DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
QUARTERLY READINESS REPORT TO
CONGRESS
April - June 1996

PART 1: THE READINESS ASSESSMENT PROCESS

Traditionally, the Department of Defense viewed readiness from a unit perspective—readiness of individual units of the Military Services to do their designed missions. Today, the Nation's global strategy calls for a readiness perspective that encompasses more than an aggregation of individual unit readiness. In the fall of 1994, the Department of Defense established a process to assess readiness across geographic regions vital to national interests.

The process and this new view of readiness required a joint perspective. In addition to the readiness issues of the four Services, the readiness of the unified commands and the Department of Defense Combat Support Agencies (CSA) is key. Joint readiness focuses on the ability of the commanders in chief (CINCs) of the unified commands plus the Combined Forces Command and the North American Aerospace Defense Command to use the forces provided from the Services and assets from the six CSAs in accomplishing theater and national objectives. Joint readiness is assessed in eight functional areas:

- Mobility
- Joint Personnel
- Joint Headquarters
- Infrastructure
- Intelligence/Surveillance/Reconnaissance (ISR)
- Special Operations
- Logistics
- Communications
In other words, these functional areas are critical to each CINC’s task of integrating and synchronizing individual units into an effective joint team. They enable the CINC to most effectively use the forces he is provided. With worldwide interests and challenges, the United States must be able to engage in virtually every region of the globe and maintain the capability to deal with more than one major contingency at a time. Readiness to execute the full range of the national military strategy depends on maintaining high states of unit and joint readiness.

The central component of the Department of Defense readiness assessment process is the Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR). This review incorporates inputs from the Services, CINCs, and CSAs. The six CSAs -- Central Imagery Office, Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Mapping Agency, Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Information Systems Agency, and the National Security Agency -- make unique and critical contributions to combat readiness and operations. The JMRR provides the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a current and broad assessment of the military’s readiness to execute the full range of the national military strategy, including peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention, and winning the Nation’s wars.

Reports provide assessments of current readiness and projected readiness over the next 12 months. In addition, the Joint Staff specifies a warfighting scenario each quarter to ensure a robust assessment of the most demanding missions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Military Strategy</th>
<th>Assessment Criteria</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Peacetime Engagement</td>
<td>• Current requirements / missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Deterrence / Conflict Prevention</td>
<td>• Forecast requirements / missions over next 12 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Fight and Win Wars</td>
<td>• Warfighting Scenario</td>
</tr>
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The JMRR is conducted on a 3-month cycle:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Full JMRR</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Dec</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By Exception</td>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>Jan</td>
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<td>By Exception</td>
<td>May</td>
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<tr>
<td>and Feedback</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

The “Full JMRR”, the most extensive review, is conducted in March, June, September, and December.

During JMRR meetings, the Services report on major combat units and critical support capabilities. Service reports show (1) the status of unit resources and training, (2) which units are currently engaged in ongoing operations, and (3) which units would engage in the warfighting scenario. In addition, each Service reports trends for the key components of unit readiness—people, equipment, and training.

Unified commands and CSAs report on each relevant joint functional area as listed earlier. The reports assess the readiness of these key components of the US military structure to meet current, projected, and scenario requirements.

By integrating the Service, unified command, and CSA reports, we reach an overall picture of current readiness. It is important to note that some elements of these assessments are, by nature, subjective. The key element of any readiness assessment must always be the commander’s judgment. However, because objective information is required to fix readiness problems, the process requires a detailed explanation of reported concerns.

During the second month of the cycle, the staffs work issues reported in the full JMRR. To maintain a monthly focus, a “By-Exception JMRR” report is required during the second month. This report highlights significant readiness changes which may have occurred since the “full JMRR.”

The “Feedback JMRR” is conducted in the third month of the cycle, in conjunction with a “By-Exception” JMRR. During the “feedback JMRR,” the Joint Staff directors address actions that have taken place in their respective functional areas to remedy CINC and CSA issues.

Issues are categorized in two ways. Readiness issues reflect an inability of existing forces to fully perform their functions. Capability issues at the theater or national-level reflect shortfalls driven by the strategy. Each concern is addressed. In some cases a near-term fix is identified and implemented. In other cases, the solution is best addressed through programmatic action.

It is important to note that the JMRR process focuses on identifying near-term readiness issues (within the next 2-year period) and on finding and implementing solutions. For longer-term readiness issues, the Joint Staff analyzes future capability requirements through the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment (JWCA) and the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC) process. This report and subsequent quarterly readiness reports will address only near-term readiness issues and fixes. Near-term readiness is the focus of the readiness system established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

To provide civilian oversight, significant issues raised through the JMRR process are used to make a monthly risk assessment that is reported to the Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC), chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The SROC brings the Service Chiefs, Under Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and key DOD civilian leadership together for a monthly forum to review current readiness. At each meeting of the SROC, the Service Chiefs provide a current and forecast assessment of their respective units. A Joint Readiness assessment is provided by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Finally, the Vice Chairman presents an overall assessment of the readiness of the Armed Forces to fight and meet the full range of the national military strategy.

SROC presentations reflect JMRR content.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1st Qtr</th>
<th>2nd Qtr</th>
<th>3rd Qtr</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full SROC</td>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>Oct</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feedback SROC</td>
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The Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress (QRRC) is based on assessments provided to the SROC.
PART 2: A CURRENT READINESS ASSESSMENT

This report provides a summary of current readiness for the period April through June 1996.

The scenario started with real-world engagement in current operations, then incorporated outbreak of hostilities in Southwest Asia, followed by a nearly simultaneous outbreak of hostilities in Korea.

**Unit Readiness.**

**Current Assessment:** US forces remain ready to execute their assigned missions. "First-to-fight" forces maintain a high level of readiness, while overall unit readiness is stable at historic levels. (See Classified Annex) Although there are no significant problem areas, we can expect some short-term degradation as units redeploy from current operations or modernize. This is a normal cost of doing business. We continue to closely monitor high-demand, low-density assets (e.g., intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance [ISR], mobility equipment, and sealift). All geographic CINC's report concerns with the competition for ISR assets.

Lift assets required for withdrawal and repositioning of NATO Implementation Forces (IFOR) from Bosnia impact initial surge of forces to Korea. Possible political constraints and the potential for a non-permissive withdrawal were not assessed in this scenario. A NATO IFOR force withdrawal to support a SWA coalition action could affect central European Lines of Communications (LOCs) and add to initial MRC deployment timelines but are not expected to delay total force closure.

Timely congressional action on previous FY96 contingency supplemental funding and reprogramming requests has been instrumental in maintaining a strong readiness posture to date. Rapid consideration of the Department's alternative sources for the second Bosnia reprogramming request is imperative to ensure the continued high readiness of our forces as outlined in this report.

**Scenario Assessment:** For this quarter's scenario, all major combat and key support units are ready to meet assigned taskings.

**Forecast Assessment:** Each Service forecasts unit readiness levels to remain strong at near historic levels. The three components of unit readiness--Personnel, Equipment, and Training--are reported by Service as Green for Satisfactory, Yellow for Marginal, and Red for Unsatisfactory with trends as shown.
### ARMY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current</th>
<th>+12 mo</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PERSONNEL</td>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>GREEN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQUIPMENT</td>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>GREEN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAINING</td>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>GREEN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Trends presuppose reimbursement for contingency operations.

### NAVY

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>GREEN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAINING</td>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>GREEN</td>
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Note: Forward deployed H-53E helos will be operational during August. All H-53E helos will be operational by 31 October.

### MARINES

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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAINING</td>
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</table>

Note: Navy’s H-53E helo problem and fix also pertain to the Marines.
### AIR FORCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current</th>
<th>+12 mo</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PERSONNEL</strong></td>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>Recruit quality and retention rates remain satisfactory. PERSTEMPO indicators are improving. Expect Global Military Force Policy (GMFP) will lower PERSTEMPO rates for Low Density/High Demand communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EQUIPMENT</strong></td>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>Indicators are adequate. Aging aircraft loaders will be a concern until new equipment is fielded. Employment of bare base assets impacts availability for contingencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TRAINING</strong></td>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>Contingency operations continue to impact training for some forces.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Trends presuppose reimbursement for contingency operations. To address aging aircraft loaders the Air Force accelerated procurement of the new 60K aircraft loader, is modifying some existing 25K loaders, and is planning future procurement of a Next Generation Small Loader. Reconstitution of bare base assets keep available inventory below requirements. The Air Force implemented new contracting procedures to ensure timely reconstitution of deployed bare base equipment.

### Joint Readiness

**Current Assessment:** Although overall unit readiness is good, **Ongoing Operations** remain at a high level and require careful management of select segments of the force. This is particularly true of those assets that enable a theater commander to integrate and synchronize forces (e.g., intelligence, mobility, support, joint headquarters). The high operations tempo (OPTEMPO) experienced by some high demand, low-density systems accelerates wear and tear on equipment and places heavy demands on personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO). There is also the potential to lose combat skills proficiency while engaged in current operations. To meet this issue, we have increased the use of the Reserve Components (RC) consistent with their missions, training requirements, and capabilities, thus enhancing RC readiness and contributing to the enhanced readiness of the Total Force, while relieving Active Component OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO. We have also tasked across like-units globally rather than exclusively using forces based in the United States or a particular theater. We have emphasized training while deployed, where possible, e.g. in Hungary the Army obtained firing ranges for use by deployed forces. We have increased use of contractors to reduce tasking on critical support capabilities. In addition, we are using the JMRR to assist in developing joint solutions to PERSTEMPO concerns. The recently completed Global Military Force Policy provides decision makers with priority guidelines for employment and allocation of low density/high demand assets worldwide.

**Contingency Disengagement** -- the ability to quickly disengage and redeploy from ongoing contingencies -- continues to be a concern. Diversion of strategic lift assets needed for withdrawal from an ongoing operation can impact arrival of forces and sustainment stocks to support a Major Regional Contingency (MRC). In addition,
indigenous rail, highway, and seaport conditions can limit the ability to withdraw rapidly. Extraction and redirection of combat and combat support units from ongoing contingencies is a difficult, complex, and time-consuming task -- time to extract, time to reconstitute and retrain to acceptable readiness levels, and time to redeploy to an MRC. National and international disengagement politics could complicate a rapid withdrawal, and of course, a non-permissive disengagement environment would increase the risk to our forces.

**Scenario Assessment:** For this scenario, some forces committed to current operations are also required in southwest Asia (SWA). We expect some readiness degradation may occur due to some missed combat training, but have acquired additional facilities and training time in theater. In addition, the need to repair, reconstitute and retrain committed units before they would deploy to an MRC will require some additional time. Operations tempo for high-demand/low-density assets continues to be a concern. For the contingency in Korea, we must plan for a no-notice attack which limits our force options prior to the outbreak of hostilities. A reassessment of this scenario is scheduled for briefing to the next overall SROC.

**Forecast Assessment:** For the next 12 months, we forecast no significant change in the joint readiness assessment. High demand will continue for elements of the force such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance or mobility. Careful management, sometimes on a case-by-case basis, of those individual elements impacted by our national policy of engagement and current operations will enable us to meet joint force requirements.

**Readiness to Execute the Full Range of the National Military Strategy.**

A classified risk assessment is included in the Classified Annex to this report.

**Summary.**

This quarter's readiness scenario started with current operations in all AORs, then incorporated outbreak of hostilities in southwest Asia, followed by a nearly simultaneous outbreak of hostilities in Korea. "First-to-fight" forces maintain a high level of readiness, while overall unit readiness is stable at historic levels and able to meet the three components of the scenario. Some segments of the force are critical to current operations as well as major regional contingencies and require careful management. See Classified Annex for a specific risk assessment. Both unit and joint readiness are forecast to remain steady over the next 12 months.
PART 1: THE READINESS ASSESSMENT PROCESS

Traditionally, the Department of Defense viewed readiness from a unit perspective—readiness of individual units of the Military Services to do their designed missions. Today, the Nation's global strategy calls for a readiness perspective that encompasses more than an aggregation of individual unit readiness. In the fall of 1994, the Department of Defense established a process to assess readiness across geographic regions vital to national interests.

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**National Military Strategy**

- Peacetime Engagement
- Deterrence / Conflict Prevention
- Fight and Win Wars

**Assessment Criteria**

- **Current** requirements / missions
- **Forecast** requirements / missions over next 12 months
- Warfighting Scenario
The JMRR is conducted on a 3-month cycle that has changed from last quarter:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Full JMRR</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>Jul</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By Exception</td>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>May</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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The "Full JMRR", the most extensive review, is now conducted in October, January, April, and July. Each Full JMRR was delayed one month to align with another assessment process, the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA).

During JMRR meetings, the Services report on major combat units and critical support capabilities. Service reports show (1) the status of unit resources and training, (2) which units are engaged in ongoing operations, and (3) which units would engage in the warfighting scenario. In addition, each Service reports trends for the key components of unit readiness—people, equipment, and training.

Unified commands and CSAs report on each relevant joint functional area as listed earlier. The reports assess the readiness of these key components of the US military structure to meet current, projected, and scenario requirements.

By integrating the Service, unified command, and CSA reports, we reach an overall picture of current readiness. It is important to note that some elements of these assessments are, by nature, subjective. The key element of any readiness assessment must always be the commander's judgment. However, because objective information is required to fix readiness problems, the process requires a detailed explanation of reported concerns.

During the second month of the cycle, the staffs work issues reported in the full JMRR. To maintain a monthly focus, a "By-Exception JMRR" report is required during the second month. This report highlights significant readiness changes which may have occurred since the "full JMRR."

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Issues are categorized in two ways. Readiness issues reflect an inability of existing forces to fully perform their functions. Capability issues at the theater or national-level reflect shortfalls driven by the strategy. Each concern is addressed. In some cases a near-term fix is identified and implemented. In other cases, the solution is best addressed through programmatic action.

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requirements through the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment (JWCA) and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) process. This report and subsequent quarterly readiness reports will address only near-term readiness issues and fixes. Near-term readiness is the focus of the readiness system established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

To provide civilian oversight, significant issues raised through the JMRR process are used to make a monthly risk assessment that is reported to the Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC), chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The SROC brings the Service Chiefs, Under Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and key DOD civilian leadership together for a monthly forum to review current readiness. At each meeting of the SROC, the Service Chiefs provide a current and forecast assessment of their respective units. A Joint Readiness assessment is provided by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Finally, the Vice Chairman presents an overall assessment of the readiness of the Armed Forces to fight and meet the full range of the national military strategy.

SROC presentations reflect JMRR content. The SROC schedule slipped one month in concert with the one month delay in this quarter's JMRR schedule.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feedback SROC</td>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>Jul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full SROC</td>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>May</td>
<td>Aug</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topic SROC</td>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>Sep</td>
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The Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress (QRRRC) is based on assessments provided to the SROC.
PART 2: A READINESS SUMMARY

This report provides a summary of unit and joint readiness with assessments of current, forecast, and scenario readiness for the period July through September 1996 using the scenario for the Full-SROC during this quarter. The scenario varied slightly from that of the previous report in that it allowed for some early warning of hostilities in Korea. It started with real-world engagement in current operations, then incorporated an outbreak of hostilities in Southwest Asia, followed by a nearly simultaneous outbreak of hostilities in Korea with some early warning for Force Enhancement/Flexible Deterrent Options (FE/FDO). The previous report did not allow for any early warning of hostilities in Korea.

Assessment Scenario

Unit Readiness.

Current Assessment: US forces remain ready to execute their assigned missions. "First-to-fight" forces maintain a high level of readiness, while overall unit readiness is stable at historic levels. (See Classified Annex) Although there are no significant problem areas, we can expect some short-term degradation as units redeploy from current operations or modernize. This is a normal cost of doing business. We continue to closely monitor high-demand, low-density assets (e.g., intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance [ISR], mobility equipment, and sealift).
Lift assets required for withdrawal and return of US Implementation Forces (IFOR) from Bosnia would impact initial surge of forces to a major contingency. Possible political constraints and the potential for a non-permissive withdrawal are not assessed. A NATO IFOR force withdrawal could affect central European Lines of Communications (LOCs) and add to initial MRC deployment timelines but are not expected to delay total force closure.

**Scenario Assessment:** For this quarter's scenario, all major combat and key support forces are ready to meet assigned taskings. The allowance for some early warning improved capability to respond to hostilities in Korea. This was an expected improvement over the scenario of last quarter which did not allow any early warning.

**Forecast Assessment:** Each Service forecasts unit readiness levels to remain strong at near historic levels. The three components of unit readiness—Personnel, Equipment, and Training—are reported by Service as Green for Satisfactory, Yellow for Marginal, and Red for Unsatisfactory with trends as shown:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARMY</th>
<th>Current</th>
<th>+12 mo</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PERSONNEL</td>
<td><img src="image1" alt="Image" /></td>
<td><img src="image2" alt="Image" /></td>
<td>Projected to be a low green. Personnel shortfalls impact all but the highest priority units. NCO strength remains constrained at 96% due to MPA shortfalls. Also, increased Other Than War (OTW) missions coupled with a significantly increased recruiting mission will continue to impact on personnel readiness and will increase turbulence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQUIPMENT</td>
<td><img src="image3" alt="Image" /></td>
<td><img src="image4" alt="Image" /></td>
<td>Equipment on-hand (ECh) and serviceability readiness remains strong overall.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAINING</td>
<td><img src="image5" alt="Image" /></td>
<td><img src="image6" alt="Image" /></td>
<td>Training measures continue at expected levels and are projected to remain constant provided programmed resources are not diverted to contingency operations.</td>
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**Note:** Personnel readiness is being managed carefully by the Army. Turbulence should level out by June 97 and readiness should return to a level green.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAVY</th>
<th>Current</th>
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<th>Comments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PERSONNEL</td>
<td><img src="image7" alt="Image" /></td>
<td><img src="image8" alt="Image" /></td>
<td>Status is satisfactory.</td>
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<tr>
<td>EQUIPMENT</td>
<td><img src="image9" alt="Image" /></td>
<td><img src="image10" alt="Image" /></td>
<td>H-53 bearing problem identified. Correction to be completed by 30 October.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAINING</td>
<td><img src="image11" alt="Image" /></td>
<td><img src="image12" alt="Image" /></td>
<td>Trends are leveling.</td>
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MARINES

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<tr>
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<th>Comments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Overall, stable; monitoring some specific skill shortages</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Current +12 mo</th>
<th>Comments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Equipment readiness is high with increased maintenance manhours due to usage and age.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Current +12 mo</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Training on track</td>
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Note: Navy's H-53E helo problem and fix also pertain to the Marines.

AIR FORCE

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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Recruit quality and retention rates remain satisfactory, but isolated pockets of high PERTEMPO impact quality of life.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
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<td>Indicators are adequate. Aircraft loader age will be a concern until new equipment is fielded. Employment of bare base assets impacts availability for contingencies.</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training</th>
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<th>Comments</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Some units continue to experience short-term readiness degradations when supporting contingency operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: To address aging Materiel Handling Equipment (MHE) the Air Force accelerated procurement of the new 60K aircraft loader, is modifying some existing 25K loaders, and is planning future procurement of a Next Generation Small Loader. Reconstitution of bare base assets keep available inventory below requirements. The Air Force implemented new contracting procedures to ensure timely reconstitution of deployed bare base equipment. Short term readiness degradations due to contingency operations are a cost of doing business that is resolved upon return from deployment activities.

Joint Readiness

Current Assessment: Overall joint readiness remains strong with six areas of readiness and capability concerns.

Ongoing Operations – worldwide engagement, exercises, and contingencies – remain at a high level and require careful management of select segments of the force. This is particularly true of those assets that enable a theater commander to integrate and synchronize forces (e.g., intelligence, mobility, support, joint headquarters). The high operations tempo (OPTEMPO) experienced by some high demand, low-density systems accelerates wear and tear on equipment and places heavy demands on personnel tempo
There is also the potential to lose combat skills proficiency while engaged in current operations. To meet this issue, we have increased the use of the Reserve Components (RC) consistent with their missions, training requirements, and capabilities, thus enhancing RC readiness and contributing to the enhanced readiness of the Total Force, while relieving Active Component OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO. We have also tasked across like-units globally rather than exclusively using forces based in the United States or a particular theater. We have emphasized training while deployed, where possible, e.g. in Hungary the Army obtained firing ranges for use by deployed forces. We have increased use of contractors to reduce tasking on critical support capabilities. In addition, we are using the JMR to assist in developing joint solutions to PERSTEMPO concerns. The Global Military Force Policy provides decision makers with priority guidelines for employment and allocation of low density/high demand assets worldwide.

Contingency Disengagement -- the ability to quickly disengage and redeploy from ongoing contingencies -- continues to be a concern. Diversion of strategic lift assets needed for withdrawal from an ongoing operation can impact arrival of forces and sustainment stocks to support a Major Regional Contingency (MRC). In addition, indigenous rail, highway, and seaport conditions can limit the ability to withdraw rapidly. Extraction and redirection of combat and combat support units from ongoing contingencies is a difficult, complex, and time-consuming task -- time to extract, time to reconstitute and retrain to acceptable readiness levels, and time to redeploy to an MRC. National and international politics could complicate a rapid withdrawal, and of course, a non-permissive disengagement environment would increase the risk to our forces.

Mobility Shortfalls: Key elements include lift and throughput challenges. Withdrawal from IFOR requires augmentation by support units and repositioning of some equipment. Over the FYDP period significant improvement should occur through programmed acquisition of key sealift and airlift assets. See classified annex.

Logistics/Sustainment Shortfalls: Key elements include some absences of prepositioned supplies, and insufficient stocks of other items. Programmatic actions or studies/reviews have been initiated to address these concerns. See classified annex.

ISR Deficiencies: The key elements include limits to surge operations with organic assets, and manning shortfall of some critical skill billets. Additional equipment has been purchased, and additional manning has been authorized. See classified annex.

C4 Shortfalls: The key elements include some insufficient communications to support requirements and a separate issue regarding a lack of some wartime staff. Some improvements to communications have been negotiated, and a new manning concept has been successfully demonstrated. See classified annex.

Scenario Assessment: For this quarter’s scenario, the slight amount of early warning allows closure of some critical forces prior to hostilities and enhances theater readiness. Otherwise, concerns about readiness degradation from missed combat training and shortages of support staff personnel remain similar to the previous quarter’s report.
Forecast Assessment: For the next 12 months, we forecast no significant change in the joint readiness assessment. High demand will continue for elements of the force such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance or mobility. Careful management, sometimes on a case-by-case basis, of those individual elements impacted by our national policy of engagement and current operations will enable us to meet joint force requirements.

**Readiness to Execute the Full Range of the National Military Strategy.**

A classified risk assessment is included in the Classified Annex to this report.

**Summary.**

This quarter's readiness scenario started with current operations in all AORs, then incorporated outbreak of hostilities in southwest Asia, followed by a nearly simultaneous outbreak of hostilities in Korea. This was essentially the same as the previous quarter's scenario except for the precautionary early flow of some forces to Korea. "First-to-fight" forces maintain a high level of readiness, while overall unit readiness is stable at historic levels and able to meet the three components of the scenario. Some segments of the force are critical to current operations as well as major regional contingencies and require careful management. See Classified Annex for a specific risk assessment. Both unit and joint readiness are forecast to remain steady over the next 12 months.
DEPARTMENT
OF
DEFENSE

QUARTERLY
READINESS REPORT
TO THE CONGRESS

OCTOBER TO DECEMBER 1996
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iii
PREFACE

Section 361 of the 1996 Defense Authorization Act added a new section to Chapter 22 of title 10, United States Code - "452. Quarterly readiness reports:

"(a) REQUIREMENT. - Not later than 30 days after the end of each calendar-year quarter, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives a report on military readiness. The report for any quarter shall be based on assessments that are provided during that quarter-

"(1) to any council, committee, or other body of the Department of Defense (A) that has responsibility for readiness oversight, and (B) the membership of which includes at least one civilian officer in the Office of the Secretary of Defense at the level of Assistant Secretary of Defense or higher;

"(2) by senior civilian and military officers of the military departments and the commanders of the unified and specified commands; and

"(3) as part of any regularly established process of periodic readiness reviews for the Department of Defense as a whole.

"(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.-Each such report shall-

(1) specifically describe identified readiness problems or deficiencies and planned remedial actions; and

"(2) include the key indicators and other relevant data related to the identified problem or deficiency.

This report is the fourth such report and the first for fiscal year 1997. As such it addresses military readiness as reported to the Senior Readiness Oversight Council with readiness indicators during the first quarter of fiscal year 1997.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report provides a review of the readiness assessment process used by the Department of Defense. The report also provides a review of current and joint military readiness during the first quarter of fiscal year 1997 (FY97). In addition, it addresses the readiness of the Armed Forces to conduct operations within a notional scenario unique to this quarter.

The central component of the Department of Defense readiness assessment process is the readiness system established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR). This review incorporates inputs from the Services, commanders in chief (CINC$s$) of the unified commands, and Combat Support Agencies (CSAs). It is important to note that the JMRR process focuses on identifying near-term readiness issues (within the next 2-year period), assessing risk, and finding and implementing solutions.

Reports provided during the JMRR provide assessments of current readiness and projected readiness over the next 12 months. In addition, the Joint Staff specifies a warfighting scenario each quarter to ensure a robust assessment of a variety of demanding missions.

To provide civilian oversight, significant issues raised through the JMRR process are used to make a monthly risk assessment that is reported to the Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC), chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The SROC brings the Service Chiefs, Under Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and key DOD civilian leadership together for a monthly forum to review current readiness.

The Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress (QRRC) is based on assessments provided to the SROC.

This quarter's readiness scenario started with current operations in all AORs, then incorporated a Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) in Burundi, followed shortly thereafter by a major regional contingency (MRC) in southwest Asia. All major combat and key support forces are ready to meet assigned taskings, and the Burundi NEO does not significantly change CENTCOM's MRC assessment. A review of force readiness reveals "First-to-fight" forces at a high level of readiness, while overall unit readiness is stable at historic levels. However, some segments of the force are critical to current operations as well as MRCs and require careful management. See Classified Annex for a specific risk assessment. Both unit and joint readiness are forecast to remain steady over the next 12 months.
I: THE READINESS ASSESSMENT PROCESS

Traditionally, the Department of Defense viewed readiness from a unit perspective—readiness of individual units of the Military Services to do their designed missions. Today, the Nation's global strategy calls for a readiness perspective that encompasses more than an aggregation of individual unit readiness. In the fall of 1994, the Department of Defense established a process to assess readiness across geographic regions vital to national interests.

The process and this new view of readiness required a joint perspective. In addition to the readiness issues of the four Services, the readiness of the unified commands and the Department of Defense Combat Support Agencies (CSA) is key. Joint readiness focuses on the ability of the commanders in chief (CINC's) of the unified commands plus the Combined Forces Command and the North American Aerospace Defense Command to use the forces provided from the Services and assets from the five CSAs in accomplishing theater and national objectives. Joint readiness is assessed in eight functional areas:

- Mobility
- Logistics
- Infrastructure
- Joint Personnel
- Communications
- Special Operations
- Joint Headquarters
- Intelligence/Surveillance/Reconnaissance (ISR)

In other words, these functional areas are critical to each CINC's task of integrating and synchronizing individual units into an effective joint team. They enable the CINC to most effectively use the forces he is provided. With worldwide interests and challenges, the United States must be able to engage in virtually every region of the globe and maintain the capability to deal with more than one major contingency at a time. Readiness to execute the full range of the national military strategy depends on maintaining high states of unit and joint readiness.
The central component of the Department of Defense readiness assessment process is the Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR). This review incorporates inputs from the Services, CINCs, and CSAs. The five CSAs -- Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Information Systems Agency, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, and the National Security Agency -- make unique and critical contributions to combat readiness and operations. The JMRR provides the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a current and broad assessment of the military's readiness to execute the full range of the national military strategy, including peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention, and winning the Nation's wars.

Reports provide assessments of current readiness and projected readiness over the next 12 months. In addition, the Joint Staff specifies a warfighting scenario each quarter to ensure a robust assessment of the most demanding missions.

**National Military Strategy**

- Peacetime Engagement
- Deterrence/Conflict Prevention
- Fight and Win Wars

**Assessment Criteria**

- Current requirements/missions
- Forecast requirements/missions over next 12 months
- Warfighting Scenario
The JMRR is conducted on a 3-month cycle:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Full JMRR</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>Jul</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By Exception</td>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>May</td>
<td>Aug</td>
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<tr>
<td>By Exception</td>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>Sep</td>
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<tr>
<td>and Feedback</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

The “Full JMRR”, the most extensive review, is conducted in October, January, April, and July. During JMRR meetings, the Services report on major combat units and critical support capabilities. Service reports show (1) the status of unit resources and training, (2) which units are engaged in ongoing operations, and (3) which units would engage in the warfighting scenario. In addition, each Service reports trends for the key components of unit readiness—people, equipment, and training.

Unified commands and CSAs report on each relevant joint functional area as listed earlier. The reports assess the readiness of these key components of the US military structure to meet current, projected, and scenario requirements.

By integrating the Service, unified command, and CSA reports, we reach an overall picture of current readiness. It is important to note that some elements of these assessments are, by nature, subjective. The key element of any readiness assessment must always be the commander’s judgment. However, because objective information is required to fix readiness problems, the process requires a detailed explanation of reported concerns.

During the second month of the cycle, the staffs work issues reported in the full JMRR. To maintain a monthly focus, a “By-Exception JMRR” report is required during the second month. This report highlights significant readiness changes which may have occurred since the “full JMRR.”

The “Feedback JMRR” is conducted in the third month of the cycle, in conjunction with a “By-Exception” JMRR. During the “feedback JMRR,” the Joint Staff directors address actions that have taken place in their respective functional areas to remedy CINC and CSA issues.

Issues are categorized in two ways. Readiness issues reflect an inability of existing forces to fully perform their functions. Capability issues at the theater or national-level reflect shortfalls driven by the strategy. Each concern is addressed. In some cases a near-term fix is identified and implemented. In other cases, the solution is best addressed through programmatic action.

It is important to note that the JMRR process focuses on identifying near-term readiness issues (within the next 2-year period) and on finding and implementing solutions. For longer-term readiness issues, the Joint Staff analyzes future capability requirements through the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment (JWCA) and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) process. This report and subsequent quarterly readiness reports will address only near-
term readiness issues and fixes. Near-term readiness is the focus of the readiness system established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

To provide civilian oversight, significant issues raised through the JMRR process are used to make a monthly risk assessment that is reported to the Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC), chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The SROC brings the Service Chiefs, Under Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and key DOD civilian leadership together for a monthly forum to review current readiness. At each meeting of the SROC, the Service Chiefs provide a current and forecast assessment of their respective units. A Joint Readiness assessment is provided by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Finally, the Vice Chairman presents an overall assessment of the readiness of the Armed Forces to fight and meet the full range of the national military strategy.

Full SROC and Feedback SROC presentations reflect JMRR content.

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<td>Feedback SROC</td>
<td>Oct</td>
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<td>Full SROC</td>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>Feb</td>
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<td>Aug</td>
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<tr>
<td>Topic SROC</td>
<td>Dec</td>
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<td>Sep</td>
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The Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress (QRRC) is based on assessments provided to the SROC.
II. THE FY97/1 READINESS REVIEW

This section summarizes readiness to meet the scenario during the period October through December 1996, as well as unit and joint readiness during the same period and forecast for the next 12 months.

Readiness to Meet a Specific Scenario.

Scenario for the First Quarter in Fiscal Year 1997 (FY97/1): This quarter’s scenario reflects the cumulative impact of ongoing operations (including IFOR), a Burundi Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO), and a major regional contingency in southwest Asia, MRC-E (SWA).

Scenario assumptions included:

- Real world requirements as of Sep 96
- Burundi NEO deployment begins Sep 96
- Based on the Southern European Task Force (SETAF) Course of Action (COA) for Burundi operations, “Hostile Environment” ---force requirements include approx. 2500 troops
- PSRC activated in support of MRC-E
- Partial Mobilization & CRAF II implementation occurs on C-day
- NO withdrawal of forces from Bosnia or Burundi to support MRC-E
Scenario Unit Assessment: For this quarter's scenario, all major combat and key support forces are ready to meet assigned taskings.

Scenario Joint Assessment: Based upon previous MRC-E scenarios, Burundi NEO does not significantly change CENTCOM’s MRC assessment.

**Unit Readiness:**

Current Unit Readiness: US forces remain ready to execute their assigned missions. “First-to-fight” forces maintain a high level of readiness, while overall unit readiness is stable at historic levels (See Classified Annex). Although there are no significant problem areas, we can expect some short-term degradation as units redeploy from current operations or modernize. This is a normal cost of doing business. We continue to closely monitor high-demand, low-density assets (e.g., intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance [ISR], mobility equipment, and sealift).

In the event US forces were required to withdraw from Bosnia, lift assets required for withdrawal could impact initial surge of forces, especially for a major contingency. Possible political constraints and the potential for a non-permissive withdrawal were not assessed during this final quarter for the IFOR. The disengagement of IFOR and transition to the Stabilization Force (SFOR) could affect central European Lines of Communications (LOCs) and add to crisis deployment timelines but are not expected to delay total force closure.

Forecast Unit Readiness: Each Service forecasts unit readiness levels to remain strong at near historic levels. The three components of unit readiness—Personnel, Equipment, and Training—are reported by each Service as Green for Satisfactory, Yellow for Marginal, and Red for Unsatisfactory with trends as shown:

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<th>ARMY</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PERSONNEL</td>
<td>![arrow]</td>
<td>![arrow]</td>
<td>Projected to be a low green. Personnel shortfalls impact all but the highest priority units. NCO strength remains constrained at 98%. Also, increased Operations Other Than War (OOTW) missions coupled with a significantly increased recruiting mission will continue to impact on personnel readiness and will increase turbulence. Accomplishing the increased recruiting mission continues to challenge the Army; however, we are determined to meet that mission. Given the current Operating Strength Deviation (OSD), meeting all of its personnel commitments is a challenge for the Army.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQUIPMENT</td>
<td>![arrow]</td>
<td>![arrow]</td>
<td>Equipment on-hand (EOH) and serviceability readiness remains strong overall.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAINING</td>
<td>![arrow]</td>
<td>![arrow]</td>
<td>Training measures continue at expected levels and are projected to remain constant provided programmed resources are not diverted to contingency operations. While current reports do not indicate a change in readiness, shortcomings in the personnel area could have a negative impact on training.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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### NAVY

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PERSONNEL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Satisfactory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQUIPMENT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Satisfactory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAINING</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Satisfactory.</td>
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### MARINES

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PERSONNEL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Overall, stable; monitoring some specific skill shortages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQUIPMENT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Equipment readiness is high with increased maintenance manhours due to usage and age. CH-53Es returning to flight status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAINING</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Training on track.</td>
</tr>
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Note: Required number of CH-53E swashplate bearings were produced and delivered for installation in operational aircraft by 30 November 1996.

### AIR FORCE

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<th>Current</th>
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<th>Comments</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PERSONNEL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Met FY96 accession rates. High PERSTEMPO continues to affect quality of life in some aircraft specialties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQUIPMENT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Aircraft Mission Capable rates and Readiness Spares Packages fill rates are adequate. Age and condition of MHE fleet remain major concerns. Continued use of bare base assets impacts on availability for MROs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAINING</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Some units continue to experience short-term readiness degradations when supporting contingency operations.</td>
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</table>

Note: To address aging Materiel Handling Equipment (MHE) the Air Force accelerated procurement of the new 60K aircraft loader, is modifying some existing 25K loaders, and is planning future procurement of a Next Generation Small Loader. Reconstitution of bare base assets is degraded by force protection efforts and keeps available inventory below requirements. Short term readiness degradations due to contingency operations are a cost of doing business that is resolved upon return from deployment activities, assuming the
Joint Readiness:

Current Joint Readiness: Although overall unit readiness remains strong, there remain six areas of readiness and capability concerns for joint readiness.

Ongoing Operations – worldwide engagement, exercises, and contingencies -- remain at a high level and require careful management of select segments of the force. This is particularly true of those assets that enable a theater commander to integrate and synchronize forces (e.g., joint headquarters). The high operations tempo (OPTEMPO) experienced by some high demand, low-density systems accelerates wear and tear on equipment and places heavy demands on personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO). There is also the potential to lose unit combat skills proficiency while engaged in current operations. To meet this issue, we continue to use the Reserve components (RC) consistent with their missions, training requirements, and capabilities, thus enhancing RC readiness and contributing to the enhanced readiness of the Total Force, while relieving Active component OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO. We also continue to task across like-units globally rather than exclusively using forces based in the United States or a particular theater. We have emphasized training while deployed, where possible, e.g., in Hungary the Army obtained firing ranges for use by deployed forces. We continue to use contractors to reduce tasking on critical support capabilities. In addition, we are using the Global Military Force Policy to provide decision makers with priority guidelines for employment and allocation of selected low density/high demand assets worldwide.

Contingency Disengagement -- the ability to quickly disengage and redeploy from ongoing contingencies -- continues to be a concern. Diversion of strategic lift assets needed for withdrawal from an ongoing operation can impact arrival of forces and sustainment stocks to support a Major Regional Contingency (MRC). In addition, indigenous rail, highway, and seaport conditions can limit the ability to withdraw rapidly. Extraction and redirection of combat and combat support units from ongoing contingencies is a difficult, complex, and time-consuming task -- time to extract, time to reconstitute and retrain to acceptable readiness levels, and time to redeploy to an MRC. National and international politics as well as the potential for a non-permissive disengagement environment could complicate a rapid withdrawal.

Mobility Shortfalls: Key elements include lift and throughput challenges. Operations such as the Burundi NEO would require augmentation by support units and repositioning of some equipment. Over the FYDP significant improvement should occur through programmed acquisition of key sealift and airlift assets. See classified annex.

Logistics/Sustainment Shortfalls: Key elements include some absences of prepositioned supplies, and insufficient stocks of other items. Programmatic actions or studies/reviews have been initiated to address most concerns. See classified annex.

ISR Deficiencies: The key elements include limits to surge operations with organic assets, and manning shortfall of some critical skill billets. Additional equipment has been purchased, and additional manning has been authorized. See classified annex.
C4 Shortfalls: The key elements include some insufficient communications capacity to support requirements. Some improvements to communications have been negotiated. See classified annex.

Forecast Joint Readiness: For the next 12 months, we forecast no significant change in the joint readiness assessment. High demand will continue for elements of the force such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance or mobility. Careful management, sometimes on a case-by-case basis, of those individual elements impacted by our national policy of engagement and current operations will enable us to meet joint force requirements.

Readiness to Execute the Full Range of the National Military Strategy.

A classified risk assessment is included in the Classified Annex to this report.

III. SUMMARY.

This quarter’s readiness scenario started with current operations in all AORs, then incorporated a Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) in Burundi, followed shortly thereafter by a major regional contingency in southwest Asia. All major combat and key support forces are ready to meet assigned taskings, and the Burundi NEO does not significantly change CENTCOM’s MRC assessment. A review of force readiness reveals “First-to-fight” forces at a high level of readiness, while overall unit readiness is stable at historic levels. However, some segments of the force are critical to current operations as well as major regional contingencies and require careful management. See Classified Annex for a specific risk assessment. Both unit and joint readiness are forecast to remain steady over the next 12 months.
GLOSSARY

The following is a list of acronyms and abbreviations used within the FY97/1 QRRC

AC  Active component
ALFT  airlift
ARG  Amphibious Readiness Group
BDE  brigade
BSR  Battle Staff Roster
BUR  Bottom Up Review
C-Day  force movement begins
C3I  command, control, communications, and intelligence
C4  command, control, communications, and computers
CENTCOM  Central Command
CINC  commander in chief of a unified command
CJCS  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
COA  course of action
COMM  communications
CRAF  Civil Reserve Air Fleet
CSA  Combat Support Agency
CVBG  carrier battle group
D Day  operations begin
DEPSECDEF  Deputy Secretary of Defense
DOD  Department of Defense
EOH  equipment on hand
FY  fiscal year
FYDP  future years defense plan
I Day  intelligence indicators are recognized
IFOR  Implementation Force
ISR  intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance
JMCIS  Joint Maritime Command Information System
JMRR  Joint Monthly Readiness Review
JROC  Joint Requirements Oversight Council
JWCA  Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment
LOC  line of communication
LRC  lesser regional contingency
MHE  materiel handling equipment
MPA  manpower authorization
MRC  major regional contingency
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO  non-commissioned officer
NEO  non-combatant evacuation operations
NMS  National Military Strategy

GL-1
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<td>OOTW</td>
<td>Operations Other Than War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ops</td>
<td>operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPTEMPO</td>
<td>operations tempo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACAF</td>
<td>Pacific Air Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERSTEMPO</td>
<td>personnel tempo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL</td>
<td>petroleum, oil, and lubricants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREPO</td>
<td>prepositioned equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSRC</td>
<td>Presidential Selective Reserve Callup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QRRRC</td>
<td>Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Reserve component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECCE</td>
<td>reconnaissance</td>
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<td>SATCOM</td>
<td>satellite communications</td>
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<td>SECDEF</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>SETAF</td>
<td>Southern European Task Force</td>
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<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations forces</td>
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<td>SROC</td>
<td>Senior Readiness Oversight Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWA</td>
<td>southwest Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USEUCOM</td>
<td>United States European Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCJCS</td>
<td>Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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PREFACE

Section 361 of the 1996 Defense Authorization Act added a new section to Chapter 22 of title 10, United States Code - "452. Quarterly readiness reports:

"(a) REQUIREMENT. - Not later than 30 days after the end of each calendar-year quarter, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives a report on military readiness. The report for any quarter shall be based on assessments that are provided during that quarter-

"(1) to any council, committee, or other body of the Department of Defense (A) that has responsibility for readiness oversight, and (B) the membership of which includes at least one civilian officer in the Office of the Secretary of Defense at the level of Assistant Secretary of Defense or higher;

"(2) by senior civilian and military officers of the military departments and the commanders of the unified and specified commands; and

"(3) as part of any regularly established process of periodic readiness reviews for the Department of Defense as a whole.

"(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.-Each such report shall-

"(1) specifically describe identified readiness problems or deficiencies and planned remedial actions; and

"(2) include the key indicators and other relevant data related to the identified problem or deficiency."

This report is the fifth such report and the second for fiscal year 1997. As such it addresses military readiness as reported to the Senior Readiness Oversight Council with readiness indicators during the second quarter of fiscal year 1997.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report provides a review of the readiness assessment process used by the Department of Defense. The report also provides a review of current and joint military readiness during the second quarter of fiscal year 1997 (FY97). In addition, it addresses the readiness of the Armed Forces to conduct operations within a notional scenario unique to this quarter.

The central component of the Department of Defense readiness assessment process is the readiness system established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR). This review incorporates inputs from the Services, commanders in chief (CINCs) of the unified commands, and Combat Support Agencies (CSAs). It is important to note that the JMRR process focuses on identifying near-term readiness issues (within the next 2-year period), assessing risk, and finding and implementing solutions. Reports provided during the JMRR provide assessments of current readiness and projected readiness over the next 12 months. In addition, the Joint Staff specifies a warfighting scenario each quarter to ensure a robust assessment of a variety of demanding missions.

To provide civilian oversight, significant issues raised through the JMRR process are used to make a monthly risk assessment that is reported to the Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC), chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The SROC brings the Service Chiefs, Under Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and key DOD civilian leadership together for a monthly forum to review current readiness. The Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress (QRRC) is based on assessments provided to the SROC.

This quarter's readiness scenario started with current operations in all AORs, then incorporated protection of air and sea lines of communication, a lesser regional contingency (LRC), in southwest Asia followed shortly by a world wide terrorist threat leading to an elevated terrorist threat condition (THREATCON CHARLIE). All major combat and key support forces are ready to meet assigned taskings, and the anti-terrorism/force protection short term impacts appear minimal. Long term impacts are a concern.

A review of force readiness reveals "First-to-fight" forces at a high level of readiness. Overall unit readiness is within historic norms. Some indicators, however, forecast a decline for rated areas within the Army and Air Force. For example, Army forecasts a decline in personnel readiness due to a leveling off of the recent force structure reduction. This transitory effect appears to be a short-term impact which nonetheless has created a challenge for recruiting and retention. Key to the Army's management of this issue is to resolve the force structure - end strength imbalance, to monitor and manage activity levels, and to make innovative use of the Reserve component where applicable. The Air Force is projecting a need to
I: THE READINESS ASSESSMENT PROCESS

Traditionally, the Department of Defense viewed readiness from a unit perspective—readiness of individual units of the Military Services to do their designed missions. Today, the Nation's global strategy calls for a readiness perspective that encompasses more than an aggregation of individual unit readiness. In the fall of 1994, the Department of Defense established a process to assess readiness across geographic regions vital to national interests.

The process and this new view of readiness required a joint perspective. In addition to the readiness issues of the four Services, the readiness of the unified commands and the Department of Defense Combat Support Agencies (CSA) is key. Joint readiness focuses on the ability of the commanders in chief (CINCs) of the unified commands plus the Combined Forces Command and the North American Aerospace Defense Command to use the forces provided from the Services and assets from the five CSAs in accomplishing theater and national objectives. Joint readiness is assessed in eight functional areas:

- Mobility
- Logistics
- Infrastructure
- Joint Personnel
- Communications
- Special Operations
- Joint Headquarters
- Intelligence/Surveillance/Reconnaissance (ISR)

In other words, these functional areas are critical to each CINC's task of integrating and synchronizing individual units into an effective joint team. They enable the CINC to most effectively use the forces he is provided. With worldwide interests and challenges, the United States must be able to engage in virtually every region of the globe and maintain the capability to deal with more than one major contingency at a time. Readiness to execute the full range of the national military strategy depends on maintaining high states of unit and joint readiness.
The JMRR is conducted on a 3-month cycle:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Full JMRR</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>Jul</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By Exception</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Exception</td>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>May</td>
<td>Aug</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Feedback</td>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>Sep</td>
</tr>
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The “Full JMRR”, the most extensive review, is conducted in October, January, April, and July. During JMRR meetings, the Services report on major combat units and critical support capabilities. Service reports show (1) the status of unit resources and training, (2) which units are engaged in ongoing operations, and (3) which units would engage in the warfighting scenario. In addition, each Service reports trends for the key components of unit readiness—people, equipment, and training.

Unified commands and CSAs report on each relevant joint functional area as listed earlier. The reports assess the readiness of these key components of the US military structure to meet current, projected, and scenario requirements.

By integrating the Service, unified command, and CSA reports, we reach an overall picture of current readiness. It is important to note that some elements of these assessments are, by nature, subjective. The key element of any readiness assessment must always be the commander’s judgment. However, because objective information is required to fix readiness problems, the process requires a detailed explanation of reported concerns.

During the second month of the cycle, the staffs work issues reported in the full JMRR. To maintain a monthly focus, a “By-Exception” JMRR report is required during the second month. This report highlights significant readiness changes which may have occurred since the “full JMRR.”

The “Feedback” JMRR is conducted in the third month of the cycle, in conjunction with a “By-Exception” JMRR. During the “feedback” JMRR, the Joint Staff directors address actions that have taken place in their respective functional areas to remedy CINC and CSA issues.

Issues are categorized in two ways. Readiness issues reflect an inability of existing forces to fully perform their functions. Capability issues at the theater or national-level reflect shortfalls driven by the strategy. Each concern is addressed. In some cases a near-term fix is identified and implemented. In other cases, the solution is best addressed through programmatic action.

It is important to note that the JMRR process focuses on identifying near-term readiness issues (within the next 2-year period) and on finding and implementing solutions. For longer-term readiness issues, the Joint Staff analyzes future capability requirements through the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment (JWCA) and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) process. This report and subsequent quarterly readiness reports will address only near-
II. THE FY97/2 READINESS REVIEW

This section summarizes readiness to meet the scenario during the period January through March 1997, as well as unit and joint readiness during the same period and forecast for the next 12 months.

Readiness to Meet a Specific Scenario.

Scenario for the Second Quarter in Fiscal Year 1997 (FY97/2): This quarter's scenario reflects the cumulative impact of ongoing operations (including SFOR), a lesser regional contingency (LRC) in southwest Asia and a worldwide terrorist threat condition (THREATCON) level of THREATCON CHARLIE. The THREATCON included this quarter is one of a progressive level of protective measures implemented by all DOD components in response to terrorist threats.

Scenario assumptions included:
- Real world requirements as of Dec 96
- PSRC is available on C-day
- CRAF I implementation occurs on C-day
- World wide terrorist threat beginning at D-day
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAVY</th>
<th>Current</th>
<th>+12 mo</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PERSONNEL</td>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>Satisfactory overall with growing concern over TACAIR pilot retention. Concentrating efforts on adequate compensation, quality of life, improved retention, and pilot production.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQUIPMENT</td>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>Satisfactory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAINING</td>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>Satisfactory.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
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<th>MARINES</th>
<th>Current</th>
<th>+12 mo</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PERSONNEL</td>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>Imbalances/uneven distribution of certain MOSs are being worked. Concerned with fixed-wing pilot retention. Deploying Infantry Battalions are being level loaded to reduce personnel turbulence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQUIPMENT</td>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>Age and maintenance man-hours remain a concern.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAINING</td>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>Satisfactory.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIR FORCE</th>
<th>Current</th>
<th>+12 mo</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PERSONNEL</td>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>Retention of rated officers is declining. Teams have been formed to start corrective action using compensation, quality of life, staff conversions, personnel continuation, and increased pilot production. High PERSTEMPO continues to affect quality of life in some specialties. Adherence to the Global Military Force Policy to prioritize asset use will help alleviate high PERSTEMPO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQUIPMENT</td>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>Continued use of bare base assets severely impacts availability for MRCs. Robusting of contractor efforts will increase reconstitution of bare base assets. Some aircraft Mission Capable rates have declined as well as Readiness Spares Packages fill rates for some high demand assets. Improvement is expected in FY98 with increased funding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAINING</td>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>Some units are experiencing short-term readiness degradations during and after supporting contingency operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The issue of pilot retention is exacerbated by a decision during force structure reductions to retain pilots and reduce initial pilot training output. Reconstitution of bare base assets is degraded by force protection efforts and keeps available inventory below requirements. Short term readiness degradations due to contingency operations are a cost of doing business.
ISR Deficiencies: The key elements include limits to surge operations with organic assets, and manning shortfall of some critical skill billets. Additional equipment has been purchased, and additional manning has been authorized. See classified annex.

C4 Shortfalls: The key elements include some insufficient communications capacity to support requirements. Some improvements to communications have been negotiated. See classified annex.

Forecast Joint Readiness: For the next 12 months, although some unit readiness indicators are forecast to decline, we project no significant change in the joint readiness assessment. High demand will continue for elements of the force such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance or mobility. Careful management, sometimes on a case-by-case basis, of those individual elements that are affected by our national policy of engagement and current operations will enable us to meet joint force requirements.

Readiness to Execute the Full Range of the National Military Strategy.

A classified risk assessment is included in the Classified Annex to this report.

III. SUMMARY.

This quarter's readiness scenario started with current operations in all AORs, then incorporated a lesser regional contingency in southwest Asia and a worldwide terrorist threat response level of THREATCON CHARLIE. All major combat and key support forces are ready to meet assigned taskings, and the worldwide terrorist threat had minimal short term impacts. A review of force readiness reveals "First-to-fight" forces at a high level of readiness. Overall unit readiness is within historic norms. Some indicators, however, forecast a decline for rated areas within the Army and Air Force. The Services are taking active measures to address these issues. In addition, some segments of the force are critical to current operations as well as major regional contingencies and require careful management. See Classified Annex for a specific risk assessment.
# Glossary

The following is a list of acronyms and abbreviations used within the Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Active component</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALFT</td>
<td>airlift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARG</td>
<td>Amphibious Ready Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDE</td>
<td>brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-Day</td>
<td>force movement begins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4</td>
<td>command, control, communications, and computers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFC</td>
<td>Combined Forces Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>commander in chief of a unified command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMM</td>
<td>communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craf</td>
<td>Civil Reserve Air Fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>Combat Support Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVBG</td>
<td>carrier battle group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-Day</td>
<td>operations begin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEPSECDEF</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSCS</td>
<td>defense satellite communications system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOH</td>
<td>equipment on hand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>fiscal year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYDP</td>
<td>future years defense plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-Day</td>
<td>intelligence indicators are recognized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMCIS</td>
<td>Joint Maritime Command Information System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMRR</td>
<td>Joint Monthly Readiness Review</td>
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<td>JROC</td>
<td>Joint Requirements Oversight Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>JWCA</td>
<td>Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDHD</td>
<td>low density, high demand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRC</td>
<td>lesser regional contingency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEU(SOC)</td>
<td>Marine expedition unit, special operations capable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHE</td>
<td>materiel handling equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILSATCOM</td>
<td>military satellite communications</td>
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<td>MPA</td>
<td>manpower authorization</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRC</td>
<td>major regional contingency</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>non-commissioned officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEO</td>
<td>non-combatant evacuation operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMS</td>
<td>National Military Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OOTW</td>
<td>Operations Other Than War</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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This quarter’s readiness scenario started with current operations in all AORs, then incorporated the outbreak of major theater warfare in the Pacific followed shortly thereafter by a second major theater war in southwest Asia. All major combat and key support forces are ready to meet assigned taskings less those employed to or recovering from their SFOR/IFOR mission in Bosnia.

A review of force readiness reveals "First-to-fight" forces at a high level of readiness. Overall unit readiness is within historic norms. Some indicators, however, forecast a decline for rated areas within the Navy and Air Force. For example, the Air Force forecasts a downward trend in personnel readiness due to a decline in pilot retention. This is in anticipation of a near-term period of airline hiring and also a consequence of an earlier decision during force structure reduction to retain onboard pilots and reduce pilot production. That decision resulted in a shortage of trained pilots in certain year groups. Key to the Air Force’s management of this issue is to increase training opportunities while realigning existing pilot assets, reducing non-operational flying requirements where possible, and making innovative use of the Reserve component where applicable. For all
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Traditionally, the Department of Defense viewed readiness from a unit perspective—readiness of individual units of the Military Services to do their designed missions. Today, the Nation’s global strategy calls for a readiness perspective that encompasses more than an aggregation of individual unit readiness. In the fall of 1994, the Department of Defense established a process to assess readiness across geographic regions vital to national interests.

The process and this new view of readiness required a joint perspective. In addition to the readiness issues of the four Services, the readiness of the unified commands and the Department of Defense Combat Support Agencies (CSA) is key. Joint readiness focuses on the ability of the commanders in chief (CINCs) of the unified commands plus the Combined Forces Command and the North American Aerospace Defense Command to use the forces provided from the Services and assets from the five CSAs in accomplishing theater and national objectives. Joint readiness is assessed in eight functional areas:

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In other words, these functional areas are critical to each CINC’s task of integrating and synchronizing individual units into an effective joint team. They enable the CINC to most effectively use the forces he is provided. With worldwide interests and challenges, the United States must be able to engage in virtually every region of the globe and maintain the capability to deal with more than one major contingency at a time. Readiness to execute the full range of the national military strategy depends on maintaining high states of unit and joint readiness.
The central component of the Department of Defense readiness assessment process is the Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR). This review incorporates inputs from the Services, CINCs, and CSAs. The five CSAs -- Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Information Systems Agency, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, and the National Security Agency -- make unique and critical contributions to combat readiness and operations. The JMRR provides the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a current and broad assessment of the military's readiness to execute the full range of the national military strategy, including peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention, and winning the Nation's wars.

Reports provide assessments of current readiness and projected readiness over the next 12 months. In addition, the Joint Staff specifies a warfighting scenario each quarter to ensure a robust assessment of the most demanding missions.

National Military Strategy

Peacetime Engagement

Deterrence/Conflict Prevention

Fight and Win Wars

Assessment Criteria

Current requirements/missions

Forecast requirements/missions over next 12 months

Warfighting Scenario
The JMRR is conducted on a 3-month cycle:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Full JMRR</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Jan</th>
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By integrating the Service, unified command, and CSA reports, we reach an overall picture of current readiness. It is important to note that some elements of these assessments are, by nature, subjective. The key element of any readiness assessment must always be the commander’s judgment. However, because objective information is required to fix readiness problems, the process requires a detailed explanation of reported concerns.

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Issues are categorized in two ways. Readiness issues reflect an inability of existing forces to fully perform their functions. Capability issues at the theater or national-level reflect shortfalls driven by the strategy. Each concern is addressed. In some cases a near-term fix is identified and implemented. In other cases, the solution is best addressed through programmatic action.

It is important to note that the JMRR process focuses on identifying near-term readiness issues (within the next 2-year period) and on finding and implementing solutions. For longer-term readiness issues, the Joint Staff analyzes future capability requirements through the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment (JWCA) and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) process. This report and subsequent quarterly readiness reports will
address only near-term readiness issues and fixes. Near-term readiness is the focus of the readiness system established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

To provide civilian oversight, significant issues raised through the JMRR process are used to make a monthly risk assessment that is reported to the Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC), chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The SROC brings the Service Chiefs, Under Secretaries of Defense, Under Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff together for a monthly forum to review current readiness. At each meeting of the SROC, the Service Chiefs provide a current and forecast assessment of their respective units. A Joint Readiness assessment is provided by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Finally, the Vice Chairman presents an overall assessment of the readiness of the Armed Forces to fight and meet the full range of the national military strategy.

Full SROC and Feedback SROC presentations reflect JMRR content.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1st Qtr</th>
<th>2nd Qtr</th>
<th>3rd Qtr</th>
<th>4th Qtr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feedback SROC</td>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>Jul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full SROC</td>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>May</td>
<td>Aug</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topic SROC</td>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>Sep</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress (QRRC) is based on assessments provided to the SROC.
II. THE FY97/3 READINESS REVIEW

This section summarizes readiness to meet the scenario during the period April through June 1997, as well as unit and joint readiness during the same period and forecast for the next 12 months.

Readiness to Meet a Specific Scenario.

Scenario for the Third Quarter in Fiscal Year 1997 (FY97/3): This quarter's scenario reflects the cumulative impact of ongoing operations (including SFOR), a major theater war in Korea, and another major theater war in southwest Asia with continued emphasis on anti-terrorism and force protection readiness concerns.

**FY97/3 Scenario**

Scenario assumptions included:
- Real world requirements as of Apr 97
- PSRC is available on C-day
- CRAFT I implementation occurs on C-day

Scenario Unit Assessment: For this quarter's scenario, all major combat and key support forces are ready to meet assigned taskings less those employed to or recovering from their SFOR/IFOR mission in Bosnia.

Scenario Joint Assessment: Operations tempo (OPTEMPO) for low-density/high demand (LD/HD) assets continues to be a concern.
Unit Readiness:

Current Unit Readiness: US forces remain ready to execute their assigned missions, and “First-to-fight” forces maintain a high level of readiness. Overall unit readiness is within historic norms (See Classified Annex), however, some indicators forecast a decline for rated areas within the Navy and Air Force. Another area of concern is short-term readiness degradation as units redeploy from current operations or modernize. This is a normal cost of doing business, but a process to provide more visibility to OPTEMPO is under development. In addition, we continue to closely monitor LD/HD assets (e.g., ISR, mobility equipment, military satellite communications, sealift, and special operations forces).

Forecast Unit Readiness: Each Service table in the following series displays current and forecast unit readiness levels. While current readiness is strong, some important downward indications are forecast. In the following tables, the three components of unit readiness—Personnel, Equipment, and Training—are reported by each Service as Green for Satisfactory, Yellow for Marginal, and Red for Unsatisfactory with trends as shown:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARMY</th>
<th>Current</th>
<th>+12 mo</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PERSONNEL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Projected to be a low green. Personnel shortfalls are impacting the Army, causing unmanned squads in many units and re-assignment of combat arms soldiers to critical support fields. Efforts taken by the Army to reduce force structure and improvements in recruiting will result in a positive trend commencing 2nd Qtr, FY98.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQUIPMENT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Equipment on-hand (EOH) and serviceability readiness remains strong overall.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAINING</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Training readiness remains constant, although personnel shortages continue to impact the readiness of many units. Continued Operations Other Than War (OOTW) missions impact on collective unit readiness. The necessity to cross-level personnel and equipment to meet contingency operation deployment standards has a negative impact on units left behind.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAVY</th>
<th>Current</th>
<th>+12 mo</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PERSONNEL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Satisfactory. Overall pilot retention is satisfactory with exception of some concern regarding retention in some TACAIR sub-communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQUIPMENT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Concern over future equipment readiness from underfunding of FY98 flying hour program (estimated shortfall of $322M). Depot maintenance backlog projected to remain above goal of 100 airframes, 250 engines. Aircraft shortfalls of certain T/M/S, in addition to shortage of student Naval Flight Officers affects replacement pilot and NFO throughput.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAINING</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Satisfactory. Closely monitoring effect of flying hour shortfall in FY98 on aviation training rates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARINES</td>
<td>Current</td>
<td>+12 mo</td>
<td>Comments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERSONNEL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Imbalances/uneven distribution of certain MOSs are being worked. Concerned with fixed-wing pilot retention. Deploying Infantry Battalions are being level loaded to reduce personnel turbulence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQUIPMENT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Age and use continue to require greater parts and maintenance man-hours at the expense of modernization/infrastructure, increasing costs to sustain readiness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAINING</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Depot aircraft may impact upon training. Must ensure continued level of flying hours, maintenance, and depot funding.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIR FORCE</th>
<th>Current</th>
<th>+12 mo</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PERSONNEL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Retention of rated officers is declining. Teams formed to start corrective action using compensation, quality of life, conversion of rated staff positions, personnel continuation, and increased pilot production. High OPTEMPO continues to affect quality of life in many specialties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQUIPMENT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Continued use of bare base assets severely impacts availability for MTWs. Robusting of contract will increase reconstitution of bare base assets. Some aircraft Mission Capable rates have declined as well as Readiness Spares Packages fill rates for some high demand assets. Small improvement is expected in FY98 with increased funding for spares. Continued shortages in the Depot Level Reparables funding could cause readiness degradations in mid FY98.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAINING</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Some units are experiencing short-term readiness degradations during and after supporting contingency operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Air Force Note: Adherence to the Global Military Force Policy to prioritize asset use will help alleviate high OPTEMPO. The issue of pilot retention is exacerbated by a decision during force structure reductions to retain pilots and reduce initial pilot training output. Reconstitution of bare base assets is degraded by force protection efforts and keeps available inventory below requirements. Short term readiness degradations due to contingency operations are a cost of doing business that have been reduced by taking steps to increase training opportunities while deployed and are resolved upon return from deployment activities, assuming the availability of resources.

Overall Note: The June 1997 approval of the contingency appropriation bill provided reimbursement of all except $152 million of requested funds.
Joint Readiness:

Current Joint Readiness: Although overall unit readiness remains strong, there are still six areas of readiness and capability concerns for joint readiness.

Ongoing Operations – worldwide engagement, exercises, and contingencies -- remain high and require careful management of select segments of the force. This is particularly true of those assets that enable a theater commander to integrate and synchronize forces (e.g., joint headquarters). The high OPTEMPO experienced by some LD/HD systems accelerates wear and tear on equipment and places heavy demands on personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO). There is also the potential to lose unit combat skills proficiency while engaged in current operations. To meet this issue, we leverage technology to provide simulation and exercises for individual, unit, and staff training. Additionally, we continue to use the Reserve components (RC) consistent with their missions, training requirements, and capabilities, (e.g. Air National Guard F-15s supporting Operation Deliberate Guard) thus enhancing RC readiness and contributing to the enhanced readiness of the Total Force, while relieving Active component OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO. The ongoing drawdown of USAF assets in support of current European operations should alleviate some of the deployment requirements for the active component. We also continue to task across like-units globally rather than exclusively using forces based in the United States or a particular theater, e.g. F-16s from PACOM supporting Operation Northern Watch. In addition, we are using the Global Military Force Policy to provide decision makers with priority guidelines for employment and allocation of selected LD/HD assets worldwide.

Contingency Disengagement -- the ability to quickly disengage and redeploy from ongoing contingencies -- is an open question, but mitigated by a reduced level of involvement during this quarter. Diversion of strategic lift assets needed for withdrawal from an ongoing operation can impact arrival of forces and sustainment stocks to support a major theater war (MTW). In addition, indigenous rail, highway, and seaport conditions can limit the ability to withdraw rapidly. Extraction and redirection of combat and combat support units from ongoing contingencies is a difficult, complex, and time-consuming task -- time to extract, time to reconstitute and retrain to acceptable readiness levels, and time to redeploy to an MTW. National and international politics as well as the potential for a non-permissive disengagement environment could complicate a rapid withdrawal.

Mobility Shortfalls: Key elements include lift and throughput challenges. A Floating Craft Working Group to develop long term solutions has been established. Over the Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP) significant improvement should occur through programmed acquisition of key sealift and airlift assets. See classified annex.

Logistics/Sustainment Shortfalls: Key elements include some absences of prepositioned supplies, and insufficient stocks of other items. These shortages, if allowed to remain uncorrected, could degrade our ability to sustain operations. Programmatic actions or studies/reviews have been initiated to address many concerns. Planning for movement of some critical spares and support equipment has been formalized. See classified annex.
ISR Deficiencies: The key elements include limits to surge operations with organic assets, and manning shortfall of some critical skill billets. Some additional equipment, reserve augmentation, additional school quotas, and additional manning have been acquired or authorized. See classified annex.

C4 Shortfalls: The key elements include some insufficient communications capacity to support requirements. Some improvements to communications equipment have been completed. See classified annex.

Forecast Joint Readiness: For the next 12 months, although some unit readiness indicators are forecast to decline, we project no significant change in the joint readiness assessment. High demand will continue for elements of the force such as special operations, ISR, or mobility. Careful management, sometimes on a case-by-case basis, of those individual elements that are affected by our national policy of engagement and current operations will enable us to meet joint force requirements.

Readiness to Execute the Full Range of the National Military Strategy.

A classified risk assessment is included in the Classified Annex to this report.

III. SUMMARY.

This quarter's readiness scenario started with current operations in all AORs (including SFOR), then incorporated a major theater war in Korea, and another major theater war in southwest Asia with continued emphasis on anti-terrorism and force protection readiness concerns. All major combat and key support forces are ready to meet assigned taskings less those employed to or recovering from their SFOR/IFOR mission in Bosnia. A review of force readiness reveals "First-to-fight" forces at a high level of readiness. Overall unit readiness is within historic norms. Some indicators, however, forecast a decline for rated areas within the Navy and Air Force. The Services are taking active measures to address these issues. In addition, some segments of the force are critical to current operations as well as major theater wars and require careful management. See Classified Annex for a specific risk assessment.
# GLOSSARY

The following is a list of acronyms and abbreviations used within the Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Active component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALFT</td>
<td>airlift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARG</td>
<td>Amphibious Ready Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDE</td>
<td>brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-Day</td>
<td>force movement begins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4</td>
<td>command, control, communications, and computers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFC</td>
<td>Combined Forces Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>commander in chief of a unified command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMM</td>
<td>communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRAF</td>
<td>Civil Reserve Air Fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>Combat Support Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVBG</td>
<td>carrier battle group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-Day</td>
<td>operations begin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEPSECDEF</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSCS</td>
<td>defense satellite communications system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOH</td>
<td>equipment on hand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>fiscal year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYDP</td>
<td>future years defense plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-Day</td>
<td>intelligence indicators are recognized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMCIS</td>
<td>Joint Maritime Command Information System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMRR</td>
<td>Joint Monthly Readiness Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JROC</td>
<td>Joint Requirements Oversight Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JWCA</td>
<td>Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDHD</td>
<td>low density, high demand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRC</td>
<td>lesser regional contingency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEU(SOC)</td>
<td>Marine expeditionary unit, special operations capable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHE</td>
<td>materiel handling equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILSATCOM</td>
<td>military satellite communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPA</td>
<td>manpower authorization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTW</td>
<td>major theater of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>non-commissioned officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEO</td>
<td>non-combatant evacuation operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMS</td>
<td>National Military Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OOTW</td>
<td>operations other than war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Meaning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ops</td>
<td>operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPTEMPO</td>
<td>operations tempo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACAF</td>
<td>Pacific Air Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERSTEMPO</td>
<td>personnel tempo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL</td>
<td>petroleum, oil, and lubricants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POM</td>
<td>program objective memorandum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREPO</td>
<td>prepositioned equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSRC</td>
<td>Presidential Selective Reserve Callup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QRRC</td>
<td>Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Reserve component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECCE</td>
<td>reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SATCOM</td>
<td>satellite communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECDEF</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SETAF</td>
<td>Southern European Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOR</td>
<td>stabilization force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SROC</td>
<td>Senior Readiness Oversight Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWA</td>
<td>southwest Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THREATCON</td>
<td>threat condition level of normal, alpha, bravo, charlie, or delta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UHF</td>
<td>ultra-high frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USEUCOM</td>
<td>United States European Command</td>
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<td>III. Summary</td>
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<tr>
<td>GLOSSARY</td>
<td>GL-1</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**APPENDIX A, CLASSIFIED ANNEX (SECRET),**  
Published Under Separate Cover .................. A-1
PREFACE

Section 361 of the 1996 Defense Authorization Act added a new section to Chapter 22 of title 10, United States Code - "452. Quarterly readiness reports:

"[a] REQUIREMENT. - Not later than 30 days after the end of each calendar-year quarter, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives a report on military readiness. The report for any quarter shall be based on assessments that are provided during that quarter-

"(1) to any council, committee, or other body of the Department of Defense (A) that has responsibility for readiness oversight, and (B) the membership of which includes at least one civilian officer in the Office of the Secretary of Defense at the level of Assistant Secretary of Defense or higher;

"(2) by senior civilian and military officers of the military departments and the commanders of the unified and specified commands; and

"(3) as part of any regularly established process of periodic readiness reviews for the Department of Defense as a whole.

"(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.-Each such report shall-

"(1) specifically describe identified readiness problems or deficiencies and planned remedial actions; and

"(2) include the key indicators and other relevant data related to the identified problem or deficiency."

This report is the seventh such report and the fourth for fiscal year 1997. As such it addresses military readiness as reported to the Senior Readiness Oversight Council with readiness indicators during the fourth quarter of fiscal year 1997.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report provides a review of the readiness assessment process used by the Department of Defense. The report also provides a review of current and joint military readiness during the fourth quarter of fiscal year 1997 (FY97/4). In addition, it addresses the readiness of the Armed Forces to conduct operations within a notional scenario unique to this quarter.

The central component of the Department of Defense readiness assessment process is the readiness system established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR). This review incorporates inputs from the Services, commanders in chief (CINCs) of the unified commands, and Combat Support Agencies (CSAs). It is important to note that the JMRR process focuses on identifying near-term readiness issues (within the next 2-year period), assessing risk, and finding and implementing solutions. Reports provided during the JMRR provide assessments of current readiness and projected readiness over the next 12 months. In addition, the Joint Staff specifies a warfighting scenario each quarter to ensure a robust assessment of a variety of demanding missions.

To provide civilian oversight, significant issues raised through the JMRR process are used to make a monthly risk assessment that is reported to the Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC), chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The SROC brings the Service Chiefs, Under Secretaries of Defense, Under Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff together for a monthly forum to review current readiness. The Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress (QRRRC) is based on assessments provided to the SROC.

This quarter's readiness scenario started with current ongoing operations in all AORs, then incorporated the outbreak of major theater warfare in southwest Asia (SWA). In addition, we looked for the first time at the potential impacts of a biological warfare threat at our air and sea ports. All major combat and key support forces are ready to meet assigned taskings less selected units employed to or recovering from their SFOR/IFOR mission in Bosnia. The readiness of these units does not present an unacceptable risk to execution of the National Military Strategy.

A review of force readiness reveals that forward deployed and "First-to-fight" forces remain at a high level of readiness. Overall unit readiness is within historic norms. While Army indicators have recovered to a stable condition and the Marine Corps remains stable, some indicators forecast a decline for rated areas within the Navy and Air Force. For example, the Navy, for its non-deployed force, forecasts a downward trend in equipment readiness due to depot maintenance backlogs of both aircraft and engines. The funding for depot maintenance has been increased and should result in increasing trends. The Air Force continues to anticipate problems with
retention of rated officers. Navy projected training shortfalls, particularly within aviation, are expected to improve due to increased funding of flying hours. For all the Services, some segments of the force remain critical to current operations as well as MTWs and require careful management. Finally, our capability to respond to a biological warfare (BW) threat raises some new concerns. See Classified Annex for a specific risk assessment.

We will soon be adding some new information to this report. In recognition of the need to more closely monitor OpTempo and PersTempo across the force the Joint Staff, in coordination with the Services, is initiating a TEMPO management process. Initial data should be available next quarter.
I: THE READINESS ASSESSMENT PROCESS

Traditionally, the Department of Defense viewed readiness from a unit perspective—readiness of individual units of the Military Services to do their designed missions. Today, the Nation’s global strategy calls for a readiness perspective that encompasses more than an aggregation of individual unit readiness. In the fall of 1994, the Department of Defense established a process to assess readiness across geographic regions vital to national interests.

The process and this new view of readiness required a joint perspective. In addition to the readiness issues of the four Services, the readiness of the unified commands and the Department of Defense Combat Support Agencies (CSA) is key. Joint readiness focuses on the ability of the commanders in chief (CINCs) of the unified commands plus the Combined Forces Command and the North American Aerospace Defense Command to use the forces provided from the Services and assets from the five CSAs in accomplishing theater and national objectives. Joint readiness is assessed in eight functional areas:

- Mobility
- Logistics
- Infrastructure
- Joint Personnel
- Communications
- Special Operations
- Joint Headquarters
- Intelligence/Surveillance/Reconnaissance (ISR)

In other words, these functional areas are critical to each CINC’s task of integrating and synchronizing individual units into an effective joint team. They enable the CINC to most effectively use the forces he is provided. With worldwide interests and challenges, the United States must be able to engage in virtually every region of the globe and maintain the capability to deal with more than one major contingency at a time. Readiness to execute the full range of the national military strategy depends on maintaining high states of unit and joint readiness.
The central component of the Department of Defense readiness assessment process is the Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR). This review incorporates inputs from the Services, CINCs, and CSAs. Five CSAs -- Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Information Systems Agency, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, and the National Security Agency -- make unique and critical contributions to combat readiness and operations. The JMRR provides the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a current and broad assessment of the military's readiness to execute the full range of the national military strategy, including peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention, and winning the Nation's wars.

Reports provide assessments of current readiness and projected readiness over the next 12 months. In addition, the Joint Staff specifies a warfighting scenario each quarter to ensure a robust assessment of the most demanding missions.

**National Military Strategy Criteria**

- Shape Strategic Environment
- Prepare for Uncertain Future
- Full Spectrum Crisis Response

**Assessment**

- Current requirements/missions
- Forecast requirements/missions over next 12 months
- Warfighting Scenario
The JMRR is conducted on a 3-month cycle:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Full JMRR</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>Jul</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By Exception</td>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>May</td>
<td>Aug</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Exception and Feedback</td>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>Sep</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The "Full JMRR", the most extensive review, is conducted in October, January, April, and July. During JMRR meetings, the Services report on major combat units and critical support capabilities. Service reports show (1) the status of unit resources and training, (2) which units are engaged in ongoing operations, and (3) which units would engage in the warfighting scenario. In addition, each Service reports trends for the key components of unit readiness—people, equipment, training and enablers.

Unified commands and CSAs report on each relevant joint functional area as listed earlier. The reports assess the readiness of these key components of the US military structure to meet current, projected, and scenario requirements.

By integrating the Service, unified command, and CSA reports, we reach an overall picture of current readiness. It is important to note that some elements of these assessments are, by nature, subjective. The key element of any readiness assessment must always be the commander's judgment. However, because objective information is required to fix readiness problems, the process requires a detailed explanation of reported concerns.

During the second month of the cycle, the staffs work issues reported in the full JMRR. To maintain a monthly focus, a "By-Exception" JMRR report is required during the second month. This report highlights significant readiness changes which may have occurred since the "full JMRR."

The "Feedback" JMRR is conducted in the third month of the cycle, in conjunction with a "By-Exception" JMRR. During the "feedback" JMRR, the Joint Staff directors address actions that have taken place in their respective functional areas to remedy CINC and CSA issues.

Issues are categorized in two ways. Readiness issues reflect an inability of existing forces to fully perform their functions. Capability issues at the theater or national-level reflect shortfalls driven by the strategy. Each concern is addressed. In some cases a near-term fix is identified and implemented. In other cases, the solution is best addressed through programmatic action.

It is important to note that the JMRR process focuses on identifying near-term readiness issues (within the next 2-year period) and on finding and implementing solutions. For longer-term readiness issues, the Joint Staff analyzes future capability requirements through the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment (JWCA) and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) process. This report and subsequent quarterly readiness reports
will address only near-term readiness issues and fixes. Near-term readiness is the focus of the readiness system established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

To provide civilian oversight, significant issues raised through the JMRR process are used to make a monthly risk assessment that is reported to the Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC), chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The SROC brings the Service Chiefs, Under Secretaries of Defense, Under Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff together for a monthly forum to review current readiness. At each meeting of the SROC, the Service Chiefs provide a current and forecast assessment of their respective units. A Joint Readiness assessment is provided by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Finally, the Vice Chairman presents an overall assessment of the readiness of the Armed Forces to fight and meet the full range of the national military strategy.

![Flowchart showing the process of the SROC and JMRR](chart.png)

Full SROC and Feedback SROC presentations reflect JMRR content.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1st Qtr</th>
<th>2nd Qtr</th>
<th>3rd Qtr</th>
<th>4th Qtr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feedback SROC</td>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>Jul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full SROC</td>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>May</td>
<td>Aug</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topic SROC</td>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>Sep</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress (QRRC) is based on assessments provided to the SROC.
II. THE FY97/4 READINESS REVIEW

This section summarizes readiness to meet the scenario during the period July through September 1997, as well as unit and joint readiness during the same period and forecast for the next 12 months.

Readiness to Meet a Specific Scenario.

Scenario for the Fourth Quarter in Fiscal Year 1997 (FY97/4): This quarter’s scenario reflects the cumulative impact of ongoing operations (including SFOR), a major theater war in southwest Asia (SWA), along with a first-time look at the potential impacts of a biological warfare (BW) threat at our air and sea ports.

**FY97/4 Scenario**

CURRENT OPERATIONS IN ALL AORs

MTW-E (SWA)

Terrorist Threat
Biological Warfare

Scenario assumptions included:

- Real world requirements as of 15 Jun 97
- NCA declares a national emergency on C-day
- No withdrawal of forces from SFOR
- No withhold of bomber, tanker, or reconnaissance assets
- JSCP planning timelines used

C-DAY = MOVEMENT FROM POINT OF ORIGIN BEGINS
D-DAY = OPERATIONS BEGINS
Scenario Unit Assessment: For this quarter’s scenario, all major combat and key support forces are ready to meet assigned taskings less those employed to or recovering from their SFOR/IFOR mission in Bosnia. Both the Navy and the Air Force are projecting problems with readiness equipment, especially aircraft engines.

Scenario Joint Assessment: Operations tempo (OPTEMPO) for low-density/high demand (LD/HD) assets continues to be a concern, as does our ability to quickly disengage from ongoing contingencies if necessary. Finally, our assessment of a BW threat has identified deficiencies which would increase the MTW risk.

Unit Readiness:

Current Unit Readiness: US forces remain ready to execute their assigned missions, and “First-to-fight” forces maintain a high level of readiness. Overall unit readiness is within historic norms (See Classified Annex), however, some indicators forecast a decline for rated areas within the Navy and Air Force. Another area of concern is short-term readiness degradation as units redeploy from current operations or modernize. In recognition of the need to more closely monitor OpTempo and PersTempo across the force the Joint Staff, in coordination with the Services, is initiating a TEMPO management process. Initial data should be available next quarter. In addition, we continue to closely monitor LD/HD assets (e.g., ISR, mobility equipment, military satellite communications, sealift, and special operations forces).

Forecast Unit Readiness: Each Service table in the following series displays current and forecast unit readiness levels. While current readiness is strong, some important downward indications are forecast. In the following tables, four components of unit readiness--Personnel, Equipment, Training, and Enablers -- are reported by each Service as Green for Satisfactory, Yellow for Marginal, and Red for Unsatisfactory. The fourth component, Enablers, is a new addition to the report this quarter. Although there are slight differences between the Services in what are considered enablers, in general they are critical units or capabilities essential to support joint operations (e.g., critical Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) units, supplies, etc.). Trends are shown with arrows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARMY</th>
<th>Current</th>
<th>+12 mo</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PERSONNEL</td>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>Projected to be a low green. Personnel shortfalls are causing unmanned squads in many units and reassignment of combat arms soldiers to critical support fields. Force structure reductions and improved recruiting will result in a positive trend commencing 2nd Qtr, FY98.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQUIPMENT</td>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>LOWRED</td>
<td>Equipment on-hand (EOH) and serviceability readiness remains strong overall.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAINING</td>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>Training readiness remains constant, although Operations Other Than War (OOTW) missions continue to impact collective unit readiness. Cross-leveling personnel and equipment to meet contingency operation deployment standards has a negative impact on units left behind.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENABLERS</td>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>While some shortages remain, fill of preposition sets continues to progress and ongoing delivery of LMSRs is greatly improving the prepo afloat capability.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### NAVY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Current</th>
<th>+12 mo</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>Satisfactory. Overall pilot retention is satisfactory with exception of some concern regarding retention in some TACAIR sub-communities.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Current</th>
<th>+12 mo</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>Concern over declining Mission Capable/Fully Mission Capable trends, and aircraft and engine backlog. A new readiness-based metric of 100% aircraft assigned for deployed squadrons and C-1 (90% aircraft assigned) for non-deployed squadrons will be attained by FY01.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Current</th>
<th>+12 mo</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>Training trends expected to improve with flying hour restoral. Undergraduate Pilot Training production, and its effect on fleet sqdn manning, is being closely watched.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enablers</th>
<th>Current</th>
<th>+12 mo</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>Satisfactory.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### MARINES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Current</th>
<th>+12 mo</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>Imbalances/uneven distribution of certain MOSs being worked. Concern with fixed-wing pilot retention.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Current</th>
<th>+12 mo</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>Ground equipment readiness remains high. Age and use continue to require greater parts and maintenance man-hours. Costs to sustain have increased.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Current</th>
<th>+12 mo</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>Must ensure steady level of funding to ensure flight hours, maintenance and timely depot turnaround.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enablers</th>
<th>Current</th>
<th>+12 mo</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>MPSRON-2 continues to rotate Prepositioned Ships through their maintenance cycle at Blount Island.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Current</td>
<td>+12 mo</td>
<td>Comments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PERSONNEL</strong></td>
<td><img src="https://via.placeholder.com/15" alt="Green" /></td>
<td><img src="https://via.placeholder.com/15" alt="Green" /></td>
<td>Retention of rated officers is declining. Surveys and focus groups identified OpTempo and quality of life concerns, as well as increased airline hiring; as primary reasons why aircrew are separating. AF Leadership implemented a gameplan designed to improve aircrew retention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EQUIPMENT</strong></td>
<td><img src="https://via.placeholder.com/15" alt="Green" /></td>
<td><img src="https://via.placeholder.com/15" alt="Green" /></td>
<td>Continued use of bare base assets severely impacts availability for MTWs. AF goal is to reconstitute 24 sets by May 98. AF aircraft engine health, driven mostly by Reliability problems is unsatisfactory but stable. Spare engine levels are below wartime requirements for several units. AF is aggressively engaging engine and other equipment shortfalls with increased inspections and repair funding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TRAINING</strong></td>
<td><img src="https://via.placeholder.com/15" alt="Green" /></td>
<td><img src="https://via.placeholder.com/15" alt="Green" /></td>
<td>Rescue, fighter and SOF units are experiencing short-term readiness degradations during and after supporting contingency operations. Tying ACC’s Ready Aircrew Program to SORTS will improve reporting fidelity. Slight decreases in training ratings is expected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ENABLERS</strong></td>
<td><img src="https://via.placeholder.com/15" alt="Green" /></td>
<td><img src="https://via.placeholder.com/15" alt="Green" /></td>
<td>High demand for Command and Control, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance platforms requires careful OPTEMPO Management to sustain readiness.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Air Force Note: The gameplan to improve retention includes actions to reduce OpTempo such as reducing rotation lengths, reducing exercises and competitions, reducing operational inspection requirements, combining inspections with real world deployments when appropriate, and increasing numbers of crewmembers in some mission areas; and actions to improve quality of life such as reducing additional duties for crewmembers, ensuring responsive medical care for dependents of deployed personnel, and facilitating communications between deployed members and their families. In addition, short term readiness degradations due to contingency operations are a cost of doing business that have been reduced by taking steps to increase training opportunities while deployed.

**Joint Readiness Strategic Concerns:**

**How Strategic Concerns are Derived:** The process is initiated with deficiency reports provided by the CINCs during the JMRP process. We presently have 145 deficiencies (22% readiness deficiencies reflecting an inability of existing forces to fully perform their functions, and 78% capabilities deficiencies reflecting capability shortfalls driven by the strategy) which are being worked or monitored. Over half of these have been reported by the two MTW CINCs. These CINC-reported deficiencies are then grouped into “elements of concern”, or tactical-level groupings of related items. These “elements of concern” are then categorized into strategic-level groupings which represent overriding readiness issues, or strategic
concerns. Service deficiencies also feed into these strategic groupings and generally have a longer-term focus than CINC discrepancies. The current strategic concerns are discussed below.

Current Joint Readiness: Although overall unit readiness remains strong, there are still six areas of strategic concern for joint readiness. A seventh area, Anti-Terrorism and Force Protection, received extensive discussion due to assessments of the Biological Warfare (BW) threat scenario.

Ongoing Operations – worldwide engagement, exercises, and contingencies -- remain high and require careful management of select segments of the force. This is particularly true of those assets that enable a theater commander to integrate and synchronize forces (e.g., joint headquarters). The high OPTEMPO experienced by some low density/high demand (LD/HD) systems accelerates wear and tear on equipment and places heavy demands on personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO). There is also the potential to lose unit combat skills proficiency while engaged in current operations. To meet this issue, we leverage technology to provide simulation and exercises for individual, unit, and staff training. Additionally, we continue to use the Reserve components (RC) consistent with their missions, training requirements, and capabilities, (e.g. Air National Guard F-16s supporting Operation Deliberate Guard) while enhancing RC readiness and contributing to the enhanced readiness of the Total Force, while relieving Active component OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO. The ongoing drawdown of USAF assets in support of current European operations should alleviate some of the deployment requirements for the active component. We also continue to task across like-units globally rather than exclusively using forces based in the United States or a particular theater, e.g. F-16s from PACOM supporting Operation Northern Watch. In addition, we are using the Global Military Force Policy to provide decision makers with priority guidelines for employment and allocation of selected LD/HD assets worldwide.

Contingency Disengagement -- the ability to quickly disengage and redeploy from ongoing contingencies -- is an open question, but mitigated by a reduced level of involvement during this quarter. Diversion of strategic lift assets needed for withdrawal from an ongoing operation can impact arrival of forces and sustainment stocks to support a major theater war (MTW). In addition, indigenous rail, highway, and seaport conditions can limit the ability to withdraw rapidly. Extraction and redirection of combat and combat support units from ongoing contingencies is a difficult, complex, and time-consuming task -- time to extract, time to reconstitute and retrain to acceptable readiness levels, and time to redeploy to an MTW. National and international politics as well as the potential for a non-permissive disengagement environment could complicate a rapid withdrawal.

Mobility Shortfalls: Key elements include lift and throughput challenges. A Floating Craft Working Group to develop long term sealift solutions has been established. Over the Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP) significant improvement should occur through programmed acquisition of key sealift and airlift assets. See classified annex.

Logistics/Sustainment Shortfalls: Key elements include some absences of prepositioned supplies, and insufficient stocks of other items. While these shortages could currently degrade our ability to sustain operations, programmatic actions or studies/reviews
have begun to address many concerns. Planning for movement of some critical spares and support equipment has been formalized and movement initiated. See classified annex.

**ISR Deficiencies:** The key elements include limits to surge operations with organic assets, and manning shortfall of some critical skill billets. Some additional equipment, reserve augmentation, additional school quotas, and additional manning have been acquired or authorized. See classified annex.

**C4 Shortfalls:** The key elements include some insufficient communications capacity to support requirements. Some improvements to communications equipment have been completed. See classified annex.

**Anti-Terrorism and Force Protection:** Primary concerns from the BW threat are insufficient detection capability, the probable extension of force closure times, the necessity to reposition assets, the possible destabilization of coalition partners, and the possible effects on our medical system. See classified annex.

**Forecast Joint Readiness:** For the next 12 months, although some unit readiness indicators are forecast to decline, we project no significant change in the joint readiness assessment. High demand will continue for elements of the force such as special operations, ISR, and mobility. Careful management, sometimes on a case-by-case basis, of those individual elements that are affected by our national policy of engagement and current operations will enable us to meet joint force requirements.

**Readiness to Execute the Full Range of the National Military Strategy.**

A classified risk assessment is included in the Classified Annex to this report.

**III. SUMMARY.**

This quarter’s readiness scenario started with current operations in all AORs (including SFOR), then incorporated a major theater war in southwest Asia with the added complication of a biological warfare threat. All major combat and key support forces are ready to meet assigned taskings less selected units employed to or recovering from their SFOR/IFOR mission in Bosnia. A review of force readiness reveals “First-to-fight” forces at a high level of readiness. Overall unit readiness is within historic norms. Some indicators, however, continue to forecast a decline for rated areas within the Navy and Air Force. The Services are taking active measures to address these issues. In addition, some segments of the force are critical to current operations as well as major theater wars and require careful management. Finally, our capability to respond to a BW threat raises some new concerns. See Classified Annex for a specific risk assessment.
# GLOSSARY

The following is a list of acronyms and abbreviations used within the Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Active component</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALFT</td>
<td>airlift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARG</td>
<td>Amphibious Ready Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDE</td>
<td>brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-Day</td>
<td>force movement begins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4</td>
<td>command, control, communications, and computers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFC</td>
<td>Combined Forces Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>commander in chief of a unified command</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMM</td>
<td>communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRAF</td>
<td>Civil Reserve Air Fleet</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>Combat Support Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CVBG</td>
<td>carrier battle group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-Day</td>
<td>operations begin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEPSECDEF</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSCS</td>
<td>defense satellite communications system</td>
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<tr>
<td>EOH</td>
<td>equipment on hand</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>fiscal year</td>
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<tr>
<td>FYDP</td>
<td>future years defense plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>I-Day</td>
<td>intelligence indicators are recognized</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMCIS</td>
<td>Joint Maritime Command Information System</td>
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<tr>
<td>JMRR</td>
<td>Joint Monthly Readiness Review</td>
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<td>JROC</td>
<td>Joint Requirements Oversight Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>JWCA</td>
<td>Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDHD</td>
<td>low density, high demand</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRC</td>
<td>lesser regional contingency</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEU(SOC)</td>
<td>Marine expeditionary unit, special operations capable</td>
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<tr>
<td>MHE</td>
<td>materiel handling equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>MILSATCOM</td>
<td>military satellite communications</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPA</td>
<td>manpower authorization</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTW</td>
<td>major theater of war</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>non-commissioned officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEO</td>
<td>non-combatant evacuation operations</td>
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<td>NMS</td>
<td>National Military Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>OOTW</td>
<td>operations other than war</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ops</td>
<td>operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPTEMPO</td>
<td>operations tempo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACAF</td>
<td>Pacific Air Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERSTEMPO</td>
<td>personnel tempo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL</td>
<td>petroleum, oil, and lubricants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POM</td>
<td>program objective memorandum</td>
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<tr>
<td>PREPO</td>
<td>prepositioned equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSRC</td>
<td>Presidential Selective Reserve Callup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QRRC</td>
<td>Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Reserve component</td>
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<tr>
<td>RECCE</td>
<td>reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SATCOM</td>
<td>satellite communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECDEF</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SETAF</td>
<td>Southern European Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOR</td>
<td>stabilization force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SROC</td>
<td>Senior Readiness Oversight Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWA</td>
<td>southwest Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THREATCON</td>
<td>threat condition level of normal, alpha, bravo, charlie, or delta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UHF</td>
<td>ultra-high frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USEUCOM</td>
<td>United States European Command</td>
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</tbody>
</table>