A QUESTION OF GENOCIDE

Armenians and Turks at the End of the Ottoman Empire
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EDITED BY
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In Tribute to One Who Built Bridges
Hrant Dink
(September 15, 1954–January 19, 2007)
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Nearly a century after its occurrence, the Armenian Genocide of 1915 remains one of the most painful episodes of mass killing in the history of the modern period. The conscience of contemporary world society is haunted by images of doomed Armenian women and children, wandering aimlessly in the Anatolian plateau, mad with hunger and grief, and by photographs of rows of corpses of murdered Armenian men and boys, guarded casually by Turkish soldiers. Like the indelible impressions of the victims of Auschwitz on modern consciousness, those of the Armenian genocide call out for remembering and for the historical understanding of a series of events that concluded with the elimination of the Armenian nation from its ancient homelands in Anatolia.

The Armenian genocide is also a painful historical episode because of the persistence over the entire history of the Turkish Republic of official government denial that genocide took place. Turkish denial erects practical barricades to the study and understanding of the events of 1915 by complicating archival access and intimidating scholars from engaging in wide-ranging research into the origins, course, and consequences of the genocide. Turkish government lobbying of foreign governments and support of foreign scholars who join the Turkish chorus of denial also holds back progress in the historiography and impedes a sense of common purpose in investigating the origins of mass murder. Denial is a continual source of injury to the Armenian community as a whole, and in particular to the few remaining survivors of the genocide and their progeny. But one could argue that it also undermines the ‘Turks’ ability to deal openly and frankly with their own historical past and present. In fact, those Turks who are willing to write without bias about the Armenian genocide tend to do so out of a deep sense of patriotism and loyalty to the Turkish nation. A healthy national consciousness cannot abide nasty secrets hidden away in a locked drawer. An increasing number of Turkish intellectuals, writers, and scholars
understand this essential historical lesson and are doing what they can to face the past with an open mind.

Despite the practical barriers to engaging in fundamental research on the Armenian genocide, including the need to know both antiquated Ottoman Turkish (in Arabic script) and Armenian, the field has experienced a flowering of new work over the past decade. Part of this is due to the efforts of Turkish scholars, among them Taner Akçam, Fikret Adanır, and Fatma Müge Göçek, to come to terms with the complicated history of the late Ottoman period, including the destruction of the Armenians. Part of it is the harvest of the pioneer research of Armenian American historians, like Richard Hovannisian and Vahakn Dadrian, who have dedicated a major part of their lives’ work to documenting and understanding the genesis of the disaster of 1915. The historiography of the Armenian genocide has also benefited enormously from the emergence of Holocaust awareness in the 1960s, the development of genocide studies in the 1970s, and the surge of scholarly interest in comparative genocide as a result of the persistence of horrific episodes of mass killing in Bosnia and Rwanda in the mid-1990s.

If the Armenian genocide was not the first genocide of the twentieth century, as some scholars claim—the imperial German massacres of the Herrero and Nama peoples in southwest Africa in 1904–7 may well claim that “distinction”—it nevertheless serves as an important paradigmatic case for thinking about the causes, course, and consequences of genocide. As many Holocaust scholars have pointed out, the mass murder of the Jews in World War II contains any number of unusual elements that underlie the claim to uniqueness. Among them are: (1) the introduction of thoroughly industrial means of mass murder, (2) the uncomfortable cultural linkages with historical Christian anti-Semitism, (3) the comprehensive qualities of the Nazi racial ideology, (4) the intent to chase down and murder the entire world population of Jews, (5) the utter helplessness of the Jews and the almost complete absence of the possibility of resistance when faced with death and destruction, (6) the extent of the success of “the final solution” in Europe, and (7) the subsuming of the entire Nazi party and state apparatus of the Third Reich to the goals of mass murder. Whether or not one accepts the historical uniqueness of the Holocaust, it is no doubt true that the Armenian genocide may be more easily compared with other cases of genocide and contains a number of important aspects that reverberate more broadly with the comparative literature on genocide and mass killing as a whole.

Like other historical episodes of genocide, the Armenian genocide took place within the context of war. It is not too strong to state that war serves as a breeding ground for genocide, providing the arguments and possibilities for its perpetration and creating both the domestic and political conditions that make genocide more likely. The victories and defeats of the Ottoman
armies in World War I, the perception of the Young Turk rulers of danger from the Russian front and the West, and the widespread conviction of the treachery, both actual and potential, of the Armenian population, drove the decision to deport and massacre the Armenian population. The mobilization of the Ottoman army and of the Special Organization, attached to the ruling İttihadist (Committee of Union and Progress, or Unionist) party, provided the manpower for deportation, executions, and mass murder. Military needs during the time of war served as a pretext to further limit parliamentary independence and the autonomy of local officials, some of whom were decidedly unsympathetic to genocidal policies.

Modern ideologies of nationalism—and of racial and religious hatred—also play a prominent role in genocide, including the Armenian case. As a number of Armenian scholars have argued, Islamic religious prejudice against the infidels played a role in the hostility of Turks to Armenians. It is also the case that Young Turk ideology contained elements of the racial superiority of Turks to the Armenians, and other Christian (and even non-Christian) peoples of the Ottoman Empire. Yet, as in many cases of nationalist ideologies, the Young Turks’ worldview was a complicated amalgam of the old Ottoman and the new Pan-Turkic, of premodern Islamic precepts of the inherent inferiority of Christian religious groups, and of modernist ideas of the mobilization of nationality and ethnic homogeneity. The Armenians themselves challenged traditional Ottoman hierarchies of politics and place by forming progressive political parties and assuming prominent positions in commerce and finance. Resentment and hatred of the Armenians grew as the Armenians increasingly sought help from the Great Powers to ensure their rights, property, and lives within the Ottoman realm. The more the West was involved in the Armenian question, the less the Turks trusted the Armenians to support the Ottoman government in the time of war. In the minds of Turkish nationalists, the Armenians’ traditional designation as gâvur (infidels) took on some of the elements of race prejudice and was reinforced by popular resentment of alleged Armenian wealth and treachery. That “Christians” had driven the Ottomans out of southeastern Europe during the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913 and now threatened the integrity of the Anatolian lands of the Turks from outside and within made the Armenian threat even more dangerous from the Young Turk point of view.

Many scholars emphasize the fact that the muhacirs—Muslim refugees, first from Russia in the nineteenth century (Circassians and Tatars, among others), and then Macedonia and Thrace as a consequence of the Balkan Wars—played a prominent role in the Special Organization that did much of the dirty work in relation to the Armenians. Their displaced status in Ottoman Anatolia, so the argument goes, raised their level of hostility to the ostensibly “rich” Armenians and led to their heavy involvement in the
genocide. The literature on mass killing points to potential dangers of rapid status reversals, especially when class and ethnicity are both involved. Hatred, resentment, and impulses for revenge often result. In the Armenian case, the muhacirs had lost their land and influence at the hands of Christian armies and, one could postulate, took out their frustrations on the Armenians, who held land and wealth, if not influence, in Anatolia. The Armenians’ relative economic success in the late Ottoman Empire—as in so many cases of genocide—aroused envy and greed. That the muhacirs were moved as quickly as they were into Armenian houses and occupied Armenian farmland after the deportations attests to the strength of popular economic ambitions, as well as government policy, in the development of genocide.

As in most cases of genocide, the mass killing of the Armenians took place in full view of the international community. The governments of the great powers were well aware of the impending deportation and extermination of the Armenians. The international press was full of stories about the disaster. The Germans and Austro-Hungarians, allied with the Ottomans in the war, might well have done more to try to stop the killing, and, in the case of the Germans, have been accused not only of doing too little, but of aiding and abetting genocide. The Central Powers were, however, also at war, and the demands of Realpolitik tended to trump the moral objections that some German citizens, even German officials, expressed about the genocide. The Americans, who did not enter World War I until later, still were unable to muster much more than diplomatic protests and isolated rallies, this despite the clear-headed and emphatically pro-Armenian reporting of the American ambassador Henry Morgenthau. The principle of noninterference in sovereign states held firm against the calls for humanitarian intervention. That this was the case certainly encouraged Hitler and the Nazis, when inaugurating their own genocidal campaign against the Poles and Jews in September 1939.

Recent research on mass killing indicates that the crime of genocide needs to be thought of as occurring at various levels of society: at the very top, where decisions are taken that lead to mass murder; at the “meso-level,” where regional officials and their accomplices, the police and military, implement orders or interpret signals from the political leadership that lead to genocide; and at the most basic local level of society, where individuals participate in the killing, steal from the victims, move into their houses, or witness the depredations. Sometimes, locals try to save individuals and families, or protest against the deportation or murder of their neighbors, usually in vain. As the articles in this volume demonstrate, the Armenian genocide can profitably be investigated at all of these levels. The Young Turk leaders themselves can and should be studied for their respective involvement in
turning loose the storm of genocide. At the top of the hierarchy of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) was the so-called “Triumvirate,” Mehmet Tâlât (Tâlât Paşa), İsmail Enver (Enver Paşa), and Ahmed Cemal (Cemal Paşa), each of whom had his own priorities and ways of thinking about the “Armenian question.” When the views of the other roughly forty members of the CUP are studied, one sees considerable differences between those who supported the destruction of the Armenians and the small minority that wanted no part of it. Similarly, at the meso-level, some valis (regional governors) refused to go along with the killing and were released from duty. Others became tribunes for forced deportation and mass killing, and insisted on the need for the elimination of the Armenians. The sometimes aggressively eliminationist, sometimes conservative views of regional army commanders and religious leaders (sharifs), similarly complicate a straightforward narrative of “the road to genocide.”

There is even greater variation in the nature of the killing and deportations from village to village, city to city, district to district, depending on the traditions of the locality, the inclinations of the local ruling elites, and the particular ethnic and religious make-up of the population. As we know from studies of other cases of mass killing, local rivalries, family feuds, and personal quarrels at the grassroots become almost instantaneously intertwined with the broader dynamics of mass murder and produce rioting, assaults, and what appears to be spontaneous killing. Every case of genocide is in some measure local. However, the extent of the variations should not lead us to conclude in the Armenian case, or in others, that genocide did not take place, only that it is a more complicated social phenomenon than the indelible images of the organized transport of Jews and their elimination in the gas chambers of Auschwitz and Treblinka might lead us to believe.

The Armenian case also supports the contention in the study of mass killing that genocide has a dynamic of its own. It is not an “event” in and of itself, but a process, one that grows and develops according to unwritten rules of historical behavior. Many cases of genocide begin with programs of forced deportation or ethnic cleansing that evolve sometimes seamlessly into mass murder. If the deportations and killing of the Ottoman Armenians began in the spring of 1915 and accelerated, though at an uneven pace, over the next six months, it is also true that mass killing cannot be said to have concluded until the early 1920s, when massacres finally subsided in waves, with the agreement to a firm border regimen in the East, the withdrawal of the French from Cilicia, and the establishment of the Turkish Republic’s hegemony over Anatolia. Rarely—and the Armenian genocide is no exception—does genocide end up with just one designated set of victims. The relationship between the killing of Armenians and that of the Assyrians is a case in point. Also, the Turks’ attacks on the Greeks, resulting in the
expulsion of the vast majority of the Greek population from Anatolia, were closely related to the Armenian events. The whirlwind of killing pulls in more and more victims and implicates an increasing number of assailants. No one person or group of people seems to order an end to a genocidal action; rather it expires more or less on its own. The frenzy is spent when the victims are for the most part eliminated. If the deportation and killing of the Armenians began in the spring of 1915 and the death rates increased dramatically over the summer, it is also true that the genocide continued when Turkish troops massacred Armenian civilians in the borderlands of Turkey, Russia, and Persia in 1920, and Armenians who had returned to Cilicia from the Middle East were assaulted by Turkish police and irregular forces during the French occupation and withdrawal from the region in 1919–20.

The chapters that follow contain fresh evidence that undermines any attempt to mitigate the responsibility of the Ottoman government for the mass murder of the Armenians in 1915. After reading these contributions, which represent the “state of the art” in the field, no scholar could contend that there was not genocide in the Armenian case. More important, these chapters take us beyond the question of denial—was there a genocide or not?—and probe deeply into the issues of causation and context, linking the development of the destruction of the Armenians to the death throes of the Ottoman Empire and its involvement in World War I. At the same time, these studies also represent an important contribution to the scholarship on genocide in particular and mass killing in general. The involvement (and noninvolvement) of the Great Powers in the Armenian genocide provides important insights into the ways the values and actions of the international system can foster genocide, rather than preventing it, and illustrates how difficult it is to shake norms of sovereignty on behalf of humanitarian intervention. The “international” and the “national” are deeply entwined when thinking about genocide in the Ottoman Empire and in its immediate backdrop of German, Russian, British, American, and French policies as they related to the Ottomans and to each other.

The ability of scholars in this volume to explore various levels of politics and society in the Ottoman Empire draws our attention to the importance of context, contingency, and timing in the development of the Armenian genocide. While providing no excuses for genocide, many contributors demonstrate that the Armenians were an active force in the combustible mix that produced their own demise. There was not much they could have done to prevent the catastrophe, but the activities of their political parties, the lobbying of their religious authorities, the periodic and forceful episodes of resistance, and the formal and informal diplomacy of their leaders reveal a community episodically mobilized, in the end in vain, to avoid the impending destruction. From these articles, as well, one gains a much more variegated
view of the motivations of the “Turkish” perpetrators, many of whom were not Turks at all, but Kurds, Circassians, Laz, and *muhacirs* of disparate nationality. Even the Young Turk leaders, including the enthusiastic perpetrators of genocide, had a variety of motivations and concerns in mind. There were isolated cases of opposition to their murderous policies and times when force had to be used to implement them. The sad conclusion of the story—the reason it is essential to tell it again—was the destruction of the Armenian community in Anatolia. But it is a complex and even intricate story that requires continuing research and discussion. We believe this volume will both reveal those intricacies and help the reader understand why the genocide took place.
Acknowledgments

This volume is the product of the research findings and discussions of two, sometimes overlapping, groups of scholars: the Workshop on Armenian and Turkish Scholarship (WATS) and the Mellon Foundation Sawyer Seminar on Mass Killing, organized by Norman Naimark and held over six years at the Center for the Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (CASBS) on the campus of Stanford University. Ronald Grigor Suny was an ongoing participant in both groups and helped to bring both together in the final Sawyer seminar in December 2007. The stunning impression of the two-and-a-half days of discussion was how far these shared discussions had evolved—how questions that had troubled the earlier meetings of WATS had been resolved and how subtle and nuanced the understanding of the Young Turks’ motives, Armenian activities, and the role of the Great Powers had become.

We are grateful and wish to recognize the contributions of the various universities, foundations, and persons that helped us come to this point in our discussions and research: the Universities of Chicago; Michigan; Minnesota; Geneva; and California, Berkeley; and New York University; the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences; the Norman Wait Harris Memorial Foundation Fund; the Mellon Foundation; the Salzburg Seminar; Louise Manoogian Simone; CIMERA (Geneva); François and Suzy Antounian; Adam and Rita Kablanian; and Herant Katchadourian and the Flora Family Foundation. We also want to thank those who have participated in our programs, helped organize our meetings, submitted papers, made comments, and contributed. Besides those represented in this volume, we would like to express our gratitude to others who either presented papers, participated, or commented on panels or roundtables at our workshops: Engin Deniz Akarlı, Taner Akçam, Mustafa Aksakal, Marc Baer, Rifat Bali, Kevork Bardakjian, Elazar Barkan, Yavuz Baydar, Seyhan Bayraktar, Murat Belge, İsmet Berkhan, Halil Berktay, Paul Boghossian, Ferhat Boratav, Juliette Cadiot, Soner Çağaptay, Cengiz Çandar, Hasan Cemal, Vicken Cheterian, Vahakn Dadrian, Ani Değirmencioğlu, Hayk Demoyan, Selim Deringil, the
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A Question of Genocide
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For many Armenians the events of 1915 are immediate and inform their sense of self and their place in the world. Turks encounter the same events when they travel outside Turkey or read about demonstrations and parliamentary resolutions and have to account suddenly for massacres they did not know existed in their officially white-washed history. No matter how much state policies work to suppress the memory of an unacceptable past, ordinary people and the demands of historical scholarship have kept the tragedies of that distant time alive. About a decade before this volume appeared a number of scholars began a series of meetings to move beyond the barriers that had long shackled research on the tragedies of the late Ottoman Empire and kept two communities frozen in hostility.¹

While there are certainly many Turks who deny the genocide, as well as Turks who fanatically back the Kemalist view of history and of modern Turkish statehood, and Turks who embrace an Islamist worldview and challenge the Kemalist hegemony, there are also Turks, many of them intellectuals and scholars, who are trying under very difficult political conditions to rethink their own history, even the history of the Ottoman mass murders of the Armenians. Those who came to the first meetings of our Workshop for Armenian-Turkish Studies (WATS) in Chicago and Michigan believed that it would be a colossal intellectual and political mistake for Armenians and others to slam the door in the face of those Turks who desire dialogue and are prepared to take risks and suffer the consequences from their own government by proposing a fresh discussion of the events of 1915.

The governing structure of the present-day Turkish republic has both authoritarian and democratic features. While certain practices are repressive and disregard international standards of human rights, Turkey is not a totalitarian state in which all dissent and open discussion are prohibited. There are contested elections, cracks in the press, and episodic free discussions in universities that sometimes allow controversial issues to be quietly aired. In an atmosphere of censorship and repeated crackdowns, there are occasions for political and intellectual openings. In a country energetically

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Introduction: Leaving It to the Historians

Ronald Grigor Suny and Fatma Müge Göçek

¹ The governing structure of the present-day Turkish republic has both authoritarian and democratic features. While certain practices are repressive and disregard international standards of human rights, Turkey is not a totalitarian state in which all dissent and open discussion are prohibited. There are contested elections, cracks in the press, and episodic free discussions in universities that sometimes allow controversial issues to be quietly aired. In an atmosphere of censorship and repeated crackdowns, there are occasions for political and intellectual openings. In a country energetically
transforming itself, Turkey’s vibrant public sphere is the site of profound questioning of old orthodoxies. The initiators who organized the WATS meetings believed that it was the responsibility of scholars to work with colleagues of all nationalities seeking to foster honest and open intellectual exchange.

Among Armenians there were other problems: a sense that the Genocide (with a capital “G”) was a sacred event; that the Armenians should have a single, united position on that event, and that arguments about causes of the genocide might be interpreted as rationalizations or justifications for mass murder. Our view was that the causes of the genocide have not been adequately analyzed, that there are a variety of explanations, ranging from Turkish racism, religious hatred, economic and social jealousy of the Armenians, the fallout from revolutionary politics, Pan-Turanism and the making of empire, and clashing nationalisms, and that they had to be interrogated by serious investigators. WATS was initially met by opposition from both Armenians and Turks, but those who attended were convinced that there could be no advances in scholarship if Armenians and Turks talked only among themselves or with those who agreed completely with their community alone.

The first workshop met over the weekend of March 17–19, 2000, involving scholars from ten universities and research centers. Ronald Suny opened the workshop with a brief statement:

This is a small, humble, and historic meeting—the first time that scholars of various nationalities, including Armenians and Turks, have gathered together to present papers and discuss in a scholarly fashion the fate of the peoples of the Ottoman Empire as that state declined and disintegrated. We do not expect full agreement, but we do expect serious and learned discussion. This is a first probe, an attempt to form a new scholarly community inspired by liberal Ottomanism, tolerance of difference on the basis of equality and respect, rather than exclusivist and insular nationalism.

A field that had been fraught with fixed views and marred by unyielding confrontation opened into normal scholarly exchange. The discussions at the first and subsequent workshops were free of partisanship and nationalism. Cultural barriers fell, and scholars learned from the work of colleagues whose sources they could not read.

While the series of workshops following Chicago attempted to open a dialogue between Armenian and Turkish scholars, the Turkish state maintained, even intensified, its campaign of denial of the genocide. In the fall of 2000, when the U.S. House International Relations Committee voted on a resolution recognizing mass killings of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire as genocide, Turkish money financed powerful lobbyists in Washington to
work against, and eventually scuttle, the resolution. At first the House committee resisted powerful lobbying from the Turkish government and influential supporters like former Congressmen Bob Livingston, Stephen Solarz, and Gerald Solomon, and put the United States on record as accepting this historic tragedy as the first genocide in the twentieth century. Reaction in Turkey was furious. Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit warned that Turkish-American relations would suffer if the House accepted the characterization of the massacres as genocide. The Turkish press condemned the Armenian version of history as myth, and demonstrators in Adana burned an Armenian flag. At the end, the administration of President Bill Clinton convinced enough House members to kill the resolution. Similar outcomes occurred in October 2007 and again in February 2010, when the House Committee on Foreign Affairs resolved that the 1915 deportations and massacres amounted to genocide. On the first occasion Turkey recalled its ambassador and threatened American supply lines to Iraq, and within weeks the resolution was withdrawn. On the second, both the State Department and the White House pushed hard against moving the resolution out of committee. Although Realpolitik had once again trumped moral and historical imperatives, the later debates focused almost entirely on policy considerations, not on whether or not there had been a genocide.

WATS had been founded on the premise that as politicized as the matter of the Armenian Genocide had become, scholars could at least establish the documentary evidence, review the various interpretations, and make judgments about the most convincing arguments. Workshop participants differed as to their willingness to engage in political efforts, but all were committed to keeping WATS dedicated to scholarship and as free of politics as possible. We continued our series of workshops at the University of Michigan (2002), the University of Minnesota (2003), Salzburg, Austria (2004), New York University (2005), the University of Geneva (2008), and the University of California, Berkeley (2010). Journalists from Turkey sometimes attended the meetings and reported back illuminating accounts of the discussions. New research papers, each time delivered by a new group of younger scholars with remarkable archival access, explored what had been dismissed as excessively controversial subjects.

Historians from Armenia met with those from Turkey and their respective diasporas. There was no dispute that deportations and massacres had occurred. The evidence mounted that the forced movement of the Armenians had been ordered by the Young Turk government, that the mass killing was both the result of government and party action, and that while there were several moments of Armenian resistance (most notably at Van in 1915), there was no civil war. The two opposing Turkish and Armenian nationalist narratives were replaced by a single shared account based on the
documented record. Yet many blank spots remained; archival access in Turkey remained restricted; and disagreements about the timing of events, the motivations of the Young Turk leaders, and, most importantly, the question of whether to call the mass killings genocide had yet to be resolved.

In Article II of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (December 9, 1948),

Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such: a) Killing members of the group; b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

A capacious definition, the UN’s conception has become standard and widely accepted, even as it is contested.

It has proved especially difficult to reach agreement on the phrase “intent to destroy.” On the motives and aims of the Young Turks, as well as the timing of their decision to deport the Armenians, major Armenian scholars claim that the massacre of dissident minorities was a consistent Turkish practice. They argue that the Hamidian massacres of the 1890s and the killing of Armenians in Adana in 1909 were precursors of the genocide, which in turn was a premeditated event planned before the World War. Others argue that the earlier massacres were discrete events different in kind from the genocide of 1915 and that the genocide was a largely contingent event that occurred in a moment of radicalization following the catastrophic defeat at Sarıkamış in the winter of 1914–1915. The contention that the genocide was planned long in advance and realized a consistent Turkish policy of extermination harkened back to the essentialist notion of “the terrible Turk,” an irredeemable enemy of Christians and European civilization, as well as to the debate in Holocaust scholarship between “intentionalists” and “structuralists.” But even those scholars who disaggregated the episodes of Ottoman state violence against Armenians agreed that the earlier massacres reflected a propensity for violent repression. Repeated official justifications based on security requirements, as well as the inconsistent and ineffective responses by the European powers, served only to open the way for future episodes. As the workshops progressed, there was greater agreement that the genocide was a distinct event that required contextualization in the particular conjuncture of Young Turk ambitions and the catastrophe of their entry into World War I. While it is undeniable that an anti-Armenian disposition existed among the Turkish elite long before the war, that some extremists contemplated radical solutions to the Armenian
Question, particularly after the Balkan Wars, and that the World War presented an opportunity for carrying out the most revolutionary program against the Armenians, the factors that brought the Young Turk triumvirate to ethnic cleansing and genocide came together only after the outbreak of war, when the Ottoman rulers feared that their rule was in peril and that the Armenians were particularly dangerous as the wedge that the Russians and other powers could use to pry apart their empire.

By 2002 the workshops found an acceptance, even legitimacy, in the Armenian-American academic community and among Turkish university scholars in Europe and Turkey as well as among others in the public sphere. The emphasis on scholarship rather than polemic, accusations, or political pleading allowed discussion to run free without rancor or defensiveness. WATS managed to hold together while more political efforts, like the Track Two diplomacy of the Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC), withered. Alongside active scholars preparing research papers, WATS also involved hundreds of people interested in Armenian-Turkish history and relations through its Internet listserv, armworkshop@umich.edu, initiated by Fatma Müge Göçek.

Among the most exposed and vulnerable scholars were those who lived and worked in Turkey. Halil Berktay gave an interview to the Turkish newspaper Radikal in which he affirmed that genocide had occurred but called on the Turkish state and other governments not to take official positions on such historical events. “Bringing up the issue renders the Turkish state and society more defensive on this topic and closed within themselves,” he said, “and pushes them to become more rigid. Political polarization on this topic is so strong that even finding the courage to speak on this subject is a great problem.” The Turkish state not only did not heed Professor Berktay but instead intensified the campaign of denial. Some Turkish nationalists even called for Sabancı University to fire Berktay, but the university refused to succumb to pressure.

The workshop process reached an unexpected climax when Turkish scholars in Turkey decided to hold their own conference, “The Ottoman Armenians during the Era of Ottoman Decline,” in May 2005. Spearheaded by several veterans of WATS and sponsored by three leading Istanbul universities—Bosphorus, Sabancı, and Bilgi—the conference was suddenly postponed by its organizers the day before it was to open because of an aggressive campaign of “pressure, threats and slander.” The then minister of justice, Cemil Çiçek, had pronounced that holding the conference would be tantamount to “stabbing Turkey in the back,” adding “I wish I had not renounced my authority to open criminal cases as justice minister.” Despite intimidation by nationalist protestors, the conference opened at the end of September at Bilgi University. Unperturbed by about a hundred nationalist
protestors outside who occasionally threw eggs or tomatoes and despite a lone woman protestor in the hall, participants heard accounts of Armenian life in Ottoman Anatolia, the evacuation of some three thousand Armenian communities, the international media coverage of the 1915 events, rival interpretations of the famous Ottoman Bank incident and the Adana massacres of 1909, and the “demographic engineering” of the Young Turks. Much discussion centered on the evolution of Turkish nationalist views generated in the Kemalist republic on the events of World War I and the way in which progressively a silence enveloped the memory of what happened to the Armenians. In an eloquent address to the conference, the Turkish Armenian journalist Hrant Dink, a participant in several of the WATS meetings, told the largely Turkish audience, “We (Armenians) want this land; not to take it away, but to lie under it!”

As dialogue broadened, as Turkish civil society increasingly explored through universities, the press, television, and published works the dark spots of Ottoman history, the backlash from nationalists and the state turned against journalists and fiction writers as well as historians. The Turkish novelist Orhan Pamuk; the editor of the Turkish Armenian newspaper Agos (Furrow), Hrant Dink; the novelist Elif Şafak; and the publisher Ragıp Zarakolu, among others, were either brought to trial or threatened with prison for remarks “insulting” Turkishness. Most of the cases were dismissed, but Dink was convicted and given a suspended sentence. When Pamuk was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature in October 2006, nearly every account mentioned his statement to a Swiss journal that “thirty thousand Kurds and a million Armenians were killed in these lands.” Just hours before the announcement that Pamuk had received the prize, the French National Assembly passed a bill criminalizing denial of the Armenian Genocide. Awareness of a genocide could no longer be obliterated.

While both the Turkish and Armenian governments have asserted that the question should be left to historians, official Turkish denial, along with more benign interventions by other governments to recognize the events of 1915 as genocide and to make denial a crime, have taken the issue out of the hands of the historians and made more difficult the free and full discussion of the Turkish and Armenian experience. Just as the dialogue among scholars was reaching the point of rough consensus, activists and politicians hardened their positions as defenders and deniers. The Turkish Parliament responded to a proposed French bill with a joint declaration signed by all parties denouncing the bill as motivated by domestic political concerns and predicting that it would harm Turkish-French relations as well as prospects for normalization of relations between Ankara and Erevan. Opposition deputy Şükrü Elekdağ, a former ambassador to the United States, called for sanctions on Armenia and the deportation of some seventy thousand Armenian illegal
workers living in Turkey. From the opposite side, Pamuk condemned the French move as a betrayal of France’s own liberal traditions. Many who had been tending the delicate dialogue in which history is written, rewritten, and revised were dismayed by the preemptive strike by legislators. Dink boldly stated that if the bill passed, he would provoke arrest by publicly denying the genocide in France.

Hrant Dink never had that chance. On January 19, 2007, a seventeen-year-old nationalist assassin from Trabzon gunned him down outside his office in Istanbul. The irony of Dink’s death is that he was killed in the name of a particularly narrow notion of patriotism while he was himself a fervent Turkish patriot. His vision of his native country, however, was of a modern democratic, tolerant state, the eastern edge of Europe, in which his own people, the Armenians, could live together with Turks, Kurds, Jews, Greeks, and the other peoples who had coexisted, however uneasily, in the cosmopolitan empire out of which the Turkish Republic had emerged. What he could not tolerate was the denial of the shared history of those peoples, a history that involved not only the mass killing of Armenians but the on-going repression of Kurds. Dink was an active participant in the vital civil society emerging in Turkey, and people who had felt alone suddenly, briefly, felt empowered in the outpouring of grief witnessed by his funeral. Tens of thousands marched for hours through the streets of Istanbul with signs proclaiming “We are all Hrant; we are all Armenians.”

January 19 seemed to shift the landscape for Armenians and Turks. More starkly than before, Armenians were revealed as symbols in present-day Turkey, having taken on a variety of meanings—enemy, outsider, foreigner, victimizer. They further became symbolic of an alternative to the current impasse, a way out, perhaps to Europe, to greater tolerance, to democracy. But as cracks in the edifice of denial widened, a backlash from nationalists took on a new force. Dink’s assassin was cheered in public as a national hero. Turkey’s mildly Islamist government, facing the “deep state” of the military and Kemalist elite, was forced to take a hard line on the Armenian issue. The question of the genocide became even more difficult either to suppress or to resolve. The path on which scholars had tentatively tread turned into a perilous minefield.

No matter how hard we tried to keep the question of genocide confined to scholarship, it could not be kept from the public sphere. While we are as yet unable to express a clear unanimity on whether or not the events of 1915 constitute a genocide, a shared sense of what happened and why has been established. The problem of the “G” word is both definitional and political. Some of the participants hold that public acceptance of the term “genocide” would render them ineffective with the Turkish public. Others disagree with the standard United Nations definition of genocide. The New York
University philosophy professor Paul Boghossian explored the imprecision and confusions of this official internationally accepted definition, but he noted that we all agreed that deportations and massacres had occurred; that they had been ordered, organized, and carried out by the Young Turks and their agents; and that the target of these brutal policies had been defined ethno-religious groups (along with the Armenians, the Assyrians, and some other minorities as well). If, he asked rhetorically, you accept that all this happened, and you still do not want to call it genocide, then you must give us the word.\(^7\)

Acceptance of the events of 1915 as an instance of ethnic cleansing, *avant la lettre*, is much less problematic. And we appear to have achieved a closer consensus that ethnic cleansing, like genocide, is almost always an activity organized by state authorities. The line between the two is a thin one, but ethnic cleansing—the coercive removal of an ethnically defined group of people from a given territory—need not involve mass killing, though death from deportation, forced marches, and deprivation usually accompanies it. Genocide, on the other hand, is the deliberate, sustained mass killing of a designated ethnic, religious, or national community with the aim of reducing or eliminating its political, social, or cultural potential.\(^8\) Unlike a pogrom or urban riot, instigated and carried out by one social, ethnic, or religious group against another, genocide does not simply flare up and die down in relatively short time but is sustained over both time and territory. It requires some premeditation and planning, however chaotic and messy its actual execution and consequences. What remains open and in dispute for some, albeit a minority among scholars, is whether the murder of a nation in the case of the Armenians and the Assyrians was intentional or an unfortunate consequence of a brutal program of deportations. After more than a decade of meeting, talking, and further research, a general, if not complete, consensus was reached that the Young Turks had had no “blueprint” for genocide, that is, no carefully drawn out, long-established plans for exterminating the Armenians, but that sometime in March 1915 a decision was made to deport them systematically and, by issuing oral orders and sending out secret emissaries, to massacre them in the process. For most of the scholars participating in these discussions the historical record confirmed that a genocide had occurred; for others the term itself led to more problems than it resolved. The title of this volume—*A Question of Genocide*—reflects both the certainty of some and the ambiguity of others, not so much on the nature of the killings, but how they might most convincingly be described.

There may be no escape from the political aspects of setting the record straight on any genocide. The Armenian Genocide has been the exemplary victim of deliberate, sustained falsification. Historians are implicated in these politics no matter how faithfully they attend to the obligations of
their craft. As Turkey and Armenia both construct and reconstruct their historic and present-day identities, they have to deal with the traumas of their twentieth-century emergence. These two countries and their peoples, at home and in the diaspora, are fated to live side by side as they have for half a millennium in the past, their destinies intertwined, their senses of self intimately wrapped up in the other. For historians, who have done so much to construct the pasts with which each nation now lives, the task of reconstruction has become imperative. Essentializing the other as irretrievably evil leads to the endless repetition of the debilitating conflicts and deceptions of the last century. At present, the histories preferred by most Armenians and Turks remain embedded in their respective nationalist master narratives, which construct the other people as perpetrator and their own people as victim. Yet the simplicities of national myths, themselves the handiwork of historians as well as politicians, must continually be challenged so that “realities” created instrumentally to defend particular power and knowledge structures may be replaced by shared, subversive narratives that move us beyond nationalism toward truer understanding. This volume is one small effort in that direction.
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Part I

HISTORIOGRAPHIES OF THE GENOCIDE
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Even before the killings had ceased, the writing about the Armenian deportations and massacres had commenced. Eyewitnesses, journalists, diplomats, and itinerant officers and missionaries recorded what they were seeing in anguished diary entries, memoranda to governments, and reports to their newspapers.¹ The contours of how seemingly unprecedented events would be understood were already being drawn, and nowhere more indelibly than in the diary and dispatches of Henry Morgenthau (1856–1945), the American ambassador to the Sublime Porte. These texts, published later as a memoir, have taken on exceptional importance as a source on Young Turk decision-making in 1914–1915. For the genocide scholar Roger W. Smith, “it is the classic, contemporary account of the first large-scale genocide of the twentieth century.”² For the Holocaust scholar Robert Jay Lifton, Morgenthau’s account is a unique and remarkable source because of its view of genocide from the top: “I do not know of any other example of a critical outsider who had regular access to the highest-ranking planners and perpetrators of genocide, even as it was taking place.”³ The narrative Morgenthau presented was considered devastating enough for one of the professional deniers of the Armenian genocide, Heath Lowry, then the head of the Institute for Turkish Studies in Washington and later the Mustafa Kemal Atatürk Professor of Ottoman and Modern Turkish Studies at Princeton University, to issue a small book that attempted to undermine the authenticity and veracity of the ambassador’s witness.⁴ Morgenthau, then, is the proper place to begin to understand how the history of what later would be called “genocide” has been written by eyewitnesses, by diplomats in their dispatches, by missionaries and soldiers in letters and memoirs, and eventually by professional historians.
Morgenthau’s book was a product of its time. Using material in his original diaries, Morgenthau’s memoir was written in the last year of World War I, a time of intense passion about the enemies of the Allied powers.\(^5\) President Woodrow Wilson wrote in November 1917 to encourage him to write up his “full exposition of some of the principal lines of German intrigue.”\(^6\)

The preface to the work, dated a month before the armistice, begins: “By this time the American people have probably become convinced that the Germans deliberately planned the conquest of the world,” which he labeled “the greatest crime in modern history.”\(^7\) While hardly the propaganda piece that his critics have claimed, the memoir reveals a mind fiercely engaged in the trauma of war and mass murder, with unguarded expression of the kind of essentialist views of national character that determined the understanding of human motivation in those years. The ambassador reveals himself as a keen observer, privileged in his access to power, judicious in his evaluations of both the political context and the key players, and highly ethical and fearless in his defense of his government and his own values.\(^8\)

For Morgenthau, the driving motivation of Tâlât, Enver, and Cemal was no longer reform but “an insatiable lust for personal power.”\(^9\) Real power in Turkey was not in the state but in the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), the forty-man executive dominated by Minister of the Interior Tâlât Bey. The triumvirate had achieved full power in the bloody coup d’état of January 26, 1913, and Morgenthau enjoyed an extraordinary intimacy with Enver and Tâlât, not only dining with them and riding together in the Belgrade forest, but at the same time confronting them with naive frankness about his objections to their policies. His subtle, rounded portraits of these men betray both fascination with them as persons and abhorrence at their deeds. He probed their psychology in a vain attempt to comprehend their actions.

The hulking figure of Tâlât, broad backed, with iron grip, was particularly intriguing to Morgenthau. Tâlât rose from humble origins, beginning as a mailman and then a telegraph operator; he was not an ethnic Turk and was uninspired by Islam or any religion. “I hate all priests, rabbis, and hodjas,” he told Morgenthau.\(^10\) By the time the ambassador befriended him, Tâlât had become disillusioned about the possibility of reform in the Ottoman Empire. “I have been greatly disappointed at the failure of the Turks to appreciate democratic institutions. I hoped for it once, and I worked hard for it—but they were not prepared for it.”\(^11\) Tâlât, like all the Turkish leaders—according to Morgenthau—was motivated primarily by fear, most particularly, fear of Russia, the most serious threat to the empire’s territorial integrity. “This fear of Russia, I cannot too much insist, was the one factor which, above everything else, was forcing Turkey into the arms of Germany.”\(^12\)

Morgenthau’s text is replete with indelible characteristics of “the Turk.” Psychologically primitive,” the Turk is essentially “a bully and a coward; he
is brave as a lion when things are going his way, but cringing, abject, and nerveless when reverses are overwhelming him.” Here as elsewhere Morgenthau used “the Turk” in the singular to describe Turkish attitudes, mentalities, and emotions, further homogenizing, naturalizing, and essentializing nationality. The Ottomans, he claims, reverted in the war years to an older ancestral type: “the basic fact underlying the Turkish mentality is its utter contempt for all other races. A fairly insane pride is the element that largely explains this strange human species. The common term applied by the Turk to the Christian is ‘dog,’ . . . ; he actually looks upon his European neighbor as far less worthy of consideration than his own domestic animals.” Yet there are also positive qualities. Besides a “keen sense of humour,” “one of the most conspicuous traits in the Turkish character” is “its tendency to compromise and to bargain.” “So far as I can discover,” he told his readers, “the Ottoman Turks had only one great quality, that of military genius.” But, lest we forget their most essential qualities, Morgenthau went on, “Such graces of civilization as the Turk has acquired in five centuries have practically all been taken from the subject peoples whom he so greatly despises.” The “innate attitude of the Moslem Turk to people not of his own race and religion [is] that they are not human beings with rights, but merely chattels, which may be permitted to live when they promote the interest of their masters, but which may be pitilessly destroyed when they have ceased to be useful. This attitude is intensified by a total disregard for human life and an intense delight in inflicting physical human suffering which are not unusually the qualities of primitive peoples.” The most primitive qualities of the Turk modified over centuries, but after the failure of the democratic revolution there was “an atavistic reversion to the original Turk.” In contrast to the Turks’ instinctive sense of survival, Morgenthau credited the Germans with strategic vision and a cunning manipulation of the Turks.

Morgenthau was repeatedly appalled by the willingness of the Turks to resort to violence, which was related to their emotional volatility. “The Turks,” Morgenthau suggested, “like most primitive peoples, wear their emotions on the surface, and with them the transition from exultation to despair is a rapid one.” When Tâlât heard that the English had bombarded the Dardanelles and killed two Turks, he exploded to Morgenthau: “We intend to kill three Christians for every Moslem killed.” Measuring Tâlât’s emotions and waiting for the right moment to make his requests, the ambassador noted, “Tâlât had shown several moods in this interview; he had been by turns sulky, good-natured, savage, and complaisant,” but on occasion he displayed a keen sense of humor. “Tâlât himself greatly loved a joke and a funny story.” The ambassador, who in his own representation was the epitome of decorum, politesse, and civilization, prided himself on his ability on some if not all occasions to tame or manipulate the Turkish leader.
For Morgenthau, violence is inscribed in Islam. A secret pamphlet that followed the declaration of jihad mixed religion—the “killing of infidels who rule over Islam has become a sacred duty”—with anticolonial nationalism—“Turan for the Turanian Moslems, . . . Caucasus for the Caucasian Moslems, and the Ottoman Empire for the Ottoman Turks and Arabs.” On November 14, mobs attacked several foreign stores in Istanbul—the Bon Marché, an Austrian shop advertising “English clothes” for sale, and the Armenian-owned restaurant Tokatlian’s. That was the extent of the “Holy War!” While the anticolonialist uprising never occurred, Morgenthau, convinced that the Germans were behind the pamphlet and the proclamation of jihad, ominously concluded, “Only one definite result did the Kaiser accomplish by spreading the inciting literature. It aroused in the Mohammedan soul all the intense animosity toward the Christian which is the fundamental fact in his strange, emotional nature, and thus started passions aflame that afterward spent themselves in the massacres of the Armenians and other subject peoples.” Emotion here is a kind of fire that consumes what it touches and then spends itself.

With the Turkish entry into the war, Cemal went off to Syria to direct the campaign against the British in Egypt, and Enver commanded the Caucasian front against Russia. With the disastrous defeat at Sarıkamış in January 1915, a general panic gripped Istanbul. It was feared that the city would fall to the Bulgarians, who might join the war on the side of the Entente or with the British, who were rumored to be about to break through the Dardanelles. Tâlât “was the picture of desolation and defeat” as the thunder of the British guns at the straits seemed “to spell doom.” There was fear of revolution in the city, and posters denounced Tâlât. Toward the end of the month Enver returned from the front, unsure of his reception by the public after the losses at Sarıkamış. The Young Turk leaders planned to burn down the city if the British broke through; the idea of such a wanton act shocked Morgenthau. “There are not six men in the Committee of Union and Progress,” Tâlât told him, “who care for anything that is old. We all like new things.”

Morgenthau elaborated a number of causes for the deportations and massacres of the Armenians, many of which became foundational for Western and Armenian historiography of the genocide. He began with the nationalist perspective that the Young Turks were committed to a Turkified empire and adopted the policy of Abdülhamid II (1876–1909). “Their passion for Turkifying the nation seemed to demand logically the extermination of all Christians—Greeks, Syrians, and Armenians.” The error of past Muslim conquerors had been that they had not obliterated the Christians, “a fatal error of statesmanship” that “explained all the woes from which Turkey has suffered in modern times.” The war presented an opportunity, for Russia, France, and Britain could no longer stand in the way as they had during
Abdülhamid’s reign. “Thus, for the first time in two centuries the Turks, in 1915, had their Christian populations utterly at their mercy. The time had finally come to make Turkey exclusively the country of the Turks.” 28

The Armenians, in Morgenthau’s account, are innocent. While the fact “that the Armenians all over Turkey sympathized with the Entente was no secret,” they acted with restraint. Their leaders urged them not to be provoked. 29 Rather than being primarily a matter of religious difference or conflict, the decision to carry out the deportations and massacres was a strategic choice. “Undoubtedly religious fanaticism was an impelling motive with the Turkish and Kurdish rabble who slew Armenians as a service to Allah, but the men who really conceived the crime had no such motive. Practically all of them were atheists, with no more respect for Mohammedanism than for Christianity, and with them the one motive was cold-blooded, calculating state policy.” 30 In a sense they had become Germans.

Already in January and February 1915, “fragmentary reports began to filter in” to the American Embassy of killings of Armenians, but “the tendency was at first to regard these activities as mere manifestations of the disorders that had prevailed in the Armenian provinces for many years.” Tâlât and Enver dismissed such reports “as wild exaggerations.” What the Armenians would later call “the defense of Van” in April was declared by officials “a mob uprising that they would soon have under control.” When prominent Armenians in the capital were arrested on April 24, Morgenthau brought the issue up to Tâlât, who replied that the government was acting in self-defense, that the Armenians in Van “had already shown their abilities as revolutionists,” and that Armenian leaders in Istanbul “were corresponding with the Russians, and he had every reason to fear that they would start an insurrection against the Central Government.” 31 “These people . . . refused to disarm when we told them,” Tâlât explained to Morgenthau. “They opposed us at Van and at Zeitoun, and they helped the Russians. There is only one way in which we can defend ourselves against them in the future, and that is just to deport them.” When Morgenthau protested that that was not a reason for “destroying a whole race” or “making innocent women and children suffer,” Tâlât simply added, “Those things are inevitable.” 32

In a later, extended conversation—this one without Morgenthau’s Armenian dragoman present—Tâlât spoke most frankly:

I have asked you to come today . . . so that I can explain our position on the whole Armenian subject. We base our objections to the Armenians on three distinct grounds. In the first place, they have enriched themselves at the expense of the Turks. In the second place, they are determined to domineer over us and to establish a separate state. In the third place, they have openly encouraged our enemies. They have assisted the Russians in the Caucasus
When Morgenthau attempted point by point to refute Tâlât’s argument, Tâlât interrupted, “It is no use for you to argue, . . . we have already disposed of three quarters of the Armenians; there are none at all left in Bitlis, Van, and Erzeroum. The hatred between the Turks and the Armenians is now so intense that we have got to finish with them. If we don’t, they will plan their revenge.” He told Morgenthau that he had “asked you to come here so as to let you know that our Armenian policy is absolutely fixed and that nothing can change it. We will not have the Armenians anywhere in Anatolia. They can live in the desert but nowhere else.” In despair, Morgenthau told Tâlât, “You are making a terrible mistake,” and repeated that three times. “Yes, we may make mistakes,” he replied, “but—and he firmly closed his lips and shook his head—we never regret.” Later he told Morgenthau, “No Armenian . . . can be our friend after what we have done to them.”

On August 3, 1915, Morgenthau wrote in his diary of his meeting with Tâlât: “He gave me the impression that Tâlât is the one who desires to crush the poor Armenians.” Morgenthau ended the book where he began, with the question of Germany’s role in the war and the Armenian massacres. He reported that the German Ambassador, Baron Hans Freiherr von Wangenheim, denounced the Armenians for the unprovoked rebellion in Van, considered them traitorous vermin, and declared, “I will help the Zionists, . . . but I shall do nothing whatever for the Armenians.” “The Armenians,” the German ambassador claimed, “have shown themselves in this war to be enemies of the Turks. It is quite apparent that the two peoples can never live together in the same country.” Wangenheim sent a formal note of protest to the Porte on July 4, 1915, but refused to intervene further with the Turks. But he insisted to Morgenthau that “Germany is not responsible for this [the Armenian deportations and massacres].” Morgenthau told Wangenheim, “You are a Christian people and the time will come when Germans will realize that you have let a Mohammedan people destroy another Christian nation. . . . Crimes like these cry to heaven.” After Wangenheim’s sudden death in October 1915, his successor, Paul Graf Wolff-Metternich, did intervene with Tâlât and Enver, an action that his superior, Foreign Minister Arthur Zimmermann, considered a mistake.

The themes of Morgenthau’s memoir remain among the most powerful elements constituting both the narrative of the genocide and its explanation
up to the present time. While other memoirs and documents appeared sporadically in the years after the Great War, little distanced reflection or scholarly attention was paid to the Armenian massacres for almost fifty years after the events. What was written either reflected the suffering of those who had endured the deportations and survived or political pleading for appropriate recognition of Armenian losses and recompense in the form of territory or reparations. Armenian political parties, particularly the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaktsutiun) worked to keep the plight of dispersed Armenians before the public, and the image of “starving Armenians” was familiar in American and European media. The major powers, however, lost interest in the Armenian Question after the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), which by recognizing the Republic of Turkey and failing to mention the Armenians or to enforce minority protections on the Kemalist state essentially confirmed the effectiveness of deportations and even murderous ethnic cleansing as a potential solution to population problems. With the Soviet republic as the only existing Armenian political presence, there was little incentive for Western governments to deal with this matter. In the new republic of Turkey there was a cold silence about the events of the late Ottoman period beyond the heroic nationalist narrative of Kemalist resistance to foreign aggression. Yet the “Armenian Question” was not easily laid to rest. The assassination of Tâlât in Berlin in March 1921 by Solomon Tehlirian and the ensuing trial and acquittal of the assassin, along with the killing of another architect of the genocide, Bahadeddin Şakir, by Dashnaks in April 1922, and Cemal in Tiflis in July, kept the fate of Ottoman Armenians in the headlines—for a while. In November 1933 the renowned writer Franz Werfel published his epic novel Die vierzig Tage des Musa Dagh (The Forty Days of Musa Dagh), about the courageous but doomed resistance of Armenian villagers during the genocide. Enormously popular, the novel was deemed “undesirable” by the Nazis, and Werfel, an Austrian Jew, fled to France after the Anschluss and later to the United States. When MGM Studios announced plans to make a film of the novel, the Turkish government applied pressure through the U.S. State Department and succeeded in stopping production.

During the Cold War, Turkey decisively joined the anti-Communist camp, and the Republic of Turkey was widely hailed as a model of secular modernization and a staunch ally of the West. A pro-Turkish account by the Princeton professor Lewis Thomas praised the “civilizing” efforts of the Turkish state in its treatment of the Kurds and its forging of an effective anti-Communist democracy. In Turkey a former official in Tâlât’s Ministry of the Interior and a CUP member, Esat Uras, compiled a collection of documents purporting to demonstrate Armenian culpability in their own destruction. Armenian diaspora activists at the time appeared more concerned with the conflicts over attitudes toward Soviet Armenia
and divisions in the Armenian Church than with a politics centered on 1915. But a renewed interest in genocide began to emerge in the 1960s. The very term “genocide,” invented by Raphael Lemkin during the Second World War, explicitly included the Armenian events along with the Nazi exterminations of European Jews. The United Nations Genocide Convention, adopted on December 9, 1948, established the killing of a people as an international crime, and with the evolution of new international norms of human rights and crimes against humanity, interest in historical examples of such abuses grew. “Holocaust consciousness” moved from primarily a Jewish concern into the broader public with the trial of Adolph Eichmann in 1961, Hannah Arendt’s controversial Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963), and the growing connection made between the tragedy in Europe and the survival of the state of Israel. The very term “holocaust,” which earlier had been applied (by David Lloyd-George, for example) to the Armenian massacres, now was nearly exclusively (and with a capital “H”) used for the Nazi killing of the Jews. With the fiftieth anniversary of the Armenian deportations in 1965, commemorations were held around the world, none more striking than the demonstrations in Erevan that demanded “mer hogher” (our lands) and led, first, to the removal of the local Communist Party secretary and, later, to the building of an official monument to the genocide at Tsiternakaberd. In an unprecedented way, in the following decades public expressions, political demands, and new scholarly interest in the events of 1915 created among diverse elements of Armenian communities a more coherent sense of Armenian identity and purpose. The greatest misfortune that had befallen Armenians, ironically, became the source of shared national consciousness, lessening the distance between Soviet Armenia and the diaspora and reducing the antagonisms among diaspora political parties.

Armenian “genocide consciousness” fed on the persistent and ever more aggressive denial by the Turkish government and sponsored spokesmen, including some with academic credentials, that the deportations and massacres had been ordered by the Young Turk government in an attempt to exterminate one of the peoples of the Ottoman Empire, that 1915 fit the United Nations definition of genocide. More deadly were the actions of Armenian terrorists, from 1973 into the early 1980s, who tried to raise the visibility of the issue by assassinating Turkish officials and setting off bombs in public places. Out of the political and historiographical struggles of the 1970s emerged the first serious scholarship. Richard G. Hovannisian’s 1978 bibliography of sources on The Armenian Holocaust demonstrated both the availability of primary sources for anyone who cared to learn about 1915 as well as the thinness, indeed absence, of academic historical research on the topic. In those years one had to turn to the
French physician Yves Ternon, who moved from his studies of Nazi medical atrocities to the Armenian genocide. As a small number of Armenian scholars, notably Richard Hovannisian, Vahakn Dadrian, and Levon Marashlian, as well as a few non-Armenians like Robert Jay Lifton, Leo Kuper, Ternon, and Tessa Hofmann, began to write about an Armenian genocide, a defense of the Turks by Heath Lowry, Stanford Shaw, and Justin McCarthy led to clashes over such basic questions as the number of victims, the role and responsibility of the Committee of Union and Progress, and whether 1915 should be considered an asymmetrical civil war or intentional, state-directed extermination of a designated people, that is, genocide. At the same time, a number of Holocaust scholars, seeking to preserve the “uniqueness” of the Jewish exterminations, rejected the suggestion of equivalence between the Armenian and Jewish genocides. As Peter Novick reports, “Lucy Dawidowicz (quite falsely) accused” an Armenian writer “of ‘turn[ing] the subject into a vulgar contest about who suffered more.’ She added that while Turks had ‘a rational reason’ for killing Armenians, the Germans had no rational reason for killing Jews.” Armenians were upset at the reduction of the Armenian presence in the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum and by the Israeli government’s attempt to close down an international genocide conference in Tel Aviv in 1982 after the Turkish government protested the discussion of the Armenian case. Prominent American Jews, including Elie Wiesel, Alan Dershowitz, and Arthur Hertzberg, withdrew from the conference, but the organizer, Israel W. Charny, went ahead with it. Several American-Armenian scholars refused to attend as well, in protest over the Israeli invasion of Lebanon that was taking place as the conference held its sessions. As one state after another officially recognized 1915 as a genocide, the United States and Israel soon became the two most notable exceptions, along with Turkey. Activists in Europe and North America organized a series of campaigns to pressure the holdout states toward genocide recognition.

Two years after the crisis over the Tel Aviv conference, the Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal, a civil society organization founded in 1979 by the Italian Senator Lelio Basso, held a “trial” examining the Armenian massacres to determine if it constituted a genocide. Meeting in Paris from April 13 to 16, 1984, the jury heard the accounts of scholars—among them Hovannisian, Jirair Libaridian, Christopher Walker, Hofmann, Ternon, and Dickran Kouymjian—and examined the arguments of the Turkish government and its supporters. In its verdict the Tribunal determined that

The extermination of the Armenian population groups through deportation and massacre constitutes a crime of genocide. . . . [T]he Young Turk government is guilty of this genocide, with regard to the acts perpetrated between
1915 and 1917; the Armenian genocide is also an “international crime” for which the Turkish state must assume responsibility, without using the pretext of any discontinuity in the existence of the state to elude that responsibility.\textsuperscript{51}

By the late 1980s, the first serious academic scholarship in the West on the fate of the Armenians began to appear in essays, collected volumes, and comparative studies. A new field of “genocide studies” legitimized serious attention to an event that had been all but erased from historians’ memory.\textsuperscript{54} Still, much of the energy spent in these debates centered on whether genocide had taken place. The Turkish denial had set the boundaries of the discussion, to the neglect of important issues of interpretation and explanation.

Much of the early literature did not deal explicitly with questions of causation. For deniers of genocide there was simply no need to explain an event that had not occurred as stipulated by those who claimed it had. What did occur, in their view, was a reasonable and understandable response of a government to a rebellious and seditious population in a time of war and mortal danger to the state’s survival. \textit{Raison d’état} justified the suppression of rebellion, and mass killing was explained as the unfortunate side-effect of legitimate efforts at establishing order behind the lines. The denialist viewpoint might be summarized as: There was no genocide, and the Armenians were to blame for what happened; they were rebellious, seditious subjects who presented a danger to the empire and got what they deserved. There was no intention or effort by the Young Turk regime to eliminate the Armenians as a people.

Even though the denialist account fails both empirically and morally, its claims shaped much of the debate. Many historians sympathetic to the Armenians shied away from explanations that might place any blame at all on the victims of Turkish policies. Because a nuanced account of the background and causes of the genocide seemed to concede ground to the deniers, Armenian scholars in particular were reluctant to see any rationale in the acts of the Young Turks. Explanation, it is claimed, is rationalization, and rationalization in turn leads to the denialist position of justification.

The political scientist Robert Melson labeled the denialist viewpoint appropriately “the provocation thesis.” The thesis, he argued, claims: (1) that Armenians and Turks lived in relative harmony for many centuries, and that that peaceful coexistence was undermined by noxious outside influences—American missionaries, Russian diplomats, Armenian revolutionaries from the Caucasus—who worked to destroy the territorial integrity and political system of the Ottoman Empire; (2) that the response of the government to Armenian rebellion was measured and justified; and (3) that Armenians, therefore, brought on their own destruction. As a form of explanation the “provocation thesis” remains on the political-ideological level and makes no
effort to probe the negative features of the Ottoman social and political order. No explanation is offered to elucidate why small groups of Armenians turned to resistance, besides their own greed and ambition, or why the overwhelming majority of Armenians acquiesced to Turkish rule and did not participate in rebellion. Like other conservative views of social discontent and revolution, arguments such as those put forth by Western historians such as William L. Langer and Stanford Shaw and Turkish apologists like the former foreign ministry official Salahi R. Sonyel neglect to evaluate the social and political conditions out of which resistance and protest grew and lay the blame on “outside agitators” and Armenian ingratitude.

The “provocation thesis” changed its form over time. Some writers limited their criticism to diminishing the number of victims, claiming that no more than 200,000 lost their lives. Others rejected the notion of genocide because a premeditated policy of extermination could not be linked to the Young Turk leadership. Still others spoke of a civil war in Anatolia in which Armenians and Turks alike were killed and in which violence to protect the motherland from usurpers and separatists was justified. The first fundamental criticism to be made of the idea that “outside agitators” disrupted the relatively peaceful relationship that had long existed between the millet-i sadıka ("the loyal millet"), as the Armenians were known early in the nineteenth century, and the ruling Turks is that such an imagined past, rather than being based in “reality,” was the cultural construction of the dominant nationality, its ideologues and rulers, and was not shared by the subordinate peoples of the empire that lived in a limbo of legally enforced inferiority. The Armenians, like the other non-Muslim peoples of the empire, were not only an ethnic and religious minority in a country dominated demographically and politically by Muslims, but given an ideology of inherent Muslim superiority and the segregation of minorities, they were also an underclass. However high they might rise in trade, commerce, or even governmental service, Armenians were never to be considered equal to the ruling Muslims and would always remain gâvur, infidels inferior to the Muslims. For centuries Armenians lived in a political and social limbo in which their testimony was not accepted in Muslim courts on a level equal to that of Muslims, where they were subject to discriminatory practices (for example, they were forced to wear distinctive clothes to identify themselves), and where they were not allowed to bear arms, when most Muslims were armed. Muslims as well as non-Muslims lived without the predictability of enforced laws. Their property and person were subject to the arbitrary and unchecked power of state officials and local lords, but non-Muslims bore the additional indignities of being infidels.

According to scholars of the millet system, active persecution of non-Muslims was relatively rare in the earlier centuries of the Ottoman Empire,
but “discrimination was permanent and indeed necessary, inherent in the system and maintained by both Holy Law and common practice.”57 The inferiority of the gâvur, unlike that of slaves and women, was voluntary; they chose not to believe in Islam. Unbelievers were to “stay in their place” and not appear to be equal or better than the Muslims. “Trouble arose when Jews or Christians were seen to be getting too much wealth or too much power and enjoying them too visibly.”58 Beginning in the eighteenth century, the decline of Muslim power outside the empire and the myriad effects of commerce and social mobility permitted enterprising Armenians and other non-Muslims to improve their economic and social standing, thus radically reversing the traditional and religiously sanctioned status hierarchy in the empire with Muslims on top and gâvur below. The reforms of the Tanzimat period, when reforming rulers and bureaucrats eliminated some of the most repressive practices against their subjects and attempted to create the basis for a Rechtsstaat (a state ruled by law) in the empire, improved the condition of Ottoman Christians, but the inconsistent application of the reforms only increased the distance and tension between stated objectives and the actual inequalities and abuses that shaped the lives of non-Muslims.59

Beginning in the late 1870s and through the following decade the Armenians of the provinces began to petition in ever larger numbers to their leaders in Istanbul and to the European consuls stationed in Eastern Anatolia. Hundreds of complaints were filed; few were dealt with. Together they make up an extraordinary record of misgovernment and corruption, of arbitrary treatment of a defenseless population, and a clear picture of the lack of legal recourse.60 Though the most brutal treatment of Armenians was at the hands of Kurdish tribesmen, the Armenians found the Ottoman state officials either absent, unreliable, or just one more source of oppression. Turks as well suffered from it, but the Armenians had the added burden of not belonging to the favored Muslim faithful. It was hard to say which was worse—the presence of Turkish authorities or the absence in many areas of any palpable political authority. When Armenians resisted the extortionist demands of the Kurds, either individually or collectively, the response from the Turkish army was often excessive. Massacres were reported from all parts of Eastern Anatolia, particularly after the formation in the early 1890s of the officially sanctioned Kurdish paramilitary units known as the Hamidiye. Against this background of growing Kurdish aggressiveness, Western and Russian indifference, and the collapse of the Tanzimat reform movement, a small number of Armenians turned to a revolutionary strategy.

As part of the “provocation thesis,” William L. Langer, Stanford Shaw, Ezel Kural Shaw, and others argued that the Armenian revolutionaries were willing to sacrifice their compatriots in order to create a separate, independent Armenian state in eastern Anatolia. Langer contends that
the first major Armenian revolutionary party, the *Hnchaks*, believed that massacre of their peasant constituents was required to interest Europe in the plight of the Armenians and was “the price to be paid for the realization of the fantastic national-socialist state of the fanatics.”[^61] He and those who have followed him seriously distort the aims and motives of the revolutionaries.

The Armenian revolutionary parties arose from a number of self-defense groups within Turkey, a tradition of resistance to state intervention characteristic of some highland Armenians, like those of the remote mountain towns Zeytun and Sassun, and from the radical intelligentsia of Russian Transcaucasia. Ironically, these small groups became a model for radical young Turks who admired, envied, and even feared the Armenian “committees.” The *Hnchaks* indeed believed that no one would take the Armenian cause seriously if Armenians themselves did not act to raise the issue of their political freedom. Here was no cynical plan to have Armenians massacred in order to provoke European intervention, like that in Bulgaria, but rather a pessimism about dependence on European goodwill and a commitment to organizing activity and stimulating national consciousness among Armenians. The revolutionaries were aware that their activities would result in Turkish reprisals, but they believed that it was no longer feasible to remain hostage to those fears. If they did not act soon, it was feared, Armenians as a distinct people would disappear.[^62] Undeniably the *Hnchaks* raised the banner of resistance, but the extreme view of Langer that the *Hnchaks* deliberately and cynically carried out provocations in order to call down upon the Armenians the wrath of the offended Turks is based on a misreading of the sources, a disregard for the causes of Armenian resistance, and inadequate consideration of the reasons for the Turkish perceptions of the Armenian threat.[^63]

The “provocation thesis” makes even less sense in the period after the decline of *Hnchaks* and the rise of its rival, the dominant party after 1896, the *Dashnaktsutiun*, which proposed a program of autonomy within the Russian and the Ottoman empires, a “free Armenia” (*azat Haiastan*). This vague formulation, carefully chosen to avoid charges of separatism, was refined in 1907 to make even clearer that the *Dashnaks* favored the formation of autonomous regions within two federative states, one Ottoman, the other Russian. In alliance with oppositional movements of other Ottoman peoples, most importantly the Young Turks, the *Dashnaktsutiun* expected European pressure on the Ottoman Empire to combine with the internal revolution to bring down Abdülhamid’s autocracy. Later the party abandoned its hopes of European intervention and became more overtly socialist. Disciplined and dedicated to a revolutionary strategy, the *Dashnaks* faced the same dilemma as their predecessors, the *Hnchaks*: both passivity and
resistance led to the same result—the progressive destruction of the Armenian people.⁶⁴

From 1908 until the Genocide of 1915, all Armenian political parties, including the Hnchaks, worked within the parliamentary system of the Ottoman Empire and abjured revolutionary activity. Despite continued discrimination and attacks on Armenians (most violently in the Adana massacres of 1909), Armenians continued to operate as loyal subjects of the empire, and many public figures held high office and were visible in society. As late as January 1913, the foreign minister of the Ottoman Empire, Gabriel Noradunghian, was an Armenian. The great majority of Armenians in the empire, despite the discrimination and abuse that many of them suffered, remained loyal and hopeful that reforms, introduced either by Ottoman reformers or outside powers, would improve their situation.⁶⁵

Confronted by the denialist construction of the Ottoman past, some authors relied on essentialized notions of how Turks customarily act.⁶⁶ Like Morgen-thau, they argued that core Turkish beliefs, culture, and customary practices led to the systematic killing of Armenians during World War I. Related to the essentialist argument that massacres, including genocide, are intimately connected to the nature of the Turks was the tendency to collapse quite distinct historical events into a single coherent, organic narrative. Thus, the Hamidian massacres of 1894–1896, the Adana killings of 1909, and the Genocide of 1915 (and even the Kemalist battles of 1920) all became part of a consistent pattern of Turkish violence aimed at elimination of the Armenians and Turkification of Anatolia. The differences between regimes and their various objectives, the different contexts of the violence, as well as the perpetrators, are effaced. Abdülhamid’s efforts to restore order by punishing “rebellious” subjects is blended into the urban riot of 1909, which at least initially was directed against the Young Turks, and the genocidal deportations and massacres by the Young Turks in 1915, which aimed at the effective elimination of a whole people from Anatolia. Continuities between Abdülhamid’s policies of modernizing the empire through centralization, bureaucratization, population transfers, and a pan-Islamic alliance and the Young Turks’ program of greater Turkification also involved massacre as a means to the ruler’s ends, but the old sultan’s ruthlessness did not extend as far as genocide.

Explanations for the Armenian Genocide have generally circled around two poles: nationalism and religion, sometimes a combination of the two. The prolific genocide scholar Vahakn N. Dadrian has largely relied on arguments from religion. His views have shifted over the years, but in his two major works, he makes an argument that genocide stems primarily from religion, though also from “nationality.”⁶⁷ Dadrian connects the genocide to
earlier ethnic conflicts in the Balkans in which Turkish authorities used “massacres as a weapon to deal with outbreaks of internal nationality conflicts.” A “culture of massacre,” he writes, developed at the same time as a “culture of denial” that rationalized the necessity of state violence.

Dadrian demonstrates that as Islamic rulers the Ottomans were tolerant of non-Muslims only as long as they recognized their inferiority and remained loyal. Even the Ottomanist ideology of the early Young Turks, which ostensibly was based on the legal equality of all subjects of the empire, concealed an idea of Turkish superiority. When European powers intervened in the empire’s affairs in defense of oppressed Christians, the effect was to raise the political hopes of non-Muslims and the resentment of Turks. Dispersed throughout Anatolia, Armenians were seldom a majority in any district, but where they were most concentrated, in eastern Anatolia, they presented the greatest geopolitical threat to the empire. The Ottoman leaders perceived that threat as particularly acute when they went to war with Russia at the end of 1914. Dadrian’s portrait of Young Turk attitudes is convincing, but he argues that these attitudes stemmed from ideology and political ambition and were largely fixed and unchanging. With little discussion of the complex social interrelations of Turks, Armenians, and Kurds on the Armenian plateau, Dadrian deduces Turkish motives primarily from their religious conviction of inherent and deserved Muslim Turkish superiority.

In Warrant for Genocide Dadrian argues more starkly that the genocide was the culmination of a deep-seated Turk-Armenian conflict that existed for centuries and was rooted in the incompatibility of the theocratic Ottoman state, guided by the precepts of Islam, with rule over a heterogeneous population divided by religion, language, and culture. Islam could not tolerate the reforms that Turkish bureaucrats and European powers attempted to implement in the nineteenth century that would have created more egalitarian relations with the non-Turkish peoples of the empire. “The reforms were a repudiation of fundamental socio-religious traditions deeply enmeshed in the Turkish psyche, and institutionalized throughout the empire.” He writes, “The Ottoman Empire, for most of its history, was and remained a theocracy which, by definition and fact, cannot be secularized; laws that are predicated upon permanently fixed and intractable religious precepts cannot be modified, much less reformed.” Besides this “ideological factor,” Dadrian argues that the Ottomans had an inclination to use violence to prevent reform or concessions to minorities. Genocide, then, arose from “the repressive and sanguinary aspects of Ottoman culture.” The dominant element in Ottoman political culture was a spirit of belligerence that in principle could not tolerate conflict with subordinate subject minorities. That culture of belligerence came from a confluence of “the forces of Islamic dogmas and the ballast of martial traditions.”
For their part Armenians moved from acquiescence in Ottoman rule to self-assertion and self-protection, thus providing the excuse for (not cause of) massacres. Armenians were progressively squeezed by Muslims’ in-migrations into Anatolia, intensifying the Turk-Armenian and Kurd-Armenian conflicts. The differential in power between the Armenians and the Turks—Armenians were much weaker and therefore could be victimized—made a policy of violence possible. The Hamidian massacres were “a prelude to, if not a rehearsal for, the World War I genocide.”

Whereas earlier the European powers had occasionally restrained the Ottoman government from massacres, World War I provided the “opportunity structure,” that is the necessary condition, for genocide. The restraints were gone, and Turks feared the armed power of Armenians, who now had the right to bear arms and had been mobilized into the Ottoman army.

Dadrian’s analysis not only removes all agency from the Armenians, who are presented only as passive victims rather than as active Ottoman subjects with their own political aspirations and organizations, but presents Islam as an unchanging doctrine, a consistent and coherent dogma from which rules of behavior and attitudes may be deduced. Muslims act in accord with doctrine, and their behavior is consistent and predictable. Yet, while certain precepts of Islam may thwart egalitarian reform, some Muslims, like Westernizing Ottoman bureaucrats, pushed for reform in a European direction at the same time that conservative clergy and army officers opposed the Tanzimat. Arguing that a theocracy by definition and fact cannot be secularized appears to be contradicted by the long European transition from medieval to modern times. Polities infused with and sanctioned by religion managed over time to become more secular not only in Europe but to some degree in Turkey in the nineteenth and (even more so) twentieth centuries. Religious orthodoxy, certainly a powerful inhibitor to effective reform, proved to be a surmountable barrier, as reforming Ottoman bureaucrats, Young Ottomans, Young Turks, and Kemalists sought to demonstrate. The argument that theocracy cannot tolerate heterogeneity also fails before five centuries of imperial rule. Empire, indeed, may be defined by its preservation, even enforcement, of heterogeneity. Distinction and discrimination, separation and inequality were hallmarks of Ottoman imperial rule (and, indeed, of all empires). That heterogeneity was marked in the millet system, an imperial structure through which the Islamic state managed other religious communities. As Islamic as the empire conceived of itself, religion was often used instrumentally—by Abdülhamid in the formation of Kurdish units to police eastern Anatolia and by the Young Turks in their policies toward the Arabs. Finally, as Morgenthau noted, the revolutionaries who seized control of the empire in 1908, were not religious fanatics but secular
modernizers devoted to bringing technology, science, and greater rationality and efficiency to their country. Suspicious of, even hostile to, conservative clerics who blocked reform, they were, however, willing to deploy Islamic rhetoric when it served their strategic ends. One has to question seriously whether the Ottoman Empire was in any meaningful sense a theocracy, that is, a state ruled by a clerical elite, rather than a dynastic empire held by the House of Osman.

The beautifully written popular history by the poet/memoirist Peter Balakian reproduces in evocative detail the horrors of what happened to the Ottoman Armenians, but his narrative only hints at a causal argument and does not attempt a sustained explanation of why genocide happened. Following Dadrian’s *Warrant for Genocide*, Balakian sees mass killing as a product of religion—the deep antagonism of Islam toward Christianity—and he refers to the proclamation of jihad by the Ottoman Sheik ul-Islam and its influence on officers and ordinary people who carried out the killings. In fact, as historians and eyewitnesses from Morgenthau on have shown, there was little immediate response to the call for jihad other than the destruction of a rather exclusive Armenian restaurant, which, it turns out, was staged by the CUP. In the Ottoman Empire religion was foundational to the identification of a community. It marked one group from another, the early modern equivalent of ethnicity or nationality. It was an identity both imposed by the state and generated from within the community and gave meaning to whom one could trust and whom one had to fear. Religion was a marker of difference and similarity that kept communities separate, but even as a source of difference and conflict, it was not the inevitable source of violence and mass killing. Religious feelings may have fueled the hatred toward the Armenians, but neither Dadrian nor Balakian explain why religion should have led to genocidal violence in the first year of the World War but not throughout Ottoman and Islamic history when Armenians and Turks managed to live together for centuries without mass killing. Moreover, the initiators of the Armenian Genocide were not religious fanatics but secular men who embraced the fashionable science of the day. Medical doctors and military officers, they saw themselves as paragons of modernity and reform.

If the Armenian Genocide was not carried out primarily for religious motives, and if religion did not prevent other outcomes such as coexistence or reform, perhaps the source of violence was nationalism, the all-purpose explanans for modern mass killing. The argument that two nationalisms—even two competing nations—faced each other in a deadly struggle for the same land has been made nowhere more eloquently than in the words of the eminent scholar of Islam, Bernard Lewis, words that can be read as an implied rationale for the Turkish massacres of Armenians:
For the Turks, the Armenian movement was the deadliest of all threats. From the conquered lands of the Serbs, Bulgars, Albanians, and Greeks, they could, however, reluctantly, withdraw, abandoning distant provinces and bringing the Imperial frontier nearer home. But the Armenians, stretching across Turkey-in-Asia from the Caucasian frontier to the Mediterranean coast, lay in the very heart of the Turkish homeland—and to renounce these lands would have meant not the truncation, but the dissolution of the Turkish state. Turkish and Armenian villages, inextricably mixed, had for centuries lived in neighborly association. Now a desperate struggle between them began—a struggle between two nations for the possession of a single homeland, that ended with the terrible holocaust of 1915, when a million and a half Armenians perished.75

In this transparent paragraph Lewis subtly rewrites the history of Anatolia from a land in which Armenians were the earlier inhabitants into one in which they become an obstacle to the national aspirations of the Turks, who now can claim Anatolia, rather than Central Asia, as their homeland. He places the Armenians “nearer [the Turkish] home” and “in the very heart of the Turkish homeland,” employing language that already assumes the legitimacy and actuality of a nation-state. Yet the logic of nationalism does not have universal relevance, certainly not for dynastic or imperial states that evolved out of and still worked within a contradictory logic of empire. Although the Ottoman Empire had long existed within an international system of powerful nation-states and an increasingly hegemonic Western conviction that the nation, however defined, was the principal source of political legitimacy, like other empires it continued to mark differences among its constituent peoples and maintain a hierarchy of rulers and subjects. The nature of that system and its self-justifications were changing as the empire attempted to “modernize” itself, but Lewis’s reading of a notion of ethnic homogeneity as the basis for a national republic of the Kemalist type, which lay in the future, into the moment of Armenian annihilation is ahistorical.

Such a scenario that the Armenian Genocide was primarily a struggle between two contending nationalisms, one of which destroyed the other, presupposes that two well-formed and articulated nationalisms already existed in the early years of the war. Among Armenians, divided though they were among a number of political and cultural orientations, identification with an Armenian “nation” had gained a broad resonance through the nineteenth century.76 Yet Turkish identity was not as clearly focused on the “nation.” The term “Turk” was in the early twentieth century still infrequently used except as a pejorative for country people. Turkish nationalists were beginning to exploit the concept of Turk, which was based on the linguistic affiliations of a group of languages, in a more positive way, but
Turkish identification was still weak, confused, and mixed in with Islamic and Ottoman identities. Turkish became an articulated identity gradually, growing in popularity and potency with the catastrophic losses of the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913. As Lewis is well aware, in the last years of the empire conflicting and contradictory ideas of Turkish nationality, some deeply racist, vied with Pan-Turanism, Pan-Islamism, and various strains of Ottomanism in an ideological contest for new ways of reformulating the state.

The argument from nationalism has dominated much of the historiography on the Armenian Genocide. In one of the most sophisticated interpretations Stephan H. Astourian attempts a structural-cultural analysis, beginning with the broad context of the Ottoman Empire as an imperial-colonial state in which Armenians were second-class citizens within the millet system of separate religious communities. The Tanzimat reforms of the mid-nineteenth century, which aimed at a more tolerant egalitarian integration of the peoples of the empire, broke down the traditional hierarchical relations between ethnoreligious communities and accelerated Armenian cultural self-definition. But the reforms resulted in a sense of relative deprivation both for Armenians and Turks, and frustration and hostility eventually translated into mass killing once the state permitted and organized the expression of popular hatred against the Armenians. Religious conservatives and traditionalists such as Abdülhamid II perceived Armenians and other infidels as “overstepping the boundaries of their position in society, being ungrateful and disloyal to the empire, and constituting a danger to its territorial integrity.” Through an innovative study of idioms, proverbs, and sayings, Astourian reaches down into popular mentality. Turks, he shows, perceived Armenians as avaricious and greedy, and as unfaithful friends, cheats, and social climbers. Turkish nationalism (Turkism and Pan-Turkism) and ideas of national economy (millî iktisat), most clearly expressed in the writings of Ziya Gökalp, “excluded the ghiaours [infidels] from the nation and denied the identity of the Kurds, thereby promoting a racially and culturally homogeneous nation: modern Turkey.” There simply was no place for Armenians in this new, nationalist vision of the Ottoman Empire. Astourian’s reading extends the nationalist approach to a broader political culture shared by Turks, and in other research he supplemented this ideological emphasis with close study of the social and economic structures and dynamics, particularly centered on landed property, to provide the comprehensive environment in which genocide became possible.

One of the most unmoored signifiers in historical writing, “nationalism” simply has too many meanings to be unproblematically invoked. Some widely shared sense of collective consciousness may have played a role in the individual and shared mentalities that made genocide conceivable, and Astourian comes closer than anyone in demonstrating what that concept of
self and other, at least for ordinary Turks, may have been. But there is a danger of overgeneralizing from such material, which might lead some to assume that more complex and contradictory attitudes toward the Armenians living among them did not also exist among the Turks. Hostile stereotypes may under particular circumstances—elite encouragement or material conflicts, for example—contribute to conflict and violence, but seeing Armenians as deceitful or avaricious does not lead one to murder them. Like Morgenthau, those historians who emphasize nationalism and political culture provide insight into the thinking of the key leaders involved in the most fateful decisions, but the specific conjuncture of the period 1912–1915 must also be factored in any explanation of the genocide.

The experience of the Balkan Wars (1912–1913) had a galvanizing effect on Young Turk thinking. As contemporary witnesses and later scholars have testified, the Young Turks quite swiftly shifted away from the liberal Ottomanism from which they had sprung and perceived that the security and unity of the empire required it to become more Turkic. Key leaders perceived Turks and Muslims to be more trustworthy and dependable allies in the imperial mission than Christians, with their ties to Europe, Greece, and Russia. To certain highly placed, influential Young Turks, Ottoman Turkey was to become a more “nationalized” empire, with Turks as the Herrenvolk ruling over subordinate nationalities and religious communities, and not the multinational state of distinct nations with institutionalized privileges that the Ottomanists had envisioned. Yet it would be anachronistic to imagine that the Committee of Union and Progress was aiming at creating a homogeneous ethnic nation, Kemalists avant la lettre. Rather they were modernizers flailing around, searching unsuccessfully to find ways to preserve their multiethnic, polyglot empire. The imperial mission of the CUP still involved ruling over Kurds and Arabs, as well as Jews, Greeks, and even Armenian survivors, in what would essentially still be a multinational Ottoman Empire, but a far more Turkic and Muslim state. Recent scholarship has revealed more clearly than ever that the Young Turks embarked on radical demographic engineering that involved all the peoples of the empire, Muslims and non-Muslims alike.

In a word, the rulers of the empire during World War I were primarily state imperialists, empire preservers, rather than fully committed ethnonationalists. Their demographic policies stemmed primarily from ideas of security in a moment of perceived acute danger, rather than nation-building. Security, however, was conceived, tragically, early in the war to involve the removal of the Armenians as a deadly threat to the continuance of the empire. Influenced by ideas of nationalism, race, and the Social Darwinist conception of a zero-sum game among peoples and states and pressed by the exigencies of a state in mortal danger, the CUP came to the fatal conclusion
that the survival of their state and “race” required the greater homogeniza-
tion of Anatolia. This meant the removal in one way or another of some of
their subject peoples. While they did not have a nation-building project in
mind, by carrying out the deportations and genocidal murders, the Young
Turks engaged in a nation-building process, the founding crime on which the
empire’s successor, the present republic of Turkey, would be built.

Among the baleful effects of the denialist claims about the Armenian Geno-
cide was the sense on the part of many scholars (particularly Armenians)
that they needed to present a united consensus on what had happened and
why. Normal scholarly debate was restrained and channeled into the polar-
izing struggle with those who rejected the thesis that the Ottoman state had
initiated and carried out a deliberate policy of ethnocide. Only in the late
1990s and the first decade of the new century were differences about the
genesis of Young Turk policy, questions of intentionality, radicalization, and
timing of decision making aired publicly. At the same time increasing
numbers of non-Armenian scholars took up the topic. Perhaps most extraor-
dinary of all, beginning with the former Turkish activist Taner Akçam, a few
scholars of Turkish and Kurdish origin explored the blank spots of their own
history. Archival access and skill in reading Ottoman elevated the writing
on the tragedies of the late Ottoman Empire to new levels of professional
authority. The burgeoning field of Holocaust studies and the comparative
study of mass killing by political scientists, anthropologists, and sociologists
opened up the study of the late Ottoman Empire and the Armenian Geno-
cide in new ways.

As with Holocaust scholarship so with historians of the Armenians and
Turks, once the static produced by denial was reduced, the relevant but con-
tested questions of why and when genocide occurred and who initiated it
could be dealt with seriously. The historiography on the Armenian Geno-
cide was far thinner than that on the Holocaust, but in important ways
scholars ranged from those who focused on the intentions of the perpetra-
tors to those who elaborated structural and environmental context. Among
the principal recent volumes on the Armenian Genocide that benefitted from
engagement with and intimate acquaintance with Holocaust literature are
works by the British historian Donald Bloxham. Taking an international
and comparative approach, Bloxham centers responsibility for genocide on
choices made by state leaders, which were shaped by “perpetrator ideology,”
“the most important element in genocide,” and seeks to explain not only
mass killing but the continued denial of it. Turkish nationalism, which he
sees as “the ideology of the CUP,” “alone could translate its agenda into
mass expropriation and murder of Christians.” His analysis employs the
notion of “cumulative radicalization,” first used by the German historian
Hans Mommsen to analyze the Holocaust. Bloxham begins by noting, “By 1914, on the eve of war and genocide, no nationalist formulation envisaged Ottoman Christians within the contract of mutual obligation.” Rather than inherent or essential to Turks, nationalism was a response to great power interference in Ottoman internal affairs that exacerbated existing Ottoman-Armenian tensions and suspicions. Like Jews in Germany, Armenians were constructed in influential Turkish minds to be economic parasites, competitors for land and wealth, as well as agents of the empire’s enemies. Great powers, Britain and Russia in particular, put the Ottoman Armenians in a precarious position: they were subjects of the sultan but in many ways the wards of other states. Yet even when these powers cynically proclaimed themselves the protectors of the Armenians, their own state interests led them to accommodate the Turkish authorities repeatedly and to leave the Armenians defenseless “on the crater of a volcano” of race hatred about to explode. Along with Turkish nationalism and external powers’ policies, the activities of small numbers of Armenian nationalists added to the toxic mix that led Tâlât and Enver to believe that extermination of Armenians was the means to the end of imperial survival. In a careful reconstruction of the genocide itself Bloxham shows how state policies became progressively more radical over time. First, Greeks were moved for security reasons but not murdered. The first massacres of Armenians were “a warning against future unrest, and the ‘punishments’ were explicitly publicized as such.” Later deportation caravans were systematically massacred, and still later mass killing dealt with those who had managed to reach the end of the journey in the Syrian desert.

In contrast to scholars who see Young Turk nationalism as more amorphous and inconsistent, Bloxham portrays the nationalism of the CUP as a “drive for ethnic homogeneity and national territorial integrity in the ‘heartlands’ of the Ottoman empire, and political and economic independence for Turks as an ethnic-national group.” The various goals and different content of Young Turk, Armenian, and later Kemalist nationalisms are to a large degree homogenized in his narrative. But the security goals of imperial rulers dedicated to holding together a still heterogeneous realm, now with a stronger core of Turks, is not the same as Kemal’s vision of an ethnically homogeneous Turkish state, and both of them can be distinguished from the national (nonseparatist) aspirations of non-Muslims driven to desperation by the ruling elite and predatory social competitors. At the same time, however, Bloxham provides insight into how the very logic of nationalism reifies and dichotomizes different groups. By assuming that the nationalism of Armenian leaders reflects the authentic feelings of their collective “nation,” Ottoman state authorities came to believe that reprisals against all, not the few, were necessary. This simple conflation, implicit in the discourse
of the nation—that the people possess naturally, essentially, and unproblematically national sentiment if not full consciousness (that is, they have the potential to become a full-fledged nation)—opens the way to action against a whole people so distinguished and defined.

In recent decades the deepening interest in the Holocaust and the widening occurrence of civil and ethnic violence led a number of social scientists away from the investigation of interstate warfare to the study of internal and civil wars, mass killing, violence, and genocide, which in the second half of the twentieth century became the major source of violent deaths.\(^93\) While theories of ethnic conflict shifted from traditional primordialist narratives of deep cleavages between peoples based on ancient antipathies to rationalist accounts of the instrumental employment of ethnicized rhetoric by elites to mobilize masses for murder, some scholars emphasized how democracy correlates highly with ethnic and civil peace, while others challenged any domestic “democratic peace” argument and demonstrated that the very process of democratization is fraught with violence, both intrastate and interstate.\(^94\) The roots of genocide, a relatively rare instance of mass killing, were variously connected to war, revolution, radical state elites, and a capacious concept of modernity.\(^95\)

Reversing an older image of ethnic violence as bubbling up from the masses below, strategic interactionist approaches have located initiative at the top, while provoking the question of why ethnic appeals have such powerful resonance below. A few killers—thugs, sadists, fanatics, and opportunists—can with modern weaponry (or even with machetes) slaughter thousands with little more than acquiescence from the surrounding population.\(^96\) Genocide in particular is an event of mass killing, with massive numbers of victims but not necessarily massive numbers of killers. The thugs, like the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* (Special Organization), set loose by the political elite, create a climate of violence that radicalizes the population, renders political moderates less relevant, and convinces people of the need to support the more extremist leaders. Warfare itself helps harden hostile group identities, “making it rational to fear the other group and see its members as dangerous threats.”\(^97\) This is not to say that thugs and ordinary people do not use the opportunities offered by state-permitted lawlessness to settle other accounts with neighbors, take revenge, or, more mundanely, simply grab what they can.\(^98\)

In his grand comparative study of modern mass killing, the historical sociologist Michael Mann suggests a combination of ideological, economic, military, and political power as important ingredients in mass violence.\(^99\) When, for example, an immanent ideology that reinforces already-formed social identities combines with a transcendent ideology that seeks to move
beyond existing social organization, this toxic mix of ideological power increases the likelihood of violence. Both interstate warfare and the overlapping of ethnicity with economic inequality enhances the probability of civil and ethnic conflict. Struggles over sovereignty are closely connected to such outbursts of violence. Looking at who the perpetrators of violence are, Mann identifies nine kinds of killers: ideological killers who believe in the value-rationality of murderous cleansing; bigoted killers who simply hate the other; violent killers who enjoy killing; fearful killers who feel threatened; careerist killers who use killing to get ahead; materialist killers who kill for economic gain; disciplined killers who comply with legitimate organized authority; comradely killers who respond to peer-group pressure; and bureaucratic killers who obey out of habit.

Mann rejects the view that Turkish governments had a consistent, long-term genocidal intent. Like Bloxham, he emphasizes the radicalization of Turkish policies from the “exemplary repression” of Abdülhamid II through the encouragement and then forced application of Turkification, on to deportation (ethnic cleansing), and finally organized mass killing, genocide. Like other historic empires, the Ottoman Empire preferred compliant subjects to dead ones. Exemplary repression was designed and carried out brutally precisely to discipline peoples into compliance with the norms and practices of the imperial order. At times Ottoman rulers used “policed deportations” to move populations around, either as punishment or to populate distant provinces. But this was a far cry from genocide, which involved the intentional killing of an ethnic group in order to remove them permanently.

Against a background of economic competition between Muslims and Christians and resultant popular economic resentments, the rise of Turkish nationalism and the radicalization of the Young Turk leadership are central to Mann’s argument that the Ottoman regime entered the “danger zone” of murderous ethnic cleansing by 1913, when radicals took over the state and were faced by a competing group, the Armenians, with its own historical memory/myth of a state, which plausibly could have been achieved with the help of the Russians. Even as the Young Turks became more radically nationalist, they nevertheless might still have turned toward traditional methods of “exemplary repression” combined with a more radical program of forcible Turkification. Indeed, Mann claims that this is precisely what radical Ittihadists discussed in the period 1910–1914—coerced assimilation, selective repression, and limited deportations. This was not yet genocide. He then follows Akçam in emphasizing the sense of humiliation and victimization that the Young Turks experienced after the Balkan wars and the imposition of the Great Power plan for inspectors in eastern Anatolia. In the eyes of the Young Turks the European powers and Ottoman Christians together were undermining the Ottoman state and thwarting the modernizing
ambitions of the Turkish leaders. The Young Turks had become state centralizers, while the non-Turkish peoples of the empire sought greater autonomy and a decentralized state structure. There was little doubt, certainly among Turkish leaders, that the Armenians preferred Russian rule over Turkish, and although more than 200,000 Armenians would be conscripted and serve in the Ottoman army, the authorities were deeply suspicious of Armenian loyalty. Several thousand Ottoman Armenians, indeed, crossed over to serve as volunteers with the Russian army.

World War I provided both stimulus and opportunity. The Russian danger made the Armenian threat all the more real. War removed external restraints on radical solutions to the ethnoreligious tensions of the empire. Genocide was “a developing process.” 100 “The Young Turk Plan A, dominant over two decades, given a last try in early August 1914, was for alliance with the Armenian nationalist parties against their common opponents. Sometime between August 1914 and February 1915, Plan A was replaced by Plan B—forcible deportations. But this approach was unstable as military pressures threatened retreat and a last stand would take place in the Turkish “heartland” where a disloyal people lived. In the conditions of war and the defeats of early 1915, deportations moved rapidly into Plan C—“deporting Armenians from all vulnerable communications routes and front areas, which might involve the whole of Anatolia and almost all Armenians.” 101 Finally, they adopted Plan D, “the simplest and most coherent plan”—wholesale extermination. Increasingly radical, Turkish policy moved extremely rapidly from alliance to removal of the Armenian political elite, on to repression and deportation, and, finally, to mass murder by the late spring of 1915.

With the breakthroughs in historical and social scientific writing in the last decades, as well as the engagement of scholars in vigorous and serious debate, it has become possible to work out a plausible causal story of the Armenian Genocide. While there is not yet an overwhelming consensus on why the Ottoman government undertook the extermination of the Armenians, three main factors are central to the explanation. First, there was a shift in the nature of the Ottoman Empire itself, from a traditional multireligious imperial state, discriminating and even repressive toward non-Muslims but recognizing their distinctions, to a modernizing, centralizing state that increasingly adopted Turkish nationalist, Pan-Turkic, and Pan-Islamic ambitions. Traditionally the Ottoman Empire had used its military power ruthlessly to repress those they perceived to be rebellious, such as the Bulgarians and Shiite Arabs, as well as policies of physical removal, exile, and deportation (sürgün). Abdülhamid II used massacres in the 1890s to attempt to restore the traditional imperial order that his own policies of bureaucratic centralization and reduction of local power were undermining. He ended
the Tanzimat reforms aimed at an Ottomanist equality among all the sultan’s subjects and adopted a Pan-Islamic policy of allying with the Kurds (the Hamidiye) against the Armenians that further alienated the Armenians and encouraged a minority among them to turn toward revolution. Revolutionary and technological changes in the West had rendered the Ottoman Empire a backward and vulnerable society, and within the empire differentially successful adaptations to modern life by the various millets—with the Christians and Jews ahead of the Muslims—combined with the ideas of nationalism to undermine the political legitimacy of the traditional order and provide alternative visions of the future.

Second, the attitudes of many Turks toward Armenians and Armenians toward Turks shifted toward greater suspicion and hostility toward the Other, and the hardening of boundaries between them. After centuries of governing the “loyal” Ermeni milleti as a separate ethnoreligious community, Ottoman state authorities and Turkish political elites, including the Young Turks, began to see Armenians, framed in the ever more potent discourse of nationalism, as an alien people, disloyal, subversive, “separatist,” and a threat to the unity of the empire. This perception was compounded more broadly by anxiety about the relative economic success of Armenian businessmen and craftsmen, the competition for the limited economic resources, particularly land, between Kurds, Turks, and Armenians in eastern Anatolia, and a sense that Armenian progress was reversing the traditional imperial status hierarchy with Muslims above the dhimmi. The fears, resentments, and ambitions of the Young Turks—and many others in the empire—formed a hostile “affective disposition” toward the Armenians, seeing in them an existential threat to the survival of the empire and the Turks. Though these perceptions and feelings were distorted, exaggerated, and pathological, they, nevertheless, disposed Young Turk leaders to conceive of deportation and the killings of hundreds of thousands of their own subjects as reasonable and necessary.

Third, the World War, with the real danger from the Russians and the British, and the imagined threat from the Armenians, presented the most radical Young Turks with new opportunities to deal with the Armenian problem. A series of options was considered: alliance with the Armenians, selective repression, removal of political leaders, deportations, and mass murder—each one more radical than the preceding. When in the first year of war the empire suffered a series of defeats in the east, its principal leaders became convinced that Armenians presented an existential threat to their power. Sometime in March 1915, they decided to carry out a vicious policy of deportation, combined with selective killing, to clear the region of Armenians. Social hostilities between Armenians and Turks, Kurds and Armenians, fed the mass killings, which the state encouraged (or at least did little
to discourage), though most of the actual killing was not done by the broad population. Unlike the earlier practice of sürgün, the tehcirler (deportations) came to be seen as an opportunity to rid the empire of the Armenian problem, which had been used as a wedge by Russians and other Europeans to interfere in the Ottoman Empire. While nationalism and Pan-Turanism played a role in formulating the mood of the leaders who ordered the deportations, so did strategic notions, a perverse sense of justice, and a desire for revenge against an internal enemy.

The story as told here, while not differing radically from many of the elements brought out in earlier historical writing, moves beyond certain widely held arguments. This account argues that the Armenian Genocide was not planned long in advance but was a contingent reaction to a moment of crisis that grew more radical over time. Yet the choice of genocide was predicated on long-standing affective dispositions and attitudes that had demonized the Armenians as a threat that needed to be dealt with. The genocide should be distinguished from the earlier episodes of conservative restoration of order by repression (1894–1896) or urban ethnic violence (1909). Though there were similarities with the brutal policies of massacre and deportation that earlier regimes used to keep order, the very scale of the Armenian Genocide and its intended effects—to rid eastern Anatolia of a whole people—make it a far more radical, indeed revolutionary, transformation of the imperial setup. The story here is that the genocide was neither religiously motivated nor a struggle between two contending nationalisms, one of which destroyed the other, but rather the pathological response of desperate leaders who sought security against a people they had both constructed as enemies and driven into radical opposition to the regime under which they lived for centuries.

The Armenian Genocide, along with the killing of Assyrians and the expulsion of the Anatolian Greeks, laid the ground for the more homogeneous nation-state that arose from the ashes of the empire. Like many other states, including Australia, Israel, and the United States, the emergence of the Republic of Turkey involved the removal and subordination of native peoples who had lived on its territory prior to its founding. The connection between ethnic cleansing or genocide and the legitimacy of the national state underlies the desperate efforts to deny or distort the history of the nation and the state’s genesis. Coming to terms with that history, on the other hand, can have the salutary effect of questioning continued policies of ethnic homogenization and refusal to recognize the claims and rights of those peoples, minorities or diasporas—Aborigines, Native Americans, Kurds, Palestinians, or Armenians—who refuse to disappear.
Scholars note that history and its recollection are especially crucial to nationalist projects. It is through the remembrance of the past that a collectivity acquires a national identity capable of uniting them through shared meaning. The construction of such an identity was especially daunting in the case of the Turkish Republic. The new nation-state was built on a disintegrating empire with frequent episodes of violence and trauma, the most significant comprising the ethnic cleansing of the Ottoman Armenians in 1915. In building the Turkish nation, the Republican leaders made a conscious decision to concentrate on the nation’s future, on progress, and on catching up with the contemporary civilization signified by the West. In doing so, they consciously omitted and repressed the past. As they officially defined this future focus as the second aim of Turkish nationalism, past incidents of violence and trauma became even more marginalized and a possible return to the previous Ottoman form of government more delegitimated.

With time, a mythicized Turkish historiography developed. It valorized the Turkish achievements, whitewashed the crimes, blamed especially the minorities and the West for all past defeats, and silenced the violence committed against others. Between 1923 and 1975, this historiography went on to produce and reproduce itself without any interruption. It was able to do so during the Second World War and the Cold War, when the focus on national security trumped all other concerns. The era between 1975 and 1986 witnessed a surge of collective violence against Turkish diplomats. In order to draw world attention to the injustice that the Turks had committed against the Armenians in 1915, the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCOAG) and the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) carried out a series of assassinations of Turkish diplomats and
bombed Turkish sites. These violent acts caught the Turkish state and society totally unprepared, unaware, and uninformed. Then, parallel to the foundation myth of the Republic, an official narrative on 1915 emerged, placing the blame for the Turkish massacres of the Armenians squarely on the latter’s seditious activities, a stand that persists to this day.

**ORIGINS OF TURKISH OFFICIAL HISTORIOGRAPHY: MUSTAFA KEMAL’S SPEECH**

As nationalism is predicated on building a narrative for the nation, the newly constructed Turkish nation required an official narrative. In 1927, the eventual leader of the Independence Struggle, Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), single-handedly provided such a story with his famous Speech (Nutuk). In it, he provided an autobiographical account of the creation of the Turkish nation that commenced with his alighting in Samsun on May 19, 1919, to start the War of Independence. At the second convention of the Republican People’s Party, specifically from the 15th to the 20th of October 1927, Mustafa Kemal narrated for thirty-six and a half hours how the Turkish Independence Struggle had created the Turkish nation. This narration not only identified and legitimated him as the primary founder of the Turkish nation, but also underscored the unique singularity of the Turkish experience as a self-contained case. Mustafa Kemal’s text was then officially adopted as the official Turkish national narrative and became sacralized by the state.

This text sets the basic parameters of the Turkish official historiography on the Armenian ethnic cleansing of 1915. Focus on what was said and unsaid is therefore essential. It is evident that the text commences the birth of the Turkish nation with 1919, removing in the process the demise of the Armenians in 1915 through state violence to the realm of Republican pre-history. Hence at the point of the Turkish Republic’s inception, the “Armenian problem” has already been temporally removed to the Ottoman past. In addition, the patriots comprising the Turkish nation that Mustafa Kemal addresses in the text are clearly Muslims, especially Turkish Muslims who had been explicitly mobilized during the War of Independence to defend their homeland. Thus the multiplicity of ethnic groups in Anatolia, including the Armenians, was also spatially excised from the foundation myth.

Turkish society has not been able to engage this text critically or consider and discuss alternate formulations to it because of the penal codes that render it a crime to do so. These have increased the societal tendencies in Turkey, not only to imagine the past, but also to mythologize it. What was to have been a “collective memory” of the past eventually has been transformed
instead, especially after the death of Mustafa Kemal, into a “collective myth.”

Turkish society was presented with a simplified and whitewashed version of past events, loosely based on, though always legitimated by, Atatürk’s Speech, told from the selective viewpoint of the Turkish nation and its struggle for nationhood. The speech glorified the feats of the Turks and placed the blame on the Christian minorities and the West.

Such a collective myth is also fraught with amnesia in relation to the violence of the nation’s birth and existence up to the present. The amnesia is necessary because nationalism is, after all, predicated on the twin principles of remembering and forgetting. Those who are forgotten, silenced, excluded from the collective myth of the Turkish Republic correspond exactly to the three social groups of Armenians, Kurds, and Greeks, who comprise the official past and present minorities in Turkey. Indeed, the collective violence committed against the minorities at the inception and during the Republican era has been totally eliminated from the Turkish collective myth. Throughout the decades, this myth was officially distributed and reproduced through the entire centralized Turkish mass education system.

EMERGENCE OF THE NARRATIVES ON THE ARMENIAN ETHNIC CLEANSING OF 1915

Upon the signing of the 1922–1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty, the Turkish nation-state assumed it had once and for all resolved the “Armenian problem” that had so challenged the Ottoman Empire. It therefore entered a state of shock and disbelief when it was faced with the sudden attacks of JCOAG and the ASALA. These attacks aimed at drawing world attention to the still unaccounted historical injustice the Turks had committed against the Armenians in 1915. As these incidents persisted, the Turkish state had to resort to commissioning a number of retired diplomats to renarrate what had happened in the past in accordance with the dominant official Turkish historiography. These mostly amateur historians selectively picked the documentation that bolstered their narrative from the Ottoman state archives. They only employed the material that valorized the Turks and damned the Armenians, leaving aside what did not support their argument.

This emerging official Turkish historiography on the “alleged” Armenian Genocide was based on the selective use of past documentation that in turn drew and built on preceding layers of denial. Also included in this stand were two historical elements pertaining to Turkish history: the emotional trauma of the Muslim losses during 1912–1922, which had hitherto been unaddressed, as well as the current tragic loss of the murdered Turkish diplomats. These attacks against and assassinations of Turkish diplomats
during 1975–1986 awakened a fervent sense of injustice among the Turkish populace. Due to this mythicized version of the past the Turkish populace had been taught for so many decades, the populace could therefore not at all comprehend why the Armenians had engaged in such heinous acts.

So ingrained was the mythicized version of the past and so final was the solution of the Armenian “problem” that when some of the Armenian perpetrators of the attacks were later tried in Western courts, the Turkish Foreign Ministry did not possess a single English-language text to send to the Western public prosecutors to inform them of the Turkish state position on 1915. The most significant consequence of these attacks was the development through the 1980s of a narrative of the Armenian issue penned mostly by retired diplomats along the lines of the mythicized history taught in the schools since the inception of the republic. That official narrative and the historiography it subsequently produced have been presented as the sole explanation of what has transpired in the Turkish past.

This essay argues to the contrary, contending that the contextualization of the Turkish official historiography on the Armenians reveals three distinct, concomitant narratives. These comprise, first, the “Ottoman Investigative Narrative” based on contemporaneous accounts that attempt to surmise the reasons behind the 1915 deportation and massacres of the Armenians. This is followed by the “Republican Defensive Narrative” based on later works written with the intent to document and justify the nationalist master narrative of the Turkish state; it explicitly denies that an Armenian genocide occurred in 1915. The third and final “Post-Nationalist Critical Narrative” comprises recent works that are critical of the nationalist master narrative. It often does not focus specifically on 1915, but is instead more concerned with the silences in Turkish history in general and its ethnic composition in particular.

Ottoman Investigative Narrative on 1915

The works in this category comprise the official reports\textsuperscript{11} prepared by the Ottoman state such as the one by Hüseyin Nazım Pasha, the memoirs\textsuperscript{12} of Ottoman officials such as Said, Kamil, Tâlât Pasha, Mehmed Asaf, and Dr. Reşid Bey, and the investigation records\textsuperscript{13} of the Ottoman military tribunals that tried those accused of perpetrating the massacres. The reports\textsuperscript{14} of the Turkish negotiations of the Lausanne Treaty and the collections\textsuperscript{15} of Ottoman documents ostensibly published by the Turkish state to deny the genocide allegations also contribute to this narrative.

A critical reading of these works reveals two distinguishing characteristics. First, none of these works, originally penned around the time of the events of 1915, question the occurrence of the Armenian “massacres”
Historiographies of the Genocide

(“genocide” did not yet exist as a term). They instead focus on the question of what happened and why. Second, they display a very strong tension between two transforming worldviews. Some officials, like Said and Kamil Pashas, maintained a more traditional Ottoman imperial view, seeing the existing structure of empire as just and the position of the Armenian subjects within it as “reform”-able. They blamed the massacres on easily manipulated Armenian subjects and corrupt Muslim officials. Others, like Tâlât Pasha and Mehmed Asaf, exhibited a more “protonationalist” view, perceiving the existing structure of the empire as inadequate, and the position of the Armenian subjects within it as problematic. While they were unclear about what to do about these inadequacies and problems, their priority lay above all else with the preservation of the state and its Muslims. They justified and legitimated their actions accordingly.

The central tension in the Ottoman investigative narrative emerges over the attribution of responsibility for the crimes committed against the Armenian subjects. The memoirs of Ottoman officials reveal a chronological shift in the allocation of responsibility. The later ones, increasingly imbued with protonationalist sentiments, view the committed crimes as a duty necessary for the establishment and preservation of a Turkish fatherland. The officials are aware these are crimes, and they willingly sacrifice themselves for the sake of the fatherland. The tension over responsibility mounted after World War I with the defeat of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman state at that time was manned not by the Committee of Union and Progress, which perpetrated the massacres, but rather by the opposition party that for the most part took a stand against them. The state not only acknowledged what happened, but also printed a book to that effect. The state also distributed as supplements to the official newspaper Takvim-i Vekayi the proceedings of the Ottoman military tribunals that tried some of the perpetrators. Yet the advent and eventual victory of the Turkish War of Independence destroyed the Allied efforts to bring the perpetrators to justice. In addition, with escalating Turkish nationalism, these newspaper issues containing the military tribunal records slowly disappeared. To this day, no complete set exists in any Turkish public library.

Soon after the military tribunals, especially with the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish nation-state, the official attribution of responsibility for the crimes gradually shifted from the perpetrators to the victims. To legitimate the Armenian massacres of 1915, official reports first noted the seditious activities of the Armenian committees as well as the 1917–1918 Armenian atrocities committed against the Turks in the eastern provinces. Significant in this shift was the strong connection between the Committee of Union and Progress and the Nationalist movement. While the former justified the Armenian tragedy as an unfortunate consequence
of their attempts to protect the Ottoman state, the latter gradually adopted this Unionist stand as its own. The Ottoman state documents published by the newly founded Turkish national state also repeated the argument of its predecessors. This argument also contained the subsequent defensive Republican narrative that developed into its own by the mid-1970s.

Republican Defensive Narrative on 1915

The works considered here emerge in three clusters. The first cluster comprises the “foundational” works, namely the two that provide the basis for all subsequent studies. The second consists of all those that define the major elements of the agenda of the Republican Defensive Narrative, all written with the intention to defend the interests of the Turkish state. The third cluster covers all those works in the 1990s that repeat and reproduce various components of the earlier studies, thereby attempting to further legitimate the Turkish Republican narrative by constantly referring to it.

The foundational 1953 works by Y. G. Çark and Esat Uras comprehensively contain the previous existing knowledge on the Armenians. Even though one can still depict a nationalist bent in the coverage of the topics, there is nevertheless an attempt to present all the available material on a particular issue. This all but disappears in the second cluster, written in the 1970s and the 1980s with direct or indirect state support. As these are penned in reaction to the JCOAG and ASALA murders, they very selectively draw on the previous works with the intent to promote state interests. The third cluster comprises the works from the 1990s to the present. It either reproduces the same arguments made in the 1970s and 1980s, or attempts to bring in a new perspective within the nationalist paradigm.

The Republican nationalist narrative traces the origins of the 1915 tragedy to the intervention of the Western powers in the affairs of the empire. It argues that the subversive acts of the Armenian committee members justify the Armenian relocations and subsequent massacres. This narrative fails to recognize the significance of the preexisting Ottoman structural divide between the Muslims and non-Muslim minorities as well as the subsequent naturalized Muslim superiority it produced. It also does not take into account that Turkish nationalism was one of the many nationalisms that emerged during this time period with claims that were no more just than those made by any of the other social groups. The lack of self-reflection prevents the narrative from acknowledging that Turkish nationalism merely happened to triumph over the others at their expense. This nonrecognition of naturalized Turkish superiority cloaked by nationalism leads the Republican state to assign the entire moral responsibility for Armenian deaths and massacres to anyone other than the actual Ottoman Turkish perpetrators.
As a consequence, in this narrative, alongside the guilty Western powers, the Armenian victims themselves tragically and ironically emerge as the main perpetrators of the crimes. Any feeble attempt to assign blame to the Turkish perpetrators is immediately dismissed with the defense that what happened was a tragic but necessary act for the preservation of the state.

During the development of this narrative, the official state scholars researching the Armenian deportations and massacres of 1915 naturalize the inherent nationalism because of their inability to historicize the pre-1919/1923 period. They could identify as the culprits of the Armenian tragedy only the two “others” of Turkish nationalism, namely the Western powers and the Ottoman Armenians themselves. Their interpretations of the actions of these two “others” are so colored by Turkish nationalism that they fail to see that the actions of the Ottoman Turks had been just as destructive. Not only do they dismiss the claims of the massacres, but they argue instead that the Turks themselves were not the perpetrators, but the victims. The emergence of a Turkish “nation-state” on the ashes of the Ottoman Empire precluded the discussion of any claims on the homeland that the Turks have by now identified as theirs. It is no accident that Mustafa Kemal states, and the Turkish state constantly continues to reiterate, that there is not “a hand-span of their fatherland’s soil” (bir karş vatan toprağı) they would give up without fighting until the last drop of their blood (kanımızın son damlasına kadar). The people’s willingness to annihilate themselves for a vision demonstrates both the ideological strength of Turkish nationalism as well as its incredibly destructive power.

This nationalist tone dominating the Republican defensive narrative was radicalized during two significant historical periods. The first was the period of Russian occupation in 1914 and later in 1917 as well as that of the Allied occupation after 1918, a period marked by the massacres of the Muslim Turkish populace by the Armenian committees. The death of approximately 40–60,000 Turks during this period became central to the Republican narrative and these were later frequently employed to counter the 1915 Armenian massacres. The second radicalizing period was a reaction to the JCOAG and ASALA murders of Turkish diplomats between 1975 and 1986. These murders enabled Republican Turkey to fully develop, in a nationalist move, its defensive narrative on the Armenians.

When the works are reviewed chronologically, no significant studies on the Armenian deaths and massacres appear until the 1950s. The two works that then emerge contain declarations of loyalty to the Turkish nation-state. This strategic act reveals the precariousness of the boundaries of Turkish identity and belonging, one that has to be constantly professed to the Turkish state at every opportunity. These two early works forming the “proto-nationalist seeds” of the Republican defensive narrative are
then followed two decades later in 1976 by the narrative boom in response to the JCOAG and ASALA assassinations. Authors then not only give their pledge of allegiance to the Turkish nation-state as citizens, but they selectively employ historical knowledge to preserve Turkish state interests at all costs.

The thirty-year gap immediately following the foundation of the Turkish Republic (1923–1953) may be explained, first, by the general trauma and devastation of the war years, and second, by the need to come to terms with a simple historical fact: the Unionist leadership perpetrating the Armenians massacres used the resources thus gained to fund the War of Independence. The same Unionists also staffed and provided leadership to the emerging Turkish nation-state. By 1926, Mustafa Kemal effectively pacified the Unionist leadership he regarded as a potential threat to his rule. The series of radical reforms the young Turkish Republic underwent during Mustafa Kemal’s reign within the format of a single-party rule also precluded the public discussion of significant social and historical issues. The subsequent promulgation of the laws of treason against the Turkish state and against the person of Mustafa Kemal also rendered any mention and interpretation of events that countered the official version subversive. After Mustafa Kemal’s death, the same political framework dominated during the rule of his successor and close friend İsmet İnönü (1884–1973). During this period, Turkey also had to come to terms with the severe economic impact of the Second World War. The 1948 transition to the multiparty system and the subsequent sweeping electoral defeat of the reigning Republican People’s Party initially liberalized the censorship over the media, leading to the emergence of the works of Uras and Çark.

Post-Nationalist Critical Narrative on 1915

These works emerge in three disparate clusters in terms of the knowledge they provide on both the Ottoman and Turkish Armenians. The first cluster comprises works specifically penned on the events of 1915 with the intent to understand the historical context within which the events occurred. They therefore critically analyze the reasons behind the contemporary Turkish denial of these events. Also contained in this cluster are works aimed at informing the contemporary Turkish reader about the historical transformation of the Armenians from the past to the immediate present. The second cluster contains studies of recent Turkish history on topics that do not directly focus on the Armenians, but instead provide ample new information on the historical background of the events of 1915. This indirect consequence is a consequence of the critical approach they take. They do not silence the role of the Ottoman minorities in their accounts the way the
Republican defensive narrative does. The third cluster includes literary works that reveal the worlds of meaning the Armenians created within both the Ottoman and the Republican periods. Here, the Armenians emerge, for the first time, as cultural actors. It is important to note that none of these works are written to defend a particular thesis; their publication is also not supported by the Turkish state. They are not colored by Turkish nationalism, emerging rather as post-nationalist products of the burgeoning civil society in contemporary Turkey.

The most significant dimension of this post-nationalist critical narrative is its willingness to recognize Turkish society not as an imagined community of nationalist compatriots of Turks, but rather as a cultural mosaic that at present includes many diverse social groups such as Kurds and Alevi, as well as the much atrophied former minority groups such as Armenians, Assyrians, Greeks, and Jews. At this particular moment, Turkish society starts to explore these social groups through their literatures and historical narratives. If this exploration gradually transforms into a larger social and political movement around the recognition of human rights, and if it is then able to overcome the resistance of the nationalist elements embedded in Turkish society and especially in the military, one can conjecture that the Armenian deportations and massacres of 1915 would finally be recognized as the genocide that they were.

TOWARD A POST-NATIONALIST HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE ARMENIAN ETHNIC CLEANSING OF 1915

Another methodological contribution to the recognition of the violence in the Turkish past may be problematizing the parameters of current official historiography. When the current Turkish historiography pertaining to the Anatolian Armenians is analyzed in detail, it is particularly the element of Turkish nationalism that needs to be critically examined and deconstructed. The domination of the ideology (Turkish nationalism) that has diffused into much of the existing scholarship on Turkey at the moment remains unexamined. Scholars approach historical sources uncritically and often accept the textual rhetoric as historical reality. Yet such histories epistemologically manipulate the role and significance of certain social groups (Sunni Turks) at the expense of all others through their selective employment and deployment of history. In so doing, they outright eliminate certain possible choices and trajectories (nonnationalist solutions) not only from history but, by implication, from scholars’ analyses as well. They thus introduce a certain historical fatalism whereby the nationally triumphant groups (the now secularized Turkish elites) always persevere by soaring to historical success
against all odds; the vanquished (the rest of Turkish society, including all minorities) seem destined to failure.

An example of this is the construction of the point of origin of the official historiography of the Turkish Republic. The famous 1927 Speech (Nutuk) of Mustafa Kemal laid the foundation stone for the official historiography of the Turkish Republic. In that speech, Mustafa Kemal narrated his own historiography of the War of Independence, and that particular historiography eventually became that of the Turkish nation. Like other leaders, Mustafa Kemal also attempted to create a nationalist history for the new Turkish Republic. Public narratives were employed to create foundational narratives for aspiring nations—a task similar to the creation of the story of American nation-building.

The first sentence of Mustafa Kemal’s speech actually declares the point of origin of his own historiography—and therefore, by implication, of all the official Turkish historiographies thereafter—as follows: “I alighted in Sam-sun on the 19th day of May of 1919.” The ensuing text not only covers the events from the year 1919 onward, but does so from the vantage point of 1927, namely four years after the establishment of the Turkish Republic and the suppression of various revolts throughout Anatolia. It is noteworthy that at the particular historical juncture when Mustafa Kemal narrated his version of this new nation’s past, all the minority groups in Turkey, including the Armenians, had already been effectively marginalized. Given these epistemological parameters, it was virtually impossible to recover and recognize fully the agency of such ethnic and religious groups in Turkey.

The ensuing Turkish nationalist discourse neatly categorized these ethnic and religious groups along strictly maintained boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. It defined the included Turkish secular elites as historically triumphant and then proceeded to naturalize their norms and values into society as “historical reality.” The nationalist ideology also idealized the emerging Turkish secular elites, giving them exclusive power over the course of Turkish history and also purifying them of all the vice they once engaged in by censoring history. It thus presented the Turkish elites morally and metaphorically as “pure white.” By the same token, Turkish nationalist ideology articulated and narrated the excluded minorities as the vanquished and then proceeded to attribute to them the exact opposite characteristics. The excluded were stripped of most of their agency, and the very little they were permitted to exercise was of course depicted within parameters defined by the triumphant group as totally subversive and immoral. Turkish nationalist ideology thus embellished history by selectively employing only those historical events that portrayed the excluded minorities in a negative light, thereby saturating them with vice, conveying them morally and metaphorically as “dark black.” When scholars, socialized within the
Historiographies of the Genocide

Turkish nation-state where such an ideology was predominant, approached this highly selective representation of Turkish history, they, too, directly or indirectly reproduced historical actors as either black or white, with no consideration of either the possible shades in-between or other colors.

The official Turkish nationalist historiography selectively retold the historical events before 1915 in a way that both legitimated what happened to the Anatolian Armenians and took pains to demonstrate that the same, if not more, happened to the Turks as well. This epistemological restructuring of the past, undertaken to emphasize the unavoidability of 1915, enabled Turkish nationalist historiography to deny both its extent and its intentionality. Hence 1915 was employed to structure all existing Turkish historical accounts within the nationalist narrative with insurmountable force and, in so doing, obliterated in the process all critical historical analysis and eliminated all events, institutions, and social groups that might not have fore-shadowed this ultimate demise. Anatolian Armenians were portrayed in history as an initially wealthy and content “loyal” social group who turned ungrateful and treacherous mostly at the instigation of the Great Powers. By the same stroke of the pen, the same Powers were also described as moving on the Turks to wrest the empire away from the “rightful owners.” As a consequence, both the Turks and the Armenians were depicted as suffering “equally” during World War I, brought upon them by the Great Powers.

In official Turkish historiography, both the hegemony of Turkish nationalism and the hegemony of 1915 ended up dramatically limiting the historical repertoire of the scholars engaged in the research of Turkey’s past. The official employment of history very selectively portrayed the social conditions of the Ottoman Empire, the agency of various social groups within, the repertoire of choices these groups had, and the range of historical events they encountered. Given this state of affairs, it is not possible for the official Turkish historiography to make any significant empirical and methodological advances. It needs to first reconstruct its framework by engaging in critical analysis so that its narrative is not solely based on the naturalized nationalist history of the Turks, but rather on the intersections of the experiences of both the Turks and the minority groups, in this case the Anatolian Armenians, of the empire. Only through the reconstruction of such a common history of Turks and Armenians can the complexity of the Anatolian past that is so bereft in the official Turkish historiography be finally captured.
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Ethnic cleansing, a broad concept that encompasses phenomena as diverse as forced deportation at one end of the spectrum and genocide at the other, is often “associated with crimes against property as well as people—that is, stealing and theft, both on the part of the state and of individuals.” Such crimes may precede the ethnic cleansing itself, accelerating the process of polarization between ethnic groups that results in the ultimate catastrophe. The wave of postwar decolonization and the resulting formation of new states plagued with ethnic strife, as well as the more recent dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union (and the concomitant wave of large-scale ethnic cleansing or local pogroms stretching from Kosovo and Bosnia to the Caucasus and Central Asia) have stimulated academic interest in “ethnic” or ethnoreligious conflicts. Examining the context in which this violence occurs, some sociologists stress that “ethnic conflicts and protests erupt when ethnic inequalities and racially ordered systems begin to break down.” Inspired by ecological theory, they suggest that racial and ethnic violence tends to occur under conditions of niche overlap, that is, competition for the same resource environment. To the extent that two ethnic or ethnoreligious groups remain in separate niches and accept the power dissymmetry between them, stable, accommodative ethnic relations usually result. However, when two or more ethnic groups compete for scarce or valued resources, such as jobs, land, or housing, ethnic boundaries intensify. Conflict is most likely to occur when various processes raise the level of ethnic competition to its apex. These processes include “migration and immigration, economic contraction, segregation and dispersion from niches, and increasing prosperity for the disadvantaged ethnics.” Two factors give further impetus to ethnic competition: “the occurrence of political struggles and challenges, and diffusion of events over time and across regions,” in other words,
imitative behavior or contagion.\textsuperscript{4} Often, modernization seems to play a significant role in these processes, for it breaks down polyethnic social systems stratified on the basis of religion, birth, service to the State, or a combination thereof. As these systems are characterized by a significant power differential between the dominant group and the subordinate one(s), their breakdown intensifies ethnic competition in the political and economic arenas, resulting in niche overlaps.\textsuperscript{5}

This chapter examines apparently dissimilar cases of niche overlap in two regions of the Ottoman Empire: Eastern Anatolia and Cilicia, both inhabited by large Armenian populations. In the former, Armenians were dispossessed from the 1850s to 1914; in the latter, they bought land from the 1870s to World War I. Niche overlap occurred in Eastern Anatolia when the Kurdish emirate of Bedr Khan (Bedirhan) was defeated by the Ottoman army, resulting in anarchy, the emergence of sheikhly families in the Kurdish leadership, and the accelerated transition of hitherto Kurdish pastoral nomadic tribes to sedentary life. The Armenian peasantry was faced with massive land usurpation and diverse forms of oppression and violence. In Cilicia, on the other hand, economic niche overlap occurred mainly from the 1870s on, when non-Muslims were allowed to buy and own large-scale land, a historical prerogative of the dominant group. In both regions, inter-ethnic polarization resulting from niche overlap was intensified by the partial resettlement of Muslim refugees (\textit{muhacirs})—from the Caucasus at first in the late 1850s and the 1860s, then also from the Balkans between 1878 and 1914—in the midst of the Armenian population. Armed Muslims thus competed for scarce resources with an existing, unarmed Christian population, whom they associated with the Christian enemies who had expelled them from their previous homelands. Both cases ended in violence: the first in the large-scale massacres of 1894–96 and the subsequent sporadic, localized violence; the second in the so-called Adana massacres of 1909. Ethnic relations in these regions foreshadowed the larger disaster to come.

The failure of the Ottoman State to remedy the plight of the Armenian peasantry resulted in the internationalization of that issue in 1878. The so-called Armenian Question was born, which historians have essentially treated from the perspective of political history, combining in their narratives the diplomatic exchanges of the European Powers with a survey of the political evolution of the Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{6} Yet, the Armenian Question is fully embedded in a number of other “questions”: the agrarian and Kurdish questions, the demographic Islamization of Anatolia during the period in question, and the attempts of the Ottoman state at modernizing and centralizing the empire. The Armenian Question is as much a Kurdish and Ottoman Question as it is an Armenian one.
While nineteenth-century Armenian-Turkish polarization cannot be reduced to the process of niche overlap alone, agrarian factors played a key role. These factors also offer a useful prism through which to consider the broader question of land relations in the late Ottoman Empire. The impact of the Land Law of 1858 on these two regions will be a central concern of this study. That law was part of a series of reforms, enacted mostly between 1839 and 1878, that aimed at centralizing the empire and modernizing its institutions and state apparatus. Two imperial rescripts constituted the pivots of that period known as the Tanzimat (Re-Ordering): the Hatt-ı Şerif of Gülhane (Noble Rescript of the Rose Chamber) in 1839 and the Hatt-ı Hümayun (Imperial Decree) in 1856, both of which promised reforms, greater justice, and equality among all Ottomans, be they Muslims or non-Muslims. In a nutshell, transformation of the traditional society (legitimized by religion and the right of conquest) was supposed to result in a legal-rational type of society, based on universal norms. The transition was ultimately a failure and, among other things, Armenians were to be one of its main victims.

**HISTORIOGRAPHY**

Donald Quataert, an economic historian of the Ottoman Empire, once wrote, “the Land Law of 1858 is like the elephant of the blind man as it appears to scholars in different guises.” While some historians have stressed that it was a result of European pressures in favor of the development of private ownership in the empire, others claim that it was an effort at reasserting the control of the state and at increasing its revenues. A recent essay erases this dichotomy and argues that “the constitution of individual ownership rights signaled the total control of the central government over land that was the primary economic resource.” This statement might be too strong, but it points rightly to the fiscal concerns of the state.

Rural stability and maintenance of cultivation seem to have been paramount goals of the state. Fiscal considerations also played a significant role in shaping the law. The Land Law was a fairly thorough attempt at categorizing and regularizing the various forms of land tenure inherited from the past and at updating “rules and terminology outmoded since the demise of the fief system.” As such, it was part of the modernizing project of the late Ottoman state. The application of the Land Law resulted in varied outcomes in landholding patterns; these stretched from small family farms to large estates. In view of such diversity, recent syntheses have emphasized that the Land Law did not in itself determine the subsequent landholding patterns, which depended on a number of variables.
These include soil and climate, previous patterns of landholding, the changing availability of labor, capital, and land, the presence of sedentarized and nomadic tribes, transport systems, regional and international market opportunities for both agricultural and animal products, the coercive power of local notables, the degree of centralized political control, and the land legislation itself.\(^\text{14}\)

Research on “landholding and actual land registration” is lacking, preventing us from making precise statements about the impact of the Land Law.\(^\text{15}\)

In addition, sedentarization of the indigenous nomadic populations characterized the eighteenth and, to a greater extent, the nineteenth century.\(^\text{16}\) In the latter, sedentarization programs coincided with a massive influx of refugees, a combination that drastically reshaped rural life.\(^\text{17}\) There are few studies, however, that analyze the socioeconomic and political impact of sedentarization, in particular in the case of the Kurds, who constituted at least a plurality in most parts of eastern Anatolia, while the Armenian peasantry, an estimated 70 to 75 percent of the total Armenian Ottoman population, is unaccounted for in Ottoman historiography written in Turkish or European languages. In the unusual instances when Armenians factor into agrarian developments, it is in the form of the urban Armenian moneylender capturing the lands of indebted Muslim peasants.\(^\text{18}\) There is little doubt that the Armenian and Kurdish populations, once combined, formed a clear majority in the eastern provinces in the second half of the nineteenth century. In this context, the effects of state power in relation to ethnic groups and immigration is generally neglected in Ottoman historiography.

Five to seven million refugees settled in the quickly shrinking Ottoman territories between 1783 and 1913.\(^\text{19}\) Besides approximate demographic data, we know little about their socioeconomic history and their impact on rural life and interethnic relations. More generally, it is known that the Ottoman state encouraged immigration from the end of the eighteenth century onward.\(^\text{20}\) As a corollary, did it develop programs to welcome the immigrants and refugees as best as it could? Was there a pattern, or a motivation, in the choice of the regions where they were resettled? On what lands did that resettlement take place? Did demographic, ethnic, or economic factors play a role? Answers to these questions should shed some light on the land question in the late Ottoman Empire.

THE EASTERN PROVINCES: LATE 1860s–1914

The socioeconomic and interethnic relations in the eastern provinces from the 1860s on, and not European diplomacy, are the core of the Armenian Question. On November 27, 1870, a special commission was appointed by
the Armenian National Assembly in Istanbul to compile and examine the numerous occurrences of “oppressive acts” in those regions. Its “First Report on Provincial Oppressions” was submitted to the Sublime Porte [a synecdoche referring to the Ottoman Government] “in the Name of the Armenian National Assembly” on April 11, 1872. The report consisted mostly of a summary of the types of exactions the commission had encountered in the eastern provinces and of respectful suggestions to the sultan on how to remedy them. Not much came out of this endeavor. On September 17, 1876, the commission submitted a “Second Report on the Oppression of the Armenians” to the Armenian National Assembly, which provided a detailed census of “oppressive acts” that had occurred in about 320 locations from April 12, 1872, to the end of August, 1876.

A rudimentary analysis of these incidents provides some insight into the role of land in the origins of the Armenian Question, and incidentally into the relationship between economic development and ethnic conflict in Eastern Anatolia. That insight differs from what many Ottomanists have suggested, especially those who rely on Immanuel Wallerstein’s world-system approach, which argues that the incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the world economy in the nineteenth century benefited the non-Muslim bourgeoisie and generated Muslim resentment that led to communal strife or massacres. In fact, nearly all of the incidents occurred in villages (308), and very few in towns (5) and cities (7). Most of those villages had little, if anything, to do with capitalistic development and were untouched by the impact of the world-economy. They were rather backward places, existing at the level of subsistence economy and local trade. The overwhelming majority of “oppressive acts” consisted of land usurpation (272 cases), mostly by Muslim aghas and beys, but also by mullahs and sheikhs (175). Eleven such events specifically mention a disregard for title deeds, though one suspects there were many such cases included under the category of “land usurpation.” For most incidents, the ethnic background of the perpetrators is unspecified. Kurds are named in 68 incidents, but it seems highly probable in view of the ethnic composition of Eastern Anatolia, in particular its countryside, that many of the aghas and sheikhs were also Kurds. Nineteen Ottoman officials were involved in those incidents, but it is not to be excluded that some of the aghas and beys were also Ottoman officials. Lack of due process and legal remedy is typical of most of the cases, which suggests indeed that title deeds were often disregarded. The commission gave the following diagnosis for the ills it had described:

The principal causes of this fatal and intolerable state of things are the non-diffusion among the Mohammedan people of the idea or sentiment of equality and the deficient administration of justice. Particularly those officials who occupy inferior posts in the provincial administrations have, through their
ignorance, prejudice, and bigotry, never shown any disposition to propagate and diffuse among the masses the principles of equality, nor have they shown any aptitude for the regular administration of justice, while these were their sacred duties, as our newly-crowned Sultan distinctly says in his Hatti-Sherif.22

The report singles out two groups. It points first to the nefarious role of Circassian refugees, tens of thousands of whom were resettled in the Armenian-inhabited regions of Erzurum, Sivas, or Diyarbakır in the eastern provinces, and those of Aintab (Gaziantep), Kilis, Zeytun (Zeytin), and Alexandretta (İskenderun) in Cilicia. Indeed, an estimated 500,000 to over a million Circassians, with the latter figure being more probable, migrated to the Ottoman Empire between 1856 and 1878. Resettled mainly in Asiatic Turkey until 1863, they were thereafter also established in Rumelia.23 The second group comprises Kurdish, Avshar, and Turkish derebeys (“lords of the valley”), or leaders of pastoral nomadic tribes. Illegal, forced taxation, arbitrary rule, violence toward women, unpunished robberies and murders, and nonadmission of evidence presented by Christians before Islamic courts of law, were common features of Armenian life in the eastern provinces.

Land relations in the late Ottoman Empire were colored by the survival in some provinces of semifeudal practices. In the Sassun region, the Armenian peasant had to pay the hafir (also hapir or kiafir) to the Kurdish tribal leader or landlord. Remitted yearly in produce or artisanal products, the hafir, which symbolized the “protection” Kurdish lords extended to the Armenian peasants, often exceeded the amount of taxes levied by the government. In addition, those peasants were expected to perform some compulsory yearly service, known as olam, reminiscent of the feudal corvée. Marriages were an occasion for the beys to claim half of the dowry as gift; some benefited from “the right of the first night” (ius primae noctis, or droit de seigneur). The Armenian peasantry of the eastern provinces was the only Christian element of the empire forced to offer winter shelter (kışlak) to the Kurdish tribesmen, sometimes for four to six months a year, a practice that led to violence of all kinds, especially toward Armenian women.

Termen, the Russian vice-consul in the Van province at the beginning of the twentieth century, described two economic practices that enriched the Kurdish beys and reduced the Armenian farmers to the status of sharecroppers or serfs. The first was a loan in cash or grain called selem or selef. Offered to the Armenian peasants on usurious terms, it was repayable in kind after the harvest. As a result of those lending conditions, the borrowers frequently defaulted on their loans, and lost their land. The second, a practice closely related to the selef, was known as miribe, whereby the Kurdish leaders advanced seed and livestock to the Armenians in exchange for half of their future crop. The combination of these practices brought about the emergence of a landless Armenian peasantry. Ottoman provincial authorities
supported the enrichment of the Kurdish leaders, for it resulted in substantial gifts to them.

Finally, some Armenian farmers, called zer kurri, were “bought with gold.” In fact they are bought and sold in much the same manner as sheep and cattle by the Kurdish beys and aghas. The only difference is that they cannot be disposed of individually; they are transferred with the lands which they cultivate. The chief appropriates as much as he wishes from their yearly earnings, capital or goods; and in return he provides them with protection against other Kurdish tribes.

Some Ottoman intellectuals were well aware of the plight of the Armenians. Osman Nuri, the popular biographer of Sultan Abdülhamid II, wrote: “There were a few things which caused the conflict between the Armenians and the Muslims. The aggression of the Kurds and the corruption of the local officials. . . . However much the Armenians were complaining of the evil of the Ottoman administration, they did not fail to consider the Russians also as a great danger for themselves.”

If many Armenians of the eastern provinces subsequently put their hopes in Russia, it was because they had lost faith in the enactment of Ottoman reforms. Little did they know that Russian policies from the 1880s on would prove detrimental to their welfare, since they thwarted various European schemes to introduce reforms in their regions, turned a blind eye to the occurrence of massacres in 1895–96, and even supported the formation of a Kurdish confederation with a view to creating an autonomous Kurdistan under Russian tutelage.

Sultan Abdülhamid II was cognizant of the circumstances of the Armenian peasantry, but he chose to co-opt Sunni Kurdish tribes in the context of a policy of Islamic unity. Such a policy pursued a number of goals: to counter non-Muslim discontent in the eastern provinces; secure the borderlands with Russia; and bring the unruly Kurdish population to a great extent under his control.

**Provincial Politics**

Abdülhamid’s policies in the eastern provinces took advantage of the underlying causes of the injustices against the Armenian peasantry, which were rooted in the socioeconomic structure, ethnic composition, and cultural worldview of the Muslim population of those regions. In the countryside and in small towns, two well-defined groups, often ethnically Kurdish, dominated society: the aghas and the sheikhs, whose power was founded on agrarian wealth and religious leadership, respectively. These groups wielded great influence on the Kurdish and other pastoral nomadic tribes (aşirets) and on the masses in general. In the larger towns and cities, where the centers of the Ottoman provincial administration were located, the notables
prevailed. After 1839, at the beginning of the Tanzimat period, they were variously called vücuh-i memleket, vücuh-i belde, müteayyinan, or mutebaran in administrative correspondence and were given the title of agha. They sat on the various regional and local bodies (the “provincial general councils,” the provincial “administrative assemblies,” and the “municipal assemblies”) created during the Tanzimat era, benefited most from the Land Law of 1858, influenced provincial state authorities, and opposed any consolidation of centralization, which would have curtailed their power. By bringing official pressure to bear on the tribal leaders and the rural aghas, the notables also controlled them to a certain extent.

The Tanzimat reforms had promised equality among all Ottomans and allowed non-Muslims some participation in the newly formed provincial and local councils, measures that in the medium run threatened to undermine the power of the notables in the provinces. Using their positions on the councils and courts, the latter either delayed or prevented the application of these reforms. They were particularly embittered by the reforms that favored the Armenians, who constituted a plurality in some areas of the six eastern provinces and a significant minority in most of them. They held the Ottoman central bureaucracy responsible for such distasteful changes. These notables supported or condoned the various crimes committed against the Armenian peasantry, and land usurpation in particular, of which they were sometimes the beneficiaries.

The expropriation of the Armenian peasantry gained momentum in 1876 after the accession to power of Sultan Abdülhamid II. While the Kurdish exactions reduced the farmers to poverty, the state “legalized” the process of confiscation using two mechanisms. The Ottoman authorities confiscated the lands of Armenian peasants whose taxes were overdue, and the Agricultural Bank seized the lands of those who could not pay back their loans. In the latter case, it mattered little that most of the loans did not exceed one-tenth to one-fifth of the value of the lands in question. The goal of the Ottoman policies was clear: to settle Muslim immigrants from the Balkans and the Caucasus in the six eastern provinces (Erzurum, Harput, Sivas, Diyarbakır, Van, and Bitlis) inhabited by a dense Armenian population. To this end, confiscated Armenian lands were handed over to the new refugees.

The socioeconomic, political, ethnic, and cultural background of the eastern provinces makes it easier to understand why the Tanzimat reforms were irrelevant to the life of the Armenian peasantry. It also sheds light on the worsening of their condition from the 1860s onward. The Turkish and Kurdish elites viewed the reforms of the Tanzimat leaders not merely as acting against their interests, but also as acting in favor of the Armenians. Their response was simple: they sabotaged the reforms, condoned violence
against the Armenians, and refused to bring the guilty parties to justice. Such behavior reminded the Armenians of their vulnerable, powerless position and the central government of its incapacity to change things in the eastern provinces without the consent and collaboration of the local elites.

The Kurds

The centralization of the empire from the 1840s on and the concomitant splintering and decay of the pastoral nomadic, tribal, semifeudal organization in the eastern provinces had much to do with the overall anarchy and oppression of the Armenians. In the 1820s and 1830s, the descendant of an illustrious Kurdish princely family, Bedr Khan (Bedirhan), created a confederation of major tribes, which he ruled with an iron fist. This emir, whose domains in 1845 stretched from Bitlis to Mosul and from Diyarbakir to the proximity of Urumiya, revolted against the Ottoman state to prevent the recentralization of his territories and their division into two eyalets (provinces). His 1843 massacre of the Nestorians of Tiyari (region of Hakkari), carried out with the acquiescence of the Ottoman governors of Mosul and Erzurum, brought about protests from the British and the French. In response to European pressure, the Porte took action, defeated Bedr Khan in 1847, and exiled him and his family to Crete. It took another two years to subdue the other prominent leaders of his emirate who controlled such regions as Van and Bitlis. The defeat of Bedr Khan and the other emirs proved disastrous for the Armenians, for their control had tempered the rapacious, anarchical instincts of their underlings. Though the Armenian peasantry had not enjoyed a good life under their rule, things had been predictable, fairly peaceful, and taxes only due to the Kurdish lords. Indeed, Bedr Khan recognized the value of the Armenian peasantry, “who were willing to colonize abandoned villages or entirely new sites.” Without these Kurdish princes, the situation deteriorated drastically.

In their absence a free-for-all occurred, with tribes violating each other’s pastures, and moving through agricultural areas in which they had no economic interest, beyond exploiting them as much as they could before moving on. Kurdish tribes had always billeted themselves on peasant villages during the winter months. While this was extremely unpopular, particularly with Armenians, it was an accepted fact of life. In 1838 Ainsworth [a traveler] had already noted how many Armenians were migrating to Russian-occupied parts of Armenia.

Now a new tendency arose of [Kurds’] stripping villages on departure. Since this could now be done with impunity, it was not long before Kurdish chieftains and their men were also abducting Armenian girls and killing those who opposed them.
The fairly tolerant religious tradition of the Kurdish princes was superseded by the fanaticism of the local Sufi leaders. These sheikhs filled the power vacuum left by the major emirs, replacing them as mediators of tribal disputes. As they married into the families of secondary tribal chiefs, they promoted religious intolerance, which they used as political weapons against the Christian and Yezidi populations. As one scholar of Kurdistan puts it, “Bitlis . . . was transformed from the seat of the cultured Badirkhânids/Rozhakis [princely dynasty] to a center for fanatic religious activities under the direction of the Sufi masters of the Naqshbandi mystic order.”32 The latter gained considerable power, as the Naqshbandi order was the fastest spreading order among the Kurds, and since their “sheikhly” families benefited most from the Land Law of 1858, registering the lands of their areas in their name.33 Land usurpation also stemmed from the slow process of Kurdish sedentarization, especially after the Russian-Turkish War of 1877–78, which increased demand for land, a requirement for settled life.34 Finally, a significant change occurred in Armeno-Kurdish relations upon the reestablishment of Ottoman control in the eastern provinces. Prior to that period, most Armenians lived in areas controlled by powerful Kurdish emirs, who “protected” them against exactions carried out by other Kurdish tribes. After the establishment of Ottoman rule and the destruction or exile of the prominent Kurdish princely families, the remaining Kurds treated Armenians as Ottoman sympathizers and subjects. They viewed Armenians as “fair game.”35

Sultan Abdülhamid II was well aware of this situation, as it served his main political goals. These consisted of consolidating centralization of the country, reasserting Islamic superiority, promoting Islamic unity within and without the empire, and getting rid of the Tanzimat reforms, in particular those reforms favorable to the Armenians. To consolidate centralization, he needed to gain control of the provincial notables and tribal leaders. He accomplished this by bringing about a rapprochement between state officials and the urban notables under his Islamic anti-Armenian policy. From 1891 on, he co-opted the Kurdish tribes by organizing them with much ceremony and pomp into light cavalry regiments directly attached to his person, hence their name, Hamidiye. In his policy of dividing Ottoman religious, ethnic, and social groups to establish his hegemony, Abdülhamid used these Kurdish regiments as a threat against the decentralizing tendencies of the urban notables.36 By organizing the Hamidiye, not only did he endorse the Kurdish exactions against the Armenians, but he also nipped in the bud the nascent Armenian revolutionary movement in the 1890s. Last but not least, he brought the Kurds themselves under his control to a significant extent.37
The Massacres of 1895–96, the Land Question, and Demographic Policies

Altering the demographic makeup of the eastern provinces by driving Armenians out of their lands became a pillar of the Ottoman government’s centralization policy from 1877 on. This was also the goal of the Hamidian massacres of 1895–96. As late as 1913, thirty-seven years after the “Second Report on the Oppression of the Armenians,” Gerald Henry Fitzmaurice, Chief Dragoman and First Secretary at the British Embassy, reflected on land usurpations, which he considered to be “the touchstone of Armeno-Turkish relations and of the genuineness of Turkish reforms in Armenia.” He went on, placing them in a political context.

The Turkish Government, after the Treaty of Berlin, realising that a sense of nationality cannot easily live without a peasantry, and that if it succeeded in uprooting the Armenian peasantry from the soil and driving them into the towns or out of the country, it would in great part rid itself of the Armenians and the Armenian question, condoned and encouraged Kurdish usurpation of Armenian lands. This retail process was repeated on a wholesale scale after the massacres of 1895–6. After the revival of the Constitution in 1908, large numbers of Armenians returned, especially from the Caucasus, and, though the Committee of Union and Progress repeatedly promised to deal with the matter, especially in the case of Armenians who are in possession of the title-deeds of their lands, nothing has been done. . . . This failure to settle the usurped lands question has been interpreted by the Armenians as evidence of bad faith on the part of the Committee, and of their secret intention to persist in the old methods of breaking up the peasantry.  

Fitzmaurice was right. By analyzing the 135 reports presented to the Ottoman governments from 1890 to 1910, the Commission of Usurped Lands established by the Armenian Chamber of Deputies on November 16, 1909 found 7,000 cases of such spoliations in thirty-five districts (sancaks) of the eastern provinces. What those reports suggest is a systematic policy of expropriation, abuse, and condoned violence aimed at reducing the Armenian settled peasantry to misery and emigration. The goal was to de-Armenianize the Armenian plateau. The commission established that 741,000 hectares of Armenian lands had been usurped or confiscated during the previous decades. This process led to the massive emigration between 1870 and 1910 of an estimated 100,000 Armenians.  

Adding to that figure the death toll of the 1894–96 massacres (probably between 150,000 and 200,000) and that of the Adana massacres of 1909 (at least 20,000), and taking into account the massive settlement of Turkic refugees in those same regions from the 1860s on, one realizes that Ottoman demographic engineering was quite successful. A secret report sent by one of the Ottoman governors
of the Armenian plateau to the sultan and intercepted by the Austrian military attaché in Constantinople at the end of 1896 made this obvious. After a description of the demographic impact of the massacres of 1895–96, its conclusion reads: “Now, thanks to the wise steps taken by Your Majesty, the majority [of the population] is everywhere secured for the Muslims.”

This telegram must be set against Sultan Abdülhamid’s broader goals, to wit, his understanding of the need to Islamize and Turkify Rumelia, and especially Anatolia, through immigration and assimilation:

Times are no more such that we would stick splinters in our own flesh by welcoming sectarians [sectateurs] of alien religions. Within the limits of our State, we can tolerate but members of our own nation [peuple] and believers [sectateurs] in our own faith. We must see to reinforcing the Turkish element: we must systematically channel back the flux of Muslim expansion which is coming back to us from Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as from Bulgaria. This colonization is a vital question for us. Now what we have to do [Il s’agit], by means of this immigration, is to augment not merely national power, but also the economic power of the Empire. We must reinforce as much as possible the Muslim element in Rumelia, and quite especially in Anatolia; first of all, what we have to do is to assimilate to us the Kurds.

After the constitutional revolution of 1908, substantial evidence indicates that the Young Turks essentially ratified the land usurpations that had taken place under Sultan Abdülhamid and sided with the Kurdish aghas, the landlords, and other provincial notables. Land usurpation, forced Islamization, and sporadic localized cases of violence continued unabated. As one scholar puts it, “the CUP [Committee of Union and Progress] as a body never seems to have envisioned changing the status quo in the countryside by ending the social, economic, and political domination of the landlords.”

They also encouraged the resettlement of Muslim refugees in the Armenian-inhabited areas of the eastern provinces, and condoned continued land usurpation. Even after the Adana massacres of 1909 had gone unpunished for two years, the hegemonic Armenian party in the Ottoman Empire at the time, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaksutiun), which had supported the ruling Committee of Union and Progress since 1908, had still not lost hope that the Young Turks would carry out reforms in the eastern provinces.

The central items of the agenda the federation prepared in early 1911, with a view to reaching an agreement with the committee, are revealing. They include the end of feudal structures and practices in Anatolia, economic development in the region, solutions to the agrarian question (land usurpation, resettlement of muhacirs, etc.), fair and legal taxation, and safety of life, honor, and property. Despite promises on the part of the Committee, nothing was done and no formal accord was reached that year. In
February 1912, however, after the annexation of Tripoli and Benghazi by the Italians (November 1911) and during the period of incubation of the forthcoming First Balkan War (October 1912), the Young Turks consented to sign an agreement comprising the same items. Only in the fall of 1912 did the Dashnaktsutiun reach the conclusion that reform in the eastern provinces would never be carried out, as the agreement was a dead letter. It then put its faith in the internationalization of the reform issue.

The outcome of that process and of painstaking negotiations between the European Powers and the Ottoman Empire was the Reform Act of February 8, 1914. It divided Eastern Anatolia into two separate Armenian-inhabited regions, each to be administered by a foreign inspector-general serving as the supreme civil authority. So central was the land question that the act stipulated that “Agrarian conflicts [would] be settled under the direct supervision of the inspector-generals.” By that time, however, the Committee of Union and Progress had already settled on a policy of Islamization and Turkification of Anatolia and its immediate surroundings, the only substantially Turkish-inhabited area of the remaining territories of the empire.

CILICIA: 1830s–1914

The tale of ethnic relations in Cilicia is quite different. Cilicia, or Kilikya in Turkish, is an appropriate example of socioeconomic change in the Ottoman Empire, for along with the region of İzmir it was the most economically dynamic province of that state at the turn of the century. Encompassed by the irregular semicircle delimited by the cities of Mersina (Mersin), Tarsus, Adana, Sis (Kozan), Hadjin (Haçin), Zeytun (Zeytin), Maras (Kahramanmaraş), Aintab (Ayintap and later Gaziantep), and İskenderun (Alexandretta), Cilicia was made up of two economic units from the mid-nineteenth century until the end of World War I. Its western part, coinciding with the eyalet (governorate) of Adana—it became a vilayet (governorate led by a vali) in May 1869—centered on Adana and the port of Mersin. The economy of its eastern part, corresponding *grosso modo* to various areas of the eyalet of Aleppo, such as Zeytun, Maraş, Aintab, Kilis, and İskenderun, revolved around Aleppo and the port of İskenderun. The eyalet of Aleppo, in turn, was transformed into a vilayet in March 1866. These two economic regions were obviously not cut off from one another, since trade was carried out between them. From the 1880s on, Cilicia was one of the most coveted regions in the ongoing economic rivalry between France, Germany, and Great Britain. Yet, the integration of Cilicia into the world economy did not so much result from this economic competition as from earlier and quite different events.
Agricultural Development: C. 1800 to the End of the 1850s

What was the economic situation at the turn of the nineteenth century and why and how did Cilicia emerge as one of the most prosperous economic regions of the Ottoman Empire by the 1870s?

Research into the history of Cilicia in the eighteenth century is almost inexistent. One essay tries to close that gap, but it has serious limitations, as it focuses on the Çukurov only (the coastal plain around Adana) and lacks any statistical data. Although this essay is prone to generalizing on the basis of scant information, it sketches some of the socioeconomic developments in the second half of that century. Large agricultural estates, or çiftlik (çiftliks), seem to have appeared in the Çukurov toward the end of the eighteenth century as a result of the indebtedness of the peasantry. The creditors are said to have been the holders of malikâne, state lands held as tax-farms for life by a quasi-private owner whose heirs had preferential rights in bidding for those lands upon his death. They accumulated some “financial power,” lent money to the peasants, and ended up acquiring the lands of those indebted. On the whole, although some çiftlik did exist in the Çukurova in the second half of the eighteenth century, most of them were undoubtedly formed after 1870.

Cilicia’s significant development stemmed from the conquest and occupation of that region between 1832 and 1840 by İbrahim Pasha, the son of the viceroy of Egypt, Muhammad Ali. In his capacity as governor of Greater Syria and of the district of Adana after the peace of Kütahya was signed in May of 1833 by the Sublime Porte and the Egyptians, İbrahim Pasha proceeded to pacify Cilicia and to develop and exploit its rich resources. His many contributions to Cilicia’s economic improvement include the systematic development of the culture of cotton and the introduction of sugar cane, the exploitation of the timber and mineral resources available in the Taurus and Amanus mountains, the building of new roads (for example one that linked Tarsus with the Cilician Gates), the development of the port of Mersin, and the settlement of Syrian and Egyptian fellahin in the fertile yet uninhabited plain of Adana. In a nutshell, Egyptian rule revealed that the economic potential of Cilicia was great and that its exploitation depended on competent administration. The Ottoman state tried to follow this example in Cilicia upon regaining control of that region in the 1840s.

This early economic growth of Cilicia continued until the mid-1860s. In the 1840s and 1850s, most trade was carried out with the interior, Syria and Cyprus, and trade with Europe was secondary. Cotton, wool, wheat, and barley constituted the main exports. In 1842, the Ottoman government let out on lease to the Artus Brothers from Marseilles the fishing and exportation of leeches from the province of Adana, a prospering business since
1837. Imports, such as English manufactures, sugar, coffee, and soap, came from Beirut and Syria; some came from Cyprus. Rice was imported from Egypt. The paşalık (pashalik, or governorate) of Adana had close commercial ties with the region of Kayseri to the northwest as it sent caravans of camels carrying cotton to the region twice a month. Most of the tradesmen were indigenous, although quite a few were nonresident Ottoman Greeks or Armenians who had settled in the small city of Tarsus for the winter. British consular sources indicate that maritime trade was dominated by Greek and Arab vessels, the value of their cargos for 1836 being more than ten times higher than those of British, Austrian, and French vessels combined.

The increased demand for cereals during the Crimean War (1854–55) resulted in the reduction of cotton growing in the Aleppo province. This shift in production did not last long, however, for the outbreak of the American Civil War (1861–1865) ushered in the second phase of Cilician economic development, characterized by the expansion of cotton cultivation.

The war drastically disrupted cotton production in the American South, which was then Great Britain’s main cotton supplier. As American exports to Europe were cut off, cotton prices reached unprecedented heights on the world market. Prompted by the British (in particular the Manchester Cotton Supply Association) to improve and develop cotton production, and keen on taking advantage of increased demand, in 1862 the government of Sultan Abdüllaziz exempted from customs duties cotton-processing equipment and other agricultural machines. It purchased modern agricultural machinery and cotton seeds to distribute in cotton-growing areas, and embarked on a program of road-building to link productive regions with ports. A five-year exemption from tithes was also granted to those who attempted to cultivate cotton in heretofore barren areas.

Not only did these measures result in a remarkable extension of cotton culture, but they brought about a significant increase in the quantities of cotton produced and exported. A large-scale survey of cotton culture in the Ottoman Empire conducted by the Foreign Office in 1864 established that land under cotton cultivation in the Adana-Maraş-Aleppo district expanded from 310,000 to 745,000 acres between 1863 and 1864. British consular sources, whose reliability is questionable, also suggest an important increase in the production of cotton. Some assert that the 1863 cotton crop of the Aleppo province was ten times as large as that of 1857. Others contend that cotton production increased from 2,800,000 pounds (1,333 tons) in 1862 to 19,600,000 pounds (9,333 tons) in 1863. These consular data coincide more or less with the estimates of Donald Quataert, who suggests that “in 1862, the Çukurova plain produced perhaps 10,000 bales [1,590 tons approximately]; and in the following two years, annual average levels rose more than sixfold.”
Along with the increase of cotton production, the first cotton-processing factories appeared in Cilicia. In 1864, Justin Daudet, a French engineer, founded in Adana the first factory equipped with cotton gins. The next year, James Kot, a British merchant, built three cotton-sorting factories in Adana, Mersin, and Tarsus. Soon thereafter, the Tripani brothers constructed a modern, steam-powered factory with cotton gins in Adana. In that same city, a Mr. Simyonoğlu owned a cotton-sewing factory, while in Tarsus another such establishment belonged to a Mr. Mavromati. These first attempts at developing processing industries paved the way for the relative mechanization and industrialization of Cilicia at the turn of the century.

Pastoral Nomads, Their Pacification, and Immigration

During the period of combined industrial and agricultural development (1830s to 1860s) the population of Cilicia was also undergoing significant changes. Population transfers and immigration as well as the forced settlement of the local nomadic tribes were the two main causes of those changes.

Before they were forcibly settled, various Turkoman tribes had dominated Cilicia and its surrounding plateaus, the Ottoman officials in the region merely being powerless figureheads. Their life and that of their herds were patterned on their seasonal moves. Their summer pastures were located on the plateaus surrounding Cilicia, in a semicircular, southwest-northeast area from Ereğli to Niğde, Kayseri, Gürün, and Elbistan. Their winter quarters, where they would return in late October or the beginning of November, were in the Çukurova, on the foothills of the Taurus, further east in the Gâvur Dağı and the Amanus (Amanos) mountains, and north of Antakya.

Their winter quarters on the foothills of the Taurus were a region inhabited by sedentary Armenians engaged in crafts, agriculture, viticulture, horse-breeding, and mining. Other Armenian settlements existed in the mountains to the north of the plain and in the caravan centers of the plain, like Adana and Misis, where they were mostly poor peasants and small traders. In addition to the Turkomans, four Kurdish nomadic tribes also settled for the summer around Kayseri and spent their winters near Maraş.

According to the anthropologist Wolfram Eberhard, the Turkomans’ pattern of winter settlement was profitable for both the pastoral nomads and for the Armenians:

As far as the settlers had agriculture, their fields were empty after October; therefore, they did not mind the tribes having their cattle graze on the fields and fertilize them. As far as they had arboriculture, the animals also did no harm to the trees, once they had lost their leaves. Moreover, the nomads were good customers who bought city products as well as staple food for the
winter and sold wool, butter and cheese which they had produced in the summer camp.\textsuperscript{71}

Under these circumstances, Eberhard asserts that the question of land ownership “probably was originally not relevant,”\textsuperscript{72} for, in view of the economic complementarity of the Armenians and the Turkoman tribes and of the seasonal presence of the latter, there were few causes for conflict related to landholding. These views will be discussed in the second part of this work.

The modicum of order İbrahim Pasha had maintained in Cilicia collapsed after the evacuation of the Egyptian army in 1840, following the Convention of London (July 15, 1840) signed by Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia with Şekib Efendi (the Ottoman envoy), and the British military intervention in Lebanon (September–November 1840), which resulted in Egyptian defeat.\textsuperscript{73} Nominally under Ottoman authority, Cilicia was in fact now under the control of Kurdish and Turkoman derebeys (lords of the valley) and of various nomadic tribes. The irrelevance of the Tanzimat reforms in Cilicia and the powerlessness of the pasha of Adana are best illustrated by the adventures of a German traveler who tried to visit the Armenian Catholicos of Sis (Kozan) in October 1853. The English vice-consul of Adana told him to give up his project, for Kozanoğlu, a Turkoman derebey, controlled the region between Adana and Sis, was prone to shoot travelers, and had successfully repelled an attack by the pasha in the summer.\textsuperscript{74} Mid-nineteenth-century travel accounts in Cilicia are rich in such stories.

To put an end to this state of anarchy, the sultan’s government sent a military force called the “improvement division,” or firka-i islahiyye, to pacify the region. The Ottoman state pursued a number of goals in so doing. It reasserted the power of Istanbul at a time when the Provincial Regulation of 1858 made governors the chief and sole representatives of the central government in the provinces. It avoided a possible European intervention in Cilicia after the 1862 Armeno-Turkish communal conflicts in Zeytun. Finally, it could replenish by conscription the badly depleted manpower of the Ottoman army after the Crimean War. Its immediate goals, however, were the subjugation of the derebeys and tribal chiefs, the forcible settlement of the nomads, and the inception of colonization and agricultural development.\textsuperscript{75} Started in March 1865 and led by Derviş Pasha and Cevdet Pasha, the process of “pacification” came to a successful close in 1866, notwithstanding some minor rebellions in that same year and in 1867.

Besides facilitating political centralization, the firka-i islahiyye completed the second phase of the economic development of Cilicia. It brought the lands of the Çukurova under cultivation, settled the local nomads (at least in the short run), and improved the infrastructure of Cilicia, such as the ports of Mersin and İskenderun. By promoting the cultivation of cotton, the
firka-i islahiyye laid the foundation for the flourishing economy at the turn of the century. It also began a new cycle of colonization—a process that had started under Egypt’s Ibrahim Pasha—by Muslim immigrants, designed to alter the ethnoreligious composition of the Cilician population and to improve prospects for agricultural development.

The first wave of population movement into Cilicia had taken place under Egyptian rule in the nineteenth century. In fact, Ibrahim Pasha brought so-called fellahs from Syria to develop the agriculture of Cilicia. He also transferred black Egyptians and Africans to the region, though their numbers are not known.

As a result of the Crimean War, around 20,000 Nogay Tatars were settled in the Adana eyalet, mostly along the Ceyhan River. Between 1859 and 1861, about 30,000 Circassian refugees from the Caucasus, who had fled Russia following the defeat of Sheikh Şamil’s rebellion, were strategically placed around northern and northeastern Cilicia, more precisely Zeytun, Maraş, and Hajin. The Ottoman government knew that two of those cities (Zeytun and Hajin) contained an overwhelming majority of Armenians and that the third (Maraş) had a significant Armenian population. The Ottoman state intended to use the Circassians against them. Even though the 1862 attack of the Ottoman army against the remote, quasi-autonomous Armenian town of Zeytun failed, it marked the beginning of centralization in northern Cilicia.

These first waves of immigration, especially of the Nogay Tatars and the Circassians, paved the way for subsequent movements in and after 1878. This would result in the further Turkification of Cilicia.

The Social Impact of the Firka-i Islahiyye and Landownership (mid-1860s–c. 1890)

The cessation of the American Civil War brought about a lowering of cotton prices, which resulted in the suspension of the government’s programs in 1865. Nevertheless, the 1860s marked a shift in the relations between Cilicia’s economy and that of the outside world. The impetus given to cotton production stimulated the tribal chiefs’ interest in cultivating it on the vast stretches of land they had acquired after the pacification. The tribal aristocracy transformed itself into a new class of large landowners, attuned to the needs of the world market. World demand was felt in Cilicia even more intensely at the beginning of the twentieth century, when cotton again became a most valuable crop. The ranks of the already extremely wealthy landowners of tribal origins were then joined by rich high functionaries, judges, and traders who invested their capital in the land. How did this “semi-feudal landlordism” result following the success of the Improvement Division?
There are two accounts of how the *firka-i islahiyye* changed landownership in Cilicia. The historian Andrew Gordon Gould contends that although Cevdet Pasha promised to give individual title deeds to the tribesmen, “there is no evidence in the archives of the Office of Land Registry (*Tapu ve Kadastro Umum Müdürlüğü*) [italics mine] that these land grants were officially recorded,” which would have taken place between 1871 and 1884. He doubts that many tribesmen showed interest in sedentary agricultural life in the early years of settlement and suggests that the land was in fact put up to auction, for they had no title to it.\(^83\)

It is not clear who would have bought those lands and why the government, which had planned to forcibly settle the nomadic tribes, would have allowed them to be auctioned off. At any rate, Gould indicates that minor tribal dynasties ended up benefiting most from the process of settlement, for “the exile of the *derebey*s, formation of towns and registration of land all worked together to advance families of secondary importance to the fore.”\(^84\)

Gould does not explain how these dynasties ended up owning a significant proportion of the land. On the whole, however, his conclusion fits in part with the second version of the events.

Unlike Gould’s interpretation, which relies on Ottoman archives, Wolfram Eberhard’s draws from popular tales and ballads as well as from oral history. He sets the question of landownership against the broader background of Ottoman policies aimed at co-opting the tribal leaders into the state apparatus by giving them titles “that indicated a certain position within this [Ottoman] bureaucracy, invested them with prestige and guaranteed them a certain income.”\(^85\)

According to Eberhard, the tribe as a whole received the land, but in view of most tribesmen’s reluctance to settle at once, “the leader’s family, already much more accustomed to settled life, remained on the land and began to regard this as their own private land.”\(^86\)

As unused land for pasture kept diminishing, owing to the extension of rice and cotton production, the nomadic tribesmen were slowly forced to settle by becoming tenants on the lands “owned” by their tribal chief. This process of sedentarization was completed by the subsequent settling of the big tribal landowners in the local cities, a setting more opportune for their power and status.\(^87\)

Thus, they became regional notables who, through intermarriages with other tribal landowning families, remained powerful until at least the mid-1950s. In fact, semifeudal landlordism, whereby tribal leaders, *aghas*, and beys owned the land, capital, and agricultural implements used by the peasants, was widespread in eastern and southeastern Turkey in the 1930s and even as late as the 1950s and 1960s.\(^88\)

Although Gould’s research does not support Eberhard’s version of events, his findings corroborate the latter’s conclusion that tribal leaders became large landowners and local notables. The main difference is that
while Gould stresses that land registers “dispel the notion that all the land in a village was concentrated in the hands of one tribal leader,” Eberhard, relying on oral tradition, suggests land concentration in the hands of a few.

In order to assess the validity of these two interpretations, one should set them against the backdrop of the Ottoman Land Law. To be sure, Gould’s version of the process fits with article 8 of the Land Law of 1858, which forbade the adjudication or concession of all the lands of a populated village or commune to its inhabitants as a whole or to one or two landholders, and stipulated that each inhabitant separately had to receive a title of possession (tapu) of his lands. Gould’s argument also fits with the first half of article 130, which forbade adjudication of the lands of a populated commune as a farm (çiftlik) to only one individual.

The second part of article 8, however, supports Eberhard’s thesis. It stipulates that if the population of the commune had dispersed, if its lands were to be surveyed and registered and new farmers could not be settled on them and given separate plots, thus returning the village to its “original form” (heyet-i asliyesine), then the lands of the commune could be granted as a whole to one or several persons for exploitation. Thus, if most of the tribesmen left the lands allocated to them after the forcible settlement of the 1860s, because they had little interest in sedentary agriculture; if the leaders’ families, being more aware of their value, stayed on those lands or claimed ownership to them in the name of their tribe; and if the registration of those lands occurred between 1871 and 1884; then tribal leaders, along with those tribesmen who adopted a settled life, would have received most of them.

Although the Ottoman state succeeded in bringing Cilicia under its control, by the 1870s it had failed in settling the nomads. Thus, two French scholars who visited the region in 1874 report that all the stone-built villages of the Turkomans and Kurds who had been forcibly settled in the mid-1860s were falling in ruins, for their inhabitants had reverted to their old, nomadic ways. While investigating the local situation in 1879, a British officer, Lieutenant Herbert Chermside, reported that “the immense majority of these populations—. . . mostly of Tukman [sic] origin—have resumed their nomadic habits; they have deserted their villages and abandoned agriculture, their houses they have quitted, in many cases destroying them and removing the beams for fuel or for sale. Ruined, deserted, village after village can be seen in some districts.” All those lands could thus have been claimed by the tribal leaders.

Article 78 of the Land Law also supports this interpretation of how land-ownership evolved, for it granted to whoever had possessed or cultivated some state land or land in mortmain for ten years, with or without title deed, ownership of said land. If it was vacant when occupied illegally, then the
person who settled on the land and cultivated it for ten years could still own it after payment of the tax for the title deed. Only if that person refused to pay the tax would the land be auctioned off to the highest bidder.93

Two remarks should be made about article 78 and its application. First, this article shows that the Ottoman state did its best to avoid that state lands remain vacant and to encourage their exploitation. Second, if one assumes that Ottoman law was enforced in Cilicia, it made little sense for tribal leaders who had settled on vacant lands without title deeds—and these were given only after 1871—not to pay the tax on the title deeds to own those lands.

Beyond the law, there were late Ottoman practices. From a legal point of view, Eberhard’s thesis seems more probable than that of Gould. In the Ottoman Empire, however, the Land Law was often not applied or enforced. Therefore, it is necessary to consider Ottoman practices, as they are often described in diverse consular reports pertaining to different regions. What they all show is that the way the law was enforced worked in favor of the aghas and beys.

In fact, their claims to the land were often based on bribery, local influence, recourse to “traditional right,” or simply on the possession of the title, for they were aware of how important the legality of title was, whereas the villagers “either cannot or will not understand the matter.”94 Lieutenant Chermside aptly describes the behavior of the derebeys and aghas, “especially in the mountain districts,” that is, in the region of Marash and further north:

These men claim as their own the villagers’ lands, and take from them in kind pretty much what they like as rent. If a goat wanted to be killed for guests it is taken from peasants and so on. In most cases these men being Notables are themselves the members of local Councils; redress for the peasants is impossible. The local Governor being either powerless, or, more probably, in their hands, they are far too strong for him to oppose; and if he, as he may be, is obliged by the conditions under which he obtained office to gain money by dishonest practices, even though naturally upright, their connivance is, of course, necessary to him. Their power is almost absolute; a man who opposes them will be thrown into prison on a charge of debt, or on a false charge.95

The degree of lawlessness depicted above was more typical of northeastern Cilicia than of the Çukurova around 1880. Yet, the situation in the eastern Çukurova was not good either. There are indications, for example, that “the disastrous exodus of the nomad populations from their settlements” was not merely the result of the local officials’ powerlessness. As Chermside reports, “Beys of communities have assured me that they bribed the Governors, and I am inclined to believe it.”96 If the beys’ bribes could efficiently undermine state policies in relation to the settlement of nomads, even more
so could they be potent in matters of private economic interest. For instance, the Christian Ottomans of the kaza of Payas complained in 1880 that the kaymakam of the sancak of Cebel-i Bereket and his binbaşı (commander), a former derebey named Ali Bey, were directly involved in the theft of their cattle and other valuables.97

Ottoman officials, who were not above corruption, were one of the main causes for the gap between law and its application in the late Ottoman Empire. Ironically enough, it is these officials who produced some of the archives that contemporary historians use in their research. In a thorough and detailed report, Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson, Her Majesty’s Consul-General in Anatolia, describes the situation: “The land registers are false; lands are assessed from one-fifth to one-tenth below their value in the official records, to defraud the Government; land titles are falsified, village lands are seized by local Beys and magnates, and I have visited very few villages in Anatolia in which land and boundary disputes have not been brought before me.”98 A literal interpretation of both the law and the documents produced in the process of its application may thus result in historical fiction.

Last but not least, the evidence available for the twentieth century supports Eberhard’s view. It shows that a small number of big landowners owned a significant portion of the agricultural lands in the Çukurova. By way of comparison, his thesis is somewhat parallel to the manner in which the Land Law was applied in Lower Iraq; Gould’s is closer to its application in the region of Konya, where the registration of tribal settlements and the distribution of title deeds took place in a more equal fashion, mostly between 1871 and 1884.99

The Economic Impact of the Firka-i Islahiyye and Cilicia’s Closer Economic Ties with Europe

From the 1860s on, Cilicia’s ties with the European economy became tighter. The strengthening of central power in Cilicia and government action to promote its agricultural development paved the way for its growing participation in international trade, which in turn led to an increase in agricultural production.

The agricultural boom in the western part of the Lower Çukurova made it into a magnet for immigration from the other provinces. This led to the region’s urban development.100 Besides the population of its cities in general, that of the Adana sancak as a whole jumped from 75,500 to 174,602 between 1868 and 1890, that is, a 131 percent increase.101 Most of the immigrants were Ottoman refugees from the Balkans who had fled the Russian advance in 1877 and the beginning of 1878 and Ottoman Armenians
and Greeks from central Anatolia. All of these groups were interested in making economic gains by cultivating the land and expanding their area of cultivation. In the eastern part of the Çukurova, however, the lands on which tribal groups were forcibly settled were poorer and the settlers less interested in and knowledgeable about agricultural production. The high level of mortality among the tribal settlers from malaria, other diseases, and perhaps the trauma and difficulties of sedentary life also explains the slower growth or stagnation of the population in the eastern Çukurova. On the whole, the number of villages in the Adana sancak grew by 84 percent between 1868 and 1890, but increased by only 13 percent in the Cebeli Bereket sancak in the eastern section of the Çukurova.

Change in the Division of Ethnoreligious Economic Niches and Some of the Origins of Ethnic Conflict

From the 1870s onward the Armenians began to acquire large landholdings. By 1875–76, many Armenians and Greeks were already “rich landed proprietors” around Adana. Their lands likely belonged to Muslim Ottomans who became unable to pay their taxes and all their arrears. Seized by the state, such lands were sold to the highest bidder, usually a native Christian. Another reason for the transfer of property to Christians was the inability of their former Muslim proprietors to repay a debt to a Christian moneylender. From the late 1870s onward, this process resulted in foreclosure. Armenians and Greeks continued to acquire land into the 1880s. By 1891, they were introducing new methods and machines in commercial agriculture, to which their landholdings were devoted: “Despite drawbacks of climate, improvement and progress in agriculture are everywhere apparent, chiefly induced by the native Christian (chiefly Armenian) and foreign Greek elements, which are largely engaged in agricultural enterprise, and are slowly, but surely, ousting the apathetic Moslem element.” Beyond “apathy,” a factor difficult to appreciate, the long conscription of Muslim youth away from home—the Christian Ottomans were not conscripted then—must have been conducive to this situation. Around Mersin, Adana, and Tarsus, this transfer of land benefited urban moneylenders and merchants.

Economic factors contributed significantly to the Adana massacres of 1909. An eyewitness to the killings—he later played a leading role in Cilicia during the Turkish War of Independence and became the deputy of Adana to the first Grand National Assembly under Kemal Atatürk—gives full vent to the Turkish bitterness about the growing wealth of the Armenians and their steady migration to Cilicia. He provides some insights into the perceptions and motivations of the Turkish masses.
The Armenians were the richest and most prosperous, well-to-do class in the region \([\textit{memleket}]\). In the city of \([\textit{Adana}]\) and towns, there were few craftsmen and artisans among the Turks. The Armenians had reached a high level of life. . . . In every field, they were ahead of the Turks.\(^{110}\)

Massive popular participation in the massacres was prompted not only by the opportunity of looting, but also by the opposition of the Turkish populace to the new technology (tractors, reaping-machines, steam-powered threshers, etc.) that Armenian landholders were introducing from abroad, as evidenced by many cases of Luddism.\(^{111}\) So great was the Muslim resentment at Armenian large-scale immigration to Cilicia and consequent land purchases that a Turkish historian considers these two phenomena to be the main causes of the Adana massacres of April 1909.\(^{112}\) A traveler, whose prejudice toward Jews and Armenians is noticeable, reports that Armenians wanted to create a kingdom in Cilicia, an idea commonly held by Muslims at the time.\(^{113}\) While exposing the “unconceivable unwisdom [sic] which Armenians so often display in their larger dealings with Moslems,” he claims that “the name of the future king was bandied about, no aloof nebulous personage, but, it is said, a well-known Armenian landowner of the Cilician plain, held in particular disfavor by Moslems.” That the imagined king of the imagined Armenian kingdom of Cilicia was a much disliked landowner is telling, for his socioeconomic background was an ideal target for the hatred of the Turkish masses.\(^{114}\)

There were several reasons why Christians were able to acquire and invest in land starting from the second half of the 1870s. First, the various credit-giving institutions the government had created failed to relieve the Ottoman peasants of their chronic indebtedness. The provincial credit banks (\([\textit{memleket sandıkları}]\) established in 1863, the public benefits banks (\([\textit{menafi sandıkları}]\) founded in 1883, or the Agricultural Bank (\([\textit{Ziraat Bankası}]\)) created in 1888, all partook in inefficiency, corruption, and blatant lending bias in favor of big landowners. While the Agricultural Bank fared better than the older institutions, its funds were inadequate for the task at hand and were often used by the government and the sultan for expenses unrelated to agriculture. The poorer cultivators, who needed loans the most, shunned the bank, for they disliked its lengthy paperwork, preferred the faster and more informal services of the moneylenders, and were reluctant to use their property as collateral. Landless sharecroppers and wage laborers, having little else to offer as security but their labor, simply could not use the Agricultural Bank.\(^{115}\)

The second reason that allowed Christians to acquire land was a legal one. In the past, Islamic law and article 115 of the Land Law of 1858 had prevented lenders from seizing mortgaged lands owned by the state but distributed to the debtor (\([\textit{arazi-i mîrîye}]\) or lands the debtor held in mortmain
(arazi-i mevkufe). Articles 116 and 117 also restricted the possibility of transferring mortgaged lands to a creditor as a result of an unpaid debt. A law promulgated in 1871, however, modified the Land Law and allowed the creditor to ask legal authorities to put up for auction as much of the above-mentioned lands as well as the vakıfs müsakaffat and müstaggallât of the debtor as was needed to pay off his debts. Various legal provisions restricted arbitrary behavior on the part of the creditors. For instance, if the debtor showed that income from his real estate could pay off his debt within three years, that income was ceded to the creditor and the properties not put up for auction. That law had been preceded by two others in 1869 and 1871 allowing the sale of these types of properties after a debtor’s death. The 1871 law explains partly why land transfer to the Christians seems to have occurred mostly from the mid-1870s on. Prior to that time, the real estate of the debtors was not put up for auction, except for privately held lands, or mülk. Two factors may explain the lag between the date of the promulgation of the law and the transfers of property. First, the law provided that the debtor should be given an opportunity to repay his debt with income derived from his real estate within a period of three years, if he so wished or could. Second, it took time to enforce legal changes in the Ottoman Empire.

The underlying reason for the transfer of real estate to non-Muslims was article 14 of the Hatt-ı Hümayun (Imperial Rescript) promulgated on February 18, 1856. In it, Sultan Abdülmecid stipulated that “as the laws regulating the purchase, sale, and disposal of immovable properties are common to all the subjects of My empire, foreigners will be allowed to own landed properties in My States.” This stipulation was conditional on foreigners’ respect for Ottoman laws, payment of dues similar to those of the indigenous population, as well as on subsequent arrangements with foreign powers. It followed that non-Muslims were given the right to acquire all kinds of Muslim-owned lands, including freehold property (mülk) or those held by a pious foundation. As landownership had a political and religious significance in the eyes of the Muslim Ottomans, they opposed the sale to non-Muslims of what they viewed as Muslim lands. Ottoman officials did their best to undermine (under various legal, religious, and customary pretexts) the changes that article 14 ushered in. A fairly knowledgeable traveler reported that non-Muslims were usually tilling the worst fields in the worst locations, so that he could recognize at a distance whether a village was inhabited by Christians or Muslims.

It took more than two decades for article 14 to be partially enforced in some areas of the empire. In 1860, a British consul reported that “fear . . . of unfair treatment deters . . . [Christians] from becoming landholders.” The European Powers expatiated in the second half of the 1860s on the failure of the Ottoman officials to put into practice the right of the non-Muslims to
buy cultivable lands and urban real estate. Equality before the law, another promise of the *Hatt-ı Hümayun*, was a mere abstraction.\(^{125}\) Since article 14 of the Imperial Rescript had mostly remained a dead letter, a new law was passed in 1876, reasserting the right of non-Muslim Ottomans to buy farms and cultivable lands belonging to the state or to *vakıfs* even when an “old usage” had prevented them from doing so.\(^{126}\) Discrepancy between the law and reality was a common feature of the late Ottoman empire. Commenting on the Land Law of 1858, a former French consul, high official of the Imperial Ottoman Bank, and authority on Ottoman land legislation wrote: “As in the case of the great majority of Turkish laws, the regulations in regard to land tenure are prepared intelligently but frequently are not respected in their execution.”\(^{127}\)

**CONCLUSION**

Agrarian relations played a central role in the emergence of the Armenian Question and in interethnic relations. They were shaped by extralegal factors such as land usurpation, illegal taxation, and violence; by legal changes (the Land Law and its partial implementation); and by political transformations. The relatively stable early nineteenth-century order prevailing in eastern Anatolia under Kurdish rule and in Cilicia under Egyptian rule was replaced by anarchy and interethnic competition resulting from the modernizing projects of the *Tanzimat*, of Sultan Abdülhamid II, and of the Young Turks. These aimed at greater administrative centralization, the sedentarization of nomadic populations, the resettlement of Muslim refugees, and more effective Ottoman state intervention.

The causes of interethnic tension varied from region to region. In eastern Anatolia, Muslim power, weak centralization until the 1870s, and the prevalence of nomadic, seminomadic, and settled Kurdish tribalism allowed usurpation of Armenian lands and growing tensions among the various nationalities. In Cilicia, Armenian economic success, which resulted from the development of cotton production under Egyptian rule and the subsequent integration of that region in the world economy, from their predominance in the crafts and trade, and from the delayed application of the land laws, led to resentment. Both patterns fueled the hatred that made riots, massacres, and genocide possible.

In the final analysis, the role of state power must be emphasized, for the state initiated and administered the sedentarization programs and refugee resettlement policies that are essential to our understanding of agrarian relations and interethnic conflict. The Ottoman State determined the geographic patterns of refugee resettlement and of land allocation, and it alone
had the ability to manipulate interethnic relations, which in turn had consequences for landholding and land usurpation.\textsuperscript{128} From the 1870s onward, the role of the state became even more significant as Sultan Abdülhamid II encouraged anti-Armenian exactions and the Young Turks condoned them and refused to correct the injustices of the sultan’s reign. To be sure, the state and its Land Law were not the only agents shaping land allocation and landholding patterns. State and “society”—provincial administrators, notables, and tribal leaders—“negotiated” both allocation and landholding. However, extralegal processes—land usurpation and what looks like fraudulent land registration—as well as power relations were often central to the negotiation.

The case of Cilicia after the Constitutional Revolution of 1908 suggests that “modernization” in the Ottoman context contributed to bringing ethnicity and interethnic competition into prominence. Indeed, modernization has been marked by the breakdown of social stratification based on birth, occupation, or religion; by theoretical, and sometimes effective, equality among the members of a given population; by the development of some form of participatory politics (at the municipal, regional, or national levels); and by large-scale commercialization of agrarian economies and the rise of protoindustrial and then industrial activities. It is worth noting that “globalization,” which includes the spread of some form of free market economy and of democracy among the less developed countries, has also led to an accentuation of ethnic identities and a proliferation of ethnic antagonism in the late twentieth century.\textsuperscript{129}

In order to give a voice to the land, in this case to eastern Anatolia, the power differential between ethnic groups and between the state and those groups should be integrated into the narrative of late Ottoman history. Power is a crucial factor, for property—in this case land—is not merely a thing, but a right. As the philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau and others have argued, “property is power and so is at the heart of the political question.”\textsuperscript{130} Armenians had been deprived of that right in the eastern provinces and their accession to that right generated resentment in Cilicia. To quote a Turkish scholar: “it is no exaggeration to say that while Armenian deportation and massacres resolved the so-called Armenian Question for the central government, it did the same with the agrarian question in favour of the usurpers.”\textsuperscript{131}
What Was Revolutionary about Armenian Revolutionary Parties in the Ottoman Empire?

Gerard J. Libaridian

Armenian political parties were founded at the end of the nineteenth century for the purpose of giving a new direction to their Armenian constituents. They spoke, negotiated, and made decisions on behalf of the Armenians; and they sought to dominate the Armenians’ cultural and religious institutions while transforming their collective identity. Alternately called “nationalist” and “secessionist,” these parties were considered separately from the political order of the Ottoman Empire, as though they were alien to the state’s body politic. Often overlooked is the fact that these parties were active players in Ottoman political life, so active, in fact, that by 1908 they were widely considered as having replaced the church as the main intermediary between the Ottoman authorities and their Armenian subjects. They worked with Young Turk and other Ottoman organizations, took part in Ottoman elections following the Young Turk Revolution in alliances with other Ottomans, held seats in parliament, and deliberated on matters relevant to the whole empire.

Even less recognized is the fact that participation of Armenian political parties in Ottoman politics arose from their ideological underpinnings and programs, even though they have been seen, by and large, as “nationalist” and antistate. The shadow cast by the genocide is so vast that it obscures to this day our sense of the choices that were available to the leaders of the Ottoman state, and, to a lesser extent, to the Armenian parties, prior to that event. The Ottoman leaders had the option to work with Armenian and other groups to solve the problems of the Ottoman Empire and, in the end, they decided not to. The Armenian parties could have acted strictly on an antistate platform or, as the church did, not act at all. Instead they strove toward conditional cooperation.
Official Turkish historiography portrays these parties as independence-seeking terrorists, as if the pursuit of independence were blameworthy in and of itself. This depiction is cited as the reason why “Armenians” represented a threat to the Ottoman state and to Turks in general, and, by implication, were deserving of massacres, or worse. Turkish condemnation of Armenian political parties is based solely on the rhetoric of the writer rather than on the words and deeds of those being judged. The problem, simply phrased, is that historians and others who have tried to tell the story of Turkish/Armenian relations toward the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have been unable to imagine a common history, one that accounts for the complexities each found in its situation and the areas where common thought and action evolved. Scholars must apply a more integrated approach if the critical period of Turkish/Armenian relations leading to the First World War and the genocide are to be accurately reconstructed. Unless we understand and assess adequately the “lines of contact” between the two political forces—Turkish and Armenian—in the waning decades of the Ottoman Empire, we will continue the sad situation of writing two separate histories: one of the “Armenians,” and the other of “Turks,” a situation that perpetuates the polemical views of the past that have dominated the literature on the subject.

This chapter does not aim to present a history of the revolutionary parties; nor is it a history of their relations with the Ottoman state. Rather, it is an attempt at delineating boundaries of political imagination developed by Armenian revolutionary organizations at their inception, boundaries created and crossed by ideology and praxis.

“ARMENIANS” AND “TURKS”

In the context of late Ottoman society, the terms “Armenian” and “Turk” are inadequate, denoting ethnic categories in their most inert, essentialist sense. “Turks” and “Armenians” are individuals and groups whose actions cannot be explained strictly by their ethnic identity. Various groups of “Turks” and “Armenians” adopted different, and at times opposing policies at different times and under different circumstances. Being Turkish or Armenian cannot be equated with having predetermined, self-evident, and immutable political agendas. Similarly, terms such as “nationalism” and “revolutionary” are problematic when substituted for precision.

To understand the evolution and character of Turkish-Armenian relations within the Ottoman Empire, it is necessary to make another clarification. Armenians are commonly referred to as a “minority,” but what does that really mean? The term first came to be used after the World War I to
describe ethnic or religious groups in emerging nation-states. Empires did not have minorities; they had peoples who had been conquered. Such terminology ascribes a large degree of inevitability to the ultimate domination of an undefined “majority” and takes for granted that right to majority’s supremacy. This ahistorical approach is useful if the historian wishes to reduce Armenians to a mere ethnic or religious group, easily categorized as a victim (or a threat). For more sophisticated analysis, however, the term “minority” introduces confusion and places limitations on the contexts within which Turkish-Armenian relations can be understood. Furthermore, it is not clear in what geographic context Armenians can be described as a minority. Armenians certainly did not consider themselves a minority within historic Western Armenia, even if numerically they did not constitute a majority. (In fact, no ethnic group constituted a majority at that time.) When a people live on their historic lands, they may be feel privileged or oppressed, conquered or dominant, but not a “minority” in the sense of the post–World War I nation-states.

Of the various terms chosen to describe the Armenian political parties under discussion, “revolutionary” is one that the parties themselves used. One question we should ask, then, is: What was revolutionary about these parties? This in turn leads to others: What problem or problems did they try to resolve? And if they constituted a threat, whom or what were they threatening? What, in fact, was the character of the conflict with which historians and others struggle?

The parties in question are the Social Democratic Hnchak Party (established in 1887, Geneva) and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation or Dashnaktsutiun (1890, Tbilisi).1 These are the parties most closely identified with developments in the Ottoman Empire and most commonly discussed by scholars who study Turkish-Armenian relations prior to the First World War. The question concerning the “revolutionary” nature of these parties is critical for our understanding of their ideologies, strategies, and actions. Within such a context we can also analyze their attempt to reshape the perceptions of Armenians both by others and themselves, as well as their self-conscious distancing from institutions that had previously spoken on behalf of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. These differences between the political parties and these institutions characterized both what was most promising and most risky in the former’s undertakings.

The establishment of these parties was part of an effort to turn Armenians into more active participants in their own history and the history of the Ottoman Empire. The founders’ idea was to transform Armenians from objects of history into participants, which required no less than the transformation of the Ottoman Empire itself. In trying to achieve this goal, these parties also assumed responsibility for their choices, decisions that must be
assessed in the larger context of Ottoman state priorities and the Great Powers’ intervention in Ottoman affairs. The first program released by the Hnchak Party stated: “The situation of the Turkish Armenian people is today the sickest. And it is the responsibility of the whole of the Armenian people to cure that disease today.” The lead article of the second issue of Droshak, the Dashnaksutium organ, begins with the following assertion:

Any political party undertaking a struggle for an ideal can hope to achieve success or failure [sic] only when the following two conditions are present:

1. When the people, on whose behalf the struggle is being waged, understands that that struggle is necessary and participates in that struggle directly or indirectly, at least through its best representatives.
2. If the means and methods selected to wage that struggle correspond fully to the present realities and the demands of circumstances of the historical moment.

The second point was an indirect criticism of the Hnchaks. As I will show, even the revolutionaries did not agree among themselves.

REVOLUTIONS AND REVOLUTIONARIES

Many sources cast the term “revolution” in a negative light, suggesting potential for violence and recklessness, as opposed to a quest for change. Additionally, since a “revolution” challenges the concept of state, it is, by definition, contemptible to those who place the interests of the state above all. This view still prevails in current debates concerning the Ottoman Empire and its relations to its Armenian population; the Young Turk and Kemalist revolutions are considered acceptable, because they saved the state; the “Armenian” revolution is not. I pose the question about the “revolutionary” nature of these parties in a somewhat neutral sense: more precisely, I am concerned with what was radically new in the ideas, ideologies, goals, and behaviors of the parties in question; what made the founders of these parties use the term “revolutionary” to describe themselves; and how the closely related question of the “loyalty” of Armenians can be assessed within this perspective.

The Party System

The first, and possibly most revolutionary innovation introduced by the Hnchak and Dashnaksutium parties was the establishment of a political
party structure in Armenian life, that is, their attempt to redefine the Armenian population as a political rather than a religious community. The Armenian Apostolic Church had dominated the political scene for centuries, owing its primacy to the disappearance of Armenian statehood and the “feudal” system that had defined political life in Armenia’s early history. The church was assigned the role of speaking on behalf of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire due to the millet system established by the Ottoman sultans, a religion-based system that regulated the communal life of non-Muslim communities such as Christians. In doing so, the Ottoman state was also able to limit the areas in which Armenians had any kind of self-governance or voice, while providing for extraterritorial self-government in many civil matters.

Smaller political groups had formed earlier, the Armenakans (1985) being the most prominent among them, and they can be partly credited with introducing the idea of parties as an alternative mechanism for the Armenians’ expression of grievances in the Ottoman Empire. Yet none had been able to develop the political scope and momentum to become nationwide parties that could supplant the church as the Armenian mouthpiece.

Despite the formally high position in which the church and its leader, the patriarch, were held in the eyes of Ottoman administrators, it became increasingly evident that their power was limited and, depending on the grievance, also useless. When the millet leadership, once democratized in the 1860s, attempted to reach beyond the confines of church-related affairs (clergy, churches and monasteries, properties, civil affairs, and to some extent education) to deal with social and economic problems plaguing the poor Armenian population in the provinces, the Porte made it clear that such concerns were not within the mandate of the patriarchate or the structures in its control. Archbishop Khrimian, the hero of the common people, resigned in frustration in 1873, accusing the government and the leaders of the Armenian community in Istanbul of blocking every effort at putting the plight of the provincial Armenians at the center of the National Assembly’s agenda. Later, in 1878, when he returned from Berlin disappointed with the results of the Treaty of Berlin, Khrimian gave a number of sermons in Istanbul and the provinces. He explained that the reason why Armenians had lost ground in the treaty was that the weapon they were using to bring about change was made of paper, and that to take a share of the “soup” being offered in Berlin an “iron ladle” was needed.

It is true that for decades a new intellectual class, in both the Ottoman and Russian sectors of the Armenian people, had challenged the status quo, from the battle against classical Armenian in favor of the vernacular, to the spread of general education, and their disputing the preeminent role of the clergy. Yet, at least in the Ottoman Empire, this was not enough to challenge
the church-led millet structure, nor did it call into question the role of the church as the representative of the Armenian people. The rise of the “revolutionary” parties was a confirmation of the failure of the church structure—within the patriarchate and National Assembly in Istanbul—and of the inability of reformist and liberal intellectuals to adequately address issues which they were not equipped to deal with. In fact, the Ottoman sultans never intended the church to perform a political function within the state, serving instead the interests of the state by depoliticizing the Armenians.\(^5\)

During their early years the parties functioned without any formal contact with the church. One exception was the “Kum Kapu” antisultan demonstration in Istanbul in 1890, organized by the nascent *Hnchak* party, which started with a challenge to the leader of the millet and the church. Armed leaders of the local *Hnchak* organization rushed into the cathedral where Patriarch Ashekian was officiating. They stopped mass, read their demands on behalf of the poor and oppressed, and demanded that the patriarch join the demonstration. When Ashekian refused, he was forced (some say beaten) to get into his carriage and lead the demonstration until government forces intervened. Alerted by a priest, they surrounded the demonstrators, released the patriarch, and jailed the leaders. Ashekian denounced the actions of the demonstrators and apologized for them. Four years later he would be the target of an assassination attempt.\(^6\)

Within the new community redefined by the parties, differences between Apostolic, Catholic, and Protestant Armenians, for example, became irrelevant, relegated to the realm of personal belief. The parties imposed, at least conceptually, a new distinction: between those who adopted a larger vision for the future and were ready to contribute actively to achieving it, and those who accepted the status quo. The parties consolidated the secular/ethnic understanding of the “Armenian,” battling against a definition based on religion. Focusing on the plight of the peasants and craftsmen in historic Western Armenia, they also reterritorialized the concept.\(^7\) The revolutionary shift brought about by these parties was first and foremost within the Armenian world. The radical intelligentsia and guerrilla leaders replaced the church-based and, to a large extent, wealth-based leadership. Thus the rise of the revolutionary parties signaled nothing less than a change of “government” within the Armenian populations of the Ottoman, but also Russian and Persian empires.

**Empowerment Of The Weak Through The Positive Laws Of History**

The *Hnchak* and *Dashnaksutiun* parties were founded by Russian-Armenian radical intellectuals who modeled their organizations after Russian secret associations. They also borrowed elements from the Balkan peoples’
struggles for independence. Both recruited adherents among Ottoman Armenians, segments of which seemed ready to find new expressions of resistance, having concluded that armed rebellion against Ottoman oppression was the only option. Paradoxically, the new leaders were self-appointed; there was no other way, it seems, to establish political parties dedicated to the liberation of Ottoman Armenians. Their perspectives combined reliance on the “inexorable” forces of history with the actions of individuals. They had the march of history on their side, they argued, and were convinced that history would prove them right; their claim to legitimacy was the ostensible scientific basis of their ideology. Yet legitimacy on the ground was to be secured through the self-sacrifice of the fighters who would emerge. The “Armenian Question,” with its universal, national, and individual dimensions, was a struggle that was part of the larger struggle for human progress; and, Armenian political aims were seen as integral to the laws and values of progressive humanity as defined by the Western Enlightenment and the French Revolution. This legitimacy had to be earned, rather than inherited, or else transferred from success in other fields.

Party “programs” articulated this new universalism, offering a wholesome and coherent worldview, and claiming a rational alternative to inherited wisdom. A scientific approach to history and its future displaced tradition and reflex as the principles of political discourse. This universalism, linked to the liberation of people with common problems, would eventually open the path for a variety of strategic choices.

The founders of both the Hnchak and the Dashnaksutiun parties framed the “Armenian Question” as part of a universal struggle based on the laws of history. The Hnchaks, who professed to be closer to the mainstream Marxist views of the time described their “Long Term Goal” thus:

The current social organization of humanity relies on injustice, on the power of the fist, and on slavery. Based on economic slavery, that organization produced in mankind strong fists, strong rulers, who exploit the majority of humankind—the working world—and thus create the injustice of inequality within the relations of mankind. That inequality is expressed in every dimension of human life: economic, political, social as well as material . . . This complex and unjust state of affairs can be reformed only through the socialist organization [of society] by the respect for [the principle] of direct legislation by the people and [through that means] giving every member of society to participate factually in all decisions of public relevance . . .

The Hnchak group, being socialists in their fundamental beliefs, accepts the socialist organization of society as its ideal, its ULTIMATE GOAL [capitalized in the original] as it applies to the Armenian people and its fatherland.8

The Dashnaksutiun, too, saw the Armenian plight in the context of human experience:
Since the time when mankind set foot on the path to civilization, since the time when it started to have its history, there have been at all times and in all places rulers and subjects, exploiters and the exploited, those who cause suffering and the sufferers . . . That is how it was in the past, that is how it is today, but that is not how it will be tomorrow, we are convinced of that. We can see very clearly how the ruling classes are falling more and more physically and morally, how labor is increasingly achieving its rights, how the exploited is moving with giant steps toward its complete victory . . .

But how can that future be achieved?

There was a time when the reformers of mankind appeared with this or that ideology, with their “credo,” to cure all mankind’s ills, to eliminate all inequalities and to establish brotherhood, liberty and equality . . . Many centuries passed, one ideology replaced the other, many reformers were martyred; yet, nonetheless, we can see that a segment of humanity refuses to be convinced [of the need for change]—the segment that must be convinced since it holds the key to injustice—since it is not in its interest to do so. Try to convince the English lord that he has no right to exploit the Irish, try to convince the highly educated factory owner that he is unjustly pocketing the labor of the worker, try to convince our beys and aghas that they should leave peasants alone, try to convince, finally the Kurd that he had no moral right to expropriate the home and the family of the man of Alashkert.⁹

The Dashnaktsutiun program analyzed the social and economic conditions in the Ottoman Empire and then listed the grievances specific to Armenians and peasants, and those relevant to all subjects of the Ottoman Empire that had to be addressed. These conditions, argued the authors of the program, could not be removed by goodwill and good intentions or utopian ideologies; change could only come through armed revolution.

The Dashnaktsutiun had tried in an early stage to include the Hnchak Party in a federation of revolutionary and oppositional groups. That attempt failed, probably because of the Dashnaktsutiun leaders’ suspicion of the wholly ideologized view of the world adopted by the Hnchaks. The Dashnaktsutiun’s first formal program, formulated over a two-year period, and published in 1892, stated:

The sad and cruel lessons of history have demonstrated clearly that to achieve victory it is not sufficient for the suffering segments of humanity to understand its own condition, or even to develop the willingness to see it changed; that it is necessary to obtain real power. But since that power cannot be created overnight, and since that power is the consequence of existing conditions and changes accordingly, it is obvious that any form of social organization, however ideal, cannot be instituted at once, and that such an institution becomes possible only through the reform of existing conditions.
On the Eve of Catastrophe

It is for this reason that we do not come forth as proponents of this or that Utopian ideology; it is our purpose that our program be basic. Our attention is focused on the present condition of our land. Our goal is to subject . . . to an objective critique the causes that have given rise to the present condition . . . to identify the causes of that condition based on the positive laws of the social sciences; and at the same time to wage a relentless struggle against the factors that have conditioned these causes.\textsuperscript{10}

The Dashnaktsutiun program constituted, in part, a direct critique of the Hnchak approach. Obviously, the two parties had major differences, even though they both relied on positivist and universal laws governing the development of human history, at least in their respective understanding of the Armenian condition. Initially evident in their conflict on the ideological level, such differences had immediate consequences for their practical goals.

The main goal of the Dashnaktsutiun was reform in Ottoman Armenia. In fact, the first issue of Droshak published the reform plan for this region developed by Patriarch Nerses Varjabedian in connection with the treaties of San Stefano and Berlin in 1878. The plan called for autonomy for the region, an Armenian governor-general appointed by the sultan in consultation with the Great Powers, equal participation of Armenian and Muslim populations in administrative and legislative bodies, and measures to improve the conditions of all. The explicit endorsement of the patriarchal plan created a problem for the new party, however: If the Varjabedian plan was acceptable, then what reason was there to create a new revolutionary party? In an editorial note, the second issue Droshak clarified:

In the previous issue of Droshak we had written that our current demands are approximately the same as those formulated in the plan presented by Nerses Patriarch. Because these words have given cause to misunderstandings, we deem it important to state, that when writing that we had in mind a circumstance when the Sultan, through his own goodwill, would introduce the reforms in Turkish Armenia proposed by Nerses Patriarch, which is very unlikely. By his behavior, the Sultan is convincing everyone that there is no salvation for Turkish Armenia but through revolt.\textsuperscript{11}

The Hrchaks, who had set socialism as their ultimate aim, needed to bridge the “present conditions” and a full-out socialist regime. The problem was solved when the party’s founders introduced the intermediate step of independence for Turkish Armenia. The Ottoman system was so backward and decrepit, they argued, that it was impossible to hope for a direct leap into socialism. Independence became the “immediate goal” of the party. In practice, however, the party wavered. In an introductory note to the Hrchak program, the founders explained that their program was tentative, and that it would be possible that various elements would be revised over time.\textsuperscript{12} The
objective of Turkish-Armenian independence was finally abandoned after the sixth [congress], the *Hnchak* Congress of 1909, following the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 and the establishment of a parliamentary system in the Ottoman Empire. In the public statement relating the decisions of the Congress in Istanbul, the *Hnchaks* wrote:

The Congress, in view of all the above factors and in support of class struggle, in accordance with the principles of social democracy, emphasizes one more time the necessity of the actualization of the harmony of nations, recognizing as a condition the necessity of the right of historical-individual existence of nations, rejecting on one hand the idea of secession (separatism), and, on the other, the supremacy and domination of one nation over the other.\(^{13}\)

For both parties the question of independence was a complicated one. The *Hnchaks* considered independence to be a necessary tactical step, but following the Young Turk Revolution—which they interpreted as the necessary “bourgeois” transformation of Ottoman society—they decided that socialism was in fact possible in the Ottoman Empire as it stood. For the *Dashnaktsutiun*, the goal was a more modest, if less clearly defined, “freedom.” This meant liberation from the oppressive political system and an end to Ottoman policies that led to the disintegration of the Ottoman Armenian economic base. Their agenda clearly stopped short of requesting the establishment of an independent state, focusing instead on reform.

In July of 1904 a major confrontation erupted between Armenian guerrilla fighters and the Ottoman army in Sassun, west of Lake Van. Two of the leaders of the “Sassun rebellion” sent a letter to the foreign consuls who were interested in the demands of the revolutionaries. The lengthy letter was signed by the then-well-known *Dashnak* guerrilla leaders Andranik and Serop, and states:

Our enemies cry out: “Armenians seek no reform, they demand sovereignty and independence!” To this we solemnly declare that the agitation and efforts of the Armenian revolutionists have never aimed at, and do not now aim at any interference with the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, or at any form of political separation. Armenians claim no sovereignty over the races living with them; they simply claim such administrative reforms as will protect their persons and property from the attacks of the local authorities, from Turks and from Kurds.\(^ {14}\)

Independence would not become an official issue for the *Dashnaktsutiun* until 1919, when an independent Armenia had already been established in the Russian segment of historic Armenia.

Although both parties shared the vision of a European-style democracy in the future autonomous or independent Armenia, their differences far outweighed their similarities. Disagreement devolved into an antagonism that
lasted for many decades, through the years of armed struggle, the constitutional period following the Young Turks’ Revolution, the genocide, the establishment of independent, then Soviet Armenia, in Eastern Armenia ruled by Russia, and in the Diaspora.

The ideological difference between the two parties was summed up by Kristapor Mikayelian, one of the founders of the Dashnaktsutiun, during a debate in 1903:

You are speaking of the surplus labor that the bourgeoisie exploits to its benefit; but we are dealing with surplus blood which is being shed everyday because of the Turkish government.\(^{15}\)

The Hnchaks remained the dominant party among Armenians until the massacres of 1894–1896, when hopes for autonomy evaporated. A fierce debate within the Hnchak Party regarding the causes of the massacres and the role of socialism led to a schism. Many Western Armenian Hnchaks left the Social Democratic Hnchak Party to establish the “Veragazmial” or “reconstituted” Hnchak Party. They regarded socialism as a distraction that may have antagonized the sultan and the Great Powers more than necessary.

The Dashnaktsutiun, too, had to make adjustments in its party strategy following the wave of massacres. But the more practical ideological perspective it had adopted made it possible to focus more on adjustments: the new strategy included a wider organizational basis and better preparation; exploring more seriously cooperation with Kurdish tribes and groups, an active search for allies among Muslim, including Turkish liberal groups; a European campaign more geared toward intellectuals and the public and not limited to government leaders, and so forth. These adjustments introduced following the massacres allowed the Dashnaktsutiun to emerge from the crisis as the dominant Armenian party; the Hnchaks never fully recovered from the shock of the massacres and the split that followed.

The antagonism between the parties continued, despite appeals from both parties to work together for the common cause. The Hnchaks criticized the Dashnaktsutiun for being opportunistic and for exaggerated claims of success and influence, all aimed at securing financial resources. The Hnchaks, true to their professed Marxist position, were also miffed by the insensitivity of the Dashnaktsutiun toward ideological purity. In their 1910 congress, they berated the Dashnaktsutiun for their meddling in the affairs of the patriarchate, and their attempts to control it by electing a “political” patriarch: They argued that the church has a religious character that must be respected; that religion is a matter of conscience; and that the church belongs to the faithful and as a socialist party the Hnchaks would not want to disturb the peace of the community of the faithful.\(^{16}\)
The Dashnaktsutiun, in turn, had long ago found the Achilles heel of the Hnchaks. A lead article in the main organ of the party, written by one of the founders of the Dashnaktsutiun Rostom (Stepan Zoryan), conveys the character of the acrimonious relations:

The Hnchak group appeared on the arena as a socialist revolutionary [group]. From the start it stated that it will not be satisfied with a democratic national independence; rather, its goal is socialism. But what was this socialism and how it could be actualized it was impossible to form a clear opinion from the articles in Hnchak [the Hnchak organ], because the editorial group of the Hnchak itself had no specific idea and still does not today.

A chaos, a cacophony of ideas and the total absence of specificities: this is what one can see in the views expressed by the Hnchak.¹⁷

Rostom continued his critique of the Hnchaks, accusing them of not having learned from the seven years of their experiment with the future of Armenians. Rostom was the most “Marxist” of the three founders of the Dashnaktsutiun.

The differences between the parties became more marked after the Young Turk Revolution. The Dashnaktsutiun embraced the change, while the Hnchaks displayed more caution. The latter considered the Young Turk Revolution a “truncated” one, which is how they had described the Midhatian reforms of the 1870s. The Hnchaks had spurned earlier advances from the Young Turks in Paris, considering them too nationalistic.¹⁸ The Dashnaktsutiun continued its policy of cooperation with the Young Turk movement by aligning with the İttihad ve Terakki or Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) Party and trying to work through it to achieve its own goals. That cooperation lasted until 1915.

In view of the events that were to follow, these differences appear fundamental. Should Armenians have concluded soon after the euphoria produced by the Young Turk had dissipated that there was no hope from the Ottoman government for reforms of any kind? Should Armenians have expected the worst and returned to the idea of a defensive war, prepared for an all-out defense, as the Hnchak advocated, instead of trying to find a compromise with the ruling İttihad ve Terakki, the Turkish party in power? To what extent the differences between the two parties were ideologically inspired and to what extent they reflected practical/political considerations is a question yet to be studied.

This antagonism, essential to the Armenian history, and disregarded by most scholars, reached its climax with the Sovietization of Armenia. The First Republic of Armenia, where the Hnchaks had little influence, was established in 1918 under the Dashnaktsutiun leadership. When the republic was Sovietized at the end of 1920, the Dashnaktsutiun became a party in
exile. The *Hnchaks*, true to their original beliefs, endorsed it as the realization of their goal, a socialist Armenia.

The Nation As Class, with a Focus on the Peasantry

The new political parties introduced the concept of class struggle to the discourse about the Armenian situation, having each adopted a form of socialism as the basis of their scientific approach to history and politics. Until their founding, the tensions within the Armenian millet of the Ottoman Empire had been articulated as a conflict between *azgaser* (nation or community lover) and *hayrenaser* (fatherland lover or patriot), loosely corresponding to the Armenians of the urban centers who controlled the millet institutions and the poor Armenians in the provinces. *Azgasers* were content with the amenities provided by the millet system, and their identity was defined mainly by religion, on which the millet system itself was based. In essence a diasporan, extraterritorial world of Armenian-ness, the focus on community affairs constituted an adjustment to a new identity away from the historic homeland, an adjustment to an extraterritorial identity centered around the church and ostensibly, faith, which unlike a homeland could not be carried by emigrants such as their ancestors had been. The *Azgaser* world, as represented by the Armenian millet National Assembly in Istanbul, was consumed by an agenda limited to *azgayin* or community institutions, such as churches, schools, and cemeteries. The provincial Armenian issues—provincial from the point of view of the Istanbul community leaders—were inconveniences at best, if not threats to the well-being of the middle- and upper-class Armenians in Istanbul, the segments of Armenian society that defined the *azg*, or the nation.

A *hayrenaser*’s main concern was the worsening situation of Armenians in the provinces. During the second half of the nineteenth century, deterioration due to economic transformation (monetization of taxation, wholesale destruction of home industries due to increased imports from an industrializing Europe) led to increased and often wanton lawlessness, land grabs by resettled Muslim refugees from Russian and Balkan wars in areas inhabited by Armenians had created a situation that reached crisis proportions for Armenians in the eastern provinces or in historic Western Armenia. These Armenians constituted the majority of the Armenian people and lived as they had for centuries, on their ancestral lands in the Ottoman Empire, even if other peoples had come to join them later.

In political terms, the conflict within the Armenian community pitted the “conservatives” and the “liberals” against one another. The *Azgasers*, or conservatives, considered any attempt to use millet structures for the purpose of advancing social and economic grievances a subversion of the
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system. They viewed such attempts as a threat to the interests of the “nation” and to their own delicate economic standing vis-à-vis the imperial government. The hayrenasers considered the millet structures as a legitimate vehicle for the articulation of grievances most threatening to those living in the historically Armenian provinces.20

Once the political parties framed their cause as one of the poor and economically threatened, including the peasantry, they redefined the new political community, or the “people,” primarily as a “class.” Their opposition to the status quo was not motivated strictly by the non-Armenian-ness of the state but also by its oppressive and exploitative nature. According to their worldview, wealthy Armenian classes constituted part of the problem, unless they actively contributed to the struggle. The parties adopted socialism and the class struggle paradigm as the framework within which to explain existing conditions and alignment of forces inside and outside the Ottoman Empire. According to these parties, the Armenian people could avoid class struggle among themselves if ethnic affinities with their oppressed and exploited brethren—the majority of the “people”—compelled rich Armenians to transform themselves into supporters of the cause by transcending their class interests and supporting the greater cause. Instead of the well-to-do urbanites who were only concerned with their own security, the parties would take the reins, determining Armenian interests, and giving a voice to the poor that constituted the Armenian “nation.”

For party activists, the nation stood for more than an ethnic group—or a “minority”—it was an active agent in its history, and did more than simply exist, content with preserving its cultural or religious peculiarities. Yet, in another sense, the parties considered the nation to be less than an ethnic group, since its basis would be an economically defined “people” that could dispense with the privileged elites who did not accept the primacy of the cause of the poverty-stricken majority. In a sense, the “people” represented a “democratized” nation.

The parties’ socialist perspective placed the peasantry and the poor front and center. This was no accident. The founders of these parties were Russian-Armenians who had been radicalized and sensitized to the problems of the peasantry by the social struggles within the Russian Empire. The Russo-Turkish war of 1877–78 and its aftermath had brought the plight of Ottoman Armenians close to home.21

It was not clear to these intellectuals, however, what role socialism should play in the actual management of the struggle for liberation. Did the parties represent the whole nation or only a segment or a class? Class struggle could be a guide only in its most general sense, placing in opposition “poor” and “rich,” “oppressed” and “oppressor,” distinctions for which Ottoman Armenians did not need a whole new science. The lack of clarity
may have been deliberate, giving the parties room to adjust their tactical thinking.

For the Hnchaks, for example, the strategy to achieve the immediate goal of independent statehood was altogether at variance with socialism; it included the use of existing resources, such as the last remnants of the impoverished Cilician nobility in Zeytun, and collaboration with the rebellious Armenians who still kept their arms in that region. Yet, with a few strokes of the pen, the Hnchaks not only introduced independence and socialism, but reconciled the two, placing them along a continuum in which one led to the other. The idea of an independent Armenian state was not altogether new. Elements in Armenian society, from clergymen to merchants had sporadically pursued independence and devised projects to this effect.\(^{22}\)

The Hnchaks, however, were the first to introduce the idea of a “modern” nation-state. Except for the analysis of socialist and Marxist writers, including Marx himself, on the “Eastern Question,” the transformation of Marxist ideology inspired by the Communist Manifesto into a political program for the Ottoman territories was, to say the least, a genuine innovation. It was a new approach, even if it was really an oversimplification (if not distortion) of what Marx and others had articulated as the positive laws of historical development. The Hnchaks easily undertook the task of transformation by sequencing but not integrating the national and social projects. If, as Marx claimed, a socialist society could only evolve from a bourgeois society, then it was first necessary to create a bourgeois society; and since a bourgeois society could not be created within an Ottoman administration, it was necessary to create an Armenia where that would be possible.

The Dashnaksutiun, less ideological than the Hnchaks, adapted its discourse to local conditions, and used socialism to color its demands for reforms and a projected transformation of the Ottoman state. Socialism was also useful when the party decided to bring in European public opinion to press their governments on reform in the Ottoman state; it provided the bridge to European socialists critical of imperial designs and protective of oppressed peoples. Yet socialism remained a thorny issue for many, if not most, Ottoman Armenians; it ultimately caused the split of the Hnchak Party in 1896, and brought the Dashnaksutiun close to a similar fate in 1907.

The parties’ focus on, and idealization of the Armenian peasantry—those still living on their historic lands in the Ottoman Empire, as opposed to the mostly urbanized diasporas in the Russian and Persian empires, and the relatively secure peasantry in Eastern or Russian Armenia—tended to territorialize an “Armenian” problem that had initially arisen as a broader social and economic issue. The concept of a Hayastan—which denotes “Armenia” in Armenian—had never disappeared from the political and popular imagination. In fact, it did not disappear from maps of the Ottoman Empire until
its waning days. After all, the Empire was proud to name the various lands it had conquered. In the early debates within the millet structure regarding reforms in the Eastern provinces, the Armenians from Istanbul referred to those in the provinces as "Hayastantsis," or people from Armenia. Their use of the term referred to a geographic location, and not to the place of their forefathers. But in the provinces "Hayastantsi" meant much more. Folklore had kept alive the memory of the kings of Armenia (the last Armenian kingdom in the historical lands had collapsed in 1045), as well as those of Armenian Cilicia, where the last king was taken to Egypt as a prisoner after having been defeated by the Mamluks of Egypt in 1375. For most provincial Armenians, the term "Hayastan" evoked happier times, before the "yoke of the Turk" had been pressed on their necks.

The Treaty of San Stefano first gave political impetus to the term "Hayastan" when it referred to the Eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire as the "Armenian provinces," a term that denotes not only the population to which article 16 referred but also the history of these provinces. The term was revised in article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin to the "Eastern Provinces," and concerned Armenians considered this a major defeat.

Patriarch Varjabedian’s proposal for reform—initially highly praised by the Dashnaktsutiun—which included the idea that the provinces in question be governed by an Armenian governor-general, constituted the next step in the process of territorialization. The solution offered by Khrimian, that is, reform through the millet system, was no longer viable. With the treaties of San Stefano and Berlin reforms were to be implemented by integrally merging territory and governance.

The territorialization of the “Armenian Question” had not occurred in an intellectual and historical vacuum. The Armenian cultural revival in the nineteenth century had produced a national history and geography, reviving memories of Armenian dynasties. These scholarly revivals had also been translated into a popular revival with the printing of textbooks along the same lines and the spread of education through an expanding Armenian school system. It was the political parties nonetheless, most of all the Hnchaks in their first program, that took the territorialization of the Armenian Question to a new level: democratic administration by subjects-turned-citizens in a republican Armenia. The Hnchaks, followed less enthusiastically by the Dashnaktsutiun, proclaimed the necessity of providing governance to Armenians, by Armenians, in historic Armenia, because that was a political requirement, if not a natural right, since the Ottoman Empire had been incapable of achieving any reforms. Armenians were ready for the “progress” and “civilization” that the Western Enlightenment had ushered in, while the Ottoman state—and by extension the Turkish people—were not. Armenians were different from Turks, the Hnchaks argued, meaning they were
capable of understanding the laws of nature, including the nature of history; after all, the Turks had not complained about their regime, and had shown no signs of an awakening. Territoriality was integral for the success of the *Hnchak* program of change. Historical memory and immediate exigencies had coalesced in an ideological leap.

For both parties, a key component in this step was the establishment of democracy in the Armenian state or autonomous region that was to be created. The point was to turn subjects into citizens. Ottoman and Turkish rulers would not be replaced by Armenian ones; there would be no rulers. If in the popular imagination Armenian kings symbolized happier times, in the imagination of the founders of the political parties, the right to govern of future ethnically Armenian leaders would be contingent on a democratic electoral process, in which all citizens, regardless of ethnicity or religion, would be equal and participate. The problem was governance; the solution was a democratized society of the kind introduced by the French Revolution.

Beyond programmatic pronouncements, changes, and differences, the parties shared one fundamental motivation: the economic base of the majority of the Ottoman Armenian population in the provinces—peasants, farmers, craftsmen, and small merchants—was disintegrating fast; impoverishment and dispossession of land had accelerated; and the “people” were threatened.

The Eastern Armenian background of the party founders presented a problem for some Western Armenians. This background would also create problems for the founders in later historiography. Yet, their personal involvement in Russian *narodnik* (populist) movements, based on the idea of the liberation of the Russian peasantry, had made them sensitive to the problems of the peasantry in Western Armenia, in ways the *azgasers* and even some of the *hayrenasers*, with a more urban orientation, were not. The parties’ ideological framework, whether the “orthodox” Marxism of the *Hnchaks* or the looser “socialistic” one of the *Dashnaktsutiun*, had become the intellectual tools with which the founders of these parties transformed the Armenian “people” from object into the subject and agent of history. Universalistic and positivistic frameworks also mediated between the founders’ idealism and the existential threat they sensed to the life of Armenians in the heartland of historic Armenia. They considered the peasantry and their rural economy to be the last bastion of a threatened people, whose urbanized elements had shown signs of embourgeoisement in the capitals and big cities of the Ottoman and Russian empires, and that had turned Armenians into *azgasers* at best.

The parties, it seems, were responding to two different, at times conflicting, impulses: The historical expectation of salvation from the West, implying a territorial dimension; and the political process that involved change
from within: The exhaustion of domestic means for reform, from the Tanz-imat to the democratization of the millet and the hopelessness that dominated the post–Berlin conference period. The parties moved from one to the other for a dominant framework, in a manner that was often confused between tactic and strategy, and between strategy and purpose.

Armed Struggle and “Terror”

Another dimension of the parties’ revolutionary nature was their willingness to use arms and shed blood—their own or others’—as part of their activities. Non-Muslims being prohibited by law from carrying arms, this decision constituted a daring rejection of the established order. Taking up arms against Ottoman imperial rule was not unheard of; Greeks and other Balkan peoples had provided precedents. But this phenomenon was new in Ottoman Armenian history, especially as a strategic choice to be exercised by the people. Certainly there had been acts of resistance to encroachments by the Ottoman central government, for example in Zeytun, which had nominal autonomy, the most celebrated instance being the rebellion of 1860. But such incidents were strictly defensive efforts, even though poets and intellectuals interpreted resistance and revolt as signs of national revival and celebrated them as symbols of a new Armenian fighting spirit. The armed struggle advocated by the parties aimed at changing the status quo, and at acquiring new rights rather than preserving old ones. The parties spent enormous amounts of energy not only preaching their rights to peasants, and inspiring self-confidence in them, but also developing channels to smuggle arms from Russia and Iran. They celebrated new heroes, and composed songs to put in relief their feats against Turkish and Kurdish oppressors and their martyrdom.\(^{23}\)

Despite all this, it was never clear what the purpose of taking up arms was. On the most basic level, armed resistance was an assertion of the natural right of self-defense against marauders, armed local chieftains, exactions, and kidnappings. If the government was not capable or willing to protect the lives of its subjects, then the subjects had the right to protect themselves.

Beyond self-defense, however, why did the parties arm themselves? Were armed activities and guerrilla warfare tactical means or a strategic choice? At times, operations amounted to raids on gendarmerie stations or punitive actions. On occasion, the parties geared up for rebellions: against the local chieftains, against regional authorities, and against the state.

The parties knew they did not have the numbers to overthrow the regime or even the local rulers through a solely “Armenian” revolution. They realized they would have to enlist the support of other ethnic and religious groups, such as the Kurds, normally considered an enemy. This was part of
the new strategy adopted by the *Dashnaksutiun* following the 1894–96 massacres. They connected with various Ottoman opposition groups, especially in Europe, where most of them were headquartered. The parties also engaged European public opinion, especially socialist leaders and parties, as a means of compelling the Great Powers to refocus on the Armenian Question. The *Dashnaksutiun* was particularly active and successful in this arena. In their program, the *Hnchaks* had adopted a policy of cooperation and winning the sympathy of other peoples, such as Assyrians, Yezdis, and Kurds, but there is little evidence that they focused on it in practice.

Until 1908, the two parties continued to entertain hope for external intervention, even if on many occasions, especially at the start of the movement, they insisted that Armenians could not rely on foreign powers to achieve their goals (the Great Powers had been tested in this respect, and had failed). Some large-scale operations were also considered as tactical steps to either ignite a larger uprising or compel the Great Powers to deal with the Armenian Question by intervening in favor of reforms. The parties knew that such activities would invite harsh measures from the government, and that blood would flow. They preempted that concern by arguing that the lifelines of the people were being severed anyway, and that there was no salvation without sacrifice. In the end, they believed, the sacrifice would be justified.

The provocation thesis often cited in this respect is correct to the extent that leaders of the parties accepted the consequences of their strategy, although it is unclear if they expected the harshness of the Ottoman reaction, particularly the onslaught of the 1894–96 massacres. The argument that the parties invited repression and massacres, in order to achieve Great Power intervention on their behalf is a false one. It is an argument that takes for granted the existence of Ottoman policies of collective punishment of a whole people through massacres, and thus shifts the responsibility for massacres from the Ottoman government to the victims. Other states have seen rebellions, and have not massacred a whole people. Leaders and states that did massacre were duly held responsible for their actions, or should have been.

The armed struggle continued after the 1894–1896 massacres, albeit with some changes. The *Dashnaksutiun*, now in ascendancy, determined that the struggle required better and more widespread preparation. Meanwhile, the massacres had produced the May 1895 Reforms, proposed by the Great Powers on the basis of the Treaty of Berlin, and accepted by the sultan. True reform was soon forgotten.

One aspect of the armed struggle deserves special attention since it occurred in both parties, and that is the “terror,” the assassination of individuals who were held personally responsible for acts considered particularly odious by the revolutionaries. The *Hnchak* program devotes a whole section to this dimension:
The purpose of terror is to protect the people, when it is subject to persecution, to raise its spirit, to inspire and elevate a revolutionary disposition among them, to show daring on behalf of the people protesting against the government, and thus to maintain the faith of the people toward the task on hand, to shake the power of the government, to abase its reputation of being powerful, to create extreme fear [in its ranks]. The means to achieve these goals are: to annihilate the worst Turkish and Armenian personalities within the government, to annihilate the spies and the traitors.24

The *Dashnaksutiun*, too, adopted assassination as a defense against external and internal enemies. This tactic continued to be used by both parties throughout their history, although the early abuse of the method against Armenian victims prompted the *Dashnaksutiun* to decree in 1892 that only the central authority of the party had the right to issue a verdict to that effect, and specify that: “The death sentence against Armenians can be applied only in cases of proven treason.”25

The best-known case of “terror” was the *Dashnaksutiun* attempt in 1906 to assassinate Sultan Abdülhamid II, the man widely held responsible for the 1894–1896 massacres. The *Dashnaksutiun* had planted a time bomb in a carriage outside the mosque where the sultan prayed every Friday. The attempt would have been successful had the sultan, a close adherent of his routine, not been delayed when walking out of his Friday prayer.26 It is useless to speculate what would have happened if the attempt had been successful. That the assassination attempt heightened the sultan’s paranoia, there is no doubt.

The “revolution,” to the extent that it involved the use of violence, assumed many forms. Assassination attempts against the worst enemies of the revolution became a critical component of the Armenian struggle for liberation. In many cases there were practical consequences, such as the elimination of spies and traitors, who, nonetheless, were replaced easily by the Ottoman authorities. The assertion of the right to armed violence seems, in the end, more an act of desperation than a strategy that would bring about the changes sought by the parties. Such use of violence represented, possibly, an assertion of the right to resist. A nation cannot be forced to die, without resisting, without hoping for the best, and doing its best to survive. In the end, the confusion the parties showed in their tactics and strategies did not stem from their ideologies. Rather, it stemmed from the existential choices they were confronted with, once they decided that the people should resist.

One Nation Concept

Both parties imagined all three segments of the Armenian people, then living under the Ottoman, Russian, and Persian empires, to be part of one nation. They considered the international borders separating them to be
artificial and of secondary importance. The parties focused on Ottoman Armenians because of their urgency of the social and economic situation. According to these parties, the Ottoman Armenian plight ought to have been of concern to all Armenians. The Hnchaks were the clearest formulators of what might be called a “trans-state” nation, when they articulated as their ultimate goal the liberation of the three Armenian segments from imperial rule and their unification in one federative state. In support of their operations in Turkish Armenia, both parties created organizational bases in Russia and Iran.

From the start the Dashnaktsutiun had focused on Turkish Armenia. And yet, when the tsarist government initiated a policy of Russification and attempted to confiscate Armenian Church properties and shut down Armenian schools during 1903–1905, the Dashnaktsutiun used its organization in Russian Armenia and the Caucasus to mount a resistance to the move. It was not difficult for the “socialistic” Dashnaktsutiun to join forces with the left wing in Russia during the first Russian Revolution against the tsarist regime in 1905. More importantly, when civil war broke out between the “Tatars” and Armenians in many parts of the Trans-Caucasus, the Dashnaktsutiun was mostly responsible for the organization of fighting units. That shift included the redeployment of experienced Western Armenian guerrilla leaders from the Ottoman to the Russian sector. In addition, both parties provided support to the Constitutional movement in Iran in 1907.27

That year was critical for the Dashnaktsutiun, not only because the party was now involved in Russia and Iran, but the Young Turks had become active themselves, providing hope for change in the Ottoman Empire as well. The fourth World Congress of the Dashnaktsutiun met in Vienna in 1907, under these difficult, yet promising circumstances. Western Armenian representatives, especially some of the guerrilla leaders, were critical of the party’s engagement in Russian and Iranian politics; they accused Russian Armenian leaders and intellectuals of forgetting why the party was founded. Some young socialist Russian Armenian participants proposed that the party be split along Turkish-Armenian and Russian-Armenian lines. The party could not ignore the struggle for social and political rights of Russian Armenians, they argued, but this battle had a different character than the one in Turkish Armenia, which was largely a national liberation struggle. The leadership managed to preserve the integrity of the party, arguing that the unity of the nation was necessary for the success of the movement, whatever their particular character in each case. The party also clarified its goals by amending for the first time the program of 1892: now the Dashnaktsutiun aimed at the establishment of federated Ottoman and Russian states, an Armenian component being part of each.28
Eventually the two parties, and especially the Dashnaktsutiun, would also be involved in the Constitutional movement in Persia. This extension of the struggle to the Russian and Persian sectors was also a challenge to the extra-territorial nature of the millet system, within which an Armenian living in the Balkans or Istanbul had the same standing as the one in Van or Erzurum. In fact, Armenians in Istanbul had dominated the politics of the millet, which made it easier for the Ottoman government to control its direction and activities. The concept of nation had changed, and so had its leadership.

The involvement of the parties in the revolutions of the three empires where Armenians lived constitutes as much a manifestation of the seriousness of their devotion to constitutionalism as an indication of their national character.

**Struggle for the People by the People**

Finally, these parties worked toward making grassroots participation—both in politics and in a fighting force—a part of the transformation process. The role assigned the people in the strategy of achieving freedom was unlike that in earlier efforts at “liberation,” where the “people” were seen at best as a tactical means. Having proclaimed the welfare of the people as the goal of the movement, the parties realized that their participation was integral to the process of bringing about change. The parties measured other values—from loyalty to the territorial dimensions that the transformation might imply—by the degree to which the people could be part of a solution to the problem.

Under section 4 of its program, the Hnchak founders proposed four separate components to the struggle. Other than the first, “terror,” these were (a) widespread revolutionary organizations among the peasantry, (b) widespread revolutionary organizations among the workers, and (c) revolutionary-war organizations among both the peasantry and the workers. These people-based organizations were considered essential not only for the upcoming struggle but also for the creation of social and political institutions after the successful war and the defense of the independence.

Criticizing those who relied on demonstrations by the few to advance their cause, the Dashnaktsutiun argued that such measures had only limited impact:

Demonstrations alone, in distant centers at that, have never liberated and will never liberate a people. [Liberation] requires a steady disposition and a battle that has potent force which can occur only with the direct participation of the majority of the Armenian people.

Whatever role they assigned to the Great Powers in their sometimes confused and confusing strategies, the revolutionary parties could not conceive
of liberation without the full participation of the “people.” It was their liberation, after all, and not simply a matter of changing rulers. Both parties went to great lengths in their programs to detail the nature of that future society, that future Armenia, imagining it to be as fully democratic as the constitutions of most states today. For the most part, the parties considered using ethnicity as a basis of that future society a questionable element, seeing that it was forced on Armenians by the discrimination of an Ottoman state that refused to reform and accept principles of governance to provide equality, fairness, and justice with a view of allowing citizens and society to develop to their fullest potential.

This is not to say that the parties were not also inspired by the precedents of the Balkan peoples’ struggles for independence or, as in the case of the Hnchaks, of the Lebanese struggle, won in 1863, all with the support of the Great Powers. Nonetheless, in the programs of both parties the nature of a future society was at least as important as the “vessel” within which the society would evolve. And both programs were sufficiently flexible that they could accommodate a reformed Ottoman state. This flexibility was as much a product of the ideological roots of the founders as of their realization that their strategic options were limited. Where Armenians were most vulnerable were areas that were no longer homogeneous in population. The party leaders argued that, although the democratic nature of a future society would protect non-Armenians and non-Christians, an Armenian-based society was necessary, because the Turkish or Muslim peoples had manifested no drive toward the highest ideals of a progressive society, whether socialist or socialistic, and certainly no impulse toward democracy.

In the parties’ view, the Armenian people constituted a beacon of enlightenment and human progress. Did they need to wait for all their neighbors to wake up, while their existence was being destroyed by the policies of a despotic sultan who made sure the fundamentals of the relationship between state and subject would not change?

The sultan considered Armenians to be a Christian conquered people who should be satisfied with their status as a “People of the Book,” a distant memory of the Prophet’s tolerant view of non-Muslims. According to him, Armenians should be satisfied with the generosity of Ottoman rulers, who had allowed them to be constituted as a millet and to run their internal affairs. Affairs of state were not, and could not possibly be the business of Christian communities. The Armenian revolutionary political parties saw the nation as following an ideological trajectory that was closer to the modern understanding of a nation than that assumed by the Balkan peoples in their liberation struggles. In fact the Armenian trajectory foreshadowed the national liberation ideologies of a century later, with their strong social and economic components, in addition to their anticolonial foundation. With
their insistence on democratic governance, the Armenian parties were threatening to the Ottoman and Russian empires.

Even between the two parties there were certainly differences in the political imagination of the “nation.” The Hnchaks imagined an ideal humanity, and decided the nation was the “vessel,” or the means to achieve it (a convenient metaphor for reconciling inherent contradictions in their ideology). The Dashnaksutiun defined the nation as the peasantry and the downtrodden who were in need of and worthy of salvation. They felt the nation should be allowed to develop to its fullest potential, and thus become part of humanity.

A QUESTION OF LOYALTY

The activities and very existence of the revolutionary parties raise the question of “loyalty.” It was a concern for the Ottoman leaders of the late empire, and remains one for official Turkish historians. Yet, such a question is problematic. Applying today’s values to a historical period when the imperial mindset was dominant is a grave error. In addition, those who accuse Armenians of disloyalty never make it clear what the charge consists of: Were they supposed to be loyal to the empire, its territorial integrity, the sultan or the CUP?

The fusion of progressive ideologies and the worsening conditions of the majority of the Armenian population, especially in the provinces, had produced programs aimed at creating a better society. That is where, nonetheless, the parties’ priorities rested ultimately. These parties sought to change the nature of the state and its relations with its subjects; in short, to transform subjects into citizens that had a contractual agreement with the state. The Ottoman state would be acceptable if it were based on the equality of its citizens, and if its purpose were their welfare, not merely its self-perpetuation. The Ottoman government could claim the loyalty of its subjects only if and when it changed the basis of its legitimacy.

Loyalty to the state could have been possible. All their programmatic goals notwithstanding, the parties were ready to endorse the state, and did so after 1908. But such loyalty could no longer be taken for granted or offered unconditionally. The Ottoman state and its system were concrete realities for its subjects, not abstractions defined by the sultan and, later, the CUP. Within such a context, “Armenians” could have been part of the solution, if the men in charge had cared as much for their subjects as they did about the regime. Instead, having permitted, if not encouraged, the situation to deteriorate, and having created an environment where armed resistance, rebellion, and appeals to the Great Powers remained the only options, the sultan and the CUP deemed the “Armenians” as a threat. That demands
for such political and economic reforms came under the rubric of a “revolution” may be misleading to some extent. That this revolution was supported by a segment of the Ottoman society that happened to be ethnically Armenian, is the actual conundrum. Were the land and economic crises less significant because they were felt most by Armenians who were able to articulate and, at some point, try to act on them? Who was responsible, ultimately for the “Armenianization” of the economic and political crises? What should Armenians have done in order not to be seen as a threat or as “disloyal” subjects that they did not try to do?

When the parties challenged the state, they empowered society; and they ended up collaborating with others who had apparently similar aims but who ultimately ended up hurting their cause. The Young Turks initially empowered themselves in the name of the Turkish people, but ended up placing a higher premium on the survival of the state. When the Dashnakt-sutiun was cooperating with the CUP during the Constitutional period, the Armenian leaders urged the CUP to spread the ideas of equality and democracy among the Turkish Muslim peoples of the region, to ensure that the Constitution would have grassroots support, and thus solidify its hold on the general population. The CUP did reach out to the “people,” but only to solidify its rule, and make sure that they would follow the dictates and designs of the CUP. The empowerment of the latter excluded the participation of the “people.”

It is not a coincidence that the state which the CUP imagined, and which eventually came into being, was anything but democratic, and remained a one-party system for a long time.

No analysis today can illustrate so poignantly the problem of loyalty as the exchange that took place in May 1915—during the last session of the trial of the Hnchak leaders—between Khurshid (Hurşit) Bey, the presiding judge of the Ottoman court, and Paramaz, the main Hnchak spokesman. It is worth quoting extensively. The Hnchaks had been accused of incitement to insurrection and secessionism and were awaiting their sentence. Before condemning the group to death, Khurshid (Hurşit) Bey reflected:

The attributes of history in our reality are arranged in such a way that what constitutes “patriotism” for one is viewed as destructive treason by the other. And thus the mutual relations between nations living together amount to the negation of international law and social concepts. Today is the last session of these trials and it is with great pain in our heart that we are visualizing in our inflamed memory these few days that we spent here with you. There was something unusual and unqualifiable in these trials. Unqualifiable because neither you nor us had enough wisdom to penetrate each other’s [worlds]. . . .

You cannot imagine, effendis, that it is with such grief that I will pronounce the depth of my conviction regarding the patriotism accumulated in you. What can be more heartbreaking that warm blooded beings like you full
of life have sacrificed logic to sentiments; your false beliefs have placed you on a path that leads to an impasse. . . . What great deeds vigorous individuals like you could have accomplished, if the ideal of a common welfare had been pursued under one banner. . . . What benefits could have been borne from a mutual understanding that eluded [us], the other end of which is sad and dark. You languished with the idea that you are struggling against injustice; while have felt, every minute, that the rules of the world are abasing higher tendencies under the weight of cruel necessities.12

Paramaz was visibly moved when he took the stand:

A while ago Khurshid Bey made some statements here and I, who has never cried in my life—I who has never moved when, after many years of absence from home returned and realized when my child did not recognize me—I am not ashamed to say that I was deeply moved by the sincerity of Khurshid Bey’s speech . . . and I cried, I, Paramaz, because Khurshid Bey put his finger on the wound when he stated “What good deed could have been accomplished. . . .” I cried because in those words I found the brilliance of truth.

[Yet] We would be asking that same question, and add, What was left that we did not do for the welfare of this country. We accepted such sacrifices, we spilled so much blood and spent such energy to bring about the brotherhood of Armenians and Turks; we lived through such suffering to elevate each other through trust. And what did we see? Not only did you condemn our gigantic efforts to sterility but also consciously pursued our annihilation. . . . You encouraged crime and oppression and tried to silence every expression of protest . . . . You started massacring us when one day we decided to do something to defend our dignity. . . . You left us outside the protection of the law when we tried to benefit from the rights granted us by the truncated Midhatian Constitution. . . .

Gentlemen, judge people by their work, by their traditions, within the realm of their ideas. I am not a separatist from this country. On the contrary, it is [this country] that is separating itself from me, being incapable of coming to terms with the ideas that inspire me.33

HOW REVOLUTIONARY?

The ideologies and strategies of these two revolutionary parties were made complex by the social, economic, and political dimensions of the struggle for liberation; they also required a degree of flexibility that bordered on the uncertain. They rejected the status quo, both among the Armenian people and within the Ottoman state; they rejected the idea of a politics whose purpose was the perpetuation of the state at the expense of its citizens. On one level, at least, these parties were far from revolutionary: both parties assigned Great Power intervention a large, though shifting role. There is no question
that the founding of both parties was related to the Armenian frustration at the nonimplementation of reforms promised first in the Treaty of San Stefano, then revised in the Treaty of Berlin in 1878.34

In their founding documents, the revolutionary parties explicitly refer to the reforms mandated by the Treaty of Berlin. Yet, their subsequent behavior manifested a distinct lack of clarity on whether they regarded the provisions of that treaty as the main goal or looked on the failure of that strategy as a basis for the legitimation of a new kind of struggle. In the end, it was the realities on the ground that dictated the parties’ increasing reliance on Great Power intervention. The Ottoman state proved to be more resilient than the revolutionaries expected, ready to use the harshest measures of repression. Guerrilla warfare, however heroic the actions of the fighters, however large the support from many segments of Armenian society, failed to topple the state. In addition, by the end of the nineteenth century, following losses in the Balkans, Anatolia’s significance for the Ottoman Empire and for the British-Russian rivalry had increased. The Armenia of 1900 was not the Greece of 1830, and it was certainly not the Serbia of 1880.

“Objective analysis,” ideological coherence, the adoption of universal values, and thus partaking in the logic of human progress may have been sufficient to “shake the Sultan’s throne,” as revolutionaries had hoped, but was not enough to bring about the outcome for which they ultimately hoped. And shifting the focus of lobbying by the revolutionaries in Europe from unreliable statesmen to “principled” socialist and liberal leaders in order to gain support for reforms did not change the game the Great Powers were playing: after all, they had become “great” by playing with smaller nations, exploiting their weaknesses and benefiting from their woes.

Among the innovations revolutionary parties introduced to the Armenian subjects was the use of arms, a tactic familiar to the Greeks. But the fact that some Armenians had adopted the use of arms certainly represented a threat to those who placed the state above society as well as to the more conservative Armenians in the capital. Similarly, the idea of one nation—identified through a common history and predicated on the negation of borders—constituted a recognizable and threatening aspect of the struggle unleashed by the parties; but it is also one that would have been equally threatening to Russia and Persia. Yet, given the threat that the Ottoman state presented to the individual and collective well-being of Armenians in the empire, the parties considered armed struggle as a legitimate course. The internal Armenian revolution, the concept of class struggle, the primacy of the interests of the peasant and craftsmen classes, and the strategization of grassroots participation in politics, were new and revolutionary not only for the Armenian community but also for the Ottoman state.
The socialist dimension of the Armenian movement was dangerous to the Turkish elites, especially to the ultimate winner of the rivalry within the Young Turk movement—the İttihad ve Terakki or CUP. Integral to the CUP vision was the kind of state that could resist Great Power intervention in its internal affairs, and allay, if not reverse, the disintegration of that empire. It was not sufficient that the eventual state be Turkish; it was also necessary that it be a “strong” state, free of the burdens of democracy and parliamentarianism. By the early twentieth century, peoples and otherwise distinct elements inhabiting the empire would be assessed by Turkish elites in terms of their potential contribution to—or detraction from—the creation of such a state. Thus, in addition to religious and ethnic differences, “Armenians” had become a political liability; the Hnchak and Dashnaktsutiun parties had come to be seen as representatives of a people that generated a different logic than that of the state.

The Armenian political parties constituted a threat, but it was a threat to the regime of Sultan Abdülhamid II, against which “Turks” themselves ultimately acted. Most “revolutionary” or otherwise threatening dimensions of the Hnchak and Dashnaktsutiun party programs disappeared with the reinstatement of the Ottoman Constitution in 1908, including the Hnchaks’ goal of Armenian independence, the use of arms, and appeals to the Great Powers. What remained were the demands for a participatory parliamentary system and for economic, especially agrarian reforms.

Partly due to their ideological concern for the lower classes and awareness of the need to be pragmatic, the parties had shown their willingness to accommodate the state, but they were not ready to accommodate any regime that failed to deliver on its promise of reform. It was the CUP’s failure at reform that compelled the parties to return to their earlier strategy of appealing to the Great Powers some time after the 1908 Young Turk Revolution.

Another way to answer the question I raise in this chapter is to address what was “negotiable” in the ideology, program, strategy, and tactics of these parties and what was not. In the end, it was their opposition to a repressive and regressive regime that was consistent. On a practical level, agrarian and administrative reforms in the empire remained nonnegotiable as far as the Armenian “revolution” was concerned. If the rulers of the Ottoman state were unwilling to introduce such reforms throughout the empire, these parties, as well as the patriarchate, demanded that reforms be introduced in the “Armenian” provinces. But even that was too much for the CUP. That says as much about the CUP regime—its concerns, its visualization of the future, the framework within which they perceived the world and themselves—as it does about the Armenians.

The CUP and the dominant “majority” had a choice to change the character of the state in ways that accommodated its various “minorities,” by
making the state serve society. Instead, by making the state a self-serving entity, they chose to change its demography. Their failure to implement reforms promised under the Tanzimat, Abdülhamid II, and the CUP, had led to the internationalization, territorialization, as well as the radicalization, of the “Armenian” problem. This, in turn, assured that Armenians would be considered incompatible with the CUP vision. It is paradoxical that the Armenian revolutionary parties, which came to be seen, and are still viewed by some, as a threat to the Ottoman state, came closest to offering a solution that may have assured the survival of the Ottoman state. This raises the question of the elites’ own loyalty toward the Ottoman state. It is possible that, consciously or not, they were already imagining a different kind of state, one within which reforms—economic or political—did not figure as the most important component of change.

The Ottoman state lacked an integrative component or program for non-Muslims particularly, except on rare occasions, when Armenians supported it fully. It was an empire, created through conquest; as such, it was keen to preserve the politics of rulers and the ruled and maintain ethnic, religious, and other divisions, making an exception only for selected individuals from all backgrounds who need not be reminded of their place in government. The system’s components, including the millet system, ensured that Armenian subjects would cling to their past, and at some point transform these differences into assets. If the legal and social system of segregation and discrimination made certain that Armenians felt inferior, the Armenian past and collective memory ensured that, when these subjects were forced into a corner and ready to become citizens, they would emerge as a force that was not only conscious of its ethnic identity but that it would be that dimension of their identity that would be invested with the new ideas, energy, and program.

Yet the primacy of economic, domestic, political, and social issues, and the ideological underpinnings of party programs provided an avenue for the newly defined Armenian nation to reach out to the Ottoman state, a significant act of Armenian “nationalism.” Obviously, this move took on a different character than that of the millet, where subservience was assumed. The parties constituted the link between universal principles and the ever-worsening economic crisis inflicted on the majority of Ottoman Armenians. Armed with the “laws” of history, energized by universal rights, and pressed by conditions on the ground, the parties could reach out more easily to Turks and Kurds who might have shared their principles, ideals, and concerns, than Armenians who felt secure in their millet-based identity and politics could.

In the final analysis, however, one cannot properly assess the politics adopted by the Armenian parties by looking only at the Ottoman state and
society. For the dynamics of this period were propelled by three factors: the state, society—including its Armenian component—and the Great Powers. 
We must understand the dual-nature of each of the three elements to assess their consequences: the Ottoman state, repressive and regressive—technical and technological modernization notwithstanding—but vulnerable to the Great Powers; the Armenians, victimized by the state, but reaching out to the Great Powers; and the “West,” with the liberating influence of its ideals of freedom, equality, and human progress, and the debilitating impact of its imperialism on the Ottoman state, and indirectly on the subjects of that state. Both Armenians and Turks suffered the consequences of these tensions, but the price Armenians paid was far more dear.

By all accounts, the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 represented the best opportunity for the “Armenian” and “Turkish” movements to find common ground and continue cohabitating as part of one state. There is not yet a consensus as to whether a multiethnic empire was still possible as a parliamentary democracy in 1908, but it is possible that the answer will differ for Balkan and Arab peoples and for Armenians, whose home was in Anatolia, a more sensitive and contested region, with a mixed population. The Young Turks envisioned a liberal state, and were willing to try parliamentarianism; on the other hand, the Armenian parties were willing to compromise and adopt a similarly liberal position, as long the state ensured reforms. Yet, absent on the Young Turk side, was any social dimension; by and large, society and social concerns remained tangential to their ideology. Theirs was a revolution from above, concerned mostly with the preservation of the state, gradually imagined as a Turkish one. While Armenian revolutionary parties were not representative of all Armenians, they primarily articulated the concerns of its majority. The addition of the Ramgavar Party, in 1908—antisocialist, antirevolutionary in the sense of rejecting violent means, and liberal bourgeois, in the classical sense—meant that most segments of the Armenian people were now represented through the three political parties. All three endorsed the 1908 revolution and committed themselves to its success. The Dashnaktsutiun partnered with the CUP and vested its whole political capital on that relationship. One question that may be asked is, why was there no Turkish equivalent to the Armenian revolutionary parties concerned with their social and economic interests? For Muslims a primarily religious and increasingly ethnic self-identification with the leaders of the state provided them with a false sense of sharing in the power of that state.

In a sense, the separation of the two histories, “Turkish” and “Armenian,” started from the time the Ottoman Empire added Armenian populated regions to its territory. Armenians were never fully integrated into Ottoman society, although some elements took part in the economy. Their status as second-class subjects ensured that separation. The economic and
social woes of the empire during its waning decades affected all subjects, however, especially non-Muslim peoples in Anatolia; the state provided support to true Kurdish tribal leaders and resettled Balkan *muhacirs*, Muslim deportees from the Balkans, in the region.

There is no question that the two Balkan wars preceding World War I, and the imperialistic machinations of the Great Powers, including the use of the Armenian pleas for intervention to their benefit, pushed the CUP leadership in a more dictatorial, nationalist, and state-based direction, away from any concerns for social and economic reforms that might benefit the Armenian element.\(^3^6\)

Inherent in the Armenian parties’ position was a paradox. Reform being the “nonnegotiable” component of their programs, often at the expense of ideology, they were able to make compromises and reach out to the Young Turks. That same logic led them to ask for assistance from the Great Powers when the state was unwilling to deliver on such reforms, promised many times. Yet, the Great Powers were the same instruments that threatened the Ottoman state and the “survival of Turkey” as imagined by the leaders of the state. In brief, the problems collided but the solutions did not meet. The exchange between Khurshid Bey and Paramaz cited above constitutes a most telling testimony to two phenomena: the historical depth of the two histories ensconced in the current debates, as well as the missed opportunities.
The Balkan War of 1912/13 was a traumatic experience for late Ottoman society. The debacle entailed the loss of practically all of “European Turkey” and laid the groundwork for a CUP (Committee of Union and Progress) coup and the establishment of a single-party dictatorship under the tutelage of the military that was to last until the end of World War I. 1 Ottomanism, which had aimed to transform a premodern empire comprising multiple religious denominations into a secular multiethnic state, was abandoned for all intents and purposes, to be replaced by a vindictive nationalism that aspired to a new mobilization along Turkish-Islamic lines. 2 This ideological reorientation within Unionist circles was paralleled by an equally momentous shift in the attitude of the Armenian political leadership toward the Ottoman state. Already by 1911 the relations of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) with the CUP were no longer based on mutual trust. 3 The failed attempts at forming a new electoral alliance in early 1912 deepened the rift further. 4 Impressed by the Ottoman collapse in the Balkan War, the opinion among Armenians favored once again seeking Great Power intervention, as this seemed to promise a better chance of solving the Armenian Question. 5 Once World War I broke out and the Ottoman Empire aligned itself with the Central Powers, a constellation emerged that hardly boded well for the future. 6 The imminent participation in a war against a coalition of powers that seemed in the recent past to have consistently supported the Armenian national cause gave rise to strong doubts in the minds of the Unionist leaders as to the sincerity of the loyalty professed by the Ottoman Armenian community. 7

In the following I depart from the view that Ottoman military considerations in the early phase of World War I affected the fate of various population
groups in Asia Minor in a significant way. As one author accurately observed, the “designation of the Armenians residing in the command-and-control zone of the IIIrd Army as a dangerous internal foe was the defining moment of the World War I Armenian genocide. It was the alpha and omega of the plea of ‘military necessity’ put forth by the High Command of the Turkish army.”

Distrust pervaded the minds of Ottoman decision-makers. Their fear that Armenian citizens might betray the empire entailed not only detaching the Armenian recruits from the active units and putting them into special “labor battalions,” but also a countrywide campaign of disarming the cadres of a would-be Armenian militia. This chapter analyzes the conditions under which Armenians as non-Muslims came to serve in the Ottoman army in the first place. Second, it offers a description of how the non-Muslim recruits in the army were blamed for having caused the Ottoman defeat in the Balkan War of 1912–13. Finally, it shows how the outcome of that war created an ideological climate that proved conducive to ethnic homogenization policies in Asia Minor that foreshadowed the course of the events leading to mass persecution and massacre of Armenians in 1915 and thereafter.

Conventional wisdom sees the Ottoman armies marching against Christian Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as composed of warriors pledged to Islamic jihad. But research has shown that the importance formerly ascribed to religious zeal call for reconsideration. Apparently, the empire had had from early on a military tradition of Muslims and non-Muslims serving side by side. Not only the Christian sipahi, who belonged to the Ottoman military (askerî) in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, but also the Christian martolos from a more modest social background had been armed, either serving in border fortresses or policing the Balkan rural areas. The Catholic tribes of northern Albania boasted of their heroic deeds in the wars of the Porte against Christian powers as late as 1877–1878. In the fleet it was common practice to have Christian sailors serve with Muslims; the crews of Ottoman warships were traditionally recruited from Muslim as well as Christian populations of Asia Minor and the Aegean islands.

The situation changed, however, with the commencement of national liberation movements in the Balkans in the first half of the nineteenth century. Until then the Porte had been quite willing to arm local Christian peasantry when it served the interests of public order, as was the case during the kırcali disturbances in the 1790s or the first phase of the Serbian uprising in 1804–07. But the experience of the Greek Revolution (1821–1829), which was “above all a religious revolt” (M. S. Anderson), led to disillusionment in this regard. This explains why the polarization of society along religious divides gained ground, although Ottoman officials were bent on
achieving civic equality irrespective of religious affiliation—something they believed was essential for military modernization and consequently the survival of the empire. Thus Mahmud II (1808–1839) understood perfectly well the need for universal conscription if the empire was to survive the challenge of ethnoreligious separatism.\textsuperscript{16} Even though the abolition of the Janissary Corps (the household troops of the sultan) in 1826 was followed by the establishment of a modern army under the designation “Victorious Soldiers of Muhammad” and the subsequent war against Russia was opened by a declaration of jihad,\textsuperscript{17} the emerging modern army was in no way purely Muslim: the new cavalry units of 1826 comprised not only Tatar and Turkish horsemen, but also Christian Cossacks including their chaplains in the payroll of the Ottoman state, and by 1832 Christian Armenians were being recruited to serve in the engineer corps.\textsuperscript{18}

The reform Edict of Gülhane (1839) officially ushered in the era of Christian-Muslim equality, thereby also implying equal military service for all.\textsuperscript{19} The years of the Crimean War (1853–1856) especially saw some successful attempts toward the recruitment of Christians for the Ottoman armed forces.\textsuperscript{20} As Roderic H. Davison has emphasized, however, it “soon became obvious that the Christians would rather continue to pay than serve,” while the Muslims “balked at giving the Christians equal opportunity for promotion to the officer corps.”\textsuperscript{21} And finally, the developments during the Eastern Crisis of 1875–1878 bore witness to the rather delusionary character of the whole project: When the issue of military service for non-Muslims was discussed in the Ottoman parliament on June 2, 1877, it transpired that “the average Ottoman Christian was quite content not to have to endure the rigors of army life and risk the chance of death on a battlefield.”\textsuperscript{22} Given these conditions, carrying arms continued to be regarded as a Muslim privilege and the exclusion of the non-Muslim subjects of the sultan from recruitment a result of religious distrust.\textsuperscript{23}

During the long reign of Abdülhamid II (1876–1909) the issue was shelved. But the period witnessed new developments that anticipated some major traits of future Turkish nationalism. It produced the first examples of an \textit{étatist} interpretation of “national economy” that implied in the long run the elimination of non-Muslim intermediary groups, the so-called comprador bourgeoisie.\textsuperscript{24} Perhaps more significant in this context was the emergence of a new awareness of the strategic importance of certain regions as well as of the overall demographic realities of the empire. At the beginning of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878, the sultan was surprised to learn that the approaches to his capital, the plain of Eastern Thrace and the Straits region, were populated by non-Muslim groups who likely sympathized with the enemy. Therefore, he demanded a new policy geared to changing the demographic situation in those areas.\textsuperscript{25} And from the 1880s onward, special
commissions toured Asia Minor in search of suitable areas for the settlement of Muslim refugees, but again with a view to changing the demographic structure of strategic localities.\textsuperscript{26}

With the oppositional Young Turk movement gaining momentum since the 1890s, the question of equal rights and duties for all citizens found renewed urgency.\textsuperscript{27} The idea of general conscription, which was an important point in the CUP’s program of 1908, was not welcomed, however, in every quarter.\textsuperscript{28} As might be expected, opposition came mostly from the Greek-Orthodox clergy. The archbishop of Drama, for example, demanded that Christians only be expected to serve in the Ottoman Army after a preparatory phase of five years and even then only in separate units commanded by Christian officers. Furthermore, their flag should show a cross, since it was impossible for a Christian to go into battle “with the Crescent as his banner.”\textsuperscript{29} At this stage, the Porte had its own reasons for not insisting on general conscription, especially since the armed forces entertained serious doubts about the loyalty of some population groups, for example, the Greeks. The army general staff was prepared to grant the “privilege” of military service at first only to Armenians and Bulgarians and then only under the condition that they be ready to serve in religiously mixed units.\textsuperscript{30}

The “counterrevolutionary” movement of spring 1909 gave the political organizations of the non-Muslim groups the first opportunity to demonstrate their goodwill toward the Young Turk regime. The CUP’s appeal to all political forces to participate in a revolutionary “Army of Action” (\textit{Hareket Ordusu}), which would march on the capital in order to suppress the reactionary movement, received an enthusiastic response, especially from former guerrilla groups in Macedonia. Hundreds registered as volunteers, and with the exception of the adherents of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate, who showed some sympathy for the counterrevolutionary movement, the representatives of the Macedonian Slavs cooperated closely with the CUP.\textsuperscript{31} Thus Mahmud Şevket Pasha’s motley forces, which appeared at the gates of Istanbul on April 23, 1909, included about 1,200 Macedonians under the leadership of Yane Sandanski. Dressed in Ottoman uniforms, they participated in the street fighting against regiments professing loyalty to Abdülhamid II.\textsuperscript{32} The presence of “Albanians and Bulgars of the wildest types,” who patrolled the streets of Constantinople, attracted the attention of many foreign observers.\textsuperscript{33} Already on May 16, 1909, the British military attaché could report that in anticipation of the passing of a law permitting the enrollment of non-Muslims in the Ottoman army 49 Greeks and 37 Armenians in Bandırma alone had volunteered, Mahmud Şevket Pasha himself, the new military chief in the Ottoman capital, being “strongly in favor of the enrollment of non-Mussulmans.”\textsuperscript{34}
The crushing of the opposition secured for the CUP decisive influence in the government; as part of feverish legislative activity, preparations for a new law on the general mandatory conscription were sped up. However, the issue continued to be viewed, especially within the Greek community, as a step toward Turkification of the empire. It was Greek susceptibilities which provoked the British military attaché to make the following comments:

It is evident that the desire of the Greek clerical and educated party is to be a nation within a nation. The Greeks are to remain Greeks, are to speak Greek, associate only with Greeks, and be led by Greeks, when they would be prepared to serve in the Ottoman army, almost, one would say, as allies! Not a very reassuring prospect for the stability of the Ottoman Empire [ . . . ] The Armenian is much more capable of living in harmony with the Turks than is the Greek. Mixed regiments of Turks and Armenians will get along with a minimum of friction. They would, of course, require their priests and the recognition of certain fêtes and holidays. But they put forward no absurd demand for separate regiments as do the Greeks.

Despite all protests by the Greeks, the law on general conscription was passed in July 1909, and a circular was sent to the vilayets in early August announcing that all men eligible for military service that year would draw lots and that no exemption tax would be exacted from the non-Muslims henceforth. Attaché reports from Constantinople indicated that the law was generally well received and that military authorities were making no difficulties “as to freedom in the exercise of religion or observances of fasts.” For example, Christians were allowed to perform their oath of loyalty on the Bible, the Jews on the Pentateuch, and the Muslims on the Koran respectively. The problem of exemptions also seemed, at least on paper, to have been resolved.

Thus the dispatch of the first group of non-Muslim recruits from Salonika to the Ottoman capital in March 1910, altogether 1,600 men including 42 Jews, and the distribution of another group of over 2,000 Christian recruits among various units of the First Army Corps in Istanbul in April of the same year, were perceived as encouraging signs.

Nevertheless, the new conscription law encountered innumerable difficulties in everyday life. Especially ominous was the tendency demonstrated by young Greeks of the Aegean islands to simply refuse to appear for their medical examination in the local recruiting offices. Many local leaders would plead that it was their commune’s vested right not to send their youth to the army. Some would openly threaten that official insistence on the conscription would compel many a young man to emigrate or to apply for Greek citizenship. Equally discouraging protests came from some Jewish communities. For example, the chief rabbi David Papo of Baghdad practically bragged about the fact that enlistment was unpopular among the local
population. Only about 1,000 persons out of his community of 50,000 were ready to serve under the colors. He himself entertained serious reservations as to the possibility of observing the kosher practices in the barracks. Moreover, he did not believe in the ideal of a Jewish-Muslim fraternization; on the contrary, he was convinced that the new liberty promised by the Young Turks was hardly going to translate into real equality.\(^43\)

Neither did the neighboring Balkan countries, especially Greece and Serbia, view the new direction toward more equality among religions and races in the Ottoman Empire with any favor. When the Chimariotes, the inhabitants of a mountainous region in the Epirus, protested against conscription in early 1910, they received unequivocal support from Athens. The Greek government even tried to persuade Great Britain to intervene at the Porte on behalf of these Christian mountaineers, the minister for foreign affairs expressing “his gravest misgivings” in face of “the Turkish policy of disregarding ancient customs and privileges and attempting to enforce a dead uniformity throughout the Empire.”\(^44\) Even more remarkable were the views of Milovan Milovanović—the Serbian foreign minister in 1908-1912, the prime minister of Serbia in 1911-1912, and an architect of the Balkan Alliance of 1912—regarding the prospects of the Young Turk regime, expressed in early 1910 in an interview with the British ambassador in Vienna:

For him that “régime” is an eccentricity imported from Europe and grafted on the surface of the complicated Ottoman national life; it is not due to a reviving spirit which has sprung from the inner Turkish life and therefore has sunk no roots into the vital parts of the Turkish race. . . . Dr. Milovanovitch observed that there was only one source of vitality still left in the Ottoman dominions, and that lay in the old Turks who were held together by faith in their religion and who would never admit that the Christian races were on a level with themselves. The Young Turk ideal that all the races who live on Turkish soil can be welded together into one nation by a sense of patriotism is a dream.\(^45\)

In the summer of the same year, the Serbian foreign minister was reported as having said that personally “he did not believe that the Young Turkish régime had any great vitality in itself. He thought it would fail because it was not a real Mahometan movement.”\(^46\)

There were other internal as well as external factors that worked against a systematic implementation of the conscription law, or of any reform measure during this last phase of Ottoman rule. Secessionist aspirations put their mark on politics. The CUP-dominated government did not hesitate to implement authoritarian measures, suppressing civic liberties and even manipulating elections.\(^47\) Protracted uprisings in Albania and Yemen since 1910 further undermined any faith in the future of the multiethnic empire. Politically discredited and socially alienated from the masses, the
CUP was totally deprived of its influence by the time the Italians invaded
Ottoman Tripoli (Libya) in 1911.

From May 1911, when the last CUP member resigned from the cabinet, until Enver Bey’s coup in January 1913, the Unionists were not only marginal-
ized politically but also persecuted by the police. On May 18, 1911, for example, their newspaper Tanin was banned. However, the cabinets of Said
Pasha (September 30, 1911–July 16, 1912) and Ahmed Muhtar Pasha (July
22, 1912–October 29, 1912) had their hands full with attending to the most
elementary business in order to keep the various parts of the dissolving
empire together and could hardly contemplate implementing any signifi-
cantly new policy, except perhaps that the rather pronounced centralism of
their Unionist predecessors was now replaced by a more conciliatory ap-
proach to local demands for autonomy. For example, the new minister of
foreign affairs in the cabinet of Ahmed Muhtar Pasha, Gabriel Noradungh-
ian Efendi, assured the German ambassador on July 27, 1912, that his gov-
ernment was determined to satisfy all Albanian wishes regarding autonomy
in a very generous way and that the same would apply afterward to Macedo-
nia and perhaps Arabia.48

Contemporary observers were unanimous in their opinion that the Porte
was very much worried about a conflagration in the Balkans in the summer
of 1912. Ironically, it was perhaps this readiness to grant autonomy to an
Albania that would also have encompassed the Kosovo and parts of the
Yanina vilayets that prompted the Balkan states to go into action.49 Already
in March 1912, Serbia and Bulgaria had reached an agreement on their respec-
tive zones of influence in Ottoman Macedonia, and on July 2 of the same
year these two Balkan states signed a military convention directed against
the Ottoman Empire. By August, the Ottoman general staff was aware that
Bulgaria and Serbia had started to reinforce their border units, but con-
sciously waived the necessary countermeasures lest Bulgaria get irritated.50
On September 21, the cabinet in Istanbul held an extraordinary meeting to
discuss urgent reports arriving from the envoy in Sofia who warned that the
Balkan states were going to create a military fait accompli within the next
few days. Yet, the Porte decided to remain calm, and no preparations were
to be undertaken, as the German ambassador reported to Berlin.51

This astonishing immobility had to do with the desolate military situa-
tion of the empire.52 Major Tyrrell, the British military attaché in Istanbul,
diagnosed the Ottoman plight two weeks before the beginning of hostilities
in Thrace with remarkable precision: The Ottomans were finally compelled
to issue orders for a general mobilization (October 1). All classes of reserves,
including mustahfiz (men up to 45 years of age), in the 1st, 2nd, 5th, and 6th
Redif Inspections, in other words, in the whole empire except Kurdistan,
Mesopotamia, and Arabia, were summoned to the colors. Since the regular,
that is, the *nizam* infantry in Europe was numerically weak, ten reserve (*redif*) divisions of the 2nd Class were assembling, “but these have had little training, are very short of officers, and their quality may be taken as poor.” In his opinion,

the Turkish position in Thrace, which would probably be the scene of the main operations, is [ . . . ] by no means an enviable one to be in when the country is on the brink of war [ . . . ] Abdullah Pasha, who will command the main army on this side, is very despondent. He told me that he sincerely hoped that war might yet be averted; that owing to the dismissal of so many men recently, and to the hopeless dislocation of the forces by the formation of the Smyrna and Dardanelles armies and by the expeditions to Albania, they were in an impossible situation; the battalions were mostly not more than 300 strong, and that it was impossible to mobilise or concentrate in time.\\(^{53}\)

Could the Ottoman High Command count on the loyalty of the non-Muslim recruits, who made up one-fourth of the whole mobilized army, in the approaching war with the Christian Balkan states?\\(^{54}\) Aram Andonian, whose daily description of the course of the war appeared in an İstanbul paper during 1912–1913, maintained that it would be too much to expect the Greeks, the Bulgarians, and the Serbs to fight enthusiastically against their conationals and that, therefore, only the Armenians and the Jews would serve loyally.\\(^{55}\) The Ottoman High Command agreed, but it had other worries as well. For example, the employees on the railroad lines in European Turkey were mostly of Bulgarian or Greek descent—would they not try to sabotage the Ottoman mobilization efforts?\\(^{56}\) This question received no satisfactory answer throughout the war, especially since the railway in Thrace had deteriorated by October into an unserviceable state. The director of the operating company pointed out that defeated soldiers and especially officers in flight had forced their way to the trains at stations, demanding immediate departure under threat of arms. No wonder that the entire personnel had disappeared.\\(^{57}\)

The mobilization was from the outset a failure. No enthusiasm for the war could be discerned anywhere in the empire. A German officer, who happened to be in Syria in the fall of 1912, noted that Christian Arabs were being urged by their clergy and community elders not to enter the army. The overwhelming majority thus either bought themselves free or fled.\\(^{58}\) Disturbing news also arrived from Ma’muratü’l-Aziz vilâyet, where men of military age were fleeing to North America.\\(^{59}\) In Cilicia, too, the military preparations made slow progress, as was reported to the German embassy. Whoever could, tried to evade the conscription. The local branch of the Deutsche Orientbank was approached by many for an advance of about 40 pounds, the exact amount needed to buy exemption from service. The port of Mersin was placed under police cordon with a view to
hindering desertion. Yet many young men managed to escape to Cyprus by sailboat via the port of Silifke.\textsuperscript{60}

Ottoman authorities took some precautionary measures against treason. Directors and teachers of the Bulgarian schools in the vilâyet of Edirne were summarily arrested and deported to İstanbul, where they were detained in the Selimiye barracks. The Bulgarian exarch pleaded their innocence, reminding the authorities that while he was not against the punishment of traitors, these people as well as the detained priests and notables in Macedonia were loyal citizens, their wives and children left behind in a wretched and precarious situation.\textsuperscript{61} From an answer of the general staff to an inquiry of the Ministry of Interior regarding this question, it becomes clear that this group of “suspicious persons” (şübheli eşhas) arrested in Edirne comprised 105 Bulgarians and one Muslim.\textsuperscript{62} But many others were also arrested and deported (to Diyarbakır, Sinop, and Kastamonu, among other places). Some Greeks, whose whereabouts were a mystery as late as May 1913, were detained one night while observing with flashlights in hand the passage of Ottoman artillery near Edirne. The Ministry of War answered an inquiry by the Ministry of Interior in this connection by pointing out that such arrests had been carried out under express orders from the Ministry of Interior and that the Ministry of War did not possess any information on the missing persons. On the other hand, it was quite possible that they belonged to that group of people arrested under political charges and then transferred to various localities in Asia Minor; in that case, it was utterly impossible to supply information about them.\textsuperscript{63}

Some Bulgarians and Greeks deported to İzmit were later exchanged against Ottoman civil servants in Edirne, who were exposed to retaliation after the town had been occupied by the Bulgarian army (March 26, 1913) on account of their presumed role in the arrest of Bulgarians during the mobilization.\textsuperscript{64} Also interesting is the case of some peasants, 22 men and 18 women, all reapers (orakçı) in a farm near Büyük Çekmece, who had been detained, evidently on account of the proximity of their location to Çatalca, and then deported all the way to Sinop on the Black Sea. Even after peace had been concluded (July 10, 1913), nobody seemed to miss them. It was the mutasarrıf of Sinop who applied on September 29, 1913, for their return, arguing that since the war was over there was no serious reason to keep this people away from their homes, not forgetting to add that feeding them was a burden on the local treasury, each receiving five piastres per diem by way of public support.\textsuperscript{65}

The hostilities along the Bulgarian-Ottoman border in Thrace began on October 22, 1912. As predicted by the experts, it was immediately clear that the Ottoman army was not prepared for this war. A German officer in Ottoman service, who had taken part in these frontline operations, put it:
Men, demoralized by bad weather, inadequate clothing, especially the miserable footwear, since days without rations, without officers who could do something, [ . . . ] had already at the outset run out of ammunition on account of shooting erratically. Since no new ammunition was coming in, a battalion had started to retreat, dragging along the other, advancing columns as well. Nothing was lost yet, apparently the enemy had not noticed anything.\textsuperscript{66}

Who was responsible for such panic? From the start, observers were preoccupied with this question. Colonel Tupschoefski, who had participated in the battle near Vize in Thrace, described the situation of the Ottoman army in rather optimistic terms. In his opinion the regular troops were fighting well. The redifs were causing recurrent panic, and it was a great mistake of the Turks to have employed them in the front lines of the army anyway. He insinuated that the pro-Entente faction around Kamil Pasha in Istanbul, as well as the local Russians and Greeks, should be held responsible for the all-pervasive defeatism.\textsuperscript{67}

The British military attaché, a keen observer, offered the following explanation: I now find that when the mobilization took place the men, who had already been under arms, including those who had just been dismissed from their nizam service (two classes), were for the most part unwilling to come out again, saying that it was now their neighbours turn, etc. The Government did not feel able to deal with this sort of thing. There was already enough discontent in the country on account of the continual calls to arms, as has been shown by various cases of insubordination and mutiny which had arisen among troops clamouring to be dismissed. The Constitution has taught even the Anatolian peasant to exact his legal rights, and he is no longer the passive instrument of orders given by superior authority that he was in the bad old days.\textsuperscript{68}

What role did the non-Muslim recruits play in this debacle? Mahmud Muhtar Pasha, the minister of the navy and the son of the grand vezir, was the commanding general of the divisions on the right flank of the front in Thrace. Writing immediately after the war, he tried to counter the impression that the Ottoman army was demoralized primarily by the lack of patriotism of its non-Muslim soldiers. It was true that many Christians had changed sides already during the first encounters with the enemy. But how about the subsequent defeats? One could hardly attribute them to the “treason” of some Christian recruits, for already “in the second battle . . . there was no Christian soldier left in our ranks.”\textsuperscript{69} Obviously, this was not a statement conducive to the clarification of the question.

There were contemporaries who were more straightforward in their appraisals. The Austro-Hungarian consul Herzfeld, who experienced the siege of Edirne (Adrianople) from within the fortress, openly blamed Ottoman Christians, specifically the Bulgarians and Greeks, for having contributed to
the catastrophic defeat: “As soldiers they often went over to the enemy, or they deserted; as peasants they destroyed railway tracks, blew up bridges and cut telegraph lines, as irregulars they served virtually as ersatz until the Bulgarian troops arrived.”

Lt. Colonel Bernard Boucabeille intimated that the non-Muslim recruits had exercised at best a negative influence on their Muslim comrades. According to Richard von Mach, a prolific journalist of the period, however, the Ottomans had resorted to most foolish means: Statements by prisoners indicated that Christians, even elderly men of over 40 who had never served before, had been goaded together in order to fill the ranks.

The assessment by another prominent military journalist of the period reads like a virtual apologia for the army of Abdülhamid. It was true that the Hamidian army was not well trained in comparison with its counterparts in Europe, but it had preserved its religious unity; only Muslims were allowed to serve in it. Interviews that Leon Trotsky conducted as a war correspondent in Bulgaria support this remarkable impression. Trotsky concluded that the enlistment of Christians was bound to undermine the conviction that Islam was the only moral tie between the state and the armed forces, something that contributed to the demoralization of the simple-minded Muslim soldier. Especially ill-boding for the future was the report of yet another foreign observer who quoted a Turkish officer lying wounded in the Gülhane Hospital in İstanbul as having told him that “all the disasters had been caused by the Christians in the army and the Bulgarian Komitadjis within Turkish lines. He manifestly believed the statement, and a similar conviction, even more forcibly expressed, exists amongst the lower classes.”

The prevailing opinion among the European observers of the theaters of war crystallized the conviction that the non-Muslim recruits, mostly Greeks and Bulgarians, had “made common cause with their co-nationals and thereby introduced the first germs of confusion into the Turkish lines.” Modern research has mostly neglected the question delineated above. Thus, Glen W. Swanson, in an otherwise interesting article, simply points out that “while most Muslims accepted their military duties, non-Muslims and other formerly exempt citizens usually shrugged off their opportunity to be equal to the Muslim Anatolian peasant in military service.” In a more recent study we find again the claim that “the army could hardly rely on the numerous Bulgarians, Greeks, and Serbs residing within the empire to fight loyally against their co-nationals.” It is evidently in full conformity with this general trend, when the author of a publication authorized by the Turkish general staff, while admitting that the causes of the Ottoman failure were manifold, nevertheless claims that one of them was surely the participation of Christian and Jewish recruits in the first battles.
How did the Ottomans react in the wake of such a traumatic defeat? At the outset, there was a wave of official persecution and punishment of traitors. For example, a certain Nicholas and four of his comrades, who, although Ottoman subjects, had fought against the Ottoman troops during the Greek occupation of Lesbos, were condemned to death by the military tribunal of İzmir. Persons who had “molested” the Muslim population in the vilâyets of Aydın, Edirne, and Cezayir-i Bahr-i Sefid (Aegean Islands) were arrested and condemned to heavy penalties by the military tribunals of İzmir and Adrianople. And there was an inquiry into the property of a certain Lefter Efendi, the former surgeon on board the Ottoman destroyer Yarhisar, who had deserted to Greece. But many reported cases of treason were to remain uninvestigated, since the next great war was just around the corner.

As indicated in the beginning, however, historically crucial was the fact that the Balkan War of 1912–13 marked the end of Ottomanism as a multicultural project. Muslim intellectuals in a now diminished empire tried to draw lessons from the catastrophe. The general tenor of their discussions was that the humiliation of the defeat meant simultaneously the chance for a “national rebirth,” as expressed—at a time when the cannonade at Çatalca could be heard in Constantinople—by Köprülü Zade Fuad, one of the distinguished personalities of the future Turkish republic.

The atmosphere of national humiliation enabled the CUP to return to power by a military coup in early 1913, establishing a virtual dictatorship. Under the new conditions, a more effective mobilization was feasible, the chief ideological proponents of which were Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924) and Yusuf Akçura (1878–1935). An adherent of solidaristic corporatism à la Durkheim, Gökalp regarded free market economy and representative parliamentary democracy—fundamental goals of Young Ottoman liberalism since the 1860s—as anachronistic institutions, aspiring instead to a tripartite synthesis of cultural Turkism, ethical Islamism, and Durkheimean solidarism. This predicated a restructuring of the political system according to the principle of occupational representation and a “national economy” in the interest of (Muslim) small-producers, the latter goal being championed by Akçura, the founder of the journal Türk Yurdu, who had already written off multicultural Ottomanism as a viable policy in 1904 in favor of a Pan-Turkist ethnic nationalism. Of special interest in the context of this chapter is Akçura’s Darwinist perception of society, which seemed to justify his characterization of “the native Jews, Greeks, and Armenians” in 1916 as “the agents and middlemen of European capitalism” and his belief that “if the Turks fail to produce among themselves a bourgeois class [. . .], the chances of survival of a Turkish society composed only of peasants and officials will be very slim.”
This shift of emphasis was also reflected in practical politics. The Treaty of Constantinople between Bulgaria and the CUP government, signed in September 1913, provided for a reciprocal exchange of populations living in a specified zone along the common border. The pertinent populations, roughly 50,000 on each side, had, however, already fled, so that the treaty’s stipulations had meaning only with regard to regulating property matters in retrospect.  

Worse befell the Ottoman Greeks living in Western Anatolia in the first half of 1914, a large number of whom were compelled to seek refuge on the nearby islands. The agents of this “ethnic cleansing” were no marauding soldiers but local Muslim peasants, “so peaceful and honest, whose tranquility and gentleness are proverbial,” who were incited to attack their Greek neighbors.  

These violent events paved the way for another population exchange, this time between the Greek and Ottoman governments, which reached an agreement in June 1914 stipulating a regulated exchange of the Muslims of Macedonia for the Greek Orthodox of the province of İzmir and Eastern Thrace.  

Before this agreement could be implemented, however, World War I broke out, and the remaining Greeks of Aegean Anatolia were deported to places in the interior.  

The Unionists must have viewed the coming of the war as a chance to solve the national question—in fact the whole Eastern Question—in conformity with their “ethnic engineering” inspired by positivism and Social Darwinism.  

More comprehensive and radical measures taken against the Armenians in 1915–16 can be seen in this framework—measures that were accompanied by recurrent massacres, culminating in the complete destruction of the Armenian communities of Asia Minor.
Dr. Mehmed Reşid was among the founders of the İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti (Committee of Union and Progress, CUP). But unlike cofounder Dr. Abdullah Cevdet, or other émigrés from Russia, Dr. Ali Hüseyinzade and Yusuf Akçura, he did not excel intellectually. Neither was he a member of the hard core of the CUP that had been forming since 1906. Rather idealistic, and fancying himself to be incorruptible, he lacked the pragmatic sense of power of colleagues such as Dr. Nâzım and Bahaeddin Şakir, or of his future boss, Minister of the Interior Tâlât Bey. All the more, he can be seen as a typical representative of the İttihadist generation with a middle-class background and Western-style education, while at the same time, a distrustful, proud and radical nationalist. How could a well-educated, upright patriot become a mass murderer?

Born in the Russian-administered Caucasus in 1873, Mehmed Reşid Şahingiray moved with his family to Istanbul in 1874. He became an Ottoman subject, grew up in the Ottoman capital and studied at the Military Medical School. After the Young Turkish Revolution of 1908, he decided to change over from medicine to the civil administration and became a governor of the district and finally, in 1915, governor (vali) of the province of Diyarbakır. A small elite, made up of a few dozen people led by a handful of figureheads, profoundly affected the fate of Turkey between 1908 and 1938. Dr. Reşid was particularly implicated in the expulsion of Greek Christians and the extermination of Armenians and Assyrians (Syriac Christians) in 1914–1916. The officious Türk Ansiklopedisi (Turkish Encyclopaedia) in its volume 32, published in 1978, presents him as a perfect patriot. Mithat Şükrü, CUP secretary general during World War I, says that many members of the party thoroughly shared the opinions of the vali of Diyarbakır, but that after the cease-fire of 1918 they changed their language.
Dr. Reşid is a terrifying figure, but there is also something tragic about him. A victim of the dynamics, fears, and ideals that he shared with the members of his party, he, unlike many others, did not have the time to rewrite his past. The writings he left behind therefore retain, in all their subjectivity, a rare authenticity.3 Indeed he met an atypical end. Unlike the vast majority of İttihadists (CUP members), he was unable to manage his personal transition from the war regime under Tâlât and Enver to the national movement under Mustafa Kemal. Neither did he manage to flee abroad, as did the great party leaders. A few days after the armistice he was arrested by the Ottoman authorities, who accused him of being responsible for the massacre of the Armenians and the murder of two kaymakams who, in 1915, had opposed his anti-Christian policies in the province of Diyarbakır. He realized that he would be executed and therefore took his own life in February 1919, after having previously made an attempt to escape.

Mehmed Reşid Şahingiray is part of what can be called the first Young Turkish cohort. Like the second Young Turkish cohort, it came primarily from the middle class and from outside the capital, where it generally studied at the state elite schools. Unlike the second cohort, its seminal intellectual experience was not the Turkist awakening—the ethnonationalist self-articulation as members of a “Turkish nation” in the 1910s. Rather, its first concern was how to save the Ottoman Empire, considered as the last defense of the Islamic world against imperialist European powers. This was particularly true for the “Turks” (term used as synonym for the Muslims) from Russia who lived as émigrés in İstanbul, the seat of the sultanate and caliphate. Mehmed Reşid was part of a social stratum of often bourgeois Russian Muslim immigrants who decisively influenced the Turkish national movement from the end of the nineteenth century. It is within the circles of Turkish-speaking Muslims from Russia that from the outset Islam was integrated into Turkish nationalism, and Turkism was born. This prepared the move to the general ethnonational “awakening” among educated Turks in the 1910s within the broad movement of the Foyers turcs (Türk yurdu and Türk ocağı).4 It is worth noting that the atmosphere in late tsarist Russia’s urban centers and particularly among its diasporas in Western Europe and Istanbul led to the creation of movements that decisively shaped the Eastern European and Middle Eastern world in the twentieth century: revolutionary socialism as well as revolutionary ethnic nationalism among Poles, Armenians, Muslims, Jews, and others. These diasporas were hotbeds of Turkism, Zionism, Armenianism, and other nationalisms.5

“Revolution” in the political history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries means legitimizing violence against those considered enemies of the project to be realized. The revolutionary project to be realized in the fin de siècle was the abolition of Abdülhamid’s “despotism” in order to make
progress and strengthen the empire. The Turkist project to be implemented in the 1910s was different: it was to “inject,” as the founders of the *Foyers* put it, into a whole academic generation “the great national goal,” that is, awak-

ening, educating, and building up a modern ethnonation from the Turkish-

speaking Muslims in Anatolia.⁶ In 1897, Mehmed Reşid, pointing to the Hamidian system, had declared “war on those who harass the fatherland from within.”⁷ As sincere as the patriotic commitment of the young doctor may have been, it carried in itself a powerful categorical vision of evil. Prob-

ably at the end of 1896, he asked for permission to hire some “bloodthirsty anarchists” and send them to assassinate the sultan, known as the “great despotic satan.”⁸ The revolutionary hatred was openly expressed in the Young Turks’ early imaginations against Abdülhamid. They frequently used medical and biological metaphors to argue “scientifically” what they con-

sider wrong with their enemy.⁹

Whereas the broad and influential movement of the *Foyers turcs*, founded in 1911, had a strong Turkist molding, the Committee of Union and Pro-

gress, founded twenty-two years earlier, was nationalist in an Ottoman Mus-

lim sense. Significantly, both movements originated at the Military Medical School, *Mekteb-i Tıbbiye-i Askeriye*, in Constantinople.¹⁰ At the end of the century, the Military Medical School was the meeting point of three ele-

ments fundamental to the Turkish national movement of the following
decades: Western science, elitist political conspiracy, and military institu-

tion. A former *Tıbbiyeli* (student of this school) from the end of the century, conveyed the atmosphere and attitude among the students:

“The classrooms and the rooms of the final-year students were all centers of learning. There, one read, wrote, treated and discussed everything,” writes Cevrî (probably a pseudonym for Dr. Reşid).¹² On May 21, 1889, according to Cevrî, five students from the Military Medical School—*Arabkirî* Abdullah Cevdet, *Kafkasyalî* Mehmed Reşid, *Ohrîlî* İbrahim Edhem (Temo), *Diyarbakîrî* İshak Süküti, and *Konyalî* Hikmet Emin—formed the conspira-
torial core that would soon assume the name of *İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti*, Committee of Union and Progress (CUP).¹³ They were all convinced that
“the dear fatherland was heading for disaster.” Mehmed Reşid wondered how a large secret society could be erected that might win the battle “against the great despotic Satan,” Abdülhamid. İbrahim Temo reassured him by pointing to the example of the Greek committee *Etniki Heteria*. The conspiracy was sealed by handshake. In 1893, a large majority of the *Askeri Tibbiyeli* were to be members of the CUP, each with numbers and code-names to ensure secrecy.

“It was a student’s pleasure which delighted me no end, that we would mock the administration, the sultan, people in high positions and other grave matters, and that we would make fun of religion,” wrote one *Tibbiyeli*. The *Tibbiyeli* called the school laboratory “the edifice of wisdom.” Man was nature’s product, determined by the laws of nature, by race, and by the law of “survival of the fittest.” In place of God was impersonal nature as conceived by the leading sciences of the end of the century (biology, chemistry, physics). Religion and devotion to the Hamidian system went hand-in-hand. Religious education, which was mandatory in school, culminated in the phrase: “Be a soldier under Abdül Hamid Han / He must be obeyed by order of the Koran.” Every evening, in accordance with military discipline, the *Tibbiyeli* fell into rank to shout “Long live the sultan.” But they preferred to remain silent or to transform the phrase into a curse, and so by contrast devised slogans exalting the fatherland, the nation, freedom and science.

In a booklet written in 1909, Cevrî informs us of open student propaganda activities in response to the great anti-Armenian pogroms of 1894–1896:

*After the painful event which the massacre of the Armenians (1310–1312) was, we decided on a new strategy, which on the one hand consisted of attracting the attention of Europe, and on the other, of informing the people of the crimes committed by the despotic government.* This greatly frightened the government, for in spite of strict police surveillance, we distributed pamphlets in public places and put up many declarations for example on the walls of police stations and the palace, or in mosques, schools, boats and trams.

What was the content of these leaflets? Cevrî sums it up:

*All peoples bearing the title of “Ottoman” are brothers. The massacre of the Armenians in Istanbul [August 1896] is a shame to Ottomans, but without a doubt, it is not the Turks, but the Hamidian government and its executioners who are to blame. Europe, demanding reforms in Turkey, is making use of this motif and wants to declare Turks barbarians and incapable of reforms. In order for the Yıldız [the sultan’s palace] not to fall into this trap, one must strive to unite the different Ottoman peoples, and to topple the despotic government. In short, if we do not wish our destruction, let us unite all Ottoman peoples, and let us strive for freedom and to reinstate the law.*
Another CUP leaflet of 1896 used a language less favorable to the Armenians, reproaching their defiance of “our state” through “insolent activities.” Moreover, the persecution by the Hamidian government and anti-Christian clichés, reinforced by the Russian Muslim émigrés, wiped out the major crime of the massacres of 1894–96 in the memory of the İttihadists; nonetheless, this crime was still prominent in the booklet published in 1909 (probably) by the CUP’s cofounder.

In 1894, Dr. Reşid became assistant to the German professor, Düring Pasha, at the hospital of Haydarpaşa. When the Hamidian police learned of his membership of the secret organization, he was arrested and exiled to Libya in 1897. Soon after his arrest he explained himself to soldiers returning from the Greco-Turkish War of the same year, for whom he uses the honorific term gazi:

“Like you, we have waged war for the fatherland. You have waged war against those who have attacked our fatherland from outside, and you have won. We have declared war on those who harass the fatherland from within, and we are sure that we will win. We call to account those who ruin our country, exploit our villages, and cause our enemies to insult our religion and our nation. [...] The Ottoman element is shrinking. Ottoman land is disappearing piece by piece. Of this, we are witnesses, and we know who the culprits are. In order to make all this evil disappear, in order to rescue our working village dwellers and feed them well, we have declared war on these libertines, these tyrants, these enemies of the fatherland [...].” Speaking these words, I experienced a nervous shudder. I understood that these words that sprang from my mouth mixed with tears were making a strong impression on our guardians.

This strong feeling of evil, fear of loss, and deadly hate of those considered culprits, make up the core of Reşid’s “radical personality.”

For ten years, Reşid stayed in Tripoli as a doctor in state service. There, sometime in 1901–1902, he married Mazlûme Hanım, daughter of adjutant major Ziya Bey, who was also living in exile. He seems to have had a happy time there, devoted to his family, to his job at the hospital, to discussions with his friends, and to some endeavors in education. In 1900 he prompted the exiles to open a library in which lectures were given to the inhabitants on basic subjects. After the Young Turk revolution, in August 1908, Mehmed Reşid returned from Tripoli to Constantinople with his other exiled friends. In December, he was promoted to adjutant major, and worked as a military doctor for a couple of months. At the end of 1908, he tried to establish himself politically in the capital. It is during this time that he very probably wrote a booklet on the genesis of the Young Turk revolution. “In order better to serve my country, I found it necessary to change my profession.” On 20 August 1909, he resigned from military service.
In the capital, the old exile became involved in politics. It seems surprising to see him temporarily associate himself with the movement of Prince Sabahaddin, which was constituted as a liberal party, Fırka-i Ahrar, in September 1908. Why did Reşid Bey want to join them? We lack sufficient information to provide a clear and straightforward answer. Like the other surviving founders of the CUP, he was no longer at the center of the party he had founded. What appealed to him in Sabahaddin’s group was no doubt the emphasis laid on private initiative, for he was skeptical of the state as it presented itself at the time, with Hamidian functionaries still in place. Besides, he was not against decentralization on condition that it would take place under the roof of Muslim unity. But the prince’s consideration for minorities could hardly have pleased him. In the tense atmosphere prevailing in the capital after the attempted coup of April 1909 (31 Mart Vakası), those with political ambitions had to tread carefully. As a matter of fact, in the same year, Dr. Reşid found himself no longer associated with Sabahaddin. Looking back, Ahmet Bedevi Kuran, a friend and disciple of the prince, wrote: “Recognizing that the Committee for Union and Progress was unwilling to compromise, a few figures from Teşebbüsü Şahsi [Sabahaddin’s Party of Private Initiative] . . . came to terms with Union and Progress by accepting the positions offered to them. . . . Dr. Reşid was among those who changed sides.”

On October 9, 1909, Mehmed Reşid was installed as kaymakam of İstanköy in the Archipelago. In February 1910 he was promoted to mutasarrıf of Hums in the province of Tripoli (Lebanon), only to be removed in June 1911, accused by the provincial authorities of having failed to remain impartial in the administrative affairs of the sancak. A memorandum on the state of Tripoli, probably addressed to the vali, sheds some light on the reasons behind the mutiny. Dr. Reşid complains of the grave insufficiency of medical care and preventative measures for civilian travelers in thekaza of Mısırat. He gives advice, and warns of the possibility of dire consequences for the entire province. This conduct, as justified as it might have been, was rather audacious for a kaymakam but was framed by a militant patriotic discourse: “My life bears witness to the fact that your servant does not waste his time on speeches, but instead devotes himself to action and to effort. I am proud of having been, at the age of seventeen, among the founders of Union and Progress. . . . Since that time, my life has served to bewail the misfortune of my nation and my country and to exact revenge on those responsible for this misfortune.” He gave an example of his zeal “for the defense of the rights of his country” by retelling an event that had occurred during the month preceding the revolution of 1908, when the parliament of the city of Tripoli (Libya) presided by Hasan Pasha wished to “give one of the most respectable landed properties to the Italians out of friendship for
Nejad Bey, son of the vali. Mehmed Reşid regarded this action as a crime against the fatherland: “In order to excite religious fervor [gayret-i diniye] and national zeal [hamiyet-i milliye], I was not ashamed to execrate the entire despotic government, including Abdül Hamid.” In a note above the line, he explains: “In crying out publicly that all those who perpetrated such a crime—Abdül Hamid, the vali, the city council—were traitors, I took neither my situation nor my future into account, nor even my own life, and proved that life would be without value to me if the fatherland were lost.”

Here again is a demonstration of Reşid’s radical personality as a committed patriot.

His patriotic confession was coupled with the conviction of having rendered excellent services as governor of Hums. He emphasizes the order and discipline acquired thanks to his kaymakamlık. Toward the end of the text, he declares, “Consequently, it is clear that I shall continue, as I have always done, to pursue with all my strength the duty which I consider as sacred as my honor.”

One hardly doubts the good faith of the author of this memorandum, who proudly presents himself as founder of the CUP, fervent patriot, and man of action. Even so, his intransigence is disconcerting. With the fervor of a Jacobean, he declares himself prepared to sacrifice everything for the highest patriotic value. Reserving no special treatment for either local notables or higher authorities, he wants to vent his anger on all those responsible in his eyes for the sufferings of “my nation.” By the outbreak of the War of Tripoli (September 1911–October 1912), we are dealing with a functionary Reşid prepared to go very far for his ideals.

After a brief intermezzo as mutasarrıf of Kozan, on July 25, 1911, Reşid Bey was appointed mutasarrıf of Lazistan (Rize), a post from which he was removed on September 10, 1912, for his belligerent behavior. Administrative inquiries followed that would, on November 7, 1912, return to Mehmed Reşid the right to continue in his office. Süleyman Nazif, at the time employed in the vilayet of Trebizond, in a retrospective article described the mutasarrıf of Lazistan as a legalist (kanunperest). But his incorruptible character inspired personal respect, and promoted discipline within the administration. It is not until after the establishment of the CUP’s dictatorship on January 23, 1913, that we see Mehmed Reşid once again solidly installed in a position. On June 7, 1913, he was very briefly reinstalled in Lazistan, and then, on July 8, 1913, appointed mutasarrıf of Karesi (province of Balıkesir), where he remained until July 23, 1914.

At Karesi, for the first time, the patriotic fervor of Dr. Reşid was expressed through large-scale anti-Christian actions. He was one of the protagonists of the policy of illegal expulsion of Greeks from the Aegean coast, a violent policy hardly concealed from diplomatic circles, and executed by party and government organs. The İttihadists saw it as retaliation for the evil which,
according to them, the Muslims under Greek domination had been suffering since the Balkan Wars. The person of the mutasarrıf of Karesi united party and government affiliation. His hasty deployment to the region seems to have served appropriate plans. Foremost, he devoted his office to the expulsion of the Rumlar (Greek-Orthodox Ottomans) and to the resettlement, to Bulgaristan, of the Bulgarians from the cities and villages of his government. Anti-Christian attitudes among İttihadists had come to the political surface and become radicalized during the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913. A year before the entry of the Ottoman Empire into World War I, the key players in the CUP had formed a highly destructive view of the Anatolian Christians as “a mortal worry,” as a race and a privileged class to be combated; as a “tumor” requiring an operation. Celal [Bayar] Bey, head of the Smyrna cell of the CUP in 1914, confirms in his memoirs that the CUP and the ministry of war, run by Enver since January 3, 1914, were, parallel to the regular activities of the government, working toward the liquidation of “concentrations of non-Muslims” in the Aegean region, and he details the methods of intimidation used in order to “encourage” them to emigrate. Especially after the international reactivation of the reform issue for the Eastern Provinces in 1913, the İttihadists established negative views of the Armenians similar to those of the Rumlar. The reactivation of the “Armenian reforms” had to do with the fact that the CUP had not been able to solve, as had been agreed with the Armenian Dashnaktsutiun (its electoral partner since 1908), the agrarian question in the Eastern provinces, which would have meant the restitution of Armenian property taken, mostly by Kurds during the great pogroms in the 1890s.

The Balıkesir Notları of Mehmed Reşid contain a blend of social frustration and nationalistic aversion. During an excursion between July 29 and August 7, 1913, he recorded the then current state of affairs, and projected a “better” future without Rumlar, writing on paper bearing the letterhead “Secretariat of the mutasarrıflik of Karesi.” The dream of a modern administration and infrastructure went hand-in-hand with the establishment of unrestricted Turkish-Muslim political, economic, and demographic domination. What resulted, was a polarized image: on the one hand, the Rumlar, socially envied and viewed all the less favorably because they were prospering in many places; and on the other hand, the good Muslims and their (sic!) state, which must be strengthened at all cost, because they were subject to exploitation and Christian intrigues.

In summer 1913, Mehmed Reşid was thus a high İttihadist functionary who, in his private notes, no longer considered the Ottoman Rumlar as compatriots (vatandaşlar), but as “foreigners” and internal enemies against whom the severest measures needed to be taken, including expropriation and expulsion. His life journey seems to have been the preparation for this.
In Karessi his rigorousness fueled dispositions that bore the imprint of social and national hate and of social, economic, ethnic, and demographic engineering. The goal was the installation of modern national structures, visible through good roads, tramways, beautiful public buildings, and the absence of multiculturalism. One had to shatter the regional reality as it then existed. The towns and villages needed to be replanned in order to strengthen the Muslim element and concentrate economic prosperity into its hands. Functionaries were needed who were more nationalist, as well as a police force that was better equipped.

Let us take a closer look at the Balikesir Notları. On the first day in İvrindi, he notes, “The [local] Rumlar have stayed perfectly Rum, made rich thanks to the Balya [mining] Company.” The following day in Edremit he accused the kaymakam of being “too closely and disagreeably connected with the [Orthodox] metropolitan.” With regard to the villages, he writes, “In this region, the villagers [Muslims] do relatively well. But they cannot duly profit from their produce or, better said, from their hard work. The monopolists and oppressors [Rum] do not permit them to open their eyes.” Here once again, the social cleavage which the author denounces is also seen in terms of ethnic opposition. Continuing, he writes, “In Edremit, a national and a commercial sentiment have awakened. A rivalry directed against the Christians has arisen.” What also disturbs the modernity projected by Reşid is the nomad phenomenon. “Here [in the region of Ilıca] there are Wallachs, coming from Teselya as nomads . . . . By the fact that they are mobile and nomadic, they constitute a risk to security. Some of them work as sawyers. They must all be expelled.”

Ayvalık appealed to Dr. Reşid, but it was “unfortunately a Greek [Yunan] city. The city is extremely prosperous, very ordered, the houses are very pretty. But the inhabitants are generally Rum. The writings in the shops are Greek [Rumca]; even the street names are Greek. The government has not been paying enough attention here.” To counter the weight of the Rumlar, he suggested as an urgent measure to “attach a few Muslim villages to the kaza and to establish active and prosperous [Muslim] traders and farmers on the territory of the kasaba. He considered it “necessary that in Ayvalık, the police officers were not indigenous non-Muslims, but that they still knew the [Greek] language.” What he found particularly “detestable” was the fact that the town hall building was the property of the metropolitan. On Yunda, an exclusively Rum island near Ayvalık, the mutasarrif deemed it “reasonable to introduce suitable immigrants [muhacir] there. Establishing a business-oriented and prosperous colony of Muslims who know the olive trade will help in keeping an eye on the Rumlar [Rumluk].” At the next halt in his journey, in Burhaniye, “a kasaba of 1700 houses, of which around 700 are Rum houses,” he once again complained of the fact that “unfortunately,”
the Rumlar were in control of commerce. A visit to the Balya Company confirmed his anti-Rum views. “The top management is made up of a few strangers, generally Rumlar and in particular, Greeks [Yunanlı], the lower employees are Laz, Kurds and Turks.” In order better to control the firm, he deemed it appropriate to “dismiss the secretary general of the firm, Prodromos, the chief engineer Kokitos and the head worker.” He henceforth appeared to conceptualize late Ottoman society in sweeping antagonistic categories of Islam and Turkishness versus Christianity, Rumluk and Ermenilik [Armenians].

The anti-Christian discourse, fed by social envy, became even more radical with regard to the Armenians portrayed as leeches on the Muslim element. According to him, as secretaries and bookkeepers to sheikhs, aghas, and Kurdish beys, they have subjected the latter “to the slavery of their economy.” As to the acts of violence committed by the tribes, in his eyes the first victims were the Muslim villagers, while the Armenians remain unscathed due to “the toadyism and base flattery peculiar to them.” We see here the same set of arguments as can be found in the anti-Semitism of the time. We find also the specter of biologism. In their “prosperous and fortunate” villages, the Armenians increase their population. Contrary to official İttihadist statistics careful to show a decreasing number of Armenians, Dr. Reşid insisted the Armenian population was growing and used this as an argument against claims that they were being persecuted. Contradicting his and the CUP’s own earlier sayings, he suppressed his knowledge about the anti-Armenian mass crimes of the 1890s.

In his categories he blended together “the enemy” of race, class, and religion, as did most Turkists in the 1910s. “Due to privileges too easily given, and also due to their own initiative,” wrote the Turkist and later Kemalist writer Moiz Kohen Tekinalp, the Christians of Asia Minor were “always more prosperous, increasingly driving out the true masters [sic!] of the land.” According to Tekinalp, the Armenians had “enriched themselves thanks to their good relations with the English.” With regard to the sacred goal of a national economy, millî iktisad, he ascertained with satisfaction, and without the slightest remorse that the widespread boycott movement (carried out before the secret expulsions in the first half of 1914) had “ruined hundreds of Greek and Armenian tradesmen.”

Unlike earlier cases, Mehmed Reşid does not seem to have ended his time in office in Karesi after falling out with local notables or regional authorities. He did pride himself on having removed the Rumlar without giving rise to protest. It was to the perfect satisfaction of the central government that he appeared to have fulfilled his task of organizing the deportations and grappling with infrastructural modernization. He found himself promoted to the rank of vali in July 1914, while at the same time his close
party comrade, the minister of the interior, Tâlât Pasha, proposed a particularly delicate post to him. In a letter of July 19, 1914, Tâlât insisted on offering him the charge of “secretary general of the inspectorate of the provinces of Van, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, and Mamuretülaziz,” while commending his devotion, his capabilities, and his efficiency. The international reform plan for the six Eastern Provinces, signed by the Porte under diplomatic pressure—also from Germany—on February 8, 1914, made provisions for two powerful inspectors from neutral countries. They were to control the process of reform, designed to stabilize the fragile coexistence of ethnic groups, enable the participation of all groups in regional politics, and establish a functioning rule of law.

But this plan ran counter to the CUP’s will to centralization, full sovereignty, and Turkist “nationalization” of Anatolia at the expense of the regions and the Christians. Indeed, the plan was rigorously denounced by the CUP as a first step toward Armenian autonomy, which would finally lead to Russian annexation. It was therefore necessary to hinder the imposed inspectorate as much as possible. The person best suited for this task was Dr. Reşid. Yet he would not take up his new office. The First World War offered the opportunity to get rid of the embarrassing question of reforms, which had been persistently raised diplomatically ever since the Congress of Berlin (1878). On August 13, 1914, three days before his superior, Inspector General Hoff, would be called back from Van, and without a replacement being appointed, Reşid Bey was named vali of Diyarbakır.

He immediately saw himself placed into other postings closer to the front: From September 10, he was vali of Basra, which fell on November 20. From November 24, 1914, until December 25 he was vice vali of Baghdad, probably to keep an eye on the vali, Süleyman Nazif, a critic of the régime. “At that point I found the mutasarrıf of Lazistan to have changed! . . . Instead of the old poised character and calm, there was an appalling arrogance and anger,” wrote the old vali in 1919, remembering that month in 1914. From January 10 to February 25, 1915, Dr. Reşid was vali of Mossul. Finally, he replaced Governor Hamid (Kapancı) Bey, whose valilik in Diyarbakır from September 17, 1914, to March 25, 1915, was distinguished by a relatively tolerant policy toward the Armenians, contrary to the wishes of the CUP. Reşid Bey’s judgment of Hamid Bey was harsh. “My predecessor did not govern. Totally indifferent, and giving himself to pleasure and amusement, he threw the affairs of the government into great chaos, and reduced the state’s hold to zero.” Dr. Reşid governed the province of Diyarbakır until March 2, 1916.

Thus, a functionary and party member who had been radicalized in his thoughts and actions since 1909 and deeply frustrated by the first months of the war, became governor of Diyarbakır in 1915. According to his own
words, he “removed” from his province 120,000 Armenians, of whom the majority were massacred, or died from exhaustion. This figure is nearly double the official Ottoman number of Armenians in the province of Diyarbakır. It corresponds roughly with that given by contemporary observers for the autochthonous Christians killed in the province.

What happened in Diyarbakır was already evident from testimony from foreign observers who were political friends of the Ottoman Empire. On July 31, 1915, the German ambassador in Constantinople informed the Chancellor of the Reich, Bethmann Hollweg, in Berlin of the murder of the Christians, saying, “Since the beginning of this month, the vali of Diyarbakır, Reşid Bey, has begun the systematic extermination of the Christian population in his province, without distinguishing between race or creed.” Why did the vali act in this way? A few months later, he explained himself during a conversation in Constantinople with Mithat Şükrü (Bleda), secretary general of the CUP at the time. His words express open social envy, an obsession with a general conspiracy, and the Social Darwinist idea that it was necessary to kill collectively in order collectively to survive. “We will liquidate them before they eliminate us.” There is the vision of a politically poisoned Armenian people, extending to a dehumanizing image of Armenian “bandits” and “microbes” within the “organism of the fatherland.” To eliminate them was the duty with which the vali Dr. Reşid saw himself to be charged. Explicitly, he abandoned the medical code of ethics where the salvation of Turkishness was concerned.

Either they us, or we them. In this situation, I thought to myself: “Hey, Dr Reşid! There are two alternatives: Either the Armenians will liquidate the Turks, or the Turks will liquidate them!” . . . Faced with the necessity of having to choose, I did not hesitate for long. My Turkishness triumphed over my identity as a doctor. Before they do away with us, we will get rid of them, I said to myself. . . . But I did not accomplish this deed either to satisfy my personal pride or to enrich myself. I had seen that the fatherland [vatan] was about to be lost, therefore, I proceeded eyes closed and without consideration, convinced that I was acting for the welfare of the nation. If my own [national] history were to call me to account for this, my conduct—nothing doing. The history of other peoples may write about me what it will, it does not trouble me in the least. . . . The Armenian bandits were a load of harmful microbes that had afflicted the body of the fatherland. Was it not the duty of the doctor to kill the microbes?

When Reşid Bey arrived in Diyarbakır at the end of March 1915, he was confronted with a situation difficult in several regards. The state had little authority, the security forces were weak, the population was agitated and anxious, while the large number of deserters, Muslims and non-Muslims, made internal security problems more acute. The Muslims feared an invasion by
The Russians, who had been victorious since the Ottoman defeat at Sarıkamış, while on the western front, the British were preparing the invasion of Gallipoli. What was feared by some was a hope to others. The Christians had suffered the most from frequently brutal requisitions since general mobilization in August 1914. Their stores in the bazaar in Diyarbakır had been burnt and looted on August 19, 1914. The memory of the great massacres of the end of the century was still fresh. To many Armenians and especially the young people, a good number of whom were deserters, the abolition of the reform plan for the Eastern Provinces and the voluntary entry into the war on the side of Germany had destroyed any acceptable prospect of life under the regime currently in place, whose downfall they were hoping for. Sometimes, they audaciously expressed their views in the streets or in the cafés. They were aware of the disarming of the Armenian soldiers, separated into work battalions since February and exposed to massacre. Aggravating the situation in the provinces was the fact that, ever since the centralizing reforms of the Tanzimat, the tribes, mostly Kurdish but also Nestorian, were rebellious and the institution of the state did not function properly in their region.

Mehmed Reşid learned of the great number of Armenian deserters (he does not mention the numerous Muslim deserters). He was appalled by the fact that they moved freely even in the city. They were impertinent in his eyes, and he thought he heard them say, in the hope of a rapid Russian breakthrough: “Up to now, you have been the ruling nation [millet-i hâkime], but now it is for us to dominate, and for you to be subjugated.” He saw or believed to see them as well armed, organized, and conspiring to stage a general rebellion. In equal manner, an important number of Muslims in the city were also seized by the specter of a Christian conspiracy. These he ably succeeded in submitting to his will and organizing, before he delivered a fatal blow to the Christian minority. More than fear, however, it was probably booty that compelled them to line up behind, or even urge on the new vali. If Süleyman Nazif is to be believed, many Muslims feared him and hated him for his brutality. According to Nazif, it was exclusively the lower masses, together with the militia and policemen brought in from outside, who participated in pillaging and murdering the Armenians. “I have learned with satisfaction that in Diyarbakır, not a single notable has been involved in the matters of deportation and massacre,” Süleyman Nazif wrote in 1919.

This however is not entirely true. Rather it is a statement typical of the months after the First World War, when Muslim patriots, among them Nazif, made up the Association for the Defense of the National Rights in the Eastern Provinces. The propaganda of this association had an interest in placing all blame on Dr. Reşid and the men he brought with him. The fact is that several local notables had closely collaborated with the vali, among them Pirinççizâde Feyzi and Cemilpaşazâde Mustafa, both sons of
local dignitaries and responsible for the anti-Armenian massacres in 1895. That earlier massacre, as well as the existence of a self-assured local committee called Young Turk (of which by the way young Nazif had been a propelling ideologist), not to mention a long, strongly anti-Armenian telegram defying the sultan that had been sent to the sultan by this committee on November 4, 1895, all suggest a powerful long-term anti-Christian potential and agency in Diyarbakır. This has to be considered as a factor for the particularly murderous outcome in that province, beside reasons related to Dr. Reşid himself.

Several of the notables cooperating with Dr. Reşid threw their lot in with the nationalist organization put up in 1919. This is true, for example, of Pirinççizâde Feyzi, a deputy of the Ottoman parliament and representative of the CUP club in the city. Together with a second deputy of Diyarbakır, Zülfı Bey, he had agitated for the dismissal of the moderate vali, Hamid. As his interview with the British vice-consul of Diyarbakır on August 27, 1914, demonstrates, Feyzi believed in a funny mixture of Panislamism and Pan-turkism, hoping—like Enver—for miracles from the war to come. If the Armenians were really loyal, he said, they would instigate rebellion against Russian rule in the Caucasus in favor of the Ottomans. In a language similar to that of other high CUP members in 1914, he openly threatened the Armenians with destruction. He was vice-president of the local High Council, which the new vali founded and presided over, and organized the murder of deportees by Kurdish tribes. Thus at the end of May 1915 he seems to have made a trip to the region of Djezireh (Cizre), bargained there with Kurdish chiefs and finally taken with him as aides-de-camps Amaro and Mustafa, the sons of the late İbrahim Pasha, head of the tribal confederation of the Milli. Whereas İbrahim had protected all Christians under his influence during the pogroms of 1895, Amaro’s men were organized as murderers of the deportees.

Dr. Reşid had brought with him a loyal troop of around 30 men, mainly Circassians. It was a strike force, probably linked to the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa. They were joined by the policemen already there. Furthermore, a militia of about a thousand volunteers, partly criminals, was organized under the command of Cemilpaşazâde Mustafa. Strengthened by this support, the vali succeeded in searching all the Armenian houses in the city, arrested hundreds of deserters, and confiscated a large quantity of arms. In perfect keeping with what had been organized in the cities of other provinces, the vali of Diyarbakır demanded the immediate surrender of the deserters and their arms, and, in order to intimidate and paralyze the Armenians, had the heads of the community arrested and tortured. Among the 1,600 notables arrested in April and at the beginning of May, there were also Assyrians.
On May 25, 1915, the müfti (religious official) listed the names of the prisoners that had been assembled in the court of the prison and read them a telegram from the capital that announced their deportation to Mosul. According to one source, the müfti Ibrahim and the kadi Necib asked in the following decisive meeting of the High Council to spare the Armenian children from the planned comprehensive destruction by converting them to Islam. But Dr. Reşid, Feyzi, Zülfi, and others were opposed. In June, when the general deportation began, the müfti succeeded, however, in convincing several families to apostatize in order to save their lives. According to the Dominican missionary J. Rhétoré, 350 Armenian families of the Gregorian (Armenian Apostolic) faith, 25 Armenian Catholic, and 12 Chaldean families converted. For each conversion the family of the müfti was said to have received a considerable sum of money. But these Islamized families were, nevertheless, later deported in agreement with the explicit policy of the ministry of the interior.

A witness by the name of Floyd Smith, a doctor associated with American missionaries (the ABCFM) in Diyarbakır since 1913, describes the searches and arrests as follows: “The police in searching houses took anything they wished. Books and papers were sure to bring condemnation to a household. Rape of women was a common accompaniment of police research. Finally the prisons were full and typhus began.—It had been present throughout the winter in the city.” Right up to the first weeks of the valilik of Reşid, Dr. Smith enjoyed intact relations with the government. Afterward, the vali refused any meeting with the “colleague.” Because of his work, Dr. Smith was perfectly aware of what was happening in the Christian quarter. He confirms the government’s precarious position in view of the general problem of desertion before the arrival of Mehmed Reşid:

During the winter many Armenians had evaded military service by means of the roofs. (One who knows Diyarbakır realises that it is possible for an expert to go all over the city and not descend unto the street.) A far larger force of police than was at hand would have been necessary to apprehend these men. They finally became so confident of their ability to avoid capture that they played cards etc. almost under the Vali’s nose (this was the first vali [Hamid Bey] we had during our stay). He at last became incensed and gave the Gregorian Bishop [Tchilgadian] to understand that unless these men surrendered, drastic measures would be undertaken. On the strength of this the Bishop and the Dragoman of the vilayet [Dikran Ilvanian] went upon the roofs and lectured the men, telling them that they were bringing ruin upon themselves and the whole Christian quarter. As a result quite a number surrendered. This occurred the last of February.

Floyd Smith makes it clear to what extent the situation worsened with the arrival of the new governor:
The vali was superseded early in March. By getting a large force of police and gendarmes the new vali (Reşid Bey) succeeded in apprehending the larger part of these men. He soon started the imprisonment of prominent Armenians using as justification the false statement that they were sheltering deserters. . . . Then a search for arms was made and several bombs unearthed, some rifles and ammunition found. Evidently there was a revolutionary committee and some ideas in some heads of doing things, but I am sure that the large majority of Christians were opposed to any such proceedings. Most people had weapons in their houses in remembrance of the event of twenty years ago, but I feel positive that there was no idea of a general uprising. About the first of April a proclamation was posted demanding arms. Men were imprisoned right and left and tortured to make them confess the presence and place of concealments of arms. Some went mad under the torture.

Confessions of some sort were extracted. An Armenian close to the ABCFM was made to sign an absurd document saying that the ABCFM was preparing an insurrection in Diyarbakır and that its “agent,” Dr. Smith, was an Armenian. According to what he wrote in 1918, Dr. Reşid seems to have believed the shocking “confessions” extracted under torture. Recently published minutes of those interrogations give, between the lines, moving insights into the despair and disunity of the local Armenians.

Even in the extreme case of mass murder in the province of Diyarbakır in 1915, where the border between victims and perpetrators was ethnoreligiously given, the perpetrators wanted that some representatives of the targeted group admit to have concretely acted as traitors against the existing order. Contrary to Turkish apologetic schemas, the Van “rebellion” after April 20, 1915, could not serve as “proof” for the Armenians’ general uprising and thus as an argument for their removal, since the systematic anti-Armenian persecution in Diyarbakır simply began earlier. The prisoners who did not die under torture were massacred after the end of May, when the full-scale liquidation of the Christians commenced. Expelled, Dr. Smith was made to leave before the final drama started. The government confiscated the property of the ABCFM within the city. The rapid and voluntary deterioration of intact relations between local functionaries and the ABCFM, an organization rooted in the vilayet of Diyarbakır for three generations, is a strong sign of the negative “new spirit” that the emissaries of the CUP brought with them to the Eastern Provinces in the Spring of 1915.

In application of the Law on abandoned property of May 25, 1915, Dr. Reşid founded a commission for the administration of the deportees’ property. As in other places, instead of its declared goal, that is, protection, the commission served to transfer the Christian goods to the Muslims—“mass murder cum robbery” (Christian Gerlach). Contrary to the régime’s intention however, the members of the High Council profited the most. On May
30, 1915, the arrested Christian representatives of the provincial capital were brought to the Tigris near the town, put on kelek (rafts) on the Tigris and several days later were slaughtered at agreed places. Walter Holstein, the German vice-consul in Mosul, told the embassy what was happening in the neighboring province. On June 10, Holstein wrote:

614 Armenian men, women and children banished from Diyarbakır have all been slaughtered on the journey here by raft; Keleks arrived here empty yesterday; for a few days now, corpses and human body parts have been floating by in the river. Further transports of Armenian “emigrants” are on the way here, with the same fate awaiting them. I have expressed my deepest revulsion toward these crimes to the local government; the local vali expresses his regret, noting that the vali of Diyarbakır alone bears responsibility. . . . The massacre of the Armenians in the vilayet of Diyarbakır is becoming increasingly known here and is creating growing unrest among the local population, which can easily give rise to unforeseen consequences in face of the incomprehensible irresponsibility and weakness of the local government. In the districts of Mardin and Amadia, conditions have developed into a true persecution of Christians.82

The vali now had the community stripped of its leaders and began to dispatch it (sevkiyat [dispatchment] was the official term for the “deportations”). In June, thousands of people of the provincial capital, among them the 3,750 Gregorian families, followed a handful of policemen. A great number of them were massacred on their way through the province; a few passed through Mardin.83 Simultaneously, the vali turned to the other towns and villages of his province. Often, as in Djezire, this meant the nearly complete massacre of the Christian population, without the effort of organizing deportations. Two kaymakams, Nesimi Bey of the district of Lice and Sabit Bey of the district of Beşiri, who opposed the policy of the vali, were ambushed and assassinated. Lice was the only place invaded some months later by the Russian army. Armenian soldiers of its vanguard were said to have then committed acts of revenge against the Muslim population.84

The German diplomatic service mentions vali Reşid several times already in June 1915, informing the embassy in Constantinople of the general massacres of Armenian men, women, and children then in progress in the province of Diyarbakır. In July, German diplomacy began attending to the matter of vali Reşid on a higher level. On July 12, 1915, the ambassador in Constantinople, Wangenheim, gave the following note in French to the minister of the interior, Tâlât: “The German Embassy has just learned the following from a reliable source: The vali of Diyarbakır, Reşid Bey, has recently organized regular massacres among the Christian population in his district, without distinguishing between Armenians and Christians belonging to other denominations, and without worrying about whether they were guilty
or innocent. . . . Under the orders of Reşid Bey, policemen from Diyarbakır went to Mardin and there arrested the Armenian bishop together with a large number of Armenians and other Christians, 700 people in total; all of them were driven to a place outside the city during the night and slaughtered like sheep. The total number of the victims of these massacres is estimated at 2000 souls. If the Imperial Government does not take measures against Reşid Bey, it must be feared that the lower classes of the Muslim population from the surrounding vilayets might themselves rise up to indulge in a general massacre of all Christian inhabitants.”

This intervention by the embassy seems to have been the consequence of a dispatch by Holstein of July 10, which had demanded the immediate removal of the vali of Diyarbakır. But Tâlât simply passed over the German “meddling.” It is true that on the same day (July 12), he conveyed the German note, partly word for word, to his subordinate comrade, and urged him not to apply the anti-Armenian measures to the other Christians. What unsettled the minister of the interior when confronted with the German reaction was the bad publicity and also the fact that Reşid was applying to the Assyrians the same “disciplinary measures [tedâbir-i inzibâtiye] intended for the Armenians,” as Tâlât calls them in the encrypted telegram. In this respect the boss harshly criticized his subordinate in a second telegram of July 20, 1915, urging him to stop the indiscriminate anti-Christian measures that were “very detrimental to the country.” It seems that Tâlât’s telegram of July 12 resulted in an amnesty for the non-Armenian Christians. But this did not last long and was, according to Rhétoré, an opportunity for the local rulers to extort more money from those hoping to be granted an amnesty.

The ally’s diplomats could not, or would not, understand that, basically, the vali of Diyarbakır had been acting by mutual agreement with his superior from the outset. By the time of the illegal expulsion of the Rumlar during the first half of 1914, Tâlât had already successfully concealed a policy that he would not acknowledge in front of the foreign diplomats. On August 14, 1915, Holstein unsuccessfully reiterated his demand for the removal of Reşid Bey and called “the atrocities officially committed in the province of Diyarbakır” historically unique. The persecutions continued until the month of September. A telegram from the embassy to the foreign ministry of September 10, 1915, confirmed the general fact of the central government’s two policies, one official, one concealed, as well as the direct implication of the regular army in the massacre of the Armenians. In particular, the telegram highlighted two characteristics of the extermination in Diyarbakır under Governor Reşid: In this case, it affected all Christians, not just the Armenians, and it included men, women, and children. Compared to other governors who usually had the men massacred on the spot, and the women and children deported to the
camps in Syria, the *vali* of Diyarbakır carried out a program of maximal killing; unlike other provinces, he did not seem to distinguish between Syriac and Armenian Christians.90

The weeding out of Christian communities went on until autumn. On September 28, 1915, the *vali* sent a telegram to the minister of the interior, stating that he had removed 120,000 Armenians from his province.91 On October 19, 1915, a friend named Halil Edib, vice governor of the district of Mardin, sent Reşid Bey his congratulations for the *kurban bayramı* [religious holiday] by telegraph from Mardin, saying, “I kiss your hands, you who have gained us the six [eastern] provinces and you have opened to us access to Turkestan and to the Caucasus.”92 He somewhat exaggerated the “salutary” Panturanist effects of the *vali*’s deeds. This telegram nevertheless is a clue to the strong Panturanist views of this friend of the *vali* and the *vali* himself.

*Vali* Dr. Reşid was responsible, or at least co-responsible, for the murder of two *kaymakams* who opposed the anti-Armenian policy, even if, under the threat of the tribunal, he vividly defended himself in his *Mülâhazât* against the accusation of having organized the assassinations.93 His incredible version of the two murders and his conceited tone, moreover, cast a dark shadow on the intellectual honesty of the author of this long text, the bulk of which concerns the Armenians. In the minutes of the police interrogations, recently published, there is no evidence of a general Armenian plan to massacre the Muslims, as he contended. That evil powers called Armenians wanted to annihilate the Ottoman nation was the idée fixe of his radicalized mind.94 There are nevertheless some pertinent elements in his *Mülâhazât*: He himself did not know the terrain; he had few trained security forces; there was great fear among the Muslims of losing their position as a ruling group; the situation in the province was chaotic; in short, an orderly evacuation of 120,000 Armenians was impossible from the outset.

An incontestable point is the fact of Reşid’s hatred against the Christians, particularly the Armenians, by the time he arrived at Diyarbakır. Linked with this was an attitude that made clear to all his subordinates that the death of the group designated as traitors was legitimate and necessary for the sake of nation and religion. It was not always necessary to give specific orders—his entourage knew what Dr. Reşid and the CUP wanted. It could anticipate what they would order and what they would welcome. Such a picture corresponds with findings on how the *Shoah* really began in Eastern Europe in 1941–1942. It shows the importance of local agencies whose murderous actions were only possible because they were in agreement with superiors in the center. The ideological articulation had prepared the ground for deeds that, in a cumulative and systematical radicalization, but without full preliminary blueprint, took the form of a total genocide.95 From this
Dr. Reşid was neither the servile instrument nor the enfant terrible of the central CUP regime—he was rather its convinced and consistent executioner. He was explicit and did not use the double language and apologetic lies made up in the capital for the Germans’ and other foreigners’ ears.

Reşid Bey was eager to serve the fatherland in accordance with the will of the party. He was well integrated into the CUP power structure during the years 1913–1916. Despite his pride and his difficult character, he was respected, or at least seen as very useful by the Ittihadist center. The latter was at the time dominated by his superior and party brother, Tâlât Bey, as well as by his colleagues from the School of Medicine, Nâzım and Baháeddín Şakîr. His rapid promotion and his appointment to important posts confirm this view. He was sent to particularly difficult places, beginning with the Aegean region in 1913, where at the end of the same year, a secret policy of expelling Christians was established for the first time. Important offices in the Eastern Provinces followed, where since the spring of 1915 a policy to remove the Armenians completely was applied. In autumn 1916, this enormous goal had been more or less achieved.

After the “success” of the anti-Armenian policy, the regime had gained a prime interest in cooling things down, so as not to compromise its future on the international scene. At this point Dr. Reşid became an inconvenience to those in power, partly because his misdeeds had not passed unnoticed by the foreign powers. They had even led to vivid protests by the German ally. The name of the valî of Diyarbakîr had become a symbol for the premeditated murder of Christians. In addition, Reşid Bey, as valî of Ankara (between March 26, 1916 and March 27, 1917), turned against the system then in place, which was full of corruption and war profiteers. His intransigence and straightforwardness began seriously to upset the regime. Confronted by corruption among functionaries in the vilayet of Ankara, on the other hand, Dr. Reşid could not remain inactive. It is not clear whether stories telling of Dr. Reşid’s enrichment while in office are true. His efforts to make a living through trade in 1917–1918 and his family’s poverty after 1919 seem to suggest the contrary. But possibly after 1913 he became both licentious in his hate against Christians, and, like so many other officers, corrupt and greedy. Unlike more Machiavellian figures such as Tâlât, or his two colleagues mentioned above, the patriot Reşid Bey probably believed at least partly in the view of the Armenians as “exploiters,” “bloodsuckers,” “tumors,” and “microbes.” This dehumanized and pseudo-scientific vision of internal foes seems to have coexisted with the tenderness of the family father Reşid Bey, even if he was mostly absent, taken by his beloved service for the state (again an unsurprising finding if compared with perpetrators of the Jewish genocide in the Second World War).
It was Reşid Bey’s known and irrefutable implication in the murder of the Armenians that made him embarrassing to the CUP politicians, who, faced with defeat, wished to save their heads, and also, their national project in Anatolia. To wide political circles, it was thus tempting to point at certain İttihadists, and to portray the vali of Diyarbakır as exceptional. Rightly, Süleyman Nazif asked in 1919, “Beyond Diyarbakır, there is a whole other group of men like Reşid. What will they do?” Mehmed Reşid was hardly wrong in feeling himself to be the scapegoat for an entire large group, when after his arrest, he wrote in his diary that he alone was held responsible. Others could have wanted his suicide, but there is no evidence. Once the Turkish national movement had won its battle and had established itself internationally, it was no longer so necessary to distance oneself from Reşid. This crops up again, however, in the interview by a journalist from Resimli Tarih with Mithat Şükrü, during which, in an account of his conversation with Reşid Bey, the former portrays himself as being above all criminal suspicion.

By taking the impoverished family of Dr. Reşid into its care after his suicide—even though in itself an irreproachable act by the Great National Assembly of Angora—the republic at the same time explicitly appropriated the political figure of Reşid Bey. This second act bore grave consequences. Dr. Reşid once again became the loyal and deserving servant of the state, according to the image he himself cultivated in his notes. A few lines written by Mithat Şükrü Bleda on Reşid Bey in his memoirs are very significant in this regard. Contrary to the interview in Resimli Tarih, the secretary general of CUP from 1916–1918 speaks clearly here. In no way does he question the behavior of the vali of Diyarbakır. On the contrary, Mithat Şükrü portrays Dr. Reşid as an infallible man of science who, rightly and for the supreme salvation of the Turkish nation, had been resolved to “annihilate the illness and the ill,” meaning the “minorities” and the Armenians here perceived as mentally ill—a kind of judgment that condemns its author and its author’s ideology. Social Darwinism, hygienic discourse, a cult of raison d’état, and political resentments blend together in his extraordinary vindication:

Vali Dr. Mehmed Reşid Bey was a doctor who, amid the most difficult of conditions, did not shy away from bearing the responsibility for the heavy duties he had been charged with. . . . Regarding the question of how the fatherland [memleket] could be liberated from its pains, after he diagnosed the disease in question and took all responsibility onto himself, and, as doctor and statesman, showed the courage as well as the maturity to accomplish the task he had been accorded. . . . This was during the most critical period of Turkey’s political life, in the years 1908–1918. Vali Dr. Mehmed Reşid Bey was then
serving in the civilian administration. He diagnosed the mental illness [ruhî hastâklâr] of the minorities. For they supported England, Russia and France, who for centuries had desired to partition Turkey, and were finally also of help to the United States, in that they referred to the principles of President Wilson. In conjunction with the diagnosis, Valî Dr. Mehmed Reşid Bey also pointed out the last possible cure during the final period: Either to destroy the illness and the ill, or to see the entire Turkish people and its country perish at the hands of maniacs [delîler]. Valî Dr. Mehmed Reşid Bey was a scientist. His outlook and his behavior could not be wrong, and were not. Valî Dr. Mehmed Reşid Bey’s behavior was sanctioned by the National Assembly of Turkey by according his children an annuity in return for his services to the fatherland, and also recognized by Atatürk.”

How can we explain Dr. Reşid’s thoughts and actions? An important underlying factor of valî Reşid’s final stance was the power- and state-oriented socialization at the Military Medical School, where young men, members of the Muslim ruling class (millet-i hakime) worried about their future and their state’s future, vexed by the specter of its end. Those seen guilty for this specter—first Sultan Abdülhamid, then the Ottoman Christians, above all the Armenians—needed to be eliminated. Power, politics, and fatherland stood above ethics and history’s judgment. As far as our sources show Reşid became openly anti-Christian only as governor of Karesi in 1913–1914, when he was deeply involved in the expulsion of Greek-Orthodox compatriots. At the beginning of the First World War, he took offices near the front where he saw defeat. He became anxious, angry, and arrogant. When in March 1915 he arrived in Diyarbakır he was radicalized enough to do what he did between March and September. The material presented in this chapter gives the impression that he arrived with the determination once and for all to get rid of the Christians in his province where a strong anti-Christian potential already existed. Dr. Reşid just needed specific orders from the center.

He believed that the Ottoman nation would be annihilated by inner and exterior foes, that the Muslim “nation” with which he identified was in a deadly battle between Muslims and Christians, between Turkish power and the effrontery of the traditionally subordinate gâvur —this is the basic tenor of Mülâhazât, his apologetic text of the end of 1918. Reşid set the decline of its own nation against the genocide of others. For its “salvation” he felt compelled to destroy an entire community. The “patriotic” mass murderer declared ill and incurable, and therefore a target of mass killing, this community of defenseless victims. The fact that both Young Turkish generations, including the founders of the Republic of Turkey, counted Dr. Reşid among its heroes, and not among its tragic and criminal figures, betrays a more general setting of the course of history. This has cast dark
shadows on the historical conscience of several Turkish generations to follow. One ought not simply to dismiss Dr. Reşid as a demon, but to analyze and contextualize his personality, career, and actions. At long last, facts should be faced as to what criminal point this “upright patriot,” and with him the CUP, the great organization of the Turkish national movement, had arrived at in 1915.
Mehmet Tâlât (Tâlât Paşa).
Andrew Goldberg,
Two Cats Productions.

Enver Paşa.
Andrew Goldberg,
Two Cats Productions.
Cemal Paşa.
Andrew Goldberg,
Two Cats Productions.

Bahaeddin Şakir.
Andrew Goldberg,
Two Cats Productions.

Demonstrator at the funeral procession for Hrant Dink, January 2007; the sign reads, “We are in mourning,” with the date of Hrant Dink’s birth. Tens of thousands marched through the streets of Istanbul, holding signs that read, “We are all Hrant Dink,” “We are all Armenian.” From Hepimiz Hrant Dink’iz [We are all Hrant Dink] (Istanbul: Agos, 2007).
Celebration of the Young Turk Revolution, July 1908, in Pera, the European Quarter of Istanbul. *Andrew Goldberg, Two Cats Productions.*

Panoramic View of Adana after the Pogrom of Armenians, April 1909. *From the Collection of the Armenian Genocide Museum, Erevan, Armenia.*
Armenians Deported by Train, 1915. Andrew Goldberg, Two Cats Productions.

Turkish Irregular Forces, 1915. Andrew Goldberg, Two Cats Productions.

Russian Soldiers Witnessing the Outcome of Massacres of Armenians in the Villages of the Mush Region. From the Collection of the Armenian Genocide Museum, Erevan, Armenia.

Sultan Abdül Hamid II.
Andrew Goldberg,
Two Cats Productions.
Part III

GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
The Russian empire played an important role in the dynamics leading up to the slaughter of the Armenian population in the six eastern provinces of the Ottoman empire. Arguably, Russia’s role—both in terms of intended and unintended consequences—was greater than that of any other party, aside from the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) itself. The CUP asserted that Ottoman subjects of Armenian and Assyrian background were a fifth column acting on behalf of Russia. In fact, actual Russian policy was far more conservative. Despite the importance of this issue, few studies have endeavored to analyze either Russia’s formal policy or its actual conduct in any depth. Instead, treatment of Russian policy has usually been relegated to the ambit of other narratives: an Armenian-national narrative about the struggle to achieve national independence in the face of the duplicitous Russian government; an Ottoman and subsequently Turkish narrative of a rapacious, aggressive Russian state seeking the dismemberment of the Ottoman empire; or, a narrative of imperial Great Power aspirations, one indebted to Soviet documentary publications, presenting the Russian imperial state as another iteration of an imperialist state relentlessly looking to dismember the Ottoman empire.

Literature focusing on the Turkish side has echoed the Ottoman state’s fears during the war and has portrayed a Russian imperial state driven by anti-Muslim bias that, in religious solidarity with the Armenians, sought to help them at the expense of the region’s Muslim population. Works that treat the Russian occupation as a pivotal moment in Armenian national history focus on the cynicism and mendacity of the Russian state, a state they present as rhetorically committed to the Armenian cause but actually...
seeking to depopulate the region of Armenians in order to pursue a policy of Russian colonization.² (Thus works in Turkish history accuse the Russian state of being anti-Muslim and pro-Armenian, while much of the literature in the field of Armenian history charges, on the contrary, that the Russian state was pro-Muslim and anti-Armenian.) More general treatments of this occupation in studies of the First World War predictably cast it as a manifestation of the imperialist agenda endemic to all Great Powers.³

All these approaches, I believe, err in three respects. First, they portray Russian policy as uniform and coherent. Second, they tend to present Russian policy as relatively constant over time. Finally, these treatments examine Russian policy as governed entirely by one dynamic: the dynamic of either Russian-Ottoman (or, often, Russian-Muslim) relations; or, for scholars of Armenia, of Russian-Armenian relations.⁴ That is, they are less concerned with the formation of Russian policy in its own right than as a factor in another narrative. The policies pursued by various Russian institutional actors in the occupied regions of the Ottoman Empire, in fact, grew out of overarching governmental policies and had analogues in other occupied regions. Russian policies in Armenia must be situated within these overarching agendas and more long-term trends.

In this chapter I examine the changing parameters and content of Russian policy in “the areas of Turkey occupied by right of war,” in particular to highlight these regions as an arena for conflict among various institutional actors within the Russian state.⁵ My goal is to present Russian policy within a broader chronological and institutional context. First, I show the Russian state to be a complex—in the sense of “compound” and “multivalent”—actor in the immediate prewar and war period. We now have excellent studies of both the Ottoman state and of the German state that portray state policy as the outcome of an interplay among a variety of actors: ministries, diplomats, military men, missionaries.⁶ Russia, no less than Germany, pursued a policy that was “complicated and riddled with contradiction,” “internally fractious and uncoordinated.”⁷ To portray “Russia” as a unitary entity simply pursuing a “cynical” policy gets one as far as describing “the Ottomans” as “duplicitous,” “Germany” as myopically focused on Weltmacht, or “Britain” as driven only by concerns of empire.

Second, the conduct of the Russian state in the face of CUP irredentist agitation and attempts to rouse the Muslim population of Kars and Batum against Russian rule provides an instructive parallel to Ottoman measures. The Russian army believed it confronted an irredentist challenge and form of insurgency —like the one the Ottomans believed they faced from the Armenians. Yet despite contemplating comprehensive expulsion plans for the Muslim population of this region, the Russian government eventually abandoned these grandiose programs. The reasons for scaling back such
comprehensive punitive measures demonstrate important institutional constraints at work in the Russian state that were absent in the CUP.\textsuperscript{8} Finally, I seek to show that the Russian military’s policy toward occupied Armenia—frequently characterized as the instrument for carrying out some overarching government policy—in fact proceeded according to its own dynamics. These dynamics produced policies that were callous and frequently brutal, yet they rarely had the purposefulness that is so often ascribed to them.

Accounts of Russian policy toward Armenia during the First World War frequently emphasize the Russian state’s desire to dupe the Armenians and use them against the Ottoman Turks, as part of the Petrograd government’s overall plan to annex “Turkish Armenia” and settle it with Russians.\textsuperscript{9} In fact, Russian policy was far more cautious and divided. The historian Donald Bloxham is right to note that “Russian policy was less offensive than defensive.”\textsuperscript{10} One need only compare Russian occupation aims and conduct in Austrian Galicia with those in Armenia to see the degree of cautiousness in the Armenian case.

From 1912 through early 1916, Russia’s official position—meaning the position of the Russian Foreign Ministry (MID)—regarding the future status of eastern Anatolia was consistent. In 1912 Russia had argued that this region should remain under Ottoman sovereignty, but with the addition of international oversight to uphold the rights of Christians in the region. This program took formal shape in the February 1914 reform act, which was signed but never implemented.\textsuperscript{11} The main force behind these reform efforts was Andrei Mandel’shtam (André Mandelstam), a protégé of Russia’s leading scholar of international law, Fedor Martens, and close colleague of Boris Nol’dé, head of the Legal Advisory Office in the Russian Foreign Ministry.\textsuperscript{12} The reform act was clearly an important moment in Great Power competition and also served to unsettle the local population, particularly the Kurds.

From August until October 1914, when the Ottomans began military operations against Russia, the Russian government sought to avoid any measures that might antagonize the Ottomans.\textsuperscript{13} Russia believed that pressing the reform project might provoke the Ottomans to declare war, and hence planned no action until after the war’s end. At that point—“at the conclusion of the European war”—the Russian government envisioned enforcing its original proposal for oversight but with solely Russian representation. The Ottoman empire was to retain formal sovereignty over the region.\textsuperscript{14} This position toward Armenia stands in stark contrast to Russian plans for occupied Austrian Galicia, which the Russian government proclaimed from the outset would be directly annexed upon the war’s conclusion.\textsuperscript{15}
Once the Ottoman Empire initiated military operations against Russia in late October 1914, some sections of the Russian government looked to the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire as a potential ally and as an irredentist threat to its foe. To this end it sought to retain the commitment and devotion of Armenians to the Russian state. Emperor Nicholas II famously proclaimed to the Armenian Catholicos Kevork V that “a most brilliant future awaits the Armenians.” In early 1915, Foreign Minister Sazonov, in an address to the State Duma (Russia’s lower legislative chamber), declared that “at the conclusion of the war, this exceptional state [the peace negotiations] will be employed by the Imperial government in a direction desirable for the Armenian population.” Historians sympathetic to the Armenian cause read these proclamations as promises of Armenian autonomy, if not outright statehood. (These soothing statements, it should be noted, were intentionally vague. The Russian government never made as unambiguous a statement about the future disposition of Armenia as it did for Poland and Galicia.) Clearly, the Russian imperial government was seeking to buttress the allegience of Armenians within Russia and win over the Armenian population of Anatolia. Others within the Russian government, however, wished to see a pro-Kurdish policy. And Russian military men proved skeptical about the use of nonregular military detachments. Nevertheless, these plans fanned Ottoman fears of the the prospect of a major Armenian irredentist threat.

Most Ottoman Armenians, it must be stressed, did not take part in either Armenian revolutionary formations or join the small number of Russian-sponsored Armenian military formations. Nor did the formation of such ethnic formations lead other states to engage in mass deportations and slaughter of their suspect populations. Austria-Hungary did not pursue such violent measures toward its Serb and Czech subjects. Equally, the Russian state did not engage in measures like those of the CUP toward those populations recruited by hostile powers: Muslims, Poles, Finns, and even Ukrainians.

When the Russian government learned of the systematic Ottoman massacre of Armenians, it pressed its Allies to issue a statement condemning the genocide and proclaiming that Ottoman government officials would be held personally accountable for these crimes. Issued on May 24, 1915, this was the first international text to contain a reference to “crimes against humanity”—language inserted by the Russians. While most accounts present this measure as a purely “cynical” act, it had a far more complicated genealogy. The Russian initiative built on earlier measures by the Russian government throughout the nineteenth century for humanitarian intervention on behalf of Christian peoples of the Ottoman empire, as well as its decades-long insistence, in its efforts to codify the international law of war, that there existed “laws of humanity.”
As regards the postwar plans for the regions of the Ottoman Empire inhabited by Armenians, however, Russian policy remained unchanged down to early 1916. In February 1915, in the aftermath of the Russian victory at Sarkamış and advance into Ottoman territory, the Foreign Ministry drew up a draft of “Basic Principles for the Future Ordering of Armenia.” This was essentially the 1914 reform agreement with more vigorous oversight, to be provided by a European governor-general. This general policy was restated in July 1915, by which time the Russian government was fully aware of the massacres of Armenians. Foreign Minister Sazonov instructed Ambassador Benckendorff in London that “the formation of an autonomous Armenia under the sovereignty of the Sultan and under the tripartite protectorate of Russia, France, and England would be the natural result of the longstanding favorable attitude not only of Russia, but of its Allies as well, toward the Turkish Armenians.”

In February 1915, during the drafting of the above guidelines, Minister of Agriculture Krivoshein proposed to Foreign Minister Sazonov that “the successful results on the Caucasus Front raise the possibility of correcting our borders and rounding out our holdings in Asia Minor and Armenia.” In particular, Krivoshein proposed incorporating the “region of the upper Arax river, usually termed ‘Armenia’”—encompassing the Ottoman vilayets of Erzurum, Van, and Bitlis. This memo, often cited as a demonstration of the annexationist ambitions of the Russian imperial state, in fact reflected ambitions specific to the Ministry of Agriculture.

Krivoshein’s desire to annex Armenia was not adopted as government policy in early 1915. This was due in large part to the fact that the Armenian movement within the Russian Empire had made the Russian government reluctant to add any more territories with large populations of Armenians. In March 1915, the Russian Ambassador to London, Count Benckendorff, informed the British Foreign Office that “the Emperor did not wish to have much to do with [the Armenian vilayets] and was not at all keen to incorporate them.” Such was indeed the overall policy of the Russian government.

In discussing developments on the Caucasus front, the Council of Ministers expressed concern that the Viceroy for the Caucasus, Illarion Ivanovich Vorontsov-Dashkov, was pursuing a pro-Armenian policy. (His wife, Countess Vorontsova-Dashkova, was widely reputed to have a special sympathy for Armenians.) The Council of Ministers was worried that Vorontsov-Dashkov was dictating military policy in the Caucasus in order to benefit the Armenian cause, using the Caucasus Army to liberate the areas of Ottoman Turkey with large Armenian populations. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers observed that “the creation of an Armenia will only be a burden for us, and will become a future source of various complications in the east.” Agriculture Minister Krivoshein concurred: “we see that authorities in the
Caucasus are prepared to sacrifice Russian interests for Armenian ones.”

The Council of Ministers most definitely wished to avoid the creation of a “Great Armenia,” or the annexation and incorporation of large swaths of territory with an Armenian population.

In an extensive 1915 report to the emperor, General Kuropatkin argued that Russia should extend its “sphere of influence” over the region: but he did not argue for annexation or for a program to settle Russians there. And while Pavel Miliukov, leader of the oppositionist Constitutional-Democrat Party, discussed the annexation of those portions of Turkish Armenia with Armenian majorities, his rationale was to safeguard the claims of the region’s Armenian population, rather than to settle Russians there. Certain segments of educated society went further, arguing for the incorporation of Armenia as compensation for Russia’s losses in the war. But even such activists—who constituted a small minority—viewed this as a project to be pursued after the war, not during it, and envisioned directing Russian settlers to plots alongside the existing Armenian population, not in place of it.

The Russian government’s formal position on annexation changed radically in early 1916. By this time the Russian Army in the Caucasus had achieved a major military breakthrough, seizing the crucial fortress city of Erzurum in February and taking the port city of Trebizond (now Trabzon) in April. But the shift in Russian policy was the result not of changing military fortunes, but of the Sykes-Picot accords, initialed in January 1916 by the British and French governments in order to divide the Near East into zones of influence for the Great Powers.

The Russian government was not party to the initial Sykes-Picot agreement. Sir Mark Sykes and Georges Picot visited St. Petersburg in early March (new style) 1916 to inform the Russians of their agreement. The accord was an unpleasant surprise to Foreign Minister Sazonov. In particular, the “improvised” extension of French claims all the way to Diyarbakır and the Persian border unsettled him. After all, Sazonov noted, “you know how complex this problem is for us—there are at least 1,200,000 Armenians in the Caucasus and, of all the heterogeneous populations we must rule, they are the most difficult.” Personally, Sazonov observed, he would have preferred “to retain Armenia under Turkish sovereignty.” Sazonov declared that Russia opposed French encroachment, but that Russia itself did not wish to annex Armenia. British Ambassador Buchanan reported that Sazonov expressed “1.) That he would prefer to keep Turkey as suzerain of Armenia [that is, the Ottoman empire would exercise dominion over Armenia, while granting limited self-rule—PH]. 2.) That he did not wish Armenia to be annexed to Russia for political reasons. 3.) That Erzurum however could not be evacuated but that Russian Government desired to take as little territory West of Erzurum as possible.”
French Ambassador Paléologue reported that Emperor Nicholas II expressed a similar sentiment: he declared that he had “no dreams for any conquests in Armenia, other than Trebizond and Erzurum, the possession of which is a strategic necessity for the [Russian-controlled] Caucasus.” As a result of a compromise brokered by the British, Russia ceded control over “Little Armenia”—the historic cradle of the medieval Armenian kingdom. In return Russia would retain control over northern Mesopotamia—Erzurum, Bitlis, and Van, a strategically important area but one with fewer Armenians and a large number of Kurds, Nestorians, and Lazes. As a result of these negotiations, Russia now committed itself to “annexing the regions of Erzurum, Trebizond, Van, and Bitlis, up to a point on the Black Sea littoral to the west of Trebizond.” Sir Mark Sykes explained the Russian government’s concerns in these negotiations: “Russians desire as few Armenians as possible in Russian territory and consider that an Armenian state under French protection will relieve them of Armenian nationalist responsibilities, as Russians can say to Armenians, if you wish to be independent, migrate to Armenian State where there is ample room.”

Until 1917, Russian officials regarded the annexation of Armenian territory as an unwelcome requirement forced on them by the British and the French. It was the cost extracted from Russia for gaining control of the Straits, and the acquisition of the new territories, Russian diplomats felt, would cause Russia “more than a few problems.” It must be emphasized, however, that attempting to absorb as little Armenian-inhabited territory as possible was not the same as plotting to expel Armenians from that territory, as is sometimes charged.

While Armenia was slated for annexation after the war, during the war it continued to be administered—in accordance with the laws of war—as an “occupied territory.” In the summer of 1916 Foreign Minister Sazonov and the viceroy for the Caucasus, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, corresponded regarding the aims and policies of the Russian occupation of Armenia. Sazonov noted that the occupation of Great Armenia and the decision to incorporate it had raised the question of the area’s future organization. While it was still premature to establish precise foundations for the conquered region, it was essential to determine guiding principles. “The greatest difficulty in our forthcoming task,” wrote Sazonov, “consists in posing and solving the Armenian question.” He continued:

Taken together, it somewhat extends beyond the boundaries of Russian state life. . . . As is well known, the two extremes between which we have posed the solution of the Armenian question are two currents. One is the desire of Armenian nationalists for full autonomy under the aegis of Russia, in the spirit of the reforms proposed by us in 1913, and the other—entirely contradictory to it—reduces the political significance of Armenians to nothing and
seeks to put Muslims in their place. It seems to me that the solution of this question entirely in one or the other direction does not correspond to Russia’s state interests, neither from the point of view of domestic nor of foreign policy. . . . It seems to me that the best outcome for us in ordering the reconquered areas of Turkey would be to be especially firm in following the principles of legality, justice, and an entirely non-partisan relation to all the diverse elements of the region, not setting one against the other and nor providing exclusive protection to any one particular nationality [narodnost’] at the expense of another.36

The grand duke had had previous experience governing an occupied territory: he and his chief of staff, General N. N. Ianushkevich, had directed the disastrous first Russian occupation of Austrian Galicia, which ended with the Russian Army’s “Great Retreat” in the summer of 1915.37 Demoted from supreme commander in chief to viceroy for the Caucasus, he now replied to Sazonov that, overall, he concurred with Sazonov’s guidelines. However, he indicated that it was his “profound belief” that the Armenian question did not exist within the boundaries of the Russian empire. In an offhand criticism of his predecessor, Vorontsov-Dashkov, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich wrote that he did not favor any group in the Caucasus over any other. “The Armenian question as such,” he insisted, “exists only outside the borders of Russia.”38 (On another occasion, he proclaimed that “there is no more an Armenian question than there is a Yakut question.”)39 Insofar as the Armenian question did exist outside the borders of Russia, he shared Sazonov’s point of view: Armenians should be granted broad autonomy, but no special privileges vis-à-vis the Muslim population. The Russian military had formally articulated these policies one month earlier, in the “Temporary Statute on the administration of the territories of Turkey, seized by right of war,” issued in June 1916.40 The statute established a governor-general for the occupied regions, spelled out his authority, and laid down general guidelines. Formally, up until the October Revolution and the conclusion of a ceasefire on the Caucasus Front, the Russian Government continued to treat the regions of Turkey as “occupied territory” rather than as regions annexed to the Russian Empire.41

Before addressing the dilemmas of administering occupied territory, the Russian military in the Caucasus first had to confront irredentist appeals and attempts to incite Russia’s Muslim population during the initial Ottoman incursion into the Russian empire.42 Prior to unleashing outright military operations against Russia, the CUP dispatched agents to provoke the Muslim population within the Russian Caucasus against the Russian government and had encouraged marauding by Kurdish tribes in Russian-controlled Persia.43 Then, during the initial Ottoman occupation of Ajaria in
December 1914, Ottoman detachments attempted to incite the local population against the Russians and slaughtered Russian-subject Armenians in the regions that they had occupied. Thus Russian authorities in January–April 1915 faced a situation not unlike the one which the Ottoman state claimed as a justification for its reprisals against Ottoman-subject Armenians. What the Russian case demonstrates, however, is that a similar structural situation did not produce identical results. In reoccupying the territory, Russian forces looted and marauded. The British correspondent for the Manchester Guardian reported that General Liakov in particular “accused the Moslem natives of treachery, and sent his Cossacks from Batum with orders to kill every native at sight, and burn every village and every mosque. And very efficiently had they performed their task, for as we passed up the Chorokh valley to Artvin not a single habitable dwelling or a single living creature did we see.” Yet in terms of further policy, the Russian government considered, then rejected, the mass expulsion of the Muslim population. Again, this measure is striking not only in its contrast to the actions of the CUP toward Greeks and Armenians, but also to Russian policy in Austrian Galicia, which saw the mass expulsion and detention of Jews.

Upon reoccupation of the region in January 1915, commanders of individual Russian units began dispatching parties of Russian-subject Muslims suspected of aiding Turkish forces to the regional administrative centers of Kars and Batum for detention. In late January, authorities in Kars were holding 159 Muslims from 15 villages under arrest for suspicion of aiding the enemy. In doing so, they invoked articles of the army’s field manual granting military authorities the power to expel by administrative decree any individual determined to be “harmful,” the same justification Russian commanders used to expel Jews in occupied Galicia.

Soon, however, Russian authorities in the Caucasus developed a more far-reaching and comprehensive plan. The military dispatched “harmful individuals” to the cities of Kars and Batum. At the time, military guidelines dictated that all suspects must be tried at the place where the crimes had been committed. The governor of the Kars region, fearing the arrival of a steady stream of suspects and the possibility of lynchings, all in light of the fact that the prisons in Kars were already full, requested that the military cease dispatching suspects to Kars. General Iudenich, chief of staff for the Caucasus Army, replied that the governor should retain only those suspects whom the military had arrested as “harmful individuals,” but against whom there was insufficient judicial evidence for a court martial, he could “expel wherever you wish.” Russian officials continued to compile lists of suspects to be handed over to court-martial in Kars and Batum. They also requested instructions regarding to which provinces they should expel those suspects against whom they lacked
sufficient information for a court martial. Authorities in the Caucasus anticipated displacing up to five thousand individuals. The Ministry of the Interior directed Russian authorities in the Caucasus to deport these individuals to Khar’kov, Kursk, Orel, Tula, and Nizhnii Novgorod provinces.\textsuperscript{51}

Soon afterward, Russian authorities in the Caucasus redefined this ad hoc measure as a comprehensive policy and requested authority to carry it out. Peterson, the head of the viceroy’s office of civil administration in Tiflis, in a report to the Council of Ministers in Petrograd, noted that many Muslims had joined with Ottoman forces. While Russian forces had managed to reoccupy the region, Peterson worried that to refrain from visiting a harsh retribution \textit{[surovaia kara]} on the “traitors” would be a “major mistake for reasons of state.” If Russian authorities failed to punish those whom they suspected of treason, but against whom they lacked sufficient evidence to hold a court martial, Muslims in other regions might be tempted to follow their lead. He requested permission to deport these types of suspects to five northern provinces both as a means “in the short term of removing [literally, ‘cleansing’] an unreliable element from the region of military operations, an element that is clearly very dangerous to us, and also as a means of restraining the remaining Muslim population from treachery. It also raises the question, no less important for the interests of the future of our borderlands, of the possibility of undertaking the colonization of these regions bordering Turkey with a Russian population.” More than thirty years of Russian administration (Kars and Batum had been annexed in 1878) had failed, Peterson wrote, to “transform the moral physiognomy of the Muslim population.” While they were nominally Russian subjects, in their hearts they remained Turkish subjects. It was essential, he argued, to establish a firm bastion along the border, by means of a program of Russian colonization. Peterson acknowledged that it would only be possible to pursue this colonization program in the future. In the meantime, it was essential to deport these suspects (those against whom there was insufficient evidence) to the northern provinces, to confiscate their property, and to revoke their Russian citizenship, thereby returning them to “their original state”—that is, they would revert to what Peterson charged was their de facto status as Turkish subjects. Then, upon the war’s end, Russian authorities could simply expel them all to Turkey.\textsuperscript{52} Ironically, Russian officials developed this proposal to deport Russian-subject Muslims to the Ottoman empire at roughly the same time that one Ottoman general broached an abortive project to expel Ottoman-subject Armenians across the border to Russia.\textsuperscript{53} Unbeknownst to each other, both states discussed simultaneous measures for what would have been a compulsory “population exchange.”

More important, however, is the fate that befell this proposal. Over the course of several months, the procedural mechanisms of the Russian
government—in an almost comically pedantic way—scaled back all of the major proposed measures in Peterson’s report. First, the governors of the northern provinces protested that they could not absorb and house the deportees. Other governors wrote that they would accept only those who were self-supporting and capable of work. Next, Prince Alexander Oldenburg, director of the army’s evacuation and sanitation service, barred the transfer of any of the detainees because of fears that this transfer would spread contagious diseases. Meanwhile, from February through April 1915, the Council of Ministers in Petrograd discussed whether to sanction the proposal from the viceroy in the Caucasus. Each individual ministry studied the project and submitted its views. When the Council of Ministers met to discuss the matter, all ministers supported the measure, except for the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Both cited legal and practical obstacles to implementing the expulsion plan. In particular, both raised the objection that the revocation of Russian citizenship from these individuals would not revert them by default to Turkish citizenship. Contemporary international law, they noted, did not permit a condition of a lack of citizenship. The two ministers also objected to the confiscation of private property as a form of collective punishment. The delegate for the viceroy in the Caucasus in Petrograd despair that the resistance of these two ministers would scuttle the plan. In the end, the Council of Ministers sanctioned a scaled-back version of the plan, permitting deportation of suspects from the Caucasus to Russia, but without revoking their Russian citizenship. The Council of Ministers determined that landholding in the region was founded on collective ownership of state property, so Russian authorities could confiscate the land of suspects without violating existing laws on private property.

In the meantime, however, there was another intervention. In mid-May, Emperor Nicholas II received a petition from his uncle, Grand Duke Georgii Mikhailovich. The grand duke had toured the Caucasus front in February and met with representatives of the Muslim population there, including local deputies to the State Duma. They told him that it was untrue that Muslims had sided en masse with Turkish forces; only a few bandits and criminals had joined them. Yet, they claimed, Russian authorities now declared them all beyond the law. The grand duke wrote that he believed it unwise to create any unnecessary “internal enemies for our fatherland.” He noted that the Council of Ministers had only recently confirmed the viceroy’s proposal for punitive measures against the Muslim population. In his view, this measure was excessively harsh and unjust, as it “would deprive all those identified as traitors of their rights, but not by means of any court, but solely in an administrative manner.” His report then repeated, word-for-word, the arguments against the proposal found in the dissenting memoranda of the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Given the verbatim
agrumentation, there can be no doubt that the grand duke coordinated his intervention with those members of the Council of Ministers also critical of the decision. He concluded by appealing to Emperor Nicholas II to appoint an individual to conduct a special investigation of the entire affair. The appeal had its effect—Emperor Nicholas II suspended the Council of Ministers’ April 28 decision and dispatched his own delegate to the region to determine the guilt or innocence of the population. Simultaneously, Muslim and non-Muslim delegates from the Caucasus in the State Duma petitioned on behalf of the population of Kars and Batum provinces.

The general assigned to conduct the investigation determined that, while there had been individual cases of treason, the local Muslim population had not in fact engaged in any organized hostile actions toward Russian forces. Less than one percent of the population had been guilty of treason against the Russian state. “Thus,” the report found, “the reckless charge that the Muslim population engaged in rebellion and state treachery should be dropped.” More than 200 cases were opened against Christians for looting and pillaging of Muslim inhabitants. Nevertheless, in the interim, up to several thousand Russian-subject Muslims had been deported from the Caucasus.

Within a year officials reversed their decision to seize the property of individuals who had fled in the aftermath of the Ottoman incursion, and instead permitted the return of this property either to relatives or to the individual’s community. In the years that followed, Russian authorities continued to pursue suspects, but now as individual accusations through the military court system. The numbers were not large, however. Russian investigative commissions identified 489 individuals who had fled with the Turks in Kars district. And a mid-1917 report of one case dealing with some inhabitants of Kars district who sided with the Turks revealed that 64 people had been convicted (56 for state treason and 8 for general criminal acts)—but 166 had been acquitted. Military courts appear to have taken their duties seriously, and the files contain frequent cases of acquittal of suspects for lack of evidence.

Thus, just when the CUP decided to embark on its systematic massacre of its Armenian population for alleged treachery, the Russian government proposed—but then fitfully scaled back—a mass expulsion of the Muslim population of the Kars and Batum districts, which was accused of having sided en masse with the enemy. This was also the time when the Russian command on the Austro-German front pursued its most expansive plans for deporting the Jewish population of the occupied territories and in the zone of Russian military operations.

Unlike the case in the Caucasus, the Russian high command did not ask for permission from the civilian government to pursue its measures against the Jews of occupied Austrian Galicia. The viceroy’s proposal to expel the
Muslims of Russia’s Kars and Batum districts received its first check at this stage. Despite the horrors of both policies—the program for expulsion of the Muslims of Kars and Batum and the army’s policy against the Jews on the eastern front—they both were scaled back by mid-1915. The Russian government continued to operate in functional terms, to deliberate and weigh policy, and—as a state—did not embrace an overarching ideological program. There was certainly a current of ideological anti-Semitism underlying plans for occupied Galicia, as well as programs for ethnic consolidation in the Caucasus. Advocates for these programs remained embedded, however, within a broader state and political structure that continued to function along bureaucratic and functional, rather than ideological, lines. These checks were both of the old regime variety (the personal intervention of Grand Duke Georgii Mikhailovich) and of a modern sort (rational-bureaucratic, as with the objections to the expulsion plan by the Ministries of Justice and Foreign Affairs, and representative-political, as with the investigations by State Duma deputies into state policy toward the Muslim population). At this stage, the Russian empire lacked structures that could institutionally coordinate and ideologically inspire such expansive programs as the CUP and the Special Organization (Teskilat-ı Mahsusa), the Bolshevik Party and NKVD, or the Nazi Party and SS/Gestapo. This explains why such wide-ranging programs were broached in early 1915—but were then abandoned or drastically trimmed down in the period from 1915 to 1917.

Both Turkish accounts and accounts sympathetic to the Armenians detail the violence of the Russian military. The former accuse the Russian military of a systematic anti-Muslim bias; the latter of a concerted agenda to clear Armenia of Armenians. It is a mistake, however, to view the violence of the Russian military as the result of a coherent policy or, still less, a specific ideology, be it a supposed overarching anti-Muslim bias or a programmatic attempt to depopulate the region in order to pursue a policy of Russian colonization. The conduct of the Russian military in fact comprised overlapping forms and types of violence. The dynamic between these forms of violence changed over time. Moreover, they were frequently at odds with one another.

In my view, at least as important as the fitful embrace of ethnic mobilization (as regards both Armenians and Kurds) was a military culture that instrumentalized the civilian population. The Russian military, rather than pursuing an overarching policy for the region, sought to come up with short-term solutions to immediate problems, solutions that privileged the military at the expense of the civilian population. At some level they had come to accept civilian losses as a military necessity. As one example, in early 1917 General Ianushkevich, the grand duke’s chief of staff for the
Caucasus front, declared bluntly that a 10 percent mortality rate due to food shortages among the civilian population in Russian-controlled regions of the Caucasus was “normal” and acceptable.\textsuperscript{69} Ianushkevich was not motivated by any specific colonial, anti-Muslim, or anti-Armenian bias. He had operated from similar guidelines both in occupied Galicia (a Slavic region slated for incorporation into Russia proper) and in Russia proper.

Two recent studies have argued (referring to the German military in World War I) that military practices may have structuring patterns yet still be the result of improvisation. The historians John Horne and Alan Kramer, in their coauthored book analyzing German atrocities in occupied Belgium and northern France, point to the “cultural and political disposition that carried not just ordinary soldiers but the entire military command rapidly beyond its own legal code and even contemporary moral norms of acceptable violence against civilians.” In their view, “brutality and inhumanity characterized the response to the ‘franc-tireur war’ because these reflected the prevailing doctrines of the German military on civilian involvement in warfare.”\textsuperscript{70} The historian Isabel Hull has extended this argument by showing that military conduct in the German case was determined not simply by conscious decisions, but by an even more diffuse institutional culture embedded both in doctrine and in unarticulated presuppositions. When facing specific dilemmas in a wide variety of cases, the German military responded in near identical fashion, without guidance or central coordination. Indeed, Hull notes that the German military behaved in strikingly similar ways in colonial wars as it did during World War I in both Eastern and Western Europe. It did so, she argues, not because colonial methods were “brought home,” but because the institutional culture of the German military—an unusually “strong” institution—transcended the particular arenas of its implementation. “When the military set about solving these problems, it came up with broadly the same techniques wherever it was.”\textsuperscript{71}

One distinction in the Russian case is that the Russian military was not an institution as “strong” as its German counterpart.\textsuperscript{72} An additional consideration in regard to occupied eastern Anatolia was the nature of the theater. The Caucasus front had a much lower concentration of forces, more difficult terrain, and a much poorer supply network than most other theaters of the First World War, conditions that complicated even the most routine operations for militaries.\textsuperscript{73} Military censors, reviewing letters from the front, reported that “the horrible thirst, the shortage of bread and water cause the soldier to dream about [serving on] a different front, one that might be more dangerous, but that would be better supplied.” In their letters home, Russian soldiers complained that they were “ragged and shoeless . . . we’d prefer three more years of war, if only we could serve on the [Austro-German] front.”\textsuperscript{74}
Nevertheless, much of the Russian military’s conduct in the occupied territories of Turkey derived from “standard operating procedure”—one that was famously utilitarian and callous. The Russian military entirely subordinated the regions and their populations to its own operations. Yet military operations in occupied Turkey did not become supercharged with an ideological program, such as the liberationist and overtly anti-Semitic occupation regime Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich and Ianushkevich had pursued in occupied Austrian Galicia in 1914–1915.

The Foreign Ministry determined official Russian government policy toward occupied territory. But the institution that actually administered the occupied territories was the Russian military. The higher military command in charge of this policy encompassed three primary posts: the supreme commander in chief (Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich until August 1915, then Emperor Nicholas II); the chief of staff for the commander in chief (General Nikolai Ianushkevich for Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, then General Mikhail Alekseev for Emperor Nicholas II); and the viceroy for the Caucasus, who in time of war simultaneously served as the commander in chief of the Caucasus Army (Illarion Vorontsov-Dashkov from October 1914 until September 1915, when he was replaced by Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, when the latter was removed from his post as commander in chief). The effective commander of the Caucasus Army was the very capable General Nikolai N. Iudenich, who formally served as chief-of-staff to both Vorontsov-Dashkov and Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich.75

As commander in chief, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich—along with much of the Council of Ministers—favored a strategy concentrating on the eastern front against Austria and Germany: “he concurred in the popular view of the Russian staff that the road to Constantinople led through Berlin.”76 The Russian army occupied a defensive posture until the Ottoman Empire entered the war, and thereafter continued to view the Caucasus front as secondary. Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich and General Ianushkevich, however, did not disdain politics or questions of military occupation. They lavished attention on the occupation and planned annexation of Austrian Galicia and Bukovina, which they—and many other conservatives—imagined as “a Russian land from time immemorial.” In order to aid the region’s anticipated incorporation, the grand duke and Ianushkevich engaged in a policy of favoring certain ethnic groups and persecuting others. In particular, they sanctioned the widespread expulsion of the region’s Jewish population, which set in motion the Russian army’s policy of deportation of Jews for much of the next year.77

While the grand duke occupied the post of supreme commander in chief, he gave little thought to Armenia. As noted above, many in the Russian government suspected that the viceroy of the Caucasus, Vorontsov-Dashkov,
was pursuing his own pro-Armenian policy. In fact, Vorontsov-Dashkov scrupulously kept the Council of Ministers informed of his general policy, like the plan to arm Armenians in anticipation of the outbreak of war with the Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{78} His program was one of Russian imperial greatness through management of ethnic difference—an old story. Moreover, from 1912 Vorontsov-Dashkov equally sought to enlist Kurdish leaders for the Russian cause.\textsuperscript{79} Nevertheless, due in large part to court politics and bureaucratic infighting, he was tarred as pro-Armenian. His successor—Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich—came to believe these rumors, and sought to “remedy” Vorontsov-Dashkov’s “pro-Armenian” orientation.

From September 1915 on, Emperor Nicholas II was nominally commander in chief. Yet it was his chief of staff, General Alekseev, who managed all military affairs. Alekseev believed even more firmly than the grand duke that the Caucasus front was a secondary theater. He favored no territorial acquisitions there and even advocated seeking a separate peace with Turkey. Russia’s victories on the Caucasus front in the spring of 1916, he believed, should be leveraged to press Turkey for peace. Alekseev in fact argued that the Sykes-Picot agreement forced on Russia too much of Turkey in Asia, fearing “an aggravation of the Armenian question within our own borders.” He opposed in particular the Russian naval ministry’s desire to extend Russia’s borders on the Black Sea littoral from Trebizond all the way to Sinope.\textsuperscript{80} The Foreign Ministry and Emperor Nicholas II were also opposed to such expansive acquisitions.

After Vorontsov-Dashkov’s dismissal in autumn 1915, the administration of the occupied Ottoman territories passed into the hands of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich.\textsuperscript{81} The grand duke retained as his chief of staff General Ianushkevich, a noted reactionary and anti-Semite. Ianushkevich’s dislikes extended to Armenians, whom he claimed were “the same as Jews”—an ominous statement coming from a man who had orchestrated the Russian Army’s expulsion of Jews from Galicia.\textsuperscript{82} Other important military officials shared his anti-Armenian prejudice.\textsuperscript{83} Many soldiers shared these views. One wrote home that “you know the Yids [\textit{zhidov}]? Well, you would need 25 Yids to trick one Armenian.”\textsuperscript{84}

Both Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich and Ianushkevich, however, were aware that their interventionist, liberationist, and anti-Semitic programs for occupied Austrian Galicia in 1914–15 had failed. Their critics—including many in the Russian military—charged that in occupied Galicia they had pursued “politics for the sake of politics,” to the detriment of the military operations. It was out of this experience that the Grand Duke and Ianushkevich stepped into their new duties. From mid-1916 on the occupied territories were overseen by a “military governor-general for the regions of Turkey occupied by right of war,” who was directly subordinate to the grand
duke. As his appointee the grand duke selected General Peshkov, who faithfully carried out the grand duke’s policy.85 The new viceroy believed it was his task to reverse Vorontsov’s allegedly “pro-Armenian” policies.86 His attempt to do so coincided with the Russian Army’s advance into territories depopulated by the Ottoman massacre of Armenians. The grand duke’s turn from what he believed were the previous policies was most evident in his efforts to win over Kurdish tribal leaders and in his order to reform Armenian volunteer formations into regular rifle regiments. Armenian organizations portrayed these measures as heartless and unjust. Vorontsov-Dashkov had also courted Kurdish leaders in the Ottoman territories. But his primary agent for this endeavor, Prince B. N. Shakhovskoi (a former consul in Damascus), believed that Vorontsov-Dashkov’s pro-Armenian orientation created an impossible environment for winning over the Kurds.87 Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich granted Shakhovskoi broad authority to seek an accommodation with the Kurdish tribes. The grand duke attempted to appeal to the latter by releasing the Kurdish leader Simko, who had committed himself to the Russians before 1914, but who had afterward sided with the Ottomans and been captured by Russian forces. (Despite his release, Simko would continue to operate against Russian forces in Northern Persia from 1916 onward.) Shakhovskoi could report few successes. He blamed his lack of success on the actions of Armenian units affiliated with the Russian army, which made any accommodation with the Kurds impossible.88

By early 1917 Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, who was never terribly well disposed toward the Armenians to begin with, had been swayed by Prince Shakhovskoi’s arguments in favor of siding with the Kurds against the Armenians.89 In fact, several of the grand duke’s secret agents for conducting negotiations with the Kurdish tribes—Prince Shakhovskoi and College Assessor Gadzhemukov—were appointed, for purposes of conspiratorial cover, as district captains for regions of occupied Turkey.90 Once the 1917 February Revolution occurred, Prince Gadzhemukov lobbied General Iudenich to pursue a more aggressive pro-Kurdish policy and to abandon any support for the Armenian cause. He concluded: “if one is to view [the Ottoman slaughter of the Armenians] not from a humanitarian, but from a political point of view, and as an already accomplished fact—one for which the Armenians bear the blame—one must say that there is this positive side: Turkey has left us an Armenia without Armenians.”91 Several studies point to Gadzhemukov’s statement as laying bare the Russian government’s true intentions for occupied Armenia.92 In fact, rather than a statement of policy, his letter was a plea for the army to abandon what he portrayed as its pro-Armenian policies. “Armenia without Armenians” was Gadzhemukov’s desire—and his criticism of the Russian government for failing to carry it out.
Several accounts charge that Russian military authorities, and the grand duke in particular, banned Armenian refugees from returning to the occupied territories as part of a general plan to depopulate occupied Turkey in preparation for settlement by Russian settlers and Cossacks.93 These charges are long-standing, and reflect Armenian suspicions of Russian state policy toward the Armenians.94 While it is true that he was not well-disposed toward the Armenians, the grand duke’s concerns were much more prosaic. They reflect at least as much the overall institutional culture of the military and the constraints within which it operated in this theater as any overt ideological bias. The conflict with the grand duke’s conduct against Jews in occupied Galicia is the most striking demonstration of this contrast.

The Armenian genocide and the flight of Muslims before the advance of the Russian army left a barren and depopulated land, making operations in this already difficult military theater even harder. The need to supply the army, rather than to prepare the land for Russian colonization, lay behind the army’s management of Armenian refugees—and other refugees, for that matter. The Russian government and public organizations, such as the All-Russian Union of Towns, set up a network of canteens throughout the occupied territories. Indeed, Russian authorities established in early 1915 an agency charged specifically with the care of refugees, both within the Caucasus and in the occupied territories of Turkey and neutral Persia. The man appointed to this post was General Mikhail Tamamshev.95 From early 1915, the Russian government provided humanitarian aid to Ottoman refugees who were Christian subjects; with the army’s advance deeper into Anatolia in the spring of 1916, the Russians found themselves having to confront the problem of Turkish Muslim refugees. As a result of appeals by General Tamamshev and Muslim deputies in the Duma, the Russian government extended humanitarian aid—essentially food supplies—to the Turkish Muslim population as well. The government opened a line of credit of 500,000 rubles for aid to the Muslim population of the occupied territories in early 1916. Russian agencies were to withhold aid only from those segments of the population that engaged in hostile activities against Russian forces, this mostly referred to the Kurdish tribes operating against Russian forces.96 Political factors played a role, but the military agreed to offer this aid largely because failing to do so would increase the risk of epidemic diseases in the areas behind the front.

The directive determining Russian policy on landholding in the occupied territories, Order no. 121, issued on March 19, 1916, had as its goal to the recultivation of abandoned lands. Local inhabitants could use any unused plots, so long as they set aside a portion of the harvest for the actual owners. The fundamental aim, wrote the grand duke, was to put these lands under immediate use—through rental arrangements—“in order to decrease our
food supply aid to the local population to a minimum, and to provide for our forces by local resources.”

In his letter to Sazonov laying out the principles for Russian occupation, the grand duke reiterated these concerns. Questions about landholding should be resolved in a totally legal and impartial manner. Concerned about the army’s food supply situation, the grand duke “raised the issue of the return of the Armenian refugees to the lands in the occupied areas of Turkey, in the hope that they will flourish in their homes and return the fertile lands of Turkish Armenia to use, which will aid the army in a major way.”

In August 1916, however, General Iudenich, commander of the Caucasus Army, banned the return of refugees to the occupied regions of Turkey. He considered “the return of inhabitants to the areas we occupy in Turkey to be premature, since it would complicate the already difficult food supply issue for these regions.”

Later that year, in an interview with the conservative St. Petersburg newspaper *Novoe vremia*, the governor-general for the occupied regions of Turkey explained why he was barring the return of refugees to certain occupied regions:

> The question of the return of the Armenian population which had fled to Russia due to the Turkish atrocities depends, in the Governor-General’s opinion, not only on completing the administrative reorganization of the region, or guaranteeing the food supply, but also on the strategic situation at the front. The premature return of refugees often brings in its wake undesirable panics and needless victims—both human and material—of which the population’s rapid departure from Van recently can serve as an example. For this reason the state must treat this question very cautiously.

General Peshkov was referring to the fact that the Russian army, in the face of an August 1916 Ottoman offensive, organized the evacuation of 50,000 refugees who had returned to Van, Bitlis, and Mush, and had distributed them further, to Basen and Igdyr. This relocation caused a new crisis, as the refugees now required food and medical supplies. Individual generals used this argument as a pretext to remove what they viewed as unnecessary mouths to feed. Where the local population had remained, Iudenich directed it to cultivate the areas closest to the army’s front, in order to help provide for the army’s needs.

By and large, the Russian army on the Caucasus front was driven by the institutional concerns of the military, rather than an ideological agenda. It is true that in spring 1915 General Iudenich developed a proposal to settle Cossacks in the Alashkert, Diadin, and Bayazet valleys—a plan that would seem to contradict the stated reasons for banning the return of Armenian refugees. He planned to settle the Cossacks on lands abandoned by Kurds.
and alongside the remaining native Armenian population. The purpose, at least in part, was to bring the land into immediate cultivation in order to support units of the Fourth Cossack Corps, operating in that region. Viceroy Vorontsov-Dashkov approved this proposal in principle, but no concrete measures resulted. Iudenich repeated his proposal in April 1916, this time also to increase cultivation and to prevent the seizure of these abandoned lands by speculators. The grand duke, like Vorontsov-Dashkov before him, approved the program in principle, but found that “it was as yet premature” to act on it. He explicitly stated that the report was compiled “for information purposes only, and the Viceroy does not expect any directives to follow from it.” Again, there was a discussion of expansive plans—plans which several secondary works claim were implemented—but which in fact were put on hold.

The army high command, then, viewed the occupied areas of Turkey in a manner that was undoubtedly utilitarian. The Russian military did not see it as its task to care for civilians, particularly when the army believed that civilians interfered with the conduct of military operations—meaning, not least of all, the army’s ability to feed itself. Thus, the Russian military regularly dispatched refugees from one region to another and sought to control their access to regions where the army was active. Its goals were frequently limited and operational. Furthermore, military authorities did not seek to pursue a far-reaching political program to incorporate the regions of Turkey, such as that Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich and Ianushkevich had attempted in Galicia in 1914–15. Certainly, there was no coordinated policy to prevent the return of Armenian refugees or to expel them from their lands for the purpose of settling Cossacks or Russian settlers.

In addition to directing the flow of refugees, the Russian military also engaged in widespread expulsions of civilian populations. It is becoming increasingly clear that mass population expulsions were an intrinsic feature not just of the Second World War, but of the First World War as well. Mass deportations occurred during the First World War not only on the Caucasus front, but also on a widespread scale on the western and eastern fronts. These expulsions were a military practice, one that grew out of a myopic focus on the conduct of military operations and a disregard for civilian populations. The same causes spurred the development of concentration camps as a tool of military operations during the Spanish American and Boer Wars. Deportations grew into something more than military practice when ideology began to inform the goals, and thus the means, of deportation. What distinguished Ottoman policy in its expulsion of Armenians was not simply military necessity, but an ideological agenda. Similarly, the Russian treatment of the Jewish population in 1915 in occupied Galicia—and within Russia itself—culminating in the mass expulsion of almost one
million people, occurred within an ideological envelope of anti-Semitism. Russian conduct during the second occupation of Galicia, in 1916–17, was strikingly different, in large part because the army command repudiated the explicitly anti-Semitic agenda of the 1914–15 occupation.110

The Russian army’s official policy toward the occupied regions of the Ottoman Empire was not to expel the Armenian population, or ban the return of Armenian refugees, in order to colonize the region with Russians. Certain individuals and even ministries had such plans, to be sure. General Peshkov, governor-general for the occupied regions of Anatolia, believed that separating the local population into ethnic enclaves was the only way to ensure peace. He proposed “to deal with this difficulty by regrouping as far as possible the population, and getting the Armenians to settle east and the Kurds south of [Lake Van].” He continued:

The regions of Trebizond and Erzurum are going to form two administrative areas separate from that of Van and Bitlis, which will form the third. Each of these three areas will be divided into four districts, and in the Van and Bitlis area as far as possible, the Moslems will be divided from the Christians and settled in particular districts. Already some 29,000 Armenians have resettled in their former homes in the Van region, and some 30,000 more, including some Caucasian Armenian traders and artisans are on their way. . . . As far as the Trebizond and Erzurum regions are concerned, only those Armenians who resided there before the war will be allowed to settle there. Those regions will be regarded as especially Moslem.111

While these far-reaching plans were not realized, army and corps commanders instructed their troops to expel populations from regions of the front line. The Russian army practiced mass population expulsion, clearing large swaths of the front of their native inhabitants, Armenian and Kurd alike. This was not, however, a policy specific to the Caucasus front, but rather a generic feature of Russian military operations.112 In the Erzurum region, for instance, the military commander resettled all inhabitants from a ten-verst strip of the front line—10,000 people—and moved them closer to the city of Erzurum, in the process exacerbating the already dire food supply situation.113 On a smaller scale, the military issued orders forcing the inhabitants of both Kurdish and Armenian villages to relocate from one half of the village into another in order to disinfect their dwellings. It was concerned not with the health of the civilians themselves, but wished to prevent the spread of infectious diseases to the troops quartered in these regions.114

The subordination and instrumentalization of the civilian population to military needs also extended to enlisting civilians for compulsory labor. This aspect of Russia’s war conduct has largely gone unstudied.115 In occupied Galicia, for instance, the Russian military employed nearly 200,000 civilians to work on its trenches. The German Army did the same on both
the eastern and western fronts. As early as November 1914, one month into the war on the Caucasus front, the Russian military drafted all male Kurds of the Bayazet valley for compulsory labor on clearing the roads. During its occupation of Erzurum, the Russian military drafted the entire population to dispose of unburied corpses (the concern again was the possibility of epidemic disease and the danger it posed to the military), then assigned “almost the entire male population fit for work, from the age of 17 to 45, to compulsory labor of a military nature.” Both Armenians and Kurds were subject to this labor. The head of the first district of the Erzurum region, Staff Captain Alekseev, arrested 47 working-age Armenians in order to assign them to work details. (They were released—but only because the commissar of the Erzurum region determined that the men were farmers and their work in agriculture was more valuable.)

In many cases, then, the Russian military engaged in expulsion and detention for reasons of “military necessity,” which took absolute precedence over the well-being of the region’s civilian population. This was an inherent feature of Russian military culture, and as the Russian army retreated, it would resort to such measures within Russia itself. Both White and Red would employ such practices in the civil war that followed.

If the first type of expulsion focused on entire civilian populations for reasons of “military necessity,” the second type focused on specific groups. The Russian Army took this approach toward populations it regarded as “unreliable.” In Galicia and Russian Poland, this primarily meant the Jewish population. On the Caucasus front, this referred first and foremost to the Kurdish population. One must distinguish here between official expulsions, and the pillaging and marauding that stemmed from anti-Kurd sentiment among lower-level commanders and the troops. On this front, both the Ottoman and Russian armies confronted foes—Armenian volunteer detachments against the Ottomans, Kurdish irregulars against the Russians—who operated with guerrilla methods, much as the Spaniards had against Napoleon one hundred years before. Russian soldiers found this type of warfare unsettling and unfair. One Cossack wrote to his brother:

It is worse in our rear than at the frontline. We receive less fire at the frontline than in the rear. All Kurds, if a regiment is passing by, are all peaceful inhabitants. As soon as the regiment passes by, they assemble and take to raiding the supply units. They don’t allow the supply units to pass and allow nothing through. But it’s interesting—they flee as soon as you go to attack them.

Commanders at the corps level and below had the authority to expel individuals and entire groups of people they determined were “unreliable.” Due to the irregular warfare practiced by the Kurds, as well as anti-Kurd sentiments among the Russians, the military frequently resorted to expelling...
Kurdish communities en masse. Throughout the period 1915–17, the Russian army removed Kurds from entire districts. This type of expulsion was distinct from, but overlapped with, the violence unleashed by Russian units and Armenian volunteer formations against Kurdish communities.

Even here, however, there was a lack of overall coordination. The high military command’s policies were filtered through the conduct of individual army commanders. Several of them gained reputations for their disregard of, or even hostility to, the plight of the Armenians. Armenian spokesmen charged that this was the inevitable result of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich’s supposedly pro-Kurdish and anti-Armenian orientation. For Armenian activists, the cause célèbre was the conduct of Major-General Nikolaev, commander of the Bayazet Detachment, which relieved the city of Van in June 1915. Nikolaev permitted Kurds to resettle in the Van region, leading to outraged Armenian protests. Yet most Russian commanders—entering a land that had just witnessed the systematic massacre of Armenians and themselves under intermittent attack from Kurdish irregulars—inclined toward the other extreme. Konstantin Kozakov served in the Bayazet detachment that relieved Van in June 1915. In a letter to a friend he wrote: “I won’t describe in detail here the scenes of those horrific atrocities and violence which the Kurds and [Turkish regulars] committed at the instigation of the Turkish government on the defenseless Armenian population. . . . It was a nightmarish scene.” Russian commanders practiced frequent “punitive expeditions” against local Muslim villages and expelled entire Kurdish communities. Cossack units in particular visited merciless retribution on the local Muslim population. Armenian volunteer detachments, later reformed as rifle corps, similarly showed little mercy to Kurdish and Turkish communities. Ultimately, the Russian occupation administration under the grand duke alienated Armenians because of its allegedly pro-Kurdish bias, while the conduct of individual army and corps commanders made hostile to Russian rule the very Kurdish population whom the grand duke was seeking to win over.

This chapter is not intended as an apology for the Russian occupation, but rather to complicate our understanding of Russian intentions and Russian policy. At the time, the CUP was convinced that the Russian state was seeking to dismember the Ottoman Empire and annex vast swathes of territory. Historical studies have tended to reflect this fear, seeing in disparate Russian measures a coordinated and predatory Russian policy—either anti-Muslim or anti-Armenian, depending on the literature. This study, rather, supports Michael Reynolds’s observation that we need to treat the Russian and Ottoman empires as “state actors,” and not simply as vessels for emerging national movements. And as a “state actor,” it is imperative to
treat the Russian state as a complex—multifaceted and compound—institution. Specifically, I wish to underscore the complex and multilayered nature of Russian decision making. The policies in Russian Armenia were not the expression of some unified program by the Russian government. Rather, policy changed over time. Moreover, to grasp the dynamics of Russian policy in Armenia, it is essential to place them in the larger context of Russian domestic and foreign policy. I hope to suggest a method of evaluating both Russian foreign policy and military conduct. The foreign policy of the Russian government was doubtless cynical in certain respects, but it is a gross simplification to leave the story at that—as it would be for any of the other powers. We must view foreign policy both as the interplay of state actors—as Reynolds insists—and as existing within an arc of institutional and political agendas. The military, for its part, was certainly callous, but it did not always pursue a nationalizing or ethnicizing goal. The presence of multiple, at times conflicting, programs within the Russian government’s overall policy explains, in part, why scholars have been able to read Russian occupation policy is such remarkably divergent ways.

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Die Türkei wird autokratisch sein, oder sie wird nicht sein.

Turkey will be autocratic, or it will not be.

Ambassador Marschall to Chancellor Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, December 26, 1899

The Armenian Genocide was committed by the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) government of the late Ottoman Empire. But unlike other genocides, where the locus of responsibility is generally quite clear, questions arise persistently about the role of another country as a possible organizer or co-perpetrator of the Armenian tragedy. The Nazis used Latvians, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and others, but no one doubts that it was the Nazi state that organized and implemented the Holocaust. No serious scholar questions the role of the Khmer Rouge government in carrying out the genocide and other atrocities committed against the Cambodian population, or of Hutu Power and the state it came to dominate in the genocide of Tutsi and killings of moderate Hutus in Rwanda.

In the case of the Armenian Genocide, that other country is, of course, Germany. In the late nineteenth century and especially after the accession to the throne in 1888 of Kaiser Wilhelm II, Germany defined the Ottoman Empire as a key area of interest, a site where Germany could become the dominant imperial power and contest the influence of the British, French, and Russians in the Mediterranean, Middle East, and Asia. Germany poured military aid into the empire, especially after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. German diplomats had great access to Sultan Abdülhamid II and his successors, and German businesses and banks arrived with great expectations. Increasingly, Germany displaced France as the main source of political counsel, intellectual influence, and military aid, although this
development was highly contested among the Ottoman elite. Ultimately, the relations between the two countries were sealed by the CUP decision in 1914 to enter World War I on the side of the Central Powers.

The Ottoman Empire was now a German (and Austro-Hungarian) ally. German military advisors fought alongside and sometimes commanded Ottoman divisions, and even received commissions as officers in the Ottoman army. CUP and German officials consulted on a regular basis and the Germans had access to privileged information. German consular officials, businessmen, and missionaries were stationed all around Anatolia and had intimate knowledge of events as they unfolded. The powerful presence of Germans in many of the major institutions of the Ottoman Empire and their geographic dispersion through Anatolia means that aside from Ottoman sources themselves, the next best archival records on the Armenian Genocide are the German ones.

But just what role did Germans play in the genocide? Could the CUP have launched such a major and drastic policy decision—the removal and slaughter of the Armenians—on its own? Did the Young Turks need the prior approval of their German allies before launching such a policy? The questions reach back in time to 1914–15, when Entente propaganda, Young Turk assertions, and general rumors among the Ottoman population explicitly blamed Germany for the Armenian massacres, a view that also persisted in the Armenian diaspora.

Scholars, though, have been divided on the issue. Major diplomatic histories most often completely ignored the Armenian Genocide. In contrast, some relatively recent works place a great deal, perhaps the decisive level, of responsibility on German officials and drive a straight line of continuity from the Armenian Genocide to the Holocaust. They view the Young Turks as largely dependent on their wealthier, more powerful, supposedly more clever German allies. But the most sophisticated analyses of Ottoman-German relations, both older and recent, present a more modest view of the German role. They portray German army officers and diplomats largely as bystanders who were ineffective or indifferent to the tragedy that befell the Armenians, whether because of the limitations inherent in their role as advisors, the perceived logic of the military alliance, or the character of German military culture with its cavalier approach to civilian casualties. Research into the role of other Germans, such as missionaries and businessmen, shows that many of them were appalled by the atrocities perpetrated against the Armenians, as were some German consular officials. Although religious and business figures were very well connected to government circles and the various elites of imperial Germany, they too found their entreaties largely ignored by the embassy and rejected by Berlin.

The more recent publications that depict a limited German role are certainly closer to the mark. The view that places the Germans at the center of
Germany and the Young Turks

the Armenian Genocide inadvertently diminishes the role of the CUP, reducing its leaders to pawns of German policy makers. The CUP triumvirs, Enver, Tâlât, and Cemal, whatever their nefarious faults, were fully capable of exercising leadership and making decisions, and little evidence exists to suggest that the Germans actively pursued a policy designed to eliminate the Armenians. However, even the more sophisticated historiography is very much concentrated on the events during World War I and neglects the larger course of German-Ottoman relations. It fails to explore fully the ideological and strategic elements that underpinned the wartime alliance and that enabled so many official Germans to accept with equanimity the violent population politics directed against the Armenians and other Christians like the Assyrians.

In this chapter I hope to present a much more nuanced picture of Ottoman-German relations. No monolithic position existed among Germans in regard to the Ottoman Empire. But official Germans as well as businessmen, academics, and missionaries active in the area agreed on three points: 1) the Ottoman Empire was a prime area of German interests; (2) to achieve those interests, Germany required, above all else, stability; and (3) stability meant a strong state. Many German diplomats, army officers, and intellectuals recognized a kinship with the authoritarianism of Ottoman rule, both of the sultanate and of the CUP. The semiauthoritarian structures of imperial Germany, with their strong military characteristics, found a mirror image in the forms of Ottoman governance—or at least so many Germans thought and hoped. Moreover, the Young Turks’ evolution, however inchoate, toward a vision of the empire as not just Muslim but Turkic accorded with the way these Germans viewed the world, as a place where aggressive nationalisms competed for domination and national or racial purity was understood as both an essential criterion of success and a goal in itself. And the elites in both countries underwent a parallel radicalization process that made them prone to adopt reckless and aggressive policies, domestically and internationally.7

Decades before the nation-state existed, some German intellectuals had begun to envision the Ottoman Empire as a primary site of German influence. Their ranks included the economist Friedrich List and a retinue of archaeologists. They were animated by German neoclassicism, which imagined a profound link between the ancient Greek world and contemporary Germany, a link that by the turn of the twentieth century was often articulated in racial terms. They also believed that “the Greek Orient,” the term they often used, could be a place of German settlement and German-inspired economic development. Especially from around the mid-nineteenth century onward, reforming intellectuals and enterprising cranks believed that German colonial settlement in western Anatolia could serve as the wellspring of
a healthy national revival against the degenerate influences of industrial society and its congested cities, or, in a modernist version, as the pioneering focal point of German imperial penetration of the Middle East.¹⁸

Nothing much came of these plans. The few German settlements that were established failed or limped along painfully. But the notion of a “German East” much farther afield than Poland and the Baltics had achieved a certain popular and ideological resonance, far more so than the actual colonies Germany gathered beginning in the 1880s in Africa and the Pacific.⁹ German missionaries went to the Ottoman Empire in serious fashion, and German companies became increasingly active there in tobacco, textiles, and, especially important, railroads, the latter an investment vehicle for Deutsche Bank and other financial institutions. Since the unification of Germany in 1871, a cadre of diplomats had emerged who viewed the Ottoman Empire as critical site of German influence despite Otto von Bismarck’s well-known, oft-expressed reservations against imperial adventures, including entanglements in the complicated ethnic, national, and Great Power conflicts in Southeastern Europe.

German diplomats and businessmen possessed the sober characteristics typical of their trades—they had little patience for experimental settlement colonies, and used all their influence to work against them. But they were interested in German power, political, military, and economic. Even Bismarck in his pursuit of German interests had allowed himself to be drawn into Ottoman affairs by challenging Russian expansion following its victory in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78. Bismarck played a key role in convening the Berlin Congress in 1878, whose final treaty rolled back Russian gains but also resulted in the loss of substantial Ottoman territory in Europe. In addition, the Berlin Treaty marked the formal and fateful internationalization of the Armenian issue, because paragraph 61 provided for western supervision of the Ottomans' treatment of the Armenians.

So when in 1897 Kaiser Wilhelm II launched Germany’s Weltpolitik (world policy), it followed nearly a century of preoccupation with the Ottoman Empire among the interlocking German elite comprising intellectuals, religious leaders, businessmen, government officials, nobles, and officers. Weltpolitik signified that Germany was no longer a satiated power, as Bismarck had declared upon the creation of the German Reich in 1871. Now Germany would seek to extend its influence around the globe, a policy that managed to antagonize first the British and then the Russians, while the French were generally threatened.¹⁰ If not a place for actual colonies, the Ottoman Empire was at least an area where Germany could exercise predominant political and economic influence, and in the process, contest British and French primacy in the Middle East. Some German intellectuals and officials began to see Turks as the Prussians of the Near East, a group that
embodied the militaristic virtues of valor, discipline, and order. The neo-absolutism of Sultan Abdülhamid II accorded with Kaiser Wilhelm’s pretensions, however misplaced and ultimately disastrous those views were given the modern and dynamic nature of Germany’s economy and society.\footnote{11} The kaiser’s famed 1898 visit to Istanbul included a number of private gatherings with Abdülhamid. Although in private the kaiser had earlier condemned the sultan as a scoundrel \textit{[Schurke]}, suddenly he felt great admiration for the absolutist trappings of the Ottoman regime and the evidence all around of monotheistic religiosity. The visit marked something of a consummation of the relations between the two powers, and was probably more important than Wilhelm’s outlandish declaration in Damascus that the German kaiser was the friend forever of the world’s 300,000,000 Muslims.\footnote{12}

The Baghdad Railway project soon followed the visit to Anatolia and the Middle East. Financed primarily by the Deutsche Bank, it became the major vehicle for German political and economic penetration of the Ottoman Empire. Meanwhile, German military advisors increasingly supplanted their French counterparts, who had exercised much influence throughout the nineteenth century. For some Ottoman officials, the newness of Germany’s entrance onto the world stage constituted the precise basis of its appeal. Germany had no record of carving off Ottoman territory; indeed, it had helped force the partial reversal of Russian gains in 1878. It provided a hopeful counterweight to the other Great Powers, and its military prowess was much admired.

The emergence of the Young Turk movement in the 1890s threatened at first to disrupt the relations between the two governments. To German officials, supporters of their own semiauthoritarian state, the Young Turks were dangerous revolutionaries. German diplomats willingly complied with Ottoman requests to keep track of Young Turk exiles with their “malevolent intentions.”\footnote{13} Germany sometimes served as a surrogate for the Ottomans and pressured other European countries to close down Young Turk publications and conspiracies, often finding a model in the repressive actions of other states, like Belgium, which banned the Young Turk newspaper edited by Ahmed Rıza.\footnote{14} In 1899, Ottoman officials approached the German ambassador in Turkey, Baron Marschall von Biberstein, and asked the German government to intervene with the Swiss government. Geneva had become a Young Turks exile center from which the Young Turks printed and smuggled leaflets and brochures into the Ottoman Empire, and perhaps also organized assassination plots against the sultan. Marschall told Tewfik Pasha, the Porte’s ambassador to Berlin, that he would immediately pass on the request to his government and he was convinced that something would be done in this question “to suit the wishes of His Majesty [Sultan Abdülhamid II].”\footnote{15} The German consuls in the Netherlands, Egypt, Bulgaria, and other
Germany’s representatives in the Ottoman Empire were always well informed about various events, including palace intrigue. In 1898, the sultan’s brother-in-law, Mahmud Pasha, apparently promised the English a part of the Baghdad railroad concession. His infelicitous action caused great concern in the palace and among German diplomats. When Mahmud Pasha could not deliver on his promises, he fled to Europe. Marschall wrote that Mahmud Pasha was “unbalanced” and was seeking to raise agitation against Germany. Bülow, state secretary at the Foreign Office, wrote to the kaiser confirming Marschall’s observations, and recommended that the sultan let the matter lie until it faded from view. German officials were bound and determined to forestall any English involvement in the railroad, and Ambassador Marschall said he would make clear to the sultan that any such concession to English interests “was politically impossible.” Recklessly, the kaiser, in a marginal notation, indicated that a concession on this matter “would be for me a casus belli.”

The kaiser’s belligerent notation on such an apparently mundane matter—the nature of the investors in a railroad—is evidence of the brashness that would eventually lead Germany, with its Ottoman ally in tow, into World War I. Determined to assert its power on the world stage, Germany under the kaiser continually challenged the predominance of the other powers, notably Britain, and promoted the massive use of force in its imperial domain. In the decade before the outbreak of World War I, the German military had demonstrated extreme brutality against the Boxer Rebellion in China and the Maji-Maji uprising in East Africa, and had committed in Southwest Africa what we now term a genocide. Notably, the radicalization of German politics, the willingness to risk war and use massive force, emanated from the very center of the system, that is, the kaiser, the military, and some Foreign Office personnel, including the foreign minister Bülow (who would soon become chancellor). The Ottomans, and especially the Young Turks after they assumed power in 1908, knew well the policies of the country they chose as their main ally.

In the context of the minicrisis involving Mahmud Pasha, Ambassador Marschall penned one of his long, elegantly written reports to the Foreign Office. His recommendations were not always followed in Berlin, but Marschall was almost always well informed, and he was a firm proponent of strong relations between Germany and the Ottoman Empire. His reports provide many insights into the thinking of German officials, and reflect a typical mix of acute political strategy and sheer prejudice and condescension concerning “the Turk” and “the Orient.” Marschall, although a Badanese liberal, strongly advocated authoritarian rule and always
expressed impatience with demands for popular sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire. His reports provide one indication of why Germany would so easily ally with the CUP: its shift toward authoritarian politics and opposition to nationalist demands, especially after 1913, had great affinities with German perspectives, and German officials also saw in the CUP continuities with the regime of Abdülhamid.

Marschall began by noting that Germany’s good standing in Turkey (the term Germans almost always used, rather than “Ottoman Empire”) had to do with the fact that their officials and journalists, unlike their French and English counterparts, recognized that other views and morals prevail in the Orient and the governmental system has to be judged on a basis different from Europe. Marschall went on to praise Abdülhamid as a ruler who

has a fine understanding for the great political questions that are bound to the existence of His Empire. With great skill He knows how to position His figures on the chessboard of Oriental politics and masterfully understands how to play the greed of certain powers against one another. But also in the realm of domestic politics He has great merits. Certainly He is no reformer in the modern sense. . . . To “reform” Turkey means to let loose on the Empire all the biting dogs, which today are restrained by their chains and now and then by well deserved blows.

Marschall went on to describe improvements in transportation and communication, public schooling, and public finances. The big problems had to do with disorderly administration and the corruption of officials, a theme he would maintain during the nearly fifteen years of his tenure as Germany’s representative to the Porte. (Marschall died in 1912 just as he was taking up a new ambassadorial post in London.) But the present Turkish governmental system could not be held exclusively responsible for the situation. “All of the wrongs are firmly rooted in Oriental morals and particularities.”

One critical fact remained, Marschall wrote:

Abdül Hamid has understood [that He has to] establish His authority in the Empire . . . firmly and unswervingly. To develop and maintain . . . this country is only possible with an autocratic regime. All the Turkish statesmen . . . who want to push Turkey down liberalizing paths and want to limit the governmental power of the Sultan through the cultivation of that intangible thing that we call “public opinion”—all those, to the extent that they are not elements consciously hostile to the state, are living in a fantasy. . . . To follow this course in Turkey would be the beginning of the end. The conglomerate of nationalities, tribes, religions, and confessions, with their diverging interests and centrifugal tendencies, often nourished from abroad . . . can only be held together with an iron hand. Every loosening of the reins, every concession to modern liberalism in the sense of participation of the people in governance would threaten the entire state with atomization.
Here we have the key elements of the German strategy. The Ottoman Empire was critical to German interests. Any form of liberalization, whether through democratic practices or concessions to ethnic and national demands for autonomy, would be dangerous because it would encourage the disintegration of the Empire. A strong, centralizing, authoritarian regime was required. When Abdülhamid provided that, he was supported by Germany. When the CUP provided that, in still more radical fashion, it was supported by Germany. With his imperial German background, Marschall welcomed the autocratic rule of the sultan, though he would later criticize its excesses. Somewhat reluctantly at first and with a great deal of complaining afterward, he would come to terms with the Young Turks. Authoritarianism at home in Germany and a willingness to use immense force, first in the colonies and then, in World War I, in Europe itself, had a recognizable counterpart in Ottoman governance.

The sultan feared the Young Turk movement, but Marschall believed in the 1890s and the first years of the twentieth century that it was “completely harmless” [völlig ungefährlich]. However great the unrest in Turkey, the elementary preconditions for revolution did not exist, namely, the possibility of bringing together large numbers of people in common action. Marschall was of course wrong in his political predictions. In 1908, the combination of the Young Turk Revolution and the Bosnian crisis forced German officials to adapt quickly to events outside their control, but the lines of strategy laid out in Marschall’s 1899 report remained constant. As Germany began dealing with the Young Turks without abandoning Abdülhamid, it tried to support those who seemed to be more in line with perceived German interests and German thinking. They watched guardedly Young Turks who were susceptible to what German diplomats always called “French” or “western European” political notions, meaning, of course, the ideas of 1789.

The first news of the Young Turk Revolution did nothing to jar German officials from their dismissive attitudes. As one embassy official wrote to Berlin:

> The broad term “Young Turks” covers those people who are consumed by and infatuated with western European concepts without having a real understanding of them. They dream of a “reformation” of their fatherland’s so-called parliamentary institutions along any kind of European model. I hardly believe that these enthusiasts are very numerous, even less that they are directly dangerous.25

The official complained that every utterance of discontent was attributed to Young Turks, although this was hardly the case. The Austrian ambassador complained that the Young Turk leaders in Paris, well educated and completely familiar with European politics—not quite a compliment in Janoš Pallavicini’s pen—held the movement tightly in hand.26
For their part, the Young Turks, while influenced by intellectual currents emanating from Germany, were also wary because of Germany’s strong support for Abdülhamid. Nonetheless, the Young Turks made overtures to Germany. They knew that Germany could be a helpful ally and it at least did not have a track record of dismembering the Ottoman Empire. The full sense of affinity would develop after the 1913 coup and in the war, when Germanophiles like Enver Pasha were at the helm of the CUP and exclusive nationalist ideologies, sometimes imbued with racial currents, had advanced among many Young Turks. But even the Francophone and Francophile Ahmed Rıza, who had long resisted attempts by other Young Turks to find a foreign patron for the movement and its efforts to overthrow Abdülhamid, sought out German contacts from his Parisian exile. Almost at the moment the 1908 Revolution was unfolding, he sought an audience with Kaiser Wilhelm II and with Reich Chancellor Bülow. In a rather obsequious note, Ahmed Rıza thanked the kaiser for his interest in the progress of the Ottoman Empire and support of the Ottoman army.

The kaiser took a middle road, backing both the sultan and the reform efforts of the CUP. But Rıza began to push a little too far. He requested that the kaiser not only communicate his views personally to the sultan, but make a public statement regarding his feelings of friendship for the Turkish people and their struggle for freedom. The German diplomats were wary of such a public move. As always, they were also keen to size up their interlocutors. From Paris the German ambassador Lancken wrote that Rıza is “clear and direct thinking, warm-hearted, and a patriotic man of honorable character.” Lancken, like other German officials, was always pleased to note that Rıza’s mother was German (she had married a Turkish diplomat), although Rıza did not speak the language. They hoped that with men like Rıza, the Young Turks would lose their revolutionary characteristics and govern with the sultan.

Official Germans were on the road to thinking about the Young Turks as statesmen rather than as revolutionaries. But Austria-Hungary’s annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina just a few weeks after the Young Turk Revolution created grave problems for the Germans. Many Ottomans indeed believed that the German government was behind or at least supportive of the annexation. However, Marschall, always a proponent of good relations with Istanbul whoever governed, bitterly condemned the Austrian move, arguing that it was a blatant violation of the Berlin Treaty of 1878 and thereby undermined European order. But he was overruled by Berlin. The alliance with Austria-Hungary was too important, and after all sorts of diplomatic dances, Germany ultimately decided not to pursue any measures against its ally.
In April 1909, various garrisons in Constantinople and elsewhere revolted, calling for the revocation of the constitution and the implementation of Shari’a, the Islamic law code. Such events were especially worrisome to the Germans. With a man like Ahmed Rıza, whose mother was German, who was fluent in French, they could easily negotiate. In other Young Turks, who perhaps had read the French and German classics and Darwin and Nietzsche, they could also place their hopes. Abdülhamid was a known quantity. But an Islamist movement was utterly foreign to them and threatened German interests and ambitions in the East far more than the old sultan or the Young Turks. According to Marschall, the rebels’ charge was that the Young Turks had acted in opposition to “holy law.” Their calls for women’s emancipation had greatly riled religious groups. Marschall suspected that the sultan had had a hand in the events, especially since he knew his land and his people better than the Young Turks, “who have spent the greatest part of their lives abroad.”

The revolt was suppressed and Ambassador Marschall lauded Young Turk military successes against the opposition forces. He sought to calm worries in Berlin about unrest in various Ottoman cities and the fate of the sultan. Even the kaiser, for once, took a restrained attitude and opposed an intervention in “a private, domestic Turkish affair,” though he lamented the fact that Germany had no major battleships in the Mediterranean to make a major show of force.

Later that fall, in October 1909, Ambassador Marschall reviewed the internal situation of Turkey in another one of his long reports. Still committed to friendly relations with the Ottoman Empire, he was growing disdainful of the political situation, and more worried about the liberal tendencies of the CUP. Germany’s predominant interest in the stability of the empire were threatened by the CUP’s commitment to liberalism (however temporary and unstable) and, even more so, by various forms of ethnic and national politics.

It is one of the signatures of modern developments that the domestic politics of states produce an ever greater array of “questions.” Turkey has an overproduction of such questions, and the new era is creating even more. The slogans of “equality and brotherhood” are answered on the side of Christians with calls for the retention of the “old privileges.” . . . Every nationality of this colorfully marked empire has its own question, which in every instance is divided into a political and religious part, each of which is then further subdivided. As a result of the territorial mixing of the population, in particular provinces the threads of various national oppositions have become drawn together in a completely confused tangle.

Marschall noted that Turkey’s constitutional monarchy allowed a huge range of freedoms.
As children are wont to do, the Turks have subjected this new toy [the constitution] to so many powerful blows that it was soon destroyed. After the joyful giddiness came the agitation of the religious leaders, strikes, armed actions, general insecurity, in a word, anarchy.38

Reality in Turkey, he continued, had little to do with what Germans would consider constitutional principles.

The system by which Turkey is today governed is no model of constitutional legality [staatsrechtlichen]. It is a caricature, an unusual mix of monarchy and oligarchy, of authoritarianism and democracy, of parliamentarism and military dictatorship, of a legal, constitutional state and an arbitrary state. Over everything exists the state of emergency with martial law and summary justice.39

The ambassador was astute enough to recognize that because of his absolutist strivings and the “annihilation struggle” he initiated against “the best element of his Army,” Abdülhamid bore major responsibility for the emergence of the CUP. Marschall, who normally had very good contacts within the Ottoman administration, was somewhat nonplussed by the secretive nature of the CUP. With a note of exasperation, he wrote that all we knew was that there existed a 12-person committee, with periodically shifting personnel, that directed the CUP.40 This “secretly functioning oligarchy” was in effect a revocation of the constitution.

Undoubtedly the Committee represents only a small minority of the Turkish people. The Young Turks do not dispute the point, but in contrast, use it to their advantage. The Turkish people, so they argue . . . are indifferent and even opposed to the constitution. Under the old regime the people lost the capacity to think politically and are incapable of recognizing that the constitution is the only means of saving the country . . . . An extraordinary organization is needed [so the Young Turks argue]. For that reason the Committee is for the time being necessary. With this argument one can ultimately prove the necessity of any kind of rule. The common understanding, on the other hand, will come to the conclusion that the Turkish people is not ripe for the constitution and it would not be clever to force upon it a state form that it does not understand and that can be maintained only through irregular institutions.41

The ambassador noted that despite a variety of political currents, there existed no organized opposition to the CUP. The low cultural level of many of the deputies in the Parliament only enhanced the CUP’s ability to dominate the political system. Indeed, Marschall was prescient in describing the dictatorial tendencies immanent in the CUP. “The more the democracy claims to distance itself from absolutism, the more it comes to resemble it.”42 He recognized the good intentions and energetic work, but also the inexperience, of many of the Young Turk leaders. He complained especially
about their determined rush to change everything before the proper preparation and infrastructure had been put in place, and their similarly determined claim to Great Power stature.

With his tirades against absolutism and dictatorship, Marschall sounded like a good liberal. But what he really advocated was a legal, constitutional state, a *Rechtsstaat* in German, infused with authoritarianism. In other words, he advocated for the Ottoman Empire something like the forms of rule prevalent in imperial Germany. Among the specific measures Marschall applauded were the limits on democracy that the CUP had implemented: curbs on the freedom of the press, a new law that forbade unions and strikes in public services, and a ban on associations that represented the particularist demands of individual nationalities. Moreover, Marschall often repeated his assessment that amid all of the difficulties in Turkey, all of its centrifugal tendencies, only the army could guarantee the development of the new order and the integrity of the empire.

So many serious differences exist, even among Muslim Turks themselves, that only one tie encircles all of them, from the turban-wearing old Turks, who look still with one eye to the old regime, to the most radical Young Turks, who swarm with enthusiasm for Rousseau and the Encyclopedists—namely, the conviction that the Empire can be saved only through the earnest, conscious strengthening of the military.

German diplomats, suspicious of both extreme dictatorial power and democracy, in the end welcomed every strengthening of centralist tendencies. The new German ambassador, Baron Hans von Wangenheim, who assumed the position after Marschall’s posting to London in 1912, wrote in 1913:

The present political program of the Committee signifies in essence the reversion from a true parliamentary system to a monarchical-constitutional system of governance. It is in Turkey’s own interests to welcome the fact that the strongest political party [the CUP] . . . has come to recognize that . . . Turkish conditions are ripe only for a substantially moderated form of constitutionalism.

Using an analogy of ready-to-wear versus tailored clothing, Wangenheim noted with satisfaction that the Young Turks had discovered that the most liberal constitutional forms from Europe do not match their size.

The jacket bought off the rack in the clothing store usually does not fit well, and the owner decides to have the suit made to his size. As is the case for the buyer with the more discerning eye, so one hopes for Turkey that it patronizes a skilled tailor.

Here we see the background to the German commitment to the Ottoman military and the logic of “military necessity,” the argument that would so
often be called on to justify the deportation and killing of Armenians in 1915–16. German diplomats were acutely aware of the divisive political and social conditions of the empire. With the sultan effectively deposed, only the CUP and the army could ensure political coherence in the empire, and the Germans supported every effort at greater centralization of power.\textsuperscript{47} Marschall and Wangenheim, though the latter perhaps to a lesser degree, had mixed feelings about the CUP, but both placed great hopes on the army. Popular participation and concessions to nationalist strivings would only worsen the situation. Force and reasonable dictatorship were the answer. Even if the CUP did not always seem the best partner in this venture, ultimately the Germans would accept it because of the hope that the party would provide the stability in the Ottoman Empire so desperately desired by Germans. Moreover, the more the CUP abandoned “French” ideas, the more its authoritarianism and forceful nationalism became pleasantly familiar to German governing circles. Underlying it all was a commitment to German imperial penetration of Anatolia and the Middle East. Marschall elucidated this position in one of his reports:

The enormous industrial rise in the United States, English imperialism, and the development of things in the Far East threaten our old and best markets [abroad]. A substitute for that we can only find in the Orient. If political frictions arise from that, so be it: that is the price we will have to pay, though we should also be ready to come to understandings in particular instances.\textsuperscript{48}

Even reasonable diplomats like Marschall and Wangenheim were prepared for great risks in their pursuit of German interests. They would negotiate with the other Great Powers, but they would not shy away from the assertion of German power abroad, notably in the Ottoman Empire. If the ultimate result was war, so be it.

Indeed, the ambassadors and other German diplomats greeted every difficulty between the Ottoman Empire and Britain or France with a good dose of \textit{Schadenfreude} [malicious pleasure] and hope in the diminution of their ideological influence on the Young Turks. As Marschall wrote to Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg:

During their stays abroad, these people [the Young Turks] acquired a certain measure of education and cultivation [\textit{Bildung}], and one cannot deny that they in part are definitely intelligent and have good intentions. Unfortunately, they studied “politics” in western Europe, primarily in France, and thereby learned nothing clever and have forgotten the traditions and perspectives of their people. As an offering they brought to their land the teaching of the “sover-eignty of the people.” I have never been able to find any kind of reasoned sense [\textit{vernünftigen Sinn}] in this theory... [and] in view of the many and varied centrifugal nationalities [in the Ottoman Empire], it is complete nonsense....
[The Turkish state] oscillates . . . from the most extreme absolutism to the opposite pole of boundless radicalism. That stands in complete opposition . . . to Turkish particularities.⁴⁹

Presciently, Marschall observed in 1911 that the main impact of the revisions of the constitution was to open the door for a coup d’état.⁵⁰

Perhaps a few thousand other Germans were active in the Ottoman Empire. They were academics, businessmen, and missionaries, and the more elite and entrepreneurial among them had close ties to official circles. Together they promoted an early form of cultural politics as a way of deepening the Ottoman-German relationship. They arranged study tours of Germans in Anatolia and of Turks in Germany, organized friendship societies, promoted German language instruction in the Ottoman Empire, and sought to establish a German Cultural House in Istanbul. At home they issued pamphlets, wrote newspaper articles, and preached from pulpits.⁵¹

Like their country’s officials, private Germans were overwhelmingly concerned with stability in the Ottoman Empire, in their case, so they could run their factories, trade at the ports, dig at archaeological sites, and conduct missionary work among Armenians (having given up on converting Muslims to Christianity, they had settled on the next best goal: making Protestants out of Gregorian Armenians). Many of the academics were pro-Turkish, but others, especially the missionaries, were deeply worried about the fate of Armenians even before the onset of the genocide. Some had ministered to Armenians during the earlier massacres of 1895–96 and 1909 and had developed ongoing relations with them through various Christian institutions.

While it is impossible to determine which “faction,” pro-Armenian or pro-Turkish, prevailed, certainly many influential Germans who straddled the worlds of business, academia, and government, like Friedrich Naumann and Ernst Jäckh, energetically promoted close ties between Turks and Germans. Retinues of Ottoman officials and businessmen were provided with grand treatment on study trips to Germany, which German officials afterward touted as great successes. After one such visit in 1911, one German official quoted an unnamed Ottoman source who gushed over the fine hospitality the Turks were accorded, not just at official meetings, but also on the street and in the shops. At a banquet, the flowers on the tables matched the colors of the Turkish flag, leaving a glowing impression on the guests, going “right to their hearts.” Turks who had only thought of Germany as a military state discovered hospitality and blooming culture and science. “Wherever one sets foot in Germany, everywhere one finds the most progressive civilization.”⁵²

Some trips were financed by the German government, others by the German-Turkish Friendship Society, headed by Ernst Jäckh, a mercurial academic and an inveterate organizer, self-promoter, and Turkish-enthusiast. Alongside “get acquainted” trips, Jäckh put great efforts into obtaining
support for the foundation of a German school in Istanbul that would be another major vehicle of winning friendship for Germany.

Over the course of these events, it became evident that German officials had decidedly mixed attitudes toward the Armenians. For some Germans, Armenians were brotherly Christians who suffered under Muslim Turkish oppression. But for many others committed to the relationship with Turkey, the Armenians were a troublesome group and worse. Their nationalist strivings threatened the integrity of the empire, and their commercial occupations made them the Jews of the Orient, not exactly a positive attribute in German eyes. The archives are full of negative references to Greeks and Armenians, who are often characterized as even more adept merchants and moneylenders than Jews.\textsuperscript{53} Ambassador Marschall commented that “all Orientals are involved in intrigues. The Armenians and Greeks are masters of the trade.”\textsuperscript{54} As a result, there was little place for anti-Semitism in Turkey.

The economic activity, which elsewhere the Jews perform, namely the exploitation of the poorer, popular classes through usury and similar manipulations, is here performed exclusively by Armenians and Greeks. The Spanish Jews who settled here cannot make any headway against them. Therefore, it has been found necessary to strengthen antisemitic sentiments by the word “Zionism,” which allegedly follows the goal of delivering to the Jews not only Palestine, but also Syria.\textsuperscript{55}

Armenians, meanwhile, often displayed an intense hostility toward Germans based both on Germany’s close relationship to the hated Abdülhamid and on economic competition between German and Armenian businesses, particularly in provincial centers outside Istanbul. According to one German businessman involved in the building of the Mersina-Tarsus-Adana railway, “the hostile mood toward Germany in Mersina and, in connection, the movement against our railroad, has won the upper hand. . . . The leadership of the movement lies in the hands of the Armenians, whose committee more than ever raises particularistic demands and does not wish to see that Mersina, ‘the Armenian port,’ falls under any kind of German control.”\textsuperscript{56}

The German consul in Mersina recognized that German textile manufacturers and efforts to control transport represented serious competition to some Armenians and Greeks, who put into motion all manner of intrigue against German interests. At the same time, the various CUP committees established in every significant town adopted “an unfriendly attitude” toward Germany that could jeopardize the Baghdad Railway.\textsuperscript{57}

Sometimes, however, pro-Armenian views overrode official support for the relationship with the Ottoman Empire. During the 1909 massacres in Adana, the marine command of the S.M.S. \textit{Hamburg} sought to deliver aid to besieged Armenians. In revenge for Armenian self-defense, Ottoman troops
had destroyed the Armenian quarter. Refugees found shelter in a German factory; the troops had plundered the offices and had murdered Armenians, making the evacuation of refugees now impossible. “Armenian trust in Turkish officials is totally lost,” the commander wrote, and requested the quick dispatch of tents, food, drugs, and physicians. “Turkish officials do nothing,” he added.58

The kaiser did, apparently, mention the massacre to the Turkish ambassador in Vienna, Ferid Pasha, during a visit there. The kaiser “sharply condemned” the Adana events and said that the repetition “of such outrages would lead to serious dangers for Turkey.”59 But such sentiments did not at all call into question Germany’s fundamental commitment to the Ottoman Empire, whether it was ruled by Abdülhamid or the CUP.

On the eve of World War I, German officials were watching the situation in the Ottoman Empire with ever heightened concerns. They remained worried about the fragility of the empire, by the demands of disparate groups for reform, and by the capabilities of the Young Turks themselves. The Balkan Wars of 1912–13 only heightened these worries at the same time that they were a defining experience for the CUP. The loss of so much Ottoman territory and population, among the last footholds of a once-great European, as well as Asian and Middle Eastern, empire was a huge blow. The poor performance of Ottoman troops unnerved both the Young Turks and German officials. Some elements in the CUP moved toward a more exclusive, Turkic conception of the empire that entailed a sharp reduction or elimination of other ethnicities and religions.60 In 1914, just months before the outbreak of World War I, the Great Powers imposed on the CUP government heightened international surveillance of the treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. Coming right after the defeat in the Balkan Wars, such actions only intensified the CUP’s hostility toward foreign interference and fears for the very existence of the Ottoman realm. Germans meanwhile began thinking about a possible federal structure or at least greater autonomy for Armenians, Greeks, and others, and some even went so far as to contemplate the dismemberment of the empire. But they knew that in such a case, England and France would come out far more profitably than Germany.

Wangenheim was a strong promoter of central power coupled with some cultural autonomy. From Corfu in 1912, he reported matter of factly on a conversation with the “liberal Albanian” İsmail Kemal Bey, who advocated a federal solution along German lines for the Ottoman Empire. “Turkishness” [Türkentum] should play a role similar to Prussia, he proclaimed, meaning that the Turkish areas and population should be dominant within the empire, but a fair level of autonomy should be allowed the various regions and peoples. Wangenheim did not comment on Kemal Bey’s proposal,
which ran against the centralizing tendencies of the CUP. But what could sound more melodic to a German official than a German model for the Ottoman Empire, however farfetched that now appears?

Some sixteen months later, Wangenheim lauded two developments: the CUP’s willingness to grant greater autonomy in the cultural sphere, notably in regard to education in languages other than Turkish, and, at the same time, the centralization of power. The ambassador wrote approvingly of the CUP’s recent efforts to assert the right of the sovereign to delay or dismiss parliament; limit the powers of deputies to engage in no confidence votes that could topple a minister or government; abolish the notion that deputies had to be resident in their districts, which would ensure a more technically oriented, experienced parliament; and reduce the time period that parliament could remain in session. Wangenheim concluded that the present political program signified a transformation from “a purely parliamentary to a monarchical-constitutional system. We can joyfully recognize that it is in Turkey’s own interests that the strongest party . . . has come to see that even in the best of circumstances, Turkish conditions are ripe only for a very mild form of constitutionalism.” Wangenheim did not need to write that such developments in Young Turk politics were also in Germany’s interests because they held out the promise of greater stability. Nor did he note that the limitations on democracy instituted by the CUP echoed the semiauthoritarian structures of imperial Germany. German forms of governance had a recognizable counterpart in the late Ottoman Empire.

As war approached in the summer of 1914, the Ottoman elite remained divided whether to enter the conflict and, if so, on which side. We know from recent research that ultimately, broad segments of the Ottoman elite had come to support war and the alliance with Germany. Germany promised the CUP the recovery of the territory and population it had lost in the Balkan Wars, and more. Moreover, Germany had never taken Ottoman territory, the one mark of distinction it possessed as all the Great Powers scurried around looking for support in the impending conflagration. In turn, the Young Turks’ imagination soared as they contemplated the fruits of victory. Like their German ally, they believed that through war, all internal social and political conflicts could be erased and an even grander empire would take shape.

It did not quite work out that way. Defeat and disaster were the consequences for Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire. But along the way, the Young Turks adopted one particularly brutal form of erasing social difference: the genocide of Armenians as a means of creating a far more homogeneous population structure.

The Armenian deportations had begun in February 1915 in Cilicia, and key decisions for further population removals were probably made at the
end of March and were perhaps discussed with the Germans in Berlin. Through the spring deportations accelerated, leading to the Armenian uprising at Van in April and May. Even before Van, news of the brutal treatment of Armenians had disseminated rapidly through Europe and the Middle East. On May 24, 1915, Britain, France, and Russia issued the now-famous note in which they promised to hold members of the Ottoman government and “their agents” responsible for “crimes against humanity.” On May 27, 1915, the Ottoman government issued a law that legitimized deportations for “security and military interests.” The timing is notable. Hundreds of thousands of Armenians had already been removed and killed. The Van revolt had been suppressed and the Ottomans had received the Allies’ note. Clearly, the CUP government was trying to forestall further criticism and pressure by presenting its actions against the Armenians as purely within the realm of legitimate warfare. In fact, it was attempting a massive demographic restructuring of the empire by the exercise of extreme violence.

German officials were very well informed about all these events. Consuls were reporting back to Wangenheim with explicit descriptions about the fate of the Armenians, pleading for the ambassador to intervene with the Ottoman authorities and with the German government in Berlin. Wangenheim had issued a few, weak protests, but by mid-spring, as the deportations accelerated, he refrained even from these limited actions. The Armenian uprising at Van in April–May 1915 pushed him—or gave him the cover he wanted in any case—to lend his full support to Ottoman policies. Always suspicious of Armenian political demands, Wangenheim defended his position on the basis of “military necessity,” the phrase raised continually by German officials and officers. Germany was at war, its Ottoman ally had to be supported, and Armenians were a troublesome lot—so went the standard explanation.

But German consular officials continued to raise fervent protests with their superior in Istanbul. Bowing to pressure, Wangenheim, on July 4, 1915, protested the Armenian deportations to the Ottoman government, but allowed that such actions were acceptable if they were done for military reasons. In essence, Wangenheim just fell in line behind the cover of the Ottoman deportation law of May 27. He communicated his objections to Berlin as well, but Bethmann-Hollweg rejected even that meek attempt. Bethmann-Hollweg responded with the favored slogan, “military necessity.” Wangenheim issued a few more protests with the Ottoman government. But it was clear that from the highest reaches of the state, German officials, with a few notable exceptions, displayed a massive indifference to the fate of the Armenians, which, in fact, signified a degree of complicity with Ottoman policies. Through the spring, summer, and fall of 1915, only consular
officials raised serious protests. Never did the top German leaders, from Wangenheim to the Foreign Office, the civilian government, the military command, and the kaiser, try in earnest to restrain their CUP allies in their exercise of the most brutal form of population politics. Within two weeks of his appeals to the Ottoman authorities, Wangenheim was writing to Bethmann-Hollweg that the Porte would not take into account German appeals and Germany should simply try to shield itself from charges of complicity.68

Through the autumn of 1915, while Armenians were still moving across the killing fields of the Syrian desert, while survivors reached Aleppo and Damascus famished and disease-stricken, a high volume of cable and personnel traffic, official and private, shuttled back and forth between Istanbul and Berlin in regard to the Armenian issue. The energetic missionary Johannes Lepsius, long engaged in the Ottoman Empire and closely tied by family and profession to high state officials in Berlin, clamored for action against the Ottoman government and support measures for Armenian survivors.69 An adept organizer, Lepsius rallied other highly placed Germans to pressure the government.

But Lepsius’s nemesis, Ernst Jäckh, was no less active, and he too was a skilled organizer. Jäckh took a long trip in Anatolia and the Balkans in September and October 1915, clearly with official support. In his extensive report, he emphasized the preparations for a German House in Istanbul, the organization of a Turkish-German Association as a parallel to the German-Turkish Association, the conditions of German schools in various parts of the empire, and other matters of that sort.70 Always one for self-promotion, Jäckh made sure his interlocutors knew about his “eight-year acquaintance and friendly relations with Enver Pasha and Tâlât Bey.”71 As ever, Jäckh played up the close connections and mutual interests of Germany and the Ottoman Empire, which leading Ottoman officials recognized as the cornerstone of Turkey’s future. According to Jäckh, one leading Ottoman official lauded in parliament the close collaboration of the two countries “from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf.” At the same time, all the leading Ottoman statesmen made clear that the capitulations—the special privileges accorded Europeans—had to be abandoned.72 The triumvirate expected “trust and more trust” from Germany and German collaboration in all Ottoman governmental offices. “The will to hold on with Germany is firm with these statesmen, and they really are ‘power holders’ who have power in the hand.”73 To Jäckh, “true” Turks were loyally behind the alliance and supportive of Germany. He claimed to hear many times, even from even traditional Turks, “Maschallah aleman! (God bless the Germans!).”74 Jäckh dismissed other ethnic groups as disloyal, in the case of Armenians, or degenerate, in the case of Levantines (meaning Maronites) and Arabs, especially Arab Christians because of their ties to France and their receipt of
French or English pensions. Jäckh offered, then, an ethnic-national political map of the Ottoman Empire that lauded its core Turkish element and rejected all the other population groups.

The Armenian deportations and murders were not in the forefront of Jäckh’s concerns, nor could he ignore them. Like leading German statesmen, Jäckh approvingly quoted Enver that the Turkish Empire (Jäckh’s words) had to secure itself against an Armenian revolution that had broken out in the rear of its troops. Tâlât made clear “that he greeted the annihilation of the Armenians as a political relief,” though there existed some voices of opposition within the CUP. According to Jäckh, Lepsius and all the other opponents of CUP policies, German and Ottoman, had to be reminded that Turkish participation in the war had resulted in great achievements against Russia and England and that Turkey was always the key to the Balkans.\(^{75}\)

At the embassy in Istanbul it was business as usual through the remainder of Wangenheim’s tenure. In one of his last dispatches, Wangenheim jauntily reported on a meeting with Halil (Menteşe) Bey, who related the deliberations of a joint meeting of the Ottoman government and ten members of the CUP central committee. After the victory in war—which they all apparently expected—the extended period of peace must be used to carry out full-scale reforms of governmental administration. These should be modeled on Germany and should be carried out with the support of Germany. But for this to happen, Germany will have to follow through on its promise to abandon the capitulations. A treaty along these lines must be concluded and trade negotiations begun.\(^{76}\) Not a word from Wangenheim or, apparently, from his Ottoman interlocutor about the Armenian deportations.

Already ill, Wangenheim left for Berlin in July, shortly after raising his protest against the treatment of the Armenians. He returned to Istanbul, and then died on October 25, 1915. His two successors, Prince Ernst zu Hohenlohe-Langenburg (on a temporary basis) and Paul Wolff-Metternich, reversed Wangenheim’s course. They raised loud and persistent complaints about the Ottoman government’s treatment of the Armenians. Wolff-Metternich took up his post in Istanbul on November 19, 1915. Shortly afterward, on a trip to the Dardanelles and Eastern Thrace, he described a territory devastated by the Balkan Wars and World War I. Even once-fertile areas were like a desert and cleared of men.

Whether after the war Turkish “culture” can succeed to conjure up again a fertile region out of the desolation remains to be seen. Personally and based on what I have seen so far, I do not believe in the regeneration of Turkey. All the conditions are lacking: honesty, an active middle class, secure legal conditions, and a sound education of the population. From a clique that proclaims \textit{liberté, droit civil pour tous}, constitution and slaughters hundreds of thousands of innocent people I do not expect much.\(^{77}\)
Wolff-Metternich scathingly dismissed the “more or less youthful enthusiasts among us” who were of a different opinion concerning the Turks; they had allowed themselves to be taken in by the current leadership. His views were echoed by the most prominent members of a Reichstag delegation, who traveled to the Ottoman Empire in February 1916. The Center Party leader Matthias Erzberger reported that Germans with long experience in Anatolia had no confidence in the empire’s future and the CUP government. According to Erzberger, they dismissed Jäckh and his various enterprises and pleaded for a more reasonable policy from Berlin. Erzberger admitted that the Ottoman Empire had done Germany a significant military service. But if by fighting the war to victorious conclusion Germany makes Turkish territory secure, it will have repaid its debt. In view of the extermination of the Armenians and the persecution of Christians, the abolition of the capitulations was fully impossible, Erzberger concluded.

But these pro-Armenian voices, as prominent as they were, could not penetrate Berlin’s resolve to support its Ottoman ally all down the line. Despite Wolff-Metternich’s continual efforts, most striking is the silence that descended on the Armenian issue in the German documents from around 1916 to the end of the war. At most, German officials made veiled references to the “exaggerated nationalism” of the Young Turks, which the Germans hoped would be curbed after the war. Official German government press guidelines in 1917 stated explicitly that “it is best to keep silent about the Armenian question.”

Within the military commands, the Armenian issue also receded from importance. Tensions certainly ran through the Ottoman-German alliance, but these had more to do with issues of personnel and authority of command than they did with the commission of atrocities. Many Ottoman officers resented the German presence and blocked or undermined German orders. Within the German camp, civilian and military officials were constantly at loggerheads, especially given the difficult character of General Otto Liman von Sanders, who was in charge of the military mission. Wagenheim complained bitterly about him, to the point where the ambassador noted to a friend that “in my long diplomatic career I have worked well with superiors, subordinates, and colleagues. But I have not yet achieved the qualifications of a doctor for the mentally ill [Irrenartzt].” Liman and Enver Pasha worked in the same building but would only communicate in writing. General Friedrich Bronsart von Schellendorf found himself in the untenable position of serving as both Enver’s chief of staff and a member of the military mission under Liman’s command. Schellendorf’s ties to Enver were no doubt part of the reason why Liman wanted to fire him.

Wolff-Metternich’s protestations on behalf of the Armenians aroused the ire of both the Ottoman and the German authorities, and the German
government acceded to the CUP request for his recall, which occurred on October 3, 1916. His tenure had lasted less than eleven months.

His successor as Germany’s ambassador, Richard von Kühlmann, arrived in Istanbul in mid-November 1916. Kühlmann was far more supportive of CUP policies and simply entered into standard ambassadorial mode by reporting on the internal politics of the CUP. His evaluations were not always accurate. Sometimes he (and his successors) mischaracterized different factions or predicted wrongly which individuals were prevailing within the party. But overall, the Germans were very well informed and they continued to advocate the policies set out by Marschall and Wangenheim: centralization of power coupled with some cultural autonomy. At the same time, they ignored the most powerful example of the exercise of central state power: the genocide of the Armenians. Like his predecessors, Kühlmann joyfully relayed any positive comments about Germany issued by his Ottoman interlocutors. He lauded Hussein Dschahid (Hüseyin Cahid) as a leader of the “modern faction” in the CUP who had come to recognize that a “wise and clever grafting of German methods onto Turkish schools and administration was the single possible way” of domestic development. Moreover, Dschahid stated that Turkey needed an ally, and if it did not maintain the relationship with Germany, it would fall victim to a “brutal relationship of dependency” with regard to all the Great Powers.

Kühlmann hoped that if this tendency prevailed, the “exaggerated nationalism” that was also present in the CUP would recede—a veiled reference perhaps to the Armenian massacres. Yet he lauded the main architect of the genocide, Tâlât Pasha, as Germany’s man. Sprinkling Romantic-type descriptions of the “broad shouldered, heavily bearded man, with black penetrating eyes and an outward calm and bonhomie” amid an analysis of the power hierarchy within the Ottoman Empire, Kühlmann projected Tâlât as a wise, decisive statesman, but one willing also to exercise brutality when it was necessary. Apparently, Kühlmann saw nothing wrong with this last trait.

Despite the varied positions among Germans in regard to Turks and Armenians, whatever the tensions between Turkish and German military men and governmental leaders, the Ottoman-German alliance held until the bitter end, with dire consequences for the Armenians. At the uppermost reaches of the state and with a slew of academics, publicists, and others in tow, German military and civilian officials supported the Young Turk government and, thereby, became complicit in the Armenian Genocide although they were hardly the initiators or organizers of the event. Their complicity stemmed from inaction, willful self-deception, and the perception of military necessity in the age of total war, when the status of civilian populations had become ever more critical to the logic of warfare.
Yet “military necessity” hardly suffices as an explanation for official German toleration and support of the Armenian Genocide. Military thinking does not exist in pristine isolation from other ideological formations, nor without reference to larger historical factors. In the particular case of the Armenian Genocide, German actions were informed by a century of intellectual interest in the Ottoman Empire and a generation of direct, active pursuit of German imperial interests in the region. To achieve those interests, Germany sought a powerful state, a general perspective that they filled out with ideas and concepts drawn from their own imperial German background. They defended authoritarian structures in the Ottoman Empire as the most reliable guarantors of stability. Ottoman authoritarianism, whether the Ssultan’s or the Young Turks,’ would best enable Germans to develop their political, economic, and religious enterprises in Anatolia and the Middle East. Strong central power, rather than popular sovereignty, was familiar and comfortable to official Germans, who identified kindred elements in Ottoman governance. The central role German diplomats accorded the Ottoman army also directly echoed the Prusso-German experience with its powerful military, which stood at the center of governance in the political structure of imperial Germany.

Two other factors were critical in the German accommodation of Ottoman atrocities. Germans, like the Ottoman rulers, had had plenty of experience with “troublesome” populations in the first years of the twentieth century. Against the Boxer Rebellion in China and the Maji-Maji Uprising in East Africa, the Germany army had unleashed extensive brutality. In Southwest Africa the army had carried out a genocide of the Herero and Nama. In World War I it committed severe violence against Belgian and French civilians. All of these actions were directly encouraged by those at the very center of power: the kaiser, the military command, and, of secondary importance, the civilian government. German strategists and politicians thought about these groups in extreme national or racial terms, such that every member of the group was deemed a potential enemy. The Armenian Genocide was more extensive and deadly than these other events. But the strategy of deportations and killings that the Young Turks initiated constituted a policy that was all too familiar to German officials.

Finally, the pursuit of these kinds of policies marked a serious radicalization of governmental policy. In both the Ottoman and German cases, it was those in power, the insiders, the elites, not those on the social or political margins, who underwent a process of radicalization. Precisely because they held power, their inclination for extreme measures, domestically and internationally, proved so deadly for certain populations (and not just rival armies and states). Both regimes advocated and put into practice the Flucht nach vorne (colloquially, the preemptive strike). The engagement of war was a
risky business, but also provided their leaders with great opportunities. In the context of war imaginations soared ever higher. German military and civilian officials envisaged a German imperium from France to Ukraine and into Anatolia and the Middle East. The Young Turks thought of war as the means of resolving all of the perceived problems of the empire—encroachments of foreign powers on Turkish sovereignty, the loss of territory through the Bosnian annexation and the Balkan Wars, and nationalist movements from within, in particular among the Armenians. It all ended in political disaster for both imperial Germany and the Ottoman Empire, but not before atrocities had been enacted upon a number of populations.

In late 1916, Ambassador Kühlmann wrote to Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg. He mentioned nothing about the Armenian deportations and massacres, except for a veiled reference to the “exaggerated nationalism” of the Young Turk government. About Tâlât, who as Minister of the Interior was one of the main organizers of the Armenian Genocide and was about to become Grand Vizier, Kühlmann wrote that “from [Tâlât] one can reliably expect a decisive and clear direction of the entire scope of Turkish politics.” He was the strong man that Germans always felt the empire needed. Moreover,

he has staked his own political existence and that of his country on the alliance with Germany. So long as we or the conditions in general do not place before him the alternative of sacrificing the existence of Turkey on the altar of the alliance, we can firmly and definitely count on him.85

From dangerous revolutionaries in the 1890s the Young Turks had become, in German eyes, responsible statesmen with whom they could work—even when “work” meant complicity in the destruction of the Armenian population.

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“Who still talks nowadays about the extermination of the Armenians?” Hitler’s challenge, flung out to his commanders on the eve of their attack on Poland, has become so familiar that it is the target of genocide deniers, determined to discredit its authenticity. Although we have no reason to doubt the remark is genuine, both attack and defense obscure an obvious reality. Suppose detractors could prove that the emissary from the German resistance who handed the Führer’s speech to the AP’s Berlin Bureau Chief had indeed inserted the reference to the Armenians in order to make Hitler appear more bloodthirsty? Such an insertion would only underscore the iconic status of the Armenian genocide as the apex of horrors conceivable in 1939.

This chapter supplies the empirical basis for what is implicit in the Nazi leader’s rhetorical question: that the Armenians and their extermination had once excited considerable “talk.” Secondarily, it raises the question, without resolving it, of whether talk has consequences. (Hitler thought so; otherwise why try to assure his generals, about to embark upon exterminations of their own, of talk’s transience?) Finally, in demonstrating the ubiquity of talk about the extermination, it offers a fortiori proof that the extermination occurred.

Talk about the extermination of the Armenians began in the mid-1890s, when Abdülhamid II’s massacres, with well over 100,000 victims, provoked an outcry of indignation and sympathy from church and peace groups to the Socialist International. In England, the House of Commons demanded that the royal navy force the Dardanelles and remove the sultan. In Russia, intellectuals from Chekhov to Solov’ev garnered nearly 30,000 rubles from donations and sales of an anthology put together for Armenian relief. In France,
Dreyfusards founded the journal *Pro Arménia*, its editorial board graced by luminaries from the Left—although agitation for the Armenians ranged across France’s entire political spectrum.³

The uproar was not confined to countries with designs on the Near East. Switzerland’s “interest” in the region was so slender that until 1927 it did not even maintain formal diplomatic relations with Turkey. Yet the Swiss soon collected a million francs (more than ten million in today’s purchasing power) for Armenian relief and more signatures than on any petition in their long history.⁴ In the United States, suffering in Anatolia spurred nationwide “Armenian Sundays,” precursors of the “Golden Rule Sundays” of the 1920s when participants consumed (often in banquet rooms provided gratis) the same meager fare dished up by Near East Relief, to raise money for “starving Armenians.” By 1925, forty-nine countries were sharing these rituals of symbolic sacrifice.⁵

Not least among those who kept the talk about Armenians humming were the Young Turks, who before 1908 planted articles and letters in the European press on their mistreatment. Referring to “the service that the Armenians are rendering to the Turks,” many hoped, as did Armenians themselves, to spur the Great Powers to topple the sultan. Meanwhile Abdülhamid bribed Western journalists to influence opinion in the opposite direction. On the Bosporus, at least, people believed talk had consequences.⁶

And in Germany? By late 1896, talk about the destruction of the Armenians was so loud that Johannes Lepsius, the young pastor who spearheaded the agitation, had become “the most famous man in Germany.”⁷ Lepsius, to whom I will return later, appealed especially to Lutherans of an evangelical persuasion, but secular Germans were also appalled by Armenian suffering. “No other aspect of the Eastern Question,” averred a prominent German liberal, “is now discussed so vigorously as the Armenian Question.”⁸

We must distinguish, of course, between noise in the public square and the intense but discreet exchanges in the corridors of power. To merge these two conversations was vital for the Armenians; to keep them apart, the goal of diplomats and statesmen. For sooner or later “talk” meant pressure, and the last thing policy makers wanted was the kind of moralizing speech that might limit their own freedom of action. The use of force on behalf of the Armenians, they feared, would compromise Ottoman survival and risk unleashing a war of all against all. Thus, in the poker game of Great Power politics, as the historian Marian Kent has noted, “The Ottoman Empire held one trump card. This was the general desire of the European Powers for it to survive as a political entity.”⁹ That card could be played as easily against Great Power humanitarianism as against Great Power imperialism. Consequently, the louder the outcry over the Armenians’ plight, a buzz that by its nature sparked networks
that jumped national boundaries, the more Europe’s foreign offices cooperated in their studied efforts at silence.

Yet behind closed doors, the talk continued, as stacks of foreign office documents make clear. Discussions grew more intense when—beginning with the Albanian rebellion in 1910 and spiraling into the Balkan inferno of 1912–13—the empire’s final “liquidation,” as diplomats delicately put it, hove into sight. The collapse of Ottoman authority in the Balkans was expected to spread to Asia Minor, where new crops of separatists were emerging, from Beirut to the Persian frontier. Some observers feared Armenian rebellions; others, massacres when the Ottoman army demobilized. In September 1912, Patriarch Hovannes Arsharuni resigned over the Porte’s passivity in the face of documented murders of Armenians—setting off demonstrations in London, Paris, Sofia, and Cairo. Amid a flurry of disquieting rumors, Germany deployed, with British approval, four cruisers to Turkish waters. For violence in Asia Minor, if it triggered Russian intervention, would surely be met by Austrian counteraction in the Balkans—with the risk of a general war. Preventing the extermination of the Armenians thus became the task of every statesman committed to peace.

Yet at the prospect of ethnic conflict spilling across the Caucasus, the tsar’s government—aware of the perils but pushed by the public—began threatening to occupy Eastern Anatolia if credible protections for Armenians were not implemented immediately. The Russian démarche added urgency to cries of the Armenians themselves. As Russians pressed and Ottomans dithered, Armenians and their supporters petitioned the president in France; sent appeals to the Hague Court from Japan and Burma; importuned Britain from outposts in India, Ceylon, and the Straits Settlement; and entreated Germany from Constantinople, Cairo, Sofia, Yokohama, Manchester, Frankfurt, and Potsdam. Talk got louder.

At least one German diplomat recognized a crisis when he saw one. Ambassador Hans von Wangenheim urged Berlin to instruct its representatives in Turkey to intervene to stop the abuses of Armenians and even, in emergencies, to act as their “really effective protectors.” It was time also to grasp the nettle of “Armenian Reforms.” The proposal required scuttling the sacred diplomatic convention of ignoring a friendly state’s domestic arrangements—a convention that during the massacres of the 1890s had kept the kaiser’s government on a noninterventionist path. The ambassador’s proposal would have meant a radical shift in Germany’s stance in the Near East.

Wangenheim’s bosses demurred. With the outcome of the Balkan wars still so uncertain, “rolling out the Armenian question” was the last thing that Germany’s new foreign secretary, Gottlieb von Jagow, wanted. But talk about imperiled Armenians could no longer be hushed. The London Times
ran eighty-eight items on Armenian troubles over the course of 1913. In Paris, Pro Arménia, defunct since 1908, resumed publication. Twelve speeches in the British parliament, an interpellation in the Italian chamber of deputies, and queries in the Reichstag reflected and contributed to the disquiet. Whether he liked it or not, Jagow had to talk about the Armenians.

The work load of Europe’s exhausted diplomats, already crushing thanks to the Balkan crisis, increased dramatically as a consequence. In June alone, well over seventy-five missives on the Armenian matter crossed the transoms of the Wilhelmstrasse. In Therapia, Baron Wangenheim was chained to his desk, his longed-for family holiday postponed, then postponed again. Even with Balkan armies still raining down atrocities on each others’ villages, the “kaleidoscopic” situation in the Orient, Jagow declared, had become “the most pressing of all political questions.”

Uncertain whether the future lay with the Armenians or the Turks, German officials began to work both sides of the street. As the atmosphere in Constantinople became increasingly “electric,” Jagow labored, with London’s cooperation, to secure protections for the Armenian minority that would be least subversive of Ottoman sovereignty. At the same time, through Johannes Lepsius, the Armenians’ champion in the nineties, he opened relations with Armenian leaders, both to win them for a compromise and to ensure their goodwill should compromise fail. Although not the dramatic course correction Ambassador Wangenheim had wanted, Jagow’s expenditure of diplomatic capital on behalf of an accord demonstrated how acute the danger in Eastern Anatolia was felt to be—to its populations, to Ottoman survival, to European peace. The Armenian question, declared a scholar returning from the Turkish capital, was “the key to all.”

On February 8, 1914, Russia and the Ottomans signed an agreement, brokered by Germany, on the seven historically Armenian provinces. The Porte ceded some of its sovereignty in Eastern Anatolia. Russia stopped threatening to occupy it.

Would these reforms stabilize Ottoman rule? Or would they, as many feared and some hoped, deliver its coup de grâce? Far from quieting talk about Armenians, the reforms of February 1914 now broadcast it through the megaphone of Great Power politics.

Nowhere was that talk louder than in the German Empire, where a newly founded German-Armenian Society, aimed at fostering warmer relations between the two peoples, held an inaugural gala in Berlin, complete with a lecture on “The Significance of the Armenians for World Culture.” The very existence of the society betrayed the Wilhelmstrasse’s tilt. Only the sun of official favor could explain how this new outfit—led by Lepsius with a steering committee composed of a journalist, a pastor, and six Armenians whose
fame surely did not extend beyond the Armenian colony in Berlin—had managed to collect the dazzling names, ninety-seven in all, that graced its appeal: four generals, the leaders of the Reichstag’s two liberal parties as well as the Conservative president of the Prussian Chamber of Deputies, and important representatives of business, government, academia, and the Protestant church. Yet the desire to be in the government’s good graces cannot explain the support of such glitterati as Germany’s celebrated painter Max Liebermann; the social theorist Georg Simmel; the winner of the 1908 Nobel Prize for literature, Rudolf Eucken; and the young novelist Thomas Mann, who would capture the same honor in 1929. They must already have been talking about the Armenians.

In urging a course correction on his superiors in February 1913, Wangelheim had warned that such a shift would require a change in the way the press treated matters Armenian. And indeed, tea-leaf readers abroad detected signs that Germany was taking steps to wean its public from hostile stereotypes. The names of the editors of Germany’s three most influential dailies on the list of the German-Armenian Society’s sponsors seemed to confirm that a page had been turned; that talk about Armenians would grow warmer, more friendly.

It was not to be. Within weeks, Europe was at war. On August 2, a (secret) alliance with the Ottoman Empire, rejected as militarily worthless by Jagow only three months earlier, was signed by Germany. The German-Armenian Society suddenly became a political embarrassment. The German-Turkish Union, which had been launched with the Foreign Office’s countenance in February, three days after the signing of the Armenian Reforms (probably to reassure the Porte of Germany’s continued benevolence), now had a mission. Its animating ventriloquist, Ernst Jäckh, a diminutive journalist with a supersized gift for self-promotion, was put on government payroll and immediately began devising instruments for piping Turkey’s praises.

On October 31, 1914, the Turks entered the war. The German public, reeling after three months of the deadliest combat of the entire conflict, embraced these unlikely brothers-in-arms as saviors. The alliance proved a Full Employment Act for orientalists. Almost overnight, enrollments in courses on Turkey and instruction in the language soared (“Everyone,” Professor C. H. Becker marveled, “wants to learn Turkish now!”). Anyone with a colorable claim to expertise on the Ottoman Empire could cash in. Trumping all competitors, Ernst Jäckh ran a one-man development office for the new alliance. He set about convincing a foreign policy establishment previously skeptical of turcophile effusions that a “scholarly” series (his “Orient Library”) would boost the war effort. The “Library” ran to twenty-five volumes and promised twenty more. Along with predictable puff pieces (mostly pamphlets), readers were offered a chorus of Ottoman
voices, among them the journalist Munis Tekin Alp, whose expansionist
demands for the Caucasus, Crimea, Persia, and Central Asia left even a
man as committed to the alliance as Professor Becker gasping: “Heaven
grant that the Turkish government does not proceed according to this
recipe.”26 “Everything possible is appearing about the Orient and Islam,”
his bemused colleague, Enno Littmann, agreed. Among the “possible” was
an article in 1915 trumpeting “The Evolution of Turkey into a State gov-
erned by the Rule of Law.”27

Even as Jäckh and his allies were marketing the Ottoman Empire as “the
land of tolerance,” Turkey’s ruling Committee of Union and Progress (CUP)
was driving Armenians to their deaths.28 By April 1915, Germans stationed
in Turkey began witnessing pogroms, expulsions, and massacres. Ensconced
at the Colonial Office as director of propaganda abroad, Jäckh was kept ap-
prised of the CUP’s policies by his crony, Hans Humann, Enver Pasha’s
boyhood friend, now a naval officer posted to his “old Orient-homeland.” In
July, as Italy’s consul in Trabzon collapsed under the weight of the horrors
he was forced to witness, “Jäckh-the-Turk,” as he was dubbed, began making
space in his series for yet another riff on the “Tolerance of Islam.”29

Those who wanted the world to know what was going down in Anatolia
faced formidable obstacles. As of May, missionaries as well as Armenians
were barred from using the mails. Soon their telephones and telegraphs
were confiscated.30 Emissaries of neutral states, now forbidden by the Porte
to encrypt their telegrams, were limited in what they might say. Only Ger-
man and Austrian partners remained secure conduits for candid informa-
tion about the gruesome events now unfolding. Would these embassies
forward such explosive information about their allies? When a German con-
sul included Karl Blank’s account of the Maraş pogrom of April 14 in his
bag, Wangenheim refused to receive it until he had extracted a promise that
the material would be released “neither through the press nor any other
way.” It took two months, and repeated requests, before Blank’s superiors in
Frankfurt, at the German Aid Federation for Christian Charity in the Orient,
received his report, and then in an oral, sanitized redaction.31

The CUP usually denied its purpose, if not its policies. Thus it was that
Wangenheim, who had protested brutalities against Armenians in winter
1914–15, at first accepted its argument that the deportations that spring
were a military expedient, to remove actual and potential fifth columns from
the path of Russian invaders. And the massacres that befell the deportees as
they trudged away? Regrettable failures of military discipline that could
happen in any wartime situation. But the deception could not last. As much
as he wanted to believe the CUP’s story, the German ambassador never sac-
rificed his critical judgment on the altar of the alliance. In this respect, the
volcanic baron compares favorably to his British counterpart at St. Petersburg, Sir George Buchanan. Responding those same months to anxious queries from London about the tsarist army’s mass expulsions of Jews, Ambassador Buchanan expressed not “the slightest doubt” that Jewish treason necessitated such harsh measures, assurances echoed uncritically by other Brits on the spot—soldiers, scholars, journalists.32

Wangenheim, however, although visibly suffering the “colossal physical decline” that prefigured his death only months later, could still summon the energy to catch the Porte in fictions.33 As early as June 17, he had concluded that “the banishment of the Armenians is not motivated by military considerations alone is clear as day.” Indeed, he reported, “the Minister of Interior, Tâlât Bey, recently expressed himself freely ‘that the Porte wanted to use the war in order to thoroughly clean out its domestic enemies—the native Christians—without being disturbed by diplomatic intervention from abroad.’” Armenians argued that any Armenian offenses had been provoked by Ottoman authorities. The baron apparently concurred.34 On July 7, he informed Germany’s chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, that the fact that the deportations had been extended to provinces not threatened with invasion, and the manner in which they were being carried out, convinced him that their ally was “in fact pursuing the aim of destroying the Armenian race in the Turkish empire.”35

Wangenheim based this conclusion not only on Tâlât’s comment, but on an array of German sources: teachers, medical personnel, church people, engineers and managers, soldiers, and his own consular staff. Especially compelling were indignant dispatches from three of his men. Walter Rössler, consul in Aleppo, would eventually earn a mild reprimand for his passionate protests on behalf of the Armenians.36 Walter Holstein, running the vice-consulate of Mosul-Van, was so moved by the famished creatures straggling by that he fed them himself. If the Foreign Office was unwilling to reimburse him the £300, well then, he declared, he’d take it out of his own pocket. The inclusion of Chaldean and Assyrian Christians, small denominations with no considerable body of coreligionists across the border, proved that the CUP’s “removals” were population policy, not security policy.37

Then there was Reserve Lt. Max Erwin von Scheubner-Richter, sent to the Caucasus to organize Muslim guerrillas behind Russian lines. Arriving in Erzurum, the heart of historic Armenia, Scheubner was pressed into service as acting vice-consul and almost immediately witnessed the same grisly sights. CUP hardliners bluntly informed him that their final goal was the “complete extermination” of the Armenians. “After the war, we will ‘have no more Armenians in Turkey,’ is the verbatim pronouncement of an authoritative personage,” the young soldier reported. In August he informed
Wangenheim’s stand-in that massacres throughout the region had left his consulate without Armenians. He did not deny there had been insurgents here and there; what could be more “natural” for a people so badly treated? But of a “general, intentional, and premeditated uprising by the Armenians, any proof whatsoever, in my view, is lacking.” The success of the extermination itself proved the absurdity of Turkish claims: “that tens of thousands of Armenians let themselves be butchered, without resisting, by a handful of Kurds and irregulars as happened here is surely proof of how very little taste this people has for fighting and revolution.”

As refugees, neutral diplomats, social workers, and medical personnel returning from Anatolia told the world of the catastrophe, were people inside Germany also talking about the extermination of the Armenians?

War means censorship—and in Germany’s censorship handbook (Zensurbuch) only five items took up more space than “Turkey.” Strictures on what might be written about the Ottoman Empire exceeded in length even such awkward topics as “Belgium” and “U-Boat Warfare.” The principle was simple: “All remarks that could in any way diminish the reputation of our Turkish allies or be wounding to them must be avoided.” Care must be taken with travelers’ reports, and anything on the Armenians had to be submitted to precensorship. In fact, the Zensurbuch made plain, on the “Armenian question” the Wilhelmstrasse wanted no articles at all.

The press got the message. Although the Frankfurter Zeitung, Germany’s most prestigious daily, had a veteran correspondent, Paul Weitz, in Constantinople, Weitz valued his insider status much too much to waste it on a story that might never see the light of day. That status was used instead to secure fawning interviews with Turkish leaders and to broadcast the CUP’s tale of Armenian treachery. Nor did other papers rock the boat. During the genocide year of 1915, the Armenians were mentioned in the Berliner Tageblatt just five times: in two reprints of rebuttals of Entente “propaganda” by the Ottoman press agency, and in asides by Enver Pasha, Interior Minister Tâlât Bey, and Grand Vizier Halil Pasha during interviews conducted by a toadying Emil Ludwig. Other papers fell into line.

In September, Friedrich Naumann, member of parliament and darling of the nonsocialist Left, let at least some cats peep out of the bag. “Yesterday,” he reported in his popular weekly, “I heard from a reliably well-informed party” of the “violent transplant” to Mesopotamia of Armenian women, children, and elderly, “because, or on the occasion of, unrest in Van.” Readers could find a comprehensive account, “which has until now hardly been noticed in Germany,” in Christliche Welt. Naumann heard yesterday? The account had appeared in July, and Christliche Welt’s editor was Naumann’s brother-in-law. Not noticing took an act of will—but war encourages such
acts. With nearly 3.4 million of their young men mobilized in 1914; with almost 9,000 casualties, on average, every day during the first months of the war; with pundits like Naumann himself insisting that “everything turns on the Dardanelles,” defended by the Turks—can we wonder that ordinary Germans let their ally’s story go unchallenged?  

And yet, statistics—on censorship, news items, casualties—do not close the question of what Germans knew and said about the extermination of the Armenians. Unlike the Third Reich, where the disclosure of genocide was a capital crime, penalties in imperial Germany for circumventing censorship were light. Dutch, French, English, and even Russian newspapers remained on sale. Among the effects of Matthias Erzberger, the Center Party’s Reichstag leader, were translations of French articles on the massacres, confirmation that talk was crossing borders. Those without foreign languages could learn the same from the Swiss press.

An information barrier so omnipresent, yet so porous, meant that Turkey’s boosters faced the task of rebutting atrocity reports that they could never be sure anyone had read. The result was a mass of contradictions. Germans were told that Armenians were being subjected to a just and necessary response to their treasonous aid to the tsar’s army. But they could also read that relations between the Armenian elite and German-Turkish circles were “very close”; that even Russia was discovering that Armenians wanted Eastern Anatolia to remain Ottoman; that the Armenian Reforms had “proven themselves absolutely,” with the “friendly relationship” between Armenians and their government now based on “firm, constitutional granite.” Contradictions multiplied when on the same page another author blamed the terrible Armenian massacres (assumed to be common knowledge) on unruly Kurds, whose depredations the Porte, burdened by a bureaucracy from the previous regime (i.e., still unreformed), could not control. Competing apologias reflected and fueled suspicions of murder and mayhem.

But still we must ask: Who knew? If we look not at the hard-pressed German-in-the-street but at the elites, the close-knit world of movers, shakers, and public opinion-makers, then the answer is clear: everyone. And if we ask, what did they know? The answer, with equal certitude, is: enough.

Orientalists learned early, from students serving as interpreters and from colleagues abroad. Göttingen’s Enno Littmann initially dismissed a report from America on the Armenian plight. The future translator of Arabian Nights knew a good tale when he saw one, and anyway London’s mobs and Russia’s expulsions of Poles and Lithuanians and persecutions of Jews were worse. Becker demurred: “That terrible things are happening is without a doubt.” A letter from a former student “contains so very many details that he has seen with his own eyes that the madness of the deportation is not to be
doubted.” Scholarly eyewitnesses tried to evade Germany’s military censors by using Arabic or Turkish to relate their most ghastly particulars, such as the “nails through the arm and hand” of an Armenian woman. Though the ploy rarely succeeded, enough details got through to convince even the hard-nosed Littmann. By October 1915 reports of the massacres, Becker saw, “fill the entire world.”

One source was Armin T. Wegner. Returning to Berlin after serving as a medic in Turkey, the aspiring writer used readings of his new work to notify dovish intellectuals, like the journalist Hellmut von Gerlach and the art collector Count Harry Kessler. Gerlach took the news to a meeting of the Federation for a New Fatherland (Bundes Neues Vaterland), whose eclectic clientele stretched from Albert Einstein and the novelist Stefan Zweig, through the usual liberal, socialist, and feminist suspects (e.g., the revisionist socialist Eduard Bernstein; the radicals Clara Zetkin and Ernst Reuter), all the way up to officials within the establishment. Gerlach got the German Peace Society to pass a resolution in Leipzig expressing sympathy “for all oppressed and abused people, especially the Armenians,” demanding “remedies” from their government. But in his more influential capacity as political editor of Die Welt am Montag (circulation 150,000) Gerlach kept faith with his government’s precept: what happens in Anatolia stays in Anatolia. Nor was Maximilian Harden, publisher of the fashionable Die Zukunft, any profile in courage. Inform the Empress! he advised Wegner. Emphasize the religious angle, since the Armenians are a Christian people! He himself, he was sorry to say, could do nothing. “The censor closed our mouths,” Gerlach later explained. But who could assess the censor’s power, with self-censors so obliging?

Talk about the Armenians extended beyond academics and peaceniks. Arthur von Gwinner, director of the mighty Deutsche Bank, which owned controlling shares of the Anatolian Railway, learned of the slaughter through the “hair-raising” accounts his deputy director-general sent the home office. “The Jewish pogroms in Russia, which I know, are comparative child’s play,” the latter exclaimed. The Railway protested to the Turks and reported in detail to the Foreign Office. It saved as many Armenians as it could by hiring even the unqualified for construction and office work. Its “life boat” bears comparison to Oscar Schindler’s, on a much larger scale. Gwinner himself designated £1,000 for immediate (secret) Armenian relief. But he did not resign as chairman of Jäckh’s German-Turkish Union, whose goals he continued to legitimize with his name.

Walther Rathenau, raw materials supremo and chairman of German General Electric, and the steel magnates Hugo Stinnes and August Thyssen also knew. Wartime Constantinople was never off limits to influential people (“every train from the Balkans brings Germans who want to monkey
around with the Turks,” complained a later German ambassador.\textsuperscript{57} Stinnes and Thyssen arrived in winter 1916 and met other Germans talking about the extermination of the Armenians. Also among the “flood” of curious compatriots was Gustav Stresemann, rising star of the Liberals, who met with newspapermen, soldiers, expats, and diplomats (including the U.S. ambassador, Henry Morgenthau)—and Enver Pasha. Stresemann’s diary leaves no doubt that he learned exactly what was happening. Armenians were mentioned five times. On day 4 he wrote: “Armenian reduction 1–1 1/2 million.”\textsuperscript{58}

Back in Germany, the future chancellor of the Weimar Republic made his influence felt. To the public, Stresemann conveyed the sunny face of the alliance, treating audiences to encomia on the “valiant Turks.”\textsuperscript{59} To insiders, his picture was grim. Along report that, though labeled “confidential,” was clearly intended for circulation, did not mince words: on the Ottoman economy, on hostility between German and Turkish officers, on growing xenophobia. But on the Armenian question, Stresemann reversed targets, aiming his guns not at Germany’s allies but at Wangenheim’s replacement, Count Paul von Wolff-Metternich, for antagonizing the Turks by his “preference” for “Armenian-Greek elements” and his “partisanship” on the “so-called Armenian question.” Talking with Turks, Wolff-Metternich “almost regularly touches” on it, taking “the part of the Armenians completely.” Citing Enver’s sarcastic query “whether Herr von Metternich was the ambassador of the German Empire or the ambassador of the Armenians?” the future Nobel peace laureate endorsed Turkey’s demand that Germany recall its outspoken ambassador.\textsuperscript{60}

Stresemann’s traveling companion, Matthias Erzberger, leader of the Catholic Left and by 1916 the most powerful man in the Reichstag, was already well informed. As director of war propaganda for neutral countries, Erzberger was kept supplied by the Foreign Office with the extenuations it sent to its diplomatic personnel to use in rebutting Entente charges. But Erzberger also had independent sources on “this newest burning question,” most credibly, an army of Catholic clerics. “The Armenian nation,” one confided, “is supposed to be pretty much exterminated.”\textsuperscript{61} From “two absolutely reliable sources” Erzberger heard that murdered Christians numbered one and a half million—the same figure Stresemann had heard in Constantinople.\textsuperscript{62}

Erzberger had several fish to fry when he arrived in the Ottoman capital in early 1916; not least he wanted to persuade the Porte to turn over the sacred sites in Jerusalem “vacated” by the Armenian Apostolic Church to the religious orders of his own church.\textsuperscript{63} Nevertheless, in interviews with Enver and Tâlât, Erzberger spoke up for the Armenians. When he returned to Berlin he wrote to the Cardinal Archbishop of Cologne about their plight.\textsuperscript{64}
He also sought out the Turkish ambassador and later his own Foreign Office, where he defended Wolff-Metternich against the German ambassador’s detractors. Alarmed by all this “talk,” Jäckh was driven to protest, at a board meeting of his German-Turkish Union, the “rumors” spread by Stresemann and Erzberger, which he denounced as completely baseless—testimony to their impact. In public, however, the normally voluble Erzberger did not break the silence.

And, as a member of parliament, he might have. The arm of the censor stopped at the Reichstag door. Only the boos of his fellows or the president’s call to order could silence a member. That was precisely what occurred, however, in January 1916, when Karl Liebknecht, radical Social Democrat, demanded that the government state whether it knew that its allies “had driven hundreds of thousands of the Armenian population from their homes and annihilated them;” that “Professor [sic] Lepsius has spoken of flat-out extermination?” A day later, the Foreign Office published an exculpatory response. The following day Liebknecht was expelled from his party.

But murder will out. By 1918, when a Center backbencher returned from Turkey with news of fresh massacres, Germany’s last ambassador to the Ottoman Empire threw up his hands: “So much has been spoken and written about the Armenian atrocities that it seems idle to express oneself on these questions.” His exasperation is revealing. It seems that Germans could not stop talking about the extermination of Armenians.

The Protestant clergy, recipients of constant streams of information from their own and international networks, talked the most. They forwarded eye-witness testimony to their government, urging it “to put a stop immediately to the murders by our Turkish allies.” Though some were tactful, others badgered the Foreign Office, protested the press’s falsifications, waxed sarcastic about CUP assurances that excesses were being controlled. In July 1915, Sonnenaufgang, the organ of the German Aid Federation for Christian Charity in the Orient, with a circulation of 25,000, was among the first, in Germany or anywhere, to publish details (reprinted internationally) of the genocide. Although such publications damaged Germany’s relations with its ally, an outright “repression of Germany’s pro-Armenian associations,” sighed the Reich’s chargé d’affaires at Constantinople, was “naturally out of the question.” Nevertheless, constant government pressure to cease their negative publicity took its toll. Yes, the genocide remained on people’s lips; otherwise the German Aid Federation for Christian Charity in the Orient could not have collected some 400,000 marks annually for Armenian relief for three years running. But in the public square where, arguably, it might have mattered, the church’s talk remained wary, sheepish, muffled. Belief requires not only hearing talk from a credible source. It requires subjecting that talk to public debate. Precisely such a debate was forbidden.
In recent years, a number of historians have reiterated the Entente’s charges of German co-responsibility for the Armenian genocide. Others have countered that in the deadly game of Ottoman minority policy, Germany held few cards. As the once-skeptical Professor Littman demanded in 1915: “In any case, would Turkey let us have a voice in a domestic matter?” He knew the answer: not if it could help it.

The Entente’s demand that Germany ditch its Ottoman alliance was a cheap shot: certainly during their Gallipoli invasion, which overlapped almost precisely with the CUP’s first genocidal push; and even later, when Turks were tying down more than million Entente troops. But there is something that all of us can demand of a society, even during a desperately fought war: that it not lie to itself.

“Living in Truth.” Václav Havel’s famous line identifies truth itself as a kind of power, available to men and women who have nothing else. Once someone steps out of the lie, Havel found, “he has shattered the world of appearances, the fundamental pillar of the system. . . . He has enabled everyone to peer behind the curtain. Living within the lie can constitute the system only if it is universal. As soon as the alternative appears, however, it threatens the very existence of appearance.” Truth becomes “the power of the powerless.”

That power was grasped by Johannes Lepsius. The veteran champion of the Armenians stepped out of the lie when he invited the German Press Association, as part of its regular briefings by the government, to hear what Tâlât Bey and Enver Pasha had revealed to him about their Armenian policy. It was an offer journalists could hardly refuse. News of Lepsius’s chilling conversations with Constantinople’s strongmen in August 1915 had already spread by word-of-mouth. Those who remembered his 1896 reports from the Hamidian killing fields, soon translated into Dutch, French, and English, were aware that this was a man who knew how to get the world’s attention. Articles now circulating in the Swiss press on the extermination of more than a million Armenians suggested that he had already begun.

How had this gadfly managed to get an audience with Turkey’s masters? Calling in the chips he had earned working for the ill-starred Armenian Reforms, in June 1915 Lepsius had pressured Under Secretary of State Arthur Zimmermann into sponsoring a mission in which Lepsius would enlist Anatolian Armenians behind the war effort and persuade Ottoman leaders of the advantages of working with a nation with populations on both sides of the bloody Caucasus border. By the time Lepsius arrived in late July in Constantinople, however, his window of opportunity, such as it was, had shut. While he was en route, the Russian army had withdrawn from Van, leaving the city’s Armenian population utterly exposed—unable to defend itself against the Ottomans, much less to subvert Russia’s Armenians on
Turkey’s behalf. The day after Russia pulled out, Zimmermann went so far as to instruct Wangenheim to gather evidence of a “wide-reaching Armenian movement endangering the Turkish state.” Germany’s campaign of disinformation had begun.

Looking reality in the face, Lepsius concluded that only the widest publicity could save the Armenians now. Addressing the German Press Association on October 5, he described the Armenian situation and recounted his conversation with Enver. The audience, prompted by a representative of the Foreign Office, expressed the obligatory skepticism, and the next day Zimmermann held his own press conference on the issue. But although he may have persuaded listeners that the Armenians were not worth the loss of their Ottoman ally, privately the chairman of the Press Association warned Zimmermann that some of those present would probably leak Lepsius’s material to their foreign affairs editors. His own editor, he sensed from a phone conversation, was already going wobbly on the Armenians.

Lepsius kept pushing. Military intelligence learned that he was winning over prominent intellectuals. On October 9, he addressed an array of Protestant leaders, mostly from missionary organizations with reliable sources of their own. The journalist Paul Rohrbach summed up: “These proceedings make it impossible for us to accept responsibility any further for the Turkish alliance. Military rule has bound our mouths before the public. But we can and must say to the government that we can no longer recognize the alliance as one concluded between two equally legitimate states. . . . We are facing the end of Turkey, which must be taken into custody.” Famous before the war as a liberal-imperialist pundit, Rohrbach now headed a Foreign Office bureau handling propaganda abroad. What might it mean for the policy of silence that even this “prophet of our whole German-Turkish relationship” was jumping ship?

A proposed mass petition to the chancellor promised fireworks, not least because it confronted the government’s disinformation policy explicitly (as explicitly as was prudent for men aware that supplicants do not insult those whom they are supplicating): “It oppresses our conscience that the German press praises the nobility and tolerance of our Mohammedan allies, while Mohammedans are shedding rivers of innocent Christian blood and tens of thousands of Christians are forced to convert to Islam.” Scarcely concealing their indignation that the Porte thwarted their attempts to deliver aid to women and children, the authors predicted a “crippling impact on the morale of German Christians when they have to look on while their allies destroy an entire Christian people. . . . without our side doing whatever is possible to save them.”

Those same visions of crippled morale, however, raised anxieties within the petitioners’ own ranks. Frightened by their own courage, important
figures in the church intervened to get Lepsius to scrap plans for a mass signature drive and to keep the petition confidential and confined to men in leadership roles. Still, within a few days forty-nine of the most distinguished figures in German Protestantism had been persuaded to sign: an unprecedented step in a church known for its expansive interpretation of “Render unto Caesar.” A fortnight later, at Lepsius’s urging, Erzberger got the steering committee for missions at the Catholics’ congress of lay organizations to issue a similar, though more anodyne, statement. Nothing remotely like this effort—a movement opposing the policies of a wartime ally—occurred in any of the other belligerent powers.81

Bethmann took notice. Referring to “mounting . . . commotion in Germany,” he instructed his embassy in Constantinople to inform the Porte of the two petitions “at every opportunity, and emphatically.”82

Yet just as the bureaucracy in the Third Reich would develop the habit of “working toward Hitler” (Ian Kershaw’s famous characterization of the relationship between the initiatives taken at lower levels of the Nazi administration and the expressed desires of the leadership), so too did the Wilhelmine media anticipate the wishes of their government—for silence. Even before Lepsius’s press conference, the head of the Press Association, alarmed at how atrocity stories were “roiling” the country’s Christian conscience, was consulting with Zimmermann over how to burke Lepsius’s shocking testimony and personally pressuring the board of one mission society to give up its plans “to involve wider circles in the Armenian question.” Jäckh was kept informed and probably Captain Humann as well.83 By December the Foreign Office had managed to convince church leaders that talk would be counterproductive—for Armenians, and for Germans. Thus debate within the establishment was aborted before “wider circles” could learn of it. Outside the columns of a few religious publications, usually employing Aesopian language, public talk about the extermination of the Armenians ceased.

Germany’s Daniel Ellsberg did not give up. The pandemonium that broke out in the Reichstag in January 1916 upon Leibknecht’s mention of the findings of “Professor Lepsius” was a telling sign that Lepsius’s very name had become a synecdoche for embarrassing information. Now he worked feverishly, sifting “hundreds of notes,” weighing their reliability and putting them in chronological order, determined to put a “comprehensive picture” of the genocide into the hands of “every Protestant pastor” in Germany.84 In March he got the board of the German Orient Mission to agree to cover the mailing costs, estimated at 4,000 marks. But the Orient Mission was unnerved by rumors that the book would finger the Ottoman government as responsible for the horrors. Couldn’t Lepsius leave that part out? (He could not.) Other misgivings surfaced: were they not risking reprisals against the Mission’s own schools, orphanages, and clinics? Within three
weeks, the board had withdrawn its sponsorship; by June, its promise to cover postage. Finally only Rohrbach was left supporting an unexpurgated account.\textsuperscript{85}

How would living in the truth in Germany halt an Ottoman killing machine? Perhaps the lack of a convincing answer explains why Lepsius found himself working alone, aided only by his family and Martin Niepage, late of the Aleppo \textit{Realschule} and soon to be sentenced to death in absentia in Turkey for publishing his own eyewitness account. Lepsius finished his \textit{Report on the Situation of the Armenians} in July 1916. Eventually he found two firms willing to risk printing it. In addition to 20,000 copies aimed at “every Protestant pastor,” he printed an additional 500 to send to public figures, the press, and members of parliament. The Lepsius children were conscripted to haul baskets of the \textit{Report} to the Potsdam post office, and—lest so many identical parcels deposited in one place attract attention—they also fanned out over town, dropping parcels in every corner mailbox.\textsuperscript{86}

How successful were these efforts? In August the authorities impounded 191 copies meant for Germany’s elected representatives. A month later, the Turkish ambassador got wind of the \textit{Report}, protested, and the military authorities ordered the seizure of any remaining copies. By then, however, the other 20,309 copies had surely already reached their destinations—as evidenced by the astonishing 24,000 marks for Armenian relief that, answering the appeal inserted in each copy, flowed into Lepsius’s coffers from mid-July through September. And by the sharp criticism of Germany’s Armenian policy voiced in the Reichstag’s budget committee.\textsuperscript{87}

The \textit{Report} offers some puzzles worth pondering. Given exploding paper costs, already driving small newspapers and presses out of business, where did an unbefriend parson with eleven children get the sums to publish and mail 20,500 copies of a 300-page book? Lepsius merely cites “friends of the good cause.” Given rationing, where did he obtain the paper? The support network built up for Armenian relief in peacetime must have managed, even now, to maintain itself. Another mystery is Lepsius’s continued freedom of movement. While Entente powers were quick to incarcerate their critics, Lepsius was threatened only with three days prison and a 30 marks’ fine—and then only in 1917. Such forbearance suggests ambivalence. Even the policeman charged with executing the seizure order in September 1916 proceeded with a minimum of force and fanfare—and, it appears, commitment. Finding no one in Lepsius’s office, he simply left a penciled slip, without official seal, on the desk, announcing the impoundment.\textsuperscript{88} Apparently German confiscations, like German censorship, were expected to be self-enforcing.

As the grapevine that informed wartime Germany of the Armenian genocide attests, a secret is simply news told to one person at a time. With the
peace, official secrets of all kinds burst into the open. Authors scrambled to “update” their rosy accounts of wartime Turkey. Openness begat controversy. Thus a slide lecture in Berlin’s largest auditorium, held by the former medic Armin Wegner, and liberally spiced with his own obiter dicta on the Turkish national character, had to be halted when Turks and Armenians in the audience came to blows. Wegner was allowed to resume only after agreeing to omit his most gruesome images—hardly a loss since (his own photos having been destroyed, he now conceded blandly) the slides dated from before the war.

What had happened to the Armenians continued to be entwined with politics, most obviously with the politics of peacemaking, as a defeated Germany found itself in the dock, accused not only of starting the war, but of atrocities in waging it: in Belgium; on the high seas; in Anatolia against the Armenians. Yet even as hard-pressed diplomats struggled to make their case in Paris, not everyone on the Wilhelmstrasse was alive to how deeply the Ottoman alliance had compromised their country. Thus the German delegation initially included not only the vice-consul of Mosul, Walter Holstein, who had succored the Armenians, but also Hans Humann, who had worked for the CUP’s success. Word that Morgenthau’s memoirs had fingered Humann as Enver’s mouthpiece led to the captain’s hasty removal. An embarrassed Foreign Office, with great misgivings, then commissioned Lepsius, a man decried by Jagow barely two years earlier for his “open opposition to the government,” to publish the Wilhelmstrasse’s own documents on the genocide, to send to Lord Bryce and other delegates. Widely reviewed, Lepsius’s Germany and Armenia exposed the horrors to a large audience. Whatever its shortcomings in portraying the entirety of Wilhelmine officialdom’s responses, the book proved to Germans that a genocide had taken place, with the knowledge of their own leaders.

In the meantime, Lepsius also republished his 1916 Report. Now entitled The Death March of the Armenian People, its fourth printing hit a whopping 28,000 copies. Inevitably the genocide became entangled in German domestic politics. Those convinced their leaders had lied to them throughout the war squared off against those who believed that their undefeated army had been stabbed in the back by “November criminals,” the democrats who had ousted the kaiser—a legend that supplied natural supporters for the CUP’s own alibi of Armenian betrayal. And a chain of assassinations kept the genocide issue alive. In March 1921, Soghomon Tehlirian shot Tâlât Pasha on a busy Berlin street. The funeral and subsequent trial unleashed controversy. A graveside eulogy for Tâlât by Jäckh praised this “statesman of great stature,” this “Turkish Bismarck.” Lepsius, on the other hand, testified successfully on behalf of Tâlât’s assassin. The jury agreed that a mass murderer’s victim was “not guilty” if he rid the world of its perpetrator. Tehlirian’s acquittal
met with international approval but heated condemnation by the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, where Hans Humann had found a safe landing. As editor-in-chief, he continued the war against the Armenians by other means, opening his pages to the apologias of a handful of German officers, veterans of Anatolia.\textsuperscript{95} The following April, fifteen more Armenians were arrested in Berlin, for assassinating the former *vali* Cemal Azmi and Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir, “butcher of Trapezunt.” Demands that, to prevent further bloodshed, all Armenians be expelled from Germany, kept the issue at a boil.\textsuperscript{96} Attacking and defending Armenians and Turks, Germans were attacking and defending each other.

The Armenian catastrophe thus meant different things to different Germans. For some, it meant mourning, mixed with shame. In May 1919, St. Hedwig’s Catholic cathedral, in the heart of Berlin, hosted a standing-room-only memorial for the Armenian people, attended by Germans, Armenians, foreign delegations, and an official representative of the German government. The invitation itself, from the German-Armenian Society, implied that the genocide had always been an open secret: “As is well known, during the World War more than a million Armenians, on orders of the Turkish government, were massacred or deported to the desert.” Conceding that their countrymen did not feel directly responsible, the sponsors stated flatly that, because of its Turkish alliance, Germany’s share in this wrong was greater than that of any other people.\textsuperscript{97}

Most Germans, weighed down by their own grief yet sensing in Armenian suffering something “not to be justified by anything,” as even General Ludendorff saw, assimilated the genocide into a developing master narrative of German battles nobly fought, if nobly lost.\textsuperscript{98} Revealing was the 1938 biography of Max von Scheubner-Richter, vice-consul of Erzurum in 1915, by his adoring adjutant. In a work published five years after the Hitler’s seizure of power, we might expect a testosterone-poisoned paean to the healthy ruthlessness of the Young Turks, especially as Scheubner had become prominent after the war in the Nazi movement, dying at Hitler’s side in 1923 during the suppression of the Beer Hall putsch. Instead, the author lingered over his hero’s efforts to save Armenians. His preface proudly recalled his young commander presenting him in 1919 with a copy of Lepsius’s newly minted *Deutschland und Armenia*, inscribed to the “memory of common struggles for the honor of Germany’s escutcheon.”\textsuperscript{99}

But other Germans drew different lessons. To Hitler, the genocide served as a warning, the handwriting on the wall that prophesied the doom that awaited weaker peoples. In 1922 he cited the fate of the Armenians as what lay in store for Germans—if no rational solution were found to the Jewish problem.\textsuperscript{100} Eight years later Hitler was still complaining of a sentimental German press, portraying “over and over, far and wide, the ‘Armenian atrocities.’”\textsuperscript{101}
Even as the war generation aged, the memory of the genocide remained green. In December 1932, Franz Werfel traveled across Germany, giving readings to capacity crowds from his epic novel of Armenian resistance, *The Forty Days of Musa Dagh*. Professor Becker clipped a review of one of these readings, the chapter depicting Lepsius’s verbal “duel” with Enver in Constantinople in August 1915. Both antagonists were now dead; the empires each had fought for, also gone. Within months, Jäckh would depart for greener American pastures. Yet before other victims claimed the world’s attention, the events in Anatolia in 1915–16 set the international standard for horror. Germans still talked about the extermination of the Armenians.
Part IV

GENOCIDE IN LOCAL CONTEXT
Ahmet Cemal Pasha, commander of the Fourth Army in Syria, minister of the marine, and one of the most powerful leaders of the Ottoman Empire, declared in his memoirs that under his command: “The most important military event up to the end of the year 1915 was the attempted rising of the Armenians in Zeitun and Urfa, which was put down by the regulars we sent there.”¹ Cemal considered what took place in Zeytun to be a clear uprising against the Ottoman government. Yet, writing in the same period after World War I, a correspondent lamented in an Armenian newspaper that Zeytun did not show the same courage in 1915 as it had in the past. It was necessary to “mercilessly punish those several traitors who, unfortunately now in sheep’s skins, have begun to enter important establishments. For example, Hovhannes Aharonian, one of the greatest betrayers of Zeytun. . . .”² Armenians blamed Aharonian, the Zeytun school district director and a noted public figure, for actively preventing the rebellion of Zeytun together with other Armenian establishment fixtures, including the head of the Armenian Church in Cilicia, Catholicos Sahag II Khabayan of Sis.³ These two divergent interpretations, fairly standard narratives involving Ottoman Armenians and Muslims, persist to this day. In this chapter I reexamine the sequence of events in Zeytun using a variety of primary sources to see if indeed the Zeytun Armenians’ actions constituted a clear act of rebellion. As the consequent Zeytun deportations constituted one of the earliest instances of uprooting an entire Armenian community during the Armenian Genocide, a study of these deportations will also inspire questions concerning the nature of the genocide’s organization.

By the beginning of World War I, tensions between Armenians and Muslims ran high in Zeytun, a predominantly Armenian town in the mountains
of Cilicia or northwestern Syria, depending on how one draws the borders. The perpetrators of two regional episodes of massacre and violence, in 1895–96 and 1909, remained largely unpunished, while the Ottoman defeats in the Balkan Wars of 1912–13 led to the stipulation of Armenian reform plans by Western powers and an abortive diasporan plan for an Armenian rebellion in Cilicia that was opposed by most local Armenian leaders. The loss of Ottoman territory in Europe brought new Muslim immigration into Cilicia, which Armenians feared was an effort to alter the demographic balance to their disadvantage.

Ottoman imperial instability encouraged both Muslim and Armenian military desertion, with Armenian deserters in not easily controlled remote areas (like Zeytun) suspected of political motivations. Weak government and poverty drove many deserters to engage in banditry, while attempts by government forces (including Armenians in Zeytun) to capture them created tensions with the local population. Transportation and commerce suffered. Success or failure in dealing with deserters contributed to the Ottoman central government’s decisions to change officials, and to pressure the Armenian patriarchate to reassign prelates and priests. The banditry became so widespread that even the mayor of Zeytun, Nazarét ‘Ch’avush’ Norashkharhian (Yenidünyayan/Yénidiwnyayan/Yénidiwnian), was allegedly cooperating with one bandit leader, and was related to another, his nephew.

Intervention in a 1914 incident involving Armenian deserters caused the Ottoman Ministry of Justice to demand from Catholicos Sahag II Khabayan the replacement of the local Armenian prelate, Very Rev. Fr. H’ovhannès Karanfilian. The same incident led to the dismissal of one kaymakam (district governor) of Zeytun and the appointment of a replacement, Hüseyin Hüsnü Bey, at the end of June 1914. At the same time, Ali Haydar Bey was appointed governor of Maraş, the sanjak or subprovince to which Zeytun kaza (district) belonged. Until March 1915, Maraş itself was subject to Aleppo province (vilayet), governed by Mehmet Celal Bey, a moderate official who for many years had enjoyed friendly personal relations with the Armenians.

According to Catholicos Sahag, both Ali Haydar and Hüseyin Hüsnü were Albanians. Many of the government officials, gendarmes, and police officers stationed in remote areas like Zeytun were immigrants from the Balkans. Bitterness over experiences with Christians in the Balkans may very well have colored the attitudes of these officials toward the Armenian Christians in Zeytun. Meanwhile, a reactive resurgence in Ottoman nationalism with Muslim and Turkish undertones contributed to a boycott of Christian merchants in parts of Cilicia in 1914.

When World War I began, Armenians outside the Ottoman Empire, unhappy about their Cilician compatriots’ constrained living conditions,
wanted to use the opportunity to end Ottoman rule over the Armenians. Some presciently feared that the Armenians in Cilicia were apt to be subject to violence during the war. Four Armenian organizations from outside the Ottoman Empire, along with the prominent Armenian diplomat Boghos Nubar Pasha, who was reappointed head of the Armenian National Delegation by the Catholicos of the Armenian Church in April 1915, were among the most active proponents of a landing by Armenian volunteer forces in Cilicia. The latter were to join with local Armenians, including those of Zeytun, in an insurrection against the Ottoman state. Although these organizations cooperated at times with each other, more often they worked independently. Realizing they did not have the ability to carry out their plans unaided, they repeatedly requested Allied military support, primarily British and French.

The Allies periodically considered the advantages of opening up a new front in Cilicia, but each time they decided against it due to the scarcity of arms, ammunition, and troops, doubts over its utility, Allied rivalries, lack of confidence in Armenian irregular forces, and fear of fierce reprisals against the local Armenians. Despite these ultimately negative Allied decisions, the Ottomans had good grounds for concern. The Cilician front was a potential weak point for many strategists. German Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg observed that a relatively small Allied force landing on the Cilician coast would have forced the Ottomans to surrender. It was in connection to this that the Ottoman minister of war, İsmail Enver Pasha, confided to von Hindenburg: “My only hope is that the enemy has not discovered our weakness.”

Taking advantage of this anxiety, the Allies engaged in relatively low-level military activities to keep the Ottomans guessing as to their intentions, and to divert troops from other areas. The British and French periodically sent warships and airplanes to bombard and blockade the Cilician coast beginning at the end of 1914 and continuing through at least 1917. These ships landed spies on the Cilician and north Syrian coast, including some Armenians (whose contact with Zeytun has not been confirmed).

Without an Allied landing or assistance on a fairly large scale, the Armenian organizations could do little for Cilicia until the end of World War I, when the Allies fought their way north through Palestine and Syria to occupy the region. Armenian volunteers then played a role in the advance as members of the French Légion d’Orient, created in November 1916.

If the possibility of outside intervention by early 1915 was limited, the question remains, what were the Armenians in Zeytun and Cilicia planning or doing themselves?

Relations between Armenians and Muslims in the Zeytun area grew worse as a result of the war. In August 1914, shortly after the Ottoman Empire
began mobilization, Zeytun became a conscription center for the surrounding area—Andırın, Göksün, and Elbistan—and thousands of Muslims flowed into the town. As there were no hotels, they either had to stay in local inhabitants’ homes or in the open. This was soon to spark many minor local clashes. The government also requisitioned salt, sugar, and animals from the natives. On one occasion, Zeytun wives invaded the government headquarters and reclaimed their families’ animals, meeting no resistance from the soldiers present. Despite such difficulties, the Zeytun women raised money for mobile kitchens at the major bridges to cook soup and bread for the conscripts, using provisions usually set aside for the severe winter.\footnote{General Ömer Fahri [Fahrettin Türkkan] Pasha,\footnote{serving as deputy to Cemal Pasha, replaced the soldiers garrisoned in Zeytun with Muslim gendarmes from Maraş. Presumably this was intended to free up soldiers for the war effort, but it contradicted the advice of the Aleppo governor-general Celal Bey. These gendarmes, according to the German consul in Aleppo, were hostile to the Zeytun Armenians, and they engaged in minor incidents of harassment and molestation of women.} serving as deputy to Cemal Pasha, replaced the soldiers garrisoned in Zeytun with Muslim gendarmes from Maraş. Presumably this was intended to free up soldiers for the war effort, but it contradicted the advice of the Aleppo governor-general Celal Bey. These gendarmes, according to the German consul in Aleppo, were hostile to the Zeytun Armenians, and they engaged in minor incidents of harassment and molestation of women.\footnote{Around this time a Turkish bandit called Tek Bıyık (“Single Mustache”) robbed and beat two Hajin (Haçin) Armenian travelers, and some young Zeytun Armenian military deserters unsuccessfully sought revenge. Seeing some sixty Muslims from Andırın heading home in August after being released from military registration in Zeytun, the Armenian gang stopped the group, suspecting that the bandit might be hiding among them. Frustrated by not finding Tek Bıyık, they partially shaved the beards of several men to dishonor them, and then robbed them. The recruits filed a complaint with Maraş governor Ali Haydar.\footnote{In response, Maraş Muslim notables, according to Armenian sources, protested to Constantinople that they would not send recruits as long as the Zeytun Armenians were at large, allegedly declaring: “Our Moscow is right here.”\footnote{A telegram from the Ottoman Ministry of the Interior confirms that officials feared Muslim retaliation, with thirty enlisted men from the region having already deserted to their villages. The government decided at the end of August 1914, to reinforce the number of troops at Zeytun, restoring units that had been removed because of the war. Orders were requested from the defense ministry for a mobile brigade of 250 recruits and the 1,160 strong depot battalion reserves in the Maraş region to be sent to Zeytun.\footnote{Ali Haydar came in September to Zeytun with at least one battalion of troops to capture Armenian military deserters and bandits. He offered them an imperial pardon, but also pressured the local populace to help him by forcing them to pay for the maintenance of the new troops until the rebels were caught. Two Armenians of Maraş, Melk’on Agha Hazarabedian and} melk’on Agha Hazarabedian and}
Garabed Nalch’ajian, were brought along to help persuade the Zeytun Armenians. According to one Armenian eyewitness, the Maraş Armenians declared that the Zeytun Armenian youth would henceforth be free from military conscription unless the state urgently needed them, in which case a special regiment with Zeytun Armenian officers would be formed. Ottoman sources report, however, that it was the Zeytun Armenians who in August 1914 offered to form such a volunteer regiment to defend the Zeytun region in place of regular military service, but that the government turned the proposal down.  

Meanwhile, outside Armenian church and political leaders urged the Zeytun Armenians to avoid rebellion for the sake of Armenians elsewhere. Soon Mayor Nazarét’ Ch’avush Norashkharhian set an example for the local notables by bringing his nephew Awedis to the government, and other families emulated him by convincing their relatives to surrender voluntarily. Nazarét’ Ch’avush had not yet given up on the idea of a rebellion, but before he could act, his plans were betrayed to the government by another Armenian. Ali Haydar arrested him, and summoned and beat the Zeytun notables, attempting to force them to surrender all their weapons. Several Martini rifles and ten Mausers were relinquished. The officials conducted similar searches for weapons and army deserters in villages around Zeytun, such as Fr’nuz and Awak-gal. Eventually, according to one Armenian source, they confiscated some 250 state and 1,150 locally made weapons of various sorts. In the process, they also carried out acts of violence and misbehavior, including attempted rape.  

Ali Haydar returned to Maraş at the end of September with Nazarét Ch’avush and at least sixty-four other captives in chains. Former prelate Fr. Karanfilian, who had also been imprisoned, was among them. The Maraş governor did not keep his promise to obtain pardons for the surrendered bandits, nor did he provide immunity to informers, arresting them too. In early October, Nazarét Ch’avush died in prison from beatings and ill-treatment. The Norashkharhian family, as well as some other Armenians, believed that he had been poisoned by the Committee of Union and Progress member Lütfi, a pharmacist, who visited him in prison together with Ali Haydar. According to a German nun in Maraş, Ali Haydar tortured people so severely during investigation that some of them had to have their toes amputated.  

After Nazarét’ Ch’avush’s imprisonment, his brother’s son-in-law Hayg Asmènian was elected mayor. This marked a shift of power away from those in Zeytun who favored armed action against the central government. A new police chief, Captain Süleyman, arrived. Süleyman, like Zeytun governor Hüseyin Hüsnü, had to abandon all he had and flee during the Balkan wars.
The Armenian youth in Zeytun continued to avoid conscription and desert army service, and were constantly pursued by the police. The police chief and governor accepted bribes to look the other way, but those without any money ended up threatening these officials at night, destabilizing the peace. The town notables sent telegrams complaining about the corruption of the Zeytun police chief and governor to the governor-general of Aleppo and to the governor of Maraş, as well as to the Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Catholicos of Sis. The Catholicos of Cilicia in turn protested to the Ministry of Religious Affairs in October 1914 that police and gendarme groups were beating village men and even women while searching for thieves. The groups stole food, clothing, and property, and took prisoners to Zeytun. Weapons—legal and illegal—were confiscated from the Armenians, while the Muslims were left armed. The Catholicos reported that when Armenians complained to the governors of Zeytun or Maraş about their treatment, they were told: “This is the government’s affair. The goal is your destruction and extinction.” Furthermore, the governor of Zeytun, Hüseyin Hüsnü, had personally slapped or beaten various priests who had come to speak with him.

Armenian banditry continued too. Sometime in mid-October, in the environs of Andırın, the village gendarme Ahmet was killed by two Armenians who had been sent out in his custody from Göksun. When the news of an imperial pardon for the arrested Zeytun Armenians who had not been accused of any crime or had been condemned in absentia reached the governor of Maraş (who already had lobbied the central government against this possibility), Ali Haydar proceeded, according to Armenian sources, to stir up the local Muslims. Fourteen Andırın notables (all Muslims except for two Armenians) signed a telegram to the War Ministry in which, citing the misdeeds of Armenian bandits going back to 1895, including the recent incidents of the robbery of the Andırın recruits and the killing of village gendarme Ahmet, they argued that the pardon would have a bad effect on military conscription of Muslims. The notables asked that if the Armenians were not to be punished, local Muslims either be left free to act as they wished on the issue, or be shown a place where they could emigrate.

In November 1914, upon the advice of governor-general Celal of Aleppo, Ali Haydar Bey was replaced as governor of Maraş by Mustafa Ahmet Mumtaz Bey, who was said to be more impartial concerning the Armenian situation. The public prosecutor of Maraş was also retired. These changes may have taken place in part due to the forceful complaints of Catholicos Sahag, the Zeytun notables, and other prominent Armenians. Catholicos Sahag had shown his resolve in a letter he had written to Patriarch Zawén Dér Eghiayan in October: “If we do not succeed in removing this monster, and his assistant, from office—if you do not do all that is possible—it is best that
we resign from the Patriarchate and Catholicate, rather than allow Zeytun, which is simply forced to be patient in order to assure the lives of its brothers, to be subjugated step by step, and basely." However, the effect of these changes may not have been that great. According to an Armenian source, Mümtaz considered Ali Haydar to have been rewarded for his behavior, for the latter was soon sent to Urfa as governor.

During the same period, the Porte ordered the release of those prisoners who had willingly surrendered, while the others were to be sent to Osmaniye for trial. Some 75 to 80 people were let go due to lack of evidence, the goodwill of Aleppo governor-general Celal Bey, and the abovementioned Armenian mediation, while 22 prisoners were sent to Osmaniye. Fr. Karanfilian and three others were released by the Aleppo court-martial. However, the Armenian patriarch of Constantinople reported that 70 to 80 Zeytun Armenians were still in prison at the end of March 1915 (some perhaps in Maraş), while according to Rössler, in April 1915, thirty Zeytun prisoners were in Osmaniye awaiting trial.

Furthermore, the Zeytun Armenians, repeating their prior requests, asked the new governor Mümtaz to remove Zeytun’s governor and the captain of the gendarmerie from office, citing their abuses. When Mümtaz asked for testimony the Armenians remained silent, presumably out of fear, so he took no action.

In January 1915, the Zeytun notables, still upset over the prevailing anarchy and oppression, and no doubt wondering about the possibilities of Allied wartime intervention, sent Awedis Aharonian (nephew of H’ovhannés) as their representative to discuss the Zeytun situation with Catholicos Sahag. Aharonian, carrying a letter asking permission from the catholicos for a rebellion, first went to Sis. Catholicos Sahag had gone to Hajin, so Aharonian spoke with Sahag’s secretary, the chancellor Bishop Kiwd Mkhit’arian. Mkhit’arian advised Aharonian to return to Zeytun instead of continuing to Hajin, and relay to the local leaders that there was no need for permission. As in the past, the Zeytun Armenians were free to act as their consciences dictated and as their interests demanded. Aharonian ignored Mkhit’arian’s advice and continued on to Hajin, delivering the letter to its intended recipient. Catholicos Sahag advised the Zeytun mountaineers that a rebellion would be imprudent, as they lacked the necessary supplies: guns, ammunition, and food. Considering the precariousness of the situation of the Ottoman Armenians in general during the world war, he argued, they should remain quiet.

The notables also sent messengers to Dörtyol and Hajin to see if these towns would join Zeytun in a rebellion. Before the answers arrived, an Armenian Revolutionary Federation member in Maraş, Mardiros T’érzian, offered to send four to five hundred youth to Zeytun if needed. The Zeytun
Armenians had little faith in this promise, however, given past disappointments with the Maraş Armenians. Soon afterward they received word that the Armenian youth of the towns were mostly away serving in the army, weapons were few, and much of the Hajin population, as was their winter custom, had scattered throughout the Adana province. At this point, the majority of Zeytun notables definitively abandoned the idea of rebellion. There may have been other attempts to establish contact between the various regions of Cilicia at this time. 59

Meanwhile the turmoil continued in Zeytun. Armenians took to throwing stones at police and gendarmes from their rooftops. On February 10, they beat and wounded a gendarme named Abdullah, seizing his weapons and ammunition. This news upset the governor-general of Aleppo, who sorrowfully reproached the Catholicos of Sis. A few weeks later, the catholicos wrote to the local priest to ask the Zeytun Armenians to maintain calm and not give the government a pretext to impose further severities. 60

The news toward the end of February 1915 that the government was planning on transporting weapons out of Zeytun offered the minority faction in favor of rebellion a prime opportunity for action. On the night of February 28, P’anos Ch’akrian, a notable who had been released from prison in Maraş several months ago, and several other veteran fighters from the 1895–96 battles, offered their leadership to the general populace for a rebellion. Some present at the large meeting were firmly opposed, citing the lack of support from other parts of Cilician Armenia, as well as the shortage of food, guns, and ammunition. They pointed out that none of the Armenian political parties had been involved in such a plan nor were ready to assist them, while the possibility of European intervention (as in 1862 and 1896) on behalf of Zeytun appeared slim. Meanwhile, the Ottomans had reconstructed the Zeytun barracks so that it was difficult to seize, and had brought Krupp artillery which could reduce the city and monastery to rubble. The proclamation of jihad had excited Muslim villagers against the Armenians, and the local Armenian villagers feared that Zeytun’s actions would lead to their own destruction. 61 Though some suggested that an attack on the weapons transport could be carried out by army deserters outside the city so that the Zeytunites could avoid blame, no one could agree on what should be done, and this meeting ended in discord.

A second meeting took place that same night with the participation of only the more radical element at the Surenian (Middle) Quarter home of Nshan Ezégiélian Efendi. Ezégiélian was an energetic young teacher from a noted clan who, like P’anos Ch’akrian, had been recently released from prison. Those present feared that the conservative or loyalist Armenian notables would accede to an isolated attack outside the city only as a cunning way of getting rid of the younger radical element in the city. The radicals
would then be suspect and be investigated by the government. Thus, they had to take action in the city that very night not only to rally the youth to the flag of rebellion, but to force the other notables to join in. The government would then consider the entire city population as complicitous. They decided to attack the fifty gendarmes in the city with seventy to eighty men and seize the weapons in the government building.62

As planned at the second meeting, some Armenians went to hold positions at key street corners, but it was already late in the night, and the signal to attack was delayed. Meanwhile, the conservative notables learned of the plan, and persuaded the families of those involved to halt it. The conspirators gradually dispersed and returned to their homes without having taken any action.63

The next day the conservative notables decided to officially inform the government and the prelate of the plot via Mayor Hayg Asmênian. Presumably they intended to prevent further incidents by the radicals which they thought could harm the broader Armenian population and threaten their own leadership, while proving once more their own loyalty to the Ottoman government. It turned out, however, that the government had already gotten wind of the events through its own spies, and had opened new investigations and made some arrests.64 The government also requested from the Ottoman Fourth Army command the dispatch of one or two companies of 250 soldiers each to Zeytun as a show of force. It feared that seizing the deserters might provoke a general uprising, which the existing number of gendarmes would be insufficient to prevent. A week later, no troops had been sent, and the governor of Maraş requested 600 troops to pacify the town. Two companies from Maraş were available.65

Many Armenians took to the mountains to avoid interrogation and imprisonment.66 When the government disarmed Christian troops in the Maraş area in the beginning of March, Armenian soldiers feared this was only the prelude to further steps against them. Some deserted and fled to Zeytun, joining the fugitives in the mountains.67 The rebels and army deserters split into three principal groups, led by the Norashkharhians, P’anos Ch’akrian, and Mesrob Ch’olakian, respectively.

In early March, the Ch’akrian and Ch’olakian groups learned of a group of 15 to 25 gendarmes and soldiers traveling to keep watch over the villages around Zeytun and track down deserters. The gendarmes may also have been there to ensure the safe delivery of weapons dispatched on March 7 from Maraş. On March 9, twenty to thirty Armenians from the abovementioned groups attacked the government forces at a site located several hours to the south of Zeytun and variously called Pambagi Tzor (Cotton Valley), Çeltik, Karacaltı/Karaçaltı, and a valley at Alikayasi. The Armenians took the soldiers’ weapons and money, after killing six to fifteen men (the lower
estimates are probably more accurate). The deserters probably attacked pre-
emptively, as well as to obtain the personal weapons of the soldiers. While
they initially may have hoped to obtain the weapons from Maraş, these had
been sent via a different route, and the Armenians probably learned of this
before the attack. According to several of the Armenian sources, the reason
for the Armenian attack was actually to avenge the licentious behavior of
the gendarmes and soldiers in area villages like Alabozan (Antréasenk’ or
Antréasian). The soldiers had spent the previous night there and harassed
the populace, even attempting to violate family honor. In response to the
attack and the general situation in Zeytun, five hundred troops from Maraş
were finally ordered to leave to Zeytun that evening together with a gendar-
merie commander.

Nshan and Eghia Norashkharhian and their followers took refuge in St.
Asduadzadzin monastery to the northeast of Zeytun, at the base of Mt. Ber-
znga and south of Mt. Pisir, which was under Eghia’s control. Cousins and
members of the influential “princely” Norashkharhian clan, Eghia and
Nshan were seasoned leaders from the 1895–96 period, who had been
released from prison with Ch’akrian. St. Asduadzadzin Monastery had its
own spring, protective walls, and a small chapel, and there were some hun-
dred homes around it that formed the Vank’ or Monastery Quarter. Several
hundred men, including the members of the other two groups, joined the
rebels there, and they raised Armenian political party flags on the roof. The
monastery soon became the base for all rebel operations. They cut the
nearby telegraph wires connecting Zeytun to the outside world, probably the
same evening.

The rebels and deserters had taken four Turkish village chiefs and some
villagers as hostages to the monastery. They issued the local Ottoman govern-
ment a 24-hour ultimatum for the release of some sixty imprisoned Arme-
nian youths, and for the evacuation and surrender of the barracks and
government building to their new Armenian government. If not, they threat-
ened to arrest more Turks and torture them. Furthermore, they would arrest
those officials and policemen who, during wartime, had oppressed the
Armenian population. The governor of Zeytun initially ordered the Zeytun
Armenians to either suppress the deserters or surrender them, but the nota-
bles declared that they were unable to do so, since their weapons had been
taken away by the government months earlier. The governor, temporarily cut
off from the outside world, had no choice but to place his hopes, at least tem-
porarily, on the conservative faction of Zeytun Armenian notables. After dis-
ussion with them, he agreed to release the Armenian youths. In exchange,
the rebels released the village chiefs and their other Turkish prisoners.

The rebels pleaded their cause before an assembly of Zeytun notables,
but the influence of the loyalist members of the diocesan council was strong.
The loyalists decided to help the governor to fix the telegraph wires cut by the rebels, but after each repair the rebels would cut them again. Eventually, the loyalist notables sent out two Armenians as couriers or guards to help ensure the safe delivery of messages to Maraş (though one Armenian source claims that a group of gendarmes were able to achieve this task independently). They sent four priests and some additional men with mules to bring back the corpses of the dead gendarmes that the local government was unable to retrieve. The military forces requested from Maraş arrived sometime during this period. Nonetheless, as the troops under his command were not yet sufficient to counter the rebels, the Zeytun governor continued negotiations, confident now that his message asking for additional soldiers had made it out successfully. It was also around this time that the rebels made an abortive attempt to assassinate Mayor Hayg Asmêniyan in revenge for his efforts to repress them.

It was also around this time that the rebels made an abortive attempt to assassinate Mayor Hayg Asmêniyan in revenge for his efforts to repress them.

Upon getting word of the troubling events taking place in a district under his jurisdiction, on March 12, Ottoman Fourth Army Commander Cemal Pasha ordered Hicaz gendarmerie regiment commander Major Hurşit Bey to take two mountain cannons, one infantry battalion, and one infantry detachment, together with a court-martial committee and the governor of Maraş to Zeytun. Hurşit was to punish the rebels without getting the populace (presumably meaning vengeful local Muslims) involved.

That same day, Maraş governor Mümtaz Bey arrived at noon and went to the Zeytun barracks, the telegraphic communications of which were cut off from the city. By then there were still not more than a thousand soldiers at Zeytun—an insufficient number to deal with the Zeytun Armenians, especially if the insurrection spread. Despite Cemal Pasha’s orders, an Armenian source claimed that Mümtaz had written letters before his arrival to the Muslim villages of the area, urging them to fight Zeytun. This is confirmed by a March 13 telegram from Mümtaz, explaining that because local Ottoman forces were insufficient in number to capture and punish the troublemakers, it was necessary to ask Muslims in surrounding areas for support. When the Zeytun governor and the conservative Armenian notables came to greet him at the barracks, Mümtaz commanded that the telegraph wires be fixed since communications essential not only for him but for other provinces relied on this route. He ordered the revolutionaries to return all the weapons that they had taken from the murdered police soldiers, or at least five or eight of them; in exchange he promised to obtain from the Fourth Army command and the central government a pardon for all revolutionary acts until that point.

According to an account by one of the leaders of the conservative Zeytun faction, the Maraş governor was pleased with the initial reception he was given by the Zeytun Armenians. Though he had been extremely upset on
his way to the town, Mümtaz Bey saw the Armenians’ efforts to repair the telegraph lines, and was persuaded by the singing schoolchildren and friendly notables that in fact the majority of the Zeytun Armenians opposed rebellion.77

The rebels were disappointed that there was no word from the rest of Cilician Armenia about supporting their actions. Maraş, with its promise of five hundred men, was silent, but the rebels still hoped that Hajin would join Zeytun and their joint forces would descend to Gars, not far from Adana. Some feared the Allied states would not help at this stage, but others believed it was inevitable.78

In any case, following the same plan that they had unsuccessfully tried to put into motion at the end of February, the rebels decided to attack the city at night and force the remaining Armenians to join them in revolt. As before, the loyalist Armenian notables got wind of this plan, and informed the government. According to one version, the Ottoman commander asked the notables what should be done, and the latter suggested that he provide four hundred troops to join with three hundred of the Zeytun Armenians in defense of the city borders against the rebels. A different version suggests that it was the governor of Zeytun who proposed joint patrols by government troops and police and the Armenian populace. The notables also tried to dissuade the deserters from their attack plan in other ways.79

On the night of March 12, the deserters set out from the monastery and first clashed with the town guards by the rock called Anpani K’ardag or Khach’ K’ar. The guards fled after some light resistance, but soldiers in the army barracks, which was at a high elevation, saw the rebels and began firing on them. As the rebels reached the homes at the northeastern outskirts of the town, the first and second lines of the guard posts joined together to fight them. The revolutionaries lost any hope of the populace joining them. They could also hear the cries of residents in the Upper or St. Lusaworch’ats’ quarter of the Norashkharbian clan whose homes were being struck by their bullets. The revolutionaries realized that more Armenians than soldiers were being harmed during the attack, and without popular support it was not possible to take over the government. They gradually stopped shooting and began to retreat back to the monastery. The shooting had lasted at least one hour. One soldier, one civilian Armenian, and two attackers were killed, and two soldiers and one civilian were wounded, according to Mümtaz. Local Armenian leaders gave higher casualty figures, with eight soldiers and two civilians killed (but no mention of attackers). It was largely thanks to the resistance of the Zeytun citizens that the deserters failed in their attempt, since the government forces alone were insufficient to withstand a general insurrection of the town. The number of attackers must not have been very large, as one of their sympathizers wrote that a few
days earlier many of the volunteer fighters had been sent home on a break and the presence of government forces on the roads prevented their rejoining the men at the monastery. Some fighters also had to defend the monastery and could not join the attack.\textsuperscript{80}

Soon after the Maraş governor’s arrival, the notables got the telegraph lines working again. Mümtaz requested the Fourth Army command to dispatch one battalion of soldiers with a battery of mountain artillery.\textsuperscript{81} Telegrams from the Catholicos of Sis urging loyalty and repeating government promises that the innocent population would not be harmed helped win over much of the population to the side of the conservatives.\textsuperscript{82}

On March 14, Mümtaz and several other Maraş officials again demanded from the Zeytun Armenian notables and priests the rifles that the deserters had seized from the gendarmes. The next day, the notables promised the rebels that if they surrendered the weapons and the government failed to keep its promise of a pardon, they, too, would join in rebellion. Municipal physician Dr. Eruant Êlmajian and the Catholic Armenian prelate went to the monastery to deliver this message in person. Though the rebels did not trust the government to keep its word, after initially refusing, they decided to hand over six Martini rifles on the condition that the notables secretly replace them. The government, meanwhile, beefed up its operations. It set up a second independent telegraph house in the barracks, increased the numbers of soldiers, and occupied strategic positions occupied in the city. Over the next week, troops continued to arrive from Maraş, and began preparations for combat, such as the digging of trenches. The Maraş and Zeytun governors, growing more confident in their own forces, now became dissatisfied over the remaining captured weapons, and forgot their talk of pardon.\textsuperscript{83}

By March 23, Catholicos Sahag, recognizing no doubt the seriousness of the situation, proposed going to Zeytun himself, to personally handle the crisis. He repeated his proposal on March 27, but Cemal Pasha thought it unnecessary, and turned it down.\textsuperscript{84}

Count Wolfskeel, the German military advisor to Fahri Pasha, suggested sending additional troops to Zeytun quickly and in large numbers, and Fahri agreed. They feared that the nearby military route Osmaniye-Islahiye-Rajo, a strategically important path that stretched from Adana to Aleppo province, would be affected if an Armenian rebellion spread. Consequently, they assembled at least five battalions, two squadrons, and mountain artillery, with troops to come from Aintab, Aleppo, and Geben.\textsuperscript{85}

On the night of March 23, the Ottoman officials who had been staying in the government building in Zeytun proper moved to the army barracks. This left the Zeytun Armenians very anxious, and they asked the Maraş governor to move the officials back. The prosecutor general of Maraş informed the Armenians that the governor of Zeytun had been fired, and
shortly thereafter the officials returned to their original lodgings.\textsuperscript{86} The Zeytun judge Muhammed Zeki, originally of Elbistan, became acting governor of Zeytun.\textsuperscript{87}

That same night, three Armenian spiritual leaders from Maraş, an Armenian notable, and a German missionary, Karl Blank, arrived from Maraş in a mediation attempt. The next day they were able to obtain information about the rebels from the city Armenians, but as they had no luck negotiating directly with the rebels themselves, they departed not long after. According to the account of a Zeytun Protestant Armenian pastor who was present, the local Armenians promised to remain neutral in any operations against the rebels.\textsuperscript{88}

Major Hurşit Bey, not caring to wait for the considerable number of Ottoman troops that were instructed to assemble, began the attack on the monastery on March 25 with a bombardment and rifle fire. The first shell landed in the courtyard of the monastery. By now there were some 100–150 men in the monastery,\textsuperscript{89} of whom 35–40 were the primary fighters.\textsuperscript{90} The rest were neighborhood villagers, who evidently supported the fighters. Some fifteen of the armed fighters took positions to the northwest of the monastery at K’art’ôshk’ôr (“Lizard’s Rock,” also called Ghat’), while two of Eghia Norashkharhian’s sons went to defend the village.\textsuperscript{91}

Approximately three hundred Ottoman troops slowly approached the walls of the monastery, and exchanged gunfire with the rebels. The Martini field artillery did not have much effect on the walls of the monastery, but when the troops realized that the Zeytun populace was neutral, they brought the Krupp cannon from the barracks. Cannon fire had begun to weaken the walls, when Maraş gendarmerie battalion commander Major Süleyman Bey approached the monastery door and was shot.\textsuperscript{92}

At this point, the loyalist Armenian notables of Zeytun went to the government officials and requested that the siege continue through the night, lest the rebels would escape and cause even more trouble. The officials gave their word, yet that evening the troops left their positions to return to the nearby barracks. Two hours later, thirty-five rebels fled the monastery to the mountains, while the Armenian villagers went to Zeytun town. Catholicos Sahag wondered whether this loosening of the siege was a deliberate attempt to create a pretext for subsequent mistreatment.

The next morning, March 26, troops fired again at the monastery, and, seeing no resistance, approached, entered, and burned it, along with the nearby Armenian homes despite Armenian pleas to spare both.\textsuperscript{93} In addition to being motivated by sheer anger, this was intended perhaps to prevent the monastery from ever being used again.

During these incidents two Armenian rebels were superficially wounded, according to Armenian sources, who also claimed that one to three hundred
troops and a major were killed. Though the latter matches initial Ottoman figures reported secondhand, Cemal Pasha’s telegram to Enver only cited as dead one major and eight soldiers, and 37 rebels. According to one German diplomat, as well as an American missionary, the two rebels were not just hurt but killed, and their friends cut off their heads to prevent their identification. Presumably, this would protect their families from retribution.

After the monastery was destroyed, troops placed the entire town under siege, and the government began to turn out Armenian villagers who had taken refuge there. They began to systematically search the rebels’ homes, and, at least according to Armenian sources, two wounded fighters who had taken refuge there were seized and taken to the barracks. Over sixty suspects were quickly imprisoned, and weapons, gunpowder, forbidden publications, and even the seal of the Hnchak Party were uncovered. Hundreds of Armenian deserters surrendered in Zeytun and other parts of Maraş province. Soldiers rounded up not just deserters but all Armenians of military age. Some fled and joined the rebels in the mountains, and thus their number reached forty-five.

On April 2, as these rebels were assembling at Alikayası and Sultandaği, to the southwest of Zeytun, a detachment of soldiers with one mountain cannon headed to Zeytun. Irregular local Turkish forces joined the troops in pursuit of the rebels. Meanwhile, those suspected of having any connection to the revolt were sent to the court-martial in Maraş. A German military officer attached to the Ottoman army wrote that the government probably did not find valid evidence of guilt, but used the opportunity to “clean things up somewhat” in Zeytun. Some thirty-two Zeytun notables who surrendered were imprisoned in Maraş, and many more soon followed. These Zeytun prisoners would be hanged over a period of almost a year after the fighting ended. Meanwhile the forty-five rebels wandered the mountains around Zeytun, periodically clashing with troops and gendarmes, until July 1915.

After a two-week period during which people suspected of having any connection to the rebels, as well as all army deserters, were arrested and removed, the government began deporting groups of families to Konya. Major Hurşit organized the first caravans. He only told the Armenians that they would be sent as far as Maraş. Between twenty-two and fifty notables and their families were deported in early April, sometime between April 7 and 10. Over the next few weeks in April and May, the Armenians in all of Zeytun’s quarters and its villages were gradually deported, until only four hundred families remained. After telegraphic inquiries as to how many Armenians were left in Zeytun and how many had been deported, Interior Minister Tâlât Pasha relayed the decision that all of
Zeytun must be emptied to the Maraş governor on May 6, and repeated it on May 9.\textsuperscript{108}

Though in Zeytun the major declared that everything was finished, and had a town crier announce the end of the deportations, in the second half of May the same town crier declared that all Armenians would have to leave Zeytun within two days. According to an Armenian eyewitness, the government feared that Armenians who remained would supply the surviving rebels with provisions. By mid-June the deportation of Armenians from Zeytun and its environs was nearly complete.\textsuperscript{109} A small number of Zeytun Armenians, including Mayor Hayg Asménian, were allowed to stay in Maraş as a reward for their loyalty to the government, but after a few months, they too were deported.\textsuperscript{110}

The first groups of Zeytun deportees were sent to Konya via Maraş, Bağçe, Osmaniye, Tarsus, and Bozanti (Pozantı).\textsuperscript{111} American missionaries reported that the government did not feed the first group of deportees in Maraş, and that an officer told the soldiers leading them that they were free to do as they pleased with the women and girls, who were sent in a separate group.\textsuperscript{112} According to William S. Dodd, an American Protestant missionary doctor who helped establish a hospital in Konya prior to the war, and now wanted to help the refugees, the Armenians were only allowed to take their animals—donkeys, horses, cows, and oxen—as far as Bozanti in the Taurus Mountains, where some of the animals were confiscated and sold. The few animals that successfully made it to Konya could neither be sold nor used because the government required that they be available for requisitioning.\textsuperscript{113} At Bozanti, too, the Armenians went hungry.\textsuperscript{114}

As much as a month later, the Zeytun Armenians were moved some sixty miles to the Sultaniye district. Celal Bey, then governor-general of Aleppo, but afterward governor-general of Konya, later wrote that Sultaniye (later renamed Karapınar) was infamous for its severe climate,\textsuperscript{115} while a Swiss teacher from Tarsus College who traveled to Konya in May 1915 described it as one of the unhealthiest places in Konya.\textsuperscript{116}

In theory, the Ottoman government intended to provide the deportees with assistance. Since their possessions had been confiscated and assessed, Count Wolffskeel reasoned, in exchange the Armenians should receive possessions or money of equal value, as well as new homes.\textsuperscript{117} In a telegram dated May 5, 1915, the Interior Ministry wrote to the Konya provincial government that the Ministry of the Treasury had been instructed to pay for the settlement and provisioning of the Armenians sent to Konya from funds for unexpected arrangements, but on May 29 it wrote instead that already existing funds in the province for emigrants must be used.\textsuperscript{118} According to what Dodd told the abovementioned Swiss teacher, although the government initially gave the deportees bread in Konya, it was bad bread, only distributed
once every two or three days. The teacher commented: “How cruelly ironic to think that the Government pretends to be sending them there to found a colony; and they have no plough, no seeds to sow, no bread, no abode, in fact they are sent with empty hands.” Dodd wrote on July 17, 1915, that it had been one month since any food had been given to the deportees: “The manifest purpose to destroy these people by starvation cannot be denied.”

The Ottoman government obstructed local aid efforts by Armenians and American missionaries, while in Constantinople Ministers Talât and Enver deflected American ambassador Morgenthau’s interventions. When the Armenians were moved to more remote Sultaniye, they were lodged in all manner of broken down buildings—even camel stables—and reduced to digging for roots to supplement the scanty bread they were able to purchase. Only some of the poor were given flour by the government initially. Some of the men were drafted into labor regiments.

By July there were some seven thousand Armenians from Zeytun and its environs in Konya province. Many perished from starvation and disease. Some fifteen hundred died from an epidemic that summer in Sultaniye. Finally on August 16, 1915, the deportees were told to prepare for their return to Zeytun, but were sent instead toward Syria. On the way back, the Zeytun deportees were robbed at many stops—Ülu Kişla, Mamure, and Şarşar (between İslahiye and Bağçe)—until they reached Katma, outside of Aleppo. They remained there for months, many dying of starvation and dehydration, before moving on to Der Zor.

By this time, there were already many Zeytun Armenians who had been deported to Syria. On April 24, Minister of the Interior Tâlât had instructed Cemal to stop deporting Armenians to Konya. Tâlât argued that they were creating too great a concentration of Armenians in one place, and that the newcomers might eventually unite in movements with local Armenians. He deemed areas in southeastern Aleppo province, Zor, and Urfa more suitable. This reasoning appears to have been generalized in a May 26, 1915, telegram from the supreme military command to the Ministry of the Interior proclaiming that deported Armenians nowhere should exceed ten percent of the local Muslim population in their areas of settlement; the villages that the deportees would establish should not exceed more than fifty homes each; and the Armenian deportee families should not be allowed to change residences.

The precise timing of the redeportation of the Zeytun Armenians to the south, as well as the initial deportation of some Konya Armenians, was a result of local circumstances. The new governor-general of Konya, the same moderate Celal Bey who had recently been removed from Aleppo, was not then at his new post, so the Committee of Union and Progress responsible secretary in Konya, along with other proponents of anti-Armenian action,
took advantage of his absence, and of the availability of the railway line to the south, to act quickly.\textsuperscript{128}

With the change in destination to the south, one of the new routes used by the May caravans from Zeytun passed near Maraş, then Perta (Birecik), Urfa, and Rakka,\textsuperscript{129} or Ras ul-Ayn. In the latter place large numbers were massacred.\textsuperscript{130} Many of the survivors were forced on to Der Zor (Deyr ez-Zor), where they were reunited with the Zeytun Armenians who had come via Konya. By the end of July 1915, 15,328 Armenians from Zeytun, Yarpuz, Alabaş, and Elbistan were in Der Zor and its surroundings (with 10,000 in the city proper), most living in the open air. Three hundred died from the stress of the journey, ninety drowned in the Euphrates, and the remaining deportees were forced to sell over thirty children, leaving them to precarious fate, in order to live. The food supply was completely inadequate, according to the German consul in Aleppo.\textsuperscript{131} Beatings, robberies, and outrages to women were commonplace.\textsuperscript{132} Two thousand people, or 350 families, by mid-May had traveled via Maraş and Aintab toward Aleppo, from where they were to be sent to Meskene, while another 250 families were expected in Aleppo by May 20.\textsuperscript{133}

The Armenians assembled at Der Zor were massacred on a large scale. The few survivors from Zeytun were assembled by gendarmes and driven to the deserted expanses of Shedaddiya and Abdül Aziz, where they were massacred without regard for age or sex. According to one Armenian report, Circassians and Chechens from the Zeytun area, whose families had emigrated from the Caucasus over fifty years ago, came all the way to these deserts to participate in the killing of their Zeytun neighbors. They took revenge for defeats and deaths in frequent conflicts against the Armenians.\textsuperscript{134}

A particularly high percentage of the Zeytun Armenians as compared to Armenians from other parts of Cilicia, or even many other parts of the Ottoman Empire, died as a result of the violence, sickness, and famine of deportation, with only some two thousand returning to the Zeytun district after the end of World War I.\textsuperscript{135}

Muslim immigrants from Macedonia moved almost immediately into the Zeytun Armenians’ homes, even while the deportation was still going on. According to an Armenian report from 1919, the Muslim refugees hastened the departure of the remaining Armenians through violence and even murder.\textsuperscript{136} On April 20, 1915, Tâlât’s deputy Ali Münif wrote in the name of the Interior Ministry and its Directorate of the Settlement of Tribes and Immigrants to Cemal’s Fourth Army Command that the transferral of Muslim refugees from Aintab (Antep later named Gaziantep) to Zeytun had begun. Despite his initial misgivings that the refugees would eventually flee because the area was not suitable for agriculture,\textsuperscript{137} by mid-June, Zeytun was full of Macedonian Muslims.\textsuperscript{138} This settlement of Muslim refugees
into the homes of Armenian deportees became a common phenomenon throughout the empire, and was part of a broader effort to change the demographic face of the country.\textsuperscript{139}

The government changed Zeytun’s name to Yeni Şehir, or “New City,”\textsuperscript{140} and then on June 8, 1915\textsuperscript{141} to Süleymanlı, in memory of Major Süleyman. Fahri Pasha or Major Hurşit ordered the destruction of the Armenian inscriptions and symbolic carvings that adorned the rocks of Bagh-Aghpiwr.\textsuperscript{142} This change of toponyms was part of a broader movement. According to the Turkish scholar Fuad Dündar, shortly after non-Muslims were removed from their homes, in the summer of 1915, places began to be renamed, though initially there were no formal state guidelines. On January 5, 1916, Enver Pasha announced the decision that place names in languages of non-Muslim millets (religious communities) would be Turkified as quickly as possible in “this favorable time for us.” Among the new toponyms suggested were names connected with great military events, or deceased individuals famous for their services to the nation, as well as local climatic, geographic, economic, or other noteworthy conditions. To make the new names easier to learn, they should sound somewhat like the old ones.\textsuperscript{143}

In August 1915, fire broke out in two separate quarters of Zeytun. It may have been arson, but the cause remains unclear. The Balkan refugees left, and in their place arrived other Muslims from the Zeytun region.\textsuperscript{144} The district capital moved from Zeytun to the Circassian town of Çardak.\textsuperscript{145} Zeytun became a shell of its former self.

The already tense Armeno-Turkish relationship in Zeytun at the start of the war was exacerbated by the demands placed on both parties through military mobilization and conscription. Any clashes that occurred were interpreted by both sides in light of their fears: for the Muslims, that the Armenians were ready to rebel and collaborate with Allied states potentially interested in occupying Ottoman territory; and for the Armenians, that the Muslims were planning another massacre. Small incidents of banditry were granted exaggerated significance, and the seemingly disproportionate responses in turn fueled the fears of the other side. Repressive government actions led some Armenians like Nazarét’ Ch’avush who had been involved in banditry or prior cycles of communal violence to plan rebellion. The Armenian community, however, was divided concerning such actions.

Most of the Zeytun establishment, wealthy landowners and merchants who had large clan-based and patronage followings, were upset with the army deserters and bandits for making the area unsafe for travelers and bringing the unwanted attention of the government on the city. They resented Nazarét’ Ch’avush for promoting and benefiting from the rebels. Furthermore, at that point they were not willing to make the necessary sacrifices for a rebellion, and feared a negative outcome, especially since
the Ottoman army was equipped with modern German weaponry, which the Zeytun Armenians could not hope to possess. Bab Agha Surénian expressed their fatigue from the anarchy and violence: “This is already the 36th war. Is there no one else who will fight? We are the fools of the [Armenian] nation. This time let others go and fight—we will stay.” Bab Agha, like some of the other prominent members of the establishment, had not been averse to using force in the past: he had been active in the 1895–96 defense/rebellion of Zeytun.\footnote{146}

Krikoris Balakian, a well-informed Armenian cleric and intellectual, confirmed in his memoirs Zeytun’s disinclination to fight. If indeed some twenty thousand Zeytun Armenians had intended to revolt, he wrote, they would not have let themselves be disarmed so easily, by a mere few thousand soldiers. (They had been able to resist regular Ottoman troops for months in 1896.) Furthermore, the Zeytun Armenians had been cautioned repeatedly by the Catholicos and Maraş notables not to endanger the very existence of the Cilician Armenians by their actions. As mentioned above, the Zeytun Armenians returning to their homes in 1919 were very upset that the Catholicos of Cilicia had worked to halt any efforts at self-defense and resistance.

The main proponents of rebellion were the bandits and army deserters. Already in trouble with the law, they had little to lose. They had become used to a life of banditry. They had as patrons notables of Zeytun, who aided them as long as they did not cause too much trouble for the latter, and perhaps provided them with a share of the loot. The idea of achieving glory as a fighter was a significant draw in a society where exhibiting such courage was virtue. Even Nazarét’ Ch’avush may have been swayed by this logic. Some young people were attracted by the ideology of patriotism. Although the Armenian political parties may have contributed to this ideology, it does not seem that they played a leading role in Zeytun during this period. As one Zeytun woman declared: “The political parties were at that time going through a period of speeches.”\footnote{147} Their function was mostly symbolic, serving as a rallying point for disparate groups.

When the deserters surrendered through the intervention of their patrons in the fall of 1914, the two factions of the Zeytun Armenians were temporarily united. The unkept promises of Ali Haydar, governor of Maraş, made it difficult for the Armenians to trust any new offers from the government, however, and despite the persistent efforts of the Armenian Church, no internal force was powerful enough to keep the two Armenian factions from dividing again.

An external force perhaps could have done it. Some—maybe even a good many—of the Zeytun Armenians harbored sympathy for the Allies, and were looking for a signal of support at the end of 1914 and in early 1915,
when it appeared that the empire was heading for complete defeat and occupation. A young Armenian woman being deported from Zeytun at the end of April 1915 told an American reporter at Bozanti that the young Armenians “had been told that the English and French had taken Constantinople and that the Turkish government was a thing of the past. Thereupon they had decided to do away with the Turkish garrison of Zeitoun. The barracks of the Ottoman battalion stationed in the town was attacked, and in the fighting a good many Turks had been killed.” According to an Armenian eyewitness, the rebels in the monastery wanted at one point to raise the flags of Allied states along with an Armenian one. Yet whatever rallying power the name of the Allied powers carried was limited due to the absence of direct Allied contact and intervention.

In the end, the Armenians remained split. Twice, the rebels tried to attack the government center in the city of Zeytun, and each time a significant portion of the local populace remained neutral or sided with the government. Several Armenians were killed by the deserters as a result. The deserters even tried to assassinate one of the leaders of the loyalist notables during this period. When the final showdown ensued, the Armenian leadership decided to remain neutral and allowed the government to attack the deserters without hindrance. In the latter instance, one Armenian eyewitness account portrays the conservative element as having prevented some youth in the city from joining the rebels.

It is also important to note that during this period there were Armenians who still served in the gendarmerie on the government side, and even fought against their fellow Armenians, according to at least one Armenian account. Thus, despite the great tensions, national-religious polarization was not complete.

In short, only a minority of Zeytun Armenians attempted to oppose the Ottoman government with force, against the wishes of the majority. Only a few Ottoman officials, however, openly accepted this explanation. Aleppo governor-general Celal Bey was one of them. He wrote at the end of World War I that there was no need for the deportation of the Zeytun people to Konya, as there were only a small number of military deserters, and minor incidents. It was the governor of Maraş subprovince, Ali Haydar, who gave the situation a political coloration.

Most Ottoman officials, like Cemal Pasha, averred that the Zeytun Armenians were in revolt, and were collaborating with the enemy. According to an American missionary of Aintab, who himself believed the contrary, Governor Mümtaz of Maraş had come to the conclusion after his experiences in Zeytun that the entire population was “more or less” involved in supporting the rebels. The German consul of Aleppo, who had visited Maraş to investigate what was taking place, was told in April by the chief judge of the
Ottoman court-martial in Maraş that there was foreign influence, meaning the instigation of Germany’s opponents in the war. The consul complained that the judge did not provide any evidence, and believed that the causes were all domestic.¹⁵³

Though Minister of the Interior Tâlât Pasha expressed his satisfaction to the Armenian Patriarch of Constantinople sometime in March 1915 that the Zeytun population had joined Ottoman state forces against the army deserters,¹⁵⁴ he declared on March 29 to the German ambassador in Constantinople that he believed that foreign agitators had had a hand in the recent Zeytun events.¹⁵⁵ Tâlât in his telegrams, public statements, and later memoirs portrayed the Zeytun Armenians as a community participating in a general Armenian uprising in collaboration with foreign powers, and this is how mainstream Ottoman and Turkish historiography continues to portray them, despite the complexity of the situation as described above.¹⁵⁶

The timing and nature of the Zeytun deportations raise important questions about the organization of the Armenian Genocide. First, why were inhospitable parts of Konya chosen as a deportation destination, far from Syria or Iraq, where the majority of later Armenian deportees were sent. Cemal Pasha claimed that he never was consulted in the planning of the empirewide deportations, and that personally he found it more “expedient” to settle Armenians in Konya, Ankara, and Kastamonu than to send them to Mesopotamia. He explained that deportations from Anatolia might delay or cause other problems with the delivery of weaponry and other items necessary for his Suez Canal expedition. Presumably either taking care of or annihilating hundreds of thousands or more of Armenians would also be a big burden.¹⁵⁷

Despite Tâlât’s abovementioned April 24 and 26 orders to stop sending Armenians to Konya province in order to avoid creating too high a concentration of Armenians, and general instructions in May specifying locations in Syria and Iraq as suitable destinations for Armenian deportees, officials in Adana province under Cemal’s jurisdiction later at least twice tried to deport more Armenians to Konya, from Adana and Tarsus, and Hajin (Kozan subprovince).¹⁵⁸

Furthermore, Armenians outside of Cemal Pasha’s jurisdiction from places like Konya city proper, Adapazari and Kincilar (both all the way in the west of Asia Minor), or Küçük İncesu of Kayseri subprovince were being deported to various parts of Konya province.¹⁵⁹

Aside from the question of why Armenians were still being sent to Konya province after April, the broader issue is how government officials in disparate and distant parts of Asia Minor knew to send Armenian deportees to Konya, and what this implies about any possible planning and organizational process.
Second, some sort of decision seems to have been reached regarding Zeytun by February 1915, as evidenced by several warnings of the Aleppo governor-general Celal to Catholicos Sahag. Furthermore, a knowledgable Armenian priest related after the war that a Cilician merchant had been warned in mid-February of a deportation decision which concerned Zeytun, Dörtyol, Hajin, and Adana, and probably other parts of Cilicia. According to this priest, the then V. Rev. Fr. Krikoris Balakian, when the merchant informed Catholicos Sahag, the latter, understandably concerned, went to Cemal Pasha for an explanation. Cemal revealed that a decision for a general deportation of Armenians had been made in the Ottoman capital. Balakian’s account is only partially verified by others, but two sets of Ottoman documents appear to confirm an early decision to deport the Armenians of Zeytun and Dörtyol.

The governor-general of the province of Adana, of which Dörtyol district was a part, telephoned either on February 25 or 26 to Gendarmerie Regiment Commander Avni Bey, who was then in Osmaniye as both vice-governor and commander of the local zone, to order the relocation of all Armenians in Dörtyol to Osmaniye, Ceyhan, and Adana. The Adana governor-general informed the Ministry of the Interior of these actions, which in turn informed Enver Pasha, as commander of the Ottoman army. On March 2, 1915, the Ottoman Minister of the Interior wrote to the Adana provincial government approving of the destinations for the Dörtyol Armenians.

On February 28, 1915, Cemal Pasha wrote to Enver from Jerusalem that, among other things, troops were ordered to remove Armenians from the areas in which they lived in Aleppo province—meaning, though not specifying, Zeytun first of all—in order to prevent an imminent Armenian rebellion. The Armenians of Zeytun were not deported until April, and those of Dörtyol, after the males were placed into forced labor battalions, in May. Why was there this time lag, and what was the connection of these decisions to a series of other decisions taken in February and March about the Ottoman Armenians? Were these deportations part of a broader plan, or reactive measures?

A third set of related questions are raised by ambiguous telegrams, behavior, and statements to Armenians and missionaries by Cemal Pasha and Ottoman officials in Cilicia initially concerning whether the entire Armenian population of Zeytun or only a select group would be deported, and, once this issue was settled, whether all or only some Armenians of Cilicia would be deported. Why the ambiguity, and what was Cemal’s role in decision-making concerning the deportations? The actions of Ottoman middle-level officials seemingly opposed to the Cilician deportations, such as Celal in Aleppo, İsmail Hakkı in Adana, and Şükrü in Aintab, must be explored in this context.
At the Paris Peace Conference a delegation representing the Assyrians laid forth reasons for granting the Assyrian people an independent state. On maps they demarcated the borders of this state—a territory that straddled the borders of present-day Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. The delegation maintained that massacres and attacks sanctioned by the Ottoman government had caused 250,000 deaths, or 50 percent of the original population.\(^1\) In addition they presented evidence that Russian and British diplomats and military officers had promised them their independence if they participated in the war on the Allied side.\(^2\) Starting in spring 1915 a significant segment of the Assyrians, the fierce highland tribes of the Hakkari Mountains, had indeed joined Allied campaigns against the Ottoman forces. Despite a widespread feeling of moral responsibility, the Great Powers did not grant the Assyrians their own state (nor even compromise on a joint Assyrian and Kurdish state). In the 1920s the survivors languished in refugee camps in Iraq, Syria, and the Soviet Union, and finding a home for them became a major international issue.\(^3\)

“Assyrian” is a designation of a Christian ethnic group living in central Kurdistan. They speak dialects descended from the Aramaic language: with differing eastern and western dialects. The dialect boundary corresponds with the ancient frontier between the Byzantine and Persian empires, which lay considerably west of the present-day Iranian-Turkish border. Assyrians converted to Christianity during its earliest stage and developed theological positions that came to be declared heretical, resulting in isolation. In the theocratic Ottoman Empire, the Assyrians were not usually identified as an ethnic group but were rather categorized by religion, which was complicated by several rival church organizations. The eastern Assyrians had two major churches: the Nestorians, ruled by a hereditary religious and secular leader entitled the “Mar Shimun” (meaning Lord Simon), resided in a hamlet in the Hakkari Mountains. The majority of Nestorians lived on both sides

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1. The Ottoman Treatment of the Assyrians
David Gaunt
of the Turkish-Iranian frontier. The Chaldean Church broke away from the Nestorians and joined Catholicism in the early modern period. A uniate church, it kept its original liturgical language and rites. The main concentration of Chaldeans was located in present-day Iraq, but there were important settlements in Iran and in the Bohtan district of Turkey. The main west Assyrian church was the Syrian Orthodox (often termed the Jacobites). This church was widespread in provinces west and south of Lake Van, and there was a nearly continuous settlement in Tur Abdin, an agricultural region centered on the town of Midyat. A small Syrian Catholic Church split off in the early modern period. During the modern period Protestantism also made some gains.4

The genocide committed against the Assyrians did not come out of the blue. On the contrary, relations between Christians and Muslims had deteriorated rapidly since the accession to the throne of Sultan Abdülhamid II. Assyrians were among the victims of the 1895–96 massacres throughout eastern Anatolia and the 1909 massacres in Adana. In addition to these major catastrophes, attacks by local Kurdish tribes and forced conversions of entire villages were frequent. Already at the outbreak of World War I, the Assyrians increasingly expected to be targeted for extermination, not because of national politics, but because of rising local anti-Christian animosity.5

Violence against the Assyrians occurred sporadically in the period before the Ottomans joined the War in November 1914, but after mobilization was declared in August. These attacks gradually increased in intensity and frequency, culminating in a full-scale genocide during the summer of 1915. Several features characterize the campaign against the Assyrians. The most prime feature was the total targeting of the Assyrian peoples. The attacks were not limited to the Nestorian mountain tribes who mounted a resistance, but spread to peaceful Assyrian farmers in Anatolia and even to Iran during the Turkish occupation. In rural villages and hamlets the killing was particularly comprehensive, while a few Assyrians in some major towns might be spared. This indicates that an important material objective was to seize land.6

Second, regular troops were deployed for the killing and expulsion in Hakkari, occupied parts of Iran, and against the few farm villages elsewhere that resisted. Third, the destruction of villages and hamlets in rural areas was nearly total. Destruction of churches, wells, houses. Complete plundering of animals, furniture, doors, and windows in order to hinder the return of eventual survivors. Fourth, organized massacres resulted in the mass murder of hundreds of thousands of noncombatants. Estimates of 250,000 were made at the time, but that figure might be too low. In the san-cak of Mardin, percentage population loss for Assyrian peoples exceeded two-thirds.7 The systematic attacks on peaceful villages terrified many witnesses into abandoning their homes. Fifth, there was a bureaucratic design
to the extermination, with several layers of Special Organization (a paramilitary section of the Committee of Union and Progress), locally recruited death squads and militia, coordinated mobilization of willing local tribes, active recruitment of outlaws and criminals to participate in the raids, and removal (sometimes assassination) and replacement of oppositional government officials.

In some respects the treatment of the Assyrians differed from that of the Armenians. There was much less central government propaganda identifying the Assyrians as traitors, but provincial and local politicians spread such accusations in their jurisdictions. On occasion the central government issued decrees that only Armenians should be deported, but this was ignored in the provinces, particularly in rural areas. The Assyrians had a low level of national feeling, had no political parties and few intellectual leaders. The only large group that attempted resistance were the tribes of the Hakkari Mountains with their antiquated hereditary leadership and clanlike social structure. The Assyrians were seldom placed into deportation columns, but rather were killed in their villages by large assemblies of local Kurdish tribes coordinated by local militia. The Ottoman authorities used the divide-and-rule approach. In large towns and cities with a mixed Christian population, the Armenians were arrested, killed, and deported in the first phase. Thereafter, the attention was turned on the Assyrians and they were given the same treatment. But this temporary respite gave many Armenians the false impression that Assyrians were spared.

This chapter will attempt to show that the Assyrians and Armenians suffered similar fates at the hands of the Ottomans during World War I. The region where these two Christian groups were most integrated, the Iranian-Turkish border strip, was also the place where the first full-scale massacres took place and where Turkish armies had their first taste of taking revenge for military setbacks on defenseless noncombatants.

Before the world war, the political situation in Iran was very complex, and it was particularly unstable in the extreme northwest corner, Azerbaijan, which was partially occupied by the Ottomans. In 1905 the latter seized much of the border, penetrating tens of kilometers into Iranian soil, advancing beyond the areas they had historically claimed. Only the coveted plain of Salmas (with the towns of Dilman and Khosrowa) near the northern tip of Lake Urmia, lay outside their grasp. This district contained a large population of Armenians and Assyrians. During 1915 it would become the scene of brutal atrocities against Christian noncombatants.

The Ottomans established a civil and military administration in 1905 that remained in place until the outbreak of the Balkan Wars. The unexpected Ottoman withdrawal in 1912 was portrayed as a temporary measure, and
local Turkish representatives assured their supporters that they would return as soon as possible. Rumors circulated that the Ottomans were on their way back, and local Muslims warmed to the idea of Turkish annexation. Panic-stricken Christians looked to Russia as their only realistic savior and were only partially calmed when a handful of Russian troops arrived, ostensibly to guard its consulates.

Thus, in August 1914, when war between Russia and Turkey seemed increasingly unavoidable, the Russian government conceived the idea of establishing a local Iranian Christian militia for border defense, and earmarked money and supplies for this purpose. The militia was concentrated in the Urmia district, which neighbored the Ottoman province of Van. On both sides of the border there were many Christian villages. In the northernmost sector lived mainly Armenians and in the south, mainly Assyrians (Nestorians or Chaldeans). The Assyrians actually outnumbered the Armenians.

In the year preceding the war, the border district was in a precarious political situation, marked by high-pitched interreligious conflict. Hostile foreign powers competed for local support and pitted religious and ethnic groups against each other. The Russians made concerted efforts to gain the loyalty of the Christians, threatening them with renewed Turkish occupation. Russian influence grew so great that a Nestorian bishop converted to Russian Orthodoxy and the patriarch Mar Shimun seriously considered doing the same. The Russians also tried to woo the Muslim population, but with discouraging results. The Ottomans on their side made great gains among the Sunni Kurdish tribes and Turkish-speaking Muslims. Thus there was a polarization of confessional groups in the wake of Russo-Turkish rivalry, and this expressed itself in Christian fear and panic, while Muslim hate-speech calling for jihad flourished.

The autonomous Assyrian tribes became a prime target for pan-Islamists and Turkish nationalists. The Young Turk government spoke of them with the same degree of animosity as they did the Armenians. The violent ethnic cleansing of Assyrians in the Hakkari Mountains was a consequence of a series of government decrees, some of which predated the war, thus indicating a long-standing intention to remove them. The eradication of the Assyrian tribes was the objective of Tâlât Pasha, the minister of the interior, because they made up a solid non-Muslim enclave near a strategic border. As war grew imminent, small-scale incidents spiraled rapidly into full-scale ethnic cleansing. Tâlât made the official decision to move forward in June 1915 with his intention, once it became clear that the Assyrian tribes could be crushed. He accused them of collaboration with the Armenians and Russians concluding: “we should not let them return to their homelands.”

After the Ottoman mobilization of August 2, 1914, news spread that Assyrians were being forced out of the Ottoman side of the border. One
close observer of these events was Basil Nikitin, a Russian diplomat. He wrote that “Turkish Assyrians refused to be mobilized in the Turkish army, and this was followed by repression and confiscation of their property. As a result, Assyrians fled to Persia.” Immediately, the families of the youths who fled were punished, causing a new wave of refugees into Iran. The government applied pressure on the Assyrian leadership. “Turkish authorities have imposed severe control over the territory of the Turkish Assyrians and take reprisals against their leaders. Mar Shimun was called to Van and the bishop of Shamdinan Mar Khnanisho was arrested,” Nikitin reported. Assyrians from nine villages had been deported to Persia and their houses burned.

The Assyrians were considered a grave risk because the Ottomans were planning a surprise invasion of neutral Iran in order to attack the unsuspecting Russians, and the loyalty of the Assyrians was doubtful. For years representatives of Russia had regularly paid visits to the patriarch Mar Shimun. The Russian vice-consul in Van met with the patriarch in October 1906, and was led to believe that the Assyrians would field forty thousand men on the Russian side. This statement should be considered as part of the negotiation rather than as a definite commitment.

In late October 1914, Tālāt Pasha issued a decree deporting the Assyrians. Like other deported minorities they were to be split among many villages so that they would be submerged in a world of Turkish-speaking Muslims. The decree read:

\[
\text{the Nestorians have always remained suspect to the government due to their predisposition to be influenced by foreigners and become a channel and an instrument. Because of the operations and activities in Iran, the concern of the government over Nestorians has increased, particularly about those who are found along our border with Iran. The government’s lack of trust of them results in their chastisement—their deportation and expulsion from their locations to suitable provinces such as Ankara and Konya.}
\]

This project was not simply a resettlement, since the dispersal of the Assyrians in the manner described was designed to destroy their culture, language, and traditional way of life. Tālāt ordered the mass arrest of Assyrians in Julemark town, close to the residence of the patriarch.

Unaware of government deportation plans, surprised Assyrians noted that the Turkish authorities arrested and shot fifty Assyrian males in the borderland. Throughout the Hakkari district, Ottoman irregular cavalry sacked Assyrian villages and abducted women. This terror must be seen as retaliation for the Assyrians’ refusal to abandon their homes. But the Assyrians did not realize the Turkish determination to drive them out. At first they saw the violence as simply continuation of prewar local anti-Christian
animosity, and they protested to the governor. “The atrocities of which we have given instances did not take place without the knowledge of high officials. On every occasion, the fullest details were sent in writing by Mar Shimun, to the Vali [provincial governor] of Van.” It took until December 1914 for the Assyrians to discover the involvement of the authorities in the reign of terror.

When the first waves of Nestorian deportees arrived in Iran, the Russians discussed the need for a village self-defense, because the Russian garrisons were very small. Foreign Minister Sazonov proposed forming a militia composed of Assyrian and Armenian volunteers. Twenty-five thousand surplus rifles and twelve million cartridges were earmarked for this purpose. The Russian military presented a proposal to train small bands of Armenians and Assyrians in camps under Russian command. Minorsky, Russia’s expert on Iran, however, tried to halt any plans to militarize the border strip. He warned that arming villagers would backfire: “the measures we are currently planning will bring us no military advantage whatsoever and will serve only to unleash just reprisals upon the Christians and their supporters.”

Before the declaration of war in November 1914, Ottoman troops started to attack and plundered border villages. A major thrust began September 29, when a surprise offensive drove the Russian Cossacks back, but it stopped October 12 after almost taking the town of Urmia. The newly formed Assyrian and Armenian militia fought side by side with the Russians. An American missionary wrote “a determined attack was made on Urmia, ostensibly by Kurds. It was afterwards clear, from statements made by Persians and Turks who were engaged in the attack, that the nucleus of the fighting force was made up of Turkish soldiers and that the attack was under the command of Turkish officers. It was also clear . . . that the result of success in this attack would have been the looting of the Christian population, with probable loss of life.” Another witness, a Catholic missionary, was more specific: “The Russians retreated to Urmia and left all of the Christian villages of the plain . . . at the mercy of the Turks and Kurds. . . . After having descended in the plain of Urmia the Turco-Kurds burned all the Christian villages which they encountered on their way, such as Anhar, Alwatshe and massacred the columns of refugees.” The invaders came to within eyesight of Urmia and perpetrated all manner of atrocities, leading a Russian diplomat to employ the term jihad. Iranian authorities found the dead bodies of uniformed Ottoman soldiers. Inspection revealed the identity of a sergeant and a private of the Fourth Army. Their dead officer carried the Ottoman military law codex and plans of operations. Enraged, the Iranian government protested over the Turkish border violations and its agents provocateurs.
On November 12, 1914, the Sultan proclaimed holy war and appealed to all Muslims to join in a common struggle. At the outbreak of war the Ottoman agents intensified already boiling jihad sentiments in the border strip. This proved effective in mobilizing the Kurdish tribesmen, who might otherwise have been unwilling to ally with Constantinople.

There was great Iranian resentment against Russia and Britain because of their heavy-handed intervention in domestic politics, and the Ottomans hoped to exploit this frustration to their advantage. Since the sultan only had religious legitimacy among the Sunni Muslims, his proclamations pulled little weight in overwhelmingly Shi'ite Iran. To overcome this obstacle, Shi'ite mujtaheds (mücahid in Turkish) in the holy cities of Najaf and Kerbala also issued calls for jihad. The Russians realized that they were sitting on a powder keg in Iran, which would prove volatile if a jihad ignited the pent-up anti-Russian feelings.

With the outbreak of open hostilities in early November, the Russians penetrated the Turkish border to the nearest administrative centers: Saray in the kaza of Mahmudi and Bashkale in the sancak of Hakkari. The Russians held these towns for only a short while, but when the Ottomans recaptured them, they took revenge on local Christians, accusing them of collaboration. A local observer wrote, “twelve villages in the [Gawar] district on the Persian frontier, Bashkale and Saray with the Nestorian and Armenian villages round, were ruthlessly wiped out after the Russian retreat.” Some eyewitness accounts were collected by a Russian investigation and an Assyrian survivor gave the following testimony:

In 1914 I lived in the village of Houzi close to the town of Bashkale. In the winter of that year . . . at about six o’clock in the evening, I saw that the Turks were approaching. I went out into the plain to find my brother Aywaz who was tending the cattle to tell him. I had not gone far before I saw my brother, running towards me. He was totally covered in blood, his mouth was sliced open, and his half cut off tongue hung from his mouth. Since he could not speak, he began to explain with his hands. From this explanation I understood that the Turks had done it. But who exactly and why, and under whose orders, my brother could not tell. . . . On the next morning, after the Turkish troops had left Houzi and gone on, I came down from the hill and went to my house. I found my brother’s corpse in the road beside my house. He had a piercing wound passing all the way through the neck and another through the stomach. I cannot say what had caused these wounds. The village was completely empty . . . Later my neighbor Benjamin Lovkoev said that Tahir Pasha and Hurshid Bey were the commanders over the Turkish troops.28

Houzi was a village with seventy-eight Assyrian households, and Hurshid was the local commander of a local Hamidiye cavalry regiment.
Reprisals and terror plagued the border strip. The violence from the Ottoman side was out of all proportion to the degree of local collaboration that had occurred. As soon as the Russians retreated from a village or town, Ottoman soldiers moved in and ruthlessly punished the population for disloyalty. As a rule, the Russians would appoint some local Christians to administrative posts. The Ottomans saw acceptance of a post inside the Russian occupation as treason. A German observer learned that all the Christian villages in the Albak valley were destroyed in punitive raids on the order of the kaymakam (district governor). According to the widow of a village headman, Hurshid’s regiment was responsible for the attacks on Assyrian villages. The widow was saved to deliver a warning to Mar Shimun. She testified:

The Turks attacked in November 1914 the village of Ardshi. These Turks were not regular askeri (soldiers) but the Sultan’s special volunteers, called the Hamidiye. The head of the group was officer Hurshid Bey. As soon as they invaded Ardshi village they set the house of Yuhannan Abdarov on fire and arrested my husband and sons. They were tortured to death. They were beaten from all sides and ordered to become Muslims, but they refused. Before my eyes Hurshid Bey shot my sons with a pistol. As I saw what happened, I tried to protect my husband, but Hurshid Bey kicked me in the face knocking out two teeth. Then he shot my husband with six bullets. The corpses of the dead, even that of my husband, were left lying in the road. We were not allowed to bury the dead. Hurshid Bey ordered that the corpses be smeared in excrement. In the following four days the dogs ate the corpses. Then Hurshid Bey ordered that the corpses be thrown in the latrine, where even the cross of the village church got thrown. Then Hurshid had the whole village burned and twelve people killed . . . 150 women and girls were forced to become the wives of Hurshid Bey’s relatives.

Inside Iran, after the October provocations, there was a period relatively free of further violence. The Ottomans were trying to entice Iran’s government to join their side for an attack on Baku. The Russians were aware of the rising Muslim hostility and wanted to avoid a conflict that would sweep through Azerbaijan, its prime economic interest. However, the two enemy powers were quietly gathering strength behind the scenes. A few thousand Russian reinforcements arrived and they included a contingent of Armenian volunteers. Minister of War Enver ordered the formation of the Fifth Expeditionary Corps to be commanded by Halil (his uncle) and to be rushed to Iran. As this division had to be recruited and trained, it did not arrive until April 1915.

Most military buildup took place in the town of Sawuj-Bulak just south of Lake Urmia. Iranian officials watched helplessly as Ottoman officials established a base with hundreds of Turkish soldiers and a constantly growing number of Kurdish tribesmen. Iranian forces headed by the pro-Russian
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provincial governor finally confronted the Ottomans in December 1914, but battle ended with complete Turkish victory. A Russian diplomat was killed in the rout, and secret documents concerning deployment of the Assyrian volunteers fell into Ottoman hands.

On New Year’s Day 1915 the Russians began a total retreat from Iran. The evacuation of Russian troops was a carefully calculated risk. With luck, it would force Iran to mount its own defense using its own army against the invaders. An armed conflict between Iran and Turkey would swiftly defuse the impact of the pan-Islamic appeal, and the Ottomans would replace the Russians as the focus of Iranian xenophobia. But Iran’s weak army was in no condition to halt the advancing Ottoman invaders.

The Russian vice-consul Nikitin reported: “Among local Christians a panic immediately occurred. Christian Assyrians tried to organize resistance” in a few places. But the Christian population was basically undefended. Some fled, walking barefoot through the snow, slush, and mud. It took a seven-day march to cross the Russian imperial border, and many perished on the way. By the end of January 1915, Russian authorities calculated that they had received 49,838 Armenian and 8,061 Assyrian refugees. Local Armenians and Assyrians serving with the Russians in volunteer brigades found themselves safe behind Russian lines, but gravely worried over the fate of their families trapped inside the occupation zone.

The combined Turkish-Kurdish force advanced from the south. Therefore destruction and loss of life was greatest in the southernmost, predominantly Assyrian sectors, and least in the northern, Armenian sectors, as the population had more time to flee. News immediately spread that the victors had begun to pillage, burn villages, destroy churches, and slaughter Christians. Between the retreat of the Russians and the arrival of the Turkish army there was a short interval of sheer anarchy, during which local Muslims staged pogroms on their Christian neighbors. Among the Assyrian villages that were attacked and plundered were Charbash, Dilgusha, and Gogtapa near Urmia, as well as the following in the Barandus valley, south of Urmia: Dizateka, Satuli, Alyabad, Shimshajeian, Babarud, Darbarud, Sardarud, Tekai, and Ardishai. The following villages of north of Urmia in the Nazlu River valley were attacked a few days later: Ada, Karajalu, Mushawa, Sherabad, Superghian. Of the major rural villages only Gulpashan was intact, thanks to the intervention of German missionaries, and even that security was only temporary. Details of certain incidents were horrifying: “At Ardichay 75 women and girls ran into the sea to escape the Turks. They refused to trust promises of safety if they came out, and all were shot as they stood in the water.”

As the Ottoman control solidified, news spread of a reign of terror. The Iranians did what they could to prevent panic. In Istanbul the German
ambassador and the Young Turk leaders admitted that the situation in Iran had gotten out of hand. On February 11, 1915, the German ambassador hosted a meeting between Minister of War Enver and the Persian ambassador to assess the situation. The Persian ambassador argued that the Turkish officers were doing a disservice to the Ottoman cause by alienating public opinion and recommended that the high command punish them.\(^41\)

The Turkish troops inside Iran reacted to the growing opposition by plundering and pillaging Christian villages. When the Russians returned they found evidence of recent atrocities. News spread to international media and created shock waves. A telegram referred to in the \textit{New York Times} stated: “the Turks and Kurds, who were retreating before the Russian advance pillaged and burned villages and put to death some of the inhabitants.”\(^42\) On March 10, 1915, a Russian consul surveyed a chilling scene in Haftavan, a village situated between Khosrowa, a Chaldean center, and Dilman, an Armenian town. This was the site of the first planned mass execution of noncombatants committed by the Ottoman army. On the ground were literally hundreds of corpses of the adult Christian male population of an entire district. Nearly all had been mutilated and as far as he could see most had been decapitated.\(^43\) An officer counted 707 corpses: all of them Armenians and Assyrians. He saw “hundreds of mangled corpses in pits, stinking from infections, lying in the open, I saw headless corpses, chopped off by axes, hands, legs, piles of heads, corpses crushed under rocks from fallen walls.”\(^44\)

Bystanders identified the Ottoman commander Jevdet (Cevdet) Bey, the \textit{vali} of Van, as the instigator of the massacre. He had ordered all adult Christian males to assemble in Haftavan under the pretense of registering them for food distribution. All of the Armenian and Assyrian men who turned up were arrested. Mass executions were conducted for two days under hair-raising circumstances. The army was running low on ammunition so the soldiers did not use bullets. In one farmyard there was a covered well and hanging upside down from its roof was a headless body, the well itself full of decapitated corpses. Victims had been hung upside down, their heads chopped off before being dropped into the well. In groups of twelve men had been made to face a wall while they were killed one by one with pick-axes smashing the backs of their skulls. A Russian consul counted fifteen wells stuffed with bodies as well as several corpse-filled barns.\(^45\) Even the Ottoman high command was stunned by the news of these excesses calling it an “unfortunate incident” caused by undisciplined troops and wild volunteers.\(^46\)

Iran’s Minister of Foreign Affairs registered a formal protest to the Turkish government over the “atrocities committed by the Ottoman troops” occupying his country. He complained that Iranian officials had witnessed repeated “acts of violence committed by your soldiers and who in the course
of battle, have pillaged many villages, torched many others and reduced all of the inhabitants to a state of misery. *This violence is most noted in the areas where there are many villages inhabited by Christians, where the population has been violated and mercilessly massacred.* Such extreme form of violence against unarmed noncombatants was unprecedented within neutral countries. The Turkish ambassador was lectured on the absolute necessity to dampen the “hatred sown by the Turks among the tribes of Azerbaijan.” The Iranians insisted on Turkey’s withdrawal and in a manner “with less ferocity, particularly the Kurdish irregulars.”47

An American missionary lamented: “In Urmia the biggest and wealthiest Syrian village, Gulpashan, which had been spared by payments of large sums of money was given over to plunder by the returning Kurds. The men of the village were all taken out to the cemetery and killed; the women and girls treated barbarously.”48 Equally dismayed, Russian consul Vvedenskii informed his government:

> I have begun to investigate the Christian villages. I have investigated twenty villages. Everywhere there is complete ruin and devastation. Churches, schools and libraries have only walls [standing]. Icons and sacred items are lying in the mud, torn and riddled with bullets. Some churches were transformed into stables or supply rooms for food or plunder. The villages are full of corpses of the poor victims of massacres, which were carried out by Turks and Kurds everywhere . . . The corpses bear the marks of cruel killing with axes, daggers and blunt objects.49

On the next day he sent a new telegram: “There is threat of a new massacre. During the last week one hundred persons were massacred.”50

By mid-March newspapers throughout the world overflowed with stories of atrocities in the Ottoman occupation zone. The situation worsened when the Turkish army prepared to return home. A Russian diplomat warned of the immediate danger in a secret telegram sent to the Russian government on March 14, 1915. “Kurds and soldiers slaughtered and killed Christians in the surroundings of Urmia. There is a risk that they will breach the sanctuary of the American mission and before they leave Urmia, they will massacre the Christians who are protected by the Americans.”51 He repeated this message with more urgency on March 22. “The Turks are preparing to massacre the Christians in Urmia. There is an evident threat to American and French missionaries, and also for the 1,500 Christians who are hidden in the missions. The Assyrian Orthodox priest and Nestorian Assyrian priests were taken from the missions and were tortured. I request to send troops immediately.”52

Aware that their makeshift forces in Iran were inadequate, the Turks were rushing reinforcements. As already noted, general Halil Bey was sent
with some elite units to command the occupation. He was military governor of Istanbul when ordered to form the Fifth Expeditionary Force and invade the Caucasus through Iran. His divisions amounted to 248 officers and an additional 10,920 well-equipped soldiers. The force also included gendarmes and 12,000 irregular Kurdish cavalry. His troops arrived in Azerbaijan in mid-April after a grueling forced march. He expected to confront the Russian forces commanded by General Nazarbekov together with the Assyrian and Armenian volunteers.

In size, Halil’s was definitely the superior force, but his army was badly mauled in a decisive battle near Dilman that left thousands of casualties on the battlefield. Official Turkish sources gave the losses for the first day of battle, listing 15 officers and 453 soldiers dead, 28 officers and 1,200 soldiers wounded, and 370 missing in action. Many of the badly injured were abandoned in the field so the casualties may have been much greater, and non-Turkish sources speak of 3,500 Ottoman dead. The Armenian and Assyrian volunteers played an important role in repulsing the Turks.

General Halil (Kut) blamed his defeat on the Christians and he even ordered the execution of his Armenian and Assyrian soldiers. German military advisors estimated that several hundred unarmed soldiers and officers were murdered. An officer who knew Halil well stated that his “campaign in Northern Persia included the massacre of his Armenian and Assyrian battalions and the expulsion of the Armenian, Assyrian, and Persian population out of Northern Persia.” An Assyrian doctor at a mission hospital recorded a conversation with a district governor who refused orders to kill all of the Ottoman Christian soldiers in his jurisdiction.

On May 13 Halil abandoned Iran, his army reduced to half its original size. The defeat at Dilman and the subsequent Ottoman retreat coincided with ongoing attacks against Assyrians and Armenians throughout Turkey’s Van province. Halil and his fellow occupation functionaries took indiscriminate retribution on Ottoman subjects of Christian faith. A Venezuelan mercenary in Ottoman service observed that Halil did “as he pleased in wreaking his own vengeance on the Christians for the moral and material aid they had lent the Russians during the Battle of Dilman.”

For many months small-scale Turkish and Kurdish assaults on tribal Assyrians were frequent in Hakkari, and more or less forced the Assyrians to prepare for full war and see Russia as their only realistic ally. Already established Assyrian-Russian contacts intensified throughout early 1915 with promises of cooperation. When the Russians followed up their victory in Iran, the Ottoman forces gradually retreated back into home territory. One of the first contingents to reach in home territory was Jevdet’s force, which was in disgrace because of the atrocities it perpetrated inside Iran. While his forces regrouped, Jevdet went to Van to solicit support for a
general massacre of all Christians in his province. His approach was affected
by his recent insight that troops could be taught to exterminate noncombat-
ants. Rumor spread that Jevdet had nicknamed his guard the “butcher bat-
talion” and that he had bragged: “We made a clean sweep with the Armenians
and Assyrians in Azerbaijan. We must do the same with the Armenians of
Van.”\textsuperscript{62} A Chaldean bishop heard Jevdet utter: “I have cleansed the Chris-
tians from the country of Bashkale and Saray. I would like to cleanse them
from Van and its surroundings.”\textsuperscript{63}

On April 20, 1915, Jevdet’s artillery began bombarding the Armenian sec-
tions of the Van, announcing that they were combating an “Armenian revolt.” On April 23, other units of the Ottoman army reported that a “Nesto-
rian revolt” had also started.\textsuperscript{64} Information about the destruction of Chris-
tian communities spread quickly. Vvedenskii reported: “In Gawar and
Bashkale almost all of the male Christian population was massacred. The
Christian villages are being burnt and destroyed.”\textsuperscript{65} Based on testimony
from refugees streaming over the border, the Russians learned “the entire
male Christian population of Gawar and Bashkale had been massacred.”\textsuperscript{66} A
missionary also heard of methodical massacres: “The many hundreds (and
perhaps some thousands) of Armenians and Syrians in the region of Bash-
kale have been massacred . . . In the mountains Mar Shimun is said to have
gathered the independent tribes about him, and they are battling for their
lives against great odds.”\textsuperscript{67}

The German consul in Mosul broke the news that the “Christian popula-
tion of Van province since several days finds itself in uproar . . . Nestorian
tribes of Tiyyari in the district of Bashkale rose at the same time. 2,000 well-
armed Tiyyari attacked Moslem villages and fortified themselves north of
Julamerk.”\textsuperscript{68} Halil directed his army to Gawar and Bashkale where he per-
ceived the “situation seems to have worsened.”\textsuperscript{69} Units of the Russian army
followed hot on their heels and called on the Assyrians to halt Halil’s retreat.
They mobilized against Halil’s retreating troops, but the promised Russian
military aid never arrived. Instead the Kurdish tribes were given free hands
to deal with the Nestorians as they saw fit.

On May 18, the German consul in Mosul, relayed to the German em-
bassy Assyrians’ fears that the Muslims intended to perpetrate a general
massacre of all Christians. “Mar Shimun in Kochanes informs me that the
anti-Christian movement in Amadia district [in southernmost Hakkari] is
growing daily. Moslems there plan a general massacre of Christians and
have partially already begun. Today the Chaldean Patriarch here delivered a
similar message.” Mosul’s vali also admitted that a general massacre was
under preparation.\textsuperscript{70}

On May 25 Halil’s last units departed from Urmia. Soldiers retreating
from Iran and Van intended to regroup near Hakkari after defeat in Iran and
at Van. The remainder of Halil’s expeditionary force tried to follow the road along the Zab River valley, and Jevdet met up with Halil near the Iranian frontier. Here Kazim Bey had already set up headquarters with a gendarmerie division and some Kurdish volunteers. As the Turks pulled out of Bashkale a new massacre of noncombatants took place. A group of “three hundred to four hundred Armenian women and children, and some fifteen artisans, likewise Armenians,” were slaughtered in nearby caves with the collusion of the civil authorities. In early June, in the face of massive hostile presence, the Turkish troops once again retreated westward. General Halil’s decimated expeditionary force struggled on to reach the town of Sa’irt. There he orchestrated a bloody massacre of Armenians and Assyrians.

The central government set a plan in motion for the complete ethnic cleansing of the Assyrian enclave in Hakkari. Enver and Tâlât coordinated their preparations in this joint effort. Responsibility for leading the operation fell on the vali of Mosul. In order to make the expedition fully legal, the districts of Julamerk, Gawar, and Shemdinan were temporarily transferred to the jurisdiction of Mosul province. Fresh troops marched up from Mosul and local Kurdish tribes planned an invasion from three sides. The Ottomans had engaged the services of local Kurdish tribes and gave them specific targets. From the west, the emir of Upper Berwar marched against Ashita, the Lizan valley, and Lower Tiyyari. Said Agha from the village of Chal marched against another valley in Lower Tiyyari. Ismael Agha marched against Chamba in Upper Tiyyari. From the east, Suto Agha of Oramar attacked the Jilu, Dez, and Baz tribes.

The encirclement operation started on June 11. The large villages in the lower valleys were lost immediately, and most of the Assyrians fled to higher ground. Although the Assyrian defense was strong and the Kurds suffered great losses, many houses were burned and sacked. Even when the Assyrians won, it proved often a costly victory, weakening their already limited capabilities and draining their resources. After a few weeks the Assyrians were almost completely surrounded in the mountain peaks.

The Jilu tribe was badly beaten in the first stage of the campaign and retreated to Iran. Suto Agha of Oramar together with other Kurdish tribes attacked their main settlement of Zirne. The Assyrians lost seventy warriors in a single battle. Suto continued to attack and destroy the other villages, and the losses were enormous. Many Assyrians had only their traditional flintlock weapons, while the aggressors had modern rifles, machine guns, and artillery. Jilu’s main church, Mar Zaya, from the fourth century, was destroyed together with priceless contents including antique Chinese vases dating from the time of the great Nestorian missions.

Around June 20, the Turkish government played a trump card. It had captured Mar Shimun’s brother Hormuz, a student in Istanbul, and Tâlât
ordered the use of this hostage as a pawn. Mar Shimun soon received a letter from the commander of the Ottoman forces: “May I inform you, that your brother, Hormuz finds himself in captivity in Mosul. If you and all your tribes do not capitulate, your brother will be murdered.” Mar Shimun is said to have replied “My people are my sons, and they are many, Hormidz my brother is but one. Let him therefore give his life for the nation.” News of his death came toward the end of July.

By late June the Assyrians’ plight was truly distressing, as they were completely cut off by Ottoman troops. On July 12 a Russian diplomat received a message from Mar Shimun that “There are many wounded and killed, ammunition is running out and the situation is critical. He asks for 3,000 soldiers with artillery in order to prevent the combination of Turkish troops with Persian Kurds. If not, they will [all] be murdered.” The Russians were never able to send supplies, and the Assyrians retreated higher and higher up into their mountains, where there was neither shelter nor food. In the end they had no other alternative than to leave Hakkari and seek refuge in Russian-held territory.

The Chaldean bishop of Van inventoried the casualties of the Catholic Assyrians:

sixty Assyro-Chaldean villages in the vicinity of Van that had been subjected to atrocities. The village of Kharachique, composed of 37 families, lost 103 persons. Khinno, 32 families, lost 51 persons. Ermans, 22 families, of which half were massacred. Sele, 50 families, Kharafsonrique, 20 families were completely annihilated. Akhadja and Rachan, 30 families, there are no more than 2 males and the females escaped, etc., etc. In the district of Gawar, likewise in the province of Van, the Assyro-Chaldeans made up some twenty villages where nearly everyone has been massacred, except the women and the small children.

Paul Shimmon, a spokesman for the Nestorian patriarchy, summed up the Nestorian experience in an article published in the Armenian journal Ararat. He retold the story of the ethnic cleansing of Hakkari:

For forty days the people defended themselves against superior forces, and that only with flintlocks and antiquated rifles. At last, unable to withstand the onslaught of modern artillery, with which the Turks also bombarded the Church of Mar Sawa, the people withdrew to the interior of the mountains with the Patriarch’s family in their center; and here they subsisted on herbs and some sheep they had taken with them, while many were daily dying of starvation. Mar Shimun came to Salmas—I had an interview with him there, and he has sent me to speak for him and his—to effect the escape of his people, or at least of as many of them as could be saved. All this happened in the latter part of September, when . . . some 25,000 had already arrived, and with them Mar Shimun, himself as destitute as the rest, while 10,000 more
were to follow. The condition of the remnant, for in all there are over 100,000, is very precarious, but let us hope not hopeless.  

If there were 35,000 survivors then we can estimate the loss of population to be about two-thirds.

This chapter compares the similar fates of the Assyrian and Armenian Christians at the hands of the Ottomans during World War I. They were targeted for eradication and ethnic cleansing for some of the same reasons—suspected disloyalty and collaboration with the enemy. Even the weakest sign of self-defense met with disproportionate violence. Both groups were pushed out of their home territories at the same time in 1914 and 1915. They were subjected to indiscriminate mass violence orchestrated by high Ottoman officials, backed up by neighboring tribesmen.

In Iranian Azerbaijan, years of pro-Turkish and pro-Russian propaganda had played on latent religious animosity causing interfaith relations to degenerate into a climate of fear and hostility. Given the lack of protection granted them by the government in Istanbul, the Armenians and Assyrians sided, almost by default, with the Russians. Whether the pull of Russian support or the push of Ottoman suspicion was the greater factor is impossible to discern. At the same time Muslims were attracted to the Ottoman cause and some Muslim Persian subjects welcomed occupation and probable annexation.

The expulsion of the Assyrians from Hakkari took the form of genocide under the guise of counterinsurgency. Mass killing of women, children, and noncombatants proceeded, while the army and volunteers destroyed rural villages. It was not a “deportation,” but rather a forced expulsion against an unwilling population. The Ottoman army was not content with merely defeating the Assyrian warriors. The order from central government was to drive them out and make sure that they would never return.
This chapter examines the proximate causes of the Armenian genocide. It contends that there was no a priori blueprint for genocide, but rather that it emerged from a series of more limited regional measures in a process of cumulative policy radicalization. Until late May 1915, anti-Armenian actions were often enacted reactively and, in the eyes of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), preemptively, as well as pro-actively. This does not mean that Ottoman actions were objectively rational in their intent or extent—the Ottoman-Armenian dynamic was a hugely unequal one, the disparity of power vast, and CUP perception was heavily colored by chauvinism. Nor does it mean that Ottoman actions were any less vicious. The extreme nature of CUP policies can be traced to perpetrators acting on ideological precepts and pushing for ever-more indiscriminate measures. Nevertheless, it is only in the early summer of 1915 that we can speak of a crystallized policy of empirewide killing and death-by-attrition. Among other things, this chapter is a plea for the normalization of the study of state-sponsored mass murder, for a recognition that it emerges, like many other governmental policies across a spectrum of regimes, often piecemeal, informed by ideology but according to shifts of circumstance.

Many of the themes involved in the deterioration of Ottoman-Armenian relations converged in the “eastern crisis” of 1875–1878, which in turn sheds light on the wider context of the decline of the Ottoman Empire. The massive territorial losses of this period, combined with the influx into Anatolia of millions of Muslim refugees (muhacirs) from the Balkans and the Caucasus, whose numbers added to the massed ranks of Circassians fleeing tsarist brutality over previous decades, greatly shifted the demographic of the empire toward a Muslim majority. It also introduced elements with often strongly anti-Christian feelings that would compete with indigenous
Christians for land resources. Their presence and actions increased the Armenians’ insecurity of life and property, and stimulated Armenian protests to Istanbul for reforms and Armenian appeals to external powers for support. The 1878 Treaty of Berlin, which settled the “eastern crisis,” saw the “internationalization” of the Armenian question.

The battle between Britain and Russia for influence over the reform issue during and after 1878 fueled increasingly strident Armenian nationalist demands and Ottoman suspicions of Armenian disloyalty at a time when the interreligious inclusiveness of the earlier Tanzimat reforms was being reversed. The Armenian nationalist political parties—foremost the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF; Dashnaktsutiun) and the Hnchaks—were formed in the 1880s, and, in light of the failure to secure enforceable reforms, they led the movement to recapture the attention of the powers, sometimes by ostentatious, terrorist methods. The massacres of 80,000–100,000 Armenians in the mid-1890s can be seen as a blow against a non-Muslim minority with perceived separatist aspirations in the context of an attempt by the sultan, Abdülhamid II, to mold the Muslims of the empire into a more coherent political unit within the hostile international system—the aim of “pan-Islamism.”

In the following CUP era, the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913 were as significant in their own way as the eastern crisis had been. The wars and their associated ethnic violence, with Muslims again the primary victims, accelerated the influx of refugees into Anatolia as Macedonia was torn away, and killed any vestige of interest in interreligious pluralism for the CUP leaders. As the conflicts cast Muslim-Christian relations into sharp relief, with widespread Christian draft evasion and Ottoman Bulgarian and Greek soldiers swapping sides to fight alongside their ethnic brethren, deportations of small groups of Christians from the vicinity of military communications routes were sanctioned. The end of the wars also saw the introduction of a new Armenian reform plan under Russian pressure, infuriating Istanbul.

The internationalization of the Armenian question is the central reason that the state-Armenian dynamic deteriorated as it did within the larger matrix of demographic change and territorial diminution of the late Ottoman Empire. Other things remaining equal, Ottoman policy from the time of the reform plan, taken to its logical conclusion, would at some point probably have required the marginalization of the Armenian national community of eastern Anatolia at least, to tackle the increasingly “anomalous” Christian population itself, to remove the excuse for European encroachments, and secure the land for Muslims. This did not necessarily mean killing, but it would likely have entailed policies of cultural and linguistic “Turkification” such as those initiated from 1910, and probably furtherance
of the sort of dilution-by-muhacir-settlement that had already occurred. But war changed circumstances and possibilities.

The Armenian fate was unusual even among the Ottoman peoples during World War I, though it cannot be properly comprehended outside of that broader framework. Albanian, Bosnian and Georgian Muslims, Kurds, “Gypsies,” and some Arab and Jewish groups were also moved around the empire in and around the war period for purposes of assimilation and in some cases, punishment, though none were so comprehensively dislocated as the Armenians, and none subject to the same near-total murder. Insofar as we can tell from the available documentation, the Armenian genocide was also somewhat more systematic and thorough than the CUP’s attacks on the Assyrians/Syriacs (Sûryani and Asuri), extensive and genocidal though these certainly were. In collective terms state intent was more explicitly murderous in the Armenian case, than in either the postwar purge of people of the Greek Orthodox religion from Anatolia and the reciprocal purge of Muslims from Greek territory, or the prolonged Kemalist assault on the Kurds. Though these episodes are testament to the gathering strength of ethnic nationalism in the region, and were marked by terrible violence, in the Greek case, intermigration was the ultimate end; in the Kurdish case, assimilation. Explaining the scale and singularly murderous nature of the Armenian deportations is therefore as important as explaining the deportations themselves.

Without subscribing to any determinism about the development of the genocide, it is clear that, as a result of its own recent experiences, the Ottoman empire entered the world war with an ethos of population politics that was already more radical than those of the other major warring parties. Even the apparatus that would conduct the Armenian genocide was in place before the war, though it had not yet been assigned to that particular task. The titles of the two governmental bodies most closely involved in the ordering and administration of the major Armenian deportations during World War I reflect the Ottoman obsession by 1914 with ethnicity and “ethnic security.” Both were in the Interior Ministry. One was the Directorate for the Settlement of Tribes and Immigrants, established in 1913 to marshal the settlement of Balkan muhacirs. The other was the Directorate for General Security.

For the Ottoman Empire, more obviously than for all the other warring great powers, entry into a continental war was an existential matter. Fighting Russia, the “hereditary enemy,” was one thing; fighting France and Britain, successively the most important supporters of the empire prior to the advent of imperial Germany, was quite another. The Ottoman entry into war bespeaks a do-or-die effort on one hand to eradicate external influences in the empire, including the 1913–1914 Armenian reform plan, the European-run
Ottoman Public Debt Administration, and extraterritorial privileges (the “capitulations”), and on the other hand to reinvigorate the empire by reexpansion to the pre-1878 boundaries. Defeat would certainly bring division of the remaining empire, the end of the Ottoman polity. Thus the scope for further radicalization of population policy was great, especially as this concerned populations who, it was suspected, desired Entente victory.

Nevertheless, whatever ideas of ethnic “homogenization” were present in 1914 did not translate smoothly into action. Despite threats, increasing violence against the Armenians in eastern Anatolia, including sporadic boycotts, and the deterioration of CUP-Armenian relations from 1909, there is no evidence that a policy to physically destroy the community was forged prior to World War I, not least because the deportations only began after seven months of war. International factors, the interaction between Russia and Armenian nationalists particularly, continued to play a role until well into World War I in radicalizing CUP policy. Continuities in this interaction were evident from the prewar period, but there were also factors specific to the war, and to the new long- and short-term strategic goals of the combatant forces in and around Ottoman territory.

Extant notions of reordering society crystallized as the CUP saw their wartime plans fall apart and felt their territory to be under threat both from outside and within, as the stereotype of Armenians as proxies of the great powers in peacetime was extended into a stereotype of military collaboration during warfare. The sheer brutality of the method used to combat this putative threat was conditioned by generations of discrimination against the Armenians.

August 1914, the month of the secret CUP military pact with Germany, was marked by the beginning of ruthless war requisitioning, in which the Ottoman Christian communities were disproportionately targeted, in an indirect continuation of practices of expropriation developed over recent years. Killing on a large scale by Ottoman forces only developed sporadically in the provinces bordering Russia and Persia from November 1914, however, with men initially the prime target. In general terms, genocide developed out of an Ottoman policy of “ethnic reprisal”—meaning deliberately collective “punitive” measures in the tradition of much counterinsurgency warfare—informed by experience and knowledge of links between Armenian nationalists and Entente sponsors, but more generally by ethnic stereotypes of Armenian disloyalty and support of Allied war aims. Anti-Armenian policy intensified with every Entente military advance or success. This was the pattern following initial small-scale Russian incursions into Ottoman territory in November, the famous Ottoman defeat at the turn of 1914–1915 at the battle of Sankamış in the Caucasus, the initial Anglo-French assaults on the outer forts of the Dardanelles in March 1915, the
near simultaneous Russian successes in Persia, the Gallipoli landings immediately prior to Apr. 24, 1915 (the day commemorated as the beginning of the genocide),

Ottoman setbacks in Persia throughout this period, and, finally, the Russian advance into the eastern Anatolian interior throughout May and June.

The broader immediate context was a war in the region that was cast partly along ethnic lines, with each major combatant trying to stimulate anti-imperial insurgency on ethnic-nationalist grounds in their opponents’ territory. Jihad, holy war, was announced by the Ottoman government with German encouragement to arouse the Muslim subjects of Britain and Russia, yet this was conceptually comparable, for instance, to British sponsorship of the Arab revolt or German appeals to Ukrainian or Georgian nationalists. Russia, too, instrumentalized some Armenians (as well as some Kurds and Assyrian Christians) in Ottoman territory and the adjacent border areas. In September 1914 Armenian volunteer battalions were formed to fight alongside the Russian army. These were composed of men from the territories taken by Russia in 1878, or who had fled to the Caucasus more recently from Turkish rule. Similar forces were set up on the Persian border. They could provide intelligence and advice on the terrain and, as has been ignored in the literature, provoke their Ottoman Armenian brethren to take up arms.

The Russian sponsoring of Armenian insurgency bore only limited results, and certainly did not stimulate the “civil war” often invoked in Turkish nationalist literature. Such eruptions as did occur in the interior were mostly comparatively minor. The most discernible phenomenon would have been the desertions. Nevertheless, the Ottoman leadership was aware of the Russian-Armenian links from the beginning. As to desertion, the difference in CUP eyes between Armenian desertion and that of Muslims, which was also widespread, was its perceived purpose. Interior Minister Tâlât later claimed the “plan” was as follows: “if war is declared Armenian soldiers will take shelter on the enemy side with their arms. If the Ottoman army advances [they will] remain inactive, if the Ottoman army retreats, [they will] form armed bands and hinder transport and communications.”

The jihad was largely unsuccessful too. Ottoman and German agitation did bear a little fruit in parts of Azerbaijan and other locations in the Caucasus around the turn of 1914–1915, where advancing Ottoman forces were joined by several thousand Muslims. The Russian response included expelling suspect Muslim communities over the Ottoman border and doubtless also massacre. This further exacerbated the ethnic situation inside the Ottoman Empire. From at least early April, for example, the Muslim refugees from Russian reprisals were settled in Armenian dwellings in the Muş
district of Bitlis, mirroring a pattern of tit-for-tat expulsions that had occurred in November 1914 on the Persian-Ottoman border.

For their part, the weight and viciousness of Ottoman responses to incidents sparked internally or by the approach of Russian forces with Armenian volunteer units can be inferred from official references to the dispatch of irregular paramilitary “militia and tribal forces” or “punishment units.” Ottoman forces had no compunction about rationalizing the severest methods to “completely crush” any incidents lest they assume more than “merely regional proportions,” including taking “rigorous measures against the families of deserters and traitors” and punishing “severely peasants who support these outlaws.” By one estimate, some twenty-seven thousand Armenians in and beyond Ottoman territory were murdered in this phase of the war between November 1914 and April 1915. Assyrians were murdered on a similar scale in the Ottoman-Persian border areas. (There is also evidence of atrocities committed in some Russian-occupied parts of eastern Anatolia. These were on a smaller scale than Ottoman anti-Christian murders, but it is safe to say that Russian use of irregulars invited fracture of the laws of war. Armenians, however, formed only a portion of the irregulars operating in Russian service. Cossacks are also identified in some of the evidence as perpetrators, as are regular Russian soldiers. This “ethnic reprisal” policy formed the background of the most contested episode in the development of the Armenian genocide, the large-scale Armenian uprising from mid-April in a quarter of the eastern Anatolian city of Van, an episode concluded successfully in mid-May with the retreat of the Ottoman besiegers in the face of a Russian advance, but at the price of many Muslim as well as Armenian lives.

At the end of March the governor of Van province, Cevdet, accompanied by several thousand soldiers and Kurdish and Circassian irregulars, returned from unsuccessful campaigning over the border in Persia. On April 17, he responded to a minor occurrence in the Shatakh district of the province by dispatching his forces to annihilate the Armenians there, but the ill-disciplined irregular soldiers opted instead to attack closer Armenian settlements, and the ensuing chain of massacres drove the Van Armenians to resist. Cevdet was attempting to isolate the city from the outlying districts of the province, and crush any sign of trouble with extreme and indiscriminate violence. Thus to ascribe the hatching of a bigger plan to either side is wrong. This was neither the intended beginning of a general Armenian genocide, as some Armenian diaspora historians would have it, nor evidence of premeditated Armenian revolt in the interior, as Turkish nationalists would have it: in a terrible circularity, the Van Armenians, trying to maintain an escape route toward Persia, were driven to action by the same “ethnic reprisal” measures Cevdet used to crush the putative Armenian
threat at a local level. The simultaneous development of the Van rising and of the wider war would have even more extreme ramifications, as we shall see shortly.

Between Sarıkamış and the Van rising, Russian forces were insufficient to sustain a major thrust into Anatolia. In the interim the major threat to Anatolia affected the region’s northwestern coast: it was the beginning of the Anglo-French assault on the Dardanelles, designed to relieve pressure on the Russian Caucasus flank. The first major stage of the attack on the outer forts was from March 5–17. In Istanbul, preparations were made for a previously planned movement of the capital and its population to the interior of western Anatolia, by force if necessary. Parliam...
indicates that Armenian policy was still contingent on the course of the war, not fully pro-active or general across the empire. From the end of March, deportations of Armenians began from parts of Cilicia to the west, but they too were regionalized measures, attributable to a combination of the turbulent history of Ottoman-Armenian relations in the area and to the course of the war in the adjacent Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{40}

Unlike the deportations from April 24 onward, which were all directed toward the desert regions in the south, the first Cilician deportees—from Zeytun—were sent to a variety of destinations, including the barren salt lake area in heavily Turkish Konya, in western Anatolia.\textsuperscript{41} Their treatment on the way to and at their destinations varied, as in some places they were fed, in others not.\textsuperscript{42} The move to a general deportation, and alongside it the express murder of the deportees, required a further trigger. This was duly supplied in the further unfolding of events in eastern Anatolia relating to the Van episode and the Russian military advance.

On May 2 the military leadership requested of the Interior Ministry that Armenians in “rebellious” areas in Van be either forced over the Russian border or dispersed in Anatolia. In addition to addressing the problem of insurgency, it was argued, this would provide a form of revenge for the Russian treatment of Muslims during the war while vacating homes for those very refugees.\textsuperscript{43} Presumably fearing that expelling Armenians into Russian territory would simply swell enemy ranks, a week later the Interior Ministry issued internal deportation orders for Van and parts of Erzurum and Bitlis provinces in the face of the Russian military advance.\textsuperscript{44}

Meanwhile, on May 4, two hundred Erzurum Armenians were arrested\textsuperscript{45} as the Russian left flank crossed the border in a two-pronged assault, one side directed through the east of Erzurum province to the northwest of Lake Van, the other heading for Van city itself on the eastward side of the lake, both accompanied by Armenian volunteers.\textsuperscript{46} As the force approached Van, and Cevdet’s forces retreated with many of the Muslim women and children of the city,\textsuperscript{47} Armenians were evicted from the rural border region—the Pasin district and the wider plane of Erzurum—whereupon their villages were resettled with Muslims.\textsuperscript{48} The Armenians were initially moved westward, with many gathering around the city itself.\textsuperscript{49} Thereafter events proceeded at bewildering pace.

The Russian forces’ arrival at Van on May 18 (with Armenian volunteers as the advance guard) seemed to confirm every Ottoman suspicion. Certainly the Van Armenians looked to Russia for aid at this dire moment, and contacted the Persian Choi district and the Caucasus to try to secure it, as the Central Powers were well aware.\textsuperscript{50} The Russian army did come, slowly, while thousands of Armenians were dying in Van, but as an ad hoc measure, not because of a preconceived plan.\textsuperscript{51} Nevertheless, by disrupting the rear
and occupying Ottoman troops, the uprising was instrumental in the failure of the Persian part of War Minister Enver’s military campaign, as were the delaying actions of the Armenian volunteers fighting alongside Russian forces in Persia at the battle of Dilman at the end of April.\textsuperscript{52} Equally important, an indeterminate number of Muslims were massacred both before and after “liberation.”\textsuperscript{53} This added fuel to the ethnic fire, though the death-toll was nowhere near the scale of 150,000 claimed as one justification for the subsequent deportation program.\textsuperscript{54} And at the Russian arrival, an estimated 80,000 Muslim refugees fled to Bitlis on the other side of Lake Van.\textsuperscript{55} For his part, Cevdet moved southward and westward into Bitlis in the face of the Russian advance, massacring as he went.\textsuperscript{56} He was joined at the beginning of June by Enver’s uncle Halil (Kut), the vanquished commander at Dilman. Between them they succeeded in repelling the Russians, and notwithstanding the deportation orders for the province’s Armenians, continued with massive, indiscriminate murder on the spot among the Armenian and Assyrian population, though they were temporarily held up by knock-on Armenian resistance at Muş and Sasun.\textsuperscript{57}

During the conclusive days of the Van conflict—May 16–18—and as the inhabitants of Khnyss (Hınıs) on the Van-Erzurum border were massacred in the retreat from the other prong of the Russian invasion, the Interior Ministry instructed the governor of Erzurum to deport those Armenians thus far evicted southward from their homes to southern Mosul, Der Zor, and Urfa provinces.\textsuperscript{58} On May 23, as the Russians and some of the Armenian volunteers pushed on from Van toward Bitlis, this decision was extended throughout the provinces in closest proximity to Russian forces—Erzurum, Van, and Bitlis—as well as much of Cilicia and the coastal district of Aleppo.\textsuperscript{59}

On May 26, the Supreme Military Command contacted the Interior Ministry referring to an oral decision for the deportation of Armenians from all the eastern provinces, Zeytun, and other areas of high Armenian concentration, to the region south of the Diyarbakır vilayet, the Euphrates valley, Urfa, and Süleymaniye.\textsuperscript{60} In contrast to those Muslims encouraged into the empire in previous years, the deportees were not supposed to settle within 25 miles of railway lines. On the same day, Tâlât sought the enactment of legislation legitimating deportations. Pursuant to these two communiqués a provisional law was promulgated on 27 May, permitting the military authorities to order deportations in the interests of “security” and “military necessity.”\textsuperscript{61}

The very nature of the deportations that followed is sufficient evidence of genocidal intent. Where the earlier anti-Armenian measures did not distinguish innocent individuals from “guilty” ones, the new measures did not differentiate between communities with revolutionary traditions or the
great majority without, nor, increasingly, between border regions and the
interior. In light of the Russian advance and the events at Van, the distinc-
tion between innocent and guilty Armenians was rendered meaningless
both ideologically and practically in CUP eyes. Now, even if only a minority
of Armenians were active enemies, in the CUP calculus all stood to benefit
from the situation that some of their number had brought about. That, and
the feared prospect of Armenians joining with Entente forces, could be fore-
stalled if the Armenian population was physically removed once and for all.
This would leave Muslims in sole occupation of the land and would render
redundant any Russian claim to a protectorate. And even if (as some offi-
cials could discern) the Van Armenians had only risen in self-defense, they
still represented an obstacle to the prosecution of the war in the short term,
and an ethnically defined challenge to Turkish authority in Anatolia in the
long term.

Unlike the first Cilician deportees, the Armenians were now not to be
sent to places were settlement was possible, if difficult; they were sent, de-
fenseless and without provision or means of subsistence, to desert regions
where natural attrition could take its deadly toll. That was not all. Murder,
rape, mutilation, kidnapping, and theft accompanied the deportations from
the beginning of June as irregulars, Kurds and other Muslim tribesmen,
alongside some units of the army, descended on the deportees at strategic
points. Thus the pattern of “ethnic reprisal” massacre as practiced for
months in the eastern border regions was fused with the practice of ethnic
cleansing by deportation, providing the constituent elements of genocide.
 Barely 20 percent of the deportees from this phase of the deportation pro-
gram would reach their desert destinations. The twin track of measures—
deportation and accompanying massive killing—was repeated throughout
the expulsions from eastern Anatolia, though not in the western provinces,
where the deportees passed relatively unmolested to the deserts, where
most would later die or be killed.

By late May, after a series of stages of radicalizations in Ottoman policy,
the move to a decision for general deportation was probably not a question
of shedding any vestige of moral restraint. On top of all the prewar Otto-
mans-Armenian tensions, the established view of Russian-Armenian mili-
tary collaboration, elements of vengeance for the events of the war since late
1914, the fall of Van, and attacks on Muslims by Russian forces, the May
developments in CUP policy were probably more a matter of logistics, of
concern for the state’s image, and even perhaps of imagination, in terms of
finally seizing the moment to “solve the Armenian question.” At the same
time we should not, conversely, imagine that as soon as the CUP leaders
opted for general measures they decided that each and every Armenian
should die. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, the death of every single
Armenian was not crucial for the aim of destroying the Armenian national presence in Anatolia and Cilicia. Given the small pockets of Armenians remaining across the empire after the war, and given the practice of allowing some converted Armenians to remain in situ, there was clearly space in the policy to allow for a few isolated and therefore irrelevant survivors.

Second, it is unlikely that the CUP leaders instantly developed a precise template of how their inherently murderous scheme would unfold across the empire. A discrete decision for total murder is the product of the ex post facto ruminations of genocide scholars. Logistical decisions still remained to be made in the following months concerning the pattern and schedule of subsequent deportations, as perhaps did lesser decisions in principle about the precise scope of the measures in the west. The provisional nature of the establishment of the desert concentration camps in the south for those Armenians that survived the deportations suggests the ongoing, rather improvised nature of the whole destruction process, as do the differences in the immediate treatment of deportation caravans from different places.64

If we are, nevertheless, to seek a turning point at which it becomes possible to speak of an accepted practice of general destruction of the major Armenian communities of Anatolia—of which outright, mass murder was an integral part—that was maintained and extended until over a million Armenians were dead, we might consider the prisoners incarcerated in Constantinople on April 24–26, and deported to Ankara. With very few exceptions they were murdered, but only in mid-June.65 By that time, Cevdet was turning Bitlis into a charnel house and the slaughter of the Erzurum Armenians was fully underway.66 The latter was given euphemistic sanction on June 14 by Talâ’t’s authorization of the killing of resisters and escapees in the deportation columns, and was pursuant to the logic he outlined three days later to a member of the German embassy staff.67 On June 17 Talâ’t averred the Porte’s intention to use the cover of war to finish for good with its “inner enemies,” thereby avoiding the problems of external diplomatic interference.68 Shortly before, on June 9, the Ministry of the Interior had directed the governor of Erzurum to auction off the property of the deported Armenians of the province: they were clearly not expected to return.69

The scope of deportations was continually expanded within Anatolia until the end of the summer. After a brief hiatus following the specific deportation orders of late May, the expulsions spread westward and southward in quick succession in June and July, through the Sivas province and the adjacent district of Shabin-Karahissar (Şebinkarahisar) (where five thousand Armenians, men, women, and children rose up and took to the hills in mid-June after local massacres of Armenians), the provinces of Harput (Kharbert, Kharput) and Trebizond (Trabzon), and into Thrace in the autumn. At the beginning of July, as the deportations expanded in
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scope, so did the reception areas for the deportees. They now incorporated
the provinces of modern-day Syria, with the stipulation that the Armenians
should not exceed 10 percent of the overall local population. This measure
was designed to prevent the establishment of any critical mass of Arme-
nians, facilitating assimilation and/or simple marginalization, and reflects
the CUP’s ongoing paranoia about concentrated Armenian populations. It has been suggested that the further rounds of massacres of deportees
barely surviving in the desert concentration centers over the first half of
1916 was due to Armenian numbers exceeding this 10 percent figure. Though much more work needs to be done in the area, the theory has some
substantiation since the greatest massacres occurred in the camps in the
vicinity of Der Zor, which was precisely the area that caused the most con-
cern over its concentration of Armenians. Additionally, the self-inflicted
problem (indeed threat) of epidemic disease rife in these camps probably
furnished both an excuse and an incentive to murder the Armenians out-
right, as it would at times in the genocide of both Jews and Romanies
during the Second World War.

Estimates of the number murdered in these camps by Circassians,
Chechens, and Arabs run as high as 150,000. This constitutes the majority
of the 200,000 Raymond Kévorkian suggests were murdered outright at this
stage of the genocide. The remainder of that total were killed at the other
two points of the Der Zor—Ras ul-Ain—Mosul triangle, well into the inte-
rior, with the projected fifteen thousand victims at Mosul killed under none
other than Halil. Given that these camps could never be self-sustaining
entities, and that the government was utterly uninterested in adequate pro-
vision for the largely elderly, juvenile and female inhabitants, massacre was
a logical method of expediting the inevitable process of death-by-attribution. In
the larger number of concentration centers nearer the Mediterranean coast,
the huge death-tolls were for the most part the result of starvation and
disease alone. The CUP rationalized its policy of obstructing German and
American missionary assistance to the destitute remnant by arguing that
the “inner resistance” of the Armenians against the Ottoman government
could only be broken when they realized that they could not expect any help
from foreign states.

The somewhat improvised and sometimes reactive nature of the destruc-
tion process as it developed in no way detracts from the overall intent man-
ifest in the conduct of the measures when they were underway. Though the
breadth of participation in the destruction and the function it served for the
empire means that the Armenian genocide was ultimately a state project, its
implementation was closely policed by the CUP. When general deportation
had become policy it was rigidly enforced from the power centre, with pro-
vincial governors shadowed by watchful “responsible secretaries” of the
CUP to ensure appropriate execution of their instructions. Reluctant officials were replaced by more enthusiastic ones, and sometimes even killed.

The deportation orders themselves contain no explicit sanction of mass murder. Doubtless the CUP leaders did not want to leave incriminating documentary evidence, nor did they wish to risk potential opposition from anyone in the larger governing structure, including some cabinet ministers who were kept in the dark. Yet testimony from various executors of the genocide at the postwar trials conducted under the auspices of the new Turkish government exposes the deliberate use of euphemism and camouflage in the instructions for “care” of the deportees. It reveals that the onus was on outright killing, and there existed oral and secret telegraph orders from Istanbul and local CUP functionaries to this effect, though regional differences in the death-tolls exacted from the deportation convoys suggests that there was not complete uniformity in this “second track” of orders.

The fact that much of the killing was done by irregulars may have meant that the power center lost a certain amount of control over the process, but that does not reduce its responsibility. The deployment of irregulars for “dirty work” was an established Ottoman tradition. While elements of the regular army clearly played a role in the Armenian genocide, it had rarely been used to exterminate entire communities. Irregular specialists were an integral part of the state’s arsenal and their actions had traditionally had the acceptance and tacit compliance of the Ottoman authorities and provided plausible deniability. Furthermore, there was a structure to the process at the macro-level that does not necessarily come through if we look only at the bedlam of the experience of the attacks on the deportation convoys or the massacres in situ in Bitlis, Van, and Diyarbakır. As the scholar of Yugoslavia Cornelia Sorabji has written of the murderous breakup of that polity, whatever arbitrary horrors individuals could invent in the process, they were only enabled to do so within an ordered context.

As has been made clear, at certain stages in the development of CUP policy, the actions of Armenian nationalists provided catalysts. Yet whatever may be said of the behavior of the volunteers and other activists, nowhere else during World War I was nationalist activism answered with total murder. That is the crux of the issue and must serve as a preface to any assessment of the issues at stake for Armenian leaders.

The distinction between acts of self-defense and acts of revolt was and remains blurred: who was to decide when and why to take up arms against the state, and how was the state to perceive the intentions of unlicensed arms-bearers in its midst? While to many Armenian nationalists and historians, the Van uprising was of the same desperate, heroic part as the famous “forty days of Musa Dagh” in autumn 1915—where a community fled
impending deportation to the hills on the Mediterranean coast south of Alexandretta and held off their assailants until their rescue by a French warship—and to the CUP they were simply two similar examples of treachery, the external observer might view them as different points on a continuum with pure voluntarism at one end and a desperate lack of choices at the other. The pure self-defense of Musa Dagh would be at the latter extreme, the Van uprising only slightly further down. The planned Zeytun rising would be still further down, perhaps at the midpoint, while still further down might be the behavior of the relatively small number of Ottoman Armenians who joined Russian ranks at the outset of the war.

If not all forms of resistance at the time were responses to genocide, all were based on experience, including experience of discrimination and massacre, and on aspirations for the future. That at the outset of World War I some Ottoman Armenians were prepared to throw their lot in with Russia is not surprising, given the dashing of their hopes for a more secure, egalitarian society with the false dawn of the 1908 CUP revolution. The great majority of Ottoman Armenians, however, remained terrified of what any “provocation” might bring. Ottoman documents on eastern Anatolia show that some Armenians were coerced into action, and also that Armenian communities condemned the reckless behavior of some of their number, and particularly that of their coreligionists in the Caucasus and Persia, who provided the driving force for action as they had traditionally done. Assuredly this was the established attitude of most ordinary eastern Anatolian peasants who feared reprisals out of long experience, and who went on, fully uninvolved, to form the bulk of the genocide’s victims. Elements in the leadership of every Armenian political party were partly culpable for not heeding voices of caution from within their communities, subordinating the interests of the Ottoman Armenian masses, ignoring their fears, and by default inveigling them in a nationalist scheme with which many did not identify. This was hardly a movement of national consensus, let alone participation. Ironically, the level of Armenian nationalist action in 1914–1915 was lower than it had been on the eve of the 1894–1896 massacres. Unfortunately for the passive Armenian majority, the actions of the few contributed to radicalizations of CUP policy.

The Armenian political leaderships were not simply dupes, acting on unrealistic hopes about Allied support for future autonomy. The first premier of the short-lived Caucasian Republic of Armenia, Hovhannes Katchaznuni, discerned that some nationalist leaders “implanted our desires into the minds of others . . . by overestimating our modest worth we were naturally exaggerating our hopes and expectations,” but not all Armenians were ready to believe Entente assurances. Appreciating at least some of the powers’ interests, both Boghos Nubar, who had been appointed by
the Catholicos of All Armenians to negotiate the prewar reform plan, and the Russian ARF spokesman Hagop Zavriev were aware in their own ways that Armenian claims had to be diplomatically “defended” against their potential sponsors. Yet Armenian representatives had precious few cards to play, and the biographer of the volunteer leader Andranik identifies the resulting dilemma: could the Armenians expect territorial favors in a peace settlement if they did not make some sacrifices? Nubar had also reflected in April 1915 that “every oppressed people needs to comply with certain duties in order to be worthy of liberation.” The promise of internal assistance to the Entente derived from the perceived need for Armenian leaders to contribute to overthrowing Turkey, to maximize the weight of their claims to territory. In a word, they tried to prove to the Entente by the provision of force that they were worthy nationalists in the Darwinian international system that the “Great Powers” had done so much to create.

The Armenian genocide was successful in its own terms, for the Armenians who remained could not hope to form a significant coherent national group and many were forcibly assimilated into Muslim society. Had CUP policy not developed into one of general murder and dislocation, it would still have boded ill for the Armenians given the trajectory of CUP ideology by the close of the Balkan Wars. This is why the element of state “security” should not be singled out above all others in the CUP move toward killing Armenians. “Security” only assumed its significance because of the CUP drive for ethnic homogeneity and national territorial integrity in the “heartlands” of the Ottoman empire, and political and economic independence for Muslims, and increasingly specifically Turkish Muslims, as a group. Armenians in Cilicia and eastern Anatolia were already seen as obstacles to each of these ends. And with Entente military advances and the very real Ottoman fears of their implications for the empire, the presence of an internal “alien” element was no longer just an obstacle, but an immediate threat. Talât’s shameless propagandizing about the “Armenian threat” thus made perfect sense in his terms, as did his claim that the deportations “were determined by national and historical necessity.”

The First World War brought everything to a head.

This interpretation in itself is not partisan; the question is to what use it is put. It does not excuse Hitler to say that his delusions about the Jewish world conspiracy were real enough to him, or that the association of Jewry with Bolshevik Russia was taken as self-evident. For the CUP the Van rising was a realization of a prophecy of Armenian treachery, but because of the repressive and often murderous nature of CUP policy up to that point, the prophecy became self-fulfilling. And any claim that the murder of the Armenians when it unfolded was not a genocide, simply because there is not unequivocal evidence of genocidal intent prior to the events of mass
deportation and massacre (events from which such intent can be legiti-
mately inferred), is as absurd as the suggestion that the Nazi “final solu-
tion” was not a genocide because it was not inscribed before the invasion of
Poland or the USSR that every Jew was to be murdered. Since the histori-
ography of the Shoah today is more mature and less politicized than that of
the Armenian genocide, the question does not have such political signifi-
cance, but it would be equally controversial for a scholar of the former as
one of the latter to pinpoint exactly when that genocide “began.”

Part of the interpretative problem is that “genocide” is more a legal term
than a historical one, designed for the ex post facto judgements of the court-
room rather than the historian’s attempt to understand events as they de-
velop, that is, out of nongenocidal or latently murderous situations. In this
sense, “genocide” is a classic example of the past examined teleologically—a
retrospective projection. As the epithet “genocide perpetrator” has become
the major stigma under international law, the politico-legal battle between,
crudely speaking, representatives of Turks and Armenians, has raged
around the applicability of the term, and specifically the key notion of intent.
It may be said categorically that the killing did constitute a genocide—every
aspect of the United Nations’ definition of the crime is applicable—but rec-
ognizing that fact should be a by-product of the historian’s work, not its
ultimate aim or underpinning.

In the historiography of the Armenian genocide the writing of recon-
structive history has too often been subordinated to ahistorical ends. Inter-
pretations have been artificially dichotomized into pre- and post-“decision”
periods. The confrontation at Van is a prime example of the confusion to
which such an approach can lead. Representatives of the official Turkish
nationalist viewpoint have tried to use those events to illustrate Armenian
treachery and thus “legitimate” subsequent CUP policy. On the other “side,”
while proving that Van was a result of Ottoman aggression, scholars have
argued that the Armenian rising must, therefore, have been a response to a
preconceived policy of genocide, or at least that it gave the perpetrators the
excuse they were looking for. The former interpretation cynically disre-
gards the whole history of CUP policy up to April 1915; the latter ignores the
complexities and contingencies of state policy-making in a period of pro-
longed wartime crisis. In reality, the Van episode contributed to the exacer-
bation of existing CUP policy and the unleashing of its most extreme
tendencies. This is probably insufficient for scholars who have been involved
in a long quasi-political battle to prove outright prior genocidal intent. Yet
Van is precisely illustrative of a process of cumulative radicalization toward
a policy of genocide.
The massacre of the Armenians, which was at the core of the Committee of Union and Progress’s “definitive solution” to the “Armenian question,” has been extensively, even exhaustively, studied in numerous works. The scholars Vahakn N. Dadrian, Taner Akçam, and Raymond Kévorkian in particular have analyzed in depth the details of the causes, organization, and execution of the massacres.¹ The actual deportation of the Armenians, however, remains relatively under-studied. So far, the subject has been approached from nearly opposite perspectives. According to most official researchers in Turkey, the deportations did not involve massacres but rather consisted of the mere removal and relocation of the Armenians to different sites in the empire.² However, a second group of researchers almost exclusively from outside of Turkey argue that the displacement of the Armenians was a pretext for mass murder and a tool with which the Unionist government carried out the genocide. In Dadrian’s words, it constituted an “economy in violence.”

Given these divergent interpretations, the deportation of the Armenians to the desert region of the south requires reexamination. As it stands, the Armenian deportation amounts to a death sentence for the deported and, therefore, the “definitive solution” to the Armenian question. There are three important factors that make the deportation into the desert region a deadly action. These are: (1) the fatal difference in climate, ecology, and topography between the regions of origin of the Armenians and the region of destination of the deportation; (2) the actualization of the deportations under conditions of war, accompanied by both spontaneous and organized attacks; and, most significantly, (3) the execution of the deportations by an empire that had spent the previous century experimenting with all kinds of population displacements, thereby accumulating vast knowledge and experience in the
process. This includes a comprehensive understanding of the devastating impact of deportation on the deported and especially of the ensuing epidemics in their midst. Specifically, members of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), who were mostly Balkan immigrants, not only knew about, but in some cases had also personally experienced, the severe effects of deportation.\(^1\) In addition, Tâlât Pasha, the leader of the CUP and the Interior Minister at the time who made the fateful decision to deport the Armenians, was certainly aware of the extremely harsh character of the region to which the Armenians were sent.

In the two sections that make up this article, I show, first that the decision to deport the Armenians was expressly lethal, after which I retrace the steps that the government took to organize the deportations. In many regions local conditions led to the emergence of practices during both the deportation as well as the resettlement that differed from the initial orders given from the center.\(^4\)

Once referred to as the Province of Desert/Desert Province (Çöl vilayeti) by Bab-ı Ali,\(^5\) Deir-ez-Zor (Der Zor; henceforth Zor), with its surface area of 78,000 square kilometers\(^6\) was the region to which most Armenians were relocated. Its population in 1907 was 66,294, meaning it was one of least densely populated regions in the empire.\(^7\) Zor lies at the center of a zone where precipitation levels do not exceed an annual average of 200 millimeters. In addition to extreme dryness, the wide variation of temperature in the region contributes to its terrible harshness. Winters in the area are exceptionally cold with temperatures frequently dropping below zero degrees centigrade. The scorching heat and the absence of water in the region cause animals to perish at very high rates and leave the land completely arid, with the exception of a few kilometers of rivers. Moreover, the absence of geographical variation and natural defenses renders the region particularly unstable.\(^8\)

The population of the region was (and still is) largely nomadic. Full and partly nomadic lifestyles helped the people survive harsh physical and climatic conditions. This is why the region counted only 139 villages, the smallest concentration of communes in the Ottoman Empire in 1917. In the subprefecture of Zor and Ashara, demographic growth between the 1910 and 1915 censuses was only 2 percent. As the governor of Zor pointed out, this meant an increase of only 398 people (from 18,265 to 18,663) over a five-year span\(^9\).

Climatic conditions and nomadic tribalism (al achariyyé) constituted the main obstacles for the establishment of Ottoman authority over the region. From the middle of the nineteenth century to the Balkan Wars, the primary concerns of the Ottoman state in Zor were to increase agricultural production and thereby its tax revenues, and to stop the aggression of the nomadic
Bedouin tribes on the settled areas. After the Balkan Wars, the question of where to settle the Balkan *muhacirs* (refugees) gave further impetus to the Ottomans’ efforts to establish authority in the region.

The Ottoman state regarded the nomadic lifestyle of the Bedouins as undesirable for three reasons. First, their mobility made them difficult to control, even during peaceful times. Second, the nomads repeatedly attacked sedentary communities, not only in the Zor region, but also in places as far as Urfa and the southern borders of Diyarbakır. Third, these attacks impeded the development of agriculture and therefore the flow of revenue into the Ottoman treasury. The Ottomans kept trying to find solutions to these related problems. In 1851–1852, even though “Zor was chosen to be the pivotal point in the Bedouin conflict,”\(^{10}\) the results were not satisfactory. The other solution was a demographic one: *muhacirs* from the Caucasus were settled in regions north of Zor in order to block Bedouin aggression. The cities of Resülayn and Nusaybin functioned as frontier posts dividing Anatolia and the Zor region, so that there was no urban development beyond this frontier. During the ensuing years, the government undertook construction of two new communes, Ebu-kemel and Tedmir, as a barrier to prevent further Bedouin attacks. At the time, the Ottoman administration noted that “The Zor *ıslahat* [reform] can only be realized with the establishment of two new outposts of defense in Ebu-Kemal and Tedmir.”\(^{11}\) The word *ıslahat* was employed in two different contexts here, to mean agricultural reform and “reforming the people.”

After 1870, the settlement of Tcherkess (Circassian/Çerkes) colonies in strategic zones allowed for agricultural improvements, extending such activity in an eastwardly direction.\(^{12}\) In 1891, the sultan ordered the settlement of the Kiki and Halican tribes in two towns, Resülayn and Harbo, which had previously been attacked by Bedouins.\(^{13}\) Throughout this period, the process of Ottomanization, otherwise called “reform,” was carried out without much success. After the 1908 revolution, however, the reform efforts in this region intensified. The extensive expulsions of the Muslims from the Balkans elevated the significance of the unoccupied area of Zor. Between 1908–1913, many reports, studies, and investigations were produced at irregular intervals about the Zor region on such topics as: were the lands capable of being farmed? How should the nomadic population be settled? Which agricultural techniques would help make barren lands cultivatable?

One of these reports, dated April 19, 1910, stated that the problems of the region stemmed from the nature of the population. Both the Bedouins’ nomadic way of life and what the Ottomans called their “savagery” were constant sources of annoyance to the authorities. According to this report, two methods were adopted in order to prevent the Bedouin attacks coming from the desert: first, increasing the number of army soldiers in the region
and second, providing the cavalry with a sufficient number of mules to improve mobility. With these military measures on the part of the government, the “savage tribes” would hopefully settle down and adapt to an agricultural lifestyle. Consequently, the Ottomans anticipated that the wealth of the region would increase, business would grow, and the revenues of the treasury would multiply.\footnote{A proposal by the Ministry Council dated April 25, 1910, focused on the agricultural development and population growth of the region. The proposal suggested two measures for accomplishing these goals: first, the construction of a road from Aleppo to Zor with a barrier of 800 meters along the Euphrates to prevent it from flooding, and, second, the construction of seven bridges in the region. Additionally, due to the high cost of these “construction” projects, the local government was enjoined to prompt local entrepreneurs to open arid lands for agricultural purposes. In return for cultivating the land, the government offered to assume the costs of maintaining publicly registered land.}

The flow of Muslim refugees into Anatolia during the Balkan Wars increased the interest of Bab-ı Ali (the Sublime Porte) in the “underutilized” region of Zor. The need to create “new spaces” to live within the borders of the empire was directly linked to this rapid explosion in the number of immigrants. Their numbers grew and steadily filled the vast Anatolian lands; at the same time, Christian Ottomans refused to accept them in their territories. As a result, the only possible region of relocation left in the empire for this Muslim immigrant population was Zor. Thus, the government developed a project to resettle large numbers of muhacirs and other Anatolian populations in the region. However, Lütfi Efendi, one of the experts on the region, refused to authorize the implementation of such a project, stating that “the region was not suitable for the installation of the muhacirs of Anatolia.”\footnote{In a report to Istanbul dated March 3, 1912, the former assistant of the governor of Zor stated that “only 20% of the administered territories can be cultivated and these lands are to be found along the Euphrates River.” He then went on to point out that the rest of the lands was completely useless.}

The report recommended the settlement of the two largest Bedouin tribes, the Anézé and Chamar, in this large underpopulated territory by assigning responsibility for these new mobile prefectures to their tribal chiefs. As the authorities found such a project difficult to implement, they instead chose to concentrate their troops in the region in order to protect the settled communities from Bedouin attacks. Yet, this measure alone could not have been expected to solve the problem. As was emphasized in the report of the governor’s ex-assistant, “Even if we covered the entire desert with soldiers, the attempt to control the Bedouin populations would not be
a total success.” Such an operation would certainly frighten the population “which has an extremely savage character” and this, in turn, would certainly “provoke a rebellion.” He therefore suggested increasing agricultural production through a more conventional measure, by creating the necessary infrastructure.

In undertaking such a project, he acknowledged that only the regions around the Tigre and the Habur that were half an hour from the Euphrates River were cultivatable; any place else beyond this distance was impossible. He therefore proposed to “construct irrigation canals along the deserts of Samiya and Cezaire, and along the Euphrates, Tigre and Habur Rivers. In this case, it would no longer be necessary to search for vacant lands in Anatolia. . . . and being that you had requested the possible settlement of muhacirs of Anatolia, even with the settlement of millions of them, there will still be a lot of land left.” The Ottoman official finished his report by stating that if the infrastructure was completed, the problem of underpopulation would be resolved.19

On July 6, 1914, during a parliamentary session dedicated to the question of the persecution of Ottoman Greeks, the deputy of Aydın, Emmanouil Emmanouilidis Efendi asked the Minister of Interior Tâlât Pasha the reason for the settlement of the muhacirs in Greek villages since this action had provoked the departure of many Greeks.20 He noted that “It was not necessary to choose the Greek villages to settle the muhacirs. If we need empty lands, there are many stretching from Üsküdar, all the way to the Gulf of Bassorah. It is not fair to bring the muhacirs into the Greek villages since it provokes unpleasant events. If the order to settle [the muhacirs in] these areas is not deliberate, then what is the true reason?”21 The response of Tâlât Pasha was very revealing. First, he explained that after having filled all the Muslim villages, they had to settle the muhacirs in the Greek villages. As for the regions stretching to Bassora:

Indeed, there are enormous parcels of land there, but in order to settle them the way Emmanouilidis Efendi has said, we first need 15–20 million pounds, something which we do not have. If we had sent them and dispersed the muhacirs [who were a total of 270 thousand], they would all be dead of hunger and Emmanouilidis Efendi would not be happy.22

Yet it was only ten months later, on April 24, 1915, that Tâlât Pasha would make the decision to deport the Armenians to exactly these regions where he knew they would “all be dead of hunger.” Such a decision, unprecedented in Ottoman history, signifies a collective punishment for the Armenian population: it was the transfer of an “incorrigible” people to a region that was “uncultivatable.” Hence, hundreds of thousands of people would be transferred to an underpopulated region dominated by the desert landscape.
Even though the Armenian deportations have often been regarded as a single event in terms of their organization and procedures, the Ottoman archives reveal that there were actually five different waves of deportations with disparate targets, destinations, durations and levels of violence. The first wave did not commence in April 1915, as is often asserted, but two months earlier: it was precisely the reaction of Armenian intellectuals in Istanbul to these deportations that led to their own violent removal two months later. Hence, the first wave of Armenian deportations was ordered in February 1915 and the direction of the deportation was to the heartland of Anatolia, not away from it.

Even though the CUP claimed that it had first experienced problems with the loyalty of its Armenian subjects on the eastern front, the first Armenian deportations were carried out in Syria, then under the authority and command of Cemal Pasha. After his first military defeat in the Egyptian Suez Canal operation, Cemal Pasha decided to change the ethnic composition of the region under his command in case of a future Allied advance. Hence, upon returning to his headquarters in Syria in February 1915, he analyzed the potential threat of the Armenians of Zeytun and Dörtyol. It was therefore Cemal Pasha who first proposed the deportation of the Armenians. And with the order of the Interior Ministry dated February 26, 1915, the deportation of the Armenians began “into the Anatolian Desert”—as it was described by a foreign reporter—in particular to “the Sultania district of Konya.”

As Tâlât Pasha noted in his memoirs, these deportations greatly disturbed the Armenian intellectuals of Istanbul, leading him to intervene and remove them as well, resulting in the second and better-known wave of Armenian deportations two months later.

On April 24, 1915, while Armenian intellectuals and politicians were being arrested in Istanbul, Tâlât Pasha ordered a change in destination for the Armenian convoys that had been expelled from Alexandretta, Dörtyol, Adana, Haçin, Zeytun, and Sis in the February deportations. The new objective of the Armenian deportees was not central Anatolia, but outside of Anatolia to the desert, toward the “south-east of Aleppo, to Zor and Urfa.” While the evacuation of the Cilicia region was taking place, some Muslim populations from the Russian Empire took refuge in Ottoman territories on the eastern front. On May 2, 1915, an Ottoman general proposed to expel the Ottoman Armenians in eastern Anatolia to the Russian lands and settle these new Muslim refugees in their place. However Istanbul did not accept this proposition because the Committee of Union and Progress was pursuing a different demographic policy vis-à-vis the Armenian population, which in turn led to a separate, third wave of deportations.
Instead of sending the Armenians to the Russian territories, the government commanded instead on May 9, 1915, that they be deported “towards the south.” This was a consequence of the CUP’s demographic policy toward the Armenians. If the Armenians were expelled to Russian territories, the Young Turk leaders conjectured, there was a possibility that they would return with the Russian army and resettle in this region, ending up constituting the majority in certain areas. This would establish permanent Armenian hegemony over Ottoman land. Also, since the Armenians were locals and therefore familiar with the topography, they might be conscripted and used by the Russian army against the Ottomans. In short, they presented a potential threat to the security of Anatolia. Due to these demographic, political, military, and strategic reasons, the Armenians were deported not to the Russian territories but instead to the south. The government then decided to evacuate all the Armenians from those areas “where the Armenian population [had been] compact”; namely, the south of Erzurum, the coast of the Van lake, the city center of Van, Bitlis, Sassun, and Talori.

Ultimately however this order was not executed. In those days all frontier areas were in a state of chaos and it would have been difficult to carry out such a command. It should also be noted that the Van resistance had begun on April 19, 1915, on the initiative of Armen Garo (Karekin Pastirmaciyan, the ex-deputy of Erzurum, 1908–1912). Indeed, it was after the loss of Van that the fourth wave of deportations commenced.

Four days after the loss of Van, Talat Pasha ordered the complete evacuation of the border areas as well as the region of Cilicia. There were to be two main zones of evacuation: the southern zone (comprising Erzurum, Van, and Bitlis) and the western zone (Adana, Antep, and Aleppo). Even though this order included all the border regions, the regions of Sivas, Ma’mures-tü-l-aziz and Diyarbakır had not yet been designated evacuation zones. The destinations of the deportees were assigned according to zone; deportees from the southern zone would be sent to Urfa, Zor and the south-west of Musul, and those from the western zone, the south of Syria and Aleppo.

In resettling the Armenians, the Ottoman army followed three principles very closely. The first, known as the “ten percent principle,” stated that the number of settled Armenians was never to exceed one-tenth of the “Muslim forces and tribes” living in the region. Second, the number of houses in a village constructed by the deportees could never exceed fifty. And third, the Armenian deportees were never allowed to change their places of settlement.

From the beginning of the Armenian deportation, the CUP leaders intended that Muslims and Turks would be resettled in the evacuated Armenian villages. While the military and security forces were in charge of cleaning out these villages, the Directorate of the Settlement of Tribes and Immigrants (IAMM) was in charge of filling them back up.
On May 26, 1915, Tâlât Pasha submitted the bill (tezkire) on resettlement to the Prime Ministry (Sadaret). On May 30, 1915, Meclis-i Vükela accepted the provisional law entitled “Temporary Law concerning precautions to be taken by the military side to counter those who oppose government actions during military campaigns.” Known as the “Deportation Law” (Tehcir Kanunu), it did not explicitly mention the “Armenians,” but it was clear that they were the implied target. The provisional law became effective on June 1, 1915, upon its publication in the official journal (Takvim-i Vekâyi), at which point the Ottoman Army was legally empowered to act.

The fifth and final stage of the deportations included all the remaining Armenians. June 21, 1915, marked a turning point for the Armenian plight as this was the date when Tâlât Pasha commanded the deportation of “all Armenians without exception” (istisnasız bütün Ermeniler) who lived in the ten provinces of the eastern region, including Trabzon, Diyarbakır, Canik, Sivas, and Ma’muretül-aziz. Henceforth, all Armenians—except the ones considered useful to the state—were to be deported to Musul, Urfa, and Zor. According to the new principles of settlement, the Armenian deportees were forbidden to open their own schools and all Armenian children had to attend state schools. They had to be dispersed in Muslim villages at a proportion of ten percent. If they could, they had to build their villages in places designated by the state; the villages could not comprise more than fifty houses and they had to be at least five hours away from one another. Hence, even though the state did not build a “concentration camp,” per se, it constructed a “region of concentration.”

The Armenians who were permitted to stay in Anatolia belonged to three categories of families and to some privileged geographical regions. These categories were the families of the artisans and soldiers; the Protestants and Catholics; and single women and orphaned children. But the state decided who was included in an Armenian family: according to its definition, for instance, all children 15 years old and over were no longer considered family members. Even girls under 15 years old, if married, were no longer considered members of the family.

In the beginning of the deportation process, the Ottoman state had excluded from the deportations those Armenians who had converted to Islam. But the CUP changed its policy within a few weeks and ordered the deportation of Armenians who had become Muslims as well. Some months later, conversion would also be forbidden, except for those Armenian women who had been married to Muslim men and therefore converted.

Despite the order to deport “all Armenians without exception” Armenians in some regions as well as a few Armenian families were spared. Even though the causes often varied, the provinces of Edirne, İstanbul, and Izmir generally witnessed the expulsion of Armenian revolutionary committee
members, with the majority of the population not included in the deporta-
tion. The main reason for the expulsion of Edirne was geopolitical: as the city
was on the European border, any drastic movement could easily be observed
by foreigners. A large number of foreigners also resided in Istanbul, the cap-
ital. For the case of İzmir, the deciding factor was the governor Rahmi Bey
within the CUP and his belief that the removal of the Armenians would be
the death sentence for the commerce of the city.

On July 5, 1915, while the evacuation regions came to include the west-
ern provinces (the vilayets of Ankara, Eskişehir and the like), the boundaries
of the deportation region were revised once again so that the new zones
were composed of the sancak of Kerkük 80 kilometers from the Persian
border; the south and east of the Musul vilayet; south and west of Zor, in-
cluding the valley of Euphrates and Habour; the southeast of Aleppo vilayet
and southeast of Harran and Kerek sancaks. On July 13, 1915, several
weeks after the total evacuation order, Tâlât Pasha declared to the director of
the abandoned property commission of Aleppo that the deportation had
been carried out as the “definitive solution to the Armenian Question.” He
had literally managed to eliminate the Armenian issue from the agenda of
the Ottoman Empire.
Part V

CONTINUITIES
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“The twentieth century,” Anthony Giddens solemnly reminds us, “is a bloody and frightening one.” While some scholars have dubbed the twentieth century the “century of genocide” or have employed other superlatives to describe its horrors, others have characterized the same century as that “of the camps,” “the age of barbarism,” “the century of fear,” or the “age of hatred.” Specifically, the first half of twentieth-century world history was marked by a tremendous body count resulting from wars and genocidal violence. In 1954, *le spectateur engagé* Raymond Aron noted the unique nature of the violence in this period where the new wars were “total” due to their unprecedented use of propaganda and bureaucracy. In a lucid article, Ian Kershaw aptly paraphrases this interpretation:

This first half of the century—or, more precisely, the years 1914 to 1950 that spanned the period from the beginning of the First World War to the end of the Second World War . . . , when high levels of violence against civilian populations with the resulting misery of millions continued—has indeed claimed, more surely than any other period in history, to be labeled “the era of violence.” That is to say: in these four decades of the twentieth century, violence had *epochal* character; it determined the age.

Micha Brumlik identifies three fundamental aspects of this “epochal character”: namely, the industrial killing of noncombatants, the establishment of lawless enclaves embodied in concentration camps, and the politically motivated deportation and expulsion of indigenous peoples. Götz Aly concurs and adds, “There was nothing taboo about the forcible resettlement of population groups and entire peoples in the first half of the twentieth century. . . . Resettlement programs were routinely justified by reference to economic and ideological arguments.” Although the period 1900–1950

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**“Turkey for the Turks”**

Demographic Engineering in Eastern Anatolia, 1914–1945

*_Ügur Ümit Üngör*_
indeed merits special attention for scholars interested in nationalist violence, nationalist population policies in general constitute more than outright violence and often include a broad range of possible political strategies. For as Amir Weiner has noted: “Whatever its ideological coloring, social engineering possessed a tremendous capacity for violence.”

This chapter surveys the literature on Young Turk social engineering, and synthesizes two hitherto separately studied phases of Young Turk nation formation and social engineering: the first phase of 1913–1918, and the second phase of 1923–1950. It argues that there are solid arguments to suggest that a relatively cohesive dictatorship existed from 1913 to 1950 that profoundly transformed Ottoman society. Though the scholarship on Young Turk social engineering is developing very rapidly, so far, the regime has been studied in a fragmented way with focus on specific aspects rather than its coherence. This chapter will challenge this convention by providing a new interpretative context and developing the thesis that from 1913 to 1950 a clear continuity can be observed in the Young Turk dictatorship’s policies of ethnic homogenization.

Demographic engineering encompasses the exercise of all possible state policies aimed at changing the composition of a given society. Donald Bloxham offered a recent definition that is concise and pointed; for him, demographic engineering and population policies are interchangeable concepts, “a series of coercive state measures in pursuit of population homogeneity.” It is a derivation of the term “social engineering,” which originated from late nineteenth-century discussions by industrialists on personnel policies. In the era of nationalism and nation-states, demographic engineering became tantamount to the enforced maximization of ethnic, religious, economic, cultural (in other words: identity) homogeneity. It is in fact partly synonymous with persecution, a concept which may be easy to invoke, but which does not do justice to the organizational complexity and surgical precision of modern persecutions. Although persecution is probably as old as humankind, only in the twentieth century did it acquire a decidedly calculated and systematic character. Instead of “sloppy” pogroms periodically striking fear into people’s hearts, the story of twentieth-century persecutions is that of a permanent terror of refined plans and calculating bureaucracies.

States can apply six strategies of demographic engineering. Ordered from the least to the most violent, the first involves the manipulation of censuses. The twin principles of sovereignty and democracy, entrenched in the paradigm of nationalism, guarantee that the ethnic majority holds political power. Nation-states therefore closely follow the ethnic composition of the population. The second strategy, closely connected to the first, is natality that augments absolute and relative numbers of the national group at the expense of minorities. A third strategy is border alteration, which aims to
achieve total overlap between ethnic and political boundaries. Forced assimilation is the fourth strategy of demographic engineering. Nationalist regimes may pressure subject minorities to “become like the majority” in order to produce greater homogeneity, leading many scholars to interpret such policies as “ethnocide” or “cultural genocide.”

Massive population transfers such as population exchanges, deportations, or violent ethnic cleansing aimed to create homogeneous societies are a fifth strategy. Finally, genocidal destruction is the most extreme and violent of all the possible strategies of demographic engineering.

The concept of demographic engineering is a useful analytical tool to discuss Young Turk population politics. The construction of the Turkish nation-state and the homogenization of Ottoman society were pursued through a range of strategies extending from the least coerced policies such as gradual integration to massively violent ones, including genocide. Virtually all of the abovementioned techniques were utilized by the Young Turk regime to homogenize Ottoman society and fit it into their ideological template of the Turkish nation-state.

The Ottoman Empire and its successors, including the Turkish Republic, did not remain immune to the era of nationalism. An incomplete list of nationalist violence in this era would include: the 1909 Adana massacres, the violent expulsion of Balkan Muslims throughout the 1910s and 1920s, the anti-Bulgarian and anti-Greek boycotts and persecutions of 1914, the 1915 deportations and genocide of Armenians and Syriacs, the 1916 crackdown on Arab-nationalist and Zionist groups, the 1918 revenge killings of Muslims in Eastern Anatolia, the 1921 Kocgiri massacre, the 1920–21 Pontus massacres, the 1925 massacres and deportations of Kurds, the 1934 anti-Jewish pogrom in Thrace, the 1938 massacres and deportations of Dersim, the 1942–44 persecutions and deportations of non-Muslims, and one is even tempted to include the 1955 pogrom against Greeks and Armenians in Istanbul.

Together, the violence and counterviolence cost millions of people from all walks of life their lives and livelihood. Listed in this “bookkeeping of death,” these campaigns may appear as incidental and isolated events, sudden explosions encapsulated in time and space. Yet a closer look reveals clear ideological, motivational, and organic links and interdependencies. Were it not for the fact that almost all of these episodes of mass violence originated and occurred under Young Turk rule, the breadth and difference in each singular event would seem to preclude any interconnections. This chapter calls this apparent isolation into question by analyzing the scattered events and positing a larger picture. I argue that these concrete events are constituents of the “dark side” of the process of Turkish nation-building, launched after 1913, during which social engineering started to develop piecemeal and was continuously in effect.
Continuities

Turkish-nationalist demographic engineering consisted of a broad scope of policies ranging from marginalization, isolation, incarceration, border alteration, deportation, forced assimilation, and population exchange to outright indiscriminate massacre, and in the most extreme case, fully fledged genocidal destruction. The fate of the victims depended both on their perceived ethnic and political distance from the newly proclaimed and heavily Islamized Turkish national identity and on the contingency of international politics. Ethnicity was equated with loyalty, so that loyal Christian Armenian government employees were doomed to be excluded whereas tax-evading Turkish Alevi peasants were often folded into this new identity (whose boundaries moreover fluctuated at intervals). Some groups, such as Muslim Kurds or Sephardic Jews, were considered slightly more “Turkifiable” (eintürkfähig) than others, albeit ambiguously.\footnote{13} Much of this designation was carried out with little regard for real and proclaimed loyalties. Once these processes of persecution escalated, millions were cleansed from their ancestral lands in mere years.

The establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 was a watershed in the modern history of the Middle East, marking the turn of a multiethnic empire into nation-states set upon homogenizing their populations in their everlasting nationalist search for identity. Scholars of Turkish-nationalist social engineering have established that in Turkey too, encompassing campaigns of thorough homogenization were carried out. In these years a generation of Turkish politicians, also known as the Young Turks, managed to maintain power and persisted in implementing plans of demographic homogenization, carried out under the banner of nation-building. In what follows, I summarize the main debates on social engineering in Turkey, utilizing key studies in this small but burgeoning field.

On the historiographic level, Fatma Müge Göçek detects three discourses on CUP era social engineering policies: an “Ottoman Investigative Narrative” (the accounts of Ottoman citizens before 1923), a “Republican Defensive Narrative” (the nationalist master narrative denying all kinds of state-led wrongdoings), and a “Postnationalist Critical Narrative” (comprising critical intellectuals’ challenges to the previous narratives, opening up new avenues of research) (See chapter 2 in this volume).\footnote{14} One could perhaps add to this portrait the “Minority Memorial Narrative”: growing attempts (political and scholarly) of a plethora of community activists of various victimized peoples to document and vociferate the violence perpetrated against “their nation” and popularize accounts thereof, which were silenced and relegated to oblivion by official Turkish historiography. After all, had they not drawn attention to these historical sufferings, fewer scholars would have picked up these signals and conducted further research.
In an early article Mark Levene argued that once Ottoman politicians were influenced by Turkish nationalism, it was only a matter of time before eastern Anatolia became a laboratory for Turkish nation-building. Levene was unreserved in expressing that this extremely violent process engulfed a mosaic of victims. 

Hilmar Kaiser deepened this notion and demonstrated in purely historical yet extremely detailed research that the treatment of the Armenians and Syriacs was nothing short of genocide, and the deportation of Kurds and Greeks were integral parts of the CUP scheme of “ethnic restructuring”—on second thought, a euphemistic and potentially malignant term. Deportation was the core theme in the work of Fuat Dündar, according to whom the deportation was a “total project” aimed at what may be considered “separating the wheat from the chaff,” that is, the cultural assimilation of Muslims and exclusion of non-Muslims. These were the first instances in which the debate on Turkish social engineering was taken seriously as an autonomous and legitimate field of study.

Periodization remains far from a settled issue. In an account of the Turkish nation-building process, Taner Akçam traces its key aspects and links it to the forced Turkification of Anatolia up to the establishment of the Republic. According to this interpretation, the Armenian Genocide was the apex of this long and at times very violent process. Others have periodized social engineering from 1923 on. In a massive volume describing anti-Jewish measures and policies of the Kemalist regime through the use of a rich array of sources in a multitude of languages, Rifat Bali has pointed out that although the Ottoman Jews may have never been targeted genocidally, neither were they ever to be included in the Turkish nation. Bali explains that during the Kemalist era, the Turkish Jews were besieged for linguistic assimilation and economic and administrative exclusion. An alternative interpretation is offered by Ayhan Aktar, who writes that no Muslim ethnic group was ever considered a minority. According to Aktar, the Kemalists excluded Armenians, Greeks, and Jews from society through economic Turkification, isolation, and expulsion, because these groups were perceived as “non-Turkifiable” minorities. A comprehensive and authoritative study by Hans-Lukas Kieser described many aspects and detailed histories of CUP social engineering rightly emphasizing Turkish nationalism as the driving force behind the homogenizing efforts, which can be characterized between 1913 and 1923 as nation-state policies on an imperial scale. His periodization is broad but nevertheless also cuts through the mystifying barrier of 1923.

Some scholars have rightly pointed out the variegated nature of CUP social engineering, involving not only a human cost, but the reorganization of space as well. In a recent article Erol Ülker notes that “Turkification was a project of nation-building, aiming to keep the unity of the empire under
the domination of a Turkish national core.” Glossing over the genocidal persecution of Ottoman Armenians and Ottoman Syriacs, as well as the formative influence of these events for the infrastructure of the envisioned Turkified Ottoman state, Ülker notes how the CUP had “Anatolia” incorporate “Kurdistan” as a form of spatial nation formation. In an original analysis of nationalist social engineering, Kerem Öktem characterized its Turkish manifestations as a double-edged sword, involving the exclusion of non-Turkish people on the one hand, but the nationalist incorporation of their space on the other. Soner Çağaptay traced the roots of nation-formation in the Turkish Republic to the millet system with its established categories of people. According to his “matrix of Turkishness,” potential Turks could only become Turks after a process of filtration involving a full identity change.

Were it not only for the fact that these works constitute a sophisticated and impressive corpus of research literature on the subject, they should not be easily dismissed as drops in the ocean, especially considering the reluctance of other scholars to work dedicatedly on these themes. Although research on this theme is developing rapidly, at present it still lacks many elements, including the place of the Armenian Genocide within this larger picture, the economic context of the genocide, longitudinal perspectives of continuity between the CUP and Kemalism, and empirical historical studies on the treatment and experiences of less well studied minorities. The latter two issues are addressed below.

In a trailblazing analysis of modern Turkish history, Erik-Jan Zürcher convincingly demonstrated the ideological and organic continuity of the Turkish-nationalist political elite in the era 1908–1950. His longitudinal study concentrates on one theme, namely, that of political leadership. Although 1923 had been interpreted as a turning point in Ottoman-Turkish history, Zürcher’s alternative interpretation stresses the continuity of the political elite in the period 1910–1940. His contribution is limited to the ebb and flow of Young Turk politics, and does not systematically address longitudinal trends of Turkish political positions toward minorities. Longitudinal research on social engineering in Turkey in this period has yet to be conducted.

This brief recapitulation of existing research provokes further historical questions. I explicitly problematize the construction in the literature of the concept of minorities in the first place: the small but growing literature on “minorities” (azınlıklar) and their treatment in Turkey often approaches the concept in political-legal terms. This is not surprising given that the concept is indeed not only politically derived, but has also evolved through various stages throughout the twentieth century, assuming many political, legal, and sociological forms. This research tradition includes
Kemalist policies toward non-Muslims, with Bali’s and Aktar’s work as noteworthy examples. Yet the literature often employs a legal definition of minorities instead of taking into account the political viewpoint of the Kemalist elite—which also included many other minorities. Hence, rather than departing from the Turkish-nationalist political mind, scholars instead choose to part with the 1923 Lausanne Treaty definition of “minorities,” which defined Armenians, Greeks, and Jews as minorities, and in the process ignored the existence of small and large pockets of Yezidis, Pontic Greeks, Alevi, Syriacs, and other ethnonational social groups. Another serious and overlooked issue is the ethnic indeterminacy in many areas: it was often difficult to pinpoint who was a Kurd, Syriac, Armenian, Greek, or Turk. I argue here that this otherwise perfectly legitimate interpretation of Turkification policies applies, somewhat differently but at least as forcefully, to social engineering policies toward other groups as well.

It is not precisely clear if and when the CUP planned to engage in an all-out campaign of “nationalization,” that is, Turkification of the Ottoman Empire. Nonetheless, it is possible to reconstruct some of the key processes and decisions that may very likely have led to the shaping of wartime policies. Three parallel developments were in effect during the years before the war. An ethnonational polarization at the highest political level impelled the CUP leadership to steer away from political pluralism. They were convinced that only their vision of saving the country by forcefully transforming it into an ethnonationally homogenous core state with an ethnonationally homogenous core population was the only acceptable model for the Ottoman Empire. Several key initiatives were implemented to actualize this vision. For example, detailed ethnographic research on almost all the non-Turkish Ottoman peoples was undertaken in order to facilitate these plans of ethnonational “restructuring.” Finally, the CUP put into effect several trial balloons that aimed at Turkification of many domains of Ottoman society.

Huge losses of the Balkan wars, the ensuing establishment of nation-states by formerly Ottoman subjects, and the persecution of Ottoman Muslims in those regions, confirmed suspicions within the CUP that non-Turkish Ottomans could not be trusted. The CUP analysis of the political predicament of the Ottoman minorities quickly turned hostile; within the tense environment of the Ottoman parliament, the various (Turkish, Greek, Arab, Armenian, Kurdish) deputies ignored, accused, cursed, provoked, and even threatened each other. Yet, especially after the Balkan wars, ethnonational deputies came together in solidarity during the plenary debates against the CUP when the latter continuously issued Turkification laws. During these debates, the CUP capitalized on the victimization of the Ottoman Muslims in the Balkans and threatened the discordant minorities with sanctions.
Although the CUP did not have a detailed program, the leadership nevertheless gradually became more determined to homogenize the country by forcefully altering its demographic makeup. Party ideologue Ziya Gökalp wrote extensively about Turkifying the empire by concentrating the non-Ottoman Muslims on Ottoman territory and by instilling Turkish nationalism into the Ottoman Muslims. According to Gökalp, this would contribute to the nascence of a new Turkey. As he wrote in a poem titled “Motherland” (Vatan):

A country that nobody plots against,
Each individual being united in ideal, language, tradition, religion,
Its parliament clean, without Boşo’s speaking,
Its children happily sacrificing their lives at its borders,
Hey Turks, that is what your motherland ought to be!

The poem reveals Gökalp’s fantasies of a nation-state, as he indulges in wishful dreams of ethnic, linguistic, religious, and political homogeneity and purity. In his famous poem “Red Apple” (Kızılelma) he fantasizes about cultural and linguistic purity, as well as the demographic homogeneity of what he calls a “new Turkish World.” The poem contains the following passage:

He said it was important to get to know the East / said the people are a garden and we are gardeners (halk bahçe biz bahçıvanız) / trees are not rejuvenated by grafting only / first it is necessary to trim the tree.

This excerpt quite literally reflects Zygmunt Bauman’s metaphor of gardening the human landscape. For Gökalp, the composition of society had to change and the political elite was in charge of making that happen. Yet Gökalp’s romanticizing of a Turkish nation-state was not limited to his poetry; the investigations he conducted for the CUP in his native Diyarbakır on the Ottoman Kurds also laid out the foundation for the future Turkification of the empire. It was not long before the CUP party dictatorship started to articulate the concept of Turkification at party congresses in Salonica (1910, 1911) and Istanbul (1912, 1913) as they adopted the ideology of Turkish nationalism and emphasized the significance of “national education.” Still, no explicit comments were made on the fate of the Ottoman minorities. Due to the secretive nature of the CUP and the sensitivity of this question, critical decisions on this issue were made behind closed doors. According to Halil Menteşe (d. 1935), chairman of the Ottoman parliament, Tâlât Bey informed him during a meeting that “he prepared to clean the country of treacherous elements.” The slogan of the new CUP policy, namely “Turkey for the Turks,” is often attributed to Tâlât.
In May, June, and August 1914, Enver Paşa organized a series of secret meetings at the War Ministry, at which “the elimination of the non-Turkish masses” was discussed with Special Organization operatives, most notably one of its commanders, Kuşçubaşı Eşref (d. 1922), Enver’s close trustee. During these meetings, the weaknesses of the Ottoman Empire were juxtaposed with the presence of clusters of non-Turkish people in strategic areas, such as in the Aegean area, which harbored hundreds of thousands of Ottoman Greeks. CUP loyalists decided that these “internal tumors” had to be removed once and for all, in other words, “Infidel Smyrna had to become Turkish İzmir.” This encompassing program was primarily directed against non-Muslim Ottoman civilians like the Greeks, Syriacs, and Armenians, and secondarily against non-Turkish Muslim populations like the Arabs, Kurds, and Albanians. Small or scattered religious groups such as the Alevi, Yezidi, Druze, Jew, or Shiite were targeted as well.

Existing Ottoman bureaucratic tools sufficed and needed only minor creative adjustments to carry out this CUP policy of “nationalization.” First of all, the hierarchic fabric of Ottoman state organs allowed for the highest echelons of any ministry (such as the Minister of the Interior) to telegraphically communicate all the way down to the county level with even the most insignificant civil servants and police officers. Discipline was reinforced not only through the proverbial Ottoman political culture of obedience, but especially by the CUP’s reputation for ruthlessness. Still, many written orders were revoked and replaced by covert oral orders, a typical CUP practice. Another important bureaucratic apparatus was the establishment of the “Directorate for the Settlement of Tribes and Immigrants” (İskân-ı Aşâir ve Muhacirîn Müdürüyeti, henceforth İAMM) in early 1914 for two purposes: to advance the sedentarization of the many Turkomans, Kurds, and Arab tribes on the one hand, and to provide accommodation for the homeless Muslim refugees, expelled from the Balkans and Russia on the other. İAMM later branched out into four units, namely settlement, intelligence, deportation, and tribes. The most prolific name in the establishment was Şükrü Kaya, the “Director of Deportation” (Sevkiyat Müdürü) who personally organized and oversaw most of the deportations.

Since the army would play a secondary role in the program, the concentration and purposeful canalization of a huge reservoir of violence was delegated to the Special Organization, which was reorganized in 1914 and split into an external branch assigned to instigating rebellions in Iran and Caucasus, and an internal branch charged with supervising the program of nationalization. The organization’s rearrangement meant that it was now detached from regular Ottoman military jurisdiction and brought under the direct control of the CUP, specifically under the auspices of Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir (1877–1922) and Dr. Nâzım (1872–1926). With a single order, the
CUP could now deploy tens of thousands of ruthless and heavily armed paramilitary troops to all corners of the vast empire to dispense violence. Along with aligning bureaucratic organs, the CUP had also ordered the conduct of detailed research on the demographic and ethnological characteristics of the targeted ethnic and religious groups. These investigations initiated on March 14, 1916, by the İAMM, which had by then been renamed the “General Directorate for Tribes and Immigrants” (Aşâir ve Muhacirin Müdiriyet-i Umumîyesi, AMMU), were based on both field work and careful examination of previous research conducted by CUP specialists during and after the World War. Thus, Baha Said was assigned to research the Kızılbaş and Bektaşi communities, Mehmed Tahir and Hasan Fehmi the Ahi communities, Esat Uras analyzed the Armenians, while Zekeriya Sertel concentrated mainly on the Kurdish-Alevi tribes. Habil Âdem was assigned to mapping out the details of Kurdish and Turkoman tribes. Zekeriya Sertel, who worked at the Tribes division of AMMU, later wrote in his memoirs that the purpose of these research programs was “to gather information in order to act accordingly.” Though most of this research was directly ordered by Şükrü Kaya, Ottoman documents reveal that in several instances it was Tâlât who personally requested detailed information like lists and maps often covering information down to even the village level. In the end, the CUP research program produced thousands of pages of detailed knowledge on the targeted ethnic groups, most of whom were inhabitants of the eastern provinces of the empire.

It was during the summer of 1913 that the CUP gradually but resolutely launched extensive campaigns of Turkification on practically all domains of Ottoman society. They began with place names, Turkifying them and wiping out in the process all traces of non-Turkish cultures: for instance, the Kızılkilise (“Red Church”) county in the Dersim district was changed into Nazimiyê (after the Ottoman politician Nâzım Paşa). Although the practice was suspended until the end of the war, this CUP practice continued well into the 1960s and ended up in the alteration of tens of thousands of topographic names. As social Turkification constituted another significant component of the CUP campaign, all state organs (including all schools) were ordered to correspond and communicate only in the Turkish language; likewise, businesses owned or operated by non-Muslims were harassed into using Turkish in all their corporate transactions. The Minister of Commerce and Agriculture, Ahmed Nesimi, admitted that this linguistic enthusiasm was in essence a method to get more Muslims employed in the Ottoman economy. Ultimately, this forceful tactic would lead to the establishment of the “national economy” that the CUP dreamed of.

In 1914, most businesses in the Aegean area were owned by the Ottoman Greeks. When persuasion for the Turkification of the economy did not
produce the desired effect, the CUP took recourse to more violent methods. It sent emissaries like Special Organization agent Kara Kemal to assist the CUP Responsible Secretary (and later president of the Turkish Republic) Celal Bayar to forcibly Turkify the economy of Smyrna/Izmir. In the summer of 1914, this political and nationalist persecution gained momentum as boycotts and expropriations escalated into kidnappings and assassinations of Greek businessmen and community leaders, and even the wholesale deportations of villages. The fact that after this campaign of terror many Ottoman Greeks opted to emigrate to Chios or Greece, abandoning their properties and lands to the Ottoman Muslims, was perceived by the CUP as a great administrative success and led to the rapid advancement of both Kara Kemal and Celal Bayar within the organization. The program of Turkification was thus being translated into effective policy.

The deportations of Armenians and Kurds away from the eastern provinces constituted two major pillars of Young Turk nationalist social engineering. Comparing these two deportations is useful, as they serve as control groups for each other. From a comparison of the deportations a converging motive surfaces: the demographic dilution of these two ethnic minorities in the eastern provinces.

The evolution of the persecution of the Ottoman Armenians is relatively well known. In early 1915, some Armenians had already been deported from their native regions, though this was not yet an empire-wide campaign. The process of deporting practically the entire Armenian millet began on May 23, 1915, when Tâlât issued orders for the compulsory deportation of all Armenians to Der Zor, starting with the northeastern provinces, urging that very same day the Fourth Army Commander to court-martial any Muslims collaborating with the Christians. The Third Army was then placed under the command of General Mahmud Kâmil Paşa, who had been issued a similar order instructing him that “any Muslim protecting an Armenian was to be hanged in front of his house, his house burnt down; and if [such a Muslim] held an office, that he should be immediately removed from it and brought in front of a martial court.” These massive arrests and persecutions prompted the Entente Powers to announce a joint declaration on May 24, 1915, denouncing the CUP policies against the Armenians. The declaration vehemently criticized these “new crimes of Turkey against humanity and civilization” and promised “that they will hold personally responsible . . . all members of the Ottoman government and those of their agents who are implicated in such massacres.” The CUP leaders, especially Tâlât, panicked and attempted to disguise the deportations, requesting permission from the grand vizier on May 26 to issue a temporary deportation law. Although the deportations had already commenced, the grand vizier endorsed Tâlât’s law on May 29, rushing the bill through the Ottoman
parliament the next day. This legal cover marked the official inception of the deportation of Armenians to the Syrian desert as it authorized the army to proceed with this fait accompli and delegated its daily implementation to the İAMM.  

The history of deportation in the Ottoman Empire can be traced back centuries. However, the execution of the Armenian and Kurdish deportations displayed a fundamental breach with conventional Ottoman statecraft in that the internal campaigns were to run parallel to the external war effort with the Great Powers, especially on the eastern front against Russia. It was no coincidence that most of the slaughter of the noncombatant Ottoman Christians occurred in the eastern provinces, where the threat of a Russian invasion backed by “Armenian insiders” was, in the paranoid minds of the CUP dictators, most immediate. However, these deportations and persecutions mostly occurred as autonomous processes and were only partly linked to the ebb and flow of the war. The initiation and conduct of the persecutions were generally in the hands of the Interior Ministry civil bureaucrats, not the military personnel of the Ministry of War. By the autumn of 1915, the Ottoman bureaucracy had depopulated most of the Armenian settlements, isolated or eliminated the Armenian community leaders, and was already micromanaging the expropriation and allocation of the remaining Armenian property to the Muslims. 

Next, it ordered the mass deportation of Kurds from Eastern Anatolia. Taken from their villages and nomadic routes, the Kurds were held at gunpoint and deported to Western Anatolia. From the official correspondence, it becomes clear that the CUP aimed at forcibly assimilating the Kurds in that while it ordered the community leaders to settle separately from the general public, it pushed for the Kurds’ rapid linguistic Turkification. Demographic dilution was another major aim: a general order proscribed that wherever sent, the Kurdish population was not to exceed an upper limit of 5 percent, which was often the limit set for deported Armenians as well. During the deportations many Kurds died from frost or hunger. 

In addition to deporting tens of thousands of Kurds out of Eastern Anatolia to the West and hundreds of thousands of Armenians to their death in the desert to the East, the CUP also ordered non-Kurdish Muslims deported to that region. This two-track policy would further expedite the Turkification process. Most of these imported settlers were Bosnian Muslims, Bulgarian Turks, and Albanian Muslims who had fled the war and persecutions in the Balkans. Another group of settlers comprised the refugees from Bitlis and Van, the Turks filtered out for immediate settlement in the vicinity. At first, the settler-deportees were temporarily lodged in the seminaries and mosques along with other poor and miserable villagers. They were then eventually housed in the empty Syriac and Armenian villages. Some were then moved
to the Adana region while others were settled on the Mardin plain. The settlement policy was put into effect in the summer of 1915 and continued until the end of the war.

The settlers sent to Eastern Anatolia had been the Muslim victims of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans and had sought asylum in the Ottoman Empire. Many had lived in Istanbul in shabby dwellings, impoverished, traumatized, and vindictive. When the war broke out, the CUP activated its plans for demographic engineering and incorporated these refugees. Albanians, for instance, were but one such group to be deported and settled. In June 1915, the İAMM ordered their “scattered settlement in order for their mother-tongue and national traditions to be quickly extinguished.”\textsuperscript{64} Albanians were to be settled all over the empire, including Diyarbakır province.\textsuperscript{65} Bosnian refugees were to be settled in Diyarbakır as well; on June 30, 1915 the İAMM ordered 181 Bosnian families temporarily residing in Konya to be deported to Diyarbakır and settled in its “empty villages.”\textsuperscript{66} The next day, İAMM headquarters ordered the deportation and settlement of the ethnic Turks from Bulgaria and Greece.\textsuperscript{67}

In the meantime, genocidal destruction raged in full force. The Armenians and Syriacs were being massacred while the Muslim settlers were en route to replace them. However, some preparations were necessary for their successful settlement. On June 17, 1915, the İAMM headquarters therefore reiterated its request for economic and geographic data on the emptied Armenian villages of Diyarbakır; in order to send the settlers to the province, it had to determine the local capacity to absorb the immigrants.\textsuperscript{68} A week later, it ordered the provision of educational commodities for the settlers:

It is necessary to appropriate the schools of the towns and villages emptied of Armenians in order to settle the Muslim immigrants there. However, the present value of the buildings, the amount and value of its educational materials need to be registered and sent to the department of general recordkeeping.\textsuperscript{69}

This national order was a warrant for the seizure of all Ottoman-Armenian schools and their subsequent conversion into Ottoman-Turkish educational facilities. School benches, blackboards, book cabinets, and even paper and pens were allocated to the yet-to-arrive settlers. Local branches of the Commission for Abandoned Properties were assigned to carry out this operation.\textsuperscript{70}

The information on the settlements of the Muslim immigrants in the districts and towns of Eastern Anatolia is sparse. Little fieldwork has been conducted as to whether the settlers remained in the designated towns and villages or migrated elsewhere. Armenian survivors recalled, however, Muslims settling in the late summer of 1915 in villages that were formerly
their. Local officials saw to it that these Muslim settlers were allocated the best houses of the deported Armenians.\textsuperscript{71} One such example of settler colonialism is the village of Tell Ermen in Diyarbakır province, the entire Christian population of which had been massacred during July 1915. Tell Ermen was then repopulated with Circassians and Chechens. Since the settlers already had ploughs and oxen, all they needed for subsistence farming was seed: the War Ministry ordered 1,000 cups of barley and 300 cups of wheat from the storage depots to provide the requisite seeds.\textsuperscript{72} When the Chechen population surpassed Tell Ermen’s capacity, the construction of a new village was ordered for them in September 1918.\textsuperscript{73} Later Tell Ermen, which means “Armenian hill” in Arabic, was renamed Kızıltepe (“red hill”). Nowadays, the town bears not a single physical trace of its Armenian past.

CUP demographic engineering came to a halt only with the end of the war. The Ottoman Empire suffered a catastrophic defeat as all its frontlines disintegrated, triggering a sudden implosion of the army. On October 30, 1918, the Ottoman minister of the navy Hüseyin Rauf Orbay and the British admiral Calthorpe signed a truce that sanctioned unconditional surrender.\textsuperscript{74} The very next night the CUP inner circle burned suitcases full of documents, disbanded the CUP as a political party, and fled to Odessa in a German submarine. The seven escapees comprised the triumvirate (Enver, Tâlât, Cemal), the doctors Bahaeddin Şakir and Nâzım, and two others.\textsuperscript{75} The power vacuum was filled by the new sultan Mehmed the Sixth (Vahdet-tin), Grand Vizier Damat Ferit Paşa, and the Freedom and Coalition Party, the CUP’s sworn enemy. They ruled the Ottoman Empire during the interregnum (1918–1923) in so far as the Istanbul government had sufficient actual leverage in Anatolia.\textsuperscript{76} With the reorganization of the CUP in Anatolia however, this “political glitch” was soon to come to an end.

The “War of Liberation” (1919–1923) was in essence a continuation of the state formation process, which included a major exclusion of Ottoman Christians from Anatolia. The Kemalists assumed control of the local elites who had collaborated in CUP crimes, and the Armenian villagers who returned to their farms and fields were chased out, terrorized, and bullied away.\textsuperscript{77} Hence the subsequent proclamation of the Turkish nation-state on October 29, 1923, was neither a starting point nor an end, but rather an intermezzo: there were compelling continuities not only in the power structure, ideology, and cadre, but also in practice, especially of population policies.\textsuperscript{78} In 1923–24, Greece and Turkey both enjoyed international support to homogenize their countries through a massive population exchange, which uprooted hundreds of thousands of people.\textsuperscript{79} No matter how thorough the campaigns conducted in 1915 and 1923 were, however, they could not achieve nationalist homogenization. Unbound by restraints of any kind,
behind the tightly knit curtains of national sovereignty and international support for “westernization” and “modernization,” homogenization policy continued in the post-1923 era in full force.80

The Kemalist abolition of the sultanate and caliphate and other revolutions triggered varied reactions throughout Turkey.81 One of heavy resistance was the Kurdish movement of Shaikh Said, which erupted in mid-February 1925.82 The government quelled the insurrection with violence, scorching villages and summarily executing both combatants and noncombatants. Shaikh Said himself was arrested and hanged on June 29, 1925, with several of his henchmen.83 The rebellion served to confirm established Kemalist fears that Kurdish society was a centrifugal, tribalist, reactionary, and potentially separatist threat that needed to be urgently dealt with. On September 8, 1925, Mustafa Kemal authorized a special council to devise a comprehensive report on “reforming” eastern Anatolia. The council, formally named “Reform Council for the East” (Şark İslahat Encümeni) and chaired by İsmet [İnönü] with positions held by politicians and officials such as Mustafa Abdüllhalik Renda (deputy for Çankırı), Cemil [Uybadın] (interior minister), Ali Cenani (minister for the economy), Mahmut Esat [Bozkurt] (minister of justice), Lieutenant General Kâzım [Özalp], and Fevzi [Çakmak] (chief of staff)84 was given fifteen days to complete a report and present it to the parliament for evaluation.

The report prepared and signed by these men on September 24, 1925, was the quintessential example of early twentieth-century social engineering, reflecting a staunch belief in the feasibility of crafting a society through large-scale, top-down authoritarian modernization, coupled with an ethnonationalist vision of “landscaping the human garden” at a distance.85 A multitrack policy would ensure the “reform”—clearly a euphemism for “containment”—of Eastern Turkey. In previous explorations, Cemil Uybadin had characterized this approach as a “colonial administrative method,” or a form of internal colonization. First of all, martial law would be proclaimed in order to facilitate further policies whereby most eastern provinces would be clustered together into five “general inspectorships” (Umûmî Müfettişlik).86 A total of seven million Turkish lira would be allocated to the inspectors heading each region to supervise the many aspects of nation and state formation such as the deportation of the Kurds living in previously Armenian villages, the settlement of Turkish immigrants in their place, the expulsion of Kurdish families deemed “dangerous,” the reinforcement of military presence in the region, the complete disarmament of civilians, the prohibition of all non-Turkish languages, the forced assimilation of Kurds and Arabs through boarding schools, the prohibition of foreigners from access to the region, and the construction of roads, railroads, and government buildings.87
The 1925 Reform Plan envisioned deportation as a legitimate measure to subdue (and assimilate) many Kurds as a “solution” to a “problem.” On July 4, 1927, the government passed a law empowering the Justice, Interior, and Economy Ministries to coorganize the deportation of fourteen hundred people and eighty families to various western provinces. Prior to its implementation, the government had prepared and published a detailed, top-secret inventory of Kurdish tribes for internal circulation, identifying for every province dozens of Kurdish tribes classified as “loyal” or “disloyal” including details provided on the nature of their relationships with one another. These plans, ambitious as they were, did not even approach either the major acceleration in Kemalist deportation campaigns after 1930 or the subsequent consolidation of the Kemalist one-party dictatorship in 1931. On June 14, 1934, the government ratified the Settlement Law, an elaborate legal text sanctioning the mass deportation of entire categories of peoples, from “itinerant Gypsies” to “anarchists” to “those not devoted to Turkish culture,” sweeping notions that would most of all target and strike the Kurds.

These policies, formulated at the national level, produced local implementations that have hitherto been virtually unexplored. On January 1, 1928, the government established the First General Inspectorate, centered in Diyarbakır, and appointed İbrahim Tali [Öngören] as its first general inspector; Ahmet Hilmi [Ergeneli] (1933–1935) and Abidin Özmen (1935–1943) succeeded him. The inspector implemented the general policies laid out in the Reform Plan in the huge area under his jurisdiction. The many reports these men sent to Ankara offer a unique insight into the local dynamics of social engineering in the Diyarbakır province: the Reform Plan was put into practice through militarization, disarmament, assimilation, infrastructural change, and most significantly: deportation. The aforementioned report included ten pages on the tribes of the Diyarbakır province; one was the influential Azizoğlu dynasty, a branch of the Narek tribe residing in and around Silvan, a town east of Diyarbakır. Although the report identified the Azizoğlu as a loyal and obedient family that had never participated in any rebellion, in the 1920s, hundreds of Azizoğlu family members were rounded up and deported to Thrace; a second wave of deportations in 1935 sent hundreds more to Western Turkey. The Cemilpaşazâde were another wealthy and influential family deported in two phases: having profited from the Armenian Genocide in 1915, they were now expropriated according to the Reform Plan, exiled to the Aegean region, and their property was turned over to the state.

The removal of the Kurds from Eastern Turkey was accompanied by forced assimilation. In 1928, the Turkish-nationalist Tekin Alp (Moise Cohen) published a nationalist manifesto entitled “Turkification,” in which he argued that the rapid cultural homogenization of Turkey could only be accomplished by Turkifying the minorities by force:
In order to preclude being dominated by the majority, minorities have no other option than integration. Because new Turkey is truly a unitary nation state, it absolutely cannot tolerate to execute old Ottoman population policies. If the minorities do not wish to be alienated from national life, i.e. from being Turks, they have no other choice than to nationalize... Sooner or later, citizens who wish to live in Turkey will have to become Turks, not only legally, but also culturally and religiously.\textsuperscript{96}

The message was clear: willingly or unwillingly all minorities had to be assimilated into Turkish culture as soon as possible. Alp also provided concrete suggestions for integration: “assuming Turkish names,” “speaking only Turkish,” “extinguishing non-Turkish collective identities,” and “socializing with Turks.”\textsuperscript{97} Even though Alp’s ideas were not very influential among the Kemalist elite, it did not take long for the government to translate them into action. In 1928, the government initiated a campaign titled “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” In January 1930, the Interior Ministry issued a top secret order regarding the fate of the deportees in that they were to be “made Turkish in languages, traditions, and desires,” and in 1934 the Surname Law homogenized all family names into the Turkish melting pot.\textsuperscript{98} As in all of Turkey, in the east too, these policies were put into practice through the “People’s Houses” (Halkevi) and “People’s Rooms” (Halkodasi), nationalist institutions that brought Kemalist ideology to the populace.\textsuperscript{99} The negative effects of these nation-building policies were not limited to Kurds, however; communities speaking (dialects of) Arabic, Zaza, or Syrian-Aramaic encountered similar threats and pressures.\textsuperscript{100}

In the period after 1931, the official discourse acquired a racist and denigrating undertone toward the Kurds. The Cumhuriyet newspaper, the mouthpiece of the Kemalist party-state, wrote that Kurds “allow their emotions and brains to be led by simple instincts like ordinary animals and therefore can only think crudely and foolishly... there is absolutely no difference between the African barbarians and cannibals and these creatures who mix raw meat with cracked wheat (bulgur) and eat it just like that.”\textsuperscript{101} In a series of articles, the nationalist journalist Yusuf Mazhar described the Kurds as follows:

Even though they may be more capable than the redskins in the United States, they are—history is my witness—endlessly bloodthirsty and cruel... They are completely bereft of positive feelings and civilized manners. For centuries, they have been a plague for our race... During Russian rule they were prohibited to descend from the mountains, where they did not lead humane and civilized lives, therefore these creatures are not really inclined to profit from civilization... In my opinion, the dark spirit, crude mental state, and ruthless manners of this Kurdish mass are impossible to break.\textsuperscript{102}

Hence social engineering during the Kemalist Republic was also a civilizing mission, one comparable in discourse and practice to the European
The campaigns were also accompanied by a thorough erasure of the memory of the events. For every region in Eastern Anatolia, for instance, local official historians produced volume upon volume, each one making sure to silence the genocide and recast all ethnic minorities as Turks, thereby trivializing the historical and contemporary existence of all local inhabitants. Only when the Republican People's Party lost power in the elections of 1950 were these modernist projects of demographic engineering finally halted. By that time, however, the political, ethnic, and cultural map of Eastern Anatolia had dramatically altered for good.

In the turbulent period during 1878–1945, various ethnic and religious groups in the Ottoman Empire and then the Turkish Republic were expelled and destroyed through the continuous processes of ethnic cleansing and demographic engineering. The victims were mostly Muslims in the Balkans and primarily Christians in Anatolia. Some regions continued to remain unquiet. For Turkey its east, for Bulgaria the coastal region, for Greece the north were heterogeneous and therefore acquired “special” status and as a consequence the populations of these regions were subjected to extra nationalist “care.” For Eastern Turkey, nationalist geopolitics remained very topical in the long term. The Turkish internal “Eastern Question” still exists, with the Kurds having replaced the position once occupied by the Armenians. The attitude of the Turkish state toward a culturally distinct, territorially compact and potentially separatist ethnic group suggests structural continuity in the long term.

This chapter has argued that the continuation of the population policies may necessitate the extension of the Young Turk era from 1908 to 1950, as put forward by Erik-Jan Zürcher. However, a Young Turk continuity can also be detected in the sphere of social engineering. Deportation, expulsion, and assimilation indeed form the three key concepts in this reconceptualization of Turkish history in the first half of the twentieth century. After the first stage of the Armenian Genocide and the second stage of the expulsion of the Greeks, the deportation and dissolution of the Kurds formulated the third major stage of homogenization during this broadly defined Young Turk era. The separate population policies of the CUP and the Turkish Republic are too interconnected to be understood in total isolation; in addition, the Armenian Genocide financed and enabled the execution of the World War I settlement of the Muslims and the deportation of the Kurds. Then again, only the deportation and expropriation of Kurdish elites in the 1920s and 1930s could have obviated the competing loyalties and facilitated the eventual cultural assimilation of the Kurdish population.

Another factor that connected the two policies was the political elite ordering and carrying them out: they were the one and the same. It can be...
suggested that a generation of men, born roughly between 1870 and 1890 and educated under Sultan Abdülhamid II at the medical and military academies, as well as school for civil service, would ultimately constitute the Young Turk generation. United in the Young Turk political movement, they struggled for power around the fin de siècle and ruled Turkey by dictatorship from 1913 to 1950. It is no accident that the names of Mustafa Abdülhalik Renda, Celal Bayar, Kâzım Özalp, İbrahim Tali Öngören, Ali Cenani, and Şükrü Kaya keep appearing and reappearing: these men were employed in drawing up and executing the post-1923 policies of demographic engineering, since they had acquired the requisite know-how and experience during the CUP period. Even though some CUP members were tried and hanged in 1926, many in “middle management” positions remained in office and many were even promoted all the way to become ministers and presidents. Local elites too, remained largely intact and willfully assisted in the continuing policies of state formation and nation formation. After the ostensible caesura of 1923, these were the men who were employed since they had proved their loyalty to the CUP’s ideological projects and were intimately related to each other, generationally and by family. It was this generation of Young Turks that remained in office and profoundly shaped the political and ethnic map of Turkey.
Twenty-five years ago I published my first book, *The Unionist Factor*. The theme of the book was the continuity between the Young Turk period in Ottoman history and the history of the early republic. It charted the way in which leading members of the Committee of Union and Progress built the national resistance movement after World War I and the way in which Mustafa Kemal Pasha gradually managed to take over this movement and concentrate power in his own hands by eliminating his former Unionist colleagues. It was a purely political history, focusing on the military and bureaucratic elite.

Generally, the book was received quite favorably, but gradually I came to realize that a discussion of the continuity between the CUP and the Republic was quite meaningless if one did not take into account the backdrop of war, ethnic conflict, and mass migration that characterized late Ottoman history between 1877 and 1923. Study of the ideological changes that occurred between 1908 and 1928 made me aware of the degree to which identity formation in this period was sharply defined by the opposition between Muslims and non-Muslims, a process in which religious identity had become an ethnic marker and which ultimately resulted in the emergence of a fierce Ottoman-Muslim nationalism. As Deringil and Yavuz have shown, the foundations for this had been laid during the reign, and through the policies, of Sultan Abdülhamid II, but it was the ten-year period of war between 1912 and 1922 that gave rise to mass mobilization of the population on this basis.

This mass mobilization was effected by a Young Turk leadership, both civilian and military, that overwhelmingly hailed from the Balkan provinces and the Aegean littoral. Although they are never called *muhacir* (refugee),
a term reserved for lower-class migrants, many of them were in effect refugees after the loss of the Dodecanese to Italy in 1911–1912 and the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913. The same was true for the first generation of leaders of the Republic of Turkey.\textsuperscript{4} In the years that followed they had to grapple with this trauma of territorial loss and military defeat, and find a new basis for their identity. From 1913 onward, the reaction of the Young Turk leadership to the Ottomans’ loss of their ancestral lands seems to have manifested itself in four different ways, which were not mutually exclusive and in fact often overlapped:

\textit{Irredentism}: Irredentism as a political program was relatively subdued. The hope of recovering at least some of the lost territory did play a role in the decision to go to war in 1914, but certainly not a dominant one.

\textit{Pan-Turkist escapism}: the loss of a real empire in the West certainly encouraged dreams of a virtual empire in the East, especially after war with Russia had broken out, but to my mind the importance of Pan-Turkism in the events that followed has been drastically overstated by Armenian scholars from Zarevand to Dadrian.

\textit{Resentment}: there is no doubt that the resentment against the Christian minorities that had been growing since the 1860s and had become very tangible after the constitutional revolution, was given a strong impetus by the sometimes blatantly disloyal behavior of the Christian communities in the Ottoman Empire during the Balkan War. We can certainly detect a discourse of revenge, violence, and hatred toward the Christian minorities as well as against Europe in the Turkish writings of this period.\textsuperscript{5}

\textit{The appropriation of Anatolia as the true Turkish fatherland}: there had been a rise in interest in Anatolia since the constitutional revolution, but after 1912 it was embraced as the true home of the Turks even, or perhaps primarily, by those (like Mustafa Kemal) who had been born and bred in southeastern Europe and discovered their new homeland when in their thirties. The same can be said for the smaller but also influential group of immigrants from the Caucasus and the Black Sea littoral.

The combination of resentment against the Ottoman Christian communities and the adoption of Anatolia as the new homeland made it crucial for the Unionists to make sure that Anatolia was and would remain an Ottoman-Muslim land. These sentiments served as the impetus for the policies of ethnic cleansing that started in the summer of 1914 with the expulsion of the Greeks from the coastal areas in the west. It is certainly no coincidence that the man in charge of these expulsions, Mahmut Celâl, was a son of
refugees from Bulgaria, as was the main architect of the Armenian massacres, Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir.

In the postwar environment, when the carving up of Anatolia by the Entente and their Greek and Armenian clients seemed imminent, the leaders of the resistance movement that emerged beginning in November 1918 onward once again had recourse to mobilization on the basis of an ethnicized religious identity. The dominant discourse of the movement between 1919 and 1922 is one of “us” and “them,” in which the other is defined as the non-Muslim. In fact, it is precisely in the postwar era, under Mustafa Kemal’s leadership, that Muslim nationalism reaches its climax, something illustrated and symbolized by the text of Mehmet Akif’s strongly Islamic “Independence March” of 1921 (which paradoxically went on to become the national anthem of the secular republic). 6

In ideological terms there is thus a great deal of continuity between the periods of 1912–1918 and 1918–1923. This should come as no surprise: even though the top echelon of the Committee of Union and Progress had been smuggled abroad by the Germans or was interned in Malta by the British, the cadres of the national resistance movement almost without exception consisted of former Unionists, who had been shaped by their shared experience of the previous decade.

In other words, one can only fully understand the postwar policies of the former Unionists who made up the national resistance movement by taking into account the experiences that shaped them in the preceding period. Of these, the persecution of the Armenians is no doubt one of the most important. Leaving this out risks turning the nationalist leaders into figures in an empty landscape.

What, then, was the impact of the Armenian massacres on the postwar attitudes of the Unionists? In this chapter I examine their public statements in order to establish to what extent an effort was made either to distance themselves from, or conversely to justify, the ethnic policies of the war years. After all, if this was the defining moment in their immediate past, they would have to deal with it one way or another when trying to carve out a new political role in the postwar environment.

Unionists in the postwar environment can be organized into three categories: (1) Unionist parliamentarians in new parties and parliamentary groupings that can be seen as successors to the Party of Union and Progress (the CUP’s parliamentary party that was ostensibly merged with the committee in 1916); and (2) the embryonic national resistance movement that was to a large extent based on the local branches and Unionist clubs in the provincial centers. Of course, individual former Unionists quite often played a role in both of these groups. The activities of the secret underground networks, 7 such as Karakol (the Guard), founded in October 1918 at the behest
of Enver and Tâlât Pashas, no doubt would be a fascinating context for the study of Unionists’ postwar sentiments and attitudes, but as these networks did not produce public statements, they fall outside the purview of this chapter.

Two political parties were clearly identified at the time as being heirs to the old Party of Union and Progress, which had dissolved itself at its final congress on November 5, 1918. The Renewal Party (Teceddüt Fırkası) was founded by the Unionists present at the final CUP party congress on November 9, 1918. Although the party officially denied that it was a continuation of the CUP, its takeover of CUP assets, such as organizational networks, real estate (the clubs) and cash detracted from the credibility of this claim. It rather sounds like the statement of the nationalist congress at Sivas in September 1919 rejecting all links with the CUP. This, too, was obviously a stratagem made necessary by the political circumstances of the time.

The party published a detailed party program (prepared by a commission during the CUP’s final congress), containing 175 articles on all aspects of its internal and external policy. This is in some ways a very interesting document. It is quite an elaborate and also a forward-looking document, which announces a number of bold policy initiatives, but it seems to be totally divorced from the reality of late 1918. There is no mention of the war, of the dire economic circumstances of the country or, indeed, of the persecution of Armenians. Security of life, honor, and property is emphasized as a common right of all Ottoman citizens, and the rights of minorities are guaranteed (Articles 3–6) but no mention is made of any past transgressions, let alone of the need to deal with the past and punish the culprits. This is remarkable, as everyone knew that the Entente powers had announced they would take action on this issue once the war was over.

In part it reads like a constitution, not as a party program at all, suggestive perhaps of the degree to which the Unionists had come to identify themselves with the state. The first section, consisting of thirty-three articles, describes the principles underpinning the Ottoman state order and its main institutional elements. It deals with issues like sovereignty, the role of the dynasty, state religion and language, and the fundamental rights of the citizen. The party itself is not mentioned even once in this whole section.

Where it does announce future policies, the document is interesting in the way it presages some of the later reforms of the Kemalist republic. Article 22 announces the abolition of all civilian honorary titles (Pasha, Bey, Efendi, etc.). Article 54 calls for the introduction of a national anthem, an official name, and arms for the state (all of which the Ottoman Empire never had). The next article, 55, states that the constitution will be modified to comply with the principles of national sovereignty (hakimiyeti milliye) and parliamentarism. This of course reminds one of the Law of Fundamental
Organization, adopted by the assembly in Ankara in early 1921, with its famous first article “Sovereignty belongs unconditionally to the nation” (*Hakimiyet bilakayduşart milletindir*). Article 70 calls for a reform of the calendar, 96 for the introduction of family names, and 118 for a reform of the Turkish language, all of them ultimately realized under Atatürk in the 1920s and 1930s. Improvement of conditions in the countryside is sought through the reclamation of marshland (Article 130) and the abolition of the tithe (159), precisely in the way the republic was to do.

The second offshoot of the CUP, the Ottoman Liberal People’s Party (*Osmanlı Hürriyetperver Avam Fırkası*), had come into being as the result of a split within the CUP. It was founded in mid-October 1918, by some leading Unionists who had not been particularly close to the wartime leadership. Mustafa Kemal’s old friend Ali Fethi [Okyar] and Hüseyin Kadri, the member of parliament for Karesi, were the founders, together with a small group of Unionist parliamentarians. Although all its members had a Unionist background and were even invited to the last party congress of the CUP after they had split off, the Liberal People’s Party was not a direct successor of the CUP in the sense that it took over CUP assets as the Renewal Party did.

The Liberal People’s Party, too, published a very detailed (94 articles) party program immediately after its founding. Like that of the Renewal Party, its first sections are strongly reminiscent of a constitution and describe the state order rather than formulating any party policies. In the rest of the document we encounter many of the elements present in the program of the Renewal Party, although it lacks the more radical reform proposals of the latter—surprising, perhaps, if one bears in mind that Mustafa Kemal was close to the party and even became co-owner of the party newspaper *Minber* after his return from the Syrian front.

Like the program of the Renewal Party, that of the Liberal People’s Party seems to have been drawn up with great care, but in complete isolation from the realities of the day. Those realities—rocketing inflation, severe shortages, displaced persons, mass desertions—are not mentioned, and there is no call for any kind of reckoning, redress, or persecution of the culprits of the Armenian massacres. This is perhaps more surprising in the case of the Liberal People’s Party than in that of the Renewal Party, as Ali Fethi’s group had not been close to the wartime leadership (indeed, Fethi’s enmity with Enver Pasha had been well known since 1913) and its members had officially and openly resigned from the CUP and thus could be expected to feel more freedom in this respect.

Both parties were closed down on the orders of the government in May 1919 because they were considered direct successors to the CUP, but they were quite active and vocal in parliament and outside it in the early months
of 1919. By the time the parties were closed, the efforts to organize a resistance movement in Anatolia, based partly on the network of Unionist clubs and branches and partly on the infrastructure of the army, were well underway. The Congress of Sivas (September 4–11, 1919) was the first attempt to unite all the regional resistance initiatives in a common national front, and it was there that the “Society for the Defence of the National Rights [a reference to President Wilson’s Fourteen Points] of Anatolia and Rumelia” was founded. The congress was completely dominated by people with a Unionist background, but like the parties discussed earlier, those present made a point of denying any continuity between the CUP and themselves, even going so far as to swear a solemn oath that they would not revive the CUP.

The formal declaration of the congress formed the basis of the “National Pact,” the nationalist program that was officially adopted by the final Ottoman parliament four months later. Unlike the documents produced by the parties in Istanbul, this declaration acknowledged and focused on the actual events and circumstances of the day. What did this text have to say about the Armenian issue? The text refers to the Armenians and Greeks explicitly in Article 3 and implicitly in Article 4. Article 3 states that fighting attempts to found independent Greek and Armenian entities (Rumluk ve Ermenilik) on Ottoman soil is legitimate, and Article 4 promises equality before the law to non-Muslims, but rejects the reintroduction of the capitulations. Again, there is no mention of the events of 1915–1916 or of the treatment of the Armenians. Nor does the text have anything to say on the question how to deal with the perpetrators of the genocide.

It could be argued that the document deals with the current situation and with political goals and that it is therefore natural that it should not refer to the events of the immediate past. One might expect, however, that the issue of the persecution of the Armenians should come up in the discussions on the oath not to revive the CUP. This oath was debated quite seriously, opinions being divided between those who merely wanted to swear not to work for personal gain or party political interests and those who expressly wanted to mention the CUP. Some of those who supported the latter option, like Bekir Sami [Kunduh] or Rauf [Orbay] referred to the “Unionist nightmare” and to the “disasters to which the CUP had led the country,” while others like Mehmet Şükrü argued that the CUP had had an exalted idealist program, which still commanded respect in the greater Turkic and Islamic world and that it would be unjust to reject its legacy simply because of the misdeeds of a few individuals. Ultimately, the argument that there was a great deal of suspicion in the country that the congress would revive the CUP and that it was therefore necessary to publicly vow not to do so, carried the day, with the understanding that the oath would be valid only for the duration of the congress. Yet at no time during these discussions was
the treatment of the Armenians mentioned, not even by those who were most critical of the CUP. The same is true for Mustafa Kemal’s opening speech at the congress, which set out the necessity of organizing national resistance. He mentioned the Armenians, but only to say “In the East the Armenians have begun their preparations to expand their state up to the banks of the Kızılırmak and even now their genocidal policy has started to reach our borders.”\textsuperscript{11} What had happened to the Armenians just four years earlier again remained unsaid.

This rather suspicious defensiveness set the tone. In the first public speech Mustafa Kemal gave after establishing his headquarters in Ankara in December 1919, he again warned the people about the dangers facing the country both from the victorious Entente and from the non-Muslim minorities, and especially from the combination of the two. He firmly rejected the idea that the Turkish nation was an oppressor (\textit{zalim}), praised the tolerance shown by the Ottoman Muslims in the past and had only this to say about the Armenian massacres during the war:

> Whatever has befallen the non-Muslim elements living in our country, is the result of the policies of separatism they pursued in a savage manner, when they allowed themselves to be made tools of foreign intrigues and abused their privileges. There are probably many reasons and excuses for the undesired events that have taken place in Turkey. And I want definitely to say that these events are on a level far removed from the many forms of oppression which are committed in the states of Europe without any excuse.\textsuperscript{14}

All the classic elements in the defense of violent aggression are here: they asked for it, it was not really so bad and anyway, others have done the same and worse.

In a sense the outcome of these findings resembles Sherlock Holmes’s famous “curious incident of the dog in the night-time.” In other words, when we scan the policy documents of Unionist postwar organizations for references to the persecution of the Ottoman Armenians barely two years earlier or for attempts to either express regret, justify the events, or unequivocally distance the said organizations from them, we draw a complete blank. As is well known, there were some in the postwar Ottoman environment who called for the culprits of the genocide to be brought to justice. These were not limited to the Liberal opposition (like Ali Kemal), but also included the Young Turk éminence grise, Ahmet Rıza. The two parties that sprang directly from the bosom of the CUP, however, did no such thing. Both the Renewal Party and the Liberal People’s Party came up with detailed, one might even say remarkably mature policy documents, but one looks in vain for a single reference to the treatment of the Armenians in the immediate past. This is the more surprising for Fethi Okyar’s Liberal People’s Party, as
that group was a dissident grouping that had broken away from the CUP before its last party congress. The same is true for the leadership of the national resistance movement in Anatolia. The language employed with regard to the Armenians and Greeks where their political or territorial claims are concerned, in Erzurum, Sivas, and Ankara is quite uncompromising, and references to the events of 1915–1916 are completely lacking save for the one very severe statement of Mustafa Kemal in Ankara, quoted in extenso above.

In this respect, the argument, sometimes voiced even by concerned historians, that Turks do not have to fear a reopening of the debate on the Armenian issue because the republic is clearly distinct from the late empire and that Mustafa Kemal “has never spoken in support of the genocide,” sounds rather weak. When it mattered, in 1918–1920, Mustafa Kemal never spoke out against the genocide, and he surrounded himself with people, his own bodyguard Topal Osman among them, who were quite notorious for having blood on their hands. His keynote address in Ankara in December 1919 put the blame squarely on the victims.

Taner Akçam, a Turkish sociologist who has written extensively on the Armenian Genocide, provides a somewhat dubious explanation for this dog that didn’t bark. In a recent article, Akçam argues that the attitude of the Turkish nationalists after the war can be explained by British actions. By simultaneously implementing an aggressive imperialist policy aimed at the destruction of the empire and taking the initiative in opening the case against the perpetrators of the genocide, the two became so closely identified that supporting the legal persecution of the Unionists became an unpatriotic act by association. His argument is that a different policy on the part of the British, which took seriously the national aspirations of the Turks, might have allowed Mustafa Kemal’s nationalists to distance themselves from the Unionists who were responsible for the genocide. This claim is unconvincing, as the party programs of the Renewal Party and of the Liberal People’s Party (with which Mustafa Kemal was associated) date from before the arrival of the British. Still, both parties denied themselves the opportunity to distance themselves from the crimes committed during the war. The Unionist underground organization Karakol was founded as early as October 1918 to smuggle arms and people to Anatolia with the twin aims of strengthening any future resistance and to keep those who were at risk of arrest out of the hands of the British. It thus linked the two elements of national resistance and sabotaging the persecution of Unionist officials right from the start.

Ultimately, it was simply impossible for Unionists in 1918–1919 to distance themselves too visibly from the crimes of 1915–1916 and those who had committed them. Those crimes occurred at the height of the period in
which the population had been mobilized by the Unionists themselves on
the basis of a Muslim-Ottoman identity, an identity that had been formed in
continuous and conscious opposition to the Ottoman Christians. The
Unionists depended on this sentiment for their grassroots support and
could not afford a break with the past. This was as true for Mustafa Kemal
and his men in Anatolia as it was for the politicians in the capital. Therefore,
the silence of the postwar documents on the issue does not indicate a con-
spiracy of silence, an effort to cover up the past. Nor does it indicate that the
Armenian massacres had become taboo. Rather, given the surviving Union-
ists’ goal to generate political support among the Ottoman Muslims, whom
they clearly regarded as their constituency (witness Rauf Bey’s statement in
Sivas: “the aim of the Defence of Rights Association is to unite the Muslim
population”), any mention of the massacres would have been counterpro-
ductive and thus politically irrelevant.

In the first few years of the Turkish republic, the Armenian issue does
not seem to have been discussed at a political level. When Mustafa Kemal
finally decided to deal with the remaining Unionist leaders and eliminate
them once and for all in the show trials conducted in the summer of 1926,
they were fiercely castigated by the Independence Tribunal before which
they had to appear for the way they had dragged the Ottoman Empire into
World War I, for acts of corruption during the war and for their behavior in
the postwar years, but not for their ethnic policies. In other words: even
when an effort was made to publicly disgrace the former Unionist leaders,
the treatment of the Armenians was apparently not considered something
disgraceful in the eyes of the Turkish public. One could argue that Mustafa
Kemal publicly condemned them for the treatment of the Armenians in his
well-known interview with the “Swiss reporter” Emile Hilderbrand that was
published in the Los Angeles Examiner on August 1, 1926, in which he is
supposed to have said that “they should have been made to account for the
lives of millions of our Christian subjects who were ruthlessly driven en
masse, from their homes and massacred.” There can be serious doubt, how-
ever, about the authenticity and reliability of this text, and even if it was
authentic, it was meant for foreign consumption. The fact remains that the
massacres did not figure in the actual trials or in Mustafa Kemal’s state-
ments to the Turkish public. On the contrary, in the same year when these
Unionist leaders were purged, the Turkish national assembly adopted a law
granting pensions to the widows and orphans of the Unionist leaders who
had been murdered by Armenian revenge killers in “Operation Nemesis”
and of those hanged by the military tribunal of Nemrut Mustafa Pasha in
Istanbul in 1919.

That the Unionist elite felt no need to distance itself from the perpetrators
of the genocide in the early republic is also shown by another interesting
example. In 1936 veteran journalist and editor Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın published a series of biographical portraits of people he had known in the paper Yedigün. Among the people whom Yalçın portrays is the man now generally considered the architect of the genocide, Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir. Yalçın first describes Bahaeddin’s character:

Bahaeddin Şakir had become a single hard unit through his exploits, like a piece of steel that had been toughened in hardship, deprivation and pain. He solved his whole life and all political problems with a sharp and decisive reasoning: What wasn’t black was white; a man who wasn’t good, was bad—forever. Subtle differences, vague colours did not exist in his eyes. One could say he lived far removed from reality and from the world. In him there was an ideal of freedom that formed life’s driving force and goal. For him this had become a creed. He had buried himself in that ideal, that creed, had withdrawn from the human world and had made himself a world in the abstract and the absolute.

In the assemblies and central committee meetings of the Committee of Union and Progress Bahaeddin Şakir was always the most ardent supporter of the most radical measures. He could not envisage sacrificing ideas or opinions to reach a compromise. In his view, there was no world, there were no opponents, no problems, just an ideal and a creed, and the process of moving towards it with decisive steps without thinking of anything.

And then he goes on the openly address the question of Bahaeddin’s role in the Armenian question:

What is Bahaeddin Şakir’s role in the deportations? Even in our most intimate meetings this issue was not made clear to us. I have no clear, definitive opinion, but based on a word here that escaped from his lips when we discussed other matters, a thought there that came out, involuntary gestures, subtle and slight, even imperceptible, indications, which aroused suspicion in a person, one idea imposed itself on me with great strength: that he was the prime shaper and executor of the deportation business. I am strongly convinced that he prepared the ground when he travelled the East by himself, took the basic decisions and that, while he worked to put his own personal ideas into practice, his position meant that his orders were taken to be orders of the Central Committee and of the government and that in the end he carried some of his influential friends in the government with him. That is why, if one day it would be necessary to revive Bahaeddin Şakir’s memory, the provinces in the east will be more than ready to put up his statue.19

First of all, it is clear that this old Unionist has no hesitation in describing Bahaeddin’s role quite openly (even if he refers to the deportations rather than the killings). That the Armenian policy was not discussed openly in his presence is entirely credible. After all, Hüseyin Cahit was certainly trusted by Tâlât’s circle up to a point, but he was not one of the people who had been actively involved in the planning of the constitutional revolution. Nor was he
a member of the innermost circle. The important thing, however, is that he concludes that Bahaeddin must have been primarily responsible and then goes on, not to blame him or to distance himself from him, but instead to suggest that his memory should be honored.

The most interesting aspect of the publication is of course that it was published at all. In 1936 Kemalist Turkey had one of the most draconian press laws in existence, which even prohibited “any publication at odds with the general policies of the state.” Censorship was strictly enforced, so we can assume that the above statement was published with the implicit agreement of the government.

In short: in the early republic the political and intellectual elite felt as little need to distance themselves from the genocide and its perpetrators as they had immediately following the war. In the years 1918–1922 the continued need to mobilize the Muslim population of Anatolia made any serious reckoning with this aspect of the recent past an impossibility. After the proclamation of the republic the composition of the ruling elite precluded it. Turkey was ruled by an elite that consisted of former Unionist bureaucrats and military officers, who hailed overwhelmingly from the Balkans and had adopted Anatolia as their new fatherland. Many of the people in central positions of power (Şükrü Kaya, Kazım Özalp, Abdülhalik Renda, Kılıç Ali) had been personally involved in the massacres, but besides that, the ruling elite as a whole depended on a coalition with provincial notables, landlords, and tribal chiefs, who had profited immensely from the departure of the Armenians and the Greeks. It was what Fatma Müge Göçek has called an unspoken “devil’s bargain.” 20 A serious attempt to distance the republic from the genocide could have destabilized the ruling coalition on which the state depended for its stability.
Notes

INTRODUCTION

1. For a prehistory of the project to bring Armenian, Turkish, and other scholars together to discuss their research on the Armenian Genocide and the final years of the Ottoman Empire, see Ronald Grigor Suny, “Truth in Telling: Reconciling Realities in the Genocide of the Ottoman Armenians,” American Historical Review, 114, no. 4 (Oct. 2009): 930–46.


4. The Turkish Armenian Reconciliation Commission was established in July 2001 with State Department support and ended its activity in April 2004. Made up of “civil society representatives,” it attempted to find common ground between Turks and Armenians on the events of 1915. The International Center for Transition Justice eventually ruled on TARC’s report and acknowledged that Ottoman government actions constituted genocide. On TARC, with which WATS has sometimes been confused or deliberately conflated, see David L. Phillips, Unsilencing the Past: Track Two


6. The account of the Istanbul conference comes from a report authored by Fatma Müge Göçek and circulated through the WATS listserv.


**CHAPTER 1**


3. Ibid., xxi.


8. For information on Morgenthau’s early life and later career, see Henry Morgenthau, *All in a Lifetime* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Page, 1922); *I Was Sent to
10. Ibid., 14. In her reading of Turkish memoirs, Fatma Müge Göçek has noted that of the three leading Young Turk leaders, Tâlât was the most religiously observant, was known to pray three times a day, and was sometimes ridiculed by others for his piety. Personal communication to the author.
12. Ibid., 18.
13. Ibid., 164, 191.
15. Ibid., 101, 170.
17. Ibid., 194.
18. Ibid., 196.
19. Ibid., 135.
20. Ibid., 100.
22. Ibid., 11.
23. Ibid., 117. Most of these attacks were orchestrated by the CUP itself, according to memoirs of members of the Special Organization. Fatma Müge Göçek, private communication to the author.
25. Ibid., 135.
26. Ibid., 138.
27. Ibid., 200.
28. Ibid., 201.
29. Ibid., 203–4.
30. Ibid., 221–22.
31. Ibid., 224. In his laconic diary entry, Morgenthau related that he had dinner with Tâlât that Saturday, April 24: “We asked him about Armenians and he admitted that they had arrested a great many of them. He said he wants them to leave the city. They intend to put them among Turks in the interior where they can do no harm.” Sarafian, *United States Diplomacy on the Bosphorus*, 216.
32. Morgenthau, *Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story*, 230. In his diary entry for April 24, 1915, Morgenthau wrote that in a conversation about the Zionists, Tâlât saw them as “mischievous and that it is their duty to get rid of them.” The ambassador concluded, “he is evidently as much afraid of internal trouble as the war, and they have made up their mind to crush all possible attempts at revolution.” Sarafian, *United States Diplomacy on the Bosphorus*, 215–16.
34. Ibid., 232.
35. Ibid., 233.
36. Ibid., 229.
37. Ibid., 234.
40. Ibid., 278.


48. The only historical journal dealing with Armenians available in English in the 1940s and 1950s was the *Armenian Review*, founded in 1948 by the Dashnak party. As Bloxham points out, “It was not for nearly two decades that the *Armenian Review* addressed the genocide with any consistency or frequency.” The journal’s “emphasis was much more on the historical Armenian struggle for freedom against domination of all sorts, from that of the sultans through the CUP to the USSR, and


58. Ibid., 7.


62. I am indebted to my colleague Jirair (Gerard) Libaridian for suggestions informing this section.

63. On the importance of considering perceptions and projections, see Robert Melson, “A Theoretical Enquiry into the Armenian Massacres of 1894–1986,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 24 (1982): 481–509. Most Armenians, of course, did not join the revolutionary movement but continued to hope for the best within the Ottoman legal structure. Even after the “Bloody Sultan,” Abdulhamid II (1876–1909) abrogated the Ottoman Constitution, the Armenian religious leaders and the middle class preferred to petition the government or appeal to the Western powers for redress. Given the general passivity of the Armenian peasantry of Anatolia and the hostility of the Armenian community leadership, the revolutionaries remained a vocal and violent irritant for the Turks but no real threat to the continuance of the sultan’s power. Resistance attracted only a small minority of Armenians, and the revolutionary movement itself split over issues of tactics and goals. In the aftermath of the massacres of 1894–1896, the Hnchak party broke into two factions, one still committed to the original populist-Marxist program, the other considerably more moderate and gravitating toward liberalism. Though it never regained its original prominence among Armenians, the Hnchak party remained notable as the only Armenian revolutionary party that clearly called for Armenian independence in its party program until it dropped that demand in 1909—after the Young Turk Revolution.


65. The divisions among Ottoman Armenians between those who worked within the Ottoman system and those who advocated rebellion are detailed in the local study of Zeytun by Aram Arkun in this volume (chapter 10).

66. See the discussion of the work of Dadrian and Balakian below.


70. Ibid.

71. Ibid., 166.

72. Ibid.
73. Ibid., 156.


75. Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961; 2nd ed., 1968), 356. Over the years Lewis has hardened his position. In 2007 he was quoted in an article opposing U.S. recognition of the genocide in the conservative Washington Times: “[T]he point that was being made was that the massacre of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire was the same as what happened to Jews in Nazi Germany and that is a downright falsehood. What happened to the Armenians was the result of a massive Armenian armed rebellion against the Turks, which began even before war broke out, and continued on a larger scale.” Bruce Fein (identified as “resident scholar with the Turkish Coalition of America”), “Armenian Crime Amnesia?” The Washington Times, Oct. 16, 2007.


79. Ibid., 27.

80. Ibid, 38.


82. This evolution toward Turkish nationalism is explored in M. Şükrü Hanioglu, The Young Turks in Opposition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); and Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902–1908 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

83. See the chapters in this volume by Dündar (13) and Üngör (14), as well as Fuat Dündar, Ittihat ve Terakki’nin Müslümanları İskan Politikası (1913–1918) [The Muslim Settlement Policy of the Union and Progress Party] (Istanbul: İletşim Press, 2001); and his dissertation, “L’ingénierie ethnique du régime jeune-turc” (Paris: EHESS, 2006).


88. Ibid., 20.

89. Ibid., 5.

90. Ibid., 65–66.

91. Ibid, 75.

92. Ibid., 94.


96. Reviewing six case studies by other authors that examine ethnic violence from Northern Ireland, India, Sudan, Rawanda, Sri Lanka, and the Balkans, Fearon and Laitin make this point graphically: “Indeed, based on these studies, one might conjecture that a necessary condition for sustained ‘ethnic violence’ is the availability of thugs (in most cases young men who are ill-educated, unemployed or underemployed, and from small towns) who can be mobilized by nationalist ideologues, who themselves, university educated would shy away from killing their neighbors with machetes” James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity,” *International Organization* 54, no. 4 (Autumn 2000): 845–77 [869].

97. Ibid., 871.


100. Ibid., 145.
101. Ibid., 141.

CHAPTER 2

5. Taha Parla, Türkiye’de Siyasi Kültürü: Atatürk’ün Nutuk’u [The Official Sources of Political Culture in Turkey: Atatürk’s Speech] (İstanbul: İletişim, 1991), 19–21. Mustafa Kemal also employed his narrative to marginalize all others who had contributed to the success of the Independence Struggle.
9. As Anthony W. Marx notes, exclusion occurs when the state elite decide “who to include, reward and encourage loyalty form as the core constituency. To identify and consolidate the core, [they] manipulate established antagonisms against some other groups thereby excluded.” “The Nation-State and Its Exclusion,” Political Science Quarterly 117, no. 1 (2002): 113. This exclusion is often not class-based because the state elite need the income generated by these groups. I define minorities as those social groups who do not share equally in the power distribution of a society. Even though some present-day Kurds do not consider themselves to be a minority group and are not officially defined as such by the Turkish state, they would sociologically comprise a minority because they do not share equally in the distribution of resources in Turkish society.
10. Also eliminated are the frequent interventions of the military in Turkish democracy through a series of military coups in 1960, 1971, 1980, and the soft-coup in 1997.


13. See, for instance, 8 Mart sene 335 tarihinde irade-i seniye-i hazret-i padişahiye iktiran eden kararname ile müteşekkil divan-i harb-i örfi muhakematı zabıt ceridesi [Turkish military tribunal records] (İstanbul: Takvim-i Vekayi Press, 1919–1920).


16. See National Congress of Turkey, The Turco-Armenian Question: The Turkish Point of View (Constantinople: Societe Anonyme de Papeterie et d’Imprimerie, 1919).

17. Y. G. Çark, Türk Devleti Hizmetinde Ermeniler (1453–1953) [Armenians in the Service of the Turkish State] (İstanbul: Yeni Press, 1953); Esat Uras, Tarihte Ermeniler ve Ermeni Meselesi [Armenians in History and the Armenian Question] (İstanbul: Belge Press, 1953). Çark was a priest who unfortunately did not feel comfortable enough to state what his first name was. Esat Uras was a member of the former Committee of Union and Progress Special Organization, initially sent to Anatolia along with others to research the minorities living there.


20. For a full discussion, see Erik Jan Zürcher, Milli Mücadele İttihatçılık [The Unionist Factor: The Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement, 1905–1926] (İstanbul: Bağlam Press, 1987).


22. For examples of this cluster, see the works of Şükür Hanoğlu, Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902–1908 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), and The Young Turks in Opposition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Türk Tarih Vakfı, 75 Yılda Tebaa’dan Yurttaş’a Doğru [From Subject to Citizen in 75 Years] (İstanbul: History Foundation Press, 1999); Osman Selim Kocahanoğlu, İttihat-terakki’nin Sorgulanması ve Yargılanması: Meclis-i Mebusan Zabıtları [The Interrogation and Trial of the Union and Progress: Proceedings of the Ottoman Assembly] (İstanbul: Temel Press, 1998); Fuat Dündar, İttihat ve Terakki’nin Müslümanları İskan Politikası (1913–1918) [The Muslim Settlement Policy of the Union and Progress Party] (İstanbul: İletişim Press, 2001).


CHAPTER 3


4. Ibid., 24–29. The quotation is on p. 47.


7. These reforms remind one of somewhat similar developments in Europe from the beginning of the nineteenth century on: the Code Napoleon (1804), later to be called *Code Civil*; the reforms of Baron von Stein in Prussia (1807); and in Russia the reforms of Tsar Alexander II (abolition of serfdom in 1861, the judicial reform of 1864, reform of municipal government in 1870, etc.). On France’s cultural and ideological impact on the modernization of the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey, see Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont and Edhem Eldem, eds., *De la Révolution française à la Turquie d’Atatürk: La modernisation politique et sociale*, Varia Türcica 16 (Istanbul and Paris: Éditions Isis, 1990).


18. For one such case, see Quataert, “The Age of Reforms, 1812–1914,” 871.


23. More than half of these refugees seem to have been in Asiatic Turkey during the 1856–1878 period. As a result of Ottoman territorial losses, those resettled in Rumelia were forced to migrate again, this time into Asiatic Turkey in the subsequent period (1878–1914). For the data on the Circassian immigration, see A. Üner Turgay, “Circassian Immigration into the Ottoman Empire, 1856–1878,” in *Islamic Studies Presented to Charles J. Adams*, ed. Wael B. Hallaq and Donald P. Little, 200–201, 204–5, 210–14 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991); also Justin McCarthy, “An Ottoman Document on the Refugees of the Crimean Period,” *The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin* 6, no. 2 (Sept. 1982): 29–30. Until the early 1860s, Circassian immigration into the Ottoman Empire, which had started after the end of the Crimean War (1856), was still limited. See Kemal H. Karpat, “Avrupali Egemenliğinde Müslüman


30. Some sources emanating from local Protestant missionaries suggest that the Ottoman government had purposely sharpened the existing tension between the Kurds and the Nestorians in order to establish its direct control of the region. See Hans-Lukas Kieser, Der verpasste Friede: Mission, Ethnie und Staat in den Ostprovinzen der Türkei 1839–1938 (Zürich: Chronos Verlag, 2000), 67. Clearly, missionary activities among Nestorians also contributed to the growing tension. See Shields, Mosul before Iraq, 54–57.


36. Kodaman, Şark Meselesi Işığ Altında Sultan II. Abdülhamid’in Doğu Anadolu Politikası, 31. The author makes it clear that one of the sultan’s main goals was to reject any reform in favor of the Armenians; see, 10. As early as the seventeenth century, the Ottoman state used provincial banditry, organized pastoral nomadic groups into paramilitary organizations, and manipulated the opposition between settled and nomadic populations to better centralize the empire. See Karen Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization, The Wilder House Series in Politics, History, and Culture (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994).


39. Kévorkian and Paboudjian, Les arméniens dans l’Empire Ottoman à la veille du génocide, 44–45. For specific cases of Armenian emigration, see for example, Lynch, Armenia: Travels and Studies, 2:218, 426. See also Sarkisyan, Politika osmanskogo
pravitel’stva v zapadnoi Armenii i Derzhavy, 63, 66. For the systematic use of demanding the payment of a year’s taxation “in advance” to drive the Armenians off their lands, see also Malcolm MacColl, “The Constantinople Massacre and Its Lesson,” The Contemporary Review (November 1895): 754–55.

40. Baron Wladimir Giesl, Zwei Jahrzehnte in Nahen Orient (Berlin: Verlag für Kulturpolitik, 1927), 120.

41. Ali Vahbi Bey, Pensées et souvenirs de l’ex-sultan Abdul-Hamid (Paris and Neuchatel: Attinger Frères, n.d [1910s]), 14–15. These thoughts of the sultan are dated 1893. The editor was his private secretary. The French original being a bit unusual, I will quote it here:

Les temps ne sont plus où nous enfoncions des échardes dans notre propre chair en accueillant des sectateurs de religions étrangères. Dans les limites de notre État, nous ne saurions tolérer que des membres de notre propre peuple et des sectateurs de notre propre foi. Il nous faut veiller à renforcer l’élément turc; il nous faut systématiquement ramener le flux de l’expansion mahométane qui nous revient de Bosnie et d’Herzégovine, ainsi que de Bulgarie. Cette colonisation-là est pour nous une question vitale. Il s’agit, par cette immigration, d’augmenter non seulement la puissance nationale, mais encore la puissance économique de l’Empire. Il nous faut renforcer le plus possible l’élément mahométan en Roumélie, et tout spécialement en Asie Mineure; avant tout, il s’agit pour nous de nous y assimiler les Kurdes.

42. For a detailed list of thousands of cases of land usurpation and exaction of all kinds from 1908 to 1912, see the Armenian Patriarchate’s reports (takrir) to the Sublime Porte and the Ottoman Ministry of Justice and Cults, La situation des arméniens en Turquie exposée par des documents 1908–1912, vol. 1, 52pp.; vol. 2, 70p.; vol. 3, 61pp.; vol. 4, 52+XXXpp.; vol. 5, 53+XXXIIIpp.; vol. 6, 32+XXVIpp.; vol. 7, 34+XXXVIIIpp; vol. 8, 32+XLIIIpp.; vol. 9, 130+Ipp. (n.p.: [Istanbul], no publisher [Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul], n.d.). The total number of usurped properties exceeds 33,000. Volume 3 is of particular interest, as it consists of an important report on the Adana massacres of 1909 by the Armenian Ottoman deputy Babigian, written shortly prior to his death in rather suspicious circumstances. The volume is entitled “Rapport en date du 7 juin 1325 (1909), de feu Babigian effendi, député d’Ardinople, sur les massacres arméniens d’Adana.”


44. A. S. Hambaryan, Yeritturkeri Azgayin u Hoghayin Kaghakakanutyune yev Azatagrakan Sharzhumern Armeniyay Hayastanum (1908–1914) [The National and Land Policies of the Young Turks and the Liberation Movements in Western Armenia (1908–1914)] (Yerevan: Armenian S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, 1979), 11–104. Refugees were settled on Armenian lands even when uncultivated lands were available in the same region, see ibid., 65–66. On the irrelevance of title deeds held by Armenians, whose lands were taken over by muhacir in the province of Bitlis, see F.O. 424/228/21, Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey (Constantinople, July 9, 1911), enclosure 2, Acting Vice-Consul Safrastian to Consul McGregor (Bitlis, June 18, 1911). On the farcical nature of the activities of the commission of inspection sent by the Unionist government to inquire into the Armenians’ agrarian grievances in 1910, see F.O. 424/228/21, Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey (Constantinople, July 9,
1911), enclosure 1, Consul McGregor to Sir Gerard Lowther (Erzerum, June 27, 1911). The inspectors collected their information entirely from the local officials.


48. On the CUP’s policies of social and demographic engineering, including ethnic cleansing and refugee resettlement, see Fuat Dündar, *İttihat ve Terakki’nin Müslümanları İskân Politikası (1913–1918)* [The Union and Progress’s Settlement Policy of Muslims (1913–1918)] (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001).

49. For the division of Cilicia into two economic regions, see among others Elyas, ed., *Memalik-i Osmaniye-i Coğrafya-i İktisadisi* [The Economic Geography of the Ottoman Empire] (Dersaadet: Matbaa-i “Kadîr,” 1328), 248; and H. Galustian, *Marash kam Germanik* [Marash or Germanik] (New York: Kochnak Tparan, 1934), 305.


52. On the existence of some çiftlikleri in the Çukurova in the second half of the eighteenth century, see Kasım Ener, *Tarih Boyunca Adana Ovasına Bir Bakış* [A Look at the Plain at Adana throughout History] (İstanbul: Berksosy Matbaası, 1964), 228. It is beyond doubt, however, that most çiftlikleri were formed after 1870, see Mustafa Soysal, *Die Siedlungs- und Landschaftsentwicklung der Çukurova*, Erlangen Geographische Arbeiten, Sonderband 4 (Erlangen: Selbstverlag der Frankischen Geographischen Gesellschaft, 1976), 64–68.


55. Langlois, *Voyage dans la Cilicie*, 36.


57. Langlois, *Voyage dans la Cilicie*, 35.


59. Great Britain, Foreign Office Archives (Public Record Office), Class 78, Turkey, Volume 316, Consul Werry to Bidwell (Aleppo, Feb. 18, 1837), “Gross Return of British and Foreign Trade at the Principal Ports within the Consulate of Aleppo and Its Dependencies during the Year Ending the 31st of December 1836.”


70. Langlois, *Voyage dans la Cilicie*, 23.


72. Ibid., 38.


77. The figure 21,705 is given by Gould, “Pashas and Brigands,” 63, whereas 19,918 is the figure offered by an Ottoman archival document, see Justin McCarthy, “An Ottoman Document on the Refugees of the Crimean Period,” 30. See also Cevdet Paşa, *Ma’rûzât*, 125.


81. This expression is from Eberhard, “Nomads and Farmers,” 38.

82. Gould, “Pashas and Brigands,” 185.

83. Ibid., 185, 189, and 191.

84. Ibid., 202.


86. Ibid., 41.

87. Ibid., 41–42.

88. Wolfram Eberhard, “Changes in Leading Families in Southern Turkey,” in *Settlement and Social Change in Asia* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1967), 312–326. To have an idea of the extent and forms of semifeudal landlordism in southern and southeastern Turkey in the 1930s, see Ismail Hüsev [Tökin], *Türkiye


92. FO 424/91/171, Sir A. H. Layard, Ambassador at Constantinople, to the Marquis of Salisbury, Foreign Secretary, (Constantinople, Dec. 17, 1879), see enclosure 2 from Lieutenant Herbert Chermside to Sir A. H. Layard (Adana, Nov. 29, 1879), 221. Also quoted with a mistake in Gould, 159.

93. For article 78, see George Young, Corps de droit ottoman, 6, 67 and Ömer Lütfi Barkan, “Türk Toprak Hukuku Tarihinde Tanzimat ve 1274 (1858) Tarihli Arazi Kanunnamesi,” 366.

94. FO 424/91/171 enclosure 1, Lieutenant Chermside to Sir A. H. Layard (Tarsus, Nov. 26, 1879), 217. I have summarized various comments he makes in that report.

95. FO 424/91/171, enclosure 2.

96. Ibid.

97. FO 424/107/158, Mr. Goschen to Earl Granville (Therapia, Oct. 17, 1880), see enclosure 2 entitled “Petition of Christians of Giaour Dagh to British Consul at Alexandretta.”

98. FO 424/107/246 Mr. Goschen to Earl Granville (Therapia, June 22, 1880), see enclosure entitled “Memorandum by Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson on Anatolia and Necessary Reforms” (June 16, 1880).


101. Gould, “Pashas and Brigands,” 205. These figures come from Ottoman provincial yearbooks.

102. Ibid., 194.

103. Ibid., 203–6. The author estimates that 75,350 tribesmen and women were settled, of whom 55,650 were alive in 1890. The total loss was 19,700 souls, 26 percent of that population (206). On the other hand, the British consul Bennet estimated in 1881 that more than half of the nomads settled in 1865 and of the 1878 refugees had died of malaria and other diseases. See ibid., 167.

104. Ibid., 205.


106. FO 424/106/161, Sir A. H. Layard to the Marquis of Salisbury (Constantinople, Apr. 21, 1880), enclosure 1, Captain Cooper to Sir A. H. Layard (Constantinople, Apr. 14, 1880), 355.

107. FO 424/122/109, Mr. Goschen to Earl Granville (Constantinople, May 20, 1881), enclosure 3, “Report on the Vilayet of Adana” by Lieutenant Ferdinand Bennet (Apr. 28, 1881), 183; an excerpt of it is quoted in Andrew Gordon Gould, “Pashas and Brigands,” 165. See also the memoirs of a British traveler, who does not hide her prejudice against Armenians, which she attributes to their own parsimony and shrewdness: Mrs. Scott-Stevenson, *Our Ride through Asia Minor*, 129.


111. Germany, Auswärtiges Amt, Abteilung A, Akten betreffend allgemeine Angelegenheiten der Türkei, Türkei No. 134, Band 25a, A9304, Consul Schroeder to His Excellency the Foreign Minister (Beirut, May 29, 1909), 2, and enclosure by candidate junior barrister Hamann, 1, 7; also Dr. Johannes Lepsius, *Le rapport secret du Dr. Johannes Lepsius sur les massacres d’Arménie* (Paris: Payot, 1918), 272–73; and FO 424/219/83, Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey (Constantinople, May 4, 1909), enclosure 1, Vice-Consul Wylie to Sir G. Lowther (Adana, Apr. 21, 1909), 84.


113. This is a common theme in Ottoman and Turkish writings about the Cilician massacres. The problem is that the main Armenian political party at that time was a socialist party with strong nationalist sentiments (the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, or *Dashnaksutiun*). The second most influential party, the Hnchak
Social-Democratic Party, was Marxist. I do not know of any Armenian organization that wanted to create a kingdom in the Ottoman Empire in general, and even less so in Cilicia in particular, at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. Thus, the information reflects the Turkish views justifying the massacres. On these parties and their platforms, see Louise Nalbandian, The Armenian Revolutionary Movement: The Development of Armenian Political Parties through the Nineteenth Century, reprint (1963; Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975), 104–78; Anahide Ter Minassian, “Nationalisme et socialisme dans le mouvement révolutionnaire arménien (1887–1912),” in La question arménienne (Roquevaire: Éditions Parenthèses, 1983), 73–111.


116. See Young, Corps de droit ottoman, vol. 6, 78 for art. 115 and Young’s analysis on pp. 84–85.

117. Ibid., 78–79.

118. Ibid., 87–89. The income of vakıfs müsakaffat derive from various kinds of buildings. Vakıfs müstaffalât are landed urban properties that do not have buildings and that generate some rent or produce. See Démétrius Nicolaides, ed., Doustour-i Hamidié: Appendice à la législation ottomane (Constantinople: Journal Thraki, 1878), 251, footnotes 1 and 2.


120. Ibid., 85–87. On these matters, see Young’s analysis on pp. 84–85.

121. The boldface characters indicate that I consider these conclusions as needing further corroboration from case studies dealing with other regions.


126. See the text in George Young, Corps de droit ottoman (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1905), 1:345.

128. For instance, an irade [decree] dated May 8, 1892, enjoined that immigrants, refugees that is, be settled in the Dersim region to face the possibility [italics mine] that a number of brigands, in this context probably Alevi Kurds, might be in contact with Armenian subversive elements. The stated goal was to ensure public order and tranquility. See Nedim İpek, Rumeli’den Anadolu’ya Türk Göçleri (1877–1890) [Turkish Migrations from Rumelia to Anatolia (1877–1890)], 2nd ed. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1999), 158–59.


CHAPTER 4

1. See Gerard Libaridian, Modern Armenia, People, Nation, State (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 2004), 89–124. A third party, the Liberal Democratic [Ramgavar] Party (ADL), was established in Cairo in 1908 and reorganized in 1921; it was heir to the Armenakan group founded in 1885 in the city of Van. The Ramgavar Party differed markedly from the first two since it rejected political or economic radicalism. Although its founding following the Young Turk Revolution and its liberal ideology constitute an important part of the larger historical picture, I chose not to discuss the Ramgavar Party in the present paper, since they were neither “revolutionary” nor a determinant of the character of the conflict. I will also put aside for the time being the analysis of the Armenian Marxist groups that emerged early in the twentieth century, because they had no direct participation in the political life of the Ottoman Empire before the war, even though their approach to the “Armenian Question” remains important for the understanding Armenian political thought or and for Armenian history after the war. There are also a number of small parties that will not feature in my article, such as the Armenian Socialist Party founded in Europe, in 1900, whose approach was quite original from the point of view of intellectual history but who did not have a particular impact on the course of events


4. Drosbak, no. 2, 1891.


7. Drosbak, no. 1, 1890.

8. Dzragir [program of the HSDP.]

9. Dzragir [Program of the Dashnaktsutiun], 1892.

10. Ibid.

11. Drosbak, no. 2 (September) 1890.

12. Kitur, Patmutiun, 32.


14. “Letter from Antranik and Kevork, Chiefs of the Insurgents Near Mush,” July 1904. The bulk of the letter was reproduced in the August 1904 Drosbak in Armenia. This section of the letter, was reproduced from the full English, from the U.S. State Department Archives.


16. Ibid., 338.

17. Droshak, no. 7, 1894.

18. Undated meeting between Hnchak representative S. Sabah-Gulian, and Ahmed Riza and Doctor Nazim, at the Café Voltaire in Paris, prior to the Young Turk Revolution but after 1906. Ahmed Riza asked that the Hnchak Party desist from appeals to the Great Powers and accept the Midhatian Constitution as the basis of cooperation. Sabah-Gulian insisted on the autonomy of the Armenia provinces and the May 1895 reforms as proposed by the Great Powers following the 1894–95 massacres of Armenians. The Hnchaks, according to Kitur, were very concerned with the Pan-Turanic designs of the Young Turks, which would have spelled disaster for the Armenians.

19. The Armenian diaspora existed even before the word was invented or used for Armenians, just as genocide would occur before a word was coined for the phenomenon. One can argue that an Armenian diaspora was formed during the collapse of the last Armenian kingdom in historic Armenia at the end of the tenth century.


22. These projects were for the most part seeking the reestablishment of the lost Armenian medieval kingdoms, which would be achieved with the help of “Christian” kings of the West. Shahamir Shahamirian, of the Madras community of merchants, promoted the vision of a republic, a most revolutionary idea for the eighteenth-century Armenian world, which, unfortunately, did not survive the prevarications of the serf-owning class, who dominated the imperial Russian occupation of Eastern Armenia and the Caucasus. The initial territorialization of the
Armenian problem by the Patriarchate, in the Treaty of San Stefano—"reforms in the Armenian provinces"—was diluted in the Treaty of Berlin, under the form of "reforms in the Eastern provinces" of the Ottoman Empire.

23. Libaridian, Modern Armenia, 73–85.
24. Kitur, Patmutiun, 35.
25. Droshak, no. 3, 1892.
26. Kristapor Mikayelian, one of the three founders of the Dashnaktsutiun, and its leading figure, had proposed the idea in 1904 to the Third World Congress of the party, and had been assigned the task. He died in 1905 while testing the time bomb, in Bulgaria.
28. Libaridian, Modern Armenia, ch. 5.
29. Dzragir of the HSDP.
30. Droshak, no. 4, 1893.
32. As reported in Kitur, Patmutiun, 386–87.
33. Ibid., 387–388.
34. Inviting the intervention of the Great Powers was not a new strategy; Patriarch Nerses Varjabedian first adopted it, with the support of some of his National Council, in anticipation of Russian victory in the 1877–78 war with the Ottoman Empire.
35. The value of the internationalization of the Armenian Question is still debated in Armenian political literature.
36. Much has been written, with justification, regarding the role of the rivalry between Great Britain and Russia, in the determination of positions regarding the "Armenian Question." Russian interference has often been pointed out as a possible cause for the rise of the Armenian revolutionary movement. Two points need to be made here. Russian interest in territorial expansion did play an indirect role in promoting the interest of Eastern Armenians in the fate of their brethren in the Ottoman Empire. But that does not diminish the significance of the social and economic factors in the rise of the movement. Second, Russian authorities were equally concerned about the revolutionary aspects of the Armenian movement. After all, Russia was an empire, too, opposed to popular and socialistic movements.

CHAPTER 5


7. There is a substantial body of literature characterized by numerous controversies over the causes, the attendant circumstances, and the consequences of the Armenian deportations of 1915/16. Some recent contributions are Donald Bloxham, *The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism, and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Günter Lewy, *The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2005); Taner Akçam, *A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006). It is not the purpose of this chapter to enter that discussion. However, one point must be emphasized: There is an (understandable) tendency to focus on the short period of 1914–1916, which is virtually the “zero-hour” of modern Armenian history, whereas developments that preceded that decisive moment are rather neglected.


Notes to Pages 114–115


17. Aksan, “The Ottoman Military and State Transformation,” 265. See also Y. Hakan Erdem, ‘Recruitment of the ‘Victorious Soldiers of Muhammad,’ in the Arab


19. For an analysis of discussions over the issue of universal conscription in the 1830s and 1840s, see Heinzelmann, *Heiliger Kampf oder Landesverteidigung*, 279–301.


29. Lieutenant-Colonel Bonham to Lowther, Drama, Sept. 9, 1908, No. 77, enclosure in Lowther to Grey, Therapia, Sept. 16, 1908, No. 577, Public Record Office (PRO), Foreign Office (FO) 371/559/32616.

30. Professor Moritz, director of the Khedivial Library in Cairo, reporting on his talks in Istanbul with “his old friend” and the present Chief of the General Staff of the Ottoman Army İzzet Pasha, 22 October 1908, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Berlin (PAAA), Türkei 142, Bd. 27, A. 18825.

31. The British consul-general in Salonica remarked: “The Macedono-Bulgarian leaders express great satisfaction at the realization of their desire to see their compatriots at last wearing the Ottoman uniform and shouldering their rifles in the ranks of the Ottoman army.” Lamb to Lowther, Salonica, Apr. 24, 1909, No. 52, PRO, FO 371/772/18457. On Greek reservations toward the Young Turks, see Feroz Ahmad, “Unionist Relations with the Greek, Armenian, and Jewish Communities of the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1914,” in Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire. The Functioning of a Plural Society, ed. Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, 1:405-18 (New York and London: Holmes and Meier, 1982).


33. Lowther to Grey, Pera, Apr. 28, 1909, No. 303, PRO, FO 371/771/16537.


36. Colonel Surtees to Lowther, Constantinople, June 20, 1909, No. 73, PRO, FO 371/776/23991.


39. For the text of the Ottoman soldiers’ oath of loyalty, see Gülsoy, Osmanlı gayrimüslimlerinin askerlik serüveni, 187-88.

40. Although the law prescribed military service for all male subjects, the well-to-do, Muslim or non-Muslim, could arrange for their relegation to the reserve after having performed six months’ service by paying the considerable sum of 50 Ottoman gold pounds. See H. Bowen, “Bedel,” Encyclopaedia of Islam, new ed. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1960), I:855. Under these conditions, the majority of the recruits continued to come from lower classes. Cf. Friedrich Immanuel, Der Balkankrieg 1912 (Berlin: Mittler, 1913), 55.
41. German Consulate Salonika, Mar. 14, 1910, No. 564/48, PAAA, Türkei 142/29/4806; German Military Attaché, Constantinople, Apr. 10, 1910, J.No. 64.10, Mil.-Bericht No. 269, PAAA, Türkei 142/29/6418.

42. See Gülsoy, Osmanlı gayrimüslimlerinin askerlik serüveni, 141–48.

43. German Consulate Baghdad, Oct. 11, 1909, No. 64, PAAA, Türkei 142/28/18171.

44. Elliot to Grey, Athens, May 12, 1910, No. 73, PRO, FO 371/1009/17734.


51. Wangenheim’s Cipher Tel. of Sept. 22, 1912, No. 297, PAAATürkei 203/1/16334.

52. For a severe critic of the Ottoman government for remaining inactive during this decisive period and for trusting the Great Powers who had promised to protect the Ottoman territorial integrity, see Aram Andonian, Balkan Harbi Tarihi [The History of the Balkan War], trans. from Armenian by Zaven Biberyan (Istanbul: Sander Yayınları, 1975), 196ff.


54. See Gülsoy, Osmanlı gayrimüslimlerinin askerlik serüveni, 162. Immanuel names 40,000 as the number of the non-Muslim recruits in the Ottomans army, see Der Balkankrieg, 60ff.

55. See Andonian, Balkan Harbi tarihi, 224.

Notes to Pages 117–120
56. 25 Şevval 1330 (Oct. 7, 1912), BOA, DH-SYS 112-7A/7-4.
58. Hans Rohde, Meine Erlebnisse im Balkankrieg und kleine Skizzen aus dem türkischen Soldatenleben (Charlottenburg: Baumann, 1913), 7.
59. 1 Zilkade 1330 (Oct. 12, 1912), BOA, DH-SYS 112-1-1/2.
63. 4 Cemaziyelahir 1331 (May 10, 1913), BOA, DH-SYS 112-13/16-9.
64. May 18, 1913, BOA, DH-SYS 112-13/16-9.
65. Mutesariflik of Sinop to the Ministry of Interior, Cipher Tel., 12 Eylül 1329 (Sept. 25, 1913), BOA, DH-SYS 112-13/16-6.
67. Wangenheim to Bethmann Hollweg, Constantinople, Nov. 4 1912, No. 486, Cipher Tel., PAAA Türkei 203/7/19365.
68. Tyrrell to Lowther, Constantinople, Nov. 9, 1912, No. 88, PRO, FO 371/1506/48795.
69. Mahmud Muhtar Pascha, Meine Führung im Balkankriege 1912 (Berlin: Mittler, 1913), 164.
73. Colin Ross, Im Balkankrieg (Munich: Mörikes, 1913), 112.


78. Hall, The Balkan Wars 1912-1913, 18.


80. Apr. 16, 1913, DH-SYS 112-22/51.


82. Sept. 26, 1913, DH-SYS 112-7B/7-53.

83. Y. Hikmet Bayur, Türk inkılıbî tarihi, 2:17ff. For a persuasive analysis of Ottoman expectations and frustrations during this period, see Eyal Ginio, “Mobilizing the Ottoman Nation during the Balkan Wars (1912–1913): Awakening from the Ottoman Dream,” War in History 12 (2005): 156–77.


91. In the coastal districts, some of which had a predominantly Greek population before 1914, practically no Greek was left by 1917. See Engin Berber, Sancılı yıllar: İzmir 1918-1922. Mütareke ve Yunan işgali döneminde İzmir Sancığı [The Painful Years: İzmir 1918–1922; The Sanjak of İzmir during the Armistice and the Greek Occupation] (Ankara: Ayraç Yayınevi, 1997), 57–72; F. Dündar, Modern Türkiye’nin Şifresi, 225–48.


CHAPTER 6


3. I am using the edition by Nejdet Bilgi: Mehmed Reşid [Şahingiray], Hayatı ve Hâtraları, ed. N. Bilgi (İzmir: Akademi Kitabevi, 1997). I will refer to it as “Bilgi, Hayati ve Hâtraları,” but will cite the texts of Mehmed Reşid by their titles, e.g., “Reşid, Balıkesir Notları,” giving the page numbers according to Bilgi’s edition, which comprises the following texts of Reşid: (1) Taşkışla Hâtıraları, 57–64; (2) Balıkesir Notları, 65–76; (3) Mülâhazât: Ermeni Meselesi ve Diyarbekir Hâtıraları, 77–114; (4) Günlik: Tevkiften İntihara kadar, 115–54; (5) Vasiyetnâme, 157–58; (6) Hal Tercümesi: Kendi El Yazısı İle Biyografisi, 163–65; and (7) Arzı: 1911 Yılına Ait Bir Arzı, 173–77.

The edition Dr. Reşid Bey’in Hâtraları: “Sürgünden İntihara,” by A. Mehmetefendioglu (İstanbul: Arba, 1993), contrary to Bilgi’s edition, only gives the censored versions
of Mülâhazât and Günlük as they were published in 1919 in the newspapers Alemdar and Memleket.

In addition, I will use the following text: Cevrî (Mehmed Reşid Bey), İnkılâb Niçin ve Nasil Oldu (Mısır: Matbaa-i İctihad, 1909). There is a new edition by Bilgi (İzmir: Akademi Kitabevi, 1994). I will cite it as Cevrî, İnkılâb. Most probably Cevrî is a pseudonym for Mehmed Reşid (see N. Bilgi’s arguments in the introduction: Cevrî, İnkılâb, 11–23), even if before 1908 Mehmed Reşid had used the CUP nickname “Çerkes Lâmi” or “Lâli”; see Şükrü Hanoğlu, The Young Turks in Opposition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 286–89, n. 410, n. 478, and 356, n. 86.


8. As he wrote to İshak Süküti of the CUP-center in Geneva; Hanoğlu, Young Turks in Opposition, 105; İbrahim Temo, İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti’nin kurucusu ve 1/1 no’lu İbrahim Temo’nun İttihat ve Terakki Anıları (1939; İstanbul: Arba yay., 1987), 14.


15. Sağlam, Nasıl Okudum, 85.


19. Temo, İttihat ve Terakki, 42. See also points 1 and 2 of the regulations of the CUP in its first years: Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler, vol. 1: İkinci Meşrutiyet Dönemi, 1908–18 (İstanbul: İletişim, 1998–99), 70.

20. Cevrî, İnkılâb, 37, 42–43 and 52.
22. Hanioğlu, Young Turks in Opposition, 207.
25. Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler, 1:175.
29. With the İttihadists in place, however, the Osmanlı İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti Hums Livâ Heyet-i Merkeziyesi thanked him in a letter of June 19/20 for his valuable services to the nation, the fatherland and the party; Bilgi, Hayatı ve Hâtıraları, 20–21.
30. Reşid, Arzi, 175–76.
31. Ibid., 176.
32. “namusum derecesinde mukaddes bildiğim vazifemi.” Ibid., 177.
34. Bilgi, Hayatı ve Hâtıraları, 21.
36. Celal Bayar, Ben de yazdım (Istanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1965–67), 5:1573. The nationalist author Nurdoğan Taçalan wrote in 1970: “Union and Progress had taken a final decision. The sources of trouble had to be eliminated, the Rumlar had to be eliminated by political and economic measures. At the very outset, the Rumlar who were economically powerful needed to be broken and destroyed.” Nurdoğan Taçalan, Ege’de Kurtuluş Savaşı başlarken (Istanbul: Milliyet, 1970), 65, cited in Taner Akçam, İnsan Hakları ve Ermeni Sorunu. İttihad ve Terakki’den Kurtulus Savaşı’na (Ankara: İmge, 1999), 179.
38. Reşid, Balıkesir Notları, 65.
39. Ibid., 66.
40. Ibid., 68.
41. Ibid., 69.
42. Ibid., 70.
43. Ibid., 71.
44. Ibid., 75.
45. “İslam unsurunun kanını emmekedirler”—in a text from the end of 1918, which retrospectively refers to Reşid’s experiences in Diyarbekir. Reşid, Mülâhazât, 97–99.
47. Bilgi, Hayatı ve Hâtıraları, 22.
55. Reşid, Mülâhazât, 102.
56. In a telegram of 5 Eylül 1331 (Sept. 18, 1915) from Diyarbekir to the Ministry of the Interior; see Armenians in Ottoman Documents (1915–1920) (Ankara: The Turkish Prime Ministry General Directorate of the State Archives, 1995), 105. In Memleket, 29 Nisan 1919, is cited, according to Bilgi, Hayatı ve Hâtıraları, 28, a similar telegram of 15 Eylül 1331 (Sept. 28, 1915).
58. 144,000 disappeared during the persecutions in 1915/16, most of them killed. Yves Ternon, Empire ottoman: Le declin, la chute, l’effacement (Paris: Editions Michel de Maule, 2002), 185–87.
62. Reşid, Mülâhazât, 102. For the recurring use of “küret” (audacity, impertinence), see, e.g., 99.
64. Cf. Beysanoğlu, Diyarbakır Tarıhi, 786–860; the transcribed telegram is on 727–29; a list of the notables closely cooperating with Dr Reşid is on 793–94. For the roles of Cemil Pasha and Pirincçizâde Arif see Gustave Meyrier, Les massacres de Diarbjekir. Correspondance diplomatique du Vice-Consul de France 1894–1896, présentée et annotée par Claire Mouradian (Paris: L’Inventaire, 2000), 172, 185, 186, 216; for the designation of the committee as Young Turk see 170. As far as I understand, Mustafa Cemilpaşazâde, colonel and chief of Dr. Reşid’s milice, was the son of Cemil Pasha, former governor of Yemen.
65. Extracts of the interview in Ternon, Empire ottoman, 351.
66. Ibid., 86, 89–90, 281.
69. Reşid, Mülâhazât, 104–5.
70. Ternon, Empire ottoman, 88.
73. Telegram of July 20, 1915, BOADH $FR 54-A/49.
74. The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Mission, the strongest and best established missionary organization in Asia Minor during the last Ottoman decades. Dr. Smith mentions several Christian notables having been tortured and finally killed. Many died from typhus. He could not get access to the suffering people. “Metassian, the representative of the Standard Oil, was taken down in prison . . .They refused me admittance [into the prison] rather rudely asking what business I had there. One of the guards said: ‘Let him die like a dog.’ He died that same afternoon.” Letter to James Barton, Vevey (Switzerland), Sept. 18, 1915, 3–4, Archives of the ABCFM, Houghton Library, Boston, ABC 16.9.7 (reel 716: 436).
75. Officially on March 25 only.
76. Letter to James Barton, Vevey (Switzerland), Sept. 18, 1915, 2–3, ABC 16.9.7 (reel 716: 434–436).
77. Reşid Bey had persons from the entourage of Dr. Smith tortured and one of them sign that “1. I (Dr. Smith) am an Armenian, 2. I (Dr. Smith) was Maynard’s agent to incite insurrection in Diyarbekir as at Van.” Smith’s letter to Barton, Vevey, Aug. 25, 1915, ABC 16.9.7.
79. Smith’s letter to Barton, Rowley (Iowa), Sept. 20, 1917, ABC 16.9.7.
80. Cf. Dr. Smith’s (Diyarbakir) and Dr. Thom’s (who had lived for forty years at Mardin) letters to Barton from 1914 to March 1915, ABC 16.9.7 (reels 716 and 717).


82. This dispatch very probably concerns the murder of the notables deported on May 30 (cf. Ternon 2002, 89–80, 281–82), but seems to blend it together with simultaneous murders (therefore the mention of women and children). June 10, 1915, Walter Holstein, German vice-consul in Mosul to the embassy in Constantinople, PA-AA/BoKon/169 (Lepsius 1919, doc. 78 and 80).


85. PA-AA/BoKon/169 (Lepsius 1919, doc. 112); note of Johannes Mordtmann, Generalkonsul in Konstantinopel: “am 12/7 persönlich an Talaat bej übergeben.”


91. Armenians in Ottoman Documents, 105.


98. Reşid’s last words to his family were undeniably tactful and touching. Reşid, “Son Sözüm,” Tasvir-i Efkar, 10 February 1919; Bilgi, Hayatı ve Hâdîraları, 155–56.
100. Reşid, Günlük, 119, 135.

CHAPTER 7

The following archival abbreviations are used in the notes to this chapter:

AVPRI Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi imperii [Foreign Policy Archive for the Russian Empire] (Moscow)
GARF Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii [State Archive of the Russian Federation] (Moscow)
HIA Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University
PRO FO Public Record Office, Foreign Office (London)
RGIA Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi imperii [Russian State Archive of the Russian Empire] (St. Petersburg)
RGVIA Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi voenno-istoricheskii arkhiv [Russian State Military-Historical Archive] (Moscow)
SHAA State Historical Archives of Armenia (Yerevan, Armenia)
SSTsSA Georgian State Historical Archive (Tbilisi, Georgia)


5. In this chapter, I address only the policies of the Russian Foreign Ministry and the Russian military. Elsewhere I discuss the agenda of the Ministry of Agriculture and its Resettlement Bureau, the agencies that had the most ambitious plans for occupied Armenia. Here I merely note that this agency’s campaign to convince the Russian government to annex and settle occupied Armenia was one conducted in opposition to existing government policy and had little actual effect on the ground. Peter Holquist, “In accord with State Interests and the People’s Wishes: The Technocratic Ideology of Imperial Russia’s Resettlement Administration” (in preparation). Relying on the memorandum of Agriculture Minister V. Krivoshein to S. Sazonov, Feb. 28, 1915, in Adamov, Razdel Aziatskoi Turtssii, appendix, 360–62, which in fact was a plea for the government to alter its policy at the time, many existing studies take this one institution’s agenda as representative of Russian policy overall. E.g., Hovannisian, Armenia, 58; and Somakian, Empires in Conflict, 107–8, portray this document as representative of Russian policy.


13. Ambassador Girs to the Russian Consul in Van, Aug. 6/19, 1914, in *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniiia v epokhu imperializma: Dokumenty iz arkhivov tsarskogo i vremennogo...*

14. Viceroy in the Caucasus Vorontsov-Dashkov to Chairman of the Council of Ministers Goremykin, Aug. 9/22, 1914; and Foreign Minister Sazonov to Chairman of the Council of Ministers Goremykin, Aug. 17/30, 1914; Goremykin to Vorontsov-Dashkov, Aug. 19/Sept. 1, 1914 (RGIA, f. 1276, op. 10, d. 848, ll. 4, 1, 9–10).


20. FM Sazonov to Ambassador Benckendorff, July 7/20, 1915, in Adamov, Razdel aziatskoi Turtsi, doc. 46.


24. General A. N. Kuropatkin, “Granitsy Rossii v rezul’tate voiny 1914–1915 godov. (Soobrazhenia k trebovaniiam pri zakliuchenii mira),” 2 vols., vol. 2: “Granitsy s Turtsiei, Persiei, i Kitaem,” (1915) (GARF, f. 543 (Kollektsiia rukopisei tsarskosl’eskogo dvortsa), op. 1, d. 751, ch. 2, ll. 240–48). Kuropatkin’s 1915 report on proposed border changes after the war’s conclusion was submitted directly to Emperor Nicholas II.


26. P. P. Migulin, “‘Zavoevanie Maloi Azii,’ Novyi ekonomist, no. 8 (Feb. 20, 1916): 2–6. Armenian activists were vocally opposed to this proposal: see “Russkii


28. M. Paléologue, Ambassadeur de France à Petrograd, à M. Aristide Briand, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, Petrograd, Mar. 11, 1916, nos. 203, 204, in *Les grandes Puissances, l’Empire ottoman et les Arméniens dans les archives françaises* (1914–1918), ed. Arthur Beylerian (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1983), docs. 185, 186; see also Sir G. Buchanan (Petrograd) to FO, Feb. 26/ Mar. 10, 1916 (PRO FO 371/vol. 2767/1916/47088). The French claimed that if they did not take the territory, the British would have demanded it all for themselves. This erroneous and self-serving justification outraged the British Foreign Office: “M. Paléologue is really incorrigible . . . This is really intolerable impertinence . . . the Russians [are] preferable neighbors to the French anywhere in the East.”


35. It had been the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71 that had brought attention to the distinction between “occupation” and “annexation”: see Doris Appel Graber, *The Development of the Law of Belligerent Occupation*, 1863–1914 (New York: AMS Press, 1968); for the role of the Russian government in advancing the codification of this aspect of international law, see Peter Holquist, “The Russian Empire as a ‘Civilized State’: International Law as Principle and Practice in Imperial Russia, 1874–1878” (unpublished paper).


40. RGVIA, f. 2005 (Grazhdanskoie upravlenie pri Verkhovnom Glavnokomanduiushchem), op. 1, d. 17, ll. 3 ob.-13 ob. Subsequent directives reiterated these goals: see “Organization of the Military Administration of the Territories of Turkey, Occupied by Right of War,” [ca. Dec. 1916] (RGVIA, f. 2168 [Staff of the Caucasus Army], op. 1, d. 268, ll. 20–23 ob.); and, Trubetzkoi, “Tseli voiny,” ll. 15–16.

41. George Buchanan to Edward Grey, Petrograd, Aug. 30, 1916, no. 198 (PRO FO 371/1916/2781/no. 181170) and Secret telegram from Stolitsa, the Official for Border Relations for the Caucasian Viceroy, Tiflis, Aug. 30, 1916, no. 1191 (AVPRI, f. 151, op. 482 [Politarkhiv], d. 4128, l. 16), regarding whether Russia had annexed Trebizond (it had not); Letter from the Chief of the Descent Detachment in the Odessa Port to MID, Oct. 7, 1917 and reply from the Second Political (Near Eastern) Department of MID, Oct. 15, 1917 (AVPRI, f. 151, op. 482 [Politarkhiv], d. 4128, ll. 41–42)


43. Dispatch of agents and appeals for uprising among Russian Muslims: Secret report from the Kutaissi provincial gendarme department to the Chancellery for the Viceroy in the Caucasus, 14 May 1914 (SSTsSAf. 13 [Kantseliariia namestnika na Kavkaze], op. 27s., d. 3265, l. 89–91); more reports on activities of Ottoman agents found in this archival file (ll. 17, 103, 107, 128); see also Bloxham, *Great Game*; and Akçam, *Shameful Act*.

Marauding in Persia: Decrypted telegram from the Vice-Consul in Khoi Kirsanov to the Diplomatic Official for the Caucasian Stolitsa, Sept. 16, 1914, no. 218 (SSTsSA f. 13 [Kantseliariia namestnika na Kavkaze], op. 27s., d. 3361, ll. 35); Decrypted telegram from the Vice-Consul in Khoi Kirsanov to the Diplomatic Official for the Caucasus Stolitsa, Sept. 16, 1914, no. 220 (SSTsSA f. 13 [Kantseliariia namestnika na Kavkaze], op. 27s., d. 3361, ll. 37); Decrypted telegram from the Vice-Consul in Urmia Vvedenskii to the Diplomatic Chinovnik on Kavkaze Stolitsa, Sept. 21, 1914, no. 648 (SSTsSAf. 13 [Kantseliariia namestnika na Kavkaze], op. 27s., d. 3361, ll. 18). See also Vladimir Genis, *Vitse-konsul Vvedenskii: Sluzhiba v Persii i Bukharском khanstve* (1906–1920 gg.): *Rossiiskaia diplomatiia v sud’bakh* (Moscow: Sotsial’no-policheskaia mysl,’ 2003), 22–34; and Gaunt, *Massacres, Resistance and Protectors*, 56–57.

44. See the reports submitted by Russian officials over the course of November–December 1914 and January 1915 in SSTsSA f. 13 (Kantseliariia namestnika na
Kavkaze), op. 27s., d. 3193. Also Bloxham, Great Game: “The Ottoman invasions of Persia and the Caucasus saw the plunder of 4–5,000 Armenian villages and the murder of some 27,000 Armenians and many Assyrians in and beyond Ottoman territory between November 1914 and April 1915” (75).

45. Report of Viceroy to the Caucasus to Nicholas II, Jan. 16, 1916 (RGIA, f. 1276, op. 19, d. 1061, l. 62), confirming cases of pillage and rape by Russian units; “Anonymous Memorandum Regarding Atrocities by Cossacks against Muslims” (1915) (RGIA, f. 1276, op. 19 [Namenik na Kavkaze], d. 1198); military investigation confirming murder of Muslim villager by soldiers (RGVIA, f. 2100 [Shtab armii Kavkazskogo fronta], op. 9, d. 3, l. 135–135ob.). Also Bloxham, Great Game, 74.

46. M. Philips Price, War and Revolution in Asiatic Russia (London: George, Allen & Unwin, 1918), 223–24; see also 208.


48. List of detainees held under guard by order of the Military Governor of Kars region, Jan. 25, 1915 (SSTsSA, f. 13 [Kantseliariia namestnika na Kavkaze], op. 27s., d. 3966, ll. 57–59). Within several months, those who had not died of typhus—65 of the 159 perished during detention—were either released or returned to their native settlements while they awaited further investigation.

49. Telegram from Governor Podborskii in Kars to O.O., copy to Gofmeister Peterson. [Jan. 8, 1915], no. 28; Otmoshenie ot Nachal’nika Polevogo Shtaba Kavk. Armii Gen. Iudenich to Pomoshchnik Namestnika EIV na Kavkaze po grazhdanskoj chasti, Jan. 11, 1915, no. 134 (SSTsSAf. 13 [Kantseliariia namestnika na Kavkaze], op. 27s., d. 3966, ll. 1, 3).

50. Governor Podborskii to the Special Department, cc. to Peterson, Jan. 8, 1915; General Iudenich to Peterson, Jan. 11, 1915 (SSTsSA f. 13 [Kantseliariia namestnika na Kavkaze], op. 27s., d. 3966, ll. 1, 3).

51. Peterson to Minister of Internal Affairs, Jan. 12, 1915, and reply, Jan. 15, 1915 (SSTsSAf. 13 [Kantseliariia namestnika na Kavkaze], op. 27s., d. 3966, ll. 7–8); Letter from MVD, Department of Police to the Glavnoe Tiuremnoe Upravlenie, Feb. 10, 1915 [sekretno] (GARF, f. 102, II-oe deloproizvodstvo, op. 73 [1915 god], d. 83, l. 6).


53. See Fuat Dundar’s contribution to this volume (ch. 13), “Pouring People into a Desert.”

54. Telegram from Acting Governor in Khar’kov to Kantseliariia Namestnika in Tiflis, Jan. 23, 1915, no. 486; Telegram from Gubernator Troinitskii in Tula to Kantseliariia Namestnika in Tiflis, Jan. 27, 1915, no. 634; Telegram from Gubernator Katerinich in Khar’kov to Direktor Kantseliariii Namestnika in Tiflis, Feb. 15, 1915; Telegram from Gubernator Andreevskii in Orel to Direktor Kantseliarii Namestnika in Tiflis, Feb. 14, 1915 (SSTsSAf. 13 [Kantseliariia namestnika na Kavkaze], op. 27s., d. 3966, ll. 16, 21, 49, 50).

55. Telegrams from Prints Aleksandr Ol’denburgskii in Petrograd to General Myshlaevskii in Tiflis, Jan. 30, 1915, no. 1627 and Jan. 31, 1915, no. 1648 (SSTsSAf. 13 [Kantseliariia namestnika na Kavkaze], op. 27s., d. 3966, ll. 25, 28).
56. Letter from Nikol’skii to Chariman of the Council of Ministers Goremykin, Apr. 11, 1915; Journal of the Council of Ministers for Apr. 28, 1915 (RGIA, f. 1276, op. 19, d. 1061, ll. 38–40, 50–54 ob.). This same file contains the memoranda of each ministry regarding the proposed measure: Ministries of Justice (ll. 12–15, Feb. 14, 1915) and of Foreign Affairs (ll. 16–18, Feb. 25, 1915).

57. Telegram from Senator Nikol’skii in Petrograd to Gofmeister Peterson in Tiflis, Feb. 28 and Mar. 9, 1915 (RGIA, f. 1276, op. 19, d. 1061, ll. 26, 36).

58. Memorandum of Grand Prince Georgii Mikhaïloïch to Emperor Nicholas II, May 16, 1915 (RGIA, f. 1276 [Council of Ministers], op. 19, d. 1061, l. 55).

59. Telegrams from Senator Nikol’skii in Petrograd to the Viceroy in the Caucasus, May 21 and 26, 1915 (RGIA, f. 1276, op. 19, d. 1061, l. 58; SSTsSAop. 27s., d. 3193, ll. 176).

60. “Chlen Gos. Dumy K. Chkhheidze,” Kavkazskoe slovo, Apr. 5, 1915, no. 76; Telegram from General Ad. [Kants-ia Namestnika] to Senator Nikol’skii in Petrograd, Aug. 4, 1915 (SSTsSA, f. 13, op. 27s., d. 3193, l. 187: interpolation from deputy Dzha-farov regarding persecution of Muslims); Letter from Nikol’skii to M. V. Rodzianko, Aug. 6, 1915 (RGIA, f. 1276, op. 19, d. 1061, l. 61); Report from Viceroy to Nicholas II, Jan. 16, 1916 (RGIA, f. 1276, op. 19, d. 1061, l. 62).

61. Report of Viceroy in the Caucasus to Nicholas II, Jan. 16, 1916 (RGIA, f. 1276, op. 19, d. 1061, ll. 62–66). For a court case determining that Russian soldiers had murdered a Muslim villager, see military investigation confirming murder of Muslim villager by soldiers (RGVIA, f. 2100 [Shtab armiiam Kavkazskogo fronta], op. 9, d. 3, l. 135–135ob.). See also Eric Lohr, Nationalizing the Russian Empire: The Campaign against Enemy Aliens during World War I (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003), 151–52—although Lohr overestimates the unity and purposefulness of Russian state action.

62. Lohr, Nationalizing, 152.

63. Chancellory of the Viceroy to the Acting Governor-General of the Batum region, June 21, 1916 (SSTsSA, f. 13, op. 15 [Kantseliariia namestnika na Kavkaze: Otdelemy sudebnoe], d. 2684, l. 15).

64. Memorandum on the composition of lists of Russian-subject Muslims who went over to the Turks, Feb. 22, 1917 (SSTsSA, f. 13, op. 15 [Kantseliariia namestnika na Kavkaze: Otdelemy sudebnoe], d. 1570, ll. 1–2ob.).

65. “List of individuals convicted in the case of certain inhabitants of Kars dis- trict going over to the Turks” [n.d. (ca. May 1917)] (RGVIA, f. 2100 [Shtab armiiam Kavkazskogo fronta], op. 9, d. 17, ll. 64–67ob.).

66. For case files, see: RGVIA, f. 2100 (Shtab armiiam Kavkazskogo fronta), op. 9, d. 3, l. 135–135ob.; ibid., d. 17, ll. 62.


71. Hull, Absolute Destruction, 228; see also 324. Most relevant to my argument here is Hull’s ch. 10, “Civilians as Objects of Military Necessity.”
74. “Summary of material prepared by the censor points of the Caucasus Front in excerpts from letters for the period from 1 to 15 August 1916” (SSTsSAf. 13 [Kantseliariia namestnika na Kavkaze], op. 27s., d. 4428, ll. 40–70ob., here at l. 28 ob.).
75. For a military history of the Caucasus front, see Maslovskii, Miruvaia voina na Kavkazkom fronte; and Allen and Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields.
76. Allen and Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields, 240.
77. Holquist, “Role of Personality.” For the later unfolding of the Jewish expulsions, which first originated in Bukovina, see Lohr, “The Russian Army and the Jews.”
78. Armenian Katolikos Kevork V to Vorontsov-Dashkov, Aug. 5, 1914; Vorontsov-Dashkov to Goremykin, Aug. 9, 1914; Goremykin to Vorontsov-Dashkov, Aug. 19, 1914 (RGIA, f. 1276 [Council of Ministers], op. 10, d. 848, ll. 7–9, 4, 10). The Council of Ministers discussed the issue on Sept. 23, 1914 (Gal’perina, ed., Sovet Ministrov, 74).
81. For a sympathetic portrayal of the grand duke’s conduct during the war, see General Iu. N. Daniilov, Velikii kniaz’ Nikolai Nikolaeveich (Paris: Imprimerie de Navarre, 1930); ch. 11 covers his period as viceroy to the Caucasus.
82. “Armenians are the same as Jews”: Grabar’ diary entry, Apr. 26, 1915 (Tartu University Library, Department of Rare Books and Manuscripts, Estonia, f. 38, s. 50, l. 86 ob.). For his anti-Semitic program, see Holquist, “Forms of Violence.”
83. E.g., Colonel Tsyss, “Memorandum on the purchase by Armenians of lands of Persia and Turkey which border the Caucasus [n.d., c. May 1916?]” (SSTsSAf. 13

84. “Summary of material prepared by the censor points of the Caucasus Front in excerpts from letters for the period from 1 to 15 August 1916” (SSTsSAf. 13 [Kantseliariia namestnika na Kavkaze], op. 27s., d. 4353, ll. 1–5).

85. “Vremennoe polozenie ob upravlenii oblastiam Turtii, zaniyatymi po pravu voiny” (RGVIA, f. 2005 [Grazhdanskoе upravlenie pri Verkhovnom Glavnokomanduiushchem], op. 1, d. 17, ll. 3 ob.–13 ob.). New guidelines for the occupation of Galicia were issued less than one month later.


87. For a general overview, see Reynolds, “Ottoman-Russian Struggle,” ch. 4. Specifically, see Prince Berdikhan and Prince Shakhovskoi to Lieutenant Chardigny (French military attache to the Caucasus Front); translation from French; Tiflis, Sept. 29, 1917 (AVPRI, f. 144, op. 489 (Persidskii stol “B”), d. 567, ll. 30–42, here at 36).

88. Report from Prince Shakhovskoi to the Headquarters of the Caucasus Army, Jan. 16, 1916, no. 10 (AVPRI, f. 144, op. 489 (Persidskii stol “B”), d. 567, ll. 6–12); also Shakhovskoi’s report to Lieutenant Aleksandr Kotsebu, July 12, 1916 (SSTsSAf. 13 [Kantseliariia namestnika na Kavkaze], op. 27s., d. 4552, ll. 2–3). The British were sceptical of Shakhovskoi’s efforts: Colonel Marsh to the Department of Military Intelligence, May 13/26, 1916 (PRO FO 371/1916/2778/no. 101880): Russia’s Kurdish contacts “have proved to be unprofitable and even dangerous allies.”

89. Secret Report of Prince Shakhovskoi to the Chief of Staff of the Caucasus Army, Jan. 31, 1917, no. 14: Tiflis (AVPRI, f. 144, op. 489 (Persidskii stol “B”), d. 567, ll. 13–28); the grand duke’s marginal notations to this document indicate his endorsement of Shakhovskoi’s proposals.

90. Letter of appointment for Prince Gadzhemukov, Feb. 12, 1917; General-major Tomilov to the General Commissar for the occupied provinces of Turkey, Aug. 9, 1917 (RGVIA, f. 2168 [Shtab Kavkazskoi armii], op. 1, d. 274, ll. 32, 63).

91. Regional administrator for the Dersim region Gadzhemukov to the Commander of the Caucasian Army Iudenich, Mar. 14, 1917 (RGVIA, f. 2168 [Shtab Kavkazskoi armii], op. 1, d. 274, ll. 1–3, here at 2 ob.)


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95. See the very large collections generated by his chancellery: SSTsSA, ff. 520, 521.

96. Correspondence and confirmation of this policy found in SSTsSA, f. 520, op. 1, d. 3; petitions from Tamamshev (l. 11) and Duma Deputy Dzhafarov (ll. 6–7, 23). Several Russian commanders petitioned for aid to be extended to local Kurdish tribes, but the Caucasus command generally declined such requests. General Iudenich reported that he had no complaints about the conduct of the Turkish Muslim population, but that the Kurdish population staged continual assaults on Russian forces (l. 10).

97. Order 121 (RGIA, f. 391 [Pereselencheskoe upravlenie MID], op. 6, d. 77, ll. 9ob.-10; English translation found in FO 371/1916/2781/no. 181170).

98. Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich to Sazonov, July 3/16, 1916 (AVPRI, f. 151, op. 1, d. 32): petitions from Tamamshev (l. 11) and Duma Deputy Dzhafarov (ll. 6–7, 23). Several Russian commanders petitioned for aid to be extended to local Kurdish tribes, but the Caucasus command generally declined such requests. General Iudenich reported that he had no complaints about the conduct of the Turkish Muslim population, but that the Kurdish population staged continual assaults on Russian forces (l. 10).

99. Note from Colonel Tsyss to the Chief of Staff of the Caucasus Military district, May 1, 1916, regarding copy of General Iudenich’s Apr. 5, 1915, report; (SSTsSA f. 13 [Kantseliariia namestnika na Kavkaze], op. 27s., d. 4353, ll. 1).

100. Report from General Iudenich to Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 4 April 1916 (SSTsSAf. 13 [Kantseliariia namestnika na Kavkaze], op. 27s., d. 4353, ll. 16–16 ob.). Iudenich was responding to a request from one of his subordinates, the commander of Diadin district.

107. Memoranda from the Chief of Staff of the Caucasian Army to Prince Vladimir Orlov, May 5, 1916, and to Petr Istomin, May 25, 1916 (SSTsSAf. 13 [Kantseliariia namestnika na Kavkaze], op. 27s., d. 4353, ll. 15, 29).


110. For the army’s general treatment of the Jews, see Lohr, “Russian Army and the Jews”; for the specificity of the 1915 operations and the shift in policies in 1916, see Holquist, “Forms of Violence in Occupied Galicia.”


112. Sanborn, “Unsettling the Russian Empire,” 302–9, 315–22; and, on Armenia, Lohr, *Nationalizing the Russian Empire*, 96–97. Lohr rightly treats these as general policies. I believe he is wrong, however, that the Russian Army on the Caucasus front sought to expel Armenians to make way for Cossacks.


114. Telegram correspondence between the Military Governor for the Regions of Turkey occupied by right of war and the head of the Erzurum district, Jan. 12 and 17, 1917 (RGVIA, f. 13249 [Office for the head of the Erzurum district of the General Commissariat for Turkish Armenia], op. 3, d. 10, ll. 23, 45).

115. Joshua Sanborn has provided a promising start: see “Unsettling the Empire.”


118. Head of the first district to the Commissar of the City of Erzurum, May 8, 1917, no. 896 (RGVIA, f. 13249 [Office of the head of the Erzurum region of the General Commissariat for Turkish Armenia], op. 2, d. 14, l. 112).


120. “Summary of material prepared by the censor points of the Caucasus Front in excerpts from letters for the period from 1 November to 15 December 1916” (SSTsSA f. 13 [Kantseliariia namestnika na Kavkaze], op. 27s., d. 4428, ll. 100–124, here at l. 112). See also the observations in Eliseev, *Kazaki*; for similar sentiments in 1918, see Viktor Shklovksy, *A Sentimental Journey: Memoirs, 1917–1922*, trans. Richard Sheldon (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984; Russian original, 1923), 72–130.

121. War Office to Commander-in-Chief, India, Oct. 4, 1915 (PRO/FO 371/1916/2778/ no. 101879) (expulsion of “disloyal Kurds” between Bayazet and Diadin); from Prince
Shakhovskoi to the Headquarters of the Caucasus Army, Jan. 9, 1916, no. 7 (AVPRI, f. 144, op. 489 [Persian Desk “B”], d. 567, ll. 2–5) (expulsion of Kurds from the Giavverskii, Bashkalinskii, Saraiskii, and Koshurskii regions); “V Erzurume,” Armianskii vestnik, no. 12–13 (24 April 1916): 37–38 (Kurds expelled from regions occupied by Russian Army); Chief of staff of the Sixth Caucasus Army Corps to the Head of the Erzurum Region, Mar. 19, 1917 no. 925 (RGVIA, f. 2168 [Headquarters of the Caucasus Army], op. 1, d. 274, l. 5).


123. See copies of General Nikolaev’s orders and Armenian protests against them in GARF, f. 579 (P. N. Miliukov), op. 1, d. 1880, ll. 3–8.

124. AVPRI, f. 151, op. 482 (Politarkhiv), d. 3504, ll. 29–29ob. The letter’s recipient, V. Sharbin, forwarded the letter to the Russian Foreign Ministry, which highlighted this passage.

125. Director of Military Intelligence to Colonel Marsh, May 19, 1916 (FO 371/1916/2768/file 938/no. 96903, p. 306); Colonel Marsh to the DMI (Secret-Intelligence), May 24, 1916 (FO 371/1916/2778/no. 101879); Prince Shakhovskoi to the Headquarters of the Caucasus Army, Jan. 9, 1916, no. 7 (AVPRI, f. 144, op. 489 (Persidskii stol “B”), d. 567, ll. 2–5); Defrance in Cairo to Ministre des Affaires étrangères, Cairo, May 2, 1916, no. 144 (AMAE, Guerre 1914–1918, Turquie, vol. 888 (reel 1), sheet 31).

126. See the excellent discussion in Reynolds, “Ottoman-Russian Struggle,” 260; for a memoir of one Cossack participant, see Eliseev, Kazaki.

127. Secret Report of Prince Shakhovskoi to the Chief of Staff of the Caucasus Army, Jan. 31, 1917, no. 14: Tiflis (AVPRI, f. 144, op. 489 (Persidskii stol “B”), d. 567, ll. 13–28); Prince Berdikhan and Prince Shakhovskoi to Lieutenant Chardigny (French military attache to the Caucasus Front); translation from French; Tiflis, Sept. 29, 1917 (AVPRI, f. 144, op. 489 (Persidskii stol “B”), d. 567, ll. 30–42.


129. See the exemplary study by David McDonald: United Government and Foreign Policy in Russia, 1900–1914 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992).

CHAPTER 8


2. For one document along these lines, see the report of German ambassador Paul Wolff-Metternich to Reich Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, Pera, Jan. 17, 1916, PAAA/R13750/A1840/No. 454, 71. Among the population at large as well as officers and officials, Wolff-Metternich wrote, the conviction was widespread that Germany had called forth the Armenian massacres just as it was now “sucking Turkey dry and stripping it of food supplies.”


5. See the still-important study by Ulrich Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914–1918 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968), and the recent works by Isabel V. Hull, Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005); and Donald Bloxham, The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism, and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). Taner Akçam, Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006), argues that the Young Turks used the Germans to cover their own actions, and may well have consulted with the highest German authorities in Berlin in March 1915.


7. For a rather different argument about German affinities for Ottoman rule, see Anderson, “‘Down in Turkey, far away.’”


9. Fuhrmann, Traum vom deutschen Orient, argues, correctly in my view, that both the traditional histories of German imperialism and the more recent work on the African colonies have ignored the centrality of the Ottoman Empire for German elites.


12. Wilhelm and Abdülhamid had met in 1889 during the kaiser’s first visit, along with a large entourage, to Istanbul. His impressions of the sultan at that point were not very positive, and would worsen in view of the Armenian massacres of 1895–96. No less outlandish than the Damascus declaration was Wilhelm’s sudden enthusiasm for Zionism, which just as suddenly evaporated when it became clear that Abdülhamid would
hear nothing about the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. On all these points, see Röhl, Wilhelm II, 153–54, 1042–44, 1050–60, quote of the Damascus speech, 1059.

13. Imperial Ottoman Ambassador Tewsik to Staatssekretär Bülow, Berlin, June 23, 1898, PAAA/R14155/A7383.


15. Telegram, Marschall to Auswärtiges Amt (hereafter AA), Pera, Mar. 18, 1899, PAAA/A3222/No. 989. Marginal notation indicated that the German government would most definitely follow up on Marschall’s suggestion. For the Swiss response, see Treutler to Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, Bern, Mar. 23, 1899, PAAA/R14155/A3547/Nr. 32; Treutler to Hohenlohe–Schillingsfürst, Bern, Mar. 24, 1899, PAAA/R14155/A3548/Nr. 333; and Swiss Ambassador Rom [?] to Herr Baron [?], Berlin, Mar. 30, 1899, PAAA/R14155/A3720.

16. See, for example, Flotow to Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, The Hague, June 22, 1899, PAAA/R14155/A7639/No. 86; Oberndorff to Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, Cairo, Oct. 20, 1899, PAAA/R14155/A12645; and concerning the case of Achmed Bey, Reichenau to Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, Sofia, Oct. 16, 1909, PAAA/R14155/A12746/No. 97. See M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, The Young Turks in Opposition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), for a finely differentiated analysis of the various opposition movements in the late Ottoman Empire.

17. Telegram, Marschall to AA, Dec. 25, 1899, PAAA/R14155/A15242/No. 388.

18. Bülow to Kaiser Wilhelm II, Berlin, Dec. 28, 1899, PAAA/R14155. Marginal notations are presumably the kaiser’s, and indicate agreement with Bülow’s recommendations. The designation of “state secretary,” a slightly lower term than “foreign minister,” was meant to convey that the chancellor typically retained major power over foreign policy.

19. Telegram, Marschall to AA, Dec. 27, 1899, PAAA/R14155/A15307/No. 392, with marginal notations of Kaiser Wilhelm II.


22. Ibid., 8–9.

23. Ibid., 9–11.

24. Ibid., 15–17.

25. Botschaft, Kiderlen to Bülow, Therapia, July 10, 1908, PAAA/R14159/A11112/Nr. 111.


27. This is Hanioğlu’s description of Riza’s politics in, Young Turks in Opposition.


30. Ibid. Riza apparently did not speak German, though he was of course fluent in French.
31. See the briefing memo prepared by the Foreign Office for Bülow in advance of the meeting with Riza: Telegram, Kaiserlicher Gesandte Flotow to AA, Nordeney, Aug. 30, 1908, with Promemoria, PAAA/R14159/A13999/No. 80.

32. See, for example, Telegram, Bülow to AA, Nordeney, Oct. 5, 1908, PAAA/R13746/A16145/No. 111. See also Telegram, Marschall to AA, Therapia, Oct. 4, 1908, PAAA/R13746/A16073/No. 322; Telegram, Marschall to AA, Therapia, Oct. 7, 1908, PAAA/R13746/A16278/No. 336; and Marschall to AA, Therapia, Oct. 8, 1908, PAAA/R13746/A16384/No. 339. For Kaiser Wilhelm’s position, which accorded with Bülow’s, see Telegram, Jenisch to AA, Rominten, Oct. 6, 1908, PAAA/R13746/A1521/No. 158; and Telegram, Jenisch to AA, Rominten, Oct. 8, 1908, PAAA/R13746/A16387/No. 171.

33. See various dispatches from the always well informed ambassador: Marschall to AA, Pera, Apr. 13, 1909, PAAA/R14160/A6551/No. 117; and Telegram, Marschall to AA, Constantinople, Apr. 14, 1909, PAAA/R14160/A6579/No. 123.

34. Telegram, Marschall to AA, Constantinople, Apr. 14, 1909, PAAA/R14160/A6579/No. 123.


38. Ibid., 2.

39. Ibid., 2–3.

40. Ibid., 3–4. For similar complaints, see also Schwörbel to Bethmann-Hollweg, Salonika, Jan. 26, 1912, PAAA/R14161/J246/K12.

41. Ibid., 6.

42. Ibid., 8.

43. Ibid., 9–11.

44. Marschall to Bethmann-Hollweg, Pera, Nov. 8, 1910, PAAA/R13747/A18813/No. 346, p. 15 (of report).


46. Ibid., 4.

47. In addition to some of the other documents cited above, see Wangenheim to Bethmann-Hollweg, Therapia, Oct. 20, 1913, PAAA/R14161/A21246/Nr. 302.


50. Ibid., 6.

51. See also, Anderson, ““Down in Turkey, far away.””

52. Miquel to Bethmann Hollweg, Therapia, July 6, 1911, PAAA/R15749/A10830, No. 173.
53. Bloxham, *Great Game of Genocide*, 115–33, has rightly warned against drawing a direct line from the prejudicial statements against Armenians to German involvement in the Armenian Genocide. At the same time, such attitudes no doubt contributed to a certain indifference among some officials to CUP actions in World War I. On negative attitudes, see also Anderson, “‘Down in Turkey, far away.’”


56. Abschrift, Dr. H. Belart to the Delegates of the Verwaltungsrates der Mersina-Tarsus-Adana Railway, Mersina, Oct. 10, 1908, PAAA/R13746.


58. Telegram, Marschall to AA, quoting telegram from S.M.S. Hamburg, Pera, Apr. 30, 1909, PAAA/R13747/A1609/No. 303.

59. Telegram, Marschall to AA, Therapia, May 23, 1909, PAAA/R13747/A8956/No. 241. The kaiser had also vigorously protested the 1895–96 Armenian massacres, even calling for Abdülhamid’s removal, at least in internal communications. He complained about the failure of the European powers to intervene, but also refused Marschall’s request to send German war boats. See Röhl, *Wilhelm II*, 1042–44.


61. Wangenheim to Bethmann-Hollweg, Korfu, Apr. 2, 1912, PAAA/R14161/A6382/No. 4.


63. Ibid., 3–4 (of report).

64. This is the conclusion of the most recent research that challenges the older, standard view that Enver, Tâlât, and Cemal dragged a reluctant Ottoman society into war on the side of the Central Powers. For the new interpretation, see Mustafa Aksakal, *The Ottoman Road to War in 1914: The Ottoman Empire and the First World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).


67. Bloxham, *Great Game of Genocide*, 125, argues that the period from mid-June to early July 1915 was a “watershed” in German reaction and that Wangenheim did pursue fervent protests. My sense is that it was all too little too late.


69. Trumpener tracks this all very well. Ibid., 217–40.

70. Ibid., 2 (of report).

71. Ibid., 14 (of report). Jäckh is quoting Halil, but it is not clear from the report which Halil he means.
73. Ibid., 14–15 (of report).
74. Ibid., 15 (of report).
75. Ibid., 17–18 (of report). The original of the quote: “Talaat freilich machte keinen Hehl daraus, dass er die Vernichtung des armenischen Volkes als eine politische Erleichterung begrüsse.”
78. Ibid. Literally, they had been “lulled to sleep” by the current rulers.
80. Quoted in Hull, Absolute Destruction, 284.
81. Wangenheim to an unnamed “Dear Friend,” Pera, Dec. 30, 1914, PAAA/R13263/AL46. This volume generally has a great deal of material on the conflicts between Wangenheim and Liman.
82. Kaiserliche Botschaft to AA, Pera, Mar. 2, 1915, PAAA/R13263/A7636/Nr. 503.

CHAPTER 9

2. Hitler had just revealed that his military objective was the “physical extermination” of every “man, woman, and child of Polish extraction and tongue.” Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik, Serie D, Bd. VII (Baden-Baden: Imprimerie nationale, 1956), No. 193: 171–72n1.


14. Wangenheim to BH, Feb. 24, 1913, Nr. 38, PAA Türkei 183 Bd. 29, also GP Bd. 38: 10–15. Previous characterizations of Wangenheim overlook his acknowledgment of the urgency of Armenian Reforms.

15. Jagow to Wangenheim, June 10, 1913, PAA, NL Wangenheim. Rejecting Wangenheim’s proposal: A. Zimmermann, minute of Mar. 5; and Jagow to Wangenheim, Apr. 22. Nr. 369, GP Bd. 38: 30–31 and 30n.


20. For Ahmed Cemal [Djemal] Pasha, Turkey’s “chief goals” in entering the war were annulling the Lebanon statute, the capitulations—and these reforms. Erinnerungen eines türkischen Staatsmannes (Munich: Drei Masken, 1922), 353–54; Russia’s proposal and final accord: 340–47, 349–51. Kirakossian, British Diplomacy, 313–30.


25. Skepticism: Jagow to Wangenheim, July 28, 1913, PAA, NL Wangenheim.


34. Lines highlighted by the AA’s blue pencil. Wangenheim to BH, June 17, 1915, ibid.

35. Wangenheim to BH, July 7, 1915, ibid.


53. Tamcke, Wegner, 161–71, 239; Wegner’s notes on Harden conversation: 163. As usual, Wegner leaves everything unspecified. Did he attempt to see the empress? He never says. Names and dates are vague; the tone of self-promotion is never absent.


55. F. J. Günther to Gwynner, quoted in G. D. Feldman, “Die Deutsche Bank vom Ersten Weltkrieg bis zur Weltwirtschaftskrise 1914–1933,” in Die Deutsche Bank,
1915

J. Froberger to Erzberger, Oct. 61


aries: Zimmermann to Neurath, Nov. 972

Neurath to AA, Oct.


183 21, PAA  Türkei 1915, Bd.

27, 70. E. v. Dryander to Zimmermann, Sept.

1915. See Gust, ed., Der Völkermord


63. BAK, NL Erzberger, 1097, Bd. 10.


68. Bernstorff to Hertling, Apr. 6, 1918. BAK, NL Erzberger 1097, Bd. 14.

69. See Gust, ed., Der Völkermord, 483; 551–53.

70. E. v. Dryander to Zimmermann, Sept. 27, 1915; F. Schuchardt to BH, Aug. 21, 1915, PAATürkei 183, Bd. 39.


74. Littmann to Becker, Oct. 26 [28?], 1915, NL Becker, fol. 4579. Donald Bloxham traces the picture of German culpability to Entente propaganda and a CUP whispering campaign aimed at shifting opprobrium. The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism, and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians (Oxford:


77. Zimmermann to Wangenheim, Aug. 4, 1914, PAATürkei 183, Bd. 37.


80. “Prophet” is Lepsius’s phrase. A. W. Schreiber to Faber and Oberpräsident von Hegel, n.d. LAH NC 1397; also Gust, ed., Der Völkermord, 331–32.

81. Compare, e.g., Lucien Wolf in Levene, War, Jews, and the New Europe.


84. Lepsius, Preface, Der Todesgang, xxv, xxvii.


91. The “Turks” in a photo of a bastonnade were in fact Persians—a discrepancy, exposed by Turks in the audience, that Wegner claimed he had intended to mention. Rößler, Report to AA, Mar. 24, 1919, PAA, NL Rößler, Bd. 1.


95. Covering these debates in detail: Dinkel, “German Officers,” 93–99; Donat, “Nachwort.”


98. Meine Kriegserinnerungen (Berlin: E. S. Mittler und Sohn, 1919), 136, 500, cited in Feigel, Das evangelische Deutschland, 280.


CHAPTER 10


2. T’ght’agits,’ “Suriagan Namagani: Lurer Zéyt’unén; Urfayi gats’ut’iwn ê; K’émalagan sharzhumner; hay ggher ê gaybané hay hanrabedut’ean errort dare-tartzê; gusagt’agan geank,” Erdisart Hayasdun, July 15, 1921, 138.


24. ATASE Ali Münim to Ministry of Defense, Sept. 1, 1914, document no. 3 in *Documents: Volume 1, 2nd ed.* (Ankara: Prime Ministry, Directorate General of Press and Information, [n.d., c. 1982]), 24–25; ATASE, Archive no. 1/131, Cabinet no. 149, Drawer no. 4, File no. 2287, Dossier no. 12, Index no. 1–26, 1–27, [Signatories:] Ahmet and Mahmut of the ulema; Ahmet of the müderris in the name of the Andırın people; Mehmet, muhtar of the Andırın kaza (subdistrict); members of the notables (esraf) Abdullah, Mustafa, and Süleyman; Çiçekli village muhtar Ali; Boztopraklı village muhtar Hüseyin; Koca Müftüzade Mehmet; Muttalibzâde Muttalip; Arakelyan Miyanes [sic?]; Semerciyan Artin; Imam Ali; Andırın, telegram no. 143, to the Ministry of War, İstanbul, 9 Teşrin-i evvel [1914]; ATASE, Archive no. 1/131, Cabinet no. 149, Drawer no. 4, File no. 2287, Dossier no. 12, Index no. 1–26, 1–27, [Signatories:] Ahmet and Mahmut of the ulema; Ahmet of the müderris in the name of the Andırın people; Mehmet, muhtar of the Andırın kaza (subdistrict); members of the notables (esraf) Abdullah, Mustafa, and Süleyman; Çiçekli village muhtar Ali; Boztopraklı village muhtar Hüseyin; Koca Müftüzade Mehmet; Muttalibzâde Muttalip; Arakelyan Miyanes [sic?]; Semerciyan Artin; Imam Ali; Andırın, telegram no. 143, to the Ministry of War, Istanbul, 9 Teşrin-i evvel [1914], document no. 2049 in *Askeri Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi* [ATBD] 36:86, Apr. 1987, 5–8; Kanar, *Ermeni Komitelerinin Emelleri,* 224.


32. Catholicos Sahag of Cilicia, Adana, no. 4980/74, to Archbishop Zawén, [Constantinople], Apr. 28, 1915, in Khabayian, Giligean gsgidzner, 146.
40. Antréasian, Zeyt’uni antznaduu t’iwn, 13.


46. ATASE Ahmet and Mahmut, et al., to the Ministry of War, Oct. 22, 1914, document no. 2049 in *ATBD*, 5–8. In fact, some Maraş notables had already demanded in September that the Zeytun Armenians be relocated to Pazarcık, a primarily Muslim populated kaza or subdistrict of Maraş lying in the plains, terrain that lacked the defensive advantages that Zeytun’s mountains provided its inhabitants. Vart-Mekhag, “Zéyt’ünü verchin ants’k’er,” 3, Nov. 8, 1919.


50. Kiwd [Mkhit’arian], “Giligean têbk’er,” 5, Mar. 21, 1919, 1.


53. Celâl Bey, “Ermeni Vakâyi-i ve Esbâb-ı ve Tesîrâtı,” 2, Vakit 12 Kanun-i Evel [Dec.] 1918, 1. My thanks to Taner Akçam for kindly providing me with a transcription of this article, as well as photocopies of some misplaced *ATBD* pages.
54. Annotation in Hrabayan, *Geligean gsgidzner*, 129. Karanfilian did not manage to remain free. In the beginning of May 1915 he was escorted to Maraş under guard to be tried by the court-martial. He received a ten-year sentence and was sent to Der Zor, after which he was not heard from again. Kiwd [Mkhit’arian], “Gili-gi nagen sakrut’iwn,” 4, Mar. 19, 1919, 1.


57. Ibid.


64. Catholicos Sahag of Cilicia, Adana, no. 4980/74, to Archbishop Zawên, [Constantinople], Apr. 8/[21], 1915, in Khabayan, Geligean gsgidzner, 147; Norashkharhyan, Zeyt’unê 1914–1922 t.’ t.’, 33; Vart-Mekhag, “Zéyt’uni ver chin ants’k’erê,” Mar. 31, 1928, 4.


68. Aharonian, “Badmut’iwn Zéyt’uni 1877–1915,” 658, 660; T’akajian, Ink’nagensakrut’iwn, 295; Norashkharhyan, Zeyt’unê 1914–1922 t.’ t.’, 34; Antréasian, Zéyt’uni antznaduut’iwnê, 15–16; Kanar, Ermeni Komitelerinin Emelleri, 225; Mirijanian,


74. Norashkharhyan, Zéyt’uni 1914–1922 t.’t., 34; Sisèr’ian, Badmut’iwn Zéyt’uni, 458; Vart-Mekhag, “Zéyt’uni verchin ants’k’erè,” June 30, 1928, 8.


86. Aharonian, “Badmut’iwn Zéyt’uni 1877–1915,” 664; Türkei 183/36 A14801 Rößler, Aleppo, K. No. 39/J. No. 764, to Bethmann Hollweg, Apr. 12, 1915. According to another source, the officials moved on Mar. 25: Catholicos Sahag of Cilicia, Adana, no. 4980/74, to Archbishop Zawên, [Constantinople], Apr. 8/[21], 1915, in Khabayan, Giligean gsgidzner, 151–52. Rößler seems to indicate that the governor of Maraş fired the governor of Zeytun and a captain of the gendarmerie either during or immediately after the Mar. 25–26 attack on the monastery.

87. Norashkharhyan, Zéyt’unê 1914–1922 t.’t., 47.


89. Eberhard Wolffskeel to Sofie-Henriette Wolffskeel, Apr. 24, 1915, 13–14, 44; PAAATürkei 183/36 A14801 Rößler, Aleppo, K. No. 39/J. No. 764, to Bethmann Hollweg, Apr. 12, 1915. However, according to Cemal Pasha, there were five to six hundred Armenians in the monastery (ATASE no. 1–131, Cabinet no. 149, Drawer no. 4, File no. 2287, Dossier no. 12, Index no. 1–33, 1–34 Cemal Commander of the Fourth Army and Marine Minister, Damascus, teleg. no. 3023, to Enver Pasha, 23 Mart [1]331 [Apr. 5, 1915], document no. 2053 in ATBD, 23–26). Anträesian, Zéyt’uni
antznaduut'ıwnê, 17, writes that there were five thousand Ottoman troops in the barracks.


91. Norashkharhyan, Zéyt'uni 1914–1922 t.'t.', 39.

92. Aharonian, “Badmut'ıwn Zéyt'uni 1877–1915,” 668; Norashkharhyan, Zéyt'uni 1914–1922 t.'t.', 40; Shorvoghlian, Zéyt'uni verchin tiwts'ıaţnê, 103–4; Catholicos Sahag of Cilicia, Adana, no. 4980/74, to Archbishop Zawén, [Constantinople], Apr. 8[21], 1915, in Khabayan, Giligean gsgidzner, 150–151; Komuvian, Zéyt'uni ant's'ıalê, 22.


96. ATASE Cemal Pasha to Enver Pasha, 23 Mart [1]331 [Apr. 5, 1915], document no. 2053 in ATBD, 23–26. Roughly the same numbers were later given by Erden (Birinci Dünya Harbi'nde, 116) and Wangenheim (PAAA Türkei 183/36 A1195 Wangenheim, Pera, no. 195, to von Bethmann Hollweg, Mar. 29, 1915—though the next day the latter verbally reported twenty-one Ottoman dead to Morgenthau (Diaries, 202)), and Wolffskeel (Eberhard Wolffskeel to Sofie-Henriette Wolffskeel, Apr. 24, 1915, 14, 44). However, Ermeni Komitelerinin Emelleri (Kanar, 222) states that one major and twenty-five regular soldiers were killed.

97. PAAA Türkei 183/36 A14801 Rößler, Aleppo, K. No. 39/J. No. 764, to Bethmann Hollweg, Apr. 12, 1915; NARA Merrill, June 14, 1915. Wangenheim reported that all 20–30 dead rebels were headless (PAAA Türkei 183/36 A1195 Wangenheim, Pera, no. 195, to von Bethmann Hollweg, Mar. 29, 1915).

98. Aharonian, “Badmut'ıwn Zéyt'uni 1877–1915,” 669; Komuvian, Zéyt'uni ant's'ıalê, 26; Catholicos Sahag of Cilicia, Adana, no. 4980/74, to Archbishop Zawén, [Constantinople], Apr. 8[21], 1915, in Khabayan, Giligean gsgidzner, 152; Kanar, Ermeni Komitelerinin Emelleri, 227; ATASE Cemal Pasha to Enver Pasha, 23 Mart [1]331 [Apr. 5, 1915], document no. 2053 in ATBD, 23–26. In the latter telegraph Cemal writes that in addition to five fighters, on March 28 sixteen suspects were arrested.


103. Eberhard Wolfskeel to Sofie-Henriette Wolfskeel, Apr. 24, 1915, 14, 44.
104. Shorvoghlian, Zéy’t’uni verchin tiwts’aznê, 104.
106. Shorvoghlian, Zéy’t’uni verchin tiwts’aznê, 39; NARAMerrill, June 14, 1915.
most likely a confusion with Hurşit, although he could also be referring to the Zeytun governor, since he never mentions, unlike other sources, that Hüsnu had been fired previously.


111. NAR ARG 59 867.4016/72 Jackson, no. 276, to Morgenthau, May 12, 1915.


116. NAR ARG 59 867.4016/95 E. Briquet, Enclosure no. 5, in Morgenthau, July 20, 1915.

117. Eberhard Wolffskeel to Sofie-Henriette Wolffskeel, Apr. 24, 1915, 14, 44.

118. BOADH ŞFR, no. 52/235 Minister [Tal’at], Bâb-i Âli, DH, EUM, special no. 21, to Konya Vilâyeti, 22 Nisan [1]331 [May 5, 1915], document no. 9 in Binark, Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeniler, 25, 297; BOADH ŞFR, no. 52/152 Ali Müniif in the name of the Minister [Tal’at], Bâb-i Âli, DH, İskân-i Aşayir ve Muhacirîn Müdîriyyeti, teleg. no. 21, to Konya Vilâyeti, 16 Mayıs [1]331 [May 29, 1915], in Binark, Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeniler, 36, 312.

119. NAR ARG 59 867.4016/95 E. Briquet, Enclosure no. 5, in Morgenthau, July 20, 1915.

120. [Dodd], “Exiles from Zeitoun,” in Bryce and Toynbee, Treatment of Armenians, 491.


126. BOADH ŞFR nr. 52/93, Tal’at, Bâb-ı Âli DH EUM, special no. 14, to Cemal Pasha, Commander of the Fourth Army 9 C. 1333 (11 Nisan [1]331) [Apr. 24, 1915], document no. 7 in Binark, Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeniler, 23–24, 295. Asimilar order was sent two days later, on Apr. 26 (BOA DH ŞFR, nos. 52/235, 52/102, and DH EUM 2 Şube nos. 68/90, 68/88, 68/92, 68/95, 68/96, 68/99, quoted in Binark, Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeniler, 9; ŞFR nos. 52/93, 52/235, 52/102 quoted in Halaçoğlu, Ermeni Têcêrî, 42.


131. PAAATürkiye 183/38 A24524 Rössler, Aleppo, K. No. 82/B. No. 1665, to Dr. von Bethman Hollweg, Berlin, July 31, 1915.


133. NARARG 59 867.4016/72 Jackson, no. 276, to Morgenthau, May 12, 1915.


137. BOADH ŞFR, no. 52/51, Ali Münüf to Fourth Army Command, 5 C. 1333 [Apr. 20, 1915], document no. 6, in Binark, Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeniler, 23, 294. Merrill’s Apr. 20, 1915, statement confirms that Muslim villagers from Aintab were being brought in to replace the deported Armenian villages. Merrill, “Statement,” Apr. 20, 1915.

138. ABCFM Ainslie to Barton, July 6, 1915.

139. Fuad Dündar, İttihat ve Terakki’nin Müslümanların İskân Politikası (1913–1918) (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), 93–173; Akçam, ‘Ermeni Meselesi Hallolunmuştur,’ 67–70.
140. Antréasian, Zéyt'uni antznaduut'iwnê, 22.


143. Dündar, İskân Politikası, 82–83. Dündar seems to indicate that the suggestions about the specific types of names actually were issued in July 1915.

144. Norashkharhyan, Zéyt’un ê 1914–1922 t.’t.’, 68; Lewon Khulmunean’s account, transcribed by Aris Aharonian and H’arut’iwn Aharonian, in Zéyt’uni badmakirk’, 964.


146. Komuvian, Zéyt’uni ants’ealê, 23.


148. Schreiner, From Berlin to Bagdad, 197.

149. See note 71 above.

150. Armenian historian Bogosyan (Zeyt’uni badmut’yun ê, 390) argues that the overwhelming majority of Zeytun’s inhabitants were on the side of rebellion, but, while possible, this is hard to prove, and in any case, even if true, circumstances led them to act differently.

151. Celâl Bey, “Ermeni Vakâyi-i ve Esbâb-ı ve Tesîrâtı,” 2, Vakit 12 Kanun-i Evvel [Dec.] 1918, 1. There is a dispatch from an unnamed Ottoman official or army officer to the Fourth Army command, dated a day or two after Mar. 1/14, 1915, that reflects similar sentiments. There is a possibility that the official is Celal himself, though it could also be Mümtaz Bey, the governor of Maraş. The official states that he only knew that a few individuals attacking the Zeytun prison killed several gendarmes. Only the attackers, he feels, should be punished, not the notables and clergy being sent as hostages to Maraş or Aleppo. He concludes that it was unlikely for the Armenians to rebel under the present circumstances, when the Great Powers, which would normally support them, were preoccupied with their own problems (To Dördüncü Ordu Kumandanlığı Vekâleti, [sometime after Mar. 1/14, 1915], in BDH File no. 1768, Old Folder 192, New Folder 206, Index No. 2–1 (1–2), in Tetik, Arşiv Belgeleriyle: 1, 71, 72–73, 355–56, 360).

152. NARA Merrill, June 14, 1915.


155. PAAATürkei 183/36 A1195 Wangenheim, Pera, no. 195, to von Bethmann Hollweg, Mar. 29, 1915


160. Catholicos Sahag II Khabayan, Feb. 11/24, 1915 entry, in AACC Aleppo file 2/1, no. 190/194, quoted in Eghiaiyân, Zhamanagagits’ badmut’iwn, 42. Shortly thereafter, in early March, Zeytun was removed from Celal’s jurisdiction (PAAATürkei 183/36 A53a/1516 Rössler, Aleppo, teleg., to Botschaft Konstantinopel, Mar. 12, 1915 5 p.m.).

161. Balak’ian, Hay kogkhoq’t an, 71–75.

162. Zawên [Dér Eghiaîyan], Bâdi’îr’ag’ an h’us’ers: vawerakirmer evw vgayut’iwn ner, assisted by Arshag Alböyajian, Cairo: Mdaworagan Sbasargut’eants’ Kraseneag,

163. See my forthcoming detailed study, “Dörtyol and the Armenian Genocide.”


167. BOA DH ŞFR, nr. 52/338, Talât to Adana province, Apr. 29 [1]331 [May 12 1915], document no. 16 in Binark, Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeniler, 30, 304; Minas Kojoyan, ed., Badmut’iwn Ch’or’k’-Marzbani (Dé ō rt’-eol) kiwghak’ağhak’mé Giligioy mêch (Los Angeles: Los Anjelési Ch’or’k’-Marzbani hayrenagts’ agan mit’iwn, 2005), 10.

168. ATASE archive no. 1/131, cabinet no. 101/149, drawer no. 14–4, file no. 2287, dossier no. 32–12, index no. 1–37, Çemal Pasha, Fourth Army, Jerusalem, teleg. no. 3108, to Acting Commander in Chief, Mar. 27, 1331 [Apr. 9, 1915], document no. 19 in Documents, vol. 1, 2nd ed., 70 (the date of Apr. 10 is erroneously given in the English translation for the old style date of Mar. 27 (71); Catholicos Sahag, Adana, to [name omitted], Sis, Apr. 15[28], 1915, in Khabayian, Giligean gsgidzner, 155–56; Catholicos Sahag, Adana, no. 4980/86, to Archbishop Zawén, Patriarch, May 10 [23], 1915, in Khabayian, Giligean gsgidzner, 165, and its slightly abridged translation by Simon Agabalian, with a few additional sections like the postscript, in PAAA K169/22 Büge, Adana, J. No. 516, to von Wangenheim, Constantinople, June 3, 1915; Kiwd [Mkhit’arian], “Giligean têbk’er,” 6, Mar. 22, 1919, 3; [P’[ap’azian]], “Irer ew lurer,” May 6, 1919, 1; Merrill, “Statement,” Apr. 20, 1915; Catholicos Sahag II Khabayian memoirs, used in Eghiayan, Zhamanagagit’s badmut’iwn, 50; ABCFM Ainslie to Barton, July 6, 1915.

CHAPTER 11


8. There were 75,000 Assyrians and 50,000 Armenians in Urmia district.

9. The six tribes were classed as ashirets, a term for autonomous tribes that paid tribute to the government, but otherwise administered themselves. They did not pay taxes, were never part of a census, and they could carry weapons.

10. Ottoman Archives, Istanbul (BOA) DH ŞFR 54/240 Talat to valis of Mosul and Van June 30, 1915.

11. Russian Archive for Foreign Policy, Moscow (AVPRI), I.F. 293, des. 571, dossier 420, list 5–6.


16. Gawar region was divided between Turkey and Iran, with provinces with the same name in both.


30. RGVIA, Fund 13159, dossier 1428, list 22, testimony of Judad Abdarova, Aug. 27 and 30, 1916.


33. Minister of Foreign Affairs to Persian Ambassador in Constantinople, Oct. 27, 1914, ibid., 17.

34. Gehrke, Persien in der deutschen Orientpolitik, 1:44.


40. Narrative of Dr. Jacob Sargsis, Feb. 12, 1912, in Bryce and Toynbee, Treatment of the Armenians, 191.


43. Genis, Vvedenskii, 44; Rockwell, Plight of the Assyrians, 65.


45. Genis, Vvedenskii, 44.

47. Minister of Foreign Affairs Moaven ud-Dowleh to Turkish Ambassador, Mar. 5, 1915; Minister of Foreign Affairs Moaven ud-Dowleh to Persian Ambassador in Constantinople, Mar. 18, 1915; Ambassador of the United States Caldwell to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mar. 19, 1915, in Neutralité Persane, 139, 153, 155.


54. Under the name of Nazarbekian he commanded the Armenian Republic’s army.


61. Rafael de Nogales, Four Years beneath the Crescent (London: Charles Scribner’s, 1926), 134.

62. Lepsius, Deutschland und Armenien, xiv and 471; Lepsius, Les massacres d’Arménie, 94.

63. Cited in Griselle, Syriens et chaldéens, 24.

64. Genelkurmay, Birinci Dünya Harbinde, 592.


68. Holstein to German Embassy, May 14, 1915, ibid., 67.

69. Holstein to German Embassy, May 18, 1915, ibid., 72–73.

70. Nogales, Four Years, 100–103.

73. BOA DH. ŞFR 53/276 Ministry of the Interior to Mosul vilayet, June 7, 1915.
75. BOA ŞFR 54/81 Ministry of Interior to Mosul vilayet, June 20, 1915.
76. Surma, Assyrian Church Customs, 72–73.

CHAPTER 12

1. This is an appropriation of Hans Mommsen’s term “cumulative radicalization.” See his “Der Nationalsozialismus: Kumulative Radikalisierung und Selbstzerstörung des Regimes,” Meyers Enzyklopädisches Lexikon, 16 (Mannheim: Bibliographisches Institut, 1976), 785–90. Mommsen used the term to address the way in which Hitler’s charismatic leadership interacted with the centrifugal forces present in the oddly unstructured Nazi-German state. In the present analysis, it refers more to the interaction of the Ottoman state within an international system and with developments within Ottoman borders at a crisis moment.

2. Anahide Ter Minassian, Nationalism and Socialism in the Armenian Revolutionary Movement (Cambridge, Mass.: Zoryan Institute, 1984), 4–5, 15, 18. This study also suggests that whatever the doctrinal differences between the political parties, nationalism was their most significant characteristic. On Hamidian policies, Bayram Kodaman, Şark Meselesi Işıği Altında Sultan II Abdülhamid’in Doğu Anadolu Politikası (Istanbul: Orkun Yayinevi, 1983), including 161–81 on the Armenian question.


11. Boghos Nubar, the leader of the Armenian National Delegation established in 1912 to forward the cause of reforms on the international scene, recalled that the battalions were to provide an example for their Ottoman “compatriots . . . in a common action to acquire the rights of autonomy”: Bibliothèque Nubar, Paris, Archives of the Délégation Nationale Arménienne (hereafter, “ADNA”), Correspondence Arménie 1915, I, Nubar to Kouchakian, Oct. 26.


24. See David Gaunt, chapter 11 in this volume.

29. Ibid, 223.
30. Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna (hereafter “HSSA”), PA I, 947, folder 21c, Pera, Dec. 21, 1914; folder 21d, Constantinople, Mar. 11, 1915, on Tâlât’s preparedness to use the police in the resettlements.
33. By March 6 the administration’s archives were taken to the interior, the civilian population was scheduled for evacuation on any Entente forcing of the harbor, and a number of families had already been ordered to leave: Ernst Jäckh papers, Yale University Library, file 22, Humbert to Smyrna consulate, Mar. 6, 1915. On the bombardment and fears that it was intended to inspire unrest among the Greeks of the city, see HHSA, PAI, 943, Smyrna, Mar. 8, 1915.
37. HHSA, PAI, 942, Pera, Mar. 24, 1915; Bryce and Toynbee, *Treatment of Arménians*, docs. 56, 57.
40. Bloxham, *The Great Game*, 78–82. The ongoing work of Aram Arkun is by far the most detailed on this area. See his chapter in this volume (ch.10).
41. *Osmanlı Belgelerinde*, 24, Interior Ministry to Fourth Army, Apr. 24, 1915, ending deportations to Konya and redirecting further deportations from Cilicia southward.
42. U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD, RG 59, 867.4016/97, Beirut to Secretary of State, July 6, 1915.
45. AAPA, Türkei 183/36, Pera, May 6, 1915.


54. DA, lxxiv.

55. AAPA, Türkei 183/6, Wangenheim to Foreign Office, May 18, 1915.

56. On the Russian advance, see note 185, and DA, Mosul, June 10, 1915.

57. Walker, *Armenia*, 211–12, 222. Mush and Sasun had been specified for the earlier, targeted deportations conceived early in May: see note 183.


59. *Osmanlı Belgelerinde*, 33–34, Interior Ministry to Erzurum, Van, and Bitlis, May 23, 1915; Orel and Yuca, *Les “telegrammes” de Talât Pacha*, Interior Ministry to Adana, Aleppo, and Marash, May 23, 1915. Specifically, the deportations ordered for Cilicia and Aleppo stipulated: (1) the districts (sancaks) of Adana, Mersin, Sis/Kozan, and Cebel-i Bereket/Dörtytol, except the central towns of Adana, Sis, and Mersin; (2) all the districts and villages in Aleppo, Iskenderun/Alexandretta, Bilan, Cisr-i Shugur, and Antakya, with the exception of the central district of Aleppo; (3) the sancak of Marash except the central town.


64. Kevorkian, *Le sort des déportés Arméniens Ottomans*; Kaiser, *At the Crossroads of Der Zor*.


66. DA, Erzurum, June 18, 1915.


68. AA, Türkei 183/37, Pera, June 17, 1915.


71. See Taner Akçam, “Rethinking the Ottoman Archival Material: Debunking Existing Myths,” unpublished manuscript.

72. *Osmanlı Belgelerinde*, 68, Directorate of Settlement of Tribes and Refugees communiqué, July 12, 1915. On subsequent deportations to Der Zor, see 124–26. On the district governor of Der Zor redirecting deportees to Mosul because they exceeded the quota, DA, Rößler to Bethmann, Apr. 27, 1916.


74. Kévorkian, *Le sort des déportés arméniens ottomans*, esp. 60–61. For German sources testifying to Circassians attacking the Armenians at Ras-ul-Ain in April 1916, see DA, Rößler to Constantinople, Apr. 6, 1916; on the same around Der Zor, DA, Hoffmann to Metternich, Aug. 29, 1916; Hoffmann to Metternich, Sept. 5, 1916; also Rößler to Bethmann, Apr. 27, 1916, recording deaths at the rate of 300–500 “daily or almost daily” for a month. On Bedouins attacking Armenian convoys on the road to Mosul and Der Zor, DA, Loytved Hardegg to Bethmann, May 30, 1916. On Halil’s statement of murderous intent as he arrived in Mosul in Nov. 1915, see DA, doc. 190, Holstein to Constantinople, Nov. 4, 1915.


76. DA, Metternich to Bethmann, Mar. 29, 1916.


78. *Osmanlı Belgelerinde*, 140, Interior Ministry to Cemal, Apr. 26, 1916, on the dispatch of an inspector to Marash owing to the leniency shown toward Armenians by the district governor; also Kaiser, *Der Zor*, 15–16.


82. On these massacres, Walker, *Armenia*, 211–12, 222.


84. Immortalized in Franz Werfel’s fact-based novel of the same name (1933).

85. *Documents*, 2, no. 1903, 49, 52.


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93. DNA, Correspondence Arménie 1915, 1, Nubar to Sahag, Apr. 30.

94. On the politics of this Darwinian international system, and the longer-term impact of the agendas of the European powers on intercommunal relations in the Ottoman Empire, see Donald Bloxham, The Great Game of Genocide, ch. 1.


96. See, e.g., Guenther Lewy, The Armenian Massacres in Turkey: A Disputed Genocide (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2005), and the critiques of his arguments about genocide (or the absence thereof) in various European colonial contexts on the basis of the absence of a clear prior intent. The critiques may be found in the Journal of Genocide Research (2008).

97. Or conversely, like Dyer (“Turkish ‘Falsifiers’”), they have depicted Van as bringing a shift to deportation in Ittihadist policy out of a clear blue sky.

CHAPTER 13


5. In the 1890s an Ottoman map named the Deir-ez-Zor region the Province of Desert/Desert Province (Çöl Vilayeti), see BOA, Yıldız Arşivi Resmi Maruzat (Y. A. Res.), 55/38, 21 Za 1308 (1891). Published the first time by Sarah D. Shields, Mosul before Iraq: Like Bees Making Five-Sided Cells (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000).

7. Its population density also was the least ten years previously; 1.2 per km², cf. Halîl İnalcîk and Şevket Pamuk, eds., Osmanlı Devleti’nde Bilgi ve İstatistik (Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, 2001), 172–73. Even though its surface is smaller today, the population of the Deir-ez-zor region of Syria has not increased a lot; it population was 133,000 habitants in 1994.


11. Dahiliye Nezareti İdare-i Umumiye (DH.ID) 45.12–53.


13. DH.ID 45.12–38.


15. DH.ID 45.12–53.5.

16. DH.ID 45.12/59.1.

17. DH.ID 45.12–53.

18. DH.ID 45.12–59.

19. In 1918, Zor region had not lost its “wild” (vahşi) character. On the Feb. 23, 1918, session of the Ottoman Parliament (Meclis-i Mebusan), during the discussion on the draft bill for changing the regional boundaries of Aleppo, the undersecretary of the Interior Ministry Mustafa Abdülhalik Bey proposed the installation of three new districts (kaza) south of the Aleppo-Zor line, where there is no district today. As I proposed just now, there are 650 villages which have not yet been disciplined (zaptûrapt) and fettered. Before the register, we have to establish a government [authority] there. . . . The government wanted to move along the desert. And it proposes to form three districts. . . . A caravan that left Aleppo reaches Zor without the authority of the government. There is no government anywhere. Therefore, when there are attacks by Arab nomads (urban) and bandits, the perpetrators disappear by the time the governments of Zor and Aleppo are informed.

Cf. Meclis-i Ayan Zabıt Ceridesi (MAZC), 3,4,1,28, 1918.02.23, 429.

20. Emmanouil Emmanouilidis was the Ottoman Greek deputy who left Turkey after the population exchange in 1922. His memoirs were then published in 1924 in Greece as Ta telefaia ete tes Othmanikes Afokratias (the Last years of the Ottoman Empire) (Athens:<pub>, 1924).


22. MMZC, 3, 1, 1, 26, July 6, 1914, 611.

23. DH ŞFR 50.141 (2.3.1915) From the EUM to Adana. See especially 118 Report in Viscount Bryce, The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire 1915–16.
25. Essentially the members of two Armenians parties were targeted: the Hnchak (1887, Geneva), and the Dashnaksutium (Armenian Revolutionary Federation, 1890).
26. According Esat Uras, on the night of April 24, 240 Armenians, and in two days 2,345 Armenians were arrested in Istanbul. cf., Tarihte Ermeniler ve Ermeni Meselesi (Ankara: <pub>, 1950), 620; English translation, The Armenians in History and the Armenian Question (İstanbul: Documentary publications, 1988).
27. Dahiliye Nezareti Şifre Kalemi (DH.ŞFR) 52.93 (April 24, 1915). From the EUM to Cemal Pasha.
28. Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Araştırmalar Enstitüsü (ATASE) Cl. 44, Ds. 207, F. 2–1, 2–2 in Documents sur les arméniens, V°1, Presidence du conseil direction générale de la presse et de l’information, 89–90.
29. Dahiliye Nezareti Şifre Kalemi (DH.ŞFR) 52.93 (April 24, 1915). From the EUM to Cemal Pasha.
31. DH.ŞFR 53.93 (23 .5.1915) and DH.ŞFR 53.94, 94–1 (May 23, 1915) to Cemal Pasha.
32. Genelkurmay, N° 1/1, c. 44, d. 207, f. 2–3, cited by Erdal Aydoğan, İttihat ve Terakkî’nin Doğu Politikası (İstanbul: Ötüken, 2005), 358.
33. Founded with the “Law for the Settlement of Immigrants” dated May 13, 1913, as “İskan-ı Aşâyir ve Muhacirîn Müduriyeti” (IAMM), its main mission was the settlement of the Muslim immigrants and refugees and the settlement of nomads. It was reorganized as the General Directorate for Settlement of Tribes and Refugees “Aşayir ve Muhacirin Müduriyet-i Umumiyyesi” (AMMU) on Mar. 14, 1916. For more details see Fuat Dündar, İttihat ve Terakki’nin Müslümanları İskan Politikası (1913–1918) (İstanbul: İletişim, 2001), 57–61.
34. Mecîlis-i Vükela Mazbataları (Cabinet Protocoles, MVM), V° 198, N° 1331/163.
35. Published in the official journal, Tâkvîm-i Vekâyi, May 19, 1331[1915], 7/2189.
36. From the EUM to Trabzon, Ma’muretü’l-aziz, Sivas, Diyarbakır and Canik. DH.ŞFR 54.87 (June 21, 1915). From the EUM to Trabzon, Ma’muretü’l-aziz, Sivas, Diyarbakır and Canik.
37. DH.ŞFR 54.122 (June 23, 1915) From the IAMM to Musul and Zor.
39. DH.ŞFR 54.315 (July 5, 1915). And also see, DH.UMVM 131.87 (July 5, 1915).
40. Ermeni meselesinin suret-i katiyede halli, DH.ŞFR 54.426 (July 13, 1915).

CHAPTER 14


13. This word is derived from the German term Eindeutschung, which denoted the envisioned forced assimilation of non-Germans eligible for Germanization during World War II. Nazi intellectuals further devised the concept of eindeutschfähig, which can be literally translated as “Germanizable,” the degree to which non-Germans
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17. Fuat Dündar, İttihat ve Terakki’nin Müslümanları İskân Politikası (1913–1918) (İstanbul: İletişim, 2001).


28. For examples of hostile parliamentary debates including rich use of profanity and even an occasional brawl, see: Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler, vol.1, İkinci Meşrutiyet Dönemi (İstanbul: İletişim, 1997), 627–28, 488 footnote 11.

29. Ziya Gökalp, Türklesmek, İslâmlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak (Ankara: Ziya Gökalp Yayınları, 1976), 93. For postwar programs of Turkification cf.: Ziya Gökalp,

30. Yorgo Boşo was a Greek member of parliament known for vehemently criticizing the CUP policies.


35. Covert oral orders were an important phenomenon during CUP rule. Although it was logical that genocidal orders were issued orally, even critical decisions like the alliance with Germany, and the declaration of war on the Entente powers were taken this way. *Said Halim ve Mehmed Tâlât Paşalar kabinelerinin Divan-ı Âli’ye sevkleri hakkında Divaniye mebusu Fuad Bey merhum tarafından verilen takrir üzerine berây-ı tahkikat kuваɾ’a isabeteden Beşinci Şube tarafından icrâ olunan tahkikat ve zaft edilen ifâdatı muhtevidir* (Istanbul, 1918), 4.

44. Dr. Bahadettin Şakir was born in Thrace and enjoyed his medical education at the Military Medical Academy in Istanbul. After joining the CUP in 1906 he moved to Paris, where he assisted Ahmet Rıza in reviving the CUP. After returning to Istanbul he became one of the most influential members of the CUP’s Central Committee in 1912. His closeness to Tâlât quickly allowed him to rise in rank, exemplified by the fact that he was charged with organizing the Special Organization in 1914. His role in the persecution of the Armenians was pivotal. He was shot dead in Berlin on April 17, 1922, by Aram Yerganian, an Armenian hitman. Hikmet Çiçek, *Dr. Bahattin Şakir: İttihat ve Terakki’den Teşkilatı Mahsusa’ya bir Türk Jakobeni* (İstanbul: Kaynak, 2004).

Dr. Nâzım was born in Salonica and joined the first CUP in 1889 during his medical education. He continued his study in Paris, where he met Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir and worked with Ahmet Rıza to unite the CUP with the “Ottoman Freedom Committee” in 1907. After 1908 he too became a member of the Central Committee, and even made it to secretary-general of the CUP. His role in the persecution of the Armenians was as covert as it was profound. In 1918 he became minister of education but fled the country before the armistice. He was executed in 1926 by the Kemalist government for his alleged role in a plot to assassinate Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk). Ahmet Eyicil, *Doktor Nâzım Bey: İttihat ve Terakki Liderlerinden* (Ankara: Gün, 2004).


47. Zekeriyə Sertel, *Hatırladıklarım* (İstanbul: Gözlem, 1977), 82.

48. BOA, DH.ŞFR 54-A/51, Tâlât to provinces, July 20, 1915.


50. BOA, DH.İD 97/1.


56. BOA, DH.ŞFR 53/91, 53/92, and 53/93, Tâlât to provinces, May 23, 1915. This is the single instance in which the empirewide nature of the deportations are reflected in one order at the most central level.

57. BOA, DH.ŞFR 53/85, Tâlât to Cemal Paşa, May 23, 1915.


60. BOA, MV 198/163, May 30, 1915.


64. BOA, DH.ŞFR 54/216, İAMM to Konya, June 28, 1915.

65. BOA, DH.ŞFR 54/246, İAMM to Diyarbakır, June 6, 1915.

66. BOA, DH.ŞFR 54/246, İAMM to Konya, June 30, 1915.

67. BOA, DH.ŞFR 54/246, İAMM to Diyarbakır, July 1, 1915.

68. BOA, DH.ŞFR 54/39, İAMM to Diyarbakır, June 17, 1915.

69. BOA, DH.ŞFR 54/101, İAMM to provinces, June 22, 1915.

70. BOA, DH.ŞFR 54/331, İAMM to Diyarbakır, July 7, 1915.


72. BOA, DH.İUM E-26/9, December 27, 1916.

73. BOA, DH.ŞFR 91/197, AMMU to Diyarbakır, September 22, 1918.


86. For a comprehensive overview of these see: Cemil Koçak, *Umûmî Müfettişlikler (1927–1952)* (Istanbul: İletişim, 2003).


88. The text of this law, numbered 1097, is available at: http://mevzuat.basbakanlik.gov.tr.

89. *Aşiretler Raporu* (Istanbul: Kaynak, 2000).


94. Interview conducted with Azizoğlu family, Stockholm, June 11, 2005.


97. Ibid., 65.


100. Interviews conducted with several families in Palu and Midyat, June 2004.


**CHAPTER 15**


7. Underground networks trying to prepare for the postwar situation became active as soon as the armistice had been concluded. Members of Enver Pasha’s “Special Organization” (*Teşkilat-i Mahsusa*), especially those of Circassian origin, seem to have formed the backbone of these networks. The most important of the networks was Karakol (The Guard), founded in October 1918 at the behest of Enver and Tâlât Pashas. This network smuggled quite significant amounts of weaponry and equipment as well as a large number of people to Anatolia in the period between November 1918 and March 1920. Many of those smuggled to Anatolia were people who not only brought vital skills to the emerging resistance movement but who could also be expected to be arrested for alleged war crimes. In 1919–1920 Karakol also nursed political ambitions, trying to determine the course of the national resistance in Anatolia and establishing independent relations with the Bolsheviks.


12. Ibid., 2–22.

13. Ibid., 107.


16. Selma İlikan and Faruk İlihan, *Ankara İstiklâl Mahkemesi* (İstanbul: Simurg, 2005) [a transcript of the court records].

17. The reasons to doubt the authenticity of the text are internal as well as external. The provenance is unclear as, to the best of my knowledge, no one has been able to trace this supposed Swiss journalist, not even under the more usual spelling of Emil Hildebrandt or any other permutation. There is no mention of the interview in contemporary Turkish sources either. The text itself seems to be strangely at odds with the actual proceedings of the tribunals (which did not mention the massacres). There are slips, which may have been due to the reporter, but are otherwise hard to explain. Surely, someone as intimately familiar with the CUP as Mustafa Kemal would not talk about the “Committee of the Union of the Young Turks?” The “interview”
could easily have been made up, as it contains no actual facts beyond those that were common knowledge in Turkey by July 1926 and were widely published in the Turkish press.


20. I gratefully acknowledge the contribution of Müge Göçek here, who has pointed out to me the importance of the existence of this coalition in explaining the silence of the early republic on the Armenian issue.
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