporting ethnic self-identity. Nonetheless, there was variability within the category “visible minority” in the proportion who mentioned ethnic identity. Moreover, the relation between visible minority group status and generational status revealed an interesting pattern.

The typical pattern of generational decline across immigrant generations occurred for those who are not members of visible minority groups, namely, different white ethnocultural groups. This trend is thus consistent with the models of cultural adaptation reviewed earlier which predict a gradual weakening of the personal salience of ethnicity. It can be argued that this pattern of findings for European origin groups of different immigrant generations is compatible with Alba’s (1990) suggestion with respect to individuals from European background in the United States. He argued that for these individuals, “ethnic identity is a choice” (Alba 1990, p. 294). Among the descendents of European immigrants, rather than being anchored to ongoing ethnic communities, according to Alba (1990), “a privatization of ethnic identity” (p. 300) seems to take place.

By contrast, as we have proposed earlier in this paper, for those from diverse visible minority groups, some aspects of ethnic self-identity may occur in response to a labelling process from others. If this is the case, ethnic self-categorization is not necessarily entirely a matter of personal choice (Phinney 1990), and one might expect ethnic self-identity to be more persistent across immigrant generations among those from various visible minority groups.

In our analysis, after controlling for a number of demographic variables such as education and income, as well as group-related positive and negative experiences, visible minority status interacted with generational status. Possibly some of the greater persistence in ethnic self-identity among those from later generation visible minority groups reflects the labelling processes described above. We cannot assess
the contribution of labelling processes in the present data set since there were no questions examining this variable.

In our findings, both group-related threat (experiencing discrimination) and own group bonding had significant independent effects on ethnic self-identity for both whites and visible minorities. These findings call attention to the importance of examining the relation of positive group-related factors, such as social ties with co-ethnics as predictors of ethnic self-identity. As Cross and Strauss (1998) pointed out, for those in minority groups, identity serves multiple psychological functions, including dealing with managing different types of threat, on the one hand, and also, reflecting positive aspects of own group-related experiences on the other hand. In addition, among respondents who were members of visible minority groups, own group bonds were associated with a greater likelihood of mentioning ethnic self-identity (interaction effect). Further examination of the relation of positive group-related factors to ethnic self-categorization merits more research attention. Moreover, there is a need for more cross-communication among researchers working in different research literatures (for example, identity formation for specific ethnic/cultural groups, intergroup relations; social cognition).

The independent effect of current friendship ties, controlling for early co-ethnic peer socialization, suggests the possibility of more complex causal mechanisms at work. The positive relationship between ethnic identity and in-group friendship ties suggest that ethnic identity may influence the choice of friendship ties, and also, structurally-determined friendship ties may enhance one’s ethnic identification. Current in-group friendships may be reinforced by ongoing ties carried through childhood, through shared networks or opportunities in the wider neighbourhood/workplace context.

Conclusions and Implications

We began the chapter by asking whether ethnic identity personally matters to individuals in a multicultural society, such as Canada, in which there is a government policy supporting and promoting the option of retaining a link with one’s ancestral heritage. In this context, what factors are associated with a greater likelihood of ethnic self-categorization? More specifically, are people more likely to claim one or more ethnic identities in response to threatening experiences, such as being the target of group-related discrimination? Or is ethnic self-categorization related to positive group-related experiences, such as strong bonds formed with other members of one’s ethnic group(s)? We found support for a “both/and” rather than an “either/or” response to the above questions.

What are the implications of our findings concerning the predictors of ethnic self-identity for social cohesion? The difference in ethnic self-categorization between visible minority group members and white minority group members across later immigrant generations suggests that in some circumstances, ethnic labelling may reflect an imposed identity category. If so, the persistence of ethnic self identity may be indicative of differential acceptance of individuals as a function of their group
membership. To the extent that ethnic self-identity reflects “reactive” ethnic identity and/or persists because of labelling by others, this pattern has negative implications for social cohesion.

Our findings in this chapter also provide evidence for optimism. After taking into account individuals’ experience of discrimination, the relation between positive own-group bonds and ethnic self-categorization remained. Moreover, there was a tendency for this association to be stronger for members of visible minority groups. This pattern of results implies that the occurrence of ethnic self-labelling can have positive implications for social cohesion, if it reflects the degree to which individuals have “a sense of being grounded” to draw on the term used by LaFromboise and her colleagues (1993) in their discussion of the correlates of successful biculturalism. To the extent that ethnic self-identity is related to feeling connected with and grounded in one’s heritage/ancestral cultural group as indicated by positive social ties, its occurrence and persistence over time is consistent with the assumptions underlying multiculturalism in Canada.

Notes
1. “Canadian” or regional identities include Canadienne, French Canadian, Acadian, Québécois, Newfoundlander or any other regional identity.
2. For this analysis, among those who reported two ethnic ancestries, we included respondents who gave at least one valid response to the own group friendship question. (For those who reported more than one ethnic ancestry, the friendship question was asked of their two top rated ancestries as mentioned earlier).
3. The present analysis included a sample of 33,660 respondents. The variables with the greatest amount of missing data were the reported own group ties (current and childhood). There were some significant differences between those included and excluded based on missing values. Respondents with incomplete data tended to be men, were slightly older, lived in rural areas, were recent immigrants and had visible minority status. Furthermore, they tended to have lower educational qualifications, lower parental education, and smaller household incomes. Despite these overall trends, the sample for this regression analysis represented the full spectrum of values on these measures.
4. To generate the graph, we transformed logged odds into predicted probability using the formula $P = 1/(1 + e^{-bx})$ for each relevant subgroup (i.e. for recent immigrant visible minorities, recent immigrant whites, early immigrant visible minorities, etc.). All other independent variables are set at their average values.
5. We also ran an additional analysis ($N = 32,500$) including only those who had complete data on both friendship questions for those respondents with two ethnic ancestries. In this analysis, the interaction between current friendship and visible minority status showed a near significant trend, $p = 0.09$. 
Chapter 3
Discrimination, Ethnic Group Belonging, and Well-Being

Kenneth L. Dion, Karen Kisiel Dion, and Rupa Banerjee

Within Canada, an explicit goal of the policy of multiculturalism is the promotion of social justice for members of all the diverse groups comprising Canadian society (Canada Multiculturalism and Citizenship 1990, 1991). Indeed, there is evidence that social justice, as defined by equal opportunity and access in different domains of the social system (e.g., employment opportunities) is regarded as one of the most important aspects of multiculturalism when Canadians have been asked about different aspects of this policy (Angus Reid Group 1991). Surveys on this topic have found that Canadians claim to disapprove of ethno-racial discrimination (Reitz and Breton 1989; Berry and Kalin 1995; Esses et al. 2001), yet some Canadian attitude surveys tell a different story. They show that Canadians do indeed have preferences for neighbours, colleagues and potential partners for family members (Kalin and Berry 1994).

Various surveys report that individuals encounter experiences of prejudice and/or discrimination in Canadian society (Dion 2001). Discrimination has been reported in a variety of contexts (see, Dion 1989). Dion and Kawakami (1996) found that visible minorities in Toronto reported significantly greater discrimination and prejudice than white minorities, for example, in obtaining work, wage rates and being passed over for advancement or a raise.

In this chapter, we draw upon the Ethnic Diversity Survey to look more closely at prejudice as a psychosocial stressor in Canadian society. More specifically, we examine whether there is a negative relation between experiencing discrimination and various indicators of well-being. We also test a multiple jeopardy hypothesis which predicts an incremental impact of prejudice: in other words, experiencing discrimination on more than one dimension should increase its negative relation to well-being. Finally, we seek to determine whether positively identifying with one’s own ethnocultural group buffers the association between discrimination and well-being.

Authors’ note: Ken Dion, who designed this study and proposed the hypotheses, died before he was able to complete this research. We, Karen Dion and Rupa Banerjee, completed his research by carrying out the analyses to test the predictions he outlined and by writing this chapter.
In the present study, the outcome variable of interest is well-being. We focus on three separate indicators of well-being: social inclusion, trust in others, and overall life satisfaction. These three measures of well-being are important in determining social cohesion since they are known to be strongly related to pro-social behaviour and social ties at all levels. Helliwell and Putnam (2004) examined the relation between social capital-related factors and subjective well-being, using two indicators: happiness and overall life satisfaction. They found well-being to be associated with family, neighbourhood, religious and community ties. Specifically, well-being was significantly related to frequency of interaction with family members, friends and neighbours, membership in non-religious voluntary community organizations, and frequency of attending religious services. Subjective well-being has also been found to be related to pro-social behaviour within the workplace. Well-being measures such as job satisfaction and particularly trust have been found to be antecedents of organizational citizenship behaviours (Chen et al. 2005; Podsakoff et al. 2000; McAllister 1995). Essentially, these are acts that go above and beyond the job description to cooperate with and help others in the organization and promote organizational cohesion (Podsakoff et al. 2000).

We recognize that interpreting the direction of the relation between well-being and social cohesion is open to debate. It may be that social cohesion results in well-being. Alternatively, well-being may lead to greater social cohesion. Moreover, the relation between these two constructs may be bi-directional. In any event, feelings of well-being and social cohesion are intimately related. Therefore, to understand the impact of prejudice and discrimination on social cohesion, it is important to examine how experiences of discrimination affect well-being.

In the social and behavioural sciences, a great deal of research has been devoted to studying the causes of prejudice and discrimination. Often, researchers have concentrated on the personal and contextual factors contributing to the likelihood that majority group members will exhibit prejudiced attitudes and behave in a discriminatory manner towards minority group members. This emphasis, however, neglects an important perspective; namely, the perspective of those who are the targets of prejudice and discrimination. To address this issue, Dion and Earn (1975) examined the ‘phenomenology of prejudice,’ a term referring to the subjective experience of prejudice. At that time, there was little systematic research addressing this important issue.

There is now considerable evidence that experiencing discrimination can be conceptualized as a psychosocial stressor (see Dion 2002, 2003). As used here, the term discrimination refers to being treated inequitably or unfairly based on either one’s group membership or some other arbitrary characteristic (Dion 2002). In the present research, Ken Dion proposed that experiencing discrimination based on ethnicity/race should be negatively related to different components of subjective well-being and to a sense of social inclusion. In addition, experiencing discrimination was predicted to show a positive relation to own-group identification.

Being treated unfairly is stressful for several reasons. It can elicit appraisals of threat by imputing stable, negative motives to others. Moreover, the experience of
discrimination is often unpredictable and uncontrollable (Dion et al. 1992), and unpredictable stressors make greater coping demands on individuals than predictable, controllable ones (Glass and Singer 1972).

What effect does the experience of feeling discriminated against have on the individual? Does the relation between self-reported discrimination and well-being differ for members of different groups? What components of well-being are related to feeling unfairly treated by others? These questions are difficult to study for many reasons. One challenge is to examine the impact of the experience of discrimination on well-being using various approaches to control for the contribution of other variables that are also related to subjective well-being. In their research, Dion and his colleagues used an experimental procedure developed by Miller and his colleagues (Boye and Miller 1968; Miller et al. 1968) to examine experiences of prejudice and discrimination in the psychological laboratory. In this paradigm, participants (university students) experienced failure or a setback that could be attributable to discriminatory behavior or not, based on the identity of the others in the group setting and whether or not the participant’s identity was known to them. As Dion (1986) noted, this approach creates in a research setting a situation similar to one experienced in daily life by members of various groups; namely some type of difficulty or setback occurs which can be attributed to prejudice as a function of other cues/information available.

For example, in Dion and Earn’s (1975) study, Jewish undergraduate men believed they were interacting with several others (all Gentiles) who presumably knew of their group identity. In this condition, prejudice was a potential explanation for subsequently-experienced negative personal outcomes in the lab setting. In another condition, the identity of each participant was unknown during the group task. Participants completed various measures, including ratings of identification with stereotypic group-related traits and a measure assessing different components of affect. The findings were consistent with the view that experiences of discrimination are a source of a psycho-social stress. After having a failure experience in the lab context, presumably as a result of their interaction with the others, the Jewish men finding themselves in a context where the others’ behavior toward them could be attributable to anti-Semitism reported feeling greater anxiety, sadness, and aggression, as well as greater self-consciousness compared to those who experienced the same negative outcome but in a context where attributions of prejudice were unlikely to explain the others’ behavior. Moreover, a negative outcome that could be attributed to discrimination resulted in greater positive in-group identification than the same negative event that could not be explained by discriminatory behavior.

Additional support for the notion that the experience of discrimination is a stressor (Dion et al. 1978) was revealed by comparing the men’s standardized scores on various components of affect in response to prejudice with findings in other research (Lazarus et al. 1962) examining affective reactions to a known stressor induced via film.

This early research conducted by Dion and his colleagues was important not only for stimulating much subsequent research on the psychology of prejudice from the perspective of the target but also for its use of an experimental paradigm. This
approach permits the inference that experiences of discrimination per se are a stressor unconfounded by the many other variables that might be related to experiencing discriminatory treatment, whether pre-existing individual differences and/or various situational factors.

There is now a growing research literature on the relation between the reported experience of discrimination on the one hand, and key indicators of personal well-being and social integration, on the other. For example, Pak et al. (1991) examined the relation between reported discrimination as experienced by Chinese university undergraduates and stress symptoms. The association between reported discrimination and attitudes towards one’s own ethnic group compared to other cultural/ethnic groups also was assessed. Chinese students who reported having experienced discrimination indicated a higher level of stress symptoms compared to those not reporting discrimination, with this effect still occurring after including reported discrimination towards one’s group and two life stress indices as covariates. Moreover, own group identification was greater for those who personally experienced discrimination compared to those who did not. Once again, this effect persisted when reported discrimination at the group level, as well as the two life stress indices, were included as covariates.

Research conducted by other investigators in the past two decades has found evidence that the experience of discrimination is associated with a number of negative psychological health correlates. To estimate the contribution of reported experiences of discrimination to well-being and a sense of social inclusion in the context of other potential correlates (such as occupation, income, education) statistical, rather than experimental, controls were employed using various multivariate research designs. For example, Williams et al. (1997) examined the contribution of several demographic variables, three indices of general stress and two indices of race-related stress to indicators of physical and mental health among black respondents and white respondents in the United States. The questions pertaining to discrimination were worded by referring to unfairness of treatment by others in three different contexts (such as job promotion) or unfair treatment in different aspects of daily living (e.g., receiving less courtesy compared to others, poorer service in a restaurant than others). Mental health was assessed by an index of psychological distress and a measure of subjective well-being (life satisfaction). After controlling for factors such as education, household income and other reported types of general stress, everyday experiences of discrimination (being treated unfairly in one’s daily life) were found to be related to less well-being and greater reported psychological distress.

Similarly, Noh et al. (1999), looking at Southeast Asian refugees in Canada, found that after controlling for several demographic variables, self-reported discrimination was related to higher levels of depressive symptoms. In the survey conducted by Noh and his colleagues, the survey question pertaining to the experience of discrimination explicitly asked about discrimination based on race rather than the more general question concerning unfair treatment asked by Williams et al. (1997). Among Asian American undergraduate students, Lee (2003) found that reported personal ethnic discrimination was related to greater psychological distress
(depressive symptoms) and lower levels of personal well-being (self-esteem) as well as less social well-being (sense of connectedness in one’s immediate social environment).

Within the context of employment, experiences of discrimination have been found to have significant negative effects on both employees and organizations. Pavalko et al. (2003) reported in their US study of sex discrimination at work that experiences of discrimination predicted more negative emotional and physical well-being. While emotional health (depression and anxiety) was found to be affected by recent experiences of discrimination, physical health (arthritis, heart disease and muscular-skeletal problems) seemed to be more affected by discrimination experienced years earlier.

Goldsmith et al. (2004) found that among female respondents, experiencing discrimination in previous job applications was negatively related to future attempts at finding work. Thus, perceived discrimination discourages potentially productive employees. In addition, experiencing discrimination has been found to be negatively correlated with task performance (Hannah 1974) and organizational commitment (Sanchez and Brock 1996). Sanchez and Brock (1996) found in their US study of Hispanic employees that reported discrimination was associated with higher work tension and lower job satisfaction. According to a study by Gutek et al. (1996), employees who perceived discrimination felt powerless and less prestige in their job. Mays et al. (1996) reported that black females who experienced racial discrimination from employers were less likely to engage in skill development or build effective relationships with coworkers and managers.

Similarly, Deitch et al. (2003) found that black employees’ heightened perceptions of discriminatory treatment at work contributed to lower levels of job satisfaction and general well-being. Experiences of workplace discrimination may also result in grievances and legal action. Allen and Keaveny (1985) reported in their US study that employees who felt they were being discriminated against were more likely to file a grievance than those who felt they were treated fairly. Thus as these studies illustrate, there is significant evidence that the experience of discrimination is a psychosocial stressor (see Dion 2002, 2003).

However, not all studies have found negative psychosocial effects of experiencing discrimination. The attribution viewpoint, discussed by Dion (1975) in his Canadian study of women’s experience of discrimination, asserts that attributing failures to discrimination rather than personal shortcomings may allow some individuals to preserve their self-esteem. In other words, perception of discrimination may actually protect one’s sense of worth in some cases. This approach has also been called the “social discount” approach since it redirects responsibility for negative experiences from the individual to the collective and provides an external rationale for the experience (Crocker et al. 1998; Mesch et al. 2008). Subsequent studies found some evidence of this effect (see Crocker and Major 1989; Ryff et al. 2003), but it has been found to vary by minority group and situation (Dion et al. 1978) and was considered by Dion (2002) to be a weak effect.

In addition to psychological well-being, experiences of discrimination may also be related to ethnic group identification. There is evidence, including Dion and Phan
(Chapter 2, this volume), supporting the hypothesis that reported discrimination is positively related to identification with one’s ingroup. Several of the studies reviewed above also document this association. It has been suggested that ethnic group identification, in essence a strong attachment and sense of belonging to one’s ethnic group, may mitigate the negative relation between experiencing discrimination and well-being (e.g., Dion et al. 1992). The rejection-identification model predicts that self-reported discrimination reflecting a stable pattern of attributions (discrimination is thought to underlie negative outcomes across diverse social situations) heightens own group identification and lowers subjective well-being (Dion 1979; Operario and Fiske 2001). But own group identification should counter these losses in subjective well-being (Branscombe and Ellemers 1998).

Ethnic group identification is known to be associated with a positive sense of well-being, higher sense of community and social connectedness (Crocker et al. 1994; Ethier and Deaux 1994; Lee and Davis 2000; Lee 2003; Tsai et al. 2001). According to Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner 1985), ethnic group identification may buffer the negative effects of discriminatory treatment since the more an individual identifies with a chosen socio-demographic group, the more committed he/she is to emphasizing the positive attributes of that group. So, individuals with high ethnic group identification are more likely to feel positive about their group membership even in the face of discrimination. Individuals with low levels of ethnic group identification or belonging, on the other hand, may not have the psychological resources to appropriately deal with discriminatory treatment.

The hypothesis that ethnic group identification should counter the association between stable self-reported discrimination and well-being has been supported in several empirical studies. Using convenience samples of African Americans in the United States, Branscombe et al. (1999) found minority group identification to somewhat alleviate the negative psychological consequences of perceived racial discrimination. Mossakowski (2003) found that ethnic identity significantly reduced the impact of discrimination on depressive symptoms among Filipino Americans. Sellers et al. (2003) found ethnic centrality to buffer African American adolescents against the negative effects of discriminatory treatment. If race was not central to identity, perceived discrimination was positively associated with psychological distress. However, if race was a central component of identity there was no relation between perceived discrimination and psychological distress. In their 3-year longitudinal study of African American, Latino and Asian American high school students, Greene et al. (2006) found ethnic identity to moderate the relationship between perceived discrimination and changes in psychological well-being over time.

However, not all studies have confirmed the above findings. Lee (2003) did not find evidence that ethnic identity buffers the relation between reported personal or group discrimination and well-being for Asian American undergraduate students. In their research with South Asian refugees in Canada, Noh and his colleagues (1999) found that the interaction between ethnic identity and discrimination was positive when their joint impact on depression was examined. So, ethnic identity actually heightened the negative effect of discrimination. Similarly, McCoy and Major (2003) found that among Latino undergraduate students, strong ethnic group
identification intensified the negative psychological effect of discrimination. Operario and Fiske (2001) came to similar conclusions for Asian, African American and Latino students. Since individuals with high ethnic identity are strongly invested in their ethnicity, in some circumstances, discrimination based on this characteristic may affect them more negatively.

In summary, the groups for whom, and contexts in which, ethnic identity is likely to buffer the relation between experiencing discrimination and psychosocial malaise (as indicated by greater depression, lower life satisfaction, less sense of belonging to one’s community at different levels) is open to debate.

Many of the studies discussed above have examined the impact of discrimination as a stressor in the context of particular groups, often various minority groups. With the Ethnic Diversity Study, however, it is possible to assess hypothesized relation between self-reported discrimination and different facets of well-being across groups representing different histories within the Canadian social structure; namely, charter groups (English and French) whose ancestors were the founding immigrant groups within Canada; white minority groups; and visible minority groups.

Experiencing discrimination should be negatively related to well-being for all of these groups. However, the hypothesized negative relation should be particularly evident for individuals from visible minority groups, followed by white minority groups and then, members of charter groups where they are in a majority position. In addition, according to the multiple jeopardy hypothesis (Pak et al. 1991), experiencing discrimination based on more than one dimension (e.g., religion and ethnicity) would be expected to have a more negative relation to subjective well-being and a sense of belongingness than discrimination based on one dimension. Thus, the first and second goals of this research are to understand the effect of self-reported discrimination on well-being and to test the multiple jeopardy hypothesis.

Since previous studies on the impact of ethnic group identification on the relation between discrimination and well-being have come to mixed conclusions, the third goal of this study is to examine the hypothesis that ethnic group belonging buffers the relation between the experience of discrimination and indicators of well-being or social inclusion. The presence of members not only of diverse visible minority groups but also of white minority groups as well as those from majority groups makes a more comprehensive and powerful assessment of this hypothesis possible than has been the case in much prior research.

**Measures of Variables**

This study used the Ethnic Diversity Survey to look at ethnic differences in the relation between reported discrimination, ethnic identification, and well-being. Ethnic background was divided into four categories: (1) Anglo; (2) French; (3) white minorities; and (4) visible minorities. Those who reported English, Scottish, Irish, Welsh, or other British Isles ethnic ancestries and resided outside Quebec were considered ‘Anglo.’ Anglo respondents residing in Quebec were categorized as white
minorities. Similarly, respondents who claimed French ancestry and resided in Quebec were considered ‘French.’ Individuals of French ancestry who resided outside of Quebec were classified as white minorities. In addition, white minorities were considered to be any respondents reporting European backgrounds other than French (in Quebec) and ‘Anglo’ (outside Quebec). Consistent with the definition created by the Canadian Employment Equity Act, respondents claiming non-European ethnic ancestries were considered visible minorities. Visible minorities include Chinese, South Asian, Black, Filipino, Latin American, Southeast Asian, Arab, West Asian, Japanese, and Korean respondents.

It is important to note that these four categories are not mutually exclusive: respondents with multiple ethnic backgrounds may belong to more than one of the four groups. All analyses done for this study were conducted separately for the four categories, utilizing bootstrap weights supplied by Statistics Canada.

**Well-Being**

In this analysis well-being was measured using three constructs: sense of social inclusion, trust in others, and overall life satisfaction. The measure of ‘sense of social inclusion’ is the same as was called ‘feelings of belonging’ in Chapter One. There are three items. Participants were asked: ‘Using a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 means not strong at all and 5 means very strong, how strong is your sense of belonging to: a) your town, city or municipality, b) your province, and c) Canada?’ A combined measure of sense of social inclusion was created from the average of these three items. The scores on this index ranged from 1 to 5 (for Anglos: $M = 3.93$, $SD = 0.92$; for French: $M = 3.71$, $SD = 1.24$; for white minorities: $M = 3.90$, $SD = 0.85$; for visible minorities: $M = 3.99$, $SD = 0.81$). The inter-item consistency of this index was found to be adequate ($\alpha = 0.76$).

The measure for trust in others was created using the average of two survey questions, which followed the question on trusting people in general, discussed in Chapter One. Participants were asked: ‘Using a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 means not strong at all and 5 means very strong, how much do you trust each of the following groups of people: a) people in your neighbourhood, b) people that you work with or go to school with?’ The scores on this index ranged from 1 to 5 (for Anglos: $M = 3.96$, $SD = 0.82$; for French: $M = 3.71$, $SD = 1.11$; for white minority groups: $M = 3.83$, $SD = 0.77$; for visible minorities: $M = 3.60$, $SD = 0.74$). The inter-item consistency of this index was slightly low but adequate ($\alpha = 0.67$).

Life satisfaction was measured using a single item, as in Chapter One. Participants were asked: ‘All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life these days?’ Scores on this item ranged from 1 to 5, with 1 indicating very low satisfaction and 5 indicating very high satisfaction (for Anglos: $M = 4.25$, $SD = 0.88$; for French: $M = 4.34$, $SD = 1.08$; for white minority groups: $M = 4.25$, $SD = 0.78$; for visible minorities: $M = 4.16$, $SD = 0.77$). Prior to conducting multivariate analyses, the three measures of subjective well-being were each standardized ($M = 0$, $SD = 1$).


**Ethnic Group Belonging**

Sense of belonging to one’s ethnic or cultural group was measured using a single item from the EDS.\(^1\) Respondents were asked: ‘How strong is your sense of belonging to your ethnic or cultural group(s)?’ Scores range from 1 to 5, with one indicating very low sense of belonging to ethnic group, and 5 indicating very high sense of belonging (for Anglos: \(M = 3.12, \ SD = 1.49\); for French: \(M = 3.78, \ SD = 1.61\); for white minority groups: \(M = 3.17, \ SD = 1.32\); for visible minorities: \(M = 3.82, \ SD = 1.01\)).

**Experiences of Discrimination**

Reported discrimination was assessed using a single item: ‘In the past 5 years or since arriving in Canada,\(^2\) do you feel that you have experienced discrimination or been treated unfairly by others in Canada because of your ethnicity, culture, race, skin colour, language, accent or religion?’ Respondents were asked to provide a yes or no answer to this question. The scores on this item were either 0 or 1 (for Anglos: \(M = 0.11, \ SD = 0.32\); for French: \(M = 0.10, \ SD = 0.39\); for white minority groups: \(M = 0.13, \ SD = 0.30\); for visible minorities: \(M = 0.35, \ SD = 0.40\)). From these descriptive statistics, it is apparent that visible minorities were much more likely than both charter group members and white minorities to report discrimination. See Fig. 3.1 for a pictorial representation of the percent of respondents reporting discrimination from each group.

In order to get a clear understanding of the reasons why respondents reported discrimination, the following item from the EDS was used: ‘For which reason or reason(s) do you feel that you have experienced discrimination or been treated unfairly in Canada?’ Possible answers included: (a) ethnicity or culture; (b) race or skin colour; (c) language or accent; and (d) religion. Respondents were permitted up to four responses. Among Anglo, French and white minorities, the more common

![Fig 3.1 Reported discrimination by ethnic group](source: Ethnic Diversity Survey 2002 (Statistics Canada and Department of Canadian Heritage))
bases for reporting discrimination were language and race or ethnicity. Whites who reported discrimination based on race may be claiming ‘reverse discrimination,’ or they may feel that undue advantages are given to racial minorities. Among visible minorities, race was the most common reason for reporting discrimination followed by language and ethnicity.

A pictorial representation of the bases for reported discrimination is presented in Fig. 3.2. It is important to note that each of the reasons depicted in Fig. 3.2 may have been reported as the sole basis for reporting discrimination, or it may be in combination with other bases. The EDS also provides a count of the number of reported bases for experiences of discrimination.

![Fig 3.2 Bases for reported discrimination](source: Ethnic Diversity Survey 2002 (Statistics Canada and Department of Canadian Heritage))

This item ranges from 0 to 4 (for Anglos: $M = 1.26$, $SD = 0.62$; for French: $M = 1.11$, $SD = 0.54$; for white minority groups: $M = 1.21$, $SD = 0.47$; for visible minorities: $M = 1.41$, $SD = 0.61$).

**Findings**

**Effect of Reported Discrimination on Well-Being**

In order to examine the effect of experiencing discrimination on subjective well-being for Anglos, French, white minorities, and visible minorities, regression analyses were conducted by ethnic category, with each of the three measures of well-being as the dependent variables, and reported discrimination as the key independent variable. Demographic and economic factors such as gender, age, education and household income were also controlled for, as they may affect both well-being and reported discrimination. For all four ethnic categories, reported discrimination was negatively related to all measures of well-being, and this relation was particularly strong for trust and life satisfaction. The results are shown in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1 Effect of reported discrimination on well-being

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Anglo</th>
<th>French</th>
<th>White minorities</th>
<th>Visible minorities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Standard error)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social inclusion</td>
<td>$-0.10^*$</td>
<td>$-0.17^*$</td>
<td>$-0.10^*$</td>
<td>$-0.16^*$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>$-0.35^*$</td>
<td>$-0.23^*$</td>
<td>$-0.39^*$</td>
<td>$-0.48^*$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction</td>
<td>$-0.26^*$</td>
<td>$-0.29^*$</td>
<td>$-0.28^*$</td>
<td>$-0.42^*$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Controlling for gender, age, education and household income. * $p < 0.05$.

Multiple Jeopardy Hypothesis

To test whether reporting discrimination based on more than one dimension or basis has additional negative effect on well-being, regression analyses were conducted by ethnic category only for respondents who reported discrimination, using each of the well-being measures as the dependent variables and the number of bases for which discrimination was reported as the key explanatory variable. This analysis was conducted for Anglos, white minorities and visible minorities. French respondents were omitted from this analysis since they were very unlikely to report multiple bases of discrimination. The vast majority of French respondents who reported discrimination indicated language as their only basis for experiencing discrimination. A small number reported two bases of discrimination, and very few reported more than two bases of discrimination.

The analyses revealed that among Anglos, there is some support for the multiple jeopardy hypothesis. Among Anglos who reported discrimination, the number of reported bases for discrimination was significantly negatively related to the sense of social inclusion and trust, but not life satisfaction. Among white minorities and visible minorities, the multiple jeopardy hypothesis was not supported since the number of reported reasons for discrimination did not have a significant additional negative effect on any measure of well-being. See Table 3.2 for a detailed account of these results.

Table 3.2 Effect of multiple bases of discrimination on well-being

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Anglos</th>
<th>White minorities</th>
<th>Visible minorities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Standard error)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social inclusion</td>
<td>$-0.25^*$ (0.11)</td>
<td>0.05 (0.04)</td>
<td>$-0.08$ (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>$-0.18^*$ (0.07)</td>
<td>$-0.08$ (0.06)</td>
<td>$-0.06$ (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction</td>
<td>$-0.16$ (0.10)</td>
<td>$-0.07$ (0.08)</td>
<td>$-0.09$ (0.06)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Only respondents who reported discrimination were included in the analysis. French respondents are excluded since very few reported multiple bases for discrimination. Controlling for gender, age, education and household income. * $p < 0.05$. 

Findings
In order to understand whether ethnic group belonging buffers the relationship between reported discrimination and well-being, suppression analysis was conducted with ethnic group belonging as the suppressor variable. A suppressor variable is defined as ‘a variable which increases the predictive validity of another variable by its inclusion in a regression equation’ (Tzelgov and Henik 1991). In this context, predictive validity is evaluated by the magnitude of the regression coefficient.

Suppression analysis is methodologically identical to mediation analysis (MacKinnon et al. 2000). However, in mediation analysis, a third variable is introduced in an attempt to explain or reduce the association between the independent and dependent variables, while in suppression analysis, the goal is to understand whether controlling for a third variable intensifies the association between the independent and dependent variables. Thus, suppression models have been referred to as ‘inconsistent mediation’ models (Davis 1985).

The most common model of mediation analyses (Baron and Kenny 1986) includes the following: a significant relation between the independent and dependent variables; a significant relation between the independent variable and the mediator; a significant relation between the mediator and the dependent variable; and a decreased relation between the independent and dependent variables when the mediator is added to the regression. Because of the fourth requirement, this model does not allow for suppressor variables. However, numerous studies have examined alternative forms of the model which allow for the possibility of suppression (see McFatter 1979; Breslow and Day 1980; MacKinnon et al. 2000). In the present analysis, the first three requirements of the classic Baron and Kenny (1986) model were met, but since the goal is suppression analysis rather than mediation analysis, the fourth requirement was not adhered to.

Before testing for the buffering effect of ethnic belonging on the relationship between reported discrimination and well-being, the correlations between each of the main variables were examined. These correlations are presented in Table 3.3.

We then proceeded to test for suppression, using a series of regression analyses, and following the method outlined by Baron and Kenny (1986). First, a regression was conducted with ethnic group belonging (the suppressor variable) as the dependent variable and reported discrimination as the independent variable. A second

### Table 3.3 Correlations between variables of interest

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Social inclusion</th>
<th>Trust</th>
<th>Satisfaction</th>
<th>Discrimination</th>
<th>Ethnic belonging</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social inclusion</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.25*</td>
<td>0.21*</td>
<td>–0.06*</td>
<td>0.39*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.28*</td>
<td>–0.16*</td>
<td>0.09*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–0.13*</td>
<td>0.12*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.05*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic belonging</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: * p < 0.05.
group of regressions was conducted with both reported discrimination and ethnic group belonging predicting each of the three well-being measures. This series of regressions was conducted for each of the four ethnic groups and is represented pictorially in Figs. 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5.

The regression coefficients for discrimination on each of the well-being measures, while controlling for ethnic group belonging, represent the ‘direct effects.’ The ‘indirect effects’ were calculated by multiplying the regression coefficient of

![Diagram of the relationships between reported discrimination, ethnic group belonging, and social inclusion for Anglo, French, White Minorities, and Visible Minorities.](image)

**Fig 3.3** Reported discrimination, ethnic group belonging, and social inclusion

*Note:* The number on the left (right) of the slash indicates the association before (after) ethnic group identification is entered into the analysis; controlling for gender, age, education, and household income. *p < 0.05*
Discrimination, Ethnic Group Belonging, and Well-Being

Fig 3.4 Reported discrimination, ethnic group belonging and trust

Note: The number on the left (right) of the slash indicates the association before (after) ethnic group identification is entered into the analysis; controlling for gender, age, education, and household income. * p < 0.05

discrimination on ethnic group belonging with the regression coefficients of ethnic group belonging on each measure of well-being while controlling for reported discrimination (MacKinnon and Dwyer 1993). The Sobel test recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986) was conducted for each measure of well-being among each ethnic group in order to test for the significance of the ‘indirect effect.’ Table 3.4 contains the ‘direct effects’ and the ‘indirect effects’ for each measure of well-being and ethnic category.
Findings

Overall, our data are consistent with the notion that reported discrimination has a negative direct effect on well-being and a positive indirect effect on well-being through ethnic group identification. However, there was no evidence of an indirect effect of ethnic group identification on well-being for French respondents, as there was no significant relation between discrimination and ethnic group identification for this group. Among the other ethnic groups, there was only evidence of partial suppression, as the magnitude of the association between reported discrimination and well-being increased only slightly when ethnic group identification was added to the analysis.\(^4\)

---

*Fig 3.5* Reported discrimination, ethnic group belonging, and life satisfaction

*Note:* The number on the left (right) of the slash indicates the association before (after) ethnic group identification is entered into the analysis; controlling for gender, age, education, and household income. * p < 0.05
Table 3.4 Direct and indirect effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Social inclusion</th>
<th>Trust</th>
<th>Satisfaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Standard error)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(Standard error)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglo</td>
<td>Direct Effect</td>
<td>$-0.14^*$ (0.04)</td>
<td>$-0.36^*$ (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indirect Effect</td>
<td>0.05* (0.01)</td>
<td>0.01* (0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>Direct Effect</td>
<td>$-0.21^*$ (0.07)</td>
<td>$-0.26^*$ (0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indirect Effect</td>
<td>0.05ns (0.04)</td>
<td>0.02ns (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White minorities</td>
<td>Direct Effect</td>
<td>0.16* (0.03)</td>
<td>0.41* (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indirect Effect</td>
<td>0.07* (0.01)</td>
<td>0.02* (0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visible minorities</td>
<td>Direct Effect</td>
<td>$-0.18^*$ (0.03)</td>
<td>$-0.49^*$ (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indirect Effect</td>
<td>0.03* (0.01)</td>
<td>0.01* (0.005)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Controlling for gender, age, education and household income.

ns not significant at the 0.10 level; * $p < 0.05$.

**Missing Data**

Individuals who did not answer questions measuring the variables of interest were removed from the above analyses. In order to assess whether there were significant and systematic differences between those who were included and those who were not, we examined the characteristics of those who were excluded from the analysis. Generally, individuals who were excluded possessed slightly lower levels of education. However, this difference was not statistically significant for all the models in the study. Excluded individuals also generally earned lower annual incomes and this was found to be statistically significant for most models in the study. In addition, those who were excluded were slightly older than those included in the analyses. There do not seem to be systematic differences in gender, immigrant status, parental education or size of area of residence. Overall, although there are some differences between individuals who were included in the analyses and those who were not, the magnitudes of these differences were not great.

**Discussion**

As stated at the start of this paper, we examined three hypotheses. First, prejudice was predicted to be a psychosocial stressor. Therefore there should be a negative relation between experiencing discrimination and different indicators of well-being. Second, a multiple jeopardy hypothesis predicted that there should be an incremental impact of prejudice; thus, experiencing discrimination on more than one dimension should increase its negative relation to well-being. Third, positively identifying with one’s own ethno-cultural group should help to buffer the association between discrimination and well-being.

We found strong and consistent support for the first of these hypotheses. On each of the three indicators – social inclusion, trust, and life satisfaction – reported discrimination was negatively related to well-being. The consistency of this pattern
is of interest, since the three indicators represent different levels of reported well-being. Social inclusion reflects a sense of feeling ‘at home’ in place of residence both locally and nationally. The measure of trust reveals confidence in the people in one’s immediate environment who are not family or friends. Finally, life satisfaction indicates a general sense of contentment with one’s current ongoing life. The negative relation between reported discrimination and well-being is particularly strong for trust of others in one’s immediate social world (colleagues and neighbours) and one’s sense of satisfaction with one’s life. The size of this negative relation was strongest for members of visible minority groups but reported discrimination was a negative correlate of well-being across each of the four groups examined.

These findings provide strong support for Dion’s (2002, 2003) model of prejudice as a psychosocial stressor. Although these data are correlational, and therefore, the interpretation of direction of effect cannot be determined, the observed relation is consistent with a number of other studies reviewed earlier. Moreover, the earlier experimental work conducted by Dion and his associates (e.g., Dion and Earn 1975) provides clear evidence that awareness of experiences of discrimination influences affect, thus strengthening the causal interpretation.

For the multiple jeopardy hypothesis, an intriguing but unexpected finding occurred. There was some support for this hypothesis but among majority group members in Canadian society – Anglos outside of Quebec. Among minority group members, reporting discrimination on more than one dimension did not have a greater impact on well-being. Why did this pattern occur? One possibility is that the cumulative impact of reported discrimination may have a more negative impact on individuals who usually occupy or expect to occupy a more advantaged and/or comfortable position within their social world.

Williams and his colleagues (1997) have found evidence for ‘differential vulnerability’ such that experiencing stressful events was more strongly negatively related to well-being for whites than for blacks. These researchers cited other work (Kessler 1979) which found that whites and high SES person fared worse in terms of mental health outcomes than nonwhites and low SES individuals, respectively, when confronted with similar stressful events in their lives. One interpretation offered by Kessler is a kind of adaptation level possibility: given a history of more negative life events, additional ones do not have the same effect for individuals from more disadvantaged groups. It is not possible to know if this interpretation accounts for the present findings, but it is one explanation that merits further investigation in future research.

Finally, concerning the buffering impact of ethnic identity, we found some evidence in support of this hypothesis. There was evidence of a positive indirect effect of ethnic belonging for three of the four groups (visible minorities, white minorities, and Anglos), but the size of this effect was not large. Hence, when this effect was controlled for, it did not have a strong impact on the relation between discrimination and well-being. As noted in the introduction, there is an ongoing debate as to the role played by ethnic group belonging as a potential counter to the adverse effects of prejudice and discrimination. These findings provide supportive evidence that the issue is worth pursuing.
Conclusions and Implications

As mentioned at the start of this chapter, an important component of Canada’s multiculturalism policy is the goal of social justice, including equality of opportunity and mutual respect among members of the many groups comprising Canadian society. If there is a discrepancy between this goal and individuals’ experiences, it has implications for social cohesion. In the Ethnic Diversity Survey, the measures focus on the individual level, rather than comparing indicators of social cohesion per se. However, the experience of discrimination at the individual level has the following implications for social cohesion.

First, the fact that discrimination was mentioned by survey respondents indicates the presence of a gap between the stated ideals/goals of multiculturalism and experiences reported by some individuals in their daily lives. Moreover, as is evident from these findings, this gap between ideals of mutual tolerance and respect, on the one hand, and experiences of discrimination, on the other hand, is greatest for members of visible minority groups.

Second, reported discrimination was negatively related to individual-level indicators of well-being that have implications for social cohesion, namely, social inclusion and trust of non-family members in one’s immediate social environment. If individuals experience unfair treatment and/or disrespectful behavior from others based on group membership, these experiences may negatively contribute to a sense of being part of one’s society and may be related to less confidence in, and connection with, others in one’s society. Both factors might be predicted to weaken cohesion.

Third, there is some evidence that ethnic group belonging may help to buffer some of the adverse correlates of reported discrimination, but as noted previously, this is a weak buffering effect. Further research is needed to assess under what conditions ethnic belonging has a protective effect in maintaining well-being in the face of negative experiences related to one’s group membership.

Finally, the relation between individuals’ personal experiences of discrimination based on ethnicity, race, language, and/or religion and their perception of how their respective group(s) fare in society compared to other groups is an important issue which has implications for social cohesion. Dion (2003) pointed out in his review of the literature on prejudice, racism and discrimination that feelings of being deprived in different domains of life depend on the individuals or groups serving as the basis of comparison. As first proposed by Runciman (1966), a person may feel deprived compared to others in one’s own group, or one may feel dissatisfied with how one’s group is faring compared to other groups in the larger society (see Dion 1986 for a discussion of this theory and related research).

Dion (2003) suggested that “affective collectivistic” relative deprivation, namely, dissatisfaction and resentment at how one’s group is treated compared to other groups is the strongest predictor of attempted social change compared to other types of relative deprivation. In the present research, there were no measures of perceived treatment of one’s ethnic/cultural group compared to other groups so we could not assess the direct contribution of this factor. However, as Dion (1986)
noted, identification with one’s group(s) and feeling a part of the group contribute to whether or not generalization occurs from the individual’s own experience to how one’s group’s position is viewed.

We found evidence here documenting a relation between the experience of discrimination and heightened own-group identity, namely, a sense of belonging, for individuals from three of the four groups examined (visible minority groups, white minority groups, and Anglo majority groups). Dion and Phan (this volume) found that reported discrimination was related to a greater likelihood of ethnic self-categorization. Dion (1986) pointed out that the occurrence of greater own group identification as a response to experiencing discrimination makes it more likely that the sense of personal deprivation will generalize to perceptions of how one’s own group is faring.

As noted above, Dion (2003) suggested that there was evidence supporting the importance of feelings that one’s group was unfairly treated compared to other groups as predictive of individuals’ desires to undertake actions to correct or remedy this situation; that is actions in favour of social change. An important direction for future research will be to identify the conditions under which these factors contribute to individual and collective approaches to foster structural changes that result in greater social cohesion.

Notes

1. Number of ethnic friends was also used as an indicator of ethnic group belonging, but failed to provide significant results.
2. For immigrants who arrived in Canada less than 5 years ago.
3. The Sobel test is used for testing the significance of the indirect effect instead of bootstrap methods because of the large sample size in this analysis.
4. Moderation analysis was also attempted using ethnic group belonging as the moderator between reported discrimination and well-being. This analysis showed that ethnic group belonging did not have a moderating effect on the relationship between discrimination and well-being. That is, regardless of the level of ethnic group belonging, the relationship between reported discrimination and well-being was the same.
Chapter 4
Inequalities and Patterns of Social Attachments in Quebec and the Rest of Canada

Mai B. Phan and Raymond Breton

This chapter deals with the social attachments of Canadians to their ethnic group and to society as a whole. Identification with, and involvement in, any collectivity is not automatic. The fact of being a member of a group does not necessarily mean that the group is important to the individual. People have a choice in the degree of importance they assign to different groups to which they belong or with which they are associated (Hewitt 1989, p. 137). These choices may be influenced by social structures and processes that may or may not be related to each other. In the book’s introduction, the association between commitment to the ethnic group and integration into the larger Canadian society is examined in a linear fashion, as being either negative or positive. It is also possible there are different combinations of relationships that indicate different mechanisms of attachment for different groups and in different regional contexts. Thus, an analysis of patterns of social attachments can throw light on the following issues pertaining to diversity in Canadian society.

Does the ethnic group matter more than the larger Canadian community to different categories of people, and vice versa? Is Canada integrating its immigrants in a cohesive social fabric or is it becoming a society of ethnic enclaves? Both these possibilities are suggested by a finding of negative association between ethnic and civic attachments, therefore we need to tease this out further. Or are there significant numbers of individuals who maintain attachments to both their ethnic group and to the larger society? If this were the case, it would be in conformity with the proclaimed objective of multiculturalism policies.

Are there individuals who are not attached to their ethnic group nor to the larger society? First, these are not the only two social entities to which individuals can become attached; they may give more importance to other kinds of groups. Second, they may have been socially alienated or marginalised, feeling attached to no group in particular. If so, what are the implications of having no attachments for social integration? Are such individuals randomly distributed in the population or are they found primarily in certain segments of the society? People who experience discrimination would tend to be less positively oriented towards the society in which they live. They would tend to retreat into their own group, either for self-protection or simply because they are more socially comfortable within it. Some may become socially alienated with no sense of attachment to any group. In short, the character
or quality of social relationships – those that reflect social inequalities, in particular – can be expected to be related to the pattern of social attachments.

Is Canadian society still a vertical mosaic? In an egalitarian pluralist society, individuals’ modes of attachment to any collectivity would be idiosyncratic, contingent on their own personal histories and characters, and not tied to the fates of groups to which they belong. If there are inter-group differences in modes of attachment this would suggest that Canada is more accurately characterised by hierarchical rather than an egalitarian pluralism. The strength of social attachments of individuals to their ethno-cultural group and to the larger society is affected by several factors and circumstances. First, being part of those who are generally seen as constituting the majority Canadian group can be expected to generate different kinds of attachments than being an immigrant or part of a minority. Also, although Canada’s population is changing, the country has been historically overwhelmingly white. Thus, being part of a non-white or minority group may well bring about different patterns of social attachment.

Such group differences would be relevant because members in each of them are likely to experience life differently, economically, socially and culturally. For instance, becoming part of a new group and especially of a new society takes time. It is impossible to change one’s cultural background, way of life and social relationships in a few months or a few years. Frequently, such an evolution occurs over generations. In addition, the ethnic community is frequently very helpful to the newcomers in finding their way in the new society. Because of this, individuals may become strongly attached to their group in Canada. It is therefore to be expected that the strength of attachments to the ethnic group and to the larger society is not likely to be the same for the immigrant generation as it for the second and subsequent generation.

Is “French-speaking Quebec” different from “English-speaking Canada” with regard to the evolution over generations of social attachments or in inter-group differences in these patterns? Different historical experiences, policy approaches towards immigration and immigration trends in these two sub-societies may have an impact on how individuals relate to their ethno-cultural group and the larger society. Sub-national politics may form an additional layer of complexity to the attachments of both immigrant groups and Charter group members. Or are there underlying structural forces at work such that there would be similar patterns of social attachments, even if the two historical and cultural contexts differ? Demographic changes brought about by declining native birth-rates and increased reliance on immigration across Canada may lead to similar integration mechanisms.

The analysis of patterns of social attachments could throw light on the issues of ethnic fragmentation and overall cohesion; of egalitarian and hierarchical pluralism; integration and marginalisation; and of sub-societal differentiation within Canadian society. The patterns of social attachments and their variations across groups and social experiences are explored through an analysis of data from the 2002 Ethnic Diversity Survey. We begin by reviewing the concepts and theoretical approaches that have been used by researchers for the analysis of ethnic and societal attachments and ethno-cultural diversity, generally. Since differences in social context may have an
impact on the propensity to associate with different collectivities, we examine some of the similarities and differences between Quebec and English-speaking Canada in their historical experiences and political approaches towards immigration and ethnic minorities within a nation-building framework.

We use items measuring the importance and strength of ethnic and societal attachments to explore the general patterns of attachment in Quebec and the rest of Canada. We consider how they perform against select indicators of social integration and look at the distribution of attachment patterns in Quebec and the rest of Canada. We consider the effects of the quality of interethnic relations and immigrant-generational cohort on attachment patterns for whites and visible minorities in each of these two social contexts.

Finally, we discuss the ways that different historical experiences, policy approaches, and demographic trends in Quebec and English Canada can have implications for understanding how individuals relate to their ethnic group and the larger society. Our findings of differential trends in attachment patterns by visible minority status and over immigrant-generational cohorts suggest that Canada may be more accurately characterised as being in a condition of hierarchical pluralism, rather than an egalitarian pluralism. Furthermore, the relationship between national, sub-national and ethnic identities must be examined for majority groups, as well as ethnic minorities, in Canada.

A Typology of Attachments

In the uni-dimensional perspective, identification with and affective attachment to the ethnic group and wider society proceed along a continuum and is often irreversible, as posited by classic assimilation theorists. Immigrants arrive with strong attachment to the ethnic group which gradually dissipate and is replaced by identification with the host society with time and also over generations (Gordon 1964). However, the relationship between attachment to the ethnic group and wider society can also occur in different combinations. An orientation towards one can evolve and change more or less independently of the other (Oetting et al. 1998); each has its own dynamic but may also be in relation to the other. They can be subjected to different sets of pressures and influences, or respond to the same sets of influences differently. Berry and colleagues (1974, 1980, 1989) popularized such an approach for the study of immigrant acculturation, although earlier scholars have discussed or proposed similar ideas (Rudmin 2003).

By cross-classifying the two dimensions of minority and majority group orientations, four strategies of acculturation are proposed: (1) integration when the individual is oriented to the ethnic culture and to the larger society; (2) assimilation when orientation is towards the dominant society or culture; (3) separation when orientation is only towards the ethnic group; (4) and marginalization when it is towards neither. Variations on the bi-dimensional approach have been used by many acculturation researchers (Zak 1973; Breton et al. 1990; Sayegh and Lasry
Inequalities and Patterns of Social Attachments

The bi-dimensional model can be represented in the following way:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension 2: Attachment to larger society</th>
<th>Dimension 1: Attachment to the ethnic group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainstream</td>
<td>Marginalised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pluralist</td>
<td>Ethnic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginalised</td>
<td>Mainstream</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>Pluralist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although many studies theorize and identify analogous four-fold typologies in different societies or contexts, this is not necessarily a universal finding (see Rudmin 2003 for a helpful review). In their study of Moroccan adolescents and adults in the Netherlands, Stevens et al. (2004) find three prevalent acculturation patterns: assimilation, ethnic, and integrated. Notably, they do not identify a “marginal” pattern of response, characterized by low sense of attachment to both Moroccan and Dutch communities. It is therefore possible for groups to manifest different patterns of attachment in different contexts.

In this chapter, we explore what patterns of socio-psychological attachment to ethnic and societal communities are occurring amongst Canadians. We use exploratory latent class analysis to identify the pattern of attachments that are prevalent in Canada. This approach has the advantage of directly testing the theory of a four-fold typology of ethnic and dominant society attachment in the Canadian context. The approach taken in this chapter will also allow us to interpret the patterns that emerge from the Ethnic Diversity Survey through the ways respondents answer questions on the salience of self-reported identities, group belonging and attitudes towards cultural practices. We can also examine how these patterns are distributed across different groups and the relative influences of positive and negative inter-group relations. Unlike other acculturation studies which focus on only minority groups, or include specific age or population groups (such as university students), this study includes all major ethnic groups including the dominant groups, of all ages above 15 across Canada.

**Patterns of Attachment: The Role of Inter-group Contacts**

The choice with regard to the direction of one’s identifications and social attachments within and across ethno-cultural boundaries is, of course, limited by available opportunities and by various kinds of social constraints. The nature of inter-group relations is expected to influence how individuals form group attachments. In a society that historically has been largely white, of European origin, and Christian, being non-white, non-European, or non-Christian may act as a barrier to integration in the larger society and as an impetus to remain attached to the in-group. More generally, not all groups may have the same opportunity to participate in the larger social context and may not be equally accepted in social interaction or as members of the community and society.
Indeed, contacts with out-group members can be a source of anxiety (Stephan and Stephan 1989). Two categories of social anticipation can produce inter-group anxiety: (a) anticipation of negative psychological (e.g., embarrassment, discomfort) or behavioural experience (e.g., fear of being taken advantage of, exploited, or dominated) with consequences for the self; and (b) negative evaluations by members of the out-group (e.g., members of low-status groups often expect the out-group to act as if their own group is inferior) or by members of the in-group (e.g., fear that members of the in-group will disapprove of their interaction with out-group members) (Stephan and Stephan 1985, p. 159).

The experience of discrimination or unfair treatment (actual or perceived) can be a powerful source of inter-group anxiety (Brewer 1991). Such feelings can be aroused in interpersonal interaction or by stereotypes expressed in the media or by public personalities. Being made to feel uncomfortable or like a stranger in the community or society can generate inter-group anxiety which, in turn, is likely to reduce the propensity to establish contact across ethnic boundaries. It is through such collective mechanisms that individuals come to perceive a social hierarchy and their place in it as group members (Blumer 1958).

In the EDS, visible minorities of all ethnic or racial backgrounds are over-represented in the proportion reporting experiencing discrimination and perceiving group vulnerability. Although there are important variations within both white and visible minority populations in their experiences of discrimination, vulnerability and group attachments, the major distinction is between white and visible minority status, where differences between these categories are greater than differences within. The white/non-white model of group status and hierarchy, albeit oversimplified, remains analytically useful (Gold 2004; Bonilla-Silva 2003).

Contacts with members of other groups can also be positive. This would be especially the case with interpersonal friendships which, by their very nature, constitute an indication of social acceptance. The composition of friendship ties could orient the social attachments of individuals in the direction of their own ethnic community; the larger society; both communities; or to neither. Specifically, it could be expected that ethnically diverse friendships would be positively associated with attachment to the larger society and conversely, that homogeneous in-group friendships would be positively associated with integration into the ethnic community. In our chapter, we consider these individual experiences of inter-group relationships on the likelihood of having certain attachment patterns.

Institutional Postulates of Diversity

Throughout the 20th century, there has been an evolution in theoretical approaches to diversity and integration at the societal level, with implications for public policy. The assimilationist approach, proposed by early scholars of ethnicity, assumes that over time, there is a blurring of ethnic boundaries through a blending of different
cultural groups into a single entity, usually towards the mainstream society. The result is a melting pot in which the potential for inter-group tensions is negligible, or completely eliminated, by the second or third generation (see Alba et al. 2000; Alba and Nee 2003). Early policy-makers discouraged the retention of ethnic practices with the view that dual or multiple loyalties are a potential source of conflict and thus, are threats to the cohesion of society.

The persistence of ethnic ties and neighbourhood segregation leads straight-line theorists to reconsider their assumptions. To reconcile the assimilationist perspective with the reality of ethnic retention among minorities, Gordon (1964) distinguishes between different dimensions of the assimilation process. Of particular relevance for this chapter is the distinction between cultural assimilation, which refers to assuming shared identities, values and beliefs, and structural assimilation, which refers to social inclusion and participation in mainstream institutions. The decoupling of these processes implies that assuming the dominant cultural values and identities is not necessarily sufficient for integration into society’s institutions (Neckerman et al. 1999). Cultural assimilation may occur sooner than structural assimilation as a result of unequal opportunities and the exclusive practices of mainstream institutions. Nevertheless, assimilation will occur eventually (Gans 1997).

Criticizing the assimilationist theory as too ethnocentric and empirically inaccurate, the more recent “pluralist” model is based on the idea that both minority and majority cultures can benefit from interaction premised on mutual respect. Ethnicity may not be detrimental to socio-economic integration – immigrants who retain attachment to the ethnic community, its values and practices may achieve better outcomes economically and/or educationally (Zhou and Bankston 1998). It also recognizes that while social forces may draw individuals to form social and psychological ties within their own group, at the same time, other forces lead them to form ties with other groups. Thus, involvement in the ethnic community and involvement in the larger society are each submitted to particular sets of circumstances, pressures, and influences. Canada’s Multicultural policy is premised on this understanding of the relationship between ethno-cultural diversity and social cohesion.

Sidanius and his colleagues (1997, 2001) point out an assumption of the pluralist approach, namely that, with time all groups will have the same opportunity to participate in societal institutions and be equally accepted in social interactions. However, ethnic, and especially racialized, groups may not be equal in terms of socio-economic opportunities, political power, social status, or interpersonal acceptance. Because of this, they extend the pluralist theory to incorporate group dynamics of power – a social dominance theory (Sidanius and Pratto 1999; Sidanis et al. 1997). Here, a distinction is made between what could be called “egalitarian” and “hierarchical” pluralism, a distinction that is analogous to Porter’s “vertical mosaic” (1965). The distinction leads to different hypotheses about the relationship that minority individuals establish with their own ethnic communities and with the larger society.

The social dominance model states that groups occupy different positions in the social hierarchy. Important social institutions such as the economy, government,
media, education, and police may be controlled by, or associated with, dominant groups. To varying degrees, the interests of other groups may not be represented by these institutions, thereby creating a ranking system, with the most institutionally-connected group at the top and the most disconnected at the bottom of the organization structure. Members of the most marginalised groups will adopt a distrustful and/or conflictual approach toward institutions to the extent that they are seen as excluding them or treating them unfairly. Hypothetically, then, low status ethnic groups will be more likely to continue to identify with their own group or become marginalised. They may also develop an oppositional culture to the mainstream (see Ogbu 2008), while high status groups will be more likely to identify with the dominant society. Attachment patterns across generations will be different among groups as well. Low status groups will retain their ethnic attachments or marginalization over time, whereas higher status groups will shed ethnic attachments and become culturally assimilated much more readily.

A parallel approach, but one which focuses on the socio-economic outcomes of second-generation immigrant children, is the segmented assimilation perspective advanced by Portes and Zhou (1992). In the segmented assimilation perspective, discrimination, prejudice, and historical and structural features of the country of origin and host society combine to determine whether ethnic minorities become adapted over time into the middle-class mainstream society, into an underclass, or whether they remain (selectively) tied to the ethnic community (Zhou 1997; Rumbaut 1994). In other words, the fates of immigrants and their children are somewhat shaped by an existing ethnic hierarchy and their interactions with it.

One of the objectives of Canada’s Multicultural policy is to create equitable conditions for all groups, settled or newly arrived, by including provisions to address inequalities in participation and foster inter-group understanding and acceptance. To the extent that some groups, particularly visible minorities and recent immigrants, continue to face considerable inequality, we would expect to find differential patterns of ethnic and societal attachment compared to Anglo and French Canadians, as well as northern and western European immigrants, net of their own personal inter-group experiences. Furthermore, the relationship between Quebec and English Canada may have implications for the integration of immigrants, but also for the attachments of members of the two Charter groups within these two regions. We turn to a discussion of these differences next.

Quebec and the Rest of Canada: Historical Differences and Integration Strategies

The propensity to establish in-group and out-group ties may vary depending on the socio-demographic context as, for example, across regions of the country. This possibility is examined here through a comparison of Quebec and the rest of Canada. Since the two sub-societies are culturally and linguistically distinct and, to a large
extent, function in parallel institutional systems, they provide an opportunity to explore the impact of context on patterns of ethnic and societal attachments.

The two sub-societies have a different historical experience of diversity, one as a majority, the other as a minority: demographically, economically, and politically. On the one hand, in an economy dominated by Anglophones, most new immigrants historically sought to integrate into the English-speaking community (Joy 1972; McRoberts and Posgate 1980). One of the most important factor underlying the concern with the assimilation of immigrants into the Anglophone community was “the fear that the Anglicization of immigrants threatens the survival of Francophone Quebec” (McRoberts and Posgate 1980, 134).

On the other hand, there was also some fear that the integration of immigrants and their descendants in the institutions controlled by Francophone (educational, governmental, and economic) would decrease the limited opportunities for occupational mobility and advancement available to French-speakers – large sectors of the economy being controlled by Anglophones. There was also a concern that the integration of large numbers of immigrants would undermine the national culture and identity. For example, the issue of integrating Catholic neo-Canadians was considered by the Montreal French Catholic School Board before the 1960s. It established a committee to look into the matter and recommend measures to be adopted for their integration. The recommendations made were rejected twice (once in 1950–1951 and once in 1960–1963) (Behiels 1986). Of course, besides immigration, there were several other factors involved in the preoccupation with identity and culture in French Quebec. For example, the maintenance and development of Quebec’s distinctiveness required it to be under the control of the Quebec government and associated institutions (Coleman 1984, Chapter 3).

As a result of a large-scale societal transformation in the course of the last four decades (the “Quiet Revolution”), a new approach to immigration and ethno-cultural minorities has emerged in Quebec (as in the rest of Canada). The earlier systematic opposition to immigration on the part of most francophone elites progressively changed to a concern with the integration of immigrants. There was a shift “from ethnocentrism to ethnic pluralism” (Behiels 1991).

Accompanying this evolution were other significant changes. Among them was the explicit definition of Quebec as a French-speaking society, the linguistic legislation that has derived from this definition, and the rise of the independence movement. This is part of a drive toward assuming control of the societal institutions which, as noted above, has been a constant component of Quebec nationalism. This implies controlling the operative language of public institutions (including economic ones), something that had been achieved earlier in the century by Anglophones in the English-speaking provinces. There has also been a dramatic decrease in the birth rate, a phenomenon seen as slowly undermining the survival of the collectivity. These transformations have led to a new approach to immigration and diversity, an approach which now differs little from the rest of Canada.

In Canadian multiculturalism and in Quebec’s “interculturalisme,” ethnic retention is valued but so is identification with, and participation in, the more inclusive
society, its culture and institutions. This is the case in both Canada generally and
in Quebec specifically, where as a policy, there are (or were) misgivings about its
underlying intentions: for example, as a gimmick to get votes or, in Quebec, “an
attempt to dilute the French fact in Canada, weakening the francophone status and
threatening the dual partnership of English-speaking and French-speaking Canadi-
ans” (Leman 1999, p. 10). In fact, a comparison of the objectives of the Canadian
Multiculturalism Act and the current Action Plan of the Quebec Government with
regard to immigration and diversity (Shared Values, Common Interests: To Ensure
the Full Participation of Quebeckers from Cultural Communities in the Development
of Quebec), reveals no significant differences in overall objectives, although impor-
tant differences exist between them.

One difference derives from the change in the collective self-definition which
shifted from national minority to regional majority; from an ethnic group to a na-
tion (from “French-Canadian” to “Québécois”). This change in collective identity,
the long history of cultural survival and the fact that in Quebec, those of French
ancestry and culture constitute more than three-quarters of the population lead to
an emphasis on the preservation of a particular cultural heritage which, in turn,
gives a particular meaning to the notion of integration. In contrast, in English-
speaking Canada, those of British ancestry constitute only about one third of the
population and the emphasis cannot be on the preservation of the British culture
but more on the formation of a new Canadian identity shared by people of a mul-
tiplicity of origins and on issues of societal cohesion (Bouchard and Taylor 2008,
pp. 41–44).

Not surprisingly, another difference pertains to language. The Canadian Multi-
culturalism Act refers to “strengthening the status and use of the official languages
of Canada,” but the Quebec Action Plan places more emphasis on the promotion of
the French language. This is not surprising: the adoption of English by members of
minorities is almost assured in the North American context, an eventuality that is
clearly not the case for the French language. Today most immigrants to Quebec are
learning French, but concerns have been expressed by the Conseil Supérieur de la
Langue Française (2008) that some immigrants, such as South Asians and northern
Europeans, prefer English over French. A different strategy of immigrant integration
is therefore required to counter demographic and economic pressures in favour of
English.

Among the main elements of this strategy is a power-sharing arrangement with
the federal government that includes greater control for Quebec over the selection
of immigrants; this has resulted in a greater number of French-speaking immigrants
and immigrants from Romance language countries, such as Portugal and Spain.
A second element is legislation requiring that immigrants send their children to
French-language schools. A third element is the arrangement with certain ethnic
communities for the promotion of French within their ranks. A study of Montreal’s
Jewish, Italian, and Greek communities indicates that current relations between
these three communities and the Quebec state constitute a new “social contract”
in which the state supports the maintenance of ethnic diversity in exchange for
compliance with state policy, such as francisation of community institutions and
practices (Rosenberg and Jedwab 1992, p. 266). This final element is based on a multiculturalist conception of the social order.

These measures and the overall strategy for the francization of Quebec and its economy have produced a “gradual equalization of the drawing power of French and English” which probably accounts, at least in part, for the greater number of French-English bilinguals in Quebec than in the rest of Canada and in the greater retention of ethnic languages (63% of second-generation allophones in Quebec, compared to 34% in the rest of Canada (Bourhis 2001, p. 117)). In other words, there is a greater incidence of “linguistic pluralism” in Quebec than in the rest of Canada.

In short, there are similarities and differences in the historical experience of the two sub-societies with regard to immigration and diversity. There are also similarities and differences in current policy objectives and strategies with respect to the integration of immigrants, with the major difference being the emphasis on French language integration in Quebec. The similarities in policy approaches towards diversity between Quebec and English Canada may lead to similarities in the attachment patterns of immigrant groups across these regions. On the other hand, the social hierarchies among the two Charter group members may have different features in the two sub-societal contexts, which, in turn, may result in different patterns of ethnic and societal attachments. Members of the French Charter group living outside Quebec may have different modes of attachment than those in Quebec, and in comparison with British Charter group members. These patterns may reflect their differences in status as minorities among majorities in the former case, and as a member of the majority in the latter.

**Specification of Analyses**

We begin the analyses by using the EDS to uncover what patterns of responses are prevalent in Canada using six indicators of socio-psychological attachments to the ethnic group and larger society. The indicators used to measure ethnic group attachment are as in Chapter 1: (1) sense of belonging to the ethnic group; (2) importance given to ethnic identity; (3) importance given to ethnic ancestry; and (4) importance of carrying on ethnic traditions and customs. To measure attachment to the broader society, the indicators used are: (1) sense of belonging to Canada, province or city/town; and (2) importance given to “Canadian” identity. “Canadian” identity is defined as any response that includes “Canadian/Canadienne,” “French Canadian,” “Québécois,” “Acadian,” “Newfoundland,” or any regional identity.

The coding decision to include these various components of societal belonging is based on the idea that Canada (like most societies) includes several levels of social organization: the locality, the municipality, the province, the region (i.e. the West) and the country. An individual’s life may not be experienced at all levels, and if it is, it may not be equally so. For instance, for some the locality may be the primary and sometimes exclusive social environment in which their life evolves and in which they acquire a sense of belonging. For others, their experience may extend – at least
in certain dimensions of it – to the province, the region or the country as a whole. For those who never or hardly ever leave their locality or province, the sense of belonging to the country as a whole may not be very relevant, except in a somewhat abstract manner. However, not including their local or regional sense of belonging would be tantamount to ignoring an important part of their social experience.

There are several advantages to exploring a typology of patterns, as opposed to creating indices for ethnic and societal attachments as commonly done: (1) different dimensions of attachment, such as those pertaining to the salience of identities, ancestries, belonging, and attitudes towards traditions/customs are distinguished, (2) their inter-relationships can be interpreted and compared, and (3) these patterns may be used to deduct different processes for different groups and cohorts in a more precise way.

Simultaneous latent class analysis is used to explore patterns of social attachments and test for similarities or differences in these patterns between the two parts of the country (for examples of this kind of analysis, see Stevens et al. 2004; Brownfield and Sorenson 1987). Latent class analysis tests the underlying structure of relationships among observed variables to construct a latent construct that may be characterized as multi-dimensional typologies. The categories of the latent variable are mutually exclusive, and latent classes can be tested for variability (or equivalence) of structures between populations of differing sizes (Clogg and Goodman 1984; McCutcheon 1987). These features of latent class analysis permit the identification of a bi-dimensional typology and the interpretation of patterns found in Quebec and in the rest of Canada separately.9

In the present analysis, respondents with missing values on any of the variables used in the latent class analysis are removed, yielding a final sample of 39,500 respondents across Canada (6,600 in Quebec and 32,870 in the rest of Canada). Respondents omitted from the analysis due to missing data tend to have lower household incomes, lower levels of education, lower parental education and are older on average. They are also more likely to be men, and are less likely to be in rural areas. Nevertheless, the sample in the analysis includes respondents from all levels of socio-economic achievements, ages and provinces.

Findings

The presentation of the results has three components. First, we describe the four patterns of social attachments identified by the latent class model. Second, we show their distribution in Quebec and in English-speaking Canada, and within different groups in Canada. We also compare select indicators of structural integration and inter-group relations across each attachment class. Third, we present the results of a multinomial regression analysis and assess the relative influence of visible minority status, immigrant-generational cohort, and the positive vs. negative quality of inter-group contacts in Quebec and the rest of Canada on each type of attachment pattern.
Description and Interpretation of the Four Patterns of Attachment

The application of simultaneous latent class analysis to the data (for Quebec and the rest of Canada) reveals four prevalent patterns of attachment. These patterns are identified by sorting the items used as indicators of ethnic and societal attachment into categorical classes on the basis of the relationships among them in each subpopulation. The best fitting model is the one in which the fit between the predicted and observed patterns cannot be improved upon by adding more complexity to the model (i.e. by adding more classes or more restrictions). The resulting attachment patterns are interpreted based on the ways the items load in each class and are identified as: “ethnic,” “mainstream,” “pluralist,” and “marginalised.” Figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 illustrates the results of the simultaneous latent class model. The patterns in each class are analogous in Quebec and rest of Canada, with some revealing differences on several items, particularly “sense of belonging to the ethnic group” in the “mainstream” class.

The “Ethnic” Pattern

The first class is indicative of an “ethnic” attachment (Fig. 4.1): ethnic identity, ancestry, customs, and sense of ethnic group belonging are all assigned a high degree of importance. Specifically, all the respondents in this class assign high importance to their ethnic ancestry, while only 21% in Quebec and 18% in the rest of Canada consider their Canadian identity (if given) highly important. The sense of belonging

![Fig 4.1 Attachment patterns classified as “ethnic” in Quebec (N = 1,430) and the rest of Canada (N = 8,090)](image)

Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey 2002 (Statistics Canada and the Department of Canadian Heritage)
Fig 4.2 Attachment patterns classified as “mainstream” in Quebec (N = 1,670) and the rest of Canada (N = 13,220).
Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey 2002 (Statistics Canada and the Department of Canadian Heritage)

Fig 4.3 Attachment patterns classified as “pluralist” in Quebec (N = 2,030) and the rest of Canada (N = 5,350).
Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey 2002 (Statistics Canada and the Department of Canadian Heritage)
to Canada is relatively high, as it is for the sample as a whole. In the “ethnic” class, respondents in Quebec and the rest of Canada give the same pattern of responses.

**The “Mainstream” Pattern**

Respondents in the “mainstream” class (Fig. 4.2) show a 1.0 (perfect) probability of giving high importance to “Canadian” identity (outside Quebec) and high probability of a strong sense of belonging to Canada, province or their city/town (1.00 in Quebec, 0.92 in the rest of Canada). Conversely, practically no one in this class rates ethnic identity or carrying on traditions and customs as highly important. In addition, there is low probability of high importance placed on an ethnic ancestry or sense of belonging to the ethnic group outside of Quebec.

Overall, the response pattern in this class is identical in Quebec and the rest of Canada, but several divergences can be observed: (1) while everyone outside Quebec rate Canadian or regional identity as important, only two thirds of respondents in Quebec do so, (2) a strong sense of belonging to the ethnic group has a probability of 0.62 in Quebec, compared to 0.27 in the rest of Canada, and (3) outside Quebec, over a quarter of respondents rate their ancestry as important compared to none in Quebec. What distinguishes this class from the “ethnic” are the relatively low importance placed on customs and traditions and ethnic identity, and high importance placed on Canadian identity overall.
In Quebec, respondents in this class are slightly more likely to have a strong sense of belonging to their ethnic group. This is driven by members of the French Charter group. This occurs because the survey question on ethnic belonging does not specifically refer to any particular ethnic group (or groups), hence there is some ambiguity here. The *ethnic group* in Quebec may include “Québécois” or “French Canadian,” as well as “French” for a significant number of respondents. In the case of Francophone respondents in Quebec, the awareness of the position of French culture and language as marginalised but having official status within Canada could lead to a heightened sense of ethnic group belonging.

**The “Pluralist Attachment” Pattern**

The “pluralist attachment” class (Fig. 4.3) is characterized by a high probability of positive responses to each indicator, whether they pertain to the ethnic group or to the society as a whole. The sense of belonging to both collectivities is strong, as well as the importance of ethnic traditions and customs. Civic identities (“Canadian,” “Québécois,” or other regional, etc.) are regarded highly in importance. All respondents in this class consider their ethnic *ancestry* highly important. In Quebec, the loading for sense of belonging to Canada, province or city/town is characteristically lower – 0.92, compared to 1.00 in the rest of Canada – but it is still very high. There is one exception to this otherwise consistent finding with the literature: none attach high importance to their *ethnic identity*. While ethnic ancestry is considered highly important, ethnic identity (if any) is rated low in importance for everyone in this class. Furthermore, the particular interpretation of the “pluralist” class also needs to be contextualized to reflect the historical and demographic characteristics of Quebec, which will be discussed in more detail later on.

**The “Marginalised” Pattern**

The respondents in the fourth pattern show a low probability of attachment to neither the ethnic group nor to the larger society (Fig. 4.4). They also show the lowest sense of belonging to Canada, province or city/town compared to all other classes. This is so for both Quebec and the rest of Canada, although much lower in Quebec (0.39 compared to 0.72 in the rest of Canada). Across Canada, no one in this class gives high importance to carrying on ethnic traditions or customs. While there is 0.37 probability of placing importance on “Canadian” identity in Quebec, none outside Quebec gives it much salience.

Respondents in this class are relatively young, with the lowest mean age in Quebec (39 years), and the lowest mean age of all classes in the rest of Canada (41 years). Other factors may be involved in the expressed distance from both the ethnic group and the society as a whole. The “marginalised” respondents who indicate low attachments to the ethnic and societal communities may have strong attachments to some other collectivity. Some may identify strongly with a social or political cause, such as environmentalism or socialism. Others may feel strongly attached to a subculture, identifying with it rather than their ethnic group or the wider society.
It has been suggested, for example, that marginalization may refer to an experience of alienation or acculturative stress (Berry 1970, 1990). In their recent studies comparing adaptation strategies of youth in different countries, Berry et al. (2006) identify prevalent attachment types they term ethnic, national, integrated, and diffuse. The “diffuse” type (with ambiguous attachments) is the least socially integrated and has the lowest scores on measures of well-being – similar to our “marginalised” class.

While agreeing with this interpretation of the low attachment group, Bourhis et al. (1997, pp. 377–8) point out that it may indicate that individuals “prefer to identify themselves as individuals rather than as members of either an immigrant group or the host majority. Such ‘individualists’ reject group ascriptions per se and prefer to treat others as individual persons rather than as members of group categories.” These authors suggest that “marginalization” could be replaced by “anomie” or “individualism.”

For present purposes, we refer to this class as “marginalised” from the ethnic and civic or national communities only.

In concluding this presentation of the four patterns of attachment, it should be pointed out that the sense of belonging to Canada, province or city/town is high throughout the population overall– a little over 80% of respondents. It is high among three of the attachment patterns – the “mainstream,” “ethnic,” and “pluralist” – but relatively low for the “marginalised.” This suggests several possibilities. One is that most respondents are psychologically invested in the Canadian society and polity and feel part of it. This is the positive view.

Another possibility is that the question may be too vague, and strong (or weak) answers reflect different understandings of what it means to belong. For some, belonging may reflect practical considerations such as where they live and have livelihoods; where their significant others reside; and/or where their current interests are invested. For others, it may be a matter of affection and psychological attachment. In Quebec, sense of belonging to Canada and province may also have political connotations that do not exist in the rest of Canada in the same way. This ambiguity in meaning may extend to the question concerning the “sense of belonging to the ethnic group” as well. In short, the item does not reveal the nature of the relationship established with the ethnic or societal community: whether it is instrumental, affective, or of some other type. Nevertheless, an affirmative (or negative) response does indicate the existence (or absence) of a bond, whether it be pragmatic or affective.

**Patterns of Attachment and Indicators of Social Integration**

Most acculturative research in social psychology conclude that high attachment or orientation towards both the ethnic group and the dominant society is the most adaptive in terms of psychological functioning, despite inconclusive evidence (Rudmin 2003). We examine the mean responses to select indicators of social integration and inter-group relations (Table 4.1). The social integration measures tap into individuals’ perception of others (as trustworthy or not), evaluation of their quality of life,
Table 4.1 Mean values of indicators of inter-group relations and social cohesion by attachments patterns across Canada

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ethnic</th>
<th>Mainstream</th>
<th>Pluralist</th>
<th>Marginalized</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inter-group relations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experienced discrimination</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worried about hate crimes</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly in-group friends</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social integration</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in people</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in neighbours</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member or volunteer</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted in last elections*</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction in life (1–5)</td>
<td>4.27</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>4.38</td>
<td>4.13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey 2002 (Statistics Canada and the Department of Canadian Heritage)

Note: All N’s are rounded; * includes only those who are eligible to vote (i.e. Canadian citizens over age 18)

and participation (voting and volunteering or membership in associations). These indicators of social integration are distinguished (in this chapter) from measures of attachment to Canada, such as sense of belonging and Canadian identity, in the sense that they are concerned with behaviours as well as perceptions about others. Attachment measures, on the other hand, indicate how closely one personally affiliates oneself with each type of group – the ethnic or the larger society.

Measures of inter-group relations include sense of vulnerability to hate crimes as a member of a targeted minority, reported experience of discrimination and in-group friendship ties. Not surprisingly, respondents in the “ethnic” class are most likely to report having experienced discrimination and to worry about being a victim of hate crime (0.22 and 0.20, respectively). Those in the “pluralist” and “ethnic” classes have the highest proportion of own-group friends (0.55 and 0.54), while those in the “mainstream” have the most diverse friendship ties (0.28).

On each of the measures of social integration, respondents in the “marginalised” class show the lowest scores. They have the lowest trust in people generally (0.46) and in their neighbours (0.54). In the past year, they are the least likely to have participated in formal organizations or associations (0.40). Those in the “marginalised” class also show the lowest rate of voting in elections (0.77) and have the lowest level of life satisfaction (4.13). To a certain extent, having no attachments to either ethnic or the societal community indicates social marginalization. There is little difference in these trends between Quebec and the rest of Canada.

Respondents in the “ethnic” attachment pattern have significantly higher scores than the “marginalised” class in measures of social integration. On the other hand, they score lower compared to the “mainstream” and “pluralist attachment” classes, but often the difference is marginal (as in voting and satisfaction). The “pluralist” class score the highest on satisfaction, voting, and association membership (not significantly different from “mainstream”). There is little difference between the “mainstream” and “ethnic” attachment classes in satisfaction with their lives and
voting. The “mainstream” class reported the highest proportion of trusting people in general.

The EDS lends some support to the hypothesis that individuals with multiple attachments experience better integration into society. Furthermore, individuals in the “marginalised” class score the lowest on most the integration measures, suggesting that this is the least adaptive strategy, with some implications for the functioning of society in general. In other words, to have some attachment to groups, whether it is the ethnic community, the larger society or both, is associated with better integration outcomes than to have none.

**The Distribution of the Four Patterns in Quebec and in English-Speaking Canada**

The expectation of a difference in the distribution of attachment patterns between the two sub-societies is partly supported. Figure 4.5 presents the distribution of the four patterns of attachment in Quebec and the rest of Canada. In Quebec, there is a higher proportion (0.34) of those having “pluralist attachment” and lower proportion (0.28) of “mainstream” compared to the rest of Canada (0.18 and 0.38 respectively). There is also a higher proportion of respondents in the “ethnic” class in the rest of

![Proportion of attachment classes in Quebec and the rest of Canada](image)

**Fig 4.5** Proportion of attachment classes in Quebec (N=6,600) and the rest of Canada (N=32,870)

*Sources:* Ethnic Diversity Survey 2002 (Statistics Canada and the Department of Canadian Heritage)
Canada (0.24) than in Quebec (0.15). There is no statistically significant difference in the occurrence of the “marginalised” class between the two regions of Canada.

The difference between Quebec and the rest of Canada in the prevalence of the “ethnic” class is due to the greater numbers of immigrants who settle across Canada (outside Quebec). On the other hand, the differences in the “mainstream” and “pluralist” classes between Quebec and the rest of Canada are largely driven by the two Charter groups, native-born French and British origin Canadians, the majority of whom are 3rd plus generation (Fig. 4.6). Within Quebec, the “pluralist attachment” is the modal category for the French charter group (at 46.3%). This orientation may reflect the distinctive French character of Quebec society within Canada and its continued salience for respondents in this context. In addition, French ancestry Canadians outside of Quebec are more likely to identify as “ethnic” (21.2%) compared to those in Quebec (10.6%), and also compared to Anglo-Canadians overall (less than 14%). However, outside Quebec, those of French ancestry tend to be “mainstream” (at 37.5%), although ancestry remains important to them. In essence, for the French ancestry group, French culture and identity remains a salient aspect of their group attachments in different contexts.

Fig 4.6 Distribution of attachment patterns among Canada’s two Charter groups in Quebec and the rest of Canada. Note: French Charter group is defined as 2nd or more generation of French, Québécois, Acadian, Canadienne or French-Canadian ancestries (N = 2,700 in Quebec, N = 2,500 outside Quebec); British Charter group is defined as 2nd or more generation of British, Canadian (not Canadienne) and regional (not Quebec) ancestries (N = 780 in Quebec, N = 11,900 outside Quebec)

Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey 2002 (Statistics Canada and the Department of Canadian Heritage)
For those of British ancestry, “mainstream” is the most prevalent category (at 48.5%) outside Quebec. Inside Quebec they are as likely to be “pluralists” as “mainstream.” This indicates several possible interpretations. First, as a minority group in a majority (French) context, members of the Anglo Charter group have a more acute awareness of their ancestry, traditions, and place in the larger national context. Second, those in the “mainstream” may see Quebec as their home, irregardless of their ancestry, and orient themselves with this local context. Third, some in this class may also be more oriented to the national context, and affiliate themselves with federalism.

**Visible Minority Status and Immigrant-Generation Cohort Across Canada**

The distribution across Canada by visible minority status and generational cohorts suggest a general pattern of assimilation into the “mainstream” over time for both whites and visible minorities (Table 4.2). There is an increase of 30.9% points between recent immigrants and 3rd/4th generation within the “mainstream” category for whites, compared to 21.1% increase for visible minorities. Both groups are also shedding ethnic attachments the longer they are in Canada. For whites, there is a decrease of 39.4% points between recent arrivals and 3rd/4th generation, while for visible minorities, the decrease is of a smaller magnitude (at 29.6%). In other words, while these trends are in the same direction, they are more pronounced for whites than for visible minorities. In addition, white recent immigrants are more vulnerable to marginalization than recently arrived visible minorities (32% compared to 22.6%), with the differences disappearing by the 3rd/4th generation.

There is also variation within these white-visible minority groups by ancestry and immigrant-status. Southern European ancestry groups as well as Other Europeans (includes Jewish, Basque, Gypsy (Roma) etc.) are over-represented in the “ethnic”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ethnic</th>
<th>Mainstream</th>
<th>Pluralist</th>
<th>Marginalized</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Whites</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent Immigrants</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1991–2001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earlier immigrants</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>4750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(before 1991)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Generation</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>11590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd or more generation</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>13800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Visible minorities</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent Immigrants</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>1730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1991–2001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earlier immigrants</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>3300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(before 1991)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Generation</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>3890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd or more generation</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>2440</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey 2002 (Statistics Canada and the Department of Canadian Heritage)*
Findings

1.12 times more likely to be in the “ethnic” category compared to their proportion in the population. This increases for those born in Canada, who are 1.72 times more likely to be “ethnic.” Likewise, both immigrants and native-born Canadians of Southern European ancestry are under-represented in the “mainstream” category, at only 0.84 and 0.81 times their actual proportion in the population. Native-born French ancestries (including “Quebecois,” “Acadian,” “French,” etc.) are over-represented in the “ethnic” and “pluralist attachment” classes (1.16 and 1.26 times their proportion in the population). On the other hand, immigrant visible minority groups and Southern Europeans are generally under-represented in the “marginalized” category, compared to most white ancestry groups (with the exception of Chinese).

For visible minorities, the patterns are much more consistent between different groups, with native-born Chinese, South Asians, Blacks, Arabs and Latin Americans over-represented in the “ethnic” category by up to double or triple their proportion in the population. On the other hand, immigrant visible minority groups and Southern Europeans are generally under-represented in the “mainstream” category.

These differences in the distribution of attachment patterns between select white ancestry and visible minority groups correspond with experiences of discrimination. For example, those groups who are over-represented in the “ethnic” class and under-represented in the “mainstream,” such as southern and other Europeans, are also the groups reporting more discrimination amongst white groups. Likewise, visible minorities overall report higher discrimination and also are over-represented in the “ethnic” and under-represented in the “mainstream” classes, particularly for the native-born. This finding indicates support for the social dominance theory which suggests that it is the structural ordering of society, experienced through negative inter-group relations, which increase the likelihood of minority (subordinate) groups to retain their in-group identification at the expense of developing attachments to the broader society.

In the next set of analyses, we explore the influences on attachment patterns by separating out the possible confounding effects of socio-economic achievement, and visible minority status and immigrant-generation cohort effects. Furthermore, a multivariate regression analysis done separately for Quebec and the rest of Canada can reveal if there are different factors influencing the likelihood of having certain attachment patterns (over being “marginalised”). Finally, we can assess what relative impacts discrimination and friendship compositions have on predicting respondents’ attachment patterns.

What Factors Influence Attachment Patterns?

We now look at differences in attachments by visible minority status and immigrant-generational cohort, and the quality of inter-group contacts in Quebec
### Table 4.3

Representation of each white ancestry and visible minority groups in each attachment class by immigrant status (relative to their proportion in the population)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Ancestry Groups</th>
<th>Immigrant</th>
<th>Native-born</th>
<th>Immigrant</th>
<th>Native-born</th>
<th>Immigrant</th>
<th>Native-born</th>
<th>Immigrant</th>
<th>Native-born</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>White ancestry groups</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British*</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French**</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western European</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South European</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other European</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Visible minority groups</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>1.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asian</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin American</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total N</strong></td>
<td>4630</td>
<td>4970</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>12340</td>
<td>1390</td>
<td>6760</td>
<td>2060</td>
<td>5170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Ethnic Diversity Survey 2002 (Statistics Canada and the Department of Canadian Heritage)

**Note:** * “British” includes English, Irish, Scottish, Welsh and other British Isles n.i.e. ancestries; ** “French” includes French ancestry, Acadian, Québécois, Canadienne and French-Canadian
and English-speaking Canada. Household income (from 2001 census response), education, gender, and age are controlled for in the analyses below to take into account both individual and group variances that may affect attachment patterns. For example, younger, more educated and higher income respondents may be more likely to have attachments to the wider society. On the one hand, recent immigrants tend to be younger compared to white native-born Canadians, as well as having higher educational achievement (due to our skills-based immigration system). On the other hand, recent immigrants also tend to have lower household incomes, which may be an alienating factor. Gender may also influence one’s attachments, with women placing greater importance on ethnic identity, ancestry and customs compared to men. Net of these effects, we hypothesize that the probability of attachment patterns over immigrant-generational cohorts will be different for visible minorities, and between Quebec and the rest of Canada.

We use multinomial logistic regression analysis, since the nature of our outcome variable is categorical (4 attachment classes). The “marginalised” class is the reference category. The underlying idea is that the “marginalised” class is indicative of a low degree of social integration (Berry et al. 2006) and the least preferred in terms of policy goal. The model considers how inter-group relations influence the probability of having different attachment patterns (over “marginalised”) and whether the effect of immigrant-generational cohort on attachment patterns varies by visible minority status. In the analysis presented in Table 4.4, respondent’s age, gender, education and household income are controlled for in order to assess the independent effect of inter-group relations and immigration-generation cohort on attachment patterns.

Generally, each year of age increases the probability of having some attachments (over none). Women are also more likely than men to have ethnic attachments, whether this is in the “ethnic” or “pluralist” classes, and the gender effect is particularly strong outside of Quebec. Higher household income and having a university degree are positively associated with “mainstream” or “pluralist” attachment (over none) in the rest of Canada only – there are no significant effects of income or higher education in Quebec on having attachments.

The Quality of Inter-group Contacts (Discrimination and Friendship Ties)

As expected, in both Quebec and the rest of Canada, the experience of discrimination increases the likelihood that respondents will draw into their ethnic group, independent of respondent’s age, gender, education or household income. Discrimination has a much stronger effect in Quebec (0.554), compared to the rest of Canada (0.301); in addition, the experience of discrimination significantly increases the likelihood of being “pluralist” over no attachments at all in the rest of Canada (0.170). We tested for the interaction between visible minority status and experiencing discrimination, and found no significant differential effect in either context. Overall, experiencing discrimination appears to be associated with strong identification with
Table 4.4 Effects of being “ethnic,” “mainstream,” and “pluralist attachment” classes (over “marginalised”); parameter estimates in logged odds (standard errors in brackets)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ethnic</th>
<th></th>
<th>Mainstream</th>
<th></th>
<th>Pluralist</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>Rest of Canada</td>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>Rest of Canada</td>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>Rest of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>−2.020 (0.322)</td>
<td>−0.451* (0.130)</td>
<td>−0.026 (0.255)</td>
<td>0.253* (0.125)</td>
<td>−0.260 (0.245)</td>
<td>−0.851* (0.138)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.029* (0.004)</td>
<td>0.007* (0.002)</td>
<td>0.010* (0.004)</td>
<td>0.008* (0.002)</td>
<td>0.026* (0.004)</td>
<td>0.017* (0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visible minority status</td>
<td>0.709* (0.199)</td>
<td>0.906* (0.312)</td>
<td>−0.509* (0.228)</td>
<td>−0.397* (0.247)</td>
<td>−0.167 (0.233)</td>
<td>0.077 (0.275)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent immigrant (1991–2001)</td>
<td>1.458* (0.271)</td>
<td>0.739* (0.139)</td>
<td>−0.641* (0.301)</td>
<td>−2.126* (0.209)</td>
<td>−1.250* (0.324)</td>
<td>−1.679* (0.230)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early immigrant (before 1991)</td>
<td>1.819* (0.192)</td>
<td>0.878* (0.077)</td>
<td>−0.045 (0.189)</td>
<td>−0.594* (0.074)</td>
<td>−0.324 (0.181)</td>
<td>−0.168 (0.087)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd generation</td>
<td>1.791* (0.171)</td>
<td>0.586* (0.076)</td>
<td>0.154 (0.160)</td>
<td>0.257* (0.064)</td>
<td>0.738* (0.154)</td>
<td>0.661* (0.071)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>−0.198 (0.127)</td>
<td>−0.443* (0.057)</td>
<td>−0.089 (0.125)</td>
<td>−0.062 (0.054)</td>
<td>−0.290* (0.115)</td>
<td>−0.562* (0.063)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household income</td>
<td>−0.092 (0.113)</td>
<td>0.004 (0.048)</td>
<td>0.007 (0.104)</td>
<td>0.282* (0.048)</td>
<td>−0.142 (0.094)</td>
<td>0.201* (0.052)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University degree</td>
<td>0.088 (0.161)</td>
<td>0.060 (0.068)</td>
<td>−0.017 (0.160)</td>
<td>0.309* (0.065)</td>
<td>0.184 (0.143)</td>
<td>0.258* (0.076)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own-group current friends</td>
<td>0.950* (0.153)</td>
<td>0.669* (0.06)</td>
<td>−0.087 (0.134)</td>
<td>−0.416* (0.063)</td>
<td>0.828* (0.129)</td>
<td>0.428* (0.070)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experienced discrimination</td>
<td>0.554* (0.178)</td>
<td>0.301* (0.073)</td>
<td>0.217 (0.196)</td>
<td>−0.114 (0.078)</td>
<td>0.128 (0.187)</td>
<td>0.170* (0.084)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visible minority recent immigrant</td>
<td>− −0.493 (0.348)</td>
<td>− −0.559 (0.351)</td>
<td>− −0.325 (0.270)</td>
<td>− −0.578 (0.303)</td>
<td>− −0.282 (0.298)</td>
<td>− −0.282 (0.298)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visible minority early immigrant</td>
<td>− −0.653* (0.322)</td>
<td>− −0.325 (0.270)</td>
<td>− −0.619* (0.269)</td>
<td>− −0.619* (0.269)</td>
<td>− −0.619* (0.269)</td>
<td>− −0.619* (0.269)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visible minority 2nd generation</td>
<td>− −0.475 (0.327)</td>
<td>− −0.475 (0.327)</td>
<td>− −0.475 (0.327)</td>
<td>− −0.475 (0.327)</td>
<td>− −0.475 (0.327)</td>
<td>− −0.475 (0.327)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max-scaled R-square</td>
<td>0.269</td>
<td>0.208</td>
<td>0.269</td>
<td>0.208</td>
<td>0.269</td>
<td>0.208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>−2 Log Likelihood</td>
<td>17762.078</td>
<td>63135.539</td>
<td>17762.078</td>
<td>63135.539</td>
<td>17762.078</td>
<td>63135.539</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Statistically significant p < 0.05; Quebec (N = 5, 520) and the rest of Canada (N = 29, 750)

Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey 2002 (Statistics Canada and the Department of Canadian Heritage)
the ethnic group, but appears to have no significant impact on “mainstream” attachment.

Own-group friends encourages (or indicates) attachments to the ethnic group. Thus, homogeneous friendship ties increases the likelihood of “ethnic” or “pluralist attachments” (compared to marginalization) in both Quebec and the rest of Canada. Conversely, diversity of friendship ties increases the likelihood of having “mainstream” attachment, although this effect is weaker. The results are similar in both Quebec and the rest of Canada, with the exception that the association of own-group friends with having some ethnic attachment is slightly stronger in Quebec.

Not surprisingly, the effect of friendship ties on having attachments (over none) is stronger than the effect of negative out-group experiences, irrespective of respondent’s age, gender or socio-economic achievements. It appears that in-group friends heighten awareness of one’s ethnicity and feelings of belonging to the group, while out-group friends increase a sense of identification with and belonging to a wider society. It should be noted, however, that the relationship can also operate in the other direction: in other words, the sense of belonging to one or the other community leads individuals to form social ties with members of that community. Nevertheless, it seems likely that interpersonal ties are the usual channels through which linkages are established to larger social units, or maintained with the in-group.

The Differential Effect of Visible Minority Status over Immigrant and Generational Cohorts for Quebec and the Rest of Canada

The “Ethnic” Pattern

Although visible minorities (Fig. 4.7) are more likely to have ethnic attachments than whites across all cohorts, there are some differences between Quebec and the rest of Canada. The differential effect of time in Canada (measured as immigrant and generational cohort) by visible minority status is statistically significant outside Quebec. Generally, there is a pattern of decline in ethnic attachments across cohorts for both visible minorities and whites. Visible minorities are more likely to have “ethnic” attachments than their white cohorts in both contexts. However, in the rest of Canada, the decline in “ethnic” attachments is significantly slower for visible minority early immigrants, compared to whites.

The “Mainstream” Pattern

There are some differences between visible minorities and whites in the likelihood of having a “mainstream” attachment over marginalization across cohorts (Fig. 4.8). As expected, the more time spent in Canada, the higher the probability of having “mainstream” attachment overall. In Quebec, whites are more likely to have a “mainstream” attachment pattern than visible minorities, but the rate of acquiring
“mainstream” attachments is the same for both whites and visible minorities. In the rest of Canada, there is a significant differential effect of time in Canada for whites and visible minorities: whites acquire “mainstream” attachment at a much higher rate than their visible minority cohort, particularly by the 2nd generation.

The “Pluralist Attachment” Pattern

The differences among the “pluralist attachment” class are between Quebec and the rest of Canada, rather than visible minority status (Fig. 4.9). In both contexts, recent immigrants (both white and visible minority) show a low probability of being “pluralist” (over “marginalised”). However, the probability of being “pluralist” increases at a much faster rate in Quebec (to 0.38 for 2nd generation whites and 0.29 for visible minorities), compared to the rest of Canada (0.20). By the 3rd/4th generation, the regional difference remains pronounced, with both whites and visible minorities much more likely to be “pluralists” in Quebec (0.31 and 0.29) compared to English Canada (0.14 and 0.13). In other words, the factors influencing “pluralist” attachment are marked by regional differences, rather than by visible minority status.

Nevertheless, in interpreting the trend for whites in Quebec and the rest of Canada, it may not be substantively different if we keep in mind that (a) the
Fig 4.8 The predicted probability of having a “mainstream” attachment (as opposed to “marginalized”)
Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey 2002 (Statistics Canada and the Department of Canadian Heritage)

Fig 4.9 The predicted probability of having a “pluralist” attachment (as opposed to “marginalized”)
Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey 2002 (Statistics Canada and the Department of Canadian Heritage)
dominant context in Quebec is French, (b) the proportion of French ancestry whites increase with later generations and therefore (c) the increasing probability of “pluralist attachment” over generations for whites in Quebec reflects a strong cohort effect. For whites of French ancestry, the “pluralist attachment” is simply attachment to the mainstream of French society and its distinct traditions, and therefore, analogous to “mainstream attachment” in the rest of Canada.

Discussion

Our study of the EDS data using exploratory simultaneous latent class analysis identifies a four-class typology of social attachments that we interpret as “ethnic,” “mainstream,” “pluralist,” and “marginalised.” It should be noted that this latter label is used to refer to a detached attitude towards the ethnic group and the larger society, keeping in mind that individuals in this class may have strong ties to other social entities, or are possibly individualist in orientation. There is a non-negligible proportion of “marginalised” in Quebec and the rest of Canada which maintains itself over generations. The results of other studies and a few factors found in this study suggest that these individuals are experiencing a certain degree of social alienation. Marginalization can manifest in multiple, inter-related ways: disengagement from the labour force, poverty, social and/or political estrangement (Jenson 2000). Underlying these forms of marginalization are the structural conditions of inequality which constitute a threat to the integration of the community or society and to individual health and well-being (Marmot and Wilkinson 1999; Wilkinson 1996).

The findings for the “pluralist” class in this study present a challenge to conventional understandings of how ethnic and civic identities are configured together. We expected to find that both ethnic and civic identities to be highly important in this class. However, whilst all the other items relating to ethnic and civic attachments loaded strongly, no one in this class rated ethnic identity as important. The view that respondents identified with “pluralist” pattern should attach equal importance to both their ethnic and civic identities are based on certain assumptions about the nature of these identities. By reflecting on some of these assumptions, the result of low importance of ethnic identity for the “pluralist” attachment class will hopefully seem less puzzling.

The first assumption is that each identity should be clearly distinguished from the other. This does not imply that identities be fixed or well defined, only that the boundaries between them be well demarcated. Such an assumption implies that the identities, however defined, can be separated into distinct, mutually-exclusive categories. For example, to be Chinese Canadian, Chinese-Canadian, or Canadian-Chinese in the sense of the theorized pluralist model implies an understanding of what it means to be “Chinese” and of what it means to be “Canadian” separately. However, to be both at once can be to combine their essences into an identity that is a sum of the two, a hybrid, or more plausibly something new altogether (Katkin et al. 1998).
The second assumption is that the identity “Canadian” carries the same meaning for respondents in each of the “ethnic,” “mainstream,” “pluralist” and “marginalised” classifications. Rather, populist debates about the meaning of “Canadian” and other civic identities indicate that there is not one common, agreed-upon understanding. “Canadian” or regional identities might assume conformity to the dominant group (e.g. Anglophones) for respondents in the “mainstream” pattern, while it might not for the “pluralist attachment” class. For those in this latter class, the model of civic identities in the multicultural context may reflect a greater sense of “deep diversity” (Taylor 1994). Thus, a multicultural “Canadian” identity may contain within it an acceptance of cultural diversity, such that one’s particularized ethnicity need not be singled out for importance, but rather taken for granted as an identity option.

If these assumptions are challenged, it can be seen how it is conceivable to identify strongly with the civic identity, and weakly or not at all with a particular ethnic identity, while remaining a pluralist for whom ancestry and customs remain salient. The civic identity may encompass and absorb ethnic difference, identified by retaining importance of one’s ethnic ancestry and traditions in everyday life. For the pluralist, to be “Canadian” is to also recognize ethnicity as a part of everyone’s heritage, and to challenge the discourse and traditional expectation of Anglo/Franco-conformity (depending on the context). In Quebec, the French character of mainstream society retains its distinction from an English Canada. Ethnic identity is subsumed within the “Canadian/Canadienne,” “Québécois,” or “French Canadian,” and ethnic ancestry and customs (which are predominately French in character) remain socially and culturally important, especially for those of French ancestry.

We examined the patterns of attachment by ethnic groups and the larger society, with a view to determining their significance to understanding Canadian society. An egalitarian model of inter-group relations implies that groups have equal opportunities and are subject to similar conditions that influence the patterns of attachments to one’s ethnic group and to the larger society. If egalitarianism prevails, there should be no differential effect of group membership on the distribution of these patterns. Rather, the choice of attachments would be individualized and random across the population.

However, our analysis indicates that visible minorities and whites differ significantly from each other in their probabilities of having an “ethnic,” or “mainstream” attachment (compared to being “marginalised”). Generally, for both whites and visible minorities across Canada, the assimilation model is supported by the evidence: over generations, an increasing proportion is found in the “mainstream” pattern of attachment, and decreasing “ethnic” attachments. Yet, this general trend is more pronounced for dominant white groups, such as British Charter groups, northern and western Europeans. Other white ancestry groups, such as Jews and southern Europeans, show more similarities with visible minorities through retaining ethnic affiliations longer and being slower to take on a “mainstream” orientation. On the basis of reported discrimination, the survey supports the perception that an ethnic hierarchy does exist, especially between whites and visible minorities.
As expected, negative inter-group experiences such as discrimination increased the probability of retaining ethnic attachments. Positive experiences such as friendship ties can affect group attachments as well. As expected, identification with the larger society is more likely for those with diverse friendship ties; whilst co-ethnic friendship ties is associated with ethnic attachment, whether this is expressed in the “ethnic” pattern or the “pluralist”. In fact, we find that such ties do more to predict own-group attachments than do negative inter-group experiences. The findings in Dion and Phan’s chapter show that both positive and negative experiences contribute to the likelihood of ethnic self-identification.

In short, judging from the frequency of negative experiences reported by members of ethnic groups, an ethnic hierarchy exists in Canada; the main disparity being between European-origin and visible minorities that seem to persist, even after controlling for immigration-generational cohort. Accordingly, it is between these groups that the differences in the patterns of ethnic and societal attachments are the most pronounced. On the other hand, visible minority groups are relatively new to Canada (with some exceptions such as Chinese and Japanese), and arrived in significant numbers only since the 1960s. Therefore, they have not had the time to make a significant impact and influence on the institutions of society. An ethnic hierarchy, especially if it is subjectively experienced, has a negative impact on the social integration of individuals and can constitute a threat to the cohesion of the society as a whole and/or of particular communities (Breton 1984). Indeed, in their chapter, Reitz and Banerjee explore the relative contribution of perceived and material inequalities on the indicators of social integration of members of different ethnic groups.

After controlling for other dimensions of social differentiation (age, gender, income, education and personal inter-group experiences), visible minority status and immigrant-generational cohort are significant factors predicting attachment to the ethnic group. Visible minorities in general are more likely to have “ethnic” attachments (over none) than whites. Nevertheless, ethnic attachments decrease with longer time spent in Canada. This is the case for both Quebec and the rest of Canada. While the general trend is towards greater “mainstream” attachment with subsequent generations, it is much more pronounced for whites outside Quebec. The differences in the propensity for “pluralist” attachments is between regions – respondents in Quebec are much more likely than those in the rest of Canada to have attachments to both the ethnic and societal groups.

To understand the variation in the “pluralist attachment” among whites in Quebec and the rest of Canada, we need to consider the make-up and background of this population in the two contexts. According to the 2001 Canadian census, 93% of the population in Quebec is white, of whom 87.5% are Canadian-born (compared to 84.3 and 73.6% respectively in the rest of Canada). Furthermore, in Quebec, 80.9% of the population report French as their only mother tongue compared to 7.8% who report English as their only mother tongue. In the rest of Canada, 74.6% report English as their only mother tongue and only 4.2% report French as their only mother tongue. This is largely replicated in the EDS where over three quarters of whites in Quebec reported their ancestry as French, French-Canadian/Canadienne, Québécois, or other regional ancestry.
Thus, the variation in the proportion of whites in the “pluralist attachment” class may be due, in part, to the fact that for whites of French ancestry in Quebec, the reference to “ethnic” is French (for questions on importance of ethnic customs and ancestry and sense of belonging to the ethnic group) and the high levels of importance given to it suggests their awareness of Quebec’s unique status as a French society in Canada. In other words, there is a space between ethnic (sub-national) and Canadian (national) identities for whites in Quebec, the majority of whom are French. Thus the “pluralist” class here reflects a strong orientation towards Quebec as a sub-national (and cultural) French entity in Canada. When we consider that the white population in Quebec is overwhelmingly of French ancestry, it is clear that in the Quebec context, this is roughly equivalent to “mainstream” in the rest of Canada.

In an analogous way, the meaning of being “English,” “Scottish,” “British” or combinations of these differ depending on the context where these identities are asserted and in the political context of devolution in the UK. Too often, state (or national), sub-national, and ethnic identities are not studied or theorized together, resulting in a conflation of state and national identities. The result is a lack of understanding of how they interact with each other in particular contexts (McCrone 2002; Curtis and Heath 2000). For example, what Scots and Welsh have “in common is an understanding that there is a space between their nation and Britain, and they can assess the relationship between the two. The English, however, are more often baffled when asked how they relate their Englishness and Britishness to each other. They often fail to understand how the two can be contrasted at all; Englishness and Britishness seem inseparable” (Barnett 1997, pp. 292–3). In the rest of Canada, “Canadian” as an identity may be used co-terminously with other identities, particularly for British-origin whites.

Thus, accounting for the variations between whites and visible minority groups are the differences in the historical experience of French Quebec and English Canada with regard to nation building, immigration and diversity. Quebec’s position as a minority within Canada had historically generated a certain reluctance to accept ethnic minorities on an equal footing. Ironically, Quebec has given the greater support for ethnic language retention than the rest of Canada, which may come some way to explaining minorities’ equal tendency to have “pluralist” attachment (as opposed to none) as their white colleagues, net of individual characteristics and personal experiences of discrimination. In summary, “pluralists” are more prevalent among both whites and visible minorities in Quebec than in the rest of Canada. This reflects a common trend that is due to different mechanisms – one relating to sub-national politics among the Charter group members in that context, and the other relating to the role of immigration and diversity in nation-building in Quebec, which promotes ethnic retention and French language acquisition at the same time.

Yet, some research has found that visible minorities face the most difficulties integrating in the labour market and are more dependent on ethnic networks (Piché et al. 2002). Thus, visible minorities in Quebec, as a “devalued” population (Moutreuil and Bourhis 2001) are encouraged towards “ethnic” attachments to a
greater extent than in the rest of Canada. But the evidence is not consistent in this regard: the Ethnic Diversity Survey shows that visible minorities in Quebec are not necessarily less likely to perceive discrimination than those living in the rest of Canada: 30% in Quebec compared to 35% in the rest of Canada (Bourhis and Montreuil 2005).

To conclude, politicized debates about ethnic separation have particularly focused on visible minority groups and expressed concern that attachment to the ethnic community is somehow maladaptive. Rather, the data suggests that this concern is misplaced. It is marginalisation – having no attachments either to the ethnic community or the larger society – that is most detrimental to social integration as measured by satisfaction, trust, and well-being. Recent immigrants, particularly newly arrived white groups, are most vulnerable to marginalisation. Ethnic attachments need not be viewed as problematic, nor be considered as exclusive to visible minority groups. Southern and other Europeans also exhibit similar trends (although to a lesser degree). Recent visible minorities seem to be better integrated, at least into their ethnic communities, upon arrival but also into the 2nd generation. However, the mechanisms which maintain attachment to the ethnic group may be different from those that promote it. If those mechanisms are negative, such as discriminatory experiences or societal rejection (sometimes innocuously expressed in the question “But where do you really come from?” asked to native-born visible minorities), then we may be rightly concerned.

Notes

1. Quotes are used because the expressions refer to the overall linguistic character of the sub-societies within which several languages are spoken. The quotes will not be used in the rest of the chapter.

2. This study of ethnic diversity in Toronto finds variations on the two dimensions across ethnic groups: Germans are high on incorporation and low on ethnic salience; Ukrainians are intermediate on ethnic salience and high on incorporation in the larger society; Jews are high on both; Italians are intermediate on both; and the two visible minorities included in the study, Chinese and West Indians, are poorly incorporated in the society and intermediate on ethnic attachments (pp. 258–261).

3. It might be argued that sense of belonging and attitudes towards one’s ethnic group and social ties may tap into an individual’s integration in the group and therefore, in some sense, capture the same phenomenon. However, the former set measures attitude and the latter behaviour. Behaviours and attitudes are shaped by many very different factors and cannot be considered interchangeable indicators for some underlying concept. See Feld (1982), Fong and Isajiw (2000) and McPherson et al. (2001) for a structural approach to in-group friendship ties.

4. There are different conceptualizations and measurements of ethnic hierarchies used in current research. Other dimensions by which groups are constructed and ranked may be gender, immigrant or foreign status, class, etc. These often intersect in complex ways (Song 2004). Furthermore, the hierarchy may change over time. New groups can enter and redefine the hierarchy (Lee and Bean 2004). The difference in acceptance between the highest and lowest ranking groups may become less pronounced (Parrillo and Donoghue 2005), as prejudice and discrimination becomes less socially acceptable, and even legislated against.

6. For information on the various measures adopted see, for example, Helly (1996) and McAndrew (1991).

7. All indicators are derived from all responses given to ethnic ancestry (up to eight responses) and ethnic identity (up to 6 responses). They are coded [1] rated strongly (4 or 5 on scale of 5) and [0] not rated highly (1–3 on scale of 5) or “not applicable”. The importance of carrying on ethnic customs was not asked of 1,744 respondents who gave only “Canadian” as their ancestry, therefore they were coded 0 on these items. Missing responses are defined for sense of belonging and importance of customs, and include “not asked,” “refused,” “don’t know”.

8. As noted in Chapter 1, this question is the same one used elsewhere to measure the importance of non-Canadian ethnic identities. The question on importance (ID_Q130) refers to any identity reported (ID_Q100).

9. To do the analysis, we use the Categorical Data Analysis Software (CDAS) (Eliason, S.R., Copyright 1990, Department of Sociology, University of Iowa).

10. An exploratory simultaneous latent class analysis (Goodman 1974) is used to empirically test for patterns of attachments present in the EDS data. The relative fit of the models is tested stepwise, starting with 2 class simultaneous models to 5 class simultaneous models across the two populations, and then applying equivalency restrictions to parameters based on the conditional probabilities. The four-class simultaneous, unrestricted model significantly improves the fit whereas the five-class simultaneous model does not. We also test for unequal numbers of class between the two populations (Quebec and the rest of Canada), but find no significant improvement.

11. The final model with the best fit to our dataset is the 4 class, partially homogeneous model (BIC = 1648.16, d.f. = 90, lambda = 0.90) with 93% of cases correctly allocated. It is partially homogeneous because not all item responses (parameters) are identical in both Quebec and the rest of Canada. There are important similarities among the identified classes but some reveal within-class variations. Figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 show the conditional probabilities (analogous to factor loadings in factor analysis) in each identified class for Quebec and the rest of Canada [see McCutcheon (1987) for more details].

12. Other authors also consider “individualism” as a possible explanation. See, for example, Rudmin and Ahmadzadeh’s interesting discussion of “marginalization” (2001, pp. 43–44).

13. Of course, the response to this question may be positively biased, given that respondents are aware that the government of Canada is conducting the survey.

14. For a discussion of a typology of “modes of belonging” (in the context of francophone minorities), see Breton (1994).

15. Includes church, recreational clubs, school or hobby groups, professional, ethnic or immigrant associations, environmental or charity groups, and senior citizen associations.

16. The multinomial logistic regression equations are done using Wesvar, applying bootstrap weights to adjust for the complex survey design. Analysis models are separately run for Quebec and the rest of Canada, excluding those with missing values. Response categories “Not asked,” “Not applicable,” “Don’t know,” or “Refused” were coded as missing. For the in-group friendship variable, “Not applicable” includes respondents who did not report at least one ethnic ancestry other than “Canadian” in ID_Q010/ID_Q020 and respondents for whom ID_Q040 was “Not asked.” They are coded as missing (n = 3, 003). A further 2,066 “don’t know,” the ethnic ancestry of their current friends and are also counted as missing.

17. The category “recent immigrants” includes non-permanent residents. Immigrant/generational variable is as a set of dummy variables (reference group is 3rd/4th generation).

18. Controlling for inter-group relations, age, gender, household income, and university degree.

19. In a different survey, respondents of French ethnic origin within Quebec were less likely to identify themselves as “Canadian,” and were more ethnocentric than French ethnics outside Quebec (Berry and Kalin 1995).

This chapter examines the extent to which, if at all, inequalities experienced by visible minorities translate into reduced attachments to Canada, or slower social integration into Canadian society. The analysis focuses on racial minorities, since these groups experience the greatest inequalities.

Racial inequality has become a significant public issue in Canada. As the racial diversity of Canadian society grew following immigration policy reforms of the 1960s, many studies documented various economic and other inequalities experienced by “visible minorities” (as these groups have been called officially since the mid-1980s). Awareness of inequalities and reports of discrimination from minority groups also have been documented. Such findings of inequality and reports of discrimination have given rise to debates over necessary reforms, some of which have been adopted, but there is continuing debate about the persistence of underlying inequalities.

Inequalities which persist over time raise a further concern that the unity of the society itself may ultimately be affected. Like the underlying inequalities themselves, lack of social unity represents a potentially significant challenge to an important ideal of a multi-cultural society, that diversity can foster unity. The purpose of the analysis to follow is to assess the significance of this challenge.

The critical role of equality and economic success for the overall relation of immigrants and racial minorities to Canadian society is underscored by several considerations. First and most obviously, inequalities arising or thought to arise from racial bias or discrimination may contribute to a sense of unfairness or injustice which breeds resentment and alienation, and perhaps eventually a withdrawal of support for mainstream institutions. Second, social hierarchies may have an important impact on the investment of individuals in any collective enterprise, whatever their evaluation of the justice of those hierarchies. Those who gain the most from society have a stronger investment in the status quo and are more inclined to feel attached to society, and perhaps even want to give something back. Third, economic or employment success generates resources which may be necessary to facilitate participation in society. By the same token, economic disadvantage and poverty
diverts energies toward survival and away from activities which might contribute to
the community. Fourth, regarding immigrants specifically, economic advancement
is a primary motivation for immigration, and hence the experience of success or
failure may have particular bearing on those relatively new to a society. And finally,
employment success may help override any tendency for culturally distinct minori-
ties to feel separate or estranged from the mainstream society, and by implication,
lack of success may reinforce such tendencies.

The chapter begins with a review of evidence on racial inequality in Canada,
including perceptions and awareness of inequality and discrimination. Then, the
social integration of immigrant minorities is examined, focusing on racial minorities
and those of European origins. Finally, the impact of inequality and awareness of
inequality on social integration is examined. Throughout, the effort is to trace pat-
terns across groups representing different experience in Canada: recent immigrants,
earlier immigrants, and the second generation offspring of immigrants.

Racial Inequality in Canada

A degree of racial inequality definitely exists in Canada, and evidence suggests
that in certain respects it may be becoming a more serious problem in recent
years (Kazemipur and Halli 2000, 2001; Baker and Benjamin 1994; Canada 1984;
Christofides and Swidinsky 1994; Ley and Smith 1998; Ornstein 2000; Reitz
2001a). Much of the evidence focuses on objective aspects, reflected in household
incomes and poverty rates; here because of our interest in the social implications
there is also a focus on the subjective aspect, and the way these inequalities are
viewed by minorities. How are patterns of inequality affected by length of experi-
ence in Canada and to what extent do they exist for the second generation?

Household Incomes and Poverty among Ethnic and Racial Groups

Generally speaking, visible minorities have much lower relative household incomes,
and higher poverty rates, than do ethnic groups of European origins. Table 5.1,
column 1, shows mean individual-equivalent household incomes for ethnic groups,
relative to the mean for the census metropolitan area of residence.¹ For visible mi-
norities as a category, incomes are $7,686 less than the local average, while for
Whites, they are $1,895 above the local average; thus, the gap is $9,581. In relation
to the national mean individual-equivalent household income of $41,330, this gap
is 23.2%. Relative household incomes of virtually all racial minority groups – in-
cluding Chinese, South Asians and Blacks, as the largest groups – are substantially
lower than those of almost all White groups.² In 2001, the racial minority poverty
rate was nearly double that for the rest of the population (Table 5.1, column 2, from
census data):³ 26.6% compared with 14.2%; some racial minorities had higher rates
than others.⁴ White ethnic groups experience inequality as well, but not nearly to
the same extent.
Table 5.1  Ethno-racial inequality in Canada – objective and reported

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Persons not visible minorities (by ancestry)</th>
<th>Income (Mean individual equivalent, relative to CMA)</th>
<th>Poverty rate* (%)</th>
<th>Experience of discrimination (%)</th>
<th>Reported vulnerability (%)</th>
<th>N (unweighted)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canadian</td>
<td>1258.7</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>1744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>750.5</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>4356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglo</td>
<td>3386.1</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>10293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North and Western European</td>
<td>2238.2</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>5893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian and East European</td>
<td>405.7</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>4109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other South European</td>
<td>−2778.6</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>11637.7</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab and West Asian</td>
<td>−6058.4</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin American</td>
<td>−7416.6</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>−617.4</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>1278.0</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>2098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>−5832.7</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other European</td>
<td>9453.1</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total non visible minorities</td>
<td><strong>1895.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>14.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>10.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>16.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>30851</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Visible minorities (all ancestries)

| Chinese                                     | −6730.2                                         | 26.9             | 33.2                            | 33.6                      | 2421          |
| South Asian                                 | −5815.8                                         | 21.7             | 33.1                            | 38.7                      | 1892          |
| Black                                       | −10607.2                                        | 31.1             | 49.6                            | 43.0                      | 1424          |
| Filipino                                    | −5063.5                                         | 16.4             | 35.8                            | 48.8                      | 653           |
| Latin American                              | −10270.3                                        | 29.3             | 28.6                            | 30.0                      | 386           |
| Southeast Asian                             | −6829.3                                         | 25.6             | 34.5                            | 37.7                      | 331           |
| Arab and West Asian                         | −13359.4                                        | 40.8             | 29.8                            | 27.0                      | 513           |
| Korean                                      | −17145.0                                        | 40.8             | 40.5                            | 49.0                      | 148           |
| Japanese                                    | 4079.5                                          | n/a              | 42.8                            | 34.2                      | 362           |
| Visible minority, n.i.e.                    | −7114.5                                         | 23.7             | 33.3                            | 36.8                      | 283           |
| Multiple visible minority                   | −4304.2                                         | n/a              | 41.5                            | 28.7                      | 209           |
| Total visible minorities                    | −7686.4                                         | 26.6             | 35.9                            | 37.3                      | 8622          |

Total 39473

Note: The origins groups in the list of “persons not visible minorities” includes categories “Arab and West Asian”, and “Latin American” which also appear among the visible minorities. Those included as not visible minorities described themselves as “white” in response to the visible minority question; Those who did not identify any ancestry or visible minority group or did not report household income or reported experiences of inequality are excluded; * excluding maritime provinces.

Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey 2002 (Statistics Canada and the Department of Canadian Heritage). n/a = not available.

The main economic problem for new racial minority immigrants is, of course, finding adequate employment (Li 2000). There are a number of reasons they experience difficulties in doing so. Some of these difficulties – but by no means all – are associated with the period of adjustment or “entry effect” that all immigrants must confront. Entry problems may be particularly severe for immigrants arriving during a recession, as was the case for many in the early 1990s. Experience shows
that all immigrants do better as they settle in and become more accustomed to their new environment. Furthermore, adverse experiences linked to economic recession may be offset by a later rebound in the economy, as the immigrants who arrived in the early 1980s discovered (Bloom et al. 1995; Grant 1999). In short, economic disadvantage and high rates of poverty may attenuate over time, and the entry effect will disappear.

There are a number of other reasons for immigrants’ employment difficulties. Perhaps the most important are urban settlement, the discounting of qualifications, and race. With respect to the first reason, in seeking employment, immigrants find that any educational advantage they might have due to Canada’s skill-selective immigration policy is offset by the fact that most settle in major urban areas where jobs are plentiful but competition is intense from new native-born labour market entrants, who tend to be young and also highly educated (Reitz 2004, p.115). In terms of the second reason, immigrants’ skills tend to be discounted in the labour market, while those of the native-born are not (Reitz 2001a; Li 2000); as for the third reason, racial minority immigrants face more obstacles than immigrants of European origin or native-born workers (Pendakur and Pendakur 1998, 2002). Other possible reasons for employment difficulties include isolation in minority occupational enclaves and the fact that minority group social networks lack the linkages necessary to find good jobs.

The obstacles to immigrant success appear to have increased, and the greatest impact has been felt by those arriving most recently, even though the late 1990s and early 2000s were a period of strong labour demand. In fact, underlying the ups and downs of several business cycles, there has been a downward trend in the employment rates and earnings of successive cohorts of newly arrived immigrants, both male and female (Frenette and Morissette 2003; see also Baker and Benjamin 1994; Reitz 2001b). Whereas immigrant men arriving in the five-year period before the 1981 Census earned 79.6% of the earnings of native-born men, by 1996 this figure had dropped to 60%. For women, it dropped from 73.1% to 62.4%. By 2001, as a result of the improved labour demand of the late 1990s, relative earnings for the most recently arrived immigrants were higher than they had been in the mid-1990s, but they remained about 15% points below 1970 levels (Frenette and Morissette 2003, 7). Notably, despite earnings mobility experienced by immigrants as their time in Canada increases, the general trend toward declining earnings also affects immigrants who have been in Canada longer.

New immigrants have seen reduced employment success even though immigrant education levels are at an all-time high (Frenette and Morissette 2003; see also Statistics Canada 2003; Citizenship and Immigration Canada 1998). Marc Frenette and René Morissette show that the proportion of immigrant men arriving in the late 1990s who possessed at least the equivalent of a bachelor’s degree was over 40%, more than twice the figure of 18.6 for native-born Canadian men; the corresponding figures for women were 37.5% and 21.7% (2003, p. 4). Yet, as we have mentioned, this has not translated into employment success. Overall, these downward trends in employment have resulted in higher poverty rates and reduced standards of living (Picot and Hou 2003).
Only some of the reasons for these trends are well understood. The shift toward immigrants originating from outside Europe, with the resulting change in the racial composition of immigration, explains some of the reduced employment success, particularly during the 1970s and 1980s. Abdurrahman Aydemir and Mikal Skuterud show that when we consider immigrant trends throughout the period following the policy changes of the 1960s focusing on earnings in relation to levels of education, we see that the decline in earnings to 2000 is as much as 50% for both men and women (2005, 648–9). As much as one-third of this decline stems from origin shifts and the disadvantages associated with racial minority status.

Broader labour market changes affect immigrants, as well – particularly racial minorities. David Green and Christopher Worswick (2004) have shown that, to some extent, the downward trend in immigrant employment parallels the trend among the native-born entering the workforce for the first time, in the sense that both groups fared worse in the 1990s than in earlier decades. While the causes of the trend may or may not be the same for immigrants and the native-born, the consequences are greater for immigrants, since a larger proportion are pushed into poverty, and racial minorities are disproportionately affected. Increased difficulties for immigrants may also be related to the move toward a knowledge economy, the transformation of the occupational structure and an overall increase in earnings inequality. One aspect of this is the rise in native-born education levels, which, since the 1970s, has been generally faster than the rise in immigrant education levels. Reitz shows that the discounting of the foreign acquired education of immigrants in the labour market compounds their difficulties in keeping pace (2001b). Furthermore, the increased earnings disadvantages of immigrants are related to their reduced access to professional-level employment (Reitz 2003b), and to their growing difficulty in obtaining well-paying jobs outside professional fields, where educational qualifications are becoming more important. Finally, there is a noticeable decline in the value of foreign experience in the labour market, though the origins of this decline are not yet known (Green and Worswick 2004; Aydemir and Skuterud 2005; Reitz 2007a,b).

In addition, the economic situation of immigrants may be affected by broader institutional changes in Canadian society (Reitz 1998, 2001b). Specifically, social services have been reduced, affecting immigrants who are in the early stages of settlement, and costs for public services are rising, including costs for retraining and educational upgrading.

Clearly, the racial dimension of economic inequality in Canada today is significant, and its social implications require scrutiny. In any society, a noticeable association of racial status and economic success over extended periods raises questions about social and political integration. A critical aspect of this, which we will now consider, is the significance of discriminatory treatment.

**Awareness of Racial Discrimination and Inequality**

The fact that immigrant racial minorities experience inequality and disadvantage may not in itself be divisive if it is regarded as the result of understandable
circumstances – such as newcomer status, lack of sufficient language skills or training that does not match Canadian job requirements. Simply stated, inequality may not become a social problem if it is perceived as legitimate. However, racism, prejudice and discrimination are another matter. Not surprisingly, discriminatory treatment is more likely to be perceived as unjust and to lead to serious intergroup antagonism, as Gunnar Myrdal has noted. In his classic – and prescient – examination of US racial inequality, Myrdal points out the significance of the contradiction between the ideal of equal opportunity and the reality of inequality reinforced by discrimination (1944). In Canada Belanger and Pinard (1994) also noted that inequalities translate into lack of social integration when they are regarded as illegitimate. In our society which emphasizes equality of opportunity as a central value, discrimination certainly is regarded as an illegitimate form of inequality.

But how significant is racial discrimination in Canada? To what extent does it affect access to employment, education or housing? There is debate about the reasons for this inequality, and in particular about whether it arises from discriminatory barriers (Wanner 1998; Hum and Simpson 1999; Li 2000; Pendakur and Pendakur 1998, 2002; Swidinsky and Swidinsky 2002; see Reitz and Banerjee 2007, pp. 500–3). Whatever the ultimate resolution of debates about the extent of inequality, it is important to note that minorities frequently report that discriminatory inequality exists. Although few are predicting a serious breakdown in social cohesion in Canada as a result of racial inequality, concerns about racial tensions have been expressed from a variety of political standpoints, including advocates for minority rights (Lewis 1992; Omidvar and Richmond 2003), and advocates of reductions in immigration (e.g., Economic Council of Canada 1991; more recently, Stoffman 2002; Collacott 2002; Francis 2002).

Within certain minority groups, perceptions of racial discrimination are fairly widespread. In the Ethnic Diversity Survey, questions were asked about personal experiences of racial and ethnic discrimination, feeling “uncomfortable or out of place in Canada” and worries about being a victim of a hate crime (for question wording, see Table 1.2 in Chapter 1). Those who reported experiences of discrimination were further asked about the frequency and contexts of those experiences (e.g. in workplace, in the media, in the street), as well as the perceived reasons for the discrimination (e.g. race, ethnicity or culture, religion, language). For purposes of this analysis, feelings of discomfort and fear of a racially-motivated attack were combined into an index reflecting feelings of ‘vulnerability.’

As Table 5.1 (p. 125) shows, of the members of visible minorities who responded to this survey, 35.9% reported experiences of discrimination, compared with 10.6% of Whites.10 The highest rate is for Blacks, at 49.6%, but there are substantial rates also for the other visible minority groups, including Chinese, at 33.2%, and South Asians, at 33.1%. Among most White groups, experiences of discrimination are reported by fewer than 15%.11 For Whites who report discrimination about half indicated that they had experienced the discrimination sometimes or often and half reported that they experienced discrimination rarely. Among visible minorities, on the other hand, more than 60% of those reporting discrimination indicated that it occurred sometimes or often. Experiences of perceived vulnerability are reported by 37.3% of visible minority groups and 16% of White groups. These are personal
experiences, and the EDS does not report perceptions of discrimination against the
group as a whole. However, earlier surveys indicate that individuals are even more
likely to perceive discrimination against their group as a whole than against them-
selves personally: over one-third of Chinese respondents felt that way, as did a clear
majority of Black respondents.\textsuperscript{12}

The context in which discrimination was experienced is presented in Table 5.2.\textsuperscript{13}
From this table, we find that discrimination is more likely to be experienced in the
workplace than in any other context. Nearly 20\% of all visible minorities and 5\% of
all Whites indicated that they experienced discrimination within the workplace
or when they were applying for a job or promotion. Relatively fewer respondents
reported discrimination when dealing with police or the court system. Even fewer
individuals reported discrimination within educational institutions.

When respondents are probed about the perceived reasons for their experiences
of discrimination, some clear racial differences emerge. Table 5.3 presents the self-
reported reasons or bases for discrimination.\textsuperscript{14} Among visible minorities, race is by
far the most commonly cited reason for experiencing discrimination. About 24\% of
visible minorities indicated that they were discriminated against because of their
race. Among Blacks, this number is about 43\%. For Whites, on the other hand,
the most commonly cited reason for discrimination is language. This may reflect
the perceptions of non-English or French-speaking European immigrants, as well
as Francophones living outside of Quebec and Anglophones living within Quebec.
Bourhis et al. (2007) found that French-speakers living outside of Quebec and
English-speakers living within Quebec indeed report heightened levels of language-
based discrimination. Religion was rarely stated as a perceived reason for discrimi-
nation. However, South Asians were more likely than any other group to report that
they were discriminated against because of their religion. In their study of religious
differences in the social integration of immigrants in Canada, Reitz et al. (2009)
found that among visible minorities who reported discrimination, Muslims were
the most likely to attribute this discrimination to religion. Sikhs were also nearly
as likely to report that their experiences of discrimination were based on religion.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
 & On the street (%) & In a store, bank or restaurant (%) & At work (including applying and promotion) (%) & When dealing with police or court (%) & At school (%) \\
\hline
Persons not visible minorities & 2.3 & 3.0 & 4.5 & 0.6 & 0.9 \\
All visible minorities & 10.6 & 12.9 & 18.6 & 5.0 & 4.4 \\
Specific minority origins & & & & & \\
Chinese & 10.2 & 12.8 & 13.8 & 4.3 & 4.3 \\
South Asian & 10.9 & 12.6 & 19.1 & 5.2 & 3.2 \\
Black & 15.5 & 20.1 & 27.6 & 10.9 & 6.6 \\
Other visible minorities & 8.7 & 10.1 & 18.1 & 3.0 & 4.1 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Contexts of reported discrimination}
\end{table}

\textit{Note:} N’s are as follows: Whites – 32240; overall Visible Minorities – 8417; Chinese – 2371; South Asians – 1826; Blacks – 1387; other Visible Minorities – 2833.
\textit{Source:} Ethnic Diversity Survey 2002 (Statistics Canada and the Department of Canadian Heritage)
Table 5.3 Reasons for reported discrimination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Religion (%)</th>
<th>Ethnicity (%)</th>
<th>Race (%)</th>
<th>Language (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Persons not visible minorities</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All visible minorities</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific minority origins</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asian</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other visible minorities</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N’s are as follows: Whites – 32179; overall Visible Minorities – 8393; Chinese – 2362; South Asians – 1825; Blacks – 1382; other Visible Minorities – 2824.

Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey 2002 (Statistics Canada and the Department of Canadian Heritage)

Among Whites, Jewish respondents were far more likely to report discrimination based on religion than any other group.

Although there are some religious differences in inequality, as shown in Table 5.4, religion seems to be less important than race. Two facts stand out. First, race has a major impact within religious groups. Visible minority Catholics, Protestants, and Other Christians, as well as visible minorities reporting no religion, all have substantially lower incomes and more frequently report discrimination and vulnerability than do their white counterparts. Second, among visible minorities, differences in inequality among for religious groups are relatively less salient. Lower mean incomes for visible minorities is reflected in all religious groups, and is most notable for Muslims who are the most recently arrived immigrants.

Table 5.4 Inequality by race and religion, objective and reported

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>IE HH income relative to CMA (mean)</th>
<th>Reported discrimination (%)</th>
<th>Reported vulnerability (%)</th>
<th>N (unweighted)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Persons not visible minorities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Religion</td>
<td>$3,036</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>5800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>$214</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>12670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>$1,977</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>10440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Christian</td>
<td>−$206</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>2580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>−$17,690</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>$14,004</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$1,237</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>32290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visible minorities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Religion</td>
<td>−$6,669</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>2040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>−$5,099</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>−$2,875</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>1250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Christian</td>
<td>−$10,061</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>−$15,320</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>−$8,273</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>−$4,886</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikh</td>
<td>−$6,646</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>−$7,684</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>8470</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Among whites, the lowest mean incomes also are observed for Muslims who again are among the most recently arrived immigrants. The greater importance of visible minority status compared to religion is particularly clear for the reported inequality measures - discrimination and vulnerability. In all the visible minority religious groups, between 30 and 50% report discrimination or vulnerability. Among whites, the Muslims and Jewish most resemble visible minorities, though not in all respects. The Muslims have the lowest relative household income like visible minorities, and more often report vulnerability, but do not discrimination as frequently. Jewish whites have high individual-equivalent household incomes, but are far more likely than other white groups to report experiences of both discrimination and vulnerability.

Examining the visible minority groups, it is clear that there is only minor variation in inequality by religion. In terms of reported inequality, the religious variations among visible minorities are minor when compared to the racial variations.

Given the on-going controversy over ‘reasonable accommodation’ of minorities in Quebec, sparked, in part, by the publication of standards for the behaviour of immigrants to the small town of Hérouxville, it is important to also examine regional differences in objective and reported inequality. Table 5.5 presents objective and reported inequality by visible minority group for Quebec and the rest of Canada.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.5</th>
<th>Objective and reported inequality among visible minorities for Quebec and the rest of Canada</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quebec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual equivalent household income relative to CMA ($)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons not visible minorities</td>
<td>$-437.3$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visible minorities, total</td>
<td>$-10,330.1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>$-11,801.0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asian</td>
<td>$-10,227.2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>$-12,171.4$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other VM</td>
<td>$-8,728.8$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reported discrimination</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons not visible minorities</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visible minorities, total</td>
<td>30.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>31.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asian</td>
<td>25.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>39.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other VM</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reported vulnerability</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons not visible minorities</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visible minorities, total</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>33.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asian</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>41.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other VM</td>
<td>28.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* Those who did not identify any ancestry or visible minority group or did not report household income or reported inequality are excluded.

*Source:* Ethnic Diversity Survey 2002 (Statistics Canada and the Department of Canadian Heritage)
terms of individual equivalent household income relative to CMA, both Whites and visible minorities are somewhat more disadvantaged in Quebec relative to the rest of Canada. The regional differences in reported discrimination and vulnerability, however, are small and tend to favour Quebec. While about 31% of visible minorities in Quebec reported discrimination, in the rest of Canada, this proportion was 37%. All of the largest visible minority groups (Chinese, South Asians and Blacks) were less likely to report discrimination in Quebec than in the rest of Canada. The regional difference is most pronounced among Blacks. While about 39% of Blacks reported discriminatory treatment in Quebec, in the rest of Canada, this proportion was 53%. The results were similar for reported vulnerability.

**Inequality: Recent Immigrants, Earlier Immigrants, and the Second Generation**

The economic circumstance of immigrants improves considerably as they adjust to Canadian society and labour markets. Furthermore, for the second generation, educational levels and employment experiences are quite positive. However, a racial gap in perception of discrimination is notable among immigrants with longer experience in Canada, and is even greater among the children of immigrants.

Data from the EDS, reported in Table 5.6, show individual equivalent household incomes relative to one’s CMA by immigrant generation. The inequalities experienced by recent immigrants are greatly reduced among the earlier immigrants. For the second generation there are also increased relative incomes, which would be even more evident on an age-adjusted basis.16

Yet as inequality declines across these groups, awareness of discriminatory inequality appears to intensify. Regarding self-reported experiences of discrimination, the rates actually seem to be higher with greater experience in Canada. Among recent immigrants (those arriving during the previous 10 years), 33.6% of racial minorities report having experienced discrimination, compared with 19.2% of those of European origin. Among immigrants arriving earlier, perceptions of discrimination are less common for those of European origin; at a rate of 10.2%, it is about the same as it is for the children of European immigrants and for the broader Canadian population of third generation and greater. But among racial minority immigrants who arrived earlier, perceptions of discrimination are, if anything, more common, at 35.5%; and among the children of racial minority immigrants, the percentage experiencing discrimination is still greater, at 42.2%. The racial gap in perceptions of discrimination, which is 14.4% for recent immigrants, becomes 25.3% for earlier immigrants, and 31.3% for the children of immigrants. In other words, greater experience in Canada seems to lead to a larger racial gap in the perception of discrimination. This widening racial gap is observed among Chinese, South Asians, Blacks and other visible minority groups. In these groups, the percentage of those born in Canada who report experiences of discrimination varies between 34.5% for Chinese, 43.4% for South Asians and 60.9% for Blacks, compared with 10.9% for the children of immigrants of European origin.
Table 5.6 Objective and reported inequality among visible minorities by recency of immigration and generation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Immigrants</th>
<th>Second generation</th>
<th>Third and higher generations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recent</td>
<td>Earlier</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual equivalent household income relative to CMA ($)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons not visible minorities</td>
<td>−8467.5</td>
<td>2190.6</td>
<td>3497.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visible minorities, total</td>
<td>−14630.7</td>
<td>−1535.2</td>
<td>−1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>−16500.8</td>
<td>1523.3</td>
<td>4670.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asian</td>
<td>−13103.3</td>
<td>1938.1</td>
<td>417.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>−15872.1</td>
<td>−6840.0</td>
<td>−3782.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other VM</td>
<td>−13726.9</td>
<td>−3779.5</td>
<td>−1680.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reported discrimination</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons not visible minorities</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visible minorities, total</td>
<td>33.6%</td>
<td>35.5%</td>
<td>42.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>35.4%</td>
<td>30.9%</td>
<td>34.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asian</td>
<td>28.2%</td>
<td>34.1%</td>
<td>43.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>44.8%</td>
<td>47.7%</td>
<td>60.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other VM</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
<td>34.8%</td>
<td>36.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reported vulnerability</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons not visible minorities</td>
<td>26.2%</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visible minorities, total</td>
<td>41.8%</td>
<td>37.8%</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>40.8%</td>
<td>32.3%</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asian</td>
<td>40.7%</td>
<td>39.9%</td>
<td>28.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>49.8%</td>
<td>44.5%</td>
<td>37.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other VM</td>
<td>41.0%</td>
<td>37.6%</td>
<td>25.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Those who did not identify any ancestry or visible minority group or did not report household income or reported inequality are excluded. Visible Minorities in third and fourth generation are excluded.

Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey 2002 (Statistics Canada and the Department of Canadian Heritage).

Reported vulnerability is less for the second generation, but still substantially higher than for whites. Thus, although visible minority groups achieve a degree of economic integration over time, their experiences of inclusion do not show the same positive trend.

Why are the children of immigrants more aware of discrimination than their parents, despite more favourable economic circumstances? Minority responses to inequality are dramatically affected by social frame of reference, and this comparative frame of reference is likely to vary over time and through generations. For immigrants, including racial minorities, the comparative frame of reference may be largely within the group or in the home country, rather than in Canada. Immigrants may often be quite accepting of any inequalities they face, acknowledging that newcomers must prove themselves, and hoping to prosper in the future. The immigrant perspective reflects a personal choice, and situations are judged in relation to that choice and to previous experience in the country of origin. Those who become disillusioned may return to a known opportunity structure in that country.
Over time, as the settlement process reaches more advanced stages, this external social frame of reference may shift significantly.

The perspective of the second generation born in Canada is likely to be different than that of immigrants. It is likely shaped more completely by Canadian experience, more often leading to expectations for equality with other native-born Canadians. The native-born second generation has a different and more complex relation to Canadian society. They have a greater sense of personal investment in Canada and judge their experiences against higher standards. Their opportunity to return to an external ‘home’ is far less, if it exists at all. It is partly for this reason that the expectation for equality may be more strongly felt. These patterns have been shown in the experiences in other countries (for example, Britain; see Rex and Tomlinson 1979, pp. 18, 33, 68–9).

What these findings underscore is that levels of income are not necessarily related to awareness related to inequality such as discrimination or other negative treatment. In the Ethnic Diversity Survey the overall correlations among these items are in fact quite low and not statistically significant. Discrimination is not reported more often by racial minority persons with lower incomes, even for those who have significant educational qualifications and presumably higher expectations for earnings. Hence, the impact of the objective and more subjective dimensions of inequality may be quite independent of one another. As objective incomes improve, subjective assessments may become more negative if expectations for equality rise more rapidly.

Visible Minorities and Attachment to Canada

The attachment to Canada of visible minorities and others can be examined considering the seven of the measures of attachments described in Chapter One. These include the two regarding personal relations, trust in others, and life satisfaction. They include three items regarding social belonging, feelings of belonging, Canadian identity, and (for immigrants) Canadian citizenship. Regarding participation, two items were used: voting, and volunteer activity. These various indicators will tell us much about individual orientations of immigrant groups and their descendants to Canadian society, and about their attitudes and behaviours which will in turn allow us to gauge their social and political integration. Social cohesion in the future will depend on other conditions and circumstances, of course, so the implications of the data for social cohesion must be considered carefully.

The overall relation between the minority group membership and attachments to Canada is shown in Table 5.7. On six of the seven indicators of integration into Canadian society, visible minorities are less integrated. The greatest gap between visible minorities and whites is regarding ‘Canadian identity’. About 30% fewer visible minorities than whites reported identification as ‘Canadian.’ Furthermore, when asked about the importance this Canadian identity, even those visible minorities who reported a Canadian identity were less likely than their white counterparts to indicate that this identity was important or very important to them. There are also significant racial differences in voting (11%) and citizenship (18%). The gap in citizenship
Table 5.7 Integration of visible minorities in Canadian society

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Belonging (%)</th>
<th>Trust (%)</th>
<th>“Canadian” Identity (%)</th>
<th>Citizenship (%)</th>
<th>Satisfaction (%)</th>
<th>Volunteering (%)</th>
<th>Voted in Federal election (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Persons not visible minorities</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>97.30</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>81.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Visible minorities, total</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>78.96</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>70.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Specific minority origins</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>83.90</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>68.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asian</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>73.30</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>76.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>80.80</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>71.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other visible minorities</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>78.00</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>69.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Those who did not answer the above questions are excluded. N’s for whites range from 31341 to 32660; unweighted N’s for overall visible minorities range from 8149 to 8622; N’s for Chinese range from 2267 to 2421; N’s for South Asians range from 1755 to 1892; N’s for blacks range from 1347 to 1424; N’s for other visible minorities range from 2757 to 2885 depending on the outcome measure.

Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey 2002 (Statistics Canada)
likely reflects the significantly higher proportion of immigrants among the visible minority sample. There are also gaps in life satisfaction (5%), volunteering (7%), and trust in others (only 2%). The exception is ‘sense of belonging,’ and on this indicator, visible minorities are actually slightly better integrated: about 4% more visible minorities than whites have a strong sense of belonging.

Some of these generalizations apply to all specific visible minorities, others do not. The most pervasive pattern affecting all visible minorities is the substantially lower levels of Canadian identity and voting. All also have lower rates of citizenship. Regarding life satisfaction and trust, there are clear variations among groups. Lower life satisfaction affects the Chinese in particular, with the other groups being closer to the white average. Blacks report less trust in others. South Asians and other visible minorities are near the white average on trust, and Chinese are over 10% above the white average. Some groups have low levels of attachment in most aspects, particularly black and Chinese. Blacks, however, have the highest rate of volunteer work, followed by South Asians and other visible minorities; Chinese are clearly lower than whites on this indicator.

Integration for Recent Immigrants, Earlier Immigrants, and the Second Generation

It is also important to consider minority integration into Canadian society as a process which evolves with experience in Canada, and with the transition to new generations. This is as true for processes of social and political integration as it is for economic integration and experiences of discrimination. On the one hand, recent immigrants may show weaker attachment to Canada in some respects if attachments to Canada take some time to develop. One example might be citizenship and voting. It takes at least three years to become eligible for citizenship and voting, and many may defer this step for some time. Immigrants often express strong attachments to Canada, stronger even than ‘mainstream’ Canadians, and these may weaken over time. These statements may reflect the frame of reference of newcomers, that the feeling of belonging is a statement of successful integration into the new country. Those who have been in Canada longer may assess their feelings of attachment in comparison to what they might have expected.

As they become better established in Canada, income levels of visible minority groups definitely rise. On the other hand, there are no such clear trends regarding the more subjective reports of experiences. A comparison of recent immigrants, earlier immigrants and the second generation regarding the seven indicators of integration in Canadian society shows that on most indicators, the gap between visible minorities and whites does not decline but in fact grows substantially with experience in Canada. These trends are shown for visible minorities in total, and for specific groups, in Table 5.8. In this table, individuals are considered to ‘trust’ if they reported that ‘most people are trustworthy.’ They are considered to be ‘satisfied’ if they scored 5 on the question of overall satisfaction. Respondents are
Table 5.8 Integration of visible minorities – by generation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Immigrants</th>
<th></th>
<th>2nd generation</th>
<th>3rd + generation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recent (%)</td>
<td>Earlier (%)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Satisfaction</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>47.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total visible minorities</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asian</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other visible minorities</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>36.3</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Trust</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>47.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total visible minorities</td>
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<td>45.6</td>
<td>44.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asian</td>
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<td>51.4</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Black</td>
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<td>26.2</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other visible minority</td>
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<td>43.7</td>
<td>46.0</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Belonging</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
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<td>60.9</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>53.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total visible minorities</td>
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<td>61.8</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asian</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>50.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Other visible minorities</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>44.1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Voting</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td>84.0</td>
<td>73.4</td>
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<tr>
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<td>77.8</td>
<td>64.3</td>
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<td>Chinese</td>
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<td>75.4</td>
<td>69.9</td>
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<td>South Asian</td>
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<td>82.9</td>
<td>66.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other visible minority</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Volunteering</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>22.1</td>
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<td>36.5</td>
<td>34.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total visible minorities</td>
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<td>27.6</td>
<td>36.2</td>
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<td>19.2</td>
<td>32.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Asian</td>
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<td>31.2</td>
<td>42.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other visible minority</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>35.2</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Canadian identity</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>78.2</td>
<td>63.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total visible minorities</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>56.6</td>
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<td>Chinese</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>59.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Asian</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>32.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other visible minority</td>
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<td>32.8</td>
<td>60.6</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Canadian citizenship</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>85.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total visible minorities</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>92.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>96.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>South Asian</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>88.8</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>88.2</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Other visible minority</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>92.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* Those who did not answer these questions are excluded. *For this variable, only those who are at least 20 years old and eligible to vote are included in the sample.

*Source:* Ethnic Diversity Survey 2002 (Statistics Canada and the Department of Canadian Heritage)
Visible minorities acquire Canadian identity more slowly. Note: See Table 5.7 for details about specific visible minority groups.

Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey 2002 (Statistics Canada and the Department of Canadian Heritage)

considered to ‘belong’ if they scored 3, 4 or 5 on each of the components of the belongingness index.

The Figs. 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5 present the same findings in pictorial form. From Fig. 5.1, it is apparent that identification as ‘Canadian’ is low for all groups

Visible minority immigrants vote, but the second generation loses interest. Note: See Table 5.7 for details about specific visible minority groups.

Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey 2002 (Statistics Canada and the Department of Canadian Heritage)
Visible Minorities and Attachment to Canada

Fig 5.3 Sense of belonging for visible minority immigrants weakens over time. *Note:* See Table 5.7 for details about specific visible minority groups. *Source:* Ethnic Diversity Survey 2002 (Statistics Canada and the Department of Canadian Heritage)

Fig 5.4 Life satisfaction among visible minorities declines relative to whites. *Note:* See Table 5.7 for details about specific visible minority groups. *Source:* Ethnic Diversity Survey 2002 (Statistics Canada and the Department of Canadian Heritage)
of recent immigrants. But whereas for whites such identification is much greater (by about 30%) for earlier immigrants (those who have been in Canada 10 years or more), for visible minorities, in most cases, it is only 10–15% greater. Perhaps even more significantly, among the second generation, for whites the rate of Canadian identification is quite high, while among visible minorities it still lags by over 20%.

A similar pattern can be seen with regard to voting in Fig. 5.2. Among recent immigrants, there is little racial difference in voting. About half of the eligible recent immigrants report voting. When we look at the voting rates for earlier immigrants, however, we find that visible minorities fall short of the rates for whites, suggesting that they are voting rather less than might be expected based on eligibility. However, it is for the second generation that the most obvious racial differences arise. Among second generation whites, the rate of voting is 84.0%, compared to 69.9% of Chinese, 66.9% of South Asians, 63.3% of other visible minorities, and only 55.5% of blacks. Overall among visible minorities, the rate of voting is 64.3%. Hence, the racial gap in voting in the second generation is about 20%.

Regarding the sense of belonging (which is higher for visible minority groups overall), the generational analysis in Fig. 5.3 shows that this higher rate is most pronounced for immigrants, particularly recent immigrants. For the second generation, however, visible minorities report less of a sense of belonging than whites. This is most striking in the case of blacks, but also quite pronounced for Chinese and other visible minorities.

Regarding life satisfaction, Fig. 5.4 illustrates that overall, visible minority recent immigrants begin their life in Canada more satisfied than their white counterparts, but that this relative satisfaction declines, such that by the second generation, visible
Visible Minorities and Attachment to Canada

minorities are much less likely than whites to report satisfaction. This overall trend is caused by the low levels of satisfaction among Chinese in all generational groups including the second generation, as well as low levels of satisfaction among blacks and other visible minorities.

Figure 5.5 shows that overall, visible minorities’ level of trust declines with time in Canada, but there are some major differences in trust by specific visible minority group. These differences are outlined in Fig. 5.5. The low level of trust among blacks is evident in all generational groups including the second generation, and low levels are also evident for South Asians and other visible minorities. Among Chinese, new immigrants start out quite trusting, but this declines with time spent in Canada.

A finding of slower integration for racial minorities in Canada compared to whites is potentially quite important, and so it is worthwhile to examine it further. The patterns of integration are quite time-sensitive, and although these time-related variables are controlled somewhat by examining patterns within the categories of recent immigrants, earlier immigrants and second generation, there are time-related variations within these categories. In particular, among earlier immigrants the whites arrived significantly earlier than the racial minorities. For the second generation the whites tend to be older than the visible minorities. Because of these patterns, a further analysis is conducted within each of these three categories, in which the impact of racial origins was examined controlling for recency of immigration (for the two immigrant groups) and for age. The results are presented in Table 5.9, and the significant effects are shown in pictorial form in Figs. 5.6, 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9. Figure 5.6 presents the OLS regression coefficients of visible minority status in predicting sense of belonging and life satisfaction. Figure 5.7 presents the odds ratios of visible minority status on the probability of citizenship and voting. Figure 5.8 presents the odds ratios of visible minority status on the probability of trusting others and reporting a Canadian identity and Fig. 5.9 presents the effect of visible minority status on obtaining Canadian citizenship.

The basic findings are not altered, but it is important to note certain details. Figure 5.6 illustrates that for belonging and life satisfaction the impact of visible minority status becomes more negative as one moves from recent immigrants to earlier immigrants to second generation after controlling for age and time in Canada. As discussed earlier, among immigrants (both new and earlier), visible minority status actually has a positive effect on belonging. In the second generation, however, there is a negative effect of visible minority status on belonging. This effect does vary by visible minority group, however. For example, blacks in the second generation report significantly lower levels of belonging than whites. Chinese and ‘other’ visible minorities in the second generation also report lower levels of belonging than whites, but these effects are not statistically significant. Second generation South Asians actually report slightly higher levels of belonging than their white counterparts, but it is still lower than among South Asian immigrants. For life satisfaction, among new immigrants there is no significant effect of visible minority status. Among earlier immigrants, visible minority status is associated with lower levels of satisfaction, and among the second generation the effect of visible minority status becomes even more negative.
Fig 5.6 Visible minority status has negative effect over time on belonging and life satisfaction. 
*Note:* Complete regression results are presented in Table 5.8  
*Source:* Ethnic Diversity Survey 2002 (Statistics Canada and the Department of Canadian Heritage)

Fig 5.7 Visible minority status has negative effect on voting and volunteering for the second generation.  
*Note:* Complete regression results are presented in Table 5.8  
*Source:* Ethnic Diversity Survey 2002 (Statistics Canada and the Department of Canadian Heritage)
Visible minority status has negative effect over time on trust and Canadian identity. *Note:* Complete regression results are presented in Table 5.8

*Source:* Ethnic Diversity Survey 2002 (Statistics Canada and the Department of Canadian Heritage)

Visible minority status has positive effect on Canadian citizenship, particularly for earlier immigrants. *Note:* Complete regression results are presented in Table 5.8

*Source:* Ethnic Diversity Survey 2002 (Statistics Canada and the Department of Canadian Heritage)
### Table 5.9 Regression effects of visible minority status on social integration – with controls for time-related variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Explanatory variable</th>
<th>Immigrants</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Recent</td>
<td>Earlier</td>
<td>Second generation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction</td>
<td>Visible minority (coeff.)</td>
<td>−0.038</td>
<td>−0.066*</td>
<td>−0.164***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chinese (coeff.)</td>
<td>−0.204***</td>
<td>−0.233***</td>
<td>−0.184***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Asian (coeff.)</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>−0.009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Black (coeff.)</td>
<td>−0.059</td>
<td>−0.085</td>
<td>−0.345***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other visible minority (coeff.)</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>−0.002</td>
<td>−0.128***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>Visible minority (coeff.)</td>
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<td>−0.402***</td>
<td>−0.229***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chinese (coeff.)</td>
<td>0.562***</td>
<td>0.006</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Asian (coeff.)</td>
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<td>−0.151</td>
<td>−0.315***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Black (coeff.)</td>
<td>−0.919***</td>
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<td>−0.566***</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Other visible minority (coeff.)</td>
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<td>−0.473***</td>
<td>−0.188*</td>
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<td>Belonging</td>
<td>Visible minority (coeff.)</td>
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<td>0.177***</td>
<td>−0.062*</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chinese (coeff.)</td>
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<td>−0.039</td>
<td>−0.046</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Asian (coeff.)</td>
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<td>0.303***</td>
<td>0.094*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Black (coeff.)</td>
<td>0.466***</td>
<td>0.320***</td>
<td>−0.235***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other visible minority (coeff.)</td>
<td>0.206***</td>
<td>0.188***</td>
<td>−0.062</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votinga</td>
<td>Visible Minority (coeff.)</td>
<td>−0.070</td>
<td>−0.119</td>
<td>−0.221**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chinese (coeff.)</td>
<td>−0.201</td>
<td>−0.326**</td>
<td>−0.133</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Asian (coeff.)</td>
<td>0.180</td>
<td>0.178</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Black (coeff.)</td>
<td>−0.459</td>
<td>0.191</td>
<td>−0.615***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other visible minority (coeff.)</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>−0.243*</td>
<td>−0.249*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteering</td>
<td>Visible minority (coeff.)</td>
<td>−0.067</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>−0.136**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chinese (coeff.)</td>
<td>−0.279*</td>
<td>−0.387***</td>
<td>−0.311***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Asian (coeff.)</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>0.273**</td>
<td>0.127</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Black (coeff.)</td>
<td>0.599***</td>
<td>0.419***</td>
<td>−0.091</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other visible minority (coeff.)</td>
<td>−0.242</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>−0.183</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian identity</td>
<td>Visible minority (coeff.)</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>−0.448***</td>
<td>−0.756***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chinese (coeff.)</td>
<td>0.447***</td>
<td>−0.075</td>
<td>−0.690***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Asian (coeff.)</td>
<td>−0.055</td>
<td>−0.533***</td>
<td>−0.836***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Black (coeff.)</td>
<td>−0.558*</td>
<td>−0.851***</td>
<td>−1.060***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other visible minority (coeff.)</td>
<td>−0.256</td>
<td>−0.515***</td>
<td>−0.571***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian citizenship</td>
<td>Visible minority (coeff.)</td>
<td>0.251*</td>
<td>1.352***</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chinese (coeff.)</td>
<td>0.788***</td>
<td>2.507***</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Asian (coeff.)</td>
<td>0.193</td>
<td>1.045***</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Black (coeff.)</td>
<td>−0.292</td>
<td>0.780***</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other visible minority (coeff.)</td>
<td>−0.001</td>
<td>1.336***</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Controls include age and, for immigrants, year of immigration. aFor this variable, only those who are at least 20 years old and eligible to vote are included in the sample.

*Source: *Ethnic Diversity Survey 2002 (Statistics Canada and the Department of Canadian Heritage).

Figure 5.7 illustrates that visible minority status does not affect voting for recent or earlier immigrants. In the second generation, however, visible minorities are 20% less likely to vote than their white counterparts. The negative effect of race on voting in the second generation is particularly true for blacks and ‘other’ visible minorities. Similar to voting, there is a negative effect of visible minority status for volunteering.
among the second generation. Second generation visible minorities are 13% less likely to volunteer than whites. This effect is driven primarily by the lower rates of volunteering among second generation Chinese and ‘other’ visible minorities.

Figure 5.8 illustrates that for new immigrants, there is no significant effect of visible minority status on trust or Canadian identity. For earlier immigrants and the second generation, however, there is a significant negative effect of visible minority status on the probability of both claiming Canadian identity and trusting others. Specifically, visible minority earlier immigrants are 33% less likely to report trusting others and 36% less likely to claim Canadian identity than their white counterparts. Among the second generation, visible minorities are about half as likely to report a Canadian identity as the white second generation and about 20% less likely to be trusting. But, as revealed in Fig. 5.5, this effect varies quite a bit by specific visible minority group.

In contrast to most of the measures, visible minority status has a strong positive effect on obtaining Canadian citizenship. Figure 5.9 illustrates that among earlier-arrived immigrants in particular, visible minorities are almost 4 times more likely to become a Canadian citizen than their white counterparts.

**Impact of Inequality and Awareness of Inequality**

What is the impact of inequality – and awareness of inequality, on these relatively slower rates of integration for visible minorities in Canada? In Table 5.10 are the standardized regression effects of individual-equivalent (IE) household income, experiences of discrimination and experiences of vulnerability on the seven indicators of integration, controlling for the time-related variables (age and, for immigrants, time in Canada) for visible minorities alone. What is quite evident is that low income in itself has relatively modest effects in slowing integration. Low income is associated with lower levels of satisfaction, and a lower likelihood of trusting others and volunteering for earlier immigrants. Paradoxically, low income is positively related to sense of belonging, indicating that those with lower levels of income actually report a stronger sense of belong to Canadian society. Among second generation visible minorities, low income is associated with lower levels of satisfaction, trust and voting. None of these effects, however, are particularly large. In addition to household income, education was also examined as a predictor of integration for visible minorities (analysis not shown). For most of the seven indicators, the effect of education on integration was very similar to that of household income. However, for the probability of voting, level of education was found to be a much stronger positive predictor among visible minorities than household income. Experiences of discrimination are more important in affecting visible minorities’ life satisfaction, trust and likelihood of volunteering. Reported vulnerability is also important in affecting visible minorities’ life satisfaction, trust of others and claiming Canadian identity. However, even these effects are limited in magnitude.

What these findings suggest is that although income levels are lower among visible minorities, they do not completely explain the trend toward lower levels of integration in Canadian society, and that experiences of discrimination and vulnerability
### Table 5.10 Effect of household income, reported experiences of discrimination and vulnerability on various attachments in Canada (7 measures) for visible minorities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Regression equations</th>
<th>Immigrants Recent</th>
<th>Immigrants Earlier</th>
<th>Second generation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction</td>
<td>(1) IE Household Income</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.076***</td>
<td>0.053**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Perceived discrimination</td>
<td>-0.229***</td>
<td>-0.148***</td>
<td>-0.134***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) Perceived vulnerability</td>
<td>-0.145***</td>
<td>-0.145***</td>
<td>-0.187***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>(1) IE Household Income</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.109***</td>
<td>0.053***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Perceived discrimination</td>
<td>-0.116***</td>
<td>-0.078***</td>
<td>-0.073***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) Perceived vulnerability</td>
<td>-0.169***</td>
<td>-0.163***</td>
<td>-0.084***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belonging</td>
<td>(1) IE Household Income</td>
<td>-0.043</td>
<td>-0.098***</td>
<td>0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Perceived discrimination</td>
<td>-0.106***</td>
<td>-0.097***</td>
<td>-0.065**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) Perceived vulnerability</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
<td>-0.042*</td>
<td>-0.058**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting*</td>
<td>(1) IE Household Income</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.036*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Perceived discrimination</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>-0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) Perceived vulnerability</td>
<td>-0.033</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>-0.0009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteering</td>
<td>(1) IE Household Income</td>
<td>-0.063</td>
<td>0.072**</td>
<td>0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Perceived discrimination</td>
<td>0.149***</td>
<td>0.107***</td>
<td>0.063***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) Perceived vulnerability</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.055*</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Identity</td>
<td>(1) IE Household Income</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Perceived discrimination</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>-0.048*</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) Perceived vulnerability</td>
<td>-0.112**</td>
<td>-0.136***</td>
<td>-0.028**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>(1) IE Household Income</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.117</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Perceived discrimination</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) Perceived vulnerability</td>
<td>-0.050</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Controls include age and, for immigrants, year of immigration. *For this variable, only those who are at least 20 years old and eligible to vote are included in the sample.

*Source:* Ethnic Diversity Survey 2002 (Statistics Canada and the Department of Canadian Heritage).

may be somewhat more important but also an incomplete explanation. This is precisely what is shown in Table 5.11.25

For most of the indicators of attachment, accounting for income equality has little impact on the effect of visible minority status. One exception is voting among the second generation. For this indicator, controlling for household income actually slightly increases the negative effect of visible minority status. Since income has a positive effect on voting, the relatively high household income of second generation visible minorities suppresses the true effect of visible minority status.

While low income has little relevance in explaining the effect of visible minority status on most of the indicators of attachment, experiences of discrimination and vulnerability do account for part of the effect. Among earlier immigrants, reported experiences of discrimination or vulnerability partly explain the lower levels of trust and Canadian identity of visible minorities. For sense of belonging, controlling for reported discrimination or vulnerability improves the already positive effect of visible minority status. Among the second generation, these variables partly explain the lower levels of satisfaction, trust, belonging, voting and Canadian identity. For
Table 5.11 Effect of visible minority status on various attachments (7 measures) controlling for inequality, reported inequality, recency of immigration and age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variables</th>
<th>Immigrants</th>
<th>Regression equations</th>
<th>Recent</th>
<th>Earlier</th>
<th>Second generation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>−0.038</td>
<td>−0.066∗</td>
<td>−0.164∗∗∗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>−0.031</td>
<td>−0.064∗</td>
<td>−0.160∗∗∗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>−0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>−0.170</td>
<td>−0.402∗∗</td>
<td>−0.229∗∗∗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>−0.138</td>
<td>−0.401∗∗</td>
<td>−0.222∗∗∗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>−0.006</td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.228∗∗∗ − 0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.246***</td>
<td>0.177***</td>
<td>−0.062∗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.230***</td>
<td>0.176***</td>
<td>−0.063∗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.268***</td>
<td>0.221***</td>
<td>−0.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>−0.119</td>
<td>−0.221∗∗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>−0.060</td>
<td>−0.116</td>
<td>−0.241∗∗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>−0.127</td>
<td>−0.177</td>
<td>−0.196∗</td>
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<tr>
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<td>−0.067</td>
<td>0.057</td>
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</tr>
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<td>0.066</td>
<td>−0.133∗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>−0.212∗∗</td>
</tr>
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<td>−0.751∗∗∗</td>
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<td>−0.673∗∗∗</td>
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<td>0.253*</td>
<td>1.362***</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.288*</td>
<td>1.296***</td>
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</table>

*Note: ∗p < 0.10; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01; a For this variable, only those who are at least 20 years old and eligible to vote are included in the sample; Regression equations: (1) time-related controls only; (2) household income, plus time-related controls; (3) household income, reported discrimination, reported vulnerability and time-related controls; changes in the coefficients of visible minority status after controlling for inequality and reported inequality are highlighted. Significant changes greater than 0.05 are bolded, and changes greater than 0.10 are bolded and underlined.

Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey 2002 (Statistics Canada and the Department of Canadian Heritage).

volunteering, controlling for feelings for discrimination and vulnerability actually strengthens the negative effect of visible minority status.

Summary and Implications

Inequality has a significant impact on the social integration of minorities in Canada, and the analysis presented above points to four main conclusions. First, the rapidly growing visible minority populations in Canada experience greater inequality than do traditional European-origin immigrant groups, and although the economic situation of visible minorities is much improved by the second generation, their subjective awareness of discrimination is not reduced – but in fact is intensified. Second, the social integration into Canadian society for racial minorities appears to be slower than for immigrants of European origins; the indicators of integration
are generally relatively less positive for the second generation than for immigrants. Third, awareness of inequality and a sense of exclusion appear to be at least part of the reason for the slower integration of racial minorities. And fourth, the findings apply to nearly all racial minorities, and variations among these groups based on ethnic or religious distinctions are relatively small. The data do however point toward one group – blacks – as experiencing the greatest difficulties with both experiences of inequality – objectively and subjectively – and slower social integration. Each of these conclusions prompts further reflection.

**Objective and Subjective Racial Inequality**

Canadian society displays considerable racial inequality. The Ethnic Diversity Survey confirms certain facts previously well-known about the objective inequalities of economic well-being. Visible minority immigrants, particularly recent immigrants, experience considerable economic disadvantage and high rates of poverty. Generally speaking, their children have done relatively well in terms of educational and occupational success. However, one group – blacks – do less well, both among immigrants and among the second generation.

The debate has been over the extent to which the economic fortunes of the racial minorities are affected by racial or other forms of discrimination, and this debate remains unresolved. One common thread in this debate is to highlight differences among visible minority groups, and most analyses do acknowledge that blacks in particular appear to experience considerable discrimination.

What the Ethnic Diversity Survey adds to the debate is evidence on subjective perceptions or awareness of discriminatory disadvantage among racial minorities, and this is significant because objective inequality is likely to have its social impact partly because of such subjective responses. Ethnic Diversity Survey provides clear evidence that such awareness is fairly widespread in Canada. The analysis here adds a particularly significant point: despite their relative success, awareness of racial discrimination is *greater* among the Canadian-born generations. Recent immigrants who are racial minorities more often report instances of discrimination than do their counterparts of European origins. However, whereas for immigrants from Europe these reports become less frequent with length of time in the country, they become *more* frequent for visible minorities. And this trend is more pronounced in the second generation: relatively few reports of discrimination from the children of European immigrants, considerably more frequent reports for the children of visible minority immigrants. These trends are observed for all visible minority groups, and are most pronounced for blacks.

It has long been observed that the second generation provides a better indication of the long-term potential for social integration than do their immigrant parents, because of extensive acculturation, official language fluency, domestic rather than foreign education, and relative economic success. If this is the case, then the rising levels of reported discrimination for this group may be considered as a highly significant indicator pointing to a potential source of difficulty.
How significant are these reports of discrimination? Taken at face value, the numbers seem very significant. One third of racial minority immigrants report experiences of discrimination in Canada within the previous five years, and more than four in ten of the second generation also report such discriminatory experiences, and up to six in ten blacks born in Canada. Most of these reports are related to racial background, rather than religion, for example – even for Muslims or other small religious minorities distinctive to new immigrant groups – or other possible bases of discrimination related to origins, such as culture or accent. Most of the reports are related to employment.

The relation between subjective experiences and actual instances of discrimination obviously may be a point of debate. Some say that the reports likely under-estimate racial discrimination, since such discrimination in Canada is subtle or hidden, particularly in domains such as housing and employment where it is illegal. Members of minority groups can hardly report discrimination of which they remain oblivious. Others charge that minorities over-estimate discrimination as a rationalization for difficulties they encounter for other reasons. From the point of view of social integration, this debate over the reality of discrimination is to some extent beside the point. Socially and politically, perceptions are reality. The famous ‘Thomas theorem’ captures this truth: situations that are defined as real are real in their social consequences.

To fully assess the meaning of these perceptions, clearly more detailed information is required. How significantly do respondents view the discrimination they report? What impact do they think it has had on their lives? Do some respondents fail to report experiences of discrimination they have experienced, because they choose to put it out of their minds, or because they want to avoid discussion of a painful experience with an interviewer who is a total stranger? These questions obviously remain but the need to provide answers is clearly demonstrated.

Social circumstances which heighten awareness of discrimination also require further study. The differences between Quebec and the rest of Canada are particularly interesting in this regard. The EDS data show that awareness of discrimination is somewhat less in Quebec than in the rest of Canada. It would be important to know the reasons, and as well whether a survey conducted in 2008 might reveal a changed situation from what is observed to have been the case in 2002. Has the debate over ‘reasonable accommodation’ heightened awareness of discrimination among minorities in Quebec?

**The Racial Difference in Social Integration and the Second Generation**

The Ethnic Diversity Survey clearly shows the impact of race on the social integration of immigrants in Canada, particularly for the second generation. Although whites with greater experience in Canada are better integrated into society, for visible minorities this is less so. The negative trends with greater experience in Canada are most pronounced with regard to self-identification as ‘Canadian’ and
voting, but it is also true of sense of belonging (which is relatively high for visible minorities who have recently-immigrated), and more general indicators such as life satisfaction and sense of trust in others. Visible minority immigrants are more likely than whites to become citizens. There are no significant group differences in volunteering.

Race has the most negative on self-identification as ‘Canadian’ and on voting; however a more pronounced negative impact of race with greater experience in Canada is evident in other indicators for which the overall racial difference is small. For example, visible minorities are not less likely than whites to report a sense of belonging in Canada; in fact recently-arrived racial minorities are more likely to report a sense of belonging than are recently-arrived immigrants of European origins. This is a positive result, however, a negative impact of race is evident in the fact that among those in Canada for longer periods of time visible minorities are generally not more likely to report a sense of belonging, and for the second generation visible minorities as a group are actually less likely to feel that they belong. This more pronounced negative impact of race among the second generation is observed for all of the indicators available in this study.

There are important variations among visible minority groups which should be noted. For example, among immigrants, life satisfaction is consistently lowest for the Chinese. Trust is consistently lowest among blacks. South Asians exhibit the highest levels of belonging. Despite these group differences, many of the trends affect all of the visible minority groups. Perhaps most significantly, for the second generation, nearly all visible minority groups are more negative on all of the indicators examined (the exception being South Asians, who are not significantly different from whites in terms of satisfaction, voting and volunteering, and actually report slightly higher levels of belonging). Blacks in the second generation are lowest on five of the six indicators (the exception is volunteering).

A strong point of this study is that the multi-dimensional aspect of social integration has been tapped. Social integration of minorities cannot be summed up by one indicator, such as ‘trust’ or ‘social belonging’ or voting. The process must be examined in a way which recognizes its complexity. At the same time, other indicators not examined here may be particularly relevant to the impact of inequality. One of these is surely the perception of the extent to which Canadian institutions are fair and just. Trust in economic and political institutions, and not only trust in other people, may be an important indicator of whether newcomers or minorities regard any disadvantages they may experience as creating barriers to inclusion. So while the various indicators examined here provide a telling indication of the extent of social integration of racial minorities, others also may be useful.

**Impact of Inequality on Social Integration**

Although visible minority immigrants have lower earnings than whites, at an individual level low earnings contribute little to these trends in social integration. To some extent, the negative trends in integration are a reflection of their more
pronounced experiences of discrimination and vulnerability, which become or re-main fairly pronounced for the second generation. Feelings of being unfairly treated or singled out for negative treatment has a more profound effect on social integration than the sheer economic consequences that these negative treatments may have on visible minorities as employees or on their families.

Immigrants’ improvement in earnings may contribute to successful integration, but higher earnings alone do not smooth the path to integration if experiences of discrimination and vulnerability remain. Furthermore, these may become intensified for the children of immigrants, whose expectations for equality may be greater than for their immigrant parents. Among visible minorities, blacks have consistently been found to experience the greatest inequalities, and these data show that their integration into Canadian society is slower.

The link between inequality and social integration can also be seen in group comparisons. In particular, the fact that black Canadians experience the greatest inequality, have the greatest awareness of inequality, and display some of the most negative trends in indicators of social integration, is surely an important fact linking inequality to social integration. Among minorities born in Canada, blacks have the lowest sense of belonging, the lowest level of trust in others, and the weakest sense of ‘Canadian’ identity. They are the least likely to vote. Among recent immigrants, blacks have high levels of volunteering, but among the second generation this difference has disappeared. Life satisfaction trends for blacks across groups reflecting experience in Canada are also more negative than for visible minorities generally. These trends are not explained by individual experiences of inequality, at least in the statistical sense, and yet the relevance of the experience of inequality among blacks generally cannot be dismissed.

This observation suggests that although inequalities experienced by visible minorities are slowing their integration into Canadian society, the processes involved may be complex. The fact that none of the indicators of inequality fully explained the slower integration of visible minorities suggests that there may be ways in which the overall standing of minority groups in society affects the sense of inclusion for individuals, apart from any individual experiences of inclusion or exclusion. That is to say, awareness that one’s group standing is low may affect how individuals feel about the society, even for those not focusing on specific disadvantages. A sense of identification with a marginal group may create feelings of personal marginality, even though personal experiences of disadvantage are not salient. This topic requires further analysis.

**Multiculturalism under Conditions of Inequality?**

The findings of this analysis carry some implications for broader issues of multiculturalism and pluralism in Canada. Both equality and social integration are important goals of multiculturalism, as was noted in our Introduction. If inequalities slow the process of integration, then perhaps the policy requires greater attention specifically to issues of equality.
Whatever the impact of policies such as multiculturalism are in paving the way toward the social integration of immigrants, it has not assured as rapid progress for racial minorities as for white immigrant groups. In fact, the impact of multiculturalism even for immigrant groups of European origins has not been assessed in any systematic way. Hence, there is little reason to expect that multiculturalism policies as currently implemented will ensure that the greater problems facing racial minorities will be successfully managed.

Much attention has been given to the educational successes of the second generation racial minorities in Canada, but the evidence in this study suggests that such success may not provide a complete picture of their experiences relevant to the cohesiveness of society. Economic integration contributes to social integration, but does not guarantee such integration. Despite success, if the second generation feels excluded and demoralized, significant social costs may be incurred.

Academic debate over the extent of racial discrimination and exclusion in specific sectors of Canadian life should not deflect attention from patterns of social integration of racial minorities. The social integration of minorities is likely to be affected very little by academic debates over the extent of discrimination. Policy discussions should focus as well on self-reported experiences of discrimination and exclusion.

The broader Canadian population remains skeptical of the significance of racial discrimination affecting minorities, and there is a prevailing view that racism is marginal in Canada (Reitz and Breton 1994). Even so, many members of the majority population recognize that discrimination exists. A CRIC-Globe and Mail survey entitled The New Canada shows that about three in four Canadians – both White and visible minority – agree that “there is a lot of racism in Canada” (Centre for Research and Information on Canada [CRIC]-Globe and Mail 2003; see also Breton 1990, 210–1). However, there are differences with respect to how significantly prejudice affects opportunities in key arenas such as employment. The survey shows that 42% of visible minorities think that prejudice affects opportunities, compared with 30% of Whites. Moreover, the actual racial divergence in perceptions of the significance of discrimination is greater than is reflected in this difference in percentages, because some Whites say it is Whites who lose opportunities because of discrimination (17%) – sometimes called “reverse discrimination” – whereas this perception is less common among visible minorities (7%).

The mainstream view that racial discrimination is not a significant problem in Canada undoubtedly contributes to the prevailing belief that existing government policies on the subject are adequate, so that further action is not needed. Official policies on multiculturalism and human rights are seen as sufficient to maintain what most Canadians would describe as a favourable environment for immigrants and minority groups, particularly by international standards. Only a minority of the White population think that prejudice is something that the Canadian government should address with more determination.

There is evidently a gap between this mainstream view and that of many members of racial minority groups. Bridging this gap is a political requirement for successful multiculturalism, and lower rates of minority participation in the political process represents a challenge to the effort to bridge the gap.
Notes

1. Individual-equivalent household income is household income adjusted for household size. This is calculated by dividing household income by the square root of household size, following conventional OECD practice. Mean values for each group are presented relative to the mean for the CMA of residence to adjust for living costs. Inequality also may be assessed by considering individual experiences in the labour force (or by introducing this variable into regression analyses of household incomes). However, a focus on labour force participants themselves is difficult because the size of samples for analysis is reduced significantly, and because of the need to consider men and women separately. In any case, studies of economic well-being have emphasized the importance of the household unit. These locally-adjusted individual-equivalent household incomes most fairly reflect the standard of living of individuals. This measure applies across the entire population, regardless of labour force participation.

2. Among racial minorities, Japanese are the sole exception in having relatively high incomes. Of those identifying as White, the ones belonging to either a Latin American group or an Arab/West Asian group have relatively low incomes. In these two categories, the majority actually do not identify as White. In the census data, these two groups appear both as White and as visible minorities. The categories Latin American and Arab/West Asian are based on responses to census questions on ethnic origins. Some of those who indicate that they have these origins give the response “White” on the visible minority question and are considered not to be visible minorities for this table; the rest are considered visible minorities. Among White ethnic groups, these two have by far the highest poverty rates, although these rates are lower than those of the two categories of people who do not consider themselves White. Apart from these exceptions, all White groups have higher incomes than the most affluent racial minorities.

3. These data refer to the proportion below the low-income cutoff, based on relative income and taking into account family size and urban area of residence. Statistics Canada does not describe this as a poverty measure, but it is commonly interpreted as such.

4. Michael Ornstein notes in his widely cited analysis of 1996 Census data on racial inequalities that while a “socio-economic polarization” exists between European and non-European groups in Toronto, there are significant variations among minorities. Rates of poverty are relatively high for the largest visible minorities – Blacks (44.6 percent), Chinese (29.4 percent) and South Asians (34.6 percent) – but they are highest for Ethiopians, Ghanaians, Afghans and Somalis, among whom poverty rates reach 50 to 80 percent and higher (Ornstein 2000).

5. Reitz (2007a, b) provides an extensive overview of determinants of immigrant employment success in Canada, including the trend toward declining immigrant earnings discussed later in this chapter.

6. Reitz’s analysis shows that the decline in employment rates has the greatest impact on the most recently arrived; it has a continuing impact on women, in particular (2001b). However, most noticeable is the decline in the earnings of those who have found employment.

7. The decline in immigrant earnings in Canada has been steeper than the parallel decline reported in the US by Borjas (1999). In the US, the decline appears to be primarily attributable to an increase in the proportion of immigrants of Mexican or Latin American origin. For immigrants of similar origin, labour market success in Canada has declined to levels previously seen in the US. In effect, the convergence of the US and Canadian educational systems, particularly at the postsecondary level in the 1970s and 1980s, has produced a marked convergence in the labour market circumstances faced by immigrants and in their earnings (Reitz 2003a).

8. See the reviews by Reitz (2007a, b) and Picot and Sweetman (2005).

9. The hypothesis that the language skills of immigrants have been poorer in recent years has not received support (Ferrer and Riddell 2004). Existing data suggest that the official language skills of immigrants who arrived in 2000 were about the same as those who arrived a decade earlier.
10. Other studies also show that self-reported experiences of discrimination represent a significant problem for minority groups (e.g., Breton 1990).

11. One exception is the Jewish group: 20 percent reported experiences of discrimination. Jewish Canadians are similar to Japanese in that they report discrimination, but have high incomes. The other exceptions are Latin Americans and Arabs/West Asians. These two are mixed categories in the sense that some of their members identify themselves as visible minority and others as White. Their reported experiences of discrimination occur at rates between the extremes represented by other visible minorities and other Whites.

12. The 1992 Minority Survey conducted in Toronto showed that 78 percent of Blacks believed that their group was the target of employment discrimination (Dion and Kawakami 1996; see also Breton 1990, 208).

13. The contexts presented here are not mutually exclusive. Respondents may have reported more than one context for discrimination.

14. The reasons for discrimination presented here are not mutually exclusive. Respondents may have reported more than one reason for discrimination.

15. These standards, while not addressing Muslims by name, targeted perceived gender practices of Islam, stipulating that women are allowed to anything else that a man can do while specifically noting that ‘killing women in public beatings, or burning them alive are not part of our standards’ (Hérouxville 2007; see also Aubin and Gatehouse 2007).

16. N’s for recent immigrants range from 740 to 770 for Whites; 603 to 622 for Chinese; 455 to 479 for South Asians; 174 to 181 for Black and 563 to 585 for other Visible Minorities; for visible minorities overall, the N ranges from 1,795 to 1,867 depending on the outcome measure. N’s for earlier immigrants range from 4,992 to 5,186 for Whites; 758 to 769 for Chinese; 463 to 675 for South Asians; 401 to 425 for Black and 999 to 1,032 for other Visible Minorities; for visible minorities overall, the N ranges from 2,801 to 2,928 depending on the outcome measure. N’s for the second generation range from 11,949 to 12,069 for Whites; 889 to 897 for Chinese; 713 to 723 for South Asians; 677 to 691 for Black and 1,062 to 1,073 for other Visible Minorities; for visible minorities overall, the N ranges from 3,341 to 3,384 depending on the outcome measure. N’s for third generation Whites range from 14,247 to 14,375 depending on the outcome measure.

17. This analysis is not reported here, but is available from authors on request.

18. Unweighted N’s for recent immigrants range from 715 to 770 for Whites; 580 to 622 for Chinese; 433 to 479 for South Asians; 167 to 181 for Black and 543 to 585 for other Visible Minorities. For overall visible minorities the N’s range from 1734 to 1867, depending on the outcome variable. N’s for earlier immigrants range from 4843 to 5186 for Whites; 714 to 769 for Chinese; 609 to 675 for South Asians; 396 to 425 for Black and 978 to 1,032 for other Visible Minorities. For overall visible minorities, the N’s range from 2,697 to 2,928, depending on the outcome variable. N’s for the second generation range from 11,766 to 12,069 for Whites; 874 to 897 for Chinese; 703 to 723 for South Asians; 664 to 691 for Black and 1,040 to 1,073 for other Visible Minorities. For overall visible minorities, the N’s range from 3,281 to 3,384, depending on the outcome variable. N’s for third generation Whites range from 13,572 to 14,375, depending on the outcome variable.

19. Regression N’s range from 2,484 to 2,640 for recent immigrants, 7,796 to 8,031 for earlier immigrants, and 15,185 to 15,445 for the second generation, depending on the outcome variable.

20. Since these are dichotomous outcomes, logistic regression was utilized. For ease of interpretability, odds ratios are reported.

21. Again, since these are dichotomous outcomes, logistic regression was utilized. For ease of interpretability, odds ratios are reported.

22. Even among those who report a Canadian identity, visible minorities, regardless of generation (and controlling for age and length of time in Canada) are less likely to report that this identity is important to them.
23. For regression 1, N’s range from 1,748 to 1,856 for recent immigrants, 2,748 to 2,830 for earlier immigrants, and 3,281 to 3,349 for the second generation, depending on the outcome variable. For regressions 2 and 3, N’s range from 1,697 to 1,798 for recent immigrants, 2,648 to 2,727 for earlier immigrants, and 3,239 to 3,306 for the second generation, depending on the outcome variable.

24. We also examined the effect of individual equivalent household income after controlling for education and found no substantial difference from the current results.

25. For regressions 1 and 2, N’s range from 2,484 to 2,640 for recent immigrants, 7,796 to 8,031 for earlier immigrants, and 15,185 to 15,445 for the second generation. For regression 3, N’s range from 2,340 to 2,463 for recent immigrants, 7,323 to 7,529 for earlier immigrants, and 14,924 to 15,173 for the second generation, depending on the outcome variable.

26. The question was, “If two equally qualified people applied for a job, one White and one a visible minority, who do you think would be more likely to get it? The White person, the visible minority person, or would both have an equal chance?”

27. In surveys, it appears that the role of government in addressing discrimination has not been a topic since the 1980s, when governments in Canada were actively concerned with equity issues. In 1987, the Charter Study found that 63.3 percent agreed that “while equal opportunity to succeed is important for all Canadians, it’s not really the government’s job to guarantee it” (Reitz and Breton 1994, 87). Since that time, racial discrimination per se has been a much less frequently discussed topic.
The reality of social life in a multi-ethnic and multi-racial society is more nuanced than a polarized debate over multiculturalism suggests. Diversity promises positive contributions to social cohesion, but it also presents significant challenges. We find that some of the assumptions about human behaviour made by proponents of multiculturalism have validity; at the same time some of the assumptions about human behaviour made by critics of multiculturalism also have validity. On empirical issues, neither side in the debate has a monopoly on truth. Moreover, our findings show differences depending not only on aspects of social relations, but also differences for particular minority groups, and for recent immigrants, earlier immigrants and for the children of immigrants. They also show differences between Quebec and the rest of Canada as a context for multicultural processes and inter-group relations.

These findings suggest that designing the most appropriate multicultural policy requires careful consideration of such nuance. The purpose of this chapter will be to summarize our findings, and suggest some implications for policies intended to promote multiculturalism ideals of respect for minority cultures while ensuring effective integration of minorities into society. Our intention is to show that a focus on social science hypotheses underlying the concept of multiculturalism may help bridge the extremes often found when multiculturalism is debated as political philosophy only. A variety of public policies may be pursued in seeking the objectives of multiculturalism, and the applicability of any specific policies may vary according to the empirical realities in different settings. We will argue that multicultural policy can still be appropriate for a country like Canada, but with significant modifications. These modifications are required to address aspects of diversity that have not been taken fully into account by the existing policies, or by those who have considered their success or failure.

Our empirical hypotheses involve two sets of issues identified in our introduction. One set of issues concerns the impact of ethnic distinctiveness, and the preservation of attachments to a social and cultural minority, on social integration within the larger society. The issue of social theory relevant to multicultural debates is whether such effects are positive or negative, in which ways, and in which circumstances. The second set of issues concerns the impact of inequality on the social integration of minorities. The questions are regarding the extent to which ethnic social boundaries are in fact a result of inequality, and the extent to which ethnic community
attachments may help cope with inequality and thus promote more effective integration. Again the issue for theory relevant to multicultural debates is whether the impacts of ethnic distinctiveness and minority attachments are positive or negative.

**Behavioural Processes Reflecting the Assumptions of Multiculturalism**

Members of immigrant ethnic groups in Canada express a strong sense of belonging in the country, but as important, or perhaps even more important, the EDS survey shows that this sense of belonging in Canada is actually stronger for those who attach greater importance to their ancestry and to the culture and customs of their minority community. This is clearly a supportive point for those who have argued that reinforcing ethnic ties builds stronger attachments to the country. In the assimilationist perspective, attachments to the minority community result in weaker attachments to the broader society. This perspective is clearly refuted with respect to the sense of belonging. A similar pattern holds for life satisfaction. Those who attach greater importance to their ethnic background are more likely to report high levels of life satisfaction. It is significant that these patterns hold for immigrant groups of European origins and they also hold for the visible minorities. Further, it is actually stronger for immigrants in the country longer, and for the second generation.

This integrative function of ethnic communities occurs at the social and psychological levels. At the social level, ethnic group networks do not isolate minority group members; rather, they appear to promote integration through group attachments. This was shown in Chapter 4 (Phan and Breton). Out-group friendship ties are positively related to a sense of identification and belonging to the larger society while in-group friendship ties heighten awareness of one’s ethnicity and feelings of belonging to the ethnic group. In short, the quality of interpersonal experiences constitutes an important channel through which linkages are established or fail to be established with the ethnic group and the larger society. For most people, this is where diversity is primarily experienced either positively or negatively. It is at this level that social bridges or barriers are built. This is an important finding in that it points to the significant role of day-to-day interpersonal interaction in fostering or eroding the cohesion of a multicultural society.

Chapter 4 shows there is a non-negligible proportion of persons who are “marginalised,” that is individuals who feel attached to no group in particular. This is observed in Quebec and the rest of Canada among visible minorities and whites, and the proportion maintains itself over generations. It has been suggested that marginalization may refer to an experience of alienation or acculturative stress (Berry 1970, 1990). To a large extent, this seems to be the case: the survey results show that on each of the measures of social integration, respondents in this category show the lowest scores: social trust, participation in formal organizations or associations; voting in elections and level of life satisfaction.
Thus, concerns of critics of multiculturalism over the attachment of minorities to their ethnic community may be misplaced. Rather, it appears that marginalisation – having no attachments either to the ethnic community or the larger society – that is most detrimental to social integration. Such social and political disengagement or estrangement represents an important challenge for social cohesion, an issue that the architects of Canada’s multicultural policies have recognized early on. To the extent that the “marginalised” are concentrated in certain groups (ethnic, racial, age, gender or social class), the threat to the cohesion and good functioning of the community may be substantial. Is the lack of meaningful integration of these individuals a failure on the part of the ethnic communities, of the larger society or both?

The analysis of the difference between Quebec and the rest of Canada shows that the “pluralist” pattern is more common among whites in Quebec than in the rest of Canada: they are more likely to exhibit attachments to both their own ethnocultural group and to the larger society. The sense of belonging to both collectivities is strong, as well as the importance attached to the cultural traditions and customs. It is likely that the “pluralist” in Quebec reflects a strong orientation primarily towards Quebec (although not necessarily exclusively). Given the fact that the white population in Quebec is overwhelmingly of French ancestry, it would seem that in the Quebec context, this is somewhat equivalent to “mainstream” in the rest of Canada. This reflects the salience of French as a culture in Quebec and Quebec’s status as a distinct society within Canada. Thus, an analysis of patterns of attachment that includes the two charter groups of Canada reveal that the success of pluralism – attachment to both ancestral and societal groups – hinges on making ancestry salient in the social context. This is the case in Quebec for French and Anglo-origin groups, and for visible minorities across Canada.

At the psychological level, ethnic attachments reinforce a positive ethnic identity, and this helps cope with negative experiences outside the group and promotes a positive sense of well-being. This was shown in Chapters 2 (Dion and Phan) and 3 (Dion, Dion and Banerjee). This “buffering” effect of ethnic communities is fairly weak, but it is positive. The results help address the controversy between those such as Bissoondath (1994) who have argued that reinforcing ethnic attachments creates barriers and boundaries restricting the freedom of minorities, and Taylor (1994) who suggests that ethnic communities can help create more positive outcomes. Our findings may not be as positive as Taylor might have expected; but they are positive, not negative as might be expected based on Bissoondath’s arguments.

The findings in Chapter 2 reveal that ethnic identification reflects processes both inside and outside the ethnic community. Internal ethnic cohesion and a sense that other groups pose a threat (measured by awareness of experiences of discrimination) both had significant independent positive effects on ethnic self-identification for both whites and visible minorities. Ethnic identities appear to be reinforced by experiences of discrimination. Ethnic identity also serves as a type of psychological shield facilitating adaptation to challenging and/or adverse external circumstances. The connection between ethnic identity and the presence of threat is explicit in the concept of “reactive ethnicity,” namely, heightened salience of one’s ethnicity in
the presence of conditions regarded as a threat to one’s group (Portes and Rumbaut 2001).

Within ethnic minority groups, the identity-reinforcing effects of group attachments appear to occur in a process that extends over the life course. For example, early experiences within an ethnic community context create relationships which then carry implications for ethnic attachments in later life. In this process, however, negative relations with other groups play a role.

One might have expected that the integrative functions of an ethnic community might be more salient for those ethnic communities more favourably placed in the social hierarchy, or within ethnic communities for those with higher status. This may be true for the social aspect of the process. However, since discrimination and a feeling of not being fully accepted are more frequently reported experiences for visible minorities, the impact of that factor is more significant and affects a larger proportion of members of those groups. The difference between visible minorities and other groups emerges as most significant among the variations across groups. Ethnic attachments among visible minorities are strong, and remain stronger over time and through generations, compared to minorities of European origins. Clearly, this is at least partly related to the more frequent awareness of discrimination. The difference in ethnic self-categorization between visible minority group members compared to white minority group members across later immigrant generations suggests that ethnic labelling may reflect an imposed identity category in some circumstances, as Dion and Phan discuss. This includes identifying visible minorities by their appearance, and also inferring foreign origins even for those born in Canada. When this happens, persistence of ethnic self identity may be indicative of differential acceptance.

Interestingly, this study did not find many substantial differences by gender. The various measures of ethnic attachments and integration into society show that men and women do not differ greatly in processes related to the multicultural processes examined here. Where differences were found, they were noted (such as in Table 2.1) The small number of differences by gender in the survey does not mean that multiculturalism and gender do not interact in important ways. The viewpoints of men and women on multicultural issues do differ. However, analysis of the variables included in this study did not identify major gender differences.

The salience of ethnicity in society likely is partly a result of the positive promotion of cultural tolerance and a permissive view of diversity. But the findings here underscore that it is not only that. It is an inevitable product of in-group ties which are formed during the experience of immigrant adjustment and maintained over time in Canada. And particularly in the case of racial minorities, it also arises as a reaction to discrimination and lack of social acceptance in the various forms this may take. To the extent that identities are reinforced as a reaction to forms of discrimination, one cannot say that ethnicity is entirely voluntary, or that minorities retreat into an enclave as a free choice. Rather the distinctiveness of racial minorities is also a product of the fact that their ethnicity is noticed and in a sense imposed by others, the phenomenon of “racialization.”
What are the implications of these processes for integration into the broader society? The findings in Chapter 3 (by Dion, Dion and Banerjee) help extend our understanding by showing how ethnic attachments serve a positive function, to shield individuals, at least to some extent, from the negative effect of feeling threatened by other groups. Previous research on the social psychology of awareness of discrimination shows that the sense of external threat not only heightens ethnic identification, it is also a source of stress and reduces the sense of well-being, and of belongingness. In other words, discrimination is a psycho-social stressor, with implications for social inclusion and belonging. In this respect the feelings of threat slow the processes of integration into society. Stronger identification with the ethnic group to some extent protects against this damage. Overall, the effect is weak, to be sure, but shows a potentially important way in which ethnic communities promote social integration: the benefits are not only in relation to the functioning of the group as a social arena somewhat separate from the rest of the society, but also in relation to the group as a mediator of relations to the rest of the society. That this effect is not stronger may be a matter of interest as well. The capacity of ethnic groups to assist in offsetting negative consequences of experiences of discrimination is limited and cannot be relied upon as a primary means to address such matters.

The two chapters together help elaborate the complex psycho-social dynamics of ethnicity, inter-group relations, and integration under conditions of inequality. Ethnic identity may reflect both positive in-group relations and negative out-group relations. The positive effect of the ethnic community in promoting feelings of well-being and belongingness, shielding individuals from negative effects of discrimination, may be part of its appeal. Reciprocal relations among these phenomena are also possible, of course. For example, ethnic identity may not only foster in-group ties, it may also intensify feelings of discrimination. At the same time, although opposite effects may occur, such as when awareness of discrimination leads to efforts to reduce the salience of ethnicity in one’s life – related to the strategy of “passing” – the evidence suggests that these effects are less frequent or the strategy may be ineffective. As well, those who respond to feelings of discrimination by reducing connections to the group do not experience the protective effect that may promote integration.

**Behavioural Processes Challenging the Assumptions of Multiculturalism**

Processes of assimilation of immigrant minorities definitely occur in Canada; findings from the Ethnic Diversity Survey leave no doubt about that. Ethnic attachments and identities are highly salient for recent immigrants but definitely weaken over time and across generations. Some measures of social integration increase across immigrant cohorts and generations, and others are high initially and are maintained across groups. In short, change in the direct of social integration of immigrants occurs in Canada, and at the same time there is a measure of pluralism in the sense
that ethnic attachments are maintained at the same time as a growing attachment to Canada. These two processes – integration and pluralism – mark the experiences of many immigrants and members of minorities in Canada.

However, the finding that ethnic communities “assimilate” does not in itself necessarily challenge the assumptions of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism really does not put forward preferences about whether assimilation should or should not occur. Rather, multiculturalism concerns “cultural freedom,” and the option for individuals to make cultural decisions for themselves. Minority group members may choose assimilation, and if they do so freely, multicultural processes are not challenged.

What is more disconcerting, from a multiculturalist point of view, is the fact that in Canada, ethnic attachments themselves appear to be associated with a slower development of a specifically Canadian identity, in some ways slow the process of acquisition of Canadian citizenship, and reduce the sense of trust in others within Canada. This was shown in Chapter 1, and applies to all groups, including European groups and visible minorities. It is interesting that ethnic attachments slow the acquisition of Canadian identity even more strongly for groups of European origins than for visible minorities. One possible reason for this is the more voluntary nature of ethnic attachments for whites. Ethnic identities are both a positive choice and sometimes also a response to exclusion and discrimination, a fact which is very clearly shown in Chapter 2. Perceptions of exclusion are less frequent for whites, and for them, those who maintain ethnic attachments may more often do so based on a weaker attachment to Canada. For visible minorities, many maintain ethnic attachments partly as a defensive response, even when they have a stronger inclination toward a Canadian identity.

Furthermore, and of equal or greater significance, are the ways in which ethnic distinctions serve to isolate their members particularly for visible minority communities. This finding permeates virtually all of the analyses. Chapter 2 showed discrimination which is experienced more often by visible minorities encourages ethnic isolation. We find in Chapter 4 that the “pluralist” pattern whereby both ethnic attachments and ties to the mainstream are maintained is, over time, more a phenomenon of the white society rather than for visible minorities. The “ethnic” pattern, reinforced by discriminatory exclusion as well as by positive forces of ethnic cohesion, is more often retained across immigrant cohorts and generations for visible minorities and some European groups (such as Southern and “other” Europeans including Jews, Romas, and Basques) who are less often reflected in the “mainstream” or the “pluralist” pattern. Partly as a result, processes of social integration in Canadian society are slower for visible minorities than for minorities of European origins. This was shown in detail in Chapter 5.

There is no evidence that visible minorities are less interested to adopt a Canadian identity, or to acquire identification with Canada. However, when asked about the group to which they feel they belong today, the frequency with which visible minorities mention “Canadian” is less than for persons of European origins. Moreover, the difference between racial groups is larger for persons in Canada for longer periods of time, and still greater for those born in Canada. There may be many reasons for this racial difference. We suggest that an important reason may be that visible minorities
more often feel a sense of exclusion within Canada. The data show that in some instances this is a result of overt experiences of discrimination, but for many, the sense of exclusion may be more subtle. Among visible minorities born in Canada it may arise for those confronted with the question “Where are you from?” as is reported so often. The assumption that a visible minority must be an immigrant is a subtle (or perhaps not so subtle) message that visible minorities are not considered quite as “Canadian” as persons of European backgrounds.

The fact that ethnic attachments reinforce some attachments to the broader society – such as the sense of belonging – while weakening others – such as a specifically Canadian identity – is not contradictory. Social integration is a multi-dimensional process, and not all aspects occur together. This well known fact has particular significance for multiculturalism, since it turns out that a proper understanding of the impact of stronger ethnic attachments depends on an understanding of the multi-dimensional aspect of social integration. It appears that ethnic communities may be effective in creating ties at a social level while creating obstacles to a feeling of national identification, or a desire for Canadian citizenship.

The claim that multiculturalism in Canada supports citizenship acquisition for immigrants was an important conclusion of the study by Irene Bloemraad (2006), which Kymlicka (2007) cited favourably as supporting the positive impact of multiculturalism. However, whereas Bloemraad was concerned with the impact of multiculturalism policy; our concern here is with the impact of ethnic attachments. What we have found is that for those emphasizing the importance of ethnic customs and ancestries, the acquisition of citizenship is slower. There are tendencies within ethnic communities which move their members away from an interest in citizenship. Bloemraad’s findings suggest is that to some extent multicultural policy may offset this general tendency. It may be that, working through ethnic communities, activities promoted by multicultural policies help create opportunities for citizenship acquisition, and that this helps explains higher naturalization rates in Canada compared to the United States. We will come back to this point when we discuss policy implications of our findings.

Chapter 4 (by Phan and Breton) approaches the analysis by exploring the configuration of responses to questions of belonging, identity and salience of the ethnic group and the larger society to the individual. They found four distinct patterns prevalent in society: “ethnic,” “mainstream,” “pluralist,” and “marginalised.” The “mainstream” pattern reflects strong attachments to the larger society and weaker ethnic attachment. Contrary to representations of our society as fully “multicultural,” it appears that, at least for earlier cohorts, it is the “mainstream” and not the “pluralist” pattern of attachments that comes to predominate. However, it is a pattern that is more pronounced among European-origin ethnic groups outside of Quebec than among visible minorities or whites in Quebec. It is important to note that these earlier generations of whites are represented in large part by those with British ancestry. Thus, the prevalence of “mainstream” attachment among this group also suggests the convergence of a national identity (Canadian) with a specific ethnic identity often subsumed within it.
The analysis examined the effect of reported experiences of discrimination have on the likelihood of being ethnic, pluralist, or mainstream (compared to being marginalized). Not surprisingly, respondents who report having experienced discrimination or worrying about being a victim of hate crime are the more likely to be attached to their own group. This may be viewed as an adaptive response to discrimination. On the other hand, discrimination also increases the likelihood of marginalisation, an outcome that has negative implications for social integration.

The survey results also show that, on the basis of reported discrimination, an ethnic hierarchy seems to exist, especially between whites and visible minorities. This chapter reinforces the finding that pervades our analyses, namely that an ethnic hierarchy, especially if it is subjectively experienced, has a negative impact on the social integration of individuals. Accordingly, it is for visible minorities that the differences in the patterns of attachments are the most pronounced, in particular, the likelihood of retaining “ethnic” attachments over time and generations in Canada. Together with the finding about the quality of interpersonal ties and their impact on social attachments, this result suggests that the white/visible minority differentiation constitutes a significant fault line affecting social cohesion.

Relative income levels are an dimension of inequality, but the analysis in Chapter 5 (by Reitz and Banerjee) shows that income levels seem to have less impact on the social integration of minorities than do the negative experiences of discrimination or vulnerability which may occur at all income levels. This is important for understanding the patterns of social integration across immigrant cohorts and generations, particularly for visible minorities. Visible minorities experience the lowest incomes among the various minorities in Canada. This is partly because of their recent arrival, and also at least partly because they experience significant employment discrimination. However, over time and across generations the employment experiences of visible minorities improve. Educational levels for the children of racial minority immigrants in particular are quite high. And yet social integration is not assured by the improved economic circumstances.

A careful analysis of the impact of race across immigrant cohorts and generations shows that race matters more for those in Canada for longer periods of time, and that the impact of race on experiences of discrimination are particularly strong for the children of immigrants. This helps to some extent to explain the slower integration of racial minorities in Canadian society in many respects, but particularly in the slower adoption of a “Canadian” self-identification, and in less frequent participation in Canadian politics in terms of voting.

This analysis also shows the importance of the differences in social perspective between immigrants and their children (found also in other countries). On the one hand, the immigrant perspective reflects a personal choice, and situations are judged in relation to that choice and to previous experience in the country of origin. Those who become disillusioned may return to a known opportunity structure in that country. On the other hand, the second-generation perspective is shaped more completely by Canadian experience. Thus, the native-born second generation has a different and more complex relation to Canadian society than the first generation. They have a greater sense of personal investment in Canada and judge their experiences against
new and higher standards. For one thing, they expect equality with other native-born Canadians.

The evidence points inescapably not only to the social salience and impact of race in Canadian life today, but to its impact on social processes relevant to multiculturalism. Because contemporary immigration is largely composed of persons who become visible minorities in Canada, the social salience of different aspects of the phenomenon of integration is changing. And the significance of issues of inequality for these groups affects their ethnic attachments and the rate and types of their integration into Canadian society.

Further Discussion

Many of the formulations of “multiculturalism” are too simplistic to capture reality effectively. Many people say that the positive reception of minority cultures in Canada makes minorities feel more positive about the country. Our data do not entirely challenge these views; to the contrary, they undoubtedly have validity. The data show that minorities who maintain ethnic attachments do feel a stronger sense of belonging. However, those who feel strongly about their ethnic attachments also seem to be slower in developing a sense of identification with Canada. In terms of social types, ethnic identity may reflect both pluralism and marginality, to differing degrees in different situations. Ethnic attachments are not decisive in themselves; other factors can play the same role.

To some extent, this complexity – the combination of positive and negative effects – is a reflection of the role of inequality. The effects of ethnic identity should be seen not only as an expression of culture, but also in some cases as a defensive response to threat. Visible minorities experience the most inequality, and also have the strongest attachments to their ethnic group and the weakest attachments to Canada, and this study shows that inequalities and awareness of unfairness explain part of the distinctive social relations of visible minorities.

As well, the distinctive experiences of visible minorities are not fully explained by the Ethnic Diversity Survey. Visible minorities have much stronger ethnic identities even after controlling for in-group ties and reports of discrimination (Dion-Phan); visible minorities also have weaker attachments to Canada, again after controlling for reported experiences of discrimination (Reitz-Banerjee). This means that although the case of visible minorities does not lend support to hypotheses about social processes in a multicultural society, the reasons for the breakdown are only partly explained. Experiences of discrimination undoubtedly play a role. It is difficult to dismiss the hypothesis that racial exclusion is involved. Yet many of the specific processes underlying this pattern are not easily discovered in survey data.

The nature of respondents’ experiences of discrimination based on ethnicity or race deserve further exploration. Respondents – both visible minorities and whites – more often report such experiences in the workplace, rather than based on what happens “on the street” or “in a store.” Possibly workplace experiences have greater personal impact, and are more often remembered or thought of as constituting
“discrimination.” It is significant that among the various bases of discrimination, race is mentioned far more often than ethnicity, language or religion. Discrimination based on race is reported often enough that its significance to respondents in their lives deserves to be understood more fully.

The most systematic differences in our findings are by visible minority status, so the analyses presented here often do not distinguish specific groups – either whites or visible minorities – from one another. Visible minorities seem to share a number of characteristics in terms of ethnic attachments, attachments to Canada, and inequalities, which distinguish them from whites. Members of various visible minority groups often express positive attachments to Canada, almost from the moment of arrival, and economic success, in itself, is not a precondition for attachment. But members of these groups more often report negative experiences in relations with other groups, and their sense of inclusion is comparatively less for those with longer experience in the country. These findings underscore the existence and significance of the Canadian racial divide. Visible minority groups, as a category and as individual groups, differ from groups of European origins in having stronger ethnic attachments, and weaker integration into Canadian society.

At the same time, there are nevertheless noteworthy differences among visible minorities, and among groups of European origins. For example, one clear finding is that among visible minorities, blacks experience the greatest inequalities, and their integration into Canadian society is more difficult. Another exceptional case is the Japanese, which among visible minorities has the lowest level of ethnic identity. The data in Chapter 5 show that the Japanese are as likely as any racial minority to be aware of discrimination, and of their vulnerability as a minority. Historically, the Japanese in Canada were inclined to reject the enclave because of a feeling that it exposed its members to persecution. Whether this is an exception to our analyses of the relation between experiences of discrimination and ethnic identity was not determined. The Japanese have high levels of education and income, and the proportion who are born in Canada is relatively high. The group also has a high rate of out-marriage.

Among the European groups, perhaps the most pronounced variations are for Greeks, Portuguese, and for the Jewish group. These all have high rates of ethnic identification, compared to others of European origins. Most likely the recent arrival and low levels of education is at least part of the explanation for Greeks and Portuguese. Experiences of discrimination and stronger in-group bonding undoubtedly are important in the case of the Jewish group. Analysis of particular cases such as these is an interesting task for future research.

Quebec and the Rest of Canada

In our analysis of Quebec and the rest of Canada, our main focus has been on immigration and immigrant groups rather than the relation between linguistic communities. Quebec actually was the main focus of the critique of Canadian multiculturalism by the American historian Arthur Schlesinger (1992).
One reason why Canada, despite all its advantages, is so vulnerable to schism is that, as Canadians freely admit, their country lacks...a unique national identity. Attracted for various reasons to Britain, France, and the United States, inclined for generous reasons to a policy of official multiculturalism, Canadians have never developed a strong sense of what it is to be a Canadian. As Sir John Macdonald, their first prime minister, put it, Canada has ‘too much geography and too little history.’ (p. 13)

The reference to “schism” indicates that Schlesinger saw the potential for Quebec separation as a reflection of the deficiency he attributed to multiculturalism, that being part of the Quebec francophone community undermines ties to the Canadian nation. However, in reality the focus for multiculturalism is on the integration of minorities of immigrant origins, and in this regard, the data on Quebec show that the multicultural hypothesis is partly supported. Quebec has the largest proportion of its population which is “pluralist” in orientation. This is a reflection both of the experiences of the French and English background populations, and also of the immigrant groups. As well, reported discrimination for minorities tends to be less in Quebec.

At the same time, patterns of integration for visible minorities are not markedly different in Quebec and the rest of Canada; a racial hierarchy exists across Canada. Regarding immigrants in general within Quebec, the EDS findings support the hypothesis that integration today is progressing as well as in the rest of Canada. There is no tendency for immigrants in Quebec to feel less included, or more often the target of discrimination.

In this sense, perhaps the greater security for the French language – which could be a result of bilingualism as a federal policy, or Quebec’s own language legislation – has created a situation where minorities are more secure. This would be consistent with expectations based on multicultural thinking, and the similarity between multicultural policies across Canada and interculturalisme in Quebec. Recent controversies over “reasonable accommodation” in Quebec, and greater concerns among francophones within Quebec, have led some to believe that Quebec is less welcoming of immigrants, specifically Muslim immigrants.1 However, Muslims are no different from other immigrants: they are less likely to report experiences of discrimination if they reside in Quebec. The recent report of the provincial commission on “reasonable accommodation,” the Bouchard-Taylor Commission (Bouchard and Taylor 2008), concluded that much of the controversies in the province were creations of a sensationalistic media, rather than a heavier dose of xenophobia compared to the rest of Canada. Our findings essentially support this conclusion.

Policy Conclusions: What Are the Implications for Multiculturalism in Canada?

When multicultural assumptions are valid, a policy of multiculturalism may be expected to produce the intended positive effects on social integration. When multicultural assumptions are not valid, the opposite may be expected. Overall, what is the policy conclusion? One answer would be that it would depend on which outcomes
are more important. However, we believe that all of the outcomes we have assessed are important, and that both the positive and negative effects of ethnic diversity in Canada should be the basis for policy. Diversity clearly has its strengths, but also creates challenges. We suggest that the policy imperative is to take advantage of the strengths, and respond constructively to the challenges.

In particular, we suggest the following four implications about the realization of multiculturalism in Canada. These concern (1) the importance of equality as a key requirement for integration, (2) the possibilities for ethnic community development to provide more direct support for integration, (3) the need for integration efforts beyond support for diversity, and (4) the need to evaluate the multiculturalism program itself.

(1) **Equality is a key requirement for integration.** Multiculturalism is sometimes tagged as “identity” politics, a focus on promoting minority identities and increasing their salience in society. Some have suggested further that this may detract from considerations of equality. However, an underlying assumption of multiculturalism is that inter-group tolerance and ethnic equality have positive effects on social integration. To the extent that multiculturalism does in fact promote tolerance and equality, perhaps by not only supporting identities but in recognizing their positive value and raising their social status, it has positive effects on social integration. However, the findings of our study clearly indicate that multiculturalism as implemented so far in Canada has not been sufficient to protect visible minorities from experiences of discrimination. Various existing programs, at different levels of government, have been mounted to combat discrimination and to assist individuals in developing skills that would facilitate their integration into society and into the labour market in particular. However, in the perception of a significant portion of members of minority groups, patterns of discrimination remain.

We suggest that multicultural policy should be supplemented by more aggressive efforts to address processes of discrimination and exclusion. Regarding aspects of inequality, the data suggest that it is discriminatory inequality that is most critical. The multicultural model assumes that all groups have an equal access to social resources and are equally valued in the society. Yet the self-reported experiences of discrimination and the differential patterns of adaptation by visible minority across generations and among recent immigrants both in Quebec and in the rest of Canada challenge this assumption of the egalitarian pluralism underpinning multicultural policy. The differential results for whites and visible minorities on attachment patterns suggest that there are institutional effects beyond personal experiences which structure the ways different groups relate to their own community as well as to the larger society.

Experiences of discrimination reported by respondents in a survey are sometimes dismissed as “perceptions” not reflecting actual discrimination. Two points are necessary here. First, evidence of racial discrimination in Canada is substantial from many sources, and not easily dismissed. Although it has not been an objective of this study to review the facts of discrimination, a summary reported elsewhere (Reitz and Banerjee 2007, pp. 491–505) shows a substantial empirical basis to support the view
that inter-group differences in reports of discrimination closely match inter-group differences in actual experiences of discrimination.

At the individual level, it is certainly possible that some persons report discrimination as more serious than it actually is, but by the same token it is equally likely that at least as many others experience discrimination but do not report it. In some instances individuals may not be aware that they have been the target of discrimination, since perpetrators have many incentives to conceal any discriminatory intent. In other instances, there may be awareness, but an aversion to discuss the matter because of feelings of shame (Taylor, Ruggerio and Louis 1996, Dupont and Leyens 2003, Bourhis et al. 2007). Under-reporting may well exceed over-reporting.

A second point is even more important: in social and political life, perceptions matter. If reports of discriminatory experiences are dismissed as unjustified complaints, the effects on social integration identified in our study will be felt anyway. When members of the white majority in Canada dismiss widespread reports of discrimination out of hand as mere “perceptions,” they risk contributing to a racial divide with potentially serious social consequences.

Addressing the issue of discrimination effectively may require the creation of a more genuine and authentic dialogue between majority and minority communities on the subject within the country. To be sure, certain forums for a dialogue on discrimination now exist, both in government and in the broader society. One example is the work of the Canadian Race Relations Foundation, created in 1996 as part of a 1988 settlement agreement between the Government of Canada and the National Association of Japanese-Canadians, acknowledging the injustice of the wartime internment experience of Japanese Canadians. The mandate of the foundation is to “foster racial harmony and cross-cultural understanding and help to eliminate racism.” Their program activities include research, education, training, and initiatives against racism in Canada. Other examples include official investigations and reports that have been conducted at various points in time (the most well-known being Equality Now! Participation of Visible minorities in Canadian Society, Canada House of Commons 1984). There are – or have been – advisory councils or panels at various levels of government.

However, it seems apparent that none of these have created the kind of national dialogue that is necessary. More grass-roots involvement may be required. The Royal Commission format has been effective in promoting a national dialogue in the past, for example the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, and the Royal Commission on the Status of Women. A Royal Commission on the Status of Visible Minorities could examine the extent and impact of discrimination and social vulnerability in racial minority communities, and might lead to constructive proposals which would lessen the concerns that now exist and affect the social integration of members of these groups.

While multiculturalism affirms the inclusion of multiple identities, undermining this ideal are unequal access to resources, lower social status and social acceptance, and under-representation in institutions and in influential positions within them among visible minorities. The potential for the “pluralist” option to maintain ethnic attachments while integrating into mainstream institutions is correspondingly
reduced. Our study has shown that racial minorities integrate more slowly in Canadian society than persons of European origins, and that discriminatory experiences are part of the reason. This situation potentially creates a tension between ethnic and societal attachments as well as leaving some individuals more vulnerable to marginalization from both. Such outcomes would constitute a possible threat to the society’s cohesion.

(2) Ethnic community development may provide more direct support for integration. Since we have found beneficial effects of ethnic attachments – fostering overall well-being and, serving, at least to some degree, as a buffer against the negative psycho-social effects of experiences of discrimination – it makes sense to think of ways to enhance these benefits. Contrary to a popular criticism of multicultural policies, support for ethnic community development not only does not necessarily detract from the social integration of minorities, properly directed it may actually bolster resources within ethnic communities that serve to promote social integration.

A number of specific mechanisms for generating these positive effects may exist. Regarding acquisition of citizenship as one aspect of integration, Bloemraad (2006) observes that Canadian multicultural policies support a higher rate of citizenship acquisition among immigrants in Canada (compared to what occurs in the United States, for example) by promoting organizational development within minority communities, and by providing channels for the dissemination of information about citizenship and how to acquire it. Other specific mechanisms may exist for effects such as buffering effects of experiences of discrimination. These might also include organizational development which reinforces social support networks in minority communities. It might also include the creation of forums for discussion of inter-group experiences and ways to address difficulties.

We have found some potentially negative effects of ethnic attachments, for example in slowing the development of a “Canadian identity,” and participation in Canadian politics as reflected in voting. These effects are not necessarily immutable; they may be subject to change, and policy development might seek also alter the effects. If multicultural policies help ethnic organizations promote the acquisition of citizenship, and since citizenship includes the right to vote as an important aspect, the same policies might be adjusted fairly easily to more explicitly underscore the importance of voting. And by the same token, finding ways to support efforts within ethnic organizations to more explicitly foster a “Canadian” identity – in the same way that they appear to support citizenship acquisition – is not at all contrary to the principles of multicultural policy.

(3) Integration requires efforts beyond support for diversity. A fairly basic assumption underlying Canada’s multiculturalism policy is the idea that social cohesion is not in contradiction with the existence of multiple identities and social attachments. On the contrary, their simultaneous existence allows not only cultural retention but also positive inter-group relations between ethnic communities and full participation in social life and institutions. Under this model, it is assumed that all groups are equally valued and represented in society’s institutions and structures. However, differential patterns of adaptation by minority groups suggest that this
assumption may be a policy blind-spot, ignoring the possibility that some groups experience greater tension in the minority-majority relationship than others.

On this point, our results support a degree of ambivalence. The effects of ethnic attachments on Canadian identity are both positive and negative, so to the extent that multiculturalism promotes such attachments, it also has both positive and negative effects. The overall impact might depend on the relative valuation of the two effects. The results do not allow conclusions about the most adaptive attachments, as each of the attachment patterns show mixed results on the available measures of social integration such as trust, life satisfaction, voting and social participation. But it is the fact of having no attachments, either to an ethnic or to the wider societal community that appears be detrimental to social integration.

(4) Multicultural policy requires closer evaluation. Our findings do not indicate whether these effects of multiculturalism policy actually occur in Canada, because they do not indicate how, if at all, multiculturalism policy may affect ethnic minorities or inter-ethnic relations. They point to issues which should be taken into account in evaluating the policy.

Formal evaluation of multicultural policies has never been seen as an important part of the program. Lack of resources may be part of the reason; budgets allocated for actual program support under the multiculturalism policy are quite small. However, the very success of Canadian multiculturalism politically – as indicated by popular support within Canada and the extent of international interest in this distinctively Canadian approach to diversity – justifies that more attention be given to how the policy actually works, and what its effects actually are.

Note

1. A program of instruction in Quebec schools, under the title “Ethics and Religious Culture Program,” was introduced in September 2008. According to the government website http://www.learnquebec.ca/en/content/curriculum/personal.dev/erc/program/index.html (accessed October 1, 2008) “This program will replace the Catholic Religious and Moral Instruction, Protestant Moral and Religious Education, and Moral Education programs that have been taught until now”.
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