Mr. Jeffrey T. Richelson

Dear Mr. Richelson:

This is in further response to your December 19, 1989, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. Our previous April 12, 1991, response, refers.

The enclosed records have been reviewed by the National Security Council and are provided as responsive to your request. I have withheld portions of these documents as exempt material which is currently and properly classified in accordance with Executive Order 12958, Section 1.5 (a), (c), and (d). This information relates to military plans, weapons, or operations; intelligence activities, intelligence sources or methods; and foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States. Accordingly, this material has been withheld pursuant to 5 USC §552 (b)(1).

You have a right to appeal this denial. Any such appeal should offer justification to support an additional release and must be received in this Directorate within 60 calendar days of this letter’s date.

Fees associated with processing this request have been waived in this instance.

Sincerely,

A. H. Passarella
Director
Freedom of Information and Security Review

Enclosures:
As stated
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Staff, US Army
Chief of Naval Operations
Chief of Staff, US Air Force
Commandant of the Marine Corps
Director, Joint Staff
Director, J-5

Subject: NSDD-73

1. In accordance with CM-6-82, 13 July 1982, "Distribution of NSC Documents," the attached memorandum by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 91046, 3 January 1983, with its attachment, is forwarded for information and guidance.

2. The attached document is especially sensitive and must receive special handling. Access should be limited to only those individuals with a valid need to know. Further distribution/reproduction is NOT authorized without the explicit approval of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. A record of access is required.

3. The Director, J-5, is responsible for appropriate action by the OJCS.

4. Without attachments, this memorandum is UNCLASSIFIED.

ROBERT C. WATSON
Colonel, USMC
Secretary

Copy to:
Secretary, JCS
MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLIC.

SUBJECT: The Peacekeeper Program Assessment (NSDD-73) (U)

The President has signed the attached National Security Decision Directive on the Peacekeeper program.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

[Signature]
William P. Clark

Attachment
NSDD-73

DECLASSIFIED BY AUTHORITY OF
NSC
0 7 JUL 1995 89-F-2286
DATE CASE #
JCS
7 of 9 copies
THE PEACEKEEPER PROGRAM ASSESSMENT (U)

On November 22, 1982, I issued NSDD-69 to provide direction for the deployment of 100 Peacekeeper missiles in an array of 100 closely spaced, superhardened silos located at or near Francis E. Warren Air Force Base, Wyoming. Since that time, the Congress decided in their 1983 Continuing Resolution to provide no procurement funds, to restrict obligation or expenditure of funds for full-scale engineering development of a permanent basing mode, and to prohibit missile flight testing until both Houses of the Congress have approved a permanent basing mode. In addition, the Congress requested that I submit a report to the Committees on Appropriations not earlier than March 1, 1983. (U)

Although the Congress has directed that the report not be submitted earlier than March 1, it is critical that the report be submitted no later than that date so as to facilitate Congressional action and assure the earliest possible initial operational capability of the missile in an approved basing mode. To facilitate this process, I have established a Commission on Strategic Forces, with technical and administrative support to be provided by the Department of Defense. (U)

The Commission, working in cooperation with the Department of Defense, will prepare the report requested by the Congress and submit it through the National Security Council to the President no later than February 18, 1983. The report will include the following information:

A. A detailed technical and strategic assessment of the closely spaced basing system recommended to the Congress on November 22, 1982, including modifications determined to be advisable.

B. A detailed technical and strategic assessment of other basing systems for the Peacekeeper missile that might serve as alternatives to closely spaced basing, such as Minuteman silos, deep underground basing, multiple protective shelters and closely spaced basing incorporating mobility and deception, silos on the reverse side of mesas, and new widely spaced hard silos.

C. A detailed technical and strategic assessment of different types of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) together with appropriate basing modes that might serve as alternatives to the Peacekeeper missile, such as an enhanced and improved Minuteman missile, a common missile, and a small missile.
D. A comparative technical assessment of the options considered in A, B, C.

E. A detailed comparative technical, strategic, and foreign policy assessment of alternatives to maintaining the ICBM in the strategic Triad, including acceleration and/or expansion of the following programs: Trident SSBN with D-5 missiles, second generation cruise missile, B-1B bomber, and the advanced technology bomber.

The assessments will address, as a minimum, the following subjects:

A. Military capability and deterrence value.

B. Survivability against current, projected and responsive Soviet threats.

C. Projected costs required to support each alternative, including those associated with command, control, and communications.

D. Impact on present and future arms reduction negotiations.

E. Foreign policy considerations.

F. SALT (IA, ABM, SALT II) interim restraint considerations.

G. Geographic, geological; and other qualifications a site would require.

H. Likely environmental impacts and public interest issues.

I. Identification of possible sites. (U)

An initial operational capability of 1986 and fully operational capability of 1989 should be maintained as critical objectives for both the missile and basing mode. If an alternative missile, basing-mode-or-system does not permit this schedule, the earliest achievable dates must be clearly identified and taken into account in each assessment.

In the interim, until the Congress completes the evaluation and responds to the President's decision, all activities required to maintain a 1986 IOC for closely spaced basing, and which are not incompatible with restrictions set forth by Congress, should be continued. In this way, all options will remain open, while not prejudicing the ultimate decision.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Chief of Staff, US Army  
Chief of Naval Operations  
Chief of Staff, US Air Force  
Commandant of the Marine Corps  
Director, Joint Staff  
Director, J-3  
Director, J-5

Subject: NSDD-72

1. In accordance with CM-6-82, 13 July 1982, "Distribution of NSC Documents," the attached memorandum by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 90976, 13 December 1982, with its attachment, is forwarded for information and guidance.

2. The attached document is especially sensitive and must receive special handling. Access should be limited to only those individuals with a valid need to know. Further distribution/reproduction is NOT authorized without the explicit approval of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. A record of access is required.

3. The Director, J-5, is responsible for appropriate action by the OJCS.

4. Without attachments, this memorandum is UNCLASSIFIED.

Attachments

Copy to: Secretary, JCS
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  

THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  

THE HONORABLE ANDREW L. LEWIS  
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION  

SUBJECT: NSDD-72. United States Program for the Exercise of Navigation and Overflight Rights at Sea (et)

Attached for your implementation is the National Security Decision Directive concerning the program to protect U.S. navigation, overflight and related security interests in the seas against excessive maritime claims. 

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

William P. Clark

Attachment  
NSDD 72

cc: The Director of Central Intelligence  
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  

DECLASSIFIED BY AUTHORITY OF  
NSC  
7 Jul 95 87-F-2286  
DATE  
CASE #

CONFIDENTIAL  
Declassify on: OADR
December 13, 1982

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 72

UNITED STATES PROGRAM FOR THE EXERCISE OF NAVIGATION AND OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS AT SEA

I have considered agency views and recommendations on the subject program and decided that the United States will continue to protect U.S. navigation, overflight, and related security interests in the seas through the vigorous exercise of its rights against excessive maritime claims. The current uncertainty in the law of the sea and the U.S. decision not to become a party to the Law of the Sea (LOS) Convention make all the more necessary a clear assertion of our rights and a revitalized and more effective navigation and overflight program. Accordingly, I have also decided that the following procedures be instituted immediately to implement this program.

U.S. interests are to be protected against the following categories of excessive maritime claims:

1. Those historic bay/historic water claims not recognized by the United States.

2. Those continental territorial sea baseline claims not drawn in conformance with the LOS Convention.

3. Those territorial seas claims exceeding three miles but not exceeding twelve miles in breadth that:
   a. overlap straits used for international navigation and do not permit transit passage in conformance with the LOS Convention, including submerged transit of submarines, overflight of military aircraft, and surface transit of warships/ naval auxiliaries, without prior notification or authorization; or
   b. contain requirements for advance notification or authorization for warships/ naval auxiliaries of apply discriminatory requirements to such vessels; or

Declassify on: OADR
c. apply special requirements, not recognized by international law, to nuclear-powered warships or to warships/ naval auxiliaries carrying nuclear weapons or specific cargoes. (C)

4. Territorial sea claims in excess of twelve miles. (C)

5. Other claims to jurisdiction over maritime areas in excess of twelve miles, such as exclusive economic zones or security zones, which purport to restrict non-resource related high seas freedoms. (C)

6. Those archipelagic claims that either:

   a. are not in conformance with the LOS Convention; or

   b. do not permit archipelagic sea lanes passage in conformance with the LOS Convention, including submerged passage of submarines and overflight of military aircraft, and including transit in a manner of deployment consistent with the security of the forces involved. (C)

The current United States juridical position regarding the breadth of the territorial seas and other jurisdictional entitlements will not be changed pending further review. (C)

To ensure that the execution of the program gives appropriate consideration to the possibility of damage to bilateral or other relations, the Department of Defense will plan, and administer the program under the following procedures:

- International straits (paragraph 3.a. above) will be used by both naval ships and aircraft freely and frequently as directed by the Department of Defense. (C)

- The Department of Defense will routinely assert U.S. rights against territorial sea claims and other claims to jurisdiction over maritime areas in excess of twelve miles (paragraphs 4 and 5 above). (C)

- The Department of Defense will submit in advance to the Department of State and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs a proposed schedule for asserting U.S. rights against the following categories of excessive claims: territorial sea claims of twelve miles or less which contain special requirements not recognized by international law (paragraphs 3.b. and 3.c. above); archipelagic claims (paragraph 6 above), unrecognized historic claims (paragraph 1 above) and nonconforming baselines (paragraph 2 above). Objections to the schedule by the Department of
State will be resolved by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. After a reasonable number of assertions of U.S. rights against an excessive claim in any of these categories, on the recommendations of the Departments of Defense and State, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs may determine that advance scheduling to assert rights against these claims will no longer be required.

Except for navigation in and over international straits including their approaches, when any assertion of rights against an excessive claim will result in entry into a politically sensitive area, the planned operation will be reviewed by the Department of State, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs prior to execution by the Department of Defense. The Department of State is responsible for maintaining an up-to-date list of politically sensitive areas. In addition, the Department of State will advise the Department of Defense if any transient political factors in a littoral country which is not a politically sensitive area make it inadvisable for a limited time to conduct an operation under this program.

The Department of State, in conjunction with this program, will continue to protest in diplomatic channels the excessive claims of littoral countries.

Ronald Reagan
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Staff, US Army
Chief of Naval Operations
Chief of Staff, US Air Force
Commandant of the Marine Corps
Director, Joint Staff
Director, J-5

Subject: NSDD-70

1. In accordance with CM-6-82, 13 July 1982, "Distribution of NSC Documents," the attached memorandum by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 90744, 30 November 1982, with its attachment, is forwarded for information and guidance.

2. The attached document is especially sensitive and must receive special handling. Access should be limited to only those individuals with a valid need to know. Further distribution/reproduction is NOT authorized without the explicit approval of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. A record of access is required.

3. The Director, J-5, is responsible for appropriate action by the OJCS.

4. Without attachments, this memorandum is UNCLASSIFIED.

ROBERT C. WATSON
Colonel, USMC
Secretary

Attachments

Copy to:
Secretary, JCS
UNCLASSIFIED
WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

SUBJECT: Nuclear Capable Missile Technology Transfer Policy (U)

The President has approved the attached National Security Decision Directive on nuclear capable missile technology transfer. (U)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Attachment
NSDD 70

UNCLASSIFIED
WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 70

NUCLEAR CAPABLE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER POLICY (U)

I. INTRODUCTION (U)

I have reviewed NSAM 294 of April 20, 1964 and its specific guidance on the transfer of strategic missile hardware and technology. Since the missile-related portion of NSAM 294 is updated in the following paragraphs, and the nuclear weapon section is governed by the Atomic Energy Act, NSAM 294 is rescinded. This directive provides policy guidance with respect to the transfer of nuclear capable missile delivery systems' hardware and technology. It should be considered in conjunction with applicable civil space launch vehicle directives with respect to the transfer of dual use space hardware and technology, as well as with NSDD 5 and other directives governing the export of conventional missiles and technology. Specific guidelines will be prepared to implement this policy statement.

For purposes of this directive, a nuclear capable missile delivery system is defined as:

(a) an unmanned rocket-powered or air-breathing vehicle that has been equipped to deliver a nuclear warhead, or

(b) an unmanned rocket-powered or air-breathing vehicle that could reasonably be modified to carry a nuclear warhead a significant distance, i.e., beyond an immediate tactical area. Conventionally armed short-range air-to-air, air-to-ground, and surface-to-air missiles and conventionally armed anti-shipping and artillery rockets shall not be subject to this directive, unless they embody technologies important for the development of a longer range surface-to-surface missile. (C)
II. POLICY GOVERNING NUCLEAR CAPABLE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY

An increasing number of states are developing both the technical option to produce nuclear explosives and the means to deliver them. Foreign acquisition of technology for ballistic missiles and cruise missiles is growing. Development of nuclear-capable missiles is possible through a dedicated military program or an ostensibly civil space launch vehicle program. Recognizing that such a development could provoke regional instability or ultimately threaten the United States or its allies, it is the policy of the United States to hinder the proliferation of foreign military missile systems capable of delivering nuclear weapons except as exempted below.

The United States will:

-- Prohibit exports of equipment and/or technology that would make a contribution to a foreign country's strategic military missile program.

-- Exempt on a case-by-case basis certain U.S. friends and allies from this policy, subject to appropriate non-transfer assurances and a Presidential approval that such transfers promote U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives.

-- Control dual use items and technology when considered likely to contribute to an identified nuclear capable missile program in a non-exempt country.

To provide the basis for further action and decision, I hereby direct that the United States Government:

-- Maintain an intelligence watch on countries suspected of having intentions of developing indigenous strategic missile programs which could pose a threat to the U.S. or its foreign policy interests.

-- Seek cooperation with supplier nations in limiting the export of strategic missile related hardware and technology by:

(a) identifying the range of commodities and technology available abroad, and

(b) consulting on items to be restricted, with special attention to the retransfer, modification, and control of these items.

III. IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICY

All Executive Branch agencies having responsibilities or authorizations for export controls, including missile-related commodities, will adopt stringent export controls on technology and equipment which could make a direct or significant
contribution to the design, development, production, inspection, testing or use of nuclear capable missile delivery systems and related components. At a minimum this will include guidance sub-systems and related software, propellants, propulsion systems, rocket nozzles and related control sub-systems, re-entry sub-systems, missile structure, and unique support equipment.

The United States will, within the scope of current export authorities:

-- Deny approval of export of technology and related knowledge on the design, development, production, inspection, and testing of missile systems and related components that can benefit a recipient's strategic military missile program.

-- Generally approve, after case-by-case review, export of dual use equipment that can be judged clearly to be for a valid civil use or clearly to apply to a recipient's peaceful program and clearly is of no more than marginal benefit to a potential recipient's strategic missile program, when consistent with the applicable legislation and U.S. policy.

The Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce shall ensure that adequate procedures are developed to identify critical export items falling under this directive. (U)

In making case-by-case decisions, the agencies and departments will consider:

1. The strategic, technical, economic, qualitative, political and time-dependent nature of the item to a foreign nuclear capable program.

2. Alternative non-U.S. sources for the technology or end-item or comparable and adequate substitutes, with a view towards bilateral discussions with alternate sources to preclude foreign availability.

3. The end use of the item.

An interagency group chaired by the Department of State, and including representatives from DOD, ACDA, NASA, NSC, OSTP, Commerce and CIA, shall be established to monitor transfer of strategic military missile technology.

When, and if, any non-exempt nation is assessed by the interagency group as pursuing a nuclear weapon delivery capability, the interagency group shall determine whether exemption status is to be granted to it and shall make a recommendation to the NSC for a decision. An exemption shall be accorded to states such as the United Kingdom, in light of existing U.S. cooperation in the strategic and nuclear fields.
With regard to nations not granted exemptions and to cases outside the specific exempted categories, the United States will:

-- Apply stringent export controls to prevent the transfer of any missile-related U.S. controlled technology and hardware from reaching that nation, either directly or through intermediaries.

-- Institute measures to reduce, insofar as possible, the assistance of other supplier nations to the country(s) in question.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Chief of Staff, US Army  
Chief of Naval Operations  
Chief of Staff, US Air Force  
Commandant of the Marine Corps  
Director, Joint Staff  
Director, J-5

Subject: NSDD-71

1. In accordance with CM-6-82, 13 July 1982, "Distribution of NSC Documents," the attached memorandum by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 90929, 2 December 1982, with its attachment, is forwarded for information and guidance.

2. The attached document is especially sensitive and must receive special handling. Access should be limited to only those individuals with a valid need to know. Further distribution/reproduction is NOT authorized without the explicit approval of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. A record of access is required.

3. The Director, J-5, is responsible for appropriate action by the OJCS.

4. Without attachments, this memorandum is UNCLASSIFIED.

ROBERT C. WATSON  
Colonel, USMC  
Secretary

Attachments

Copy to: Secretary, JCS
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ  
The Secretary of State  

THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER  
The Secretary of Defense  

THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY  
Director of Central Intelligence  

GENERAL JOHN W. VESSEY  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  

SUBJECT: NSDD-71: U.S. Policy Toward Latin America in the Wake of the Falklands Crisis  

The President has approved National Security Decision Directive 71 (NSDD-71), subject as above. A copy of the approved NSDD is attached. Please ensure special handling of this document to prevent unauthorized disclosure.  

Attachment  
NSDD-71  

TOP SECRET  
Declassify on: OADR  

by 5 of 5 copies
National Security Decision Directive 71

U.S. Policy Toward Latin America
In the Wake of the Falklands Crisis (S)

The Falklands crisis has strained relations with several Latin American countries and resulted in uncertainty regarding the long-range policy goals of the United States in the region.

U.S. national interests in Latin America and the region dictate policies that achieve the following objectives:

- the development of stable and democratic political systems and institutions which promote respect for basic human rights;
- cooperative bilateral relations to deal with security and other issues flowing from geographic proximity;
- advancement of major U.S. trade and investment;
- access to raw materials;
- prevention of nuclear proliferation;

Achieving these objectives has been complicated by the Falklands crisis. Accordingly, our policy must be aimed at ameliorating the following specific problems:
The vulnerability of burgeoning free enterprise economies and developing political institutions to radical insurgent movements supported by the Soviet Union and/or its surrogates.

The interdiction threat to U.S. aerial and maritime routes in the Caribbean Basin by potentially hostile airbases and the introduction/augmentation of Soviet Bloc tactical aircraft and weaponry. (TS)

Our second priority is to restore and reassert United States influence in South America. To this end we will:

- Maintain our diplomatic position on the fundamental Falklands issues as it existed prior to the crisis. Specifically: The U.S. will continue as a neutral on the question of sovereignty over the islands and support negotiations, mediation or other peaceful efforts to resolve this dispute;
The aforementioned program — aimed first at the Caribbean Basin/ Central American region, and second at South America — will be effected in concert with the following overall hemispheric actions:

- The United States will pursue more active bilateral diplomatic contacts throughout the continent in order to stay efforts to alter the Inter-American System.

Throughout, our goal is to support free enterprise economies and foster the investment and trade necessary to their growth.

- U.S. global sugar policy will be reviewed to assess its foreign and domestic impact on states in the region. If advantageous to our foreign policy goals, consideration will be given to establishing more flexible sugar import levels.

- We will use our influence through traditional diplomatic channels to promote development of democratic institutions and human rights in order to facilitate U.S. public support for expanded, closer relationships with the governments concerned.
A concerted effort will be made to increase U.S. military influence in the hemisphere through promotion of U.S. military training and doctrine, greater use of small mobile training teams, expanded military personnel exchanges and increased International Military Education and Training (IMET) resources. To implement this process, the Department of Defense, in cooperation with the Department of State and the Director of Central Intelligence will develop a comprehensive prioritized list of defense requirements, by count and propose a strategy for implementation.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY
THE ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

SUBJECT: National Space Strategy (U)

The President has approved the attached National Security Study Directive which directs completion of a National Space Strategy by May 31, 1983. The President requests that agencies provide their highest priority to this effort. (U)

In addition to the three SIG(Space) Working Groups currently in existence (Space Station, Space Launch Policy, and Remote Sensing), five additional Working Groups will be formed and chaired as follows: (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization/Funding</th>
<th>NSC (U)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commercialization</td>
<td>Private Sector Group (U)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology</td>
<td>OSTP (U)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planetary Exploration</td>
<td>NASA (U)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The area of manned space flight will be integrated into the deliberations of the existing Space Station Working Group. Composition of the Commercialization Working Group will be announced subsequently. (U)
The IG(Space), chaired by Robert C. McFarlane, will provide central direction for development of the Strategy. Gilbert D. Rye of the NSC Staff will coordinate day-to-day activities. The completed National Space Strategy will be approved by the SIG(Space) and the National Security Council. (U)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

William P. Clark

Attachment
NSSD 13-82
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Staff, US Army
Chief of Naval Operations
Chief of Staff, US Air Force
Commandant of the Marine Corps
Director, Joint Staff
Director, J-3
Director, J-5
Director, C3S

Subject: NSSD-13

1. In accordance with CM-6-82, 13 July 1982, "Distribution of NSC Documents," the attached memorandum by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 90831, 15 December 1982, with its attachment, is forwarded for information and guidance.

2. The attached document is especially sensitive and must receive special handling. Access should be limited to only those individuals with a valid need to know. Further distribution/reproduction is NOT authorized without the explicit approval of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. A record of access is required.

3. The Director, J-5, is responsible for appropriate action by the OJCS.

4. Without attachments, this memorandum is UNCLASSIFIED.

Copy to:
Secretary, JCS

Attachments

DAVID O. SHERNEN
Colonel, USAF
Acting Secretary
National Security Study
Directive Number 13-82

NATIONAL SPACE STRATEGY (U)

Introduction

A study will be conducted to develop a broad strategy for implementing the National Space Policy contained in National Security Decision Directive 42, dated July 4, 1982. This National Security Study Directive establishes the Terms of Reference for the study. (C)

Objectives of the Study

The results of the study will be reflected in a National Security Decision Directive on National Space Strategy. The strategy will outline a broad action-oriented plan for a more vigorous and focused U.S. Space Program in furtherance of the National Space Policy contained in NSDD 42. The study will proceed on the premise that:

-- The Soviet Union has initiated a major campaign to capture the "high ground" of space, and

-- Regardless of Soviet activities, the space medium offers significant potential for the enhancement of civil, commercial and national security capabilities. (S)

Scope of the Study

The study will review the total U.S. Space Program (civil, commercial, defense, and intelligence) and formulate a plan of action that, at a minimum, addresses the following areas:

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR
Organization, Roles and Responsibilities of:

-- NASA, especially regarding Space Shuttle operations and marketing. (U)

-- DOD, especially concerning the need for:

--- A separate military department for space or the designation of an existing military department as executive agent for space. (S)

--- A unified Space Command. (S)

-- DOD/DCI, with emphasis on the need for:

-- DOC, especially regarding NOAA's responsibilities for LANDSAT and METSAT if these systems are transferred to the private sector. (U)

-- The Private Sector, especially concerning its relationship with the U.S. Government and the need for regulation, oversight and incentives to stimulate investment. (U)

Funding

-- The adequacy of current and projected funding for the overall U.S. Space Program. (U)

-- The adequacy of the current funding mix and priorities among the civil, defense and intelligence sectors of the U.S. Space Program. (S)

-- From the above, the study will present three alternative space programs: current, enhanced and significantly enhanced. (S)
Commercialization

-- New areas of private sector investment in space which the Administration should stimulate. (U)

Planetary Exploration and Scientific Experimentation

-- The need for revitalizing our efforts to explore the planets and perform scientific experiments useful to mankind. (U)

Basic Technology

-- The need for significant increases in basic technology related to space (civil and national security). (U)

Manned Space Flight

-- The need for a more vigorous manned space program. (U)

Efforts related to outer space arms control will be conducted by existing interagency mechanisms. (U)

The National Space Strategy developed by this study will also include applicable results from the other SIG(Space) working groups currently in being. (U)
Administration

The study will be conducted under the sponsorship of the SIG(Space) established by NSDD 42. Working Groups chaired by individuals appointed by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs will be formed under the overall direction of the Interagency Group for Space. All agencies will provide the highest priority to support of this study. Administrative and other support will be provided by the NSC as augmented by the agencies. An NSDD will be completed for consideration by the SIG(Space) and National Security Council as soon as possible, but not later than May 31, 1983. (U)

Dissemination of this NSSD, subsequent material, and the resulting NSDD should be strictly controlled and handled on a need-to-know basis. (U)

[Signature]

Ronald Reagan