Participants in NATO PLANNING CONFERENCE
8 - 11 September 1961

RED TEAM

Mr. David H. Harry (State Department)
Mr. Carl Kaysen (White House) Team Chairman
Mr. Timothy W. Stanley (Department of Defense)
Mr. Seymour Weiss (State Department)
Col Thomas W. Wolfe (Department of Defense)

BLUE TEAM

Mr. John C. Ausland (State Department)
Mr. Alexander L. George (Rand Corporation)
Mr. Henry A. Kissinger (White House)
Mr. John T. McNaughton (Department of Defense) Team Chairman
Mr. John P. Shaw (State Department)
Col Robert B. Spragins (Department of Defense)

CONTROL TEAM

Mr. Alan R. Ferguson (Rand Corporation)
Mr. Alexander L. George (Rand Corporation)
Mr. James J. Hinshock (Central Intelligence Agency)
Col William M. Jones (Department of Defense)
BrigGen Edward L. Rowny (Department of Defense)
Mr. Thomas C. Schalling (Rand Corporation) Conference Chairman
Mr. Theodore G. Shackley (Central Intelligence Agency)

ADMINISTRATION TEAM

Col Jerry L. Campbell (Camp David)
Mrs. Ruth L. Clark (Department of Defense)
SSgt Richard J. Donaldson (Bolling Air Force Base)
Miss Denzel Durrant (Department of Defense)
ADMINISTRATION TEAM (CONT'D)

LtCol Kenneth S. Field (Department of Defense) Team Head
Mass Ruth Goodwin (Department of Defense)
SSgt Frank E. Green (Andrews Air Force Base)
YN1 Walter F. Kuen (Navy Administrative Unit - NWP)
CN Robert L. Murray (Camp David)
SSgt Kirby L. Patterson (Bolling Air Force Base)
SN Kirby J. Smith (Navy Administrative Unit - NWP)
YN3 Edward T. Stamer (Camp David)
Miss Jean Stoneman (Department of Defense)
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Colonel William M. Jones (Department of Defense)
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Billeting List

Lodge Area

LINNEN
LAPTEL
SAVOUGE
FAVIMER
WAHNET

SOG

Room 1
Mr. Kiesinger
Mr. Keysen
Mr. Keyes
Mr. Schilling
Mr. George

Room 2

Room 3

Room 4

Room 5

Room 6

Room 7
SSgt. Donaldson
SSgt. Green
SSgt. Patterson
Instructions for Red and Blue Teams

Basic Scheme

1. The point of departure is a "scenario," prepared in advance, which guides events from the present to a future point in time. It is intended to be plausible, but not necessarily more plausible than a dozen alternative scenarios might be. It is designed to provide a climactic starting point. Actually, three such scenarios in brief form will be available to the participants in advance; one of these will be chosen for the exercise and made available in greater detail at the start of the exercise.

2. Certain military assumptions regarding available forces and their status will be provided to Red and to Blue. Each will be provided with appropriate intelligence about the other's military situation. For the most part these will be reasonable estimates projected to the opening time, somewhat modified by events in the scenario, and simplified to facilitate the game.

3. The game proceeds in a sequence of policy-planning stages. Each evaluates the situation, identifies the principal strategies available to it, and determines a course of action. The course of action will be responsive to the anticipated actions of the other team; that is, should contain contingent moves as well as definite moves, and specifies a response to alternative conceivable moves by the adversary. Both Red and Blue do this simultaneously, as of a given point in time. The first such point in time -- for the first policy planning session -- is a point at which the initial scenario leaves off. Approximately three hours are allowed for one such stage.

4. For this purpose the Blue Team represents (on plans on behalf of) the United States Government, the Red Team represents the government of the Soviet Union. The Blue team does not control or represent the OAS Alliance. The Red team "controls" satellite governments -- and in particular the GDR -- to the extent it can be presumed to in reality, the control team will determine the actual behavior of other countries within, say, the GDR.
5. The Control team receives the planning documents from the Red and Blue teams at the end of the third policy-planning session. (At "same time" transfers during the policy-planning session, the teams develop their strategies as of the specified moment in time.) Using the plans of both Red and Blue, Control prepares an original scenario as a second point in time, at which the three planning stages take place. To the extent that Red and Blue actions are concurrent or in conflict, Control must determine what actions are implied in the ver plans taken together. Control superimposes such events as we consider the control of Red and Blue — e.g., third-country behavior, incidents or acts of God, outcomes of chance events. The starting point for stages two is thus the original scenario carried forward on the basis of the Red and Blue plans and Control's manipulation of chance events.

6. "Scenario" material for the second policy-planning stage is thus provided by Control. It indicates to Red and Blue what their actions were and what the consequences have been. It provides to each side appropriate intelligence about the other's actions and chance events and third-country behavior.

7. The second planning stage proceeds thus far the first, is followed by another projection of events by Control, and a third, and a fourth. These four policy-planning stages, together with Control's projections of events, take two days.

8. At the end of the fourth planning session both teams are given the full documentation of the other team — the other team's planning documents and the other team's intelligence as provided by Control along the way. Each team thus has constructive access to the other's estimates, statements of intent, etc. A fifth session is then devoted to a projection by each team of likely outcomes. Red, Blue, and Control separately prepare their evaluations and projections with full access to all the documents, and these three projections are distributed to all participants.

9. A sixth and final session is a plenary discussion of the entire experience.

II. Detailed Structure of the Planning Cycles

10. A "cycle" consists of a Red-Blue planning session and a projection session by Control. The policy-planning documents submitted by a team to Control, at the close of a policy-planning session, will be referred to as the team's "strategy." The materials provided by the teams at the outset of the policy-planning session will be referred to as Control's "scenario."
of these queries is to clarify unintended ambiguity in the scenario material, to check with Control any questionable assumptions the team will make, or to elicit supplementary materials on matters that Control was insufficiently responsive or informative on. Ordinarily these queries should be received by Control within the first half hour of the planning session. The queries need not all be collected in a single document; queries should be sped to Control as they arise.

12. For the first session it is expected that such queries may be extensive, and will relate to preparation or actions that the teams will wish to assume they had taken prior to the opening of the game. For that reason a special session on the scenario will be held by each team on the evening before the first policy-planning session. Teams will receive the scenario at 8:30 Friday evening and have a two-hour session to familiarize themselves with the context, to discuss general strategy, and to prepare in detail the queries they wish to address to Control. Control's response and supplementary scenario material will be available at the start of the first planning session Saturday morning.

13. In allowing Red and Blue to make certain prior assumptions Control will be permissive within two important limitations. First, such assumptions must be consistent with the scenario and not too dependent on hindsight. Second, additions to the scenario requested by Red or Blue that would entail a response or countermove by the other team will usually be disallowed to avoid "gaming" the scenario retroactively.

14. At the end of each strategy session Control may direct queries to Red and Blue. These will be to elicit fuller or clearer detail at those points in the plan that Control (with access to the other team's strategy) foresees as critical. Control queries will be in writing, should be delivered within the first half hour after the planning documents are in, and should be answered promptly by Red or Blue.

15. Control will have an observer sitting in the room with each team. The observer will keep Control posted on developing plans of the team, to expedite Control's own preparations. The observer will sit with Control during the "projection" phase of the cycle to help inform Control of the team's intentions and understandings. The observer will particularly be alert to any mistaken assumptions or interpretations of the team that need to be ironed out or coordinated with Control. The observer will help Control in the interpretation of queries received from the team. The observer will not be used by the team as a direct line of communication with Control.

16. Ordinarily Red and Blue will not communicate orally with each other or with Control. An exception may occur in connection with military details. Direct consultation between the military members of Red or Blue and Control's military advisers may be necessary to iron out essential assumptions on military detail.
17. Certain military details will be displayed on maps. The purpose is partly to facilitate the team's appreciation of military resources and events, partly to provide a visual check on the consistency of team and Control assumptions about military resources and events. Team plans will make reference to maps where appropriate, and Control's military advisers may consult with team military members to verify plans or to clarify projections with reference to the map displays.

18. The exact form in which Red and Blue submit their strategies (planning documents) is up to them. The contents should include:

a - An estimate of the situation with statement of general objectives and estimate of adversary's general objectives.

b - An outline of main alternatives with their likely consequences; and an outline of main alternatives available to the adversary.

c - Detailed statement of strategy chosen, giving:
1- definite moves decided on;
2- contingency moves and what they depend on;
3- estimated adversary moves and responses.

19. Direct communication between US and SU governments may be indicated in the form of messages (e.g., notes, broadcasts) that are to be passed verbatim to the other team for the next cycle. Actions taken secretly or conspicuously should be described to facilitate Control's transmittal of appropriate intelligence to the other team for the next cycle.

20. The projection provided by Control for each cycle will necessarily be brief and selective. For this reason Control will need to be aware of the emphasis teams attach to different issues and activities -- e.g., to intelligence of particular kinds, to alliance problems, world opinion, state of strategic forces, military tactics, etc. The observers will help Control to be responsive to the team's interests; but teams should be as candid and informative as they can be on their main interests at each stage.

21. The internal organization -- if any -- of Red and Blue teams is up to the teams. It is not intended that team members "represent" agencies or cabinet posts or any such thing. Any division of labor is an internal team matter! The one organisational requirement indicated by experience with this type of game is that the Captain must exercise authority. The time schedule requires this. Efficiency in reaching decisions and getting them on paper is essential to the pace of the exercise.
22. The teams are to develop the best strategies they can that are consistent with American or Soviet objectives. The Red team, in particular, is not to imitate or predict Soviet behavior but to explore what the Soviets can do and elect the most effective strategies. (The Red team is not comprised of specialists on Soviet behavior.)

23. The teams are not directed to confine their attention to Berlin, or to Germany, or to Europe. If events dictate, or if strategies are so chosen, strategic forces or events and interests outside the theater may become a dominant preoccupation. Control will use its own hand to keep actions from becoming too diffuse; but, in principle, Red and Blue are deciding national strategy in a crisis, not just local or regional strategy.

III. The Control Team's Responsibilities

24. The Control team has two somewhat competing responsibilities. The function is to channel the game in interesting directions, maintaining the tempo of the game, and choosing decisive points in time for the successive policy-planning stages. In doing this it utilizes the variables under its control -- third countries, chance events, selective intelligence flows to the teams, etc. It thus plays a more active role than a "referee." Since time is short and only four policy-planning stages will fit, Control must actively force the pace of events.

25. At the same time, Control must not make decisions for Red and Blue. It must, so far as possible, project the explicit and implicit strategies of the teams and not count them to decisions inconsistent with their strategies. Control must also stay within bounds of plausibility in the events it controls. Thus it must "guide" events in a plausible way within the strategies developed by Red and Blue. How faithfully it can project Red and Blue decisions will of course depend on how well those teams have identified contingencies and specified their actions and responses.

26. Military actions will likely be involved and may become dominant. The object is not, however, to explore or test the tactical implications of military plans; this is not a "war game." Control's military evaluations must be plausible but beyond that will be a compromise with time and will be responsive to the need to guide the game. Military detail may at times be exceedingly significant for political decisions, but military detail for its own sake is not the object.

27. Control will "leak" intelligence to Red and Blue, both intelligence of its own invention about the variables under its control, and intelligence about actions determined by the teams. Where the detail provided in team plans is insufficient to determine what the other team should "observe," Control will be obliged to flesh out the details of an action -- within the spirit of the team's strategy, as far as possible. Control may give conflicting intelligence to Red and Blue if circumstances warrant, still within bounds of plausibility.
BERLIN DECISION EXERCISE

TIME SCHEDULE

Friday
8:30-9:00 pm Orientation, administrative arrangements, distribution of scenario.
9:00-10:30 pm Teams hold preliminary meetings on scenario, prepare queries for Control.
10:30-11:30 pm Control prepares responses to queries.

Saturday
8:30-12:00 Planning session, Cycle I.
12:00-12:30 Observers brief Control, strategies delivered to Control.
12:30-1:00 Teams respond to Control’s queries.
1:00-3:00 Teams lunch
Control prepares projection for Cycle II.
3:00-6:30 Planning session, Cycle II.
Control develops questionnaire.
6:30-7:00 Observers brief Control, strategies delivered to Control.
7:00-7:30 Teams respond to Control’s queries.
8:00-9:30 Dinner
9:30-12:00 Control prepares projection for Cycle III.
9:30-10:30 Team session on questionnaire.

Sunday
5:30-12:00 Planning session, Cycle III.
12:00-12:30 Observers brief Control, strategies delivered to Control.
12:30-1:00 Teams respond to Control’s queries.
1:00-3:00 Teams lunch.
Control prepares projection for Cycle IV.
3:00-6:30 Planning Session, Cycle IV.
6:30-7:00 Observers brief Control, Strategies delivered to Control.
7:00-7:30 Teams respond to Control’s queries.
8:00-9:30 Dinner
9:30-11:30 Full documentation provided to all participants. Reading period, teams’ preliminary discussion. Control initiates preparation of its final projection.

Monday
8:30-10:00 Control finishes projection.
8:30-12:00 Teams prepare projections.
10:00-12:00 Control prepares agenda for plenary.
12:00-1:00 Lunch
1:00-2:00 Final projection of Blue, Red, and Control distributed.

Notes: Document one hour for reading.
No change allowed without permission.
2 copies of the original office.
From Control To Red and Blue R 2A

Doc. No. E 324
Cycle No. 3 7

BERLIN DECISION EXERCISE (Amendment to Cycle II)

TIME SCHEDULE

Saturday

The time schedule for Cycle II is amended as follows:

4:15 - 7:00 Planning Session, Cycle II
7:00 - 7:30 Control prepares Queries
        Teams free for Cocktails
7:30 - 8:00 Teams joined by Control for Cocktails
8:00 - 8:30 Dinner
9:00 - 9:30 Teams respond to Queries
        Control sits on porch to enjoy evening
9:30 - 10:30 Control prepares projection for Cycle III
        Teams prepare assessments
BERLIN DECISION EXERCISE (Amendment to Cycles II and III)

TIME SCHEDULE

Saturday

The time schedule for Cycle II is amended as follows:

4:15 - 7:00 Planning Session, Cycle II.
7:00 - 9:15 Control prepares projection for Cycle III.
         Dinner.
9:15 - 11:30 Planning session, Cycle III.
11:30 -  
Control prepares projection for Cycle IV.

Sunday

8:30 - 12:00 Planning session, Cycle IV.
12:00 - 12:30 Observers brief control, strategies delivered to Control.
12:30 - 1:00 Teams respond to Control's queries.
1:00 - 3:00 Teams lunch.
3:00 - 6:30 Planning Session, Cycle V.
6:30 - 7:00 Observers brief Control, Strategies delivered to Control.
7:00 - 7:30 Teams respond to Control's queries.
7:30 - 9:30 Dinner.
9:30 - 11:00 Full documentation provided to all participants. Reading period, teams' preliminary discussion. Control initiates preparation of its final projection.

Monday

8:30 - 10:00 Control finishes projection.
8:30 - 12:00 Teams prepare projections.
10:00 - 12:00 Control prepares agenda for plenary.
12:00 - 1:00 Lunch.
1:00 - 2:00 Final projection of Blue, Red, and Control distributed, one hour for reading.
2:00 - 5:00 Plenary session.
SERLIN DECISION EXERCISE

DOCUMENTATION

1. Documents will be in two series, Blue and Red. The Blue series will include all communications from Blue to Control and all communications from Control to Blue. The Red series will include all communications from Red to Control and from Control to Red. Within the series all documents will receive consecutive serial numbers and will be marked with the time they are received for duplication by Documents Control. The Blue series will be numbered "Blue__(Serial Number)" and the Red series, "Red__(Serial Number)." Typists will be instructed as to the form.

2. Communications from Blue to Control will be on blue paper from Control to Blue on green paper, from Red to Control on Red paper, and from Control to Red on yellow paper. Communications from Control that go to both teams simultaneously will be handled as two communications: on green with a Blue-serial number to the Blue team, and on yellow with a Red-serial number to the Red team. White paper will be used for administrative notices (which will be separately serially numbered). Every document should be labelled "Blue to Control," "Control to Red," etc., by the teams to assure that correct handling by typists and Document Control.

3. Documents will receive a cycle number (roman numeral) as well as a serial number. "Cycle I" includes the original scenario, queries, and answers on it, team strategies from the first session, Control queries, and team replies. Control's projection then initiates and is a part of "Cycle II," which includes the teams' second strategies and associated queries and replies. Cycles III and IV include the teams' third and fourth strategies, the projections that precede them, the queries and answers associated with them. The three team projections in the fifth session will be labeled "Cycle V."

4. Serial numbers and cycle numbers will be assigned by Document Control at the time a document is cleared for duplication. A team's strategy may consist of several documents; if so, they will be serial-numbered separately. For cross-reference purposes the several documents comprising a team's strategy may be identified as Annex A, B, C, etc., in the opening line. Annex letters, if used, will be inserted by the team, not by Document Control.

5. Queries should be labeled "QUESTION?" in capital letters at the top. Answers to queries will be labeled at the top "RESPONSE? to Red (Serial Number)" or "RESPONSE? to Blue (Serial Number)," the referenced serial number (or numbers) being that of the query to which it responds.
6. Documents are to be marked "Immediate" or "Hold for Release by Blue (Red, Control)". Documents marked "Immediate" will be distributed as soon as reproduced to the receiving and sending teams. Documents marked "Hold for release by Blue" will be distributed immediately to Blue (Sending Team) with an administrative note to the chairman indicating that distribution will not be made until so directed by the Team chairman. (This is to permit a team to assemble several documents comprising a strategy for a last look before sending them to Control. It is hoped that teams will release documents as soon as they can to expedite Control's preparation of projections for the next cycle).
Scenario

It is Fri., Nov. 17, 1961, 8 p.m., Berlin time. These are pertinent events up to this point.

X X X X X X X X

Following the sealing off of East Berlin, resumption of nuclear tests, and threats of interference with the air corridors, the Berlin situation remained tense but indecisive throughout the late summer. There continued to be some resentment in Berlin over the lack of vigorous Allied action in response to the violation of the four power agreement on Berlin. The refugee flow inched up to 25 per day through the underground railroad.

In the United States the military buildup was in line with the President's speech of mid-July. West German troop strength continued to increase and the draft was increased to two years. The French Government announced that three divisions would have been moved from North Africa to Europe by the end of the year; the British announced plans to mobilize some reserves.

The German elections resulted in no major change in the composition of the Bundestag; Adenauer continued as Chancellor.

Informal disarmament talks between the USA and USSR led to no agreement on the resumption of negotiations. The Soviets insisted that test-ban talks had gotten nowhere because no progress was made on the world's demands for general and complete disarmament. General Assembly debate on the issue was unexpectedly quiet. President Kennedy, in a major address on the eve of the General Assembly, had linked Berlin and disarmament, stating that the test whether the world could disarm was Soviet willingness to make "peaceful coexistence" a reality in Berlin.

The much anticipated "Berlin negotiation" had not occurred. The Soviet position continued to be that a separate peace treaty was inevitable if a new status for Berlin and the GDR could not be negotiated; the Allied position continued to be that such a peace treaty was a violation of the occupation agreement but that the only fighting issue was access to Berlin. Talk of a "Summit" conference continued but no basis for such a conference emerged from the various notes, conversations, or the Sokharo visit. Popular demands in Allied countries, especially in Britain, for a "Berlin negotiation" were somewhat disconcerted by Soviet test resumption. East German boasts that the Allies would soon be dealing with the GDR became somewhat less threatening on the question of access; there was widespread hope that Khrushchev had played his hand for the moment and would ease his way into a peace treaty. Suspense rather than action characterized the situation.
October was marked by a number of military developments in the United States. The President participated in several "topaz" exercises that took him to posts outside Washington. Continuous, multicolor light of 200,000 lamps was in effect by mid-October, and 10% of S.A. was on immediate ground alert, several "alert" exercises were reported. Civil defense preparations included extensive consultations by the Defense Department with representatives of airlines, broadcast networks, radio and television stations, the communication industry and others, about emergency procedures in the event of military crises.

In the Soviet Union, an extensive change in troop deployment occurred. East German forces, especially air forces, were reported undergoing intensive training.

In early October, it was announced that the peace treaty with the DDR would be signed before the end of the month. East Berlin was prepared for appropriate celebrations, including a parade of East German military units on October 24. Khrushchev made clear that the status of West Berlin was still subject to negotiation, that united, that city would be safe unless Western adventurism put them in jeopardy. He stressed that Allied "token" military forces in West Berlin were an anomaly and an affront to that fact that, in the interest of peace, force would not be used to remove them. He hoped that, with the peace treaty a fact, the West would come to its senses and not use Berlin as an excuse for evading the need for world disarmament. He warned against Western use of force in any form to violate the sovereign rights of DDR. He particularly warned against Western efforts to use the so-called "supply problem" in Berlin as an excuse for violating the integrity of DDR. There is no supply problem and there need be none, he said, so long as the Western powers do not make illegal use of their absolute "occupation rights" to violate DDR sovereignty.

In October West Berlin was visited by a number of Western statesmen. After some dispute with the British government, the United States government obtained Western agreement on a further enlargement of the Berlin garrison and an increase in its armor and weaponry. Enlarged military airlift and some enlargement of military ground traffic continued in mid-October, without incident and without response from the Soviet side.

The German government had pressed for a more vigorous response to the forthcoming Russian action but, failing to obtain British approval, the United States did not commit itself to any further steps. Both Brandt and Adenauer bitterly attacked the proposed peace treaty, but they urged the German people -- East and West -- to remain calm, assuring them that the West would react vigorously if the Russians violated Western rights.

The ceremony took place on October 21st. Preparations were held but nothing happened for a week. On Friday, October 27, the DDR announced that the Allied powers were abusing their access to Berlin. Citizens of DDR, guilty of crimes against the state, were being flown through DDR
airspace; these so-called "refugees" were subject to EDA jurisdiction; it was an affront and an illegal act for the Western powers to smuggle GDR citizens, guilty of crimes against the state, through the territory of the GDR; this must cease or the GDR would be obliged to exert its sovereign rights over aircraft passing through its airspace; such illegal passenger traffic could in no way be construed as "normal" east-west traffic nor as the legitimate business of the occupation authorities.

On October 31 East German authorities dramatically announced that they would permit no further, armed penetration of their national border. Military "supply" had been proceeding through the courtesy of the GDR, they said, but armed penetration would not be permitted in the guise of "supply"; the transport of military equipment could proceed. Specifically, armed, combat-ready equipment could not proceed across East German territory except in accordance with legitimate treaties; armed columns on the Autobahn were an invasion.

On November 2 military vehicles on route to West Berlin were stopped at the border. GDR authorities conveyed the following: dismantled and otherwise non-combat-ready equipment was not objectionable; but vehicles that could be construed as in an "armed" state would not penetrate the border. This would require inspection to assure that any military vehicles "transported" to Berlin were not combat-ready and not on an "armed mission." Ammunition should not be carried in combat vehicles; the crew should be limited so that weapons or vehicles could not be manned. Everything must be in secured status. (Several vehicles loaded with military soft goods were conspicuously cleared to proceed.)

In accordance with instructions the Allied officer in charge suspended traffic and reported the matter to higher authority. The Western allies consulted and, largely through British insistence against a U.S. desire to press the issue, suspended ground military traffic to Berlin. Accusing the GDR of trumping of fake issues, the Allies refused to admit to any such inspection. A substantial increase in military air lift took place at once, and the scheduled augmentation of the Berlin garrison was reported to be going ahead, minus some of the planned heavy equipment. The allies consulted on what sort of ground supply operations to resume; the British reportedly suggesting that ordinary materials be trucked in and that "armed vehicles" not be sent, the U.S. refusing to respond to GDR demands by screening out sensitive items. Airlift continued.

November 9 a commercial aircraft flying outbound from Berlin, bound for West Germany, was forced to land at an East German airfield where the crew and passengers were interrogated. Seven passengers were arrested as GDR citizens wanted for crimes against the state; the rest of the passengers were returned, with the crew, safely to West Berlin. The aircraft was held. The East German radio announced that a "smuggling operation" involving East German criminal escapees had been intercepted in East German airspace, and warned that unless the practice stopped commercial aircraft would be forced to submit to inspection, either in Berlin or at airfields in the GDR. The action was hotly denounced by the Western Allies; return of the aircraft was demanded, hints of fighter escort appeared in the Western press.
As a result of the incident, West German suspended interzonal traffic. The NATO Allies were reported to be considering a pending to suspend all East-West trade. Civilian traffic between West Berlin and West Germany continued at a slightly accelerated rate.

A high state of nervousness was reported among the East German populace. Isolated instances of attacks on police and Communist officials were reported, as were some worker demonstrations. The police were subjected to increased security measures. East Berlin border guards were defecting at a rate of several per week.

The United States ordered U.S. citizens travelling in Iron Curtain countries to return home. Issuance of passports for travel to these countries was stopped. U.S. citizens travelling in West Europe were advised to return home.

Ernst in a mass rally in Berlin urged the Berliners to remain calm and again predicted vigorous allied action. But he indicated that he was less sure now that the West was prepared to defend Berlin. Macmillan in Commons stressed that this was a time to remain calm, and that the world might be the much could send the world over the brink of war. He hinted at some length on the horrors of nuclear war. Nehru appealed to both sides to maintain the peace. The NATO Council was in constant session with reports leaking of a major rift in the alliance over a hard or soft line.

November 12 another commercial plane was turned on route from Berlin to West Germany, in an apparent effort to force it toward a landing at an East German airfield. It reported being fired on. It crashed, no survivors. The DDR announced that flights of smuggling East German civilians, so-called "refugees" or escapees, had not ceased and that one such flight attempted to evade apprehension at its own peril and, through the pilot's desperation, crashed. On the basis of prior agreement, the Western Allies initiated a fighter air patrol of the air corridors, announcing that any interference with flights would be treated as an attack. DDR announced it would initiate its own fighter air patrol in the same areas that DDR aircraft would behave with restraint in the defensive role long enough to give the United Nations and world opinion time to restrain the bellicose allies. The situation — they announced — was fraught with the peril of war; the Allied fighter aircraft would not be tolerated longer than the time necessary for the Allied governments to reconsider and retract their illegal actions.

The French, British, and U.S. Governments, all represented in the fighter escort operation, denounced the concept of DDR airspace in the Berlin air corridors, denounced the piracy of the DDR in molesting air traffic and causing our aircraft to crash, vowed to continue providing for the security of Eastern European refugees seeking freedom in the West, and stated that the air corridors would be patrolled as long as East German molestation made it necessary. The Soviet Union was called on by the Allies to prevent the kind
of incident that could lead to war. Asked whether the fighter aircraft had orders to fire on East German marauding aircraft, a high American military official said, "If the Commies are foolish enough to wonder about that, they'll find out soon enough."

Simultaneous with the initiation of fighter escort, the Strategic Air Command went to a higher state of alert; the number of B-52's on continuous airborne alert was raised to 72 and the rest of the strategic force was put on maximum ground alert, leaves were cancelled, training flights suspended, and maximum base-security and communication-security measures were put into effect. Civilian personnel at MEU establishments were ordered to National Guard Status, other air-defense readiness measures were taken. Carriers cleared European ports, all Polaris submarines were ordered on Station. Defense officials conferred at length with airline and communications-industry officials about emergency procedures -- including the grounding of commercial air traffic. The White House held a series of conferences with news media representatives about news security and possible emergency measures.

In the USSR similar alert procedures took place. Submarines put to sea; air defense warning was increased; communication security was tightened; leaves were cancelled; USSR stopped training flights and was reported to be on a high state of ground alert. The Soviets conducted an elaborate alert and command exercise. There was some Soviet build-up of fighters in East Germany -- about 150 more tactical aircraft were reported moving into the area, and POL supplies were being augmented at numerous East German airfields. The heavy build-up around Berlin, which had taken place in August was maintained. Soviet troop dispositions did not change. Polish and Czech troops were put in high states of readiness, but no reserves were called up. An additional surface-air missile battalion was moved into the area west of Berlin.

Arguments and aircraft flew for five days without incident. On November 17, Friday, an American military cargo aircraft crashed in the Berlin corridor. A French fighter aircraft collided with a B-52 that the cargo aircraft and that he was returning to base, the pilot having been announced by radio that he and a cargo aircraft had been buzzed by a B-52 plane, that the cargo aircraft was in trouble, and that he was going in pursuit of the East German planes. (This is late afternoon Berlin time, late morning Washington time.) One hour later the world is startled at a CDR announcement that Allied plane strafed GDR airbase, killing seven military personnel, lighting buildings on fire; Allied plane shot down immediately afterwards; this has all characteristics of "undeclared war" on an ally of the USSR; CDR has full military support of USSR in any action it deems necessary to its integrity and security. Note being sent to heads of U.S., British, and French Governments, stating USSR will render all necessary assistance, military and other, in support of CDR. The note was broadcast.
From Control To Pas and Tyler

Doc. No. R 4
B 4
Cycle No 7

A-1 p.m. Berlin time East German Radio broadcast message from GDR to Allied Governments, along following lines:

For five days GDR has shown extraordinary restraint while Allied governments criminally violated GDR frontier with illegal military action, namely armed fighter aircraft in GDR airspace. We hoped good sense and world opinion would prevail and induce termination of this action. GDR, in interest of world peace, allowed this final chance for West to come to its senses. It has been evident that Allies have brought world to the brink of war and that a single misstep could bring disaster to world. Now such a misstep has occurred. Allies have not only failed to reconsider their irresponsible action but have now proven themselves irresponsible in the extreme. GDR can only guess whether this tragic and perilous episode represents Allied incapability of restraining its own military forces or is a flagrant deliberate act of violence. In either case it is not apparent that Allies cannot be allowed to continue their mad incursions over the brink of war.

Allies have until midnight to cease armed incursions. Any armed aircraft penetrating GDR frontier after that time will be attacked and destroyed at once by the forces of the GDR. The GDR is not awed by the size of the forces armed against it because it has the solid backing of the most advanced and powerful military forces in the world, namely, the Warsaw Pact nations, committed to the defense of world peace and the integrity of the GDR.

Henceforth -- starting midnight -- any combat aircraft will be summarily dispatched upon extract to GDR airspace. Transport aircraft will be permitted but only subject to the following safeguard: to assure against any breach of the frontier, transport aircraft wishing to use the air corridors to Berlin must be manifestly unarmed. For this purpose, any transport aircraft wishing to cross the GDR frontier will submit to inspection by designated GDR diplomatic officials prior to take-off, or alternatively will submit to escort and land at designated GDR airfields for examination prior to proceeding to Berlin. Similar inspection by GDR will apply to military transport on surface routes. Transport aircraft must submit to such military escort as the GDR sees fit to provide. GDR is prepared to discuss these arrangements at once with the Western Occupation Authorities so that supply operations may be resumed as early as possible. Pending such arrangements, no alien aircraft will be permitted.
Western Occupation Authorities have only themselves to blame for this situation. They cannot but recognize, as all the world will recognize, that the GDR is acting with heroic restraint to permit the Western Occupation Authorities still to withdraw from the brink of war. These conditions are evidently absolute minimal conditions that, under the circumstances, meet NIE requirements for security and national dignity. If the Western Authorities find it necessary to their own prestige to continue with the absolute force of maintaining token military forces in West Berlin they must recognize that such activity cannot longer provide any excuse for illegal military action.

At 7 p.m., Berlin time, Mayor Brandt spoke to a large crowd in West Berlin. His remarks, broadcast, were a vigorous statement that a reckoning had come; that GDR was testing Allied resolve; that the West, however weak it had been in the past, would not surrender to the GDR threat — to do so would be to surrender Berlin; that the Berliners should be confident in the face of this Soviet bluff and that by their actions the stuff the West is made of.

It is 9 p.m. Berlin time, Friday, November 17, 1945.
1. Force:

As of January 1962, SAC will possess about 400 heavy bombers ('B-52's) and about 900 medium bombers ('B-47's). Tankers can be considered adequate to support the bomber force, but may limit the choice of bomber tactics. The force will be based on about 60 bases in the U.S. (excluding Alaska). Outside the U.S. there will be about 8 bases in North America capable of supporting SAC operations, 10 in Europe and 3 in the Far East. In addition, there are in the United States about 25 civil (mostly large-city) and 16 military airfields adequate for dispersing medium bombers. On the average about 13 medium bombers are stationed in Europe and 15 in the Far East.

Missile forces available for the strategic mission by that time will include 50 Atlas and Titan weapons in the United States and about 60 Thors (UK) and 10 Jupiter (Italy) in Europe. There will be a total of 5 Polaris-armed submarines with 15 missiles each.

2. Alert State of the Bomber Force:

SAC now maintains about 50% of the bomber force (i.e., about 250 heavies and 450 mediums) on 15-minute alert (ground alert only for most wings). About 12 B-52's are currently on airborne alert, maintained by exercising different wings at different times. Before the end of the year it will be possible, at 72-hour notice, to increase the airborne alert to 112 (16) or 156 (24) of the heavy force, still retaining enough aircraft in ground alert so that half of the entire force (750 bombers) were on continuous alert. This state could be maintained indefinitely. In this condition half the medium bombers would continue to be held on ground alert and for each B-52 wing (with a B-52, 17 aircraft) a total of 6 could be maintained on alert with 6, 1 or 1 of that number being continuously on airborne alert.

Thus, it can be assumed that 750 bombers are on 15-minute alert with a minimum of 12 of these airborne, and 72-hours after a fire-bombing to destroy up to 60 of the alert (heavy) bombers could be cut in airborne alert. Roughly 50 alert aircraft per hour could be returned.

The number of alert aircraft can be greatly increased for limited periods. By suspending training and postponing modernization and routine maintenance, etc., nearly 100% of the possessed bomber force could be placed on alert within about 14 hours. Should the entire force be held on ground alert over 90% of the force could be maintained in alert state more or less indefinitely. So long as the airborne alert were not increased to more than 1/8 of the B-52's, there would be no substantial reduction in the portion of the force that could be maintained on alert for a relatively extended time (a matter of a few weeks). Should the airborne alert be increased to about some portion of the ground alert force be limited, the maximum duration of the peak alert would be reduced. With present plans, however, it should be possible to increase the airborne alert force to about 130 heavies and maintain that level for about 72 hours with little effect on the originating office.

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ground-alert force. No further increase in air-base alert appears feasible.

Flushing the ground-alert force constitutes a commitment of the force. Its recovery is costly in terms of alert status. The operation is complex. Conceivably, on receipt of extremely threatening warning the ground alert force (50% of the force minus the air-borne alert aircraft) could be flushed, that is dispatched toward targets. The remaining portion of the force would be brought to maximum alert on the ground if it were not already at alert.

1. Alert Status of the Missile Forces

The SAC missiles, about 50 ICBM's and 50 MIRBM's are on 15-minute alert. They can be fueled and thus be brought to about 3-minute alert; they can be held at that point for about one hour. After an hour about 6 hours are required before they can again be brought to the 15-minute alert again. Further, some small fraction of them, say 10%, would be found to malfunction and would not be operational for an additional day.

The ICBM's have an estimated overall reliability of about 0.5, the MIRBM's of about 0.7. Both have a CEP of 100 miles.

Of the Polaris fleet, 3 are normally on station and one enroute to or from station and one at the tender. In a week all five can be put on station. Under crisis conditions all five could be maintained on station for a minimum of forty-five days. The Polaris missiles are considered to have the same reliability and CEP as the MIRBM's.
1. Forces

As of November 1961, the Soviets will have an estimated strength in long-range bombers as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>RANGE (miles)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BISON (Heavy Bomber)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2,900/ 3,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEAR (Heavy Bomber)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>4,500/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BADGER (Medium Bomber)</td>
<td>975 (plus 435 in naval &amp; tac air units)</td>
<td>2,500/ 2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLINDER (Medium Bomber)</td>
<td>Few</td>
<td>1,650/ 2,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tankers are included in the BISON and BADGER figures. Considering use of some bombers as tankers, together with Arctic staging and other factors, the Soviets could put about 200 bombers over North America on two-way missions in an initial attack. Half or more would be medium bombers.

The Soviet long-range bomber force normally is deployed on about 20 bases in the Western USSR and the Soviet Far East. Some 10 heavy and 20 medium bomber Arctic staging bases also are available to this force. In addition, there are about 200 other bases in the Soviet Union considered adequate for dispersing the long-range bomber force.

2. Alert Status of Soviet Long-Range Bomber Force

Under conditions of "normal" readiness, roughly 10 per cent of the bomber force is kept on ground alert. The Soviet bomber force has not utilized an airborne alert system.

During an intense crisis period, some dispersal of the bomber force could be expected. This would probably involve use of a limited number of internal bases previously prepared for long-range operations, as well as staging of some aircraft to Arctic bases.

The warning time of US bomber attack upon which the Soviet command could realistically count would vary considerably according to the location involved, high or low level attack, etc. In general, the Soviets could count on at least 30 minutes warning of high level approaches to the Soviet border, degraded to 1/3 of this or less for low level approaches. Permanent home bases of the long-range bomber force located in the interior night
BLUE STRATEGIC FORCES (SUPPLEMENT)

Under present procedures the alert force, if flushed, is not subject to recall but automatically turns back under "positive-control" procedures at points about 6 to 8 hours out. An execute order can be sent during that period or for about an hour after turn-around. After that the alert force is ineffective (for lack of fuel) for 8 to 12 hours (6 to 9 hours returning home and approximately 2½ hours turn-around time on the ground). Thus, beginning 6 hours after flushing, the alert force is greatly reduced for some fifteen hours. However, if during this entire period the aircraft not originally flushed are retained on airborne or ground alert up to 40% of the total can be held on effective alert. This force is presently targeted for follow-on missions and is therefore not an exact replacement of the "alert" force.
expect at least an hour of warning, while bases nearer the periphery and Arctic staging bases would enjoy substantially less warning time.

The relatively small proportion of heavy bombers in the long-range force would tend to amplify the problem of flushing and recall for the Soviets. Assuming all in-commission heavies were flushed and recalled at about the point of no return, it is doubtful whether more than a handful of heavy bombers could again be launched within 12 hours of return to base.

3. Soviet ICBM Numbers (See Supplement)

4. ICBM Reaction Time

Estimated reaction time for ready missiles is as indicated below under three alert conditions: (See Supplement)

5. ICBM Reliability

Ready missile rate - 80%

Reliability - 70%

The above estimated reliability factors are cumulative. Roughly, 55% of inventory (28 missiles) would reach the target.

6. Sub-Launched Missiles

As of November 1961, it is estimated that the Soviets will have 28 long-range submarines capable of launching missiles while surfaced. Of these submarines, 7 are believed to be nuclear-powered. The total number of missiles carried is about 78. They are ballistic missiles of 150-350 nautical miles range.

7. MGRM's and ICBM's

Missiles of ranges from 700 nautical miles or are considered by the Soviets to be in the strategic category, and as such will probably not be under immediate control of the theater commander, although available on call for theater support.

As of November 1961, the operational inventory will be approximately the following:
In addition, a 2,000 N. M. missile has been developed, and will not be available in November in operationally significant numbers. Of the missile launchers in the 700 and 1100 N. M. categories estimated above, a substantial number are sited in the Western USSR from where most of Western Europe could be brought under fire. Some are sited in other parts of the Soviet Union.

Reliability and reaction times for the 700 and 1100 N. M. missiles can be considered roughly the same as given for the ICBM's. Reload time for a second firing from the 700 and 1100 N. M. sites is estimated two hours under favorable conditions.
1. Bomber Alert Force

Estimated reaction time (off the ground after order given) of the ground alert aircraft is from 15 to 30 minutes. Aircraft generation rates for the remainder of the force are unknown, but would probably be somewhat less than for SAC (in percentage terms). In a period of intense crisis, the proportion of the force that could be maintained in ground alert could be at least doubled.*

While an airborne alert might be instituted in a period of intense crisis, lack of training and other long-term preparations would probably degrade Soviet airborn capability relative to that of SAC by a factor of 1:3.*

2. Soviet ICBM's

The Soviets are believed to have between 25 and 125 ICBM's operational on launchers.

3. ICBM Reaction Time

Estimated reaction time for ready missiles is as indicated below under three conditions of alert:

**Condition I:**  Crews on routine standby, electrical equipment cold, missiles not fueled.
Reaction time: 1-3 hours.

**Condition II:**  Crews on alert, electrical equipment warmed up, missiles not fueled.
Reaction time: 15-30 minutes.

**Condition III:**  Crews on alert, electrical equipment warmed up, missiles fueled and occasionally topped.
Reaction time: 5-10 minutes. (This condition probably could not be maintained more than an hour or two).
RED STRATEGIC FORCES (Supplement for Red)

1. Alert Forces:

Ten percent of the bomber force capable of two-way attack on the United States (20 bombers with tankers) is normally kept on ground alert. With 72 hours notice, this can be increased to 25% (50 bombers with tankers) for a period of two weeks. For the alert force the reaction time (off the ground after order given) is 20 minutes. Aircraft can be generated (brought to ground alert status) at a rate of 6 bombers and associated tankers per hour up to a total 200 bombers. Starting from 25% (50 aircraft) on ground alert it will take 24 hours to get 200 on alert, starting from 1% it will take 30 hours.

It is not feasible for Red to maintain more than ten bombers on continuous air-borne alert.

2. ICBM's

The Soviets have 50 ICBM's on launchers and operational.

3. ICBM Reaction Time:

In Condition I - Routine:

Reaction Time, 2 hours

Condition II - Alert not fuelled

Reaction Time: 15 minutes

Condition III - Alert and fuelled

Reaction Time: 5 minutes can be held for one hour after which missile is inoperative for six hours.
On Doc. No. R-4, P-4, Cycle 1, Control to Red and Blue, page 5, line 7, "... airborne alert was raised to 12" should (for consistency with other documents) read "... airborne alert was raised to 60".

Same document, same page, the 150 fighter aircraft mentioned in paragraph 3 is included in the 58G S. U. Fighters shown in East Germany on page RA-3 of the tactical forces document.
QUESTION?

QUESTIONS ON SCENARIO

1. What was the nationality of the aggressor fighters involved in the incidents of 12 and 17 November? GDR? Soviet? Other?

On 17 November did the French plane in fact strafe a German airfield?

2. What is the situation in Southeast Asia in general; in Laos in particular?

3. What was the nature of the peace conference? Who was invited? Who came and signed the treaty? What were the chief provisions of the treaty?

4. Is the General Assembly still in session?

Has there been any significant action with respect to the Berlin crisis taken in the General Assembly?

5. We are assuming that where not specified in the scenario, the factual situation is as we know it e.g. labor party opinion in Britain, the attitude of India, civilian access to autobahn, etc. Is this an appropriate assumption?

6. Is it appropriate to raise questions about specified forces? If so, we wish to ask specifically: What shall we assume about relative air defensive capabilities?
RESPONSE!

1a. The Red fighters used in the two incidents in November were GDR aircraft.

1b. Yes, the French aircraft did strafe a GDR base.

2. There have been no striking actions in Laos where a neutralist government is being formed. In South Viet Nam there has been an increase in terrorist activities with strong reaction by the government including the penetration of Laos and North Viet Nam by special forces. There has been a buildup of material provided by the Chinese to North Viet Nam.

3. Nature of peace conference: all belligerents invited; Satellites, Communist China attended. Yugoslavia did not, nor did any other "neutral". Treaty was general in language, ending the state of war with Germany, restoring sovereignty to the GDR, reaffirming mutual defense and security provisions already inherent in Warsaw Pact. No specific references made to Berlin or to access questions; however, Soviets handed diplomatic notes to UK, US, France drawing attention to the end of the state of war with Germany and noting that the USSR was now released from any obligation to maintain quadrupartite supervision of access or any other quadrupartite functions, e.g., Spanish, BSC.

4. General Assembly still in session. Various possible resolutions have been discussed, informally and behind the scenes, but the only resolution passed is one exhorting both sides to negotiate. A lot of "Belgrade"-type neutralist activity, but no real progress toward coming up with a UN solution to the Berlin problem.

5. Yes.

6. In general, you may make your own assessments as to specified forces and relative capabilities. However, Control has certain data, such as estimated US and USSR air defense forces (air defense jet fighters and air defense missiles) which will be made available by direct consultation with General Dowry upon request.
1. May we assume that the document entitled "Final Date: C.E. and Construction" is effective as of the date of the scenario - Friday, November 17, 1961? If not, what projection shall we assume applies as of that date?

2. May we assume that the "sealing off of East Berlin," as referred to in page 1 of the scenario, implies the same restriction on communications between the two parts of the city as existed on September 6? If not, what additional steps were taken to seal off East Berlin?

3. On page 2 of the scenario, fourth paragraph, what is meant by the verb "enlarged military reality" and why was it instituted?

4. See page 2, fifth paragraph. What is the status of relevant Allied contingency plans?

5. On what date did the UN assume jurisdiction of the check points? What was the Allied reaction?

6. What role has the UN played throughout this period?
Following supplementary paragraphs one and two of page 3 of Scenario:

The amended jurisdiction of the checkpoints at midnight 21 October - the day the treaty was signed. Although United Nations had formerly enacted permits disappeared from the checkpoints, the Germans who occupied the checkpoints made no attempt to halt Allied military convoys or to stamp essentials but simply waved the vehicles through. Thus a stable state of affairs continued until 2 November when a new UN inspection facility appeared at each checkpoint and the effort was made to inspect Allied convoys.
1. Consider it effective on date of scenarios.

2. You may assume it.

3. A noticeable increase (noticeable to the Reds) in the numbers of US military transport aircraft in Air Corridor 3 associated with the movement and support of the military personnel being brought into West Berlin in the process of enlarging the Garrison.

4. There is general agreement by the Allies on contingency plans which allowed the situation to develop in the manner specified in the scenario. However, there is no agreement on the specific course of action which the Allies can take in response to this particular situation as it has developed.

5. GDR assumed jurisdiction of the checkpoints at midnight, 21 October - the day the treaty was signed. Although Soviet officers who had formerly stamped permits disappeared from the checkpoints, the Germans who occupied the checkpoints made no effort to halt Allied military convoys or to stamp credentials but simply waved the vehicles through. This amiable state of affairs continued until 2 November when a new GDR inspection facility appeared at each checkpoint and the effort was made to inspect Allied convoys.

6. General Assembly in session. Various possible resolutions have been discussed, informally and behind the scenes, but the only resolution passed is one enjoining both sides to negotiate. A lot of "Belgrade"-type neutralist activity, but no real progress toward coming up with a UN solution to the Berlin problem.
ESTIMATE OF SITUATION - OBJECTIVES RED AND BLUE

1. Red

What are our general objectives? We have four positive objectives subject to a strong general constraint.

The second is to retain

The third is to force the West to retreat on these issues

The fourth is to weaken NATO cohesion and strength

Finally, the achievement of these objectives in a manner

2. Blue

1. To achieve a settlement of the Berlin situation which recognizes the freedom of West Berlin and guarantees its access to and from West Germany.

2. Second: To maintain the strength of NATO.

3.

4. To show themselves and the rest of the world that Red cannot advance and gain further control of territory by force or the threat of force.
We see three kinds of alternatives in the "action dimension" and three kinds of alternatives in the "talk dimension" which to some extent can be combined.

Our objective in so doing would be to force the West to negotiate on our terms by pointing up to them their incapacity to maintain tolerable situation, i.e., in the sense that they could reasonably hope to accomplish their immediate objective of retaining their position in Berlin.

The objective of this action would be to choke off completely or almost completely air or ground access to Berlin or both.

A third alternative is that we can initiate pressure elsewhere.

In the "talk" dimension we can make specific offers to negotiate, we can continue the mixture of general threat with a generalized invitation to negotiate, or we can introduce specific new threats of a "spectacular" nature (see section C).
C. Detailed Statement of Strategy Choice

Meanwhile, we take a number of positive and preparatory actions.

1) We increase our air defense readiness in an appropriate way.
QUESTION?

1. Do we or do we not have sufficient first strike capability to reduce US strategic retaliation to acceptable proportions?

2. Is there an agreed Allied contingency plan re GR access? If so, what is it?
INTelligence on BLUE MOVES

Discontinue corridor flights beginning midnight, November 24.

Declare general mobilization in the U.S.

Press short lead-time actions dealing with civilian defense.

Deliver allied note in reply to Soviet note of November 23. Refer to our note of November 24, reaffirming it. We then propose (i) that all military actions be stopped and (ii) that conditions, with respect to access routes, which prevailed before the peace treaty, be restored. We state that we are stopping for 48 hours flights to Berlin to avoid the possibility of incidents while the Soviets consider this note.

Step up the peripheral reconnaissance flights immediately.

Call up Civil Reserve Air Fleet.

Begin to airlift three STRAC divisions to CINCEUR.

Use wide assortment of means of communication to broadcast contents of the above note on the way to Moscow. Explain its contents, and add that, if any action is taken against our trapped battalion or other Allied forces, the 48-hour moratorium is off.

Drop leaflets by aircraft on Polish division saying "Why fight for the Germans?!"
of STRA to Europe, strategic alert of naval blockade, occurs; the
airborne alert inches up to about 72 aircraft as a result of improved
logistical preparations.

On November 20 a very brief negotiating session ends in a recess,
no slackening of Soviet position having occurred.- The U. S. being unwilling
to consider the conditions demanded by the USSR. It is well known that the
British Government has hinted that it will not participate in any military
action that may result from allied refusal to settle on the Soviet terms,
that its participation in the NATO buildup will be reversed, and that
THOR and E-47 bases will be reconsidered if the US takes unilateral military
action toward Berlin.

Meanwhile, apathy has settled in West Berlin, a new "refugee flow"
of West Berliners escaping by auto to West Germany has set in, unemployment
has reached 30% of the labor force in that city, massive bank withdrawals
are occurring, Mayor Brandt has been in seclusion ever since the uprising,
and morale is considered in general to be exceedingly low.

Shortly after noon on November 20 the USSR and the GDR issue a
joint announcement to the effect that certain warlike pressures in the
US and in western Germany have overcome the better judgment of more
peaceable elements among the Allied powers, that the allies has consequently
withdrawn from negotiations, but that in the interest of tranquillity access
of the allied powers to Berlin is still open, subject only to the reasonable
condition that military convoys must correspond to the concept of "supply"
and not constitute armed penetration, and that subject to very cooperative
arrangements by the GDR for inspection of military convoys and air trans-
ports, supply even of the Berlin garrison may go forward.

It is 4 PM, Berlin time, November 30, 1961
Does Control mean (Doc. No. 3-30, page 1) that Allied escort flights were stopped? This must be the meaning because paragraph 3 of that page says that the Soviets offered "free access to Berlin during the negotiations" and because the Blue Team would not even consider suspending transport flights during negotiations.
This is a supplement to Control Document B-30.

There was a suspension of all flights by the Allies for 48 hours. At the end of the 48-hour moratorium the Allies resumed unescorted supply flights to Berlin.
Cycle V, scheduled for 3:00 this afternoon, will not be a "strategy" session but rather an evaluative session. Control will provide the usual projection, reflecting the strategies developed in Cycle IV. The Red and Blue teams will devote the session to an assessment of the game history, of the situation reached at the end of Cycle IV, and of their own and each other's strategies to date. A set of general questions will be provided by Control to guide the teams in the preparation of these assessments.

When this fifth session is completed, the team's assessments will be duplicated and distributed to all participants. At the same time, each team will receive the other team's full documentation.

Monday morning will be a plenary session, starting at 9:30 to allow an hour for reading each other's game documents by Red and Blue. The session will terminate at 12:30 and that will close the exercise. Departures will be arranged following lunch.
On 1 December the French, British, and German evening press reported that the Allies had been informed of a secret approach made by the Soviets to Averna, stating that they recognize his concern with the right of Germans to travel freely in Germany and that the Soviets are willing in the course of the negotiations to come to an understanding about travel along the following lines: Beginning initially with a Western quota of permits for travel to East Germany of 10,000 per month (to be assigned by the West) matched against an East German quota of 3,000 per month (to be assigned by the East).

The following morning the German press reported rumors that both Grand and Menia had also been informed by the Soviets of the "secret" approach to Averna. The same papers and others in the West carried a differing statement by Averna, announcing the Soviet suggestion that the GDR withdraw from NATO. He also said that the first problem is to devise means of assuring uninterrupted access to Berlin and called on the Soviet Union to accept the Western proposal for a technical commission. He welcomed that portion of the Soviet note which invited observers to elections in the GDR, but made it clear that having observers is far short of having free elections. He challenged the Soviets to have genuinely free elections and to create the prerequisites by permitting all parties to have full opportunities to campaign in the GDR. Above all he reminded the Soviets that the SPD would have been permitted to re-establish itself as an independent party. He went on to say that any country which would wish to send representatives to observe the free elections in the FRG is welcome to do so.

In separate notes, after consultation, the U.S., U.K., France and West Germany reject the proposals in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Soviet Union note of 30 November and urge the Soviet Union to accept immediately their proposal for a technical commission. The wording of the British reply is appreciably more sympathetic to paragraph 1 of the Soviet Union note but makes it clear that obtaining a solution to the problem of access should not be delayed by tying it to the Soviet proposal. All four Western replies, although rejecting paragraphs 1 and 2, express willingness to discuss in a separate conference later measures for securing a solution to the overall German problem.

The other NATO countries have not yet replied to the Soviet note and a meeting of the NAC has been called for December 6 to discuss the Soviet proposals. There are rumors that several small NATO countries are sympathetic with the Soviet proposal. There is a strong mixed public opinion reaction to the Soviet proposals in the press of the NATO countries.
EXCHANGE OF NOTES

On evening of 30 November Western powers in Vienna give Soviets a note proposing a technical commission to work out modalities of free access. The note also states that the Allies insist that the status quo as to access to West Berlin continue without any impediment while the technical commission is at work.

This Western note of 30 November crossed one sent by Red to each NATO capital proposing the resumption of negotiations in Vienna on the basis of the following new proposals:

"1. A commission at the official level which discusses the problem of the relations between the GDR and FRG. Among the instructions which we give this commission is the question of how we can promote freedom of travel between the two parts of Germany.

2. An offer to NATO that if the Federal Republic withdraws from NATO the GDR will withdraw from the Warsaw Pact. Further, that the Warsaw Pact will offer to guarantee the security and independence of the Federal Republic and its ability to shape its own relations with the GDR in exchange for a NATO guarantee of the same kind offered to the GDR.

3. We remain willing to guarantee access to West Berlin for the whole world subject only to guarantees that West Berlin will not again be used as a base for an attack across the boundaries of the GDR.

4. In its consideration of travel between East and West Germany, the Commission should also consider travel between East and West Berlin.

5. We invite Western observers to the next elections of the GDR in exchange for allowing Warsaw Pact observers at the next elections of the FRG."
Between 30 November and 4 December this:
- maintains general mobilization and civil defense efforts in the US
- maintains a mobilization of the Civil Air Fleet
- concludes the transfer of 3 STRICG divisions to CincEur.
- maintains pressure on Allies to raise mobilization levels
- retains the corps Probe in limited readiness in its assembly area
- moves 3 regiments of air defense aircraft armed with MB-1 rockets to airfields 44, 38 and 36.

Against this Blue posture of continued readiness, Red observes:
- reduction in number of SAC aircraft on air alert and with fewer SAC flights into areas close to Red
- reduction to limited degree of NATO alert condition
- diminished aggressiveness of Blue ASW forces, now confined to air surveillance of contacts rather than active pursuit by HUK groups
- considerably reduces frequency and extent of peripheral reconnaissance.

Reduced tension in Blue quarters and general return to earlier conditions reflected in major resumption of contact with West Berlin;
- continuation of Blue military air transport flights with West Berlin enough to handle military and civilian requirements - those had been resumed 27 November.
This is answer to B-12

As indicated in B-7, Soviets have 25 to 125 ICBMs; locations of fewer than 25 known to you. Depending on alert status of Soviet bomber forces at time of a US attack, a high altitude attack might catch substantial part before takeoff, or might not. A low altitude attack coordinated with ICBMs and Polaris might knock out large fraction of bomber force if not on highest alert they are capable of, assuming US bomber take-offs managed so as to give no tactical warning. Soviet Union bombers, according to scenario, are on high state of alert; some dispersal to alternate bases has occurred pursuant to B-7 para 1 and B-4 page 5 para 2. You must assume substantial damage to SAGE system if Soviets have a score or so of ICBM's after you attack; US air defense substantially degraded thereby. Control does not know what damage the Blue Team would consider acceptable.
After much discussion in the Military Committee, it has been our appreciation that the highly increased state of alert of U.S. SAC, which is the largest that we have ever experienced, presents a genuine threat that the U.S. might initiate an attack on the Soviet Union in response to another increase in the level of tension. We do not think that this would be in any sense a rational plan, but we cannot consider the probability that it will occur as negligible. It is our evaluation that even if we preempt now, the level of damage that residual American forces could inflict on us in unacceptable, and that further, we are not forced to consider this alternative now. Accordingly, we are moving to utilize to our advantage the American offer of negotiation in order to lower the tension but with the expectation that we will be able to achieve our objectives to a substantial extent in the negotiations and in the period of disillusionment in the West which will follow its conclusion.

Our specific responses will be as follows:
This is a "Response" to question 2 of B 12

2. Allied agreement exists on ground probes up to a division-size force with air cover. Additionally, the U. S. has proposed and the Allies have discussed but not agreed upon a ground action of a size. As stated in Response 4 of B 11 there is no specific Allied agreement as to the exact course of action to be followed in these circumstances.
(a) ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

1. "Estimate of the situation"; The West has superior sea power and superior strategic forces (numbers and diversification). Also the West has a superior economic base.

2. West's objectives, as to Berlin, are to maintain freedom of access to Berlin and to maintain Berlin as a viable city and:

3. East's objectives, as to Berlin, are [immediately] to gain for the East Germans effective control over all access to Berlin.

(b) MAIN ALTERNATIVES AND CONSEQUENCES

2. West
2. Heat

(c) STRATEGY CHOSEN

1. Definite moves decided on.
   a. Diplomatic.
indeed unmolested a few minutes later. As the hours passed into evening with no further flights, the crowds drifted restlessly away from Tempelhof and the rumors gained swift acceptance that the loss of the second plane to East German sneak attack had forced the West to reconsider how many flights to be sent in.

As the 20th passed with only three transport flights and the 21st with the last transport on the 21st crashing after being shot down, the sense of isolation and of having been deserted grew rapidly in the city. Various rumors that a major ground effort would be made to reopen overland access to the city only intensified this sense of isolation as the days passed without any such news.

By Wednesday, the 22nd, an abnormally large number of West Berliners were finding one reason or another to drive to West Germany, by car as usual for long trips. Meanwhile, a number of West Berliners' incidents along the sector border during the day have angered the parents of young men which have been swelled by a surprisingly large number of workers either absentees given leave by management, or who uncertainty have led many firms to release workers on temporary leave while decisions were reached on future production schedules. Most plans were encountering increasing difficulty in finding storage for products now moving out to West Germany far more slowly than they were being produced. Word of a particularly brutal shooting of three young girls trying to slip thru a gap in the fence near the Checkpoint Charlie has inflamed the crowds and several to have flared along the "wall" during the late afternoon.
On the evening of 22 November a solidarity rally of West Berliners was scheduled for 2000 hours in front of the West Berlin City Hall at Freedom Square. This rally was called by Lord Mayor Brandt in an attempt to boost morale as well as stem the exodus of people out of Berlin. As the time for the rally nears the gathering crowd reflects deep pessimism and a desire for action. Many of the early arrivals at the rally are young males in the age bracket 16-27 who have been held Marienfelde for extended periods of time due to Berlin Senate inability to evacuate them by air from West Berlin. As the rally starts Brandt begins an impassioned speech about the need for West Berliners to retain faith and to believe that their sisters and brothers in the GDR have not abandoned them or their cause. This in turn means that the populace of West Berlin has not forgotten its freedom loving country man in the GDR. At this point a spontaneous outburst takes place within the crowd. Repeated calls for a march of silence to the Brandenburger Tor come from the crowd. In response to this, large elements of the audience start drifting out into the avenues for a march toward the Brandenburger Tor. Brandt tries to hold back the crowd by his words of caution but he has temporarily lost control of the rally. As Brandt leaves the speakers balcony and enters his office in order to leave City Hall in order to make a personal attempt to head off the crowd he learns that minor disturbances have erupted at the Friedruhstrasse border crossing point. Brandt asks for a full report on this incident and it be radioed to him in his car.
Berlin Action Police on full alert. (The Action Police have a total force of 2,010 equipped with infantry weapons and riot control devices). It is now 2045 hours. Brandt tries to reach the point of the crowd but traffic is jammed because as the crowd moves toward the Brandenburger Tor it has picked up momentum. This has been reflected not only in terms of large numbers of people joining the crowd but vehicles had been added to the flow of traffic. The psychological mood has also shifted as the tempo of mass hysteria began to penetrate the entire crowd. In the meantime a minor skirmish has developed at the Friedrichstrasse Crossing area as the VOPD units at the crossing point have just fired at young West Berliners who have been taunting them while riding on motorcycles along the Chinese wall at Friedrichstrasse. At 2200 major portions of the crowd are at the Brandenburger Tor but Brandt has not gotten through to the head of the crowd. As the crowd spills into the Brandenburger Tor area, British and American troops are hard pressed to protect the Soviet War Memorial in West Berlin. At this point there is an arrival of support strength from the West Berlin Action Police units. These units enable Brandt to reach the point of what is now a mob on the verge of explosion. At this point the radio in Brandt's automobile blares forth with the news that a four year old child has been killed by indiscriminate firing by the VOPD's or NVA personnel at the Friedrichstrasse area. The news spreads in the mob that the incident took place. The mob surges forward but Brandt tries to hold it back with his police escort and a plea which is broadcast by a hand megaphone. The pressure of the mob pushes Brandt to the very border markers. As the VOPD units try to drive the mob from the immediate border marker the crowd surges over the border and there is
a burst of gunfire. No one knows where it came from or who started the exchange. The West Berlin police fear that Brandt may be killed thus they fire at the VOPO’s to take pressure off of Brandt’s exposed position. Chaos results and the mob pours into East Berlin. There is hesitation by some VOPO’s and NVA personnel to fire on the mob. Instead of firing some join the mob. This puts arms into the hands of the mob. As the mob spills into East Berlin the Action Police bring up reinforcements about 500 strong. This unit tries to pinch off the mob in crossing to East Berlin but it can’t. As the riot spreads into East Berlin both parts of Berlin are electrified. People are all in the streets and increased action is initiated to tear down sector border barriers. As a result the West Berlin Action Police are fully deployed all along the West Berlin/East Berlin Sector borders by 2315 and have moved to protect life and property of West Berliners. Rifle fire fights are carried out all over the city. East Berlin is blacked out be power plant failures as in West Berlin. The riot is all over East Berlin by 2400 and is spilling into the GDR suburbs around Berlin. Brandt recovers from the initial shock and moves from the chaotic Brandenburger Tor situation to RIAS Building Brandt broadcasts for worldwide to prevent another Hungary and its bloody aftermath. After Brandt’s initial broadcast continued appeals go out over RIAS for help. Brandt calls a quorum of the Berlin Senate into session by 0200 on 23 November. At this point Berlin is in full revolt and it appears that the freedom fighters have control of the major portions of East Berlin and are using West Berlin as a safe haven.
Our response to the revolt in Berlin on 22, 23 November has four features.

1. We move as quickly as possible to suppress the revolt using Soviet forces.

2. We take a number of diplomatic steps, all of which have in common the elements. The first is to indicate that we are anxious to restore the peace in East Berlin and damp down a situation of tension; the second is to point out the responsibility of West Germany for the illegal aggression against East Germany and time playing upon European misconceptions of Germany.
The following has been observed during November 23 and 24.

US Airborne alert increased apparently by 20 to 30 over the 60 already in effect. SAC Tankers dispersed to bases in Alaska, Greenland, and Canada. 75 fighter bombers moved to NATO area.

Worldwide movements of US Naval Units, and some Naval movement other allied powers indicating intention general contradiction all Soviet shipping.
November 23 US declared national emergency.

November 24 US Naval Vessels intercepted a score of more of Soviet freighters and tankers on the high seas. Escortod them to neutral ports under pain of attack. Five Soviet vessels in Arctic, North Sea, and Sea of Japan outward bound, forced by US Naval vessels to return to ports of origin.

Pattern of events suggests general blockage entire Soviet block; but by November 24 unclear whether includes Communist China, Communist North Korea, and North Vietnam.

Substantial movements of Soviets from Interior of USSR toward its western borders is noted. Several air regiments and an Army Corps seen moving into East Germany from Poland, replaced by similar forces from USSR.

USSR 9th Division moves on November 23 and 24 position previously occupied by East German 3rd Division, which reported moving eastward.

No change in basic disposition or operation of Soviet strategic forces.
From: Control  To: Red and Blue

Doc No.  Cycle No.  

Change signals. This is Cycle 3 and not the reflective follow-up to cycle 2 mentioned in earlier notice.

It is 6 PM, November 24th.

On November 23 the Soviet Fifth and Seventeenth divisions moved into Berlin to seal sector boundary and to cut Berlin off from East Germany. Sixth and Seventeenth Divisions moved to complete the operation. Proceeding brutally and successfully, situation will evidently be under control before morning of the 25th.

Allied garrison Berlin takes steps to restore order West Berlin. Does not cross sector boundary. (Neither do Soviet forces.) Despite harassment by population in West Berlin, whose anger turns against Allies, restoring order along sector boundary and by morning of 25th will have situation under control.

In the air, an allied transport is destroyed by GDR aircraft 2 PM on the 24th. At 3 PM 3 squadrons US fighter-bombers attack airfield 23, occupied by GDR air force, substantially destroying parked aircraft and making field unusable for next couple of days.

A battalion of US troops breaks through the barriers at Helmstedt at 10 AM on the 24th, proceeds beyond Magdeburg by late afternoon. It is attacked by GDR aircraft at 4:30 PM forced to
deploy and stop forward movement. The GDR Second Division, which began moving as soon as the US battalion crossed the border, immediately moved to surround the US battalion. By nightfall the battalion is dug in and the GDR division is moving in as though for attack.

Meanwhile, strikingly similar remarks were made in the Security Council by Stevenson and Zorin, both calling on UN to restore peace in Berlin.

The evening of the 23rd, US, France, Britain, received notes from USSR asking help to restore peace in Berlin. Note points out USSR have limited action to East Berlin, calls on Allies to use their troops in West Berlin to fulfill their responsibility and prevent further provocative action by the Germans. To the British and French note says that events of the last day are clearly evidence of aggressive designs of German Government and attempt to involve Allies in its aggressive designs. Note refers to common interest in restoring peace. USSR sent note at same time to West Germans demanding to know whether events in Berlin are attempt to conquer or GDR by force and drag NATO powers into to do the job for them.
Reminds Adenauer that last time Germany attempted to expand eastward by force it took 15 years to rebuild. This time it will take them 50. Note warns Adenauer to control his troops and points out Soviet capacity to deal with any troops he cannot control.

Early morning, 24th, Allies deliver note to Soviets pointing out situation getting out of control. All results from eastern interference with western access to Berlin. "But Soviet guarantee of access would reduce problem. "We demand the Soviet guarantee western access, air and ground, as it existed before the signing of the treaty, so that peaceful settlement can be achieved."

Note also states that West will continue to exercise its rights of access and that, in event of any further interference with access, West will be "compelled to attack the sources of interference with whatever force is required to overcome it." Note points out it is difficult to predict effect of such action on situation in East Germany.

There is no response to either Soviet or western note by the time of the events that occurred on November 24.

This is situation at nightfall November 24.

See supplementary intelligence reports to Red and Blue.
Allied reaction to U. S. proposal for battalion probe and air strike was discussion but no agreement. Battalion was U.S. and air strike was U.S. because U. S. decided imperative to proceed whether or not Allied agreement reached. Allied reaction to unilateral action is as follows. French strongly support; Germans hesitantly support, British make disagreement known but adopt passive attitude.

By nightfall November 24 no Allied plan exists for what to do next. British still reluctant to proceed but unready to take strong opposition; French entirely sympathetic, and urging Allied collaboration, their own participation available whenever U. S. demands it. Germans going along in principle but not enthusiastic. All signs are that French and Germans will follow U. S. leadership, British will probably acquiesce but not altogether certain. Discussion regarding reinforcement in division strength so far reflects this lineup.
QUESTION REF 3 26. III

What was the Allied reaction to U.S. proposal for battalion probe and air strike against ground installation in GDR?

What is Allied position on wider engagement on ground and in the air?

Why is battalion only U.S. unit and not tripartite?
At Vienna the Soviet Foreign Minister bluntly confesses an interest in peace by a desire to see Allied access so assured as to prevent any recurrence of the unfortunate events of the last two weeks. The Soviets indicate that they and the new government of the GDR are quite prepared to guarantee traffic and transport in and from Berlin, conditionally of course on cession of the naval blockade, which, if continued, will force termination of the Vienna negotiations.

The Soviet proposal is that a formal treaty among the five Powers - US, UK, France, USSR and GDR - guarantee allied rights to support the occupation garrison in Berlin indefinitely and that civilian traffic be allowed under the same regulations that have been in force for several years under the supervision of the USSR. Certain conditions are of course made necessary by the sovereign status of the GDR. Armed penetration could not be permitted. This means that military equipment transported to Berlin should be in secured status, not armed, both on the surface and in the air. Very nominal and perfunctory clearance procedures of the friendliest sort can be instituted to satisfy the GDR that military forces proceeding to Berlin are "supply" rather than an invasion. Once the exchange of diplomatic officials has occurred there need be no difficulty in working out procedures to see that these conditions are no practical obstacle to allied supply of their garrison in Berlin, which, though an archaic reflection of WW II are naturally a status symbol for the western powers. In order to prevent any recurrence of the recent unpleasantness the USSR proposes again, but will not press, a "free city" status for West Berlin but is prepared to let that sector of the city continue de facto as an occupied area of the defeated Third Reich.

The Allied powers perceive the Soviet position to be not strikingly dissimilar to the position adopted in mediately prior to the recent unnerving events. The British are reliably reported to be pressing for acceptance of these terms, in spite of growing sentiment in the leadership of the Labor Party for rejection of the terms so patently identical to what was rejected a scant week ago. The US is adamant that these terms must be rejected, and that the entire negotiations is a farce that the Soviets are simply reiterating the provocative demands that led to the events of the past week. The French strongly support the US in this, and the Germans go along with the US position.

After four days there is no sign of the Soviet interest in yielding an inch. On November 29 the Secretary of State indicates to newspaper reporters that the Soviet position is wholly unacceptable - hardly different from the position that so nearly led to substantial war during the past week. No slackening of military buildup, movement
The night of November 24 the GDR division confronting the US battalion takes no offensive action. November 25 the US proposes to the USSR that all military actions be stopped, that conditions with respect to access routes that prevailed before the peace treaty be restored. The US announces on behalf of the Allies that all flights to Berlin are being stopped for 48 hours to avoid incidents while the Soviets consider these proposals. Meanwhile the US declares general mobilization, presses urgent civil defense actions, steps up peripheral reconnaissance flights around the USSR, calls up the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, announces and begins the airlift of 3 STRAC divisions to Europe. The naval blockade is continued in full force. In various broadcasts the US makes clear what its proposal has been and that this proposal is off if any action is taken against the trapped battalion.

Meanwhile the Allies ready a corps for invasion of East Germany in the general area behind Helmstedt. The Polish division deployed in Germany is bombaraded with leaflets saying, "why fight for the Germans?" A U. S. note to the Polish Government warns again against supporting the Russians in Germany and indicating that the presence of Polish troops in Germany is an unfriendly act.

The US proposal is crossed in transit by a Soviet acceptance of the early western note of the 24th, agreeing that negotiation is desirable, declaring an interest in guarantee of access to Berlin under suitable arrangements, proposing immediate negotiations in Moscow or Vienna, and offering free access to Berlin during the negotiations. Various clearances about the legal and peace-loving posture of the USSR and GDR are advanced. The USSR announces that the GDR has agreed that the U. S. battalion should be allowed to withdraw, in the interest of peace. The USSR promises the illegal naval blockade, noting that it will not be possible to continue negotiations successfully if the blockade persists, but takes no military action against the blockade.

Meanwhile mopping up in East Berlin is completed by Soviet forces.

North Viet Nam forces maneuver conspicuously along the dividing line between North and South Viet Nam. The compatibility of the Allied and Soviet proposals leads to agreement on a Foreign Ministers meeting in Vienna the morning of the 27th, by which time all military action in East Germany has ceased, the battalion all safely withdrawn, all Allied flights in the air corridors have been suspended, and Berlin has become orderly. US and NATO strategic alert continues, though the crash increase in US airborne alert to about 100 B-52s has fallen off to about half that number for lack of crew and logistic arrangements. The naval blockade continues.
On December 3 the London Times publishes rumors attributed to high-level sources that MacMillan has been invited to Moscow by Khrushchev. MacMillan denies the rumors the next day and states that he will attend the NATO meetings on 6 December.

By evening of December 4 the Allies and the Soviet Union have not yet agreed on resumption of negotiations at Vienna. Through private diplomatic channels they are still exploring the wide differences in their proposals of Soviet Union note.
continued (since 27 November) military transport movement along the Autobahns inasmuch as GDR authorities attempted to exercise no more control than the Soviets had prior to 21 October treaty.

- Attempted to consolidate physical recontact with West Berlin in announcing a major 10-year plan for the future of Berlin, including development of cultural institutions and economic development, starting with immediate measures to reduce unemployment in the city.

Note to Red Military Adviser:

The transfer of 200 S.U. TAC and S.U. NAVY Badger crews to SUSAC does not result in an immediate capability to prevent deterioration of SUSAC readiness for the reasons given below. An increased capability to maintain a high state of SUSAC alert should become evident starting in about one month.

While the S.U. TAC and S.U. NAVAL Badger crews are familiar with the aircraft, they must receive training and practice in SUSAC procedures and tactics before they can be considered as ready for integration into the force. Some SUSAC crews will be required to conduct this training and exercising.
Situation in Laos and VIET NAM

On 2 December Western news accounts report increased activity by Pathet Lao in Laos and more infiltration from across DRV border.

On 3 December, Soviet press announces Souvanna is flying to Moscow for medical treatment "in the near future." Also on 3 December, Western press carries account of "satisfaction" expressed by General McGaw, following an inspection of Viet Nam border with Laos that newly-instituted measures to seal border are proving effective.

Disposition of Ground Troops:

Soviet Fifth and Seventeenth move back out of Berlin to their original location, leaving Sixth and Seventh divisions in place to maintain surveillance. GDR Second division moves back to its original location, leaving the Scout Troop in the vicinity of Magdeburg.

The U.S. battalion withdraws from Magdeburg to a bivouac position near the autobahn 500 yards west of East German boundary. The U.S. Corps is in bivouac in LUNEBURG-UELZEN area.

Navel Activity

While U.S. is holding on to ships already seized and is harvesting occasional Eastern ships, no seizure or sinking of ships on either side has taken place during period November 30th to the present.
NOTE FOR LONG-RANGE INTERCEPTOR

Re Sinking of Merchantmen

In view of reduction in Blue peripheral reconnaissance effort, Control disallows shooting down of peripheral recce flights by Red long-range interceptors. Instead Blue is informed as follows:

"Red, apparently premeditatively, reveals a new, apparently long-range interceptor in the Baltic Area.

New configuration fighter sighted and photographed by experienced Swedish air observers on 2 December. Technical analysis indicates a range of about 1000 miles—considerably greater than estimated for any Soviet interceptor."

Because Blue has seized no further ships since 30 November, we can assume blockade has been eased or lifted. Therefore, the proposed sinking by Red of two merchantmen by escort submarine action was abandoned.
INTELLIGENCE ON RED MOVES

Between 30 November and 4 December:

- Red maintains a high level of readiness through air and ground forces deployed in Eastern Europe and GDR. It is clear that any Blue probe will be met with superior force almost at once after crossing the GDR border.

- Red, to offset fatigue and deterioration in SUSAC from prolonged alert status, appears to be commencing transfer to SUSAC of some tactical and naval Bajer crews, numbers uncertain. Red apparently willing to accept degradation of naval and tactical air elements and some reduced SUSAC capability until transferred crews complete transition check out—perhaps for as long as a month.

- Red, apparently premeditatively, reveals a new apparently long-range interceptor in the Baltic area. New configuration fighter sighted and photographed in the Southern Baltic by experienced Swedish air observers on 2 December. Technical analysis indicates a range of about 1000 miles—considerably greater than estimated for any Soviet interceptor.
Intelligence Situation Report on Results of Blue Action and Intelligence on Red Moves

1. As of 3 December indigenous resistance units of 3 men each have been activated in Wroclaw (Breslau), Warsaw and Lodz Poland. Similar units have been activated in Marienbad (Marianske Lazne) and Prague, CSSR.

2. On 1 December a simultaneous announcement was made in Washington, Bonn and Berlin that a United States sponsored 10 year plan had been initiated to make West Berlin a cultural center, to reduce unemployment, and to build up the West Berlin electronics industry.

3. On 3 December SFB Chairman Brandt has received a highly classified report via the SFB Ostburo (SFB Office For The East) that Chancellor Adenauer has received a highly sensitive Soviet proposal relative to the regulation of travel from East to West Germany. In this proposal a Western quota would enable 10,000 West Germans per month to travel to the GDR. The East Germans have a quota of allowing 3,000 East Germans per month to travel to the FRG.

4. At 1800 hours on 3 December an assassination of a French Consul was carried out in the Metropole by KGB agents. The operation followed known FLN techniques. As a result the French believe it was a FLN operation. The US knows the operation was run by the KGB.

5. On 3 December rumors are all over Lyon and Paris that two additional French divisions will be withdrawn from Algeria for deployment in Europe. Right wing French extremists are furious.

6. Overtures were made, by the Soviet Ambassador to Laos, to Souvanna on 4 December to fly to Moscow in the near future. Souvanna is considering the matter.

7. The Chief of the Soviet Trade Mission in Rio de Janeiro approached Quadros in San Paolo on 1 December and asked Quadros to open a Soviet exposition in Moscow on 2 December. Quadros refused due to the press of time.
8. On 4 December Castro announces to the world a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of all countries devoted to peace for 15 December in Havana. As of 4 December Poland GDR Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and China have accepted.

9. As of 2 December the GDR has taken technical steps to harass German traffic moving east to Berlin. The GDR has at the same time facilitated the flow of traffic westward from Berlin.

10. A lead article appeared in the SED oriented West Berlin newspaper Telegraf on 3 December which states that Adenauer is attempting to negotiate secretly with the Soviets on Berlin and the German issue. Investigation by the U. S. revealed by 4 December that the appearance of this article was Soviet (KGB) inspired.

11. Nine agents which were dropped into the Soviet Union on 26 and 27 November have been neutralized as of 2 December. Prior to this time they reported on state of readiness of Soviet ICBM's.

12. The Soviets are redeploying as of 1 December 500 men from tactical and naval Badger units to the long range air force in the interior of the Soviet Union.
This afternoon's session is for your evaluation of where you stand, what you expect as likely outcomes, and how you interpret the events of the past 2½ weeks of November and December 1961.

You are free to develop this evaluation in any way you prefer. The questions and topics mentioned below are for guidance about what we would like covered, but are not intended to determine the form of your response.

We are as interested in your evaluating, with hindsight, your own and the other team's reasoning, during this period, as in your assessment of what the situation is now and what it will probably lead to.

To help you keep track of some of the things we are interested in, they are listed below as numbered questions, but you need not treat this as a questionnaire to be filled out.

1. How does the situation as of the evening of December 4 differ from the situation on September 10 with respect to:
   a. the prospects for general war?
   b. the prospects for European war?
   c. The NATO Alliance?
   d. The likely status of East Germany?
   e. The Soviet assessment of US willingness to risk war?
   f. The US assessment of the Soviet willingness to risk war?
   g. The state of world opinion?
   h. The arms race, disarmament, and all that?

2. At what point in the events between September 10 and December 4 was the danger of general war the greatest? At what point was the danger
of escalation to general war ever have been suggested? How great was it?
What did it suggest? Was it only concerned alliances or events threatened
at that point to bring about war?

3. How do you think you were assessed on your intentions and
objectives compared with the way you tried to convey them. For example, how
did you think they assessed your intentions to use nuclear war, or risk general war? How do you
think they assessed your intentions about any uprising in East Germany or
other Satellite? How well did your threats get across, how much did they
probably interpret as bluffs?

4. What do you consider to be the most provocative, risky, daring
with action you took? (You might recall, up to this both/hindsight and as of the
time you took the action.) What do you consider to have been the most
provocative, bold or dangerous action the other team took?

5. If you were to rank the degree of danger and intentions at every
moment in the course of the game, and if the other team were to do likewise,
how closely do you think the estimates of intentions of the two teams would
have coincided?

6. If you were to list the several most important objectives or criteria
for your decisions in the course of the game—e.g., risk of general war,
risk of another European war, status of Berlin, status of East Germany,
status of the NATO Alliance, world opinion, enemy appraisal of your capabilities,
and intentions, cohesion of the Soviet Bloc, state of the arms race and arms
budget, political-military situation in Southwest Asia, domestic morale, etc.
and if you were to rank these in terms of their relative importance to you at the decision points corresponding to the different cycles:

a. how closely do you think your ranking would have corresponded to the other teams ranking of these objectives and criteria?

b. would your ranking have changed substantially from cycle to cycle?

7. If we may phrase it crudely "who won the war?" - what we mean is, recognizing that both sides may be better off or worse off, should the US or the Soviet Government feel more satisfied or dissatisfied with the course of events from November 17 to December 4? Should the American or Soviet Government feel more satisfied, with benefit of hindsight, from the policies it pursued? Is the situation on December 4 better or worse for the US Government than it was September 10 or November 17? Is the situation of the Soviet Government better or worse than it was September 10 or November 17?

8. What do you assess to be the most successful move that the other team made? What moves did you most feel they would make in the course of the game? What moves might they have taken that, with hindsight, you now think would have been most effective against you or embarrassed you the most?

9. In quantitative and impressionistic terms, could you comment on whether your relations with the other team (i.e., the relations of the US and Soviet Governments) should be described as collaborative, cooperative, and considerate, during the period from November 17 to December 4, or should be described as antagonistic and inimical and best characterized by wholly opposite interests.
INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT OR RESULTS OF
RED ACTION AND INTELLIGENCE ON BLUE MOVES

1. SPD chairman Brandt has received on 3 December a highly
classified report via the SPD Ostburo (SPD Office for the East)
that Chancellor Adenauer has received a highly sensitive Soviet
proposal relative to the regulation of travel from East to West
Germany. In this proposal a Western quota would enable 10,000 West
Germans per month to travel to the GDR. The East Germans have a
quota of allowing 3,000 East Germans per month to travel to the FRG.
This same information has been fed into a Sea/Estgerman channel which
will result in this intelligence reaching FDP Chairman Mende after
4 December.

2. At 1800 hours on 3 December an assassination of a French
Colonel was carried out in the Metropole by KGB assets. The operation
followed known FLN techniques and as a result French authorities
believe that this was a FLN operation.

3. On 3 December rumors have been planted in Lyon and Paris by
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German traffic moving east to Berlin. The GDR has at the same time
facilitated the flow of traffic westward from Berlin.

8. A lead article appears in the SPD oriented West Berlin
newspaper Telegraph on 3 December which states that Adenauer is
attempting to negotiate secretly with the Soviets on Berlin and the
German issue.
Could you also comment on the relative importance of military considerations and political considerations in the various military moves you took or planned?

10. Do the events leading up to December 4 suggest a common interest between US and Soviet governments so that the problem is one of "successful negotiation" or are there basic irreconcilable differences that make a stable, viable "solution" out of the question?

11. Was there any point at which private talk communications between Soviet and US government might have substantially helped or substantially hindered a settlement, or might have been used effectively one side against the other?

Do you think arms-control considerations were relevant at any point up to December 4? Do you think the events leading up to December 4 have any implications for arms control and disarmament?

This is a big order. It is furthermore meant to be suggestive, not exhaustive, and you may ask yourselves your own questions. Team agreement on these assessments is not essential; differences of view may be just as interesting and should be reported. If you will reflect on these and similar questions after you leave Camp David, or if there are questions you would like to address to the other team or Concept please keep them in mind and communicate them to ISA in whatever fashion is convenient for you. These questions, or others you suggest, can also guide our discussion tomorrow morning.
9. As of 4 December Blue has reduced the NATO status of alert by one level.

10. As of 1 December there has been a reduction of Blue RB-47 peripheral reconnaissance.

11. As of 3 December there are indications that Blue has set up unidentified indigenous resistance as cells of three men each in Wroclaw (Breslau), Warsaw and Lodz in Poland.

12. As of 4 December there are indications that Blue has initiated action to reduce the SAC air alert level.

13. On 1 December a simultaneous announcement was made in Washington, Bonn and Berlin that a United States sponsored 10-year plan has been initiated to make West Berlin a cultural center to reduce unemployment, and to build up the West Berlin electronics industry.

14. On 2 December HDE units neutralized 9 U. S. agents which were dropped into the Soviet Union on 26 and 27 November. The mission of these agents was to determine state of readiness of Soviet ICBM sites.
With reference to B-18, IV, p.3, para. (c); The U.S. has proposed to the UK, France and West Germany that they consider and evaluate for contingency planning purposes the concept of a demilitarized zone to be proposed to the Soviet Union, after the 20 airfield strike under consideration.

In doing so, the U.S. was not able to spell out to the Allies the full implications of the concept because it had not had time to analyze it.
MacMillan replied to the recent note from Khruschev saying that he was deeply interested in the invitation but that he would like to wait for a more propitious time. To visit the S.U. now would be misinterpreted by the Allies and public opinion as an endorsement of the Soviet proposals in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the S.U. note of 30 November.
A Dissent

Though recognizing how diabolically clever is the strategy developed by Red in Phase III, I wish to note that I feel a great opportunity was sacrificed, unwittingly to be sure, by my comrades. To be clear on the point, the difference is one of degree. The Red position on entering Phase III was so strong, Blue having shown such extraordinary timidity in its previous response, that the opportunity existed for making political and psychological gains of immense import: perhaps sufficient to jeopardize the entire NATO alliance. The threat from increased Blue SAC readiness which deterred my compatriots left me totally unpermed that Blue could or would take decisive action. The time was not yet upon Red when a general retraction in position was justified. This was a time for further aggressive moves — either in Europe or elsewhere (e.g., Laos and SE Asia) — which would have improved the de facto position of Red when at some later date negotiation to avoid a Blue desperation attack, might more plausibly be indicated.

I trust the above views are in no way colored by the extremely discommodious conditions of my current Siberian residence.
QUESTION?

Questions to Blue on para 2 of PAGE 4.

1. What does Secretary of State go to Paris?
2. What do you report to Security Council?
3. What do you initiate anti-submarine operations? Kind? What response do you anticipate?
4. What Soviet actions analogous to your anti-submarine operations - i.e., what Soviet actions outside the theater do you anticipate, if any?
5. What will the ground probe be initiated? How large will it be?
6. a. How do you propose to exploit political and/or economic instability in the GDR.
   b. In exploiting the instability in the GDR what are your objectives? i.e., keep the pot boiling, initiate sabotage operations, generate the establishment of resistance organizations, cause popular revolt.

If resistance or sabotage activity in the GDR precipitates repressive GDR measures which eventually lead to popular revolt along the lines of Hungary 1956 what policy posture do you propose to take.

d. If popular revolt in the GDR is in full swing and civilian or military elements of the FRG attempt to come to the side of the
revolting populace what will be your policy posture? If you attempt to restrain the PRC and it acts unilaterally to aid the revolt what is your fall back position.

e. There are no Blue forces in the USSR. Will you attempt to exploit political instability in this area. If so, how and where? i.e., Slovakia or Bohemia.

f. What will your actions be in Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria or Albania relative to exploitation of instability, etc.

g. If your efforts to exploit instability restrict themselves to psychological warfare activities what themes will you play, who will this activity be attributable to, what recognition will it give to national interests and aspirations in the satellites.

7. a. What type aircraft are ordered prepared? How many? What "irregular" flight schedule is envisaged?

b. What will these non-combat aircraft carry? (also, are these civil, military or both).

c. Will Western fighter escorts initiate air-to-air combat under any circumstances, or only if attacked by Red aircraft? What are the instructions to fighter pilots?

d. What lossess will be considered to "excessive" requiring Blue to consider further escalation?

e. How would you decide whether to attack East Germany - SAMs or airfields? What is meant, more specifically, by a "token" attack?

8. a. Would time be taken to coordinate with Allies; even preliminarily, the US note to the Soviets? Assume effect would be made, not soon is "immediately". Would 24 hour suspension expire midnight 16 November?
QUESTION?

b. What is ploy intended by notes to satellites? How square implicit Oder-Neisse concession with West Germans?

c. Would report to Security Council depend on Allied agreement?

d. What is the real purpose of the Secretary of State meeting with MAC and tripartite foreign ministers? Why not a Defense Ministers' meeting or stepped up military staff consultations viable to Reds?

e. What is status and mechanism of inter-Allied coordination at this point? (8 Fm 17 Nov)

f. What measures can be taken before midnight to ensure French and West German flights will cease?

g. What will be done to persuade UK to resume its flights (after the end of the 24-hours moratorium?)

h. In the event full Allied coordination fails to be achieved, what will Blue do unilaterally - still order Norsted to fly US aircraft after 24-hour suspension? In absence of Allied coordination, would Blue consider unilateral attacks on SAM sites? Would Blue adopt steps indicating acceptance of risks of escalation alone?
1. Immediately.
2. Immediately.
3. This measure was suggested as illustrative.
This is Part A of projection to open planning session II.

Time is 6 AM, Berlin time, November 23.

Your actions with regard to preparing to counter revolt in East Germany were carried out.

At 10 PM, November 17, the U. S. Government sent a note to the Soviet Union stating that although the West will ignore the GDR ultimatum it will refrain from exercising its rights in the air corridor for a period of 24 hours (until midnight 11-18). This suspension is made to permit the USSR to intervene to persuade the GDR to retract its threat. At the end of 24 hours the U. S. will resume flights to West Berlin. The note further proposes that the issue be negotiated by the Four Powers provided that there is no interference with access during the negotiation. Finally the note states that the Allies will maintain access to Berlin and the Soviets bear full responsibility for the consequences if the Allies must resort to force.

Similar notes were sent to all satellites adding that the U. S. guarantees their present borders unless there is war.

The Secretary of State departed for Paris for conferences with the North Atlantic Council and with the tripartite Foreign Ministers early on the morning of November 18.

The U. S. introduced a resolution in the Security Council on the morning of November 18 calling for the re-establishment of the situation which prevailed prior to the signing of the Peace Treaty.

The NATO forces in Europe were put on a general alert by orders issued November 18. No flights in the air corridor occurred on November 18. Three fighter squadrons are moved from the U. S. to Western Europe and placed under NATO's command during the period November 13 - 21. The week of November 19 has been characterized by increased activity among dissident elements in East Germany. Some western agents have been taken into custody for encouraging sabotage and for publishing propaganda against the States.
This is Part A of projection to open planning session II. Time is 6 AM, Berlin time, November 23.

Your ultimatum was communicated to the Soviet Union and to the Satellites. The Secretary of State has come to Paris and is still conferring. The Security Council was discussing the U. S. resolution when it adjourned on the evening of the 22nd. All your political-military moves, p.3 of B-15, were carried out, except the preparation for tanker dispersal which you withdrew.

On November 13 and 19, 3 Soviet divisions took up forward positions in East Germany and the Polish division moved into the neighborhood of Berlin on 19-20 November. Blue intelligence has reported extensive infiltration of KGB agents into WDR security forces and a great influx of KGB agents into Berlin. There have been reports of increased alert in the Soviet air defense forces. Marshal Konev on behalf of the Warsaw Pact nations made a speech broadcast from East Berlin on the 20th restating the previously announced aims of the Soviet Union and GDR in settling the Berlin and German problems.
Military: Air action.

1. At noon on 19th of November, one U.S. military transport aircraft, together with its escort of 5 fighter aircraft (3 French and 6 British) proceeded to Berlin with difficulty. GER or E.U. (nationality unknown) fighter aircraft were reported in the area but no aggressive actions were taken.

   Late in the afternoon of the 19th of November, two more U.S. military transport aircraft, with allied fighter escort, entered the corridor at fifteen minute intervals. Numerous GER fighters were reported in the area of the corridor but the flights experienced no aggressive action until the number two transport and its escort neared Berlin. At that time, with the escort fighters somewhat relaxed, the GER fighters started to withdraw. Unexpectedly one GER fighter suddenly made a firing pass, destroyed the transport aircraft and then successfully evaded the escort fighters by diving into a nearby cloud layer.

   The number three transport, which was in the corridor at the time number two was destroyed, while reporting GER fighters sighted, experienced no hostile acts.

2. On 20 November three more transports with allied and U.S. fighter aircraft escort proceeded through the corridor without incident.

3. On 21 November the second transport of the daily schedule received a sudden attack from three GER fighters who successfully shot down the transport and then fled south out of the corridor. Half of the escort followed the attackers in close pursuit but were forced to withdraw (after losing one U.S.
fighter and one British fighter) when the fleeing attackers were met by 50 DR fighters.

Number three transport was damaged by an attacking GDR fighter near Berlin, and crashed on landing. The attacking GDR fighter was destroyed by the escort.

4. On 22 November multi-layers of cloud along the corridor made it impossible to insure effective escort fighter activities at the scheduled transport flights were cancelled.
This is Part F of project to open Cycle II.

U.S. note to Soviets gets mixed reaction in West. British government willing to have some of its planes included when and if it becomes necessary to resume corridor flights.

Indications are that French, West Germans and West Berliners regard three flights a day as weak demonstration of resolve. French press carries report that Nuremberg received secret U.S. instruction not to resume corridor flights automatically at end of 24-hour period without further orders. This has demoralizing effect on West Berliners and West Germans despite denial and resumption of flights.

Allied ground-probe force of one Allied division moves to assembly area.
This is Part F of projection to open Cycle III.

Western Reactions

U.S. note to Soviets gets mixed reaction in West. Lack of prior coordination with Allies criticized, particularly by French and British. British Government is willing to have some of its planes included when and if corridor flights are to be resumed. But British Government is reluctant to see number of flights per day increased to more than three, and informs U.S. government that they will not necessarily go along with contingency plans for further action in case RED resumes hostile air action vs. corridor flights.

French, West Germans and West Berliners regard three flights a day as weak demonstration of resolve. French get wind of secret U.S. instruction to Norstad that flights not be resumed until further orders (B-15, I, p.3) and protest immediately. This is leaked to press and demoralizes West Berliners and West German publics, despite U.S. denial and resumption of flights.

U.S. quickly obtains necessary Allied concurrences to move agreed ground-probe force of one division into assembly areas. (Ref. B-15, I, p. 3). Simultaneously discussions begin on U.S. proposal that action of corps still be taken if necessary, but no agreement is reached largely due to negative British attitude.

At the U.N. desultory discussions continue.

Uprising in Berlin of 22-23 November stuns Western governments and publics. Initial reaction is that Allies are not confronted with painful dilemma on which they cannot temporize.
From Control To Red and Blue R 17

Doc. No. B 25
Cycle No. 77

THIS IS PART 2 OF PROJECTION TO OPEN CYCLE II

In West Berlin, the popular mood has passed from the most acute suspense the night of the 17th to incredulous bewilderment as the Allies failed to do more than run a few flights to the city, deepening into disillusionment, bitterness and, among many, resignation as the inconclusive situation drags on.

Hope was high after Mayor Brandt's speech Friday night, and as midnight neared everyone waited anxiously for word that the West was flying in anyway in the teeth of the GDR ultimatum. Although there was disappointment on the 16th that no immediate challenge was made when the Allies broadcast their note to the USSR with its 24-hour suspension of flights, hope continued to be high that the next day, the 19th, would see a major air effort to supply West Berlin. So widespread was this expectation that rumors that the West had really ordered an indefinite suspension were generally discounted, and various Soviet members went on the air during the 16th to remind the West Berliners of US pledges to defend the city going back to the late forties and of US and Allied heroism in the Airlift.

This mood left West Berliners virtually unprepared for the diminutive effort the Allies made on Sunday the 19th. Sunday crowds had turned out at Tempelhof in clear crisp weather to greet the new airlift - and the first plane to arrive was given a tumultuous welcome. For the second to be shot down practically over West Berlin seemed a particularly cruel blow and sharpened the anger of the expectant crowds, dimming the welcome given the third flight which
THIS IS PART OF PROJECTION TO OPEN CYCLE II

During the evening of 22 November the Garrison Commander in West Berlin issued his order to reinforce the guard on the radio station and to integral parts of the power supply. Garrison guards are prepared to allow entry into the radio station of well-known West German authorities and to forcibly exclude all others. The remainder of the troops are moved to back-up possible points of entry from the East Berlin sector of hooligan or goon-squad raids across the Glienicke Bridge.

The Soviets, during the night of 22-23 November, move four armored divisions and around East Berlin into positions of readiness without entering into the Glienicke Bridge. They are prepared to restrain OES forces from defecting, or in the event they are successful in doing so, to take command of the situation in East Berlin. Additionally, the Soviets move an armored division to back-up OES forces and to maintain entry into West Berlin. By doing so, Soviet forces are moving in positions where they can prevent defection of major concentrations of OES forces and to seize control of the larger cities in East Berlin.
Berlin Action Police on full alert (The Action Police have a total strength of 350 men equipped with infantry weapons and riot control devices). It is now 2045 hours. Brandt tries to reach the point of the crowd but traffic is jammed because as the crowd moves toward the Brandenburger Tor it has picked up momentum. This has been reflected not only in terms of large numbers of people joining the crowd but vehicles had been added to the flow of traffic. The psychological mood has also shifted as the tempo of mass hysteria began to penetrate the entire crowd. In the meantime a minor skirmish has developed at the Friedrichstrasse Crossing area as the VOP's units at the crossing point have just fired at young West Berliners who have been taunting them while riding on motorcycles along the Chinese wall at Friedrichstrasse. At 2200 major portions of the crowd are at the Brandenburger Tor but Brandt has not gotten through to the head of the crowd. As the crowd spills into the Brandenburger Tor area British and American troops are hard pressed to protect the Soviet War Memorial in West Berlin. At this point there is an arrival of support strength from the West Berlin Action Police units. These units enable Brandt to reach the point of what is now a mob on the verge of explosion. At this point the radio in Brandt's automobile blasts forth with the news that a four year old child has been killed by indiscriminate firing by the VOP's or NVA personnel at the Friedrichstrasse area. The news spreads in the mob that the incident took place. The mob surges forward but Brandt tries to hold it back with his police escort and a plea which is broadcast by a hand megaphone. The pressure of the mob pushes Brandt to the very border markers. As the VOP's drive the mob from the immediate border marker the crowd surges over the border and there is