Mr. John Murray Clearwater

Dear Mr. Clearwater:

This responds to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of October 29, 1992. In a telephone conversation with a member of my staff on November 20, 1992, you amended your request to one document: JCS Positions and Statements on Disarmament, January 1961 - November 1969.

The Organization of the Joint Staff (JS) has provided the enclosed document as responsive to your request. Major General Charles T. Robertson, Jr., USAF, Vice Director, Joint Staff, an Initial Denial Authority, has denied portions of the document pursuant to 5 USC §552 (b)(1) which applies to information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to Executive Order 12958, Section 1.5 (a) and (d), pertaining to information concerning military plans, weapons systems, or operations; and foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States. Additionally, the redacted information is exempt from automatic declassification in accordance with Section 3.4(b)(6) of the Order.

You may appeal Major General Robertson’s decision to deny the information by offering justification to support reversal of the initial denial. Any such appeal should be postmarked within 60 calendar days of the date above to this Directorate.

There are no assessable fees for this response in this instance.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

H. J. McIntyre
Director

Enclosure:
As stated
JCS POSITIONS AND STATEMENTS ON DISARMAMENT
JANUARY 1961–NOVEMBER 1969

NOTE ON PARAGRAPH CLASSIFICATION

The security classification of all information contained in this volume is derivative. The classification of any particular paragraph is that of the most highly classified document cited in the footnote indicating the source of the information.

Historical Division
Joint Secretariat
Joint Chiefs of Staff
16 June 1972
JCS commented on a research program, "Arms Control and a Stable Military Environment (Project VULCAN)," which the US Disarmament Administration proposed to have conducted by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) under its own contractual supervision. They noted that, as proposed, the project apparently could impinge upon the statutory responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense, the JCS, and others primarily responsible for national security. Also, the use of a non-governmental agency would create difficulties involving security regulations. If Project VULCAN was intended to be a program looking toward modification of US national strategy and military posture, the JCS would have reservations as to its propriety; if this was not intended, however, then no specific modifications of the terms of reference for Project VULCAN appeared necessary. The JCS were prepared to cooperate fully and to render assistance as needed. (FOUO) JCSM 47-61 to SecDef, 28 Jan 61, JMF 3050 (14 Jan 61).

Because of a study being conducted to re-evaluate the requirements for resumption of nuclear testing, the JCS reaffirmed to SecDef their previous views on this subject. They stated that the health hazard of nuclear testing, if it existed, had assumed importance far in excess of its significance in relation to the primary issue, the security of the United States. Because of the grave implications should the USSR achieve the next major breakthrough ahead of the United States, it was mandatory that the US again review the restrictions on technological progress in nuclear weaponry. After listing the military developments and requirements that were attainable only through testing, the JCS recommended that, until such a time as a reliable system of verification was developed and operational, nuclear testing be resumed without delay in environments in which the release of radioactive material to the atmosphere could be controlled. In the JCS view, the most important problem requiring solution prior to the resumption of the Geneva Conference was an immediate Presidential decision on the following policies:

1) A continued voluntary moratorium on testing was not in the best interest of the United States in the absence of demonstrated Soviet sincerity regarding the reaching of agreement.

2) If agreement was not reached by the end of the first 60 days of the resumed negotiations, the US would announce that it could no longer continue its voluntary moratorium on nuclear weapons tests and that it would resume such tests under condition that would preclude the introduction of harmful matter into the atmosphere. The US would either continue its participation in the Geneva talks in a further effort to resolve the outstanding differences
or terminate the talks and propose that future negotiations be resumed in the context of general disarmament discussions.

3) The US would initiate at once a seismic research program in an effort to improve the capabilities of the system for the detection and identification of nuclear explosions. The JCS recommended that "concurrency with any modifications of current US proposals be conditioned upon the taking of the above decision by the President prior to the resumption of negotiations." They asked that the President be informed of their views.

(TS) JCSM-99-61 to SecDef, 21 Feb 61, JMF 4613 (3 Feb 61).

Mar 61

JCS commented on Section VII of the Fisk Panel Report. They noted that this section contained no conclusions, and that various interpretations and courses of action could be rationalized from it. In the short time available, they had reviewed the non-concurrence submitted by the Assistant to SecDef for Atomic Energy (made as a member of the Fisk Panel) and generally agreed with his expressed views. Noting the serious implications of any trend toward Case 3 assumed by the Panel (i.e., a total ban with no testing by US and possible clandestine testing by USSR), JCS recommended that their views, as expressed in JCSM-99-61 of 21 Feb 61, be carefully considered. Specifically, they viewed "with concern" the failure of Section VII to give sufficient emphasis to consequences of a major breakthrough in the nuclear field, to emphasize the need for testing to insure safety of nuclear weapons, to consider the urgent need for weapons effects data in various environments, or to recognize that testing was necessary to provide assurance that future weapons would function properly.

(The Fisk Report was a compilation of technical material bearing on the subject before the Geneva Conference on Cessation of Nuclear Tests. Section VII evaluated the impact of a test ban on US and USSR nuclear weapons systems. The Assistant to SecDef for Atomic Energy had criticized it for its assumption that increased numbers of weapons could substitute for higher quality and for treating limited war too summarily. He said that any US action that would deny the scientific and engineering community the opportunity to apply its maximum capabilities to defense could not result in a military advantage.)

(TS) JCSM-133-61 to SecDef, 4 Mar 61, JMF 3050 (2 Mar 61).

Mar 61

JCS gave their views on cessation of production of fissionable materials. They noted that the US proposal of 27 June 1960 conditioned this cessation upon an effective method of verification and upon the numerical limitation of Sino-Soviet armed forces and armaments. They stressed that cessation of the production of these materials must not be separated from other related proposals, citing the position they had expressed on 28 October 1960 (JCSM-87-60). The JCS views were: (1) The US proposals of 27 June 1960, if fulfilled, would
safeguard US interests, but developing an effective verification capability presented great problems. (2) Estimates of Soviet fissionable materials production through 1965 were unavailable, but the wide range of possible Sino-Soviet objectives and actions could not be assessed with certainty. (3) It would be premature to try to implement this one measure unless the Sino-Soviet bloc gave concrete examples of good faith. (4) Continued production of tritium (a "fusionable," not a "fissile," material) was essential to US security; its cessation should be addressed only at the last stage in arms control negotiations. (5) The current test ban was restricting research and development of nuclear weapons; this accentuated the need to produce material to maintain and modernize the stockpile of existing weapons. (6) In the absence of the safeguards set forth in the US proposal of 27 June 1960, a cessation of production of fissile material would be to the advantage of the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

(TS-RD) JCS-148-61 to SecDef, 11 Mar 61, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec 19.

In connection with a memo from the Adviser to the President on Disarmament, dated 2 Feb 61, to the Secretary of Defense, JCS commented on the question of Communist China's participation in a nuclear test ban treaty. They regarded Communist China's accession as essential, in order to prevent the nuclear capability of the Soviet Bloc from advancing while that of the US stood still. But, they added, the United States should not concede anything, beyond its own conformance to the terms of the treaty, to obtain Communist China's accession. If the matter of concessions was raised, the US should simply stress that its accession to a nuclear test ban treaty was important to the Soviet Union and Communist China, and should indicate that the US would withdraw from the treaty and resume testing if Communist China did not accede in a reasonably short time.

(TS-RD) JCS-159-61 to SecDef, 17 Mar 61, JMF 3050 (16 Feb 61).

JCS forwarded two studies on Chemical-Biological-Radiological (CER) weapons as they related to arms control. The studies indicated that there were no entirely satisfactory inspection techniques capable of high assurance levels against CW and BW violations for the period 1961-1970; also that safeguards against clandestine manufacture, stockpiling, and subversive use of CER agents were "essentially non-existent."

(TS-RD) JCS-174-61 to SecDef, 21 Mar 61, JMF 3050 (29 Aug 60) set 2.

JCS set forth their views concerning certain basic policy issues on which decisions were likely to be needed in the near future. On many of these issues they had already expressed views, which they had repeated. The issues, and the JCS recommendations (briefly summarized), were:
(1) Cessation of Nuclear Weapons Testing: The US should seek an agreement by 1 June 1961. If none was reached, testing should be resumed as soon as possible. The US should agree to cease only those tests for which an effective international detection system was feasible.

(2) Cessation of production of fissionable materials for use in weapons: The US should not implement any such agreement unless it was accompanied by other agreements and involved a system of verification.

(3) Transfer of fissionable materials from past production to non-weapons uses: This should be internationally controlled, and US transfers should be matched by those of the Soviets.

(4) Declaratory prohibition of nuclear sharing: The US should continue to abstain from commitment to the UN resolution that called upon nuclear powers to refrain from transferring nuclear weapons or information to non-nuclear powers.

(5) Suitability of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for monitoring the restriction of fissionable materials to peaceful uses: The US could agree that IAEA be used to police the diversion of fissionable material if the IAEA statute were strengthened and an adequate inspection system set up.

(TS-RD) JCSM-182-61 to SecDef, 23 Mar 61, JMF 3050 (14 Mar 61).

JCS noted a cable from Acting SecState to US Delegation to the Geneva Conference on a Test Ban Treaty, which indicated that the US was prepared to continue its voluntary moratorium on all underground nuclear testing (including tests producing a seismic signal less than that agreed on as enforceable) for three years after a treaty was signed. JCS believed that this moratorium would seriously hinder vital research on the pure fusion or "neutron" bomb (OWL) and on certain radiation phenomena outside the atmosphere. They desired the matter brought to the attention of the President.

(TS-RD) JCSM-221-61 to SecDef, 8 Apr 61, JMF 3050 (29 Mar 61).

JCS forwarded comments on a paper by Mr. John J. McCloy, Adviser to President Kennedy on Disarmament, relating to test ban negotiations. They agreed with him that the Soviets were dragging out these negotiations on disarmament, probably, to inhibit development of US capability. They pointed out that on numerous occasions, they had indicated a pressing need for the US to resume testing.

(TS-RD) JCSM-275-61 to SecDef, 25 Apr 61, JMF 3050 (22 Apr 61).

JCS submitted comments on a RAND report on "space weapons of mass destruction." JCS agreed with the conclusion in the report that it would not be advisable to initiate separate negotiations to ban such weapons, because the Soviets might try to extend any such proposal to include reconnaissance satellites. Also, any agreement on orbital weapons should not restrict satellite research and development programs, since it was not feasible to monitor any such restriction.

(TS-RD) JCSM-364-61 to SecDef, 8 May 61, JMF 3050 (9 Mar 61) sec 2.
JCS commented on a draft working paper on "Recommended US Disarmament Negotiating Proposal," prepared by the US Disarmament Administration. They noted that it deviated from former US positions, apparently in order to include elements of British, French, Canadian, and Italian positions. They believed that the draft paper contained proposals that, if implemented, would "confer significant military advantage on the Sino-Soviet Bloc." The JCS were particularly concerned with the provisions relating to force levels, nuclear weapons, and strategic delivery vehicles. The draft constituted a "serious erosion" of the most recent US position on arms control (27 June 1960). The JCS believed that this position should continue to be the basis for US arms control negotiating proposals and that SecDef should not concur in the draft paper.

(5) JCSM-395-61 to SecDef, 10 Jun 61, JMF 3050 (6 Jun 61) sec 1.

JCS commented on a draft letter from SecDef to the President, which recommended that the US complete preparations to resume nuclear weapons testing and collaterally prepare for a VELA program of underground shots for seismic research. They generally concurred, but suggested that the letter be amended to recommend that the President make the decision to resume testing "at an early date" and initiate preparations at once.

(5) JCSM-335-61 to SecDef, 26 Jun 61, JMF 4613 (22 Jun 61).

JCS commented on a revised "Recommended US Disarmament Negotiating Proposal," which had been amended to reflect the views they expressed on 10 Jun 61 (JCSM-395-61). They noted that many of the changes they sought had been accepted, but certain issues still remained. Their principal concern was that the draft failed to prescribe the interrelationship and implementing sequence of measures in the first stage, thus permitting these to be adopted independently of one another. In particular, the draft failed to require that limitations on and reductions in nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles be related to each other and be conditional on reductions in armed forces and other armaments. The JCS recommended changes in the draft to bring it into line with their position.

(5) JCSM-440-61 to SecDef, 29 Jun 61, JMF 3050 (5 Jun 61) sec 2.

JCS commented on a recommendation by the Perkins Panel that a study be conducted of the net effects of a cessation of production of fissionable material. JCS informed SecDef that such a study was already under way. Preliminary results seemed to support the JCS position expressed on 28 Oct 1960, reaffirmed on 29 Mar 1961 and 10 Jun 1961. Pending completion of the study, JCS continued to hold that, as an isolated measure, the cessation of production of fissionable material for use in weapons was militarily unacceptable.

(1S) JCSM-461-61 to SecDef, 6 Jul 61, JMF 4230 (1 Apr 61) sec 2.
As requested by ASD (ISA), the JCS forwarded an evaluation of military considerations involved in a cessation of production of fissionable material for use in weapons. The Perkins Panel had suggested that the impact of such a cessation on the relative military positions of the US and the USSR be evaluated [see item 5 July 1961]. The JCS noted that a complete evaluation would require detailed knowledge of Soviet strengths; precisely the information "being sought by the entire military establishment on a continuing basis." However, making due allowance for lack of information on the Soviets' nuclear weapons stockpile and supply of fissionable materials, the JCS stated that (1) to end the production of fissionable materials would reduce or eliminate important new weapon systems then in development, and (2) relative military strength would be significantly affected if the US stockpile were frozen at the 1963 level and the USSR managed to continue production. The issue of producing fissionable materials was closely related to other arms control measures, and the JCS recommended that it be considered in conjunction with their report, being forwarded, on the impact of reducing US military forces to 1.8 million men [see JCSM-497-61, 21 July 1961]. If the US were to consider separately the question of production of fissionable materials, the Soviets would probably demand that the negotiations include elimination of all nuclear weapons and material stockpiles; the US would then have to abandon, or else suffer a propaganda defeat. (TS-R) JCSM-487-61 to SecDef, 21 Jul 61, JMF-4230 (1 Apr 61) sec 3.

JCS appraised the effects of a reduction of US military forces to 1.8 million men. They reaffirmed views expressed in JCSM-440-61 (28 Jun 61), JCSM-395-61 (10 Jun 61), JCSM-483-60 (28 Oct 60), and JCSM-318-60 (22 Jul 60), that numerical limitations on manpower should only be considered with other measures, that any reduction resulting from negotiations with the Bloc must be in conjunction with sound inspection and control measures, and that armed forces and armaments were a result and not a cause of international tension. A level of 1.8 million men would make it impossible to maintain US security if the Sino-Soviet bloc was able to evasively to evade restriction to deploy forces in support of a "forward strategy," and to maintain mobile forces able to intervene effectively in more than one area of the world at once. (S) JCSM-497-61 to SecDef, 21 Jul 61, JMF 3050 (5 Jun 61) sec 2.

JCS commented on Report of the Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Testing (Panofsky Panel). They agreed with the statement by the Panel itself that its report was "essentially an updated Fisk Panel Report"; hence their comments on the latter JCSM-133-61, 4 March 1961) remained valid. JCS concluded that there were many points in the report that were inaccurate or expressed judgments with which they could not agree; also, that it used unconfirmed intelligence estimates, so that its conclusions with regard to Soviet capabilities were unreliable. They believed that the report underestimated the prospect of major new developments in connection with tactical nuclear weapons.
The JCS disputed the conclusion that there was little urgency in resuming nuclear tests. Regarding the psychological consequences associated with worldwide fallout that would be produced by new testing, they reemphasized the conclusion by DASA, cited in their memo of 29 July 1961, that "worldwide fallout from past tests has not produced a biologic hazard." They reaffirmed their earlier views on resumption of nuclear testing.

JCS commented on a "Joint Declaration on Disarmament," dated 28 July 1961 (a revision of the paper entitled "Recommended US Disarmament Negotiating Proposal," on which the JCS had commented on 28 June 1961, in JCSM-440-61). There were four points at issue in the Declaration. Two of them had already been commented on in JCSM-440-61. The two other issues were:

1. What specific language should be used in proposing force level reductions in Stage I? The JCS replied that language approved by them in JCSM-440-61, in their comment on the earlier paper, should be used; it would ensure that Soviet and Chinese Communist force levels were reduced to the existing US level, and verified, before reductions to the 200 million level would begin.

2. Should it be proposed, in Stage I, that limitations be placed upon weapons designed to counter strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles? The JCS replied in the negative, believing that such a proposal "ignores current military strategy upon which all plans and programs are based and presumes a hypothetical strategy which has not been adopted."

JCS submitted additional comments on the Panofsky Panel Report, having reconsidered it at the request of the President. They cited specific statements in the Report (involving estimates of Soviet capabilities, etc.) with which they disagreed. They reaffirmed their disagreement with the Panel's conclusion regarding the urgency of nuclear testing and recommended that nuclear testing "be resumed within a reasonable time, i.e., several months at the latest."

JCS commented on proposals for reciprocal US-USSR transfers to international custody of medium jet bombers and weapons-grade fissionable materials (proposals advanced by sources outside DOD for inclusion in a speech that might be delivered by the President to 16th United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)). JCS thought it undesirable at a time when Soviet Union had resumed nuclear tests and was threatening the Allies with nuclear destruction for the US to advance any specific disarmament proposals (as distinct from an overall, comprehensive plan). The possible military impact of the transfer of bombers required further study, but JCS saw several objections. As for transfer of fissionable material, the JCS reaffirmed views expressed on 10 May 1960 (JCSM-197-60) and 23 March 1961.
(JCSM-182-61). Both of these proposals, said the JCS, were being advocated by 'the proponents of a so-called philosophy of "balanced" or "stable deterrence,"' which should be studied more carefully before it became the basis of specific proposals. The JCS drew attention of SecDef to the fact that a panel under Mr. William C. Foster had been formed in July 1961 to consider certain disarmament proposals. There were "indications," he said, that the panel had finished its study and that its conclusions varied from the recently approved disarmament plan presented to the UN by President Kennedy. The JCS were not represented on the panel, nor had they been requested to provide data for comment during the preparation of its report. The Chairman asked that the Foster Panel report, "Proposed Disarmament Timetable," be obtained and that JCS be given an opportunity to comment.

(J) CM-376-61 to SecDef, 4 Oct 61, JMF 3050 (4 Oct 61) sec 2.

JCS commented on four of a series of approximately 20 papers being prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) for a "Declaration on Disarmament." The JCS considered that, in general, the papers were "useful as background material in the development of future US negotiating positions and talking papers," subject to possible revision when the other papers in the series became available.

Three of the papers on which the JCS commented dealt with "The International Peace Force and the Military Environment in an Era of General and Complete Disarmament," "The Political Peacekeeping Machinery in an Era of General and Complete Disarmament," and "National Security During the Disarmament Process." The JCS suggested only minor changes in these. Regarding the fourth paper, "Force Levels," they submitted the following criticisms: it did not provide for adequate controls; it treated force levels in isolation from retained quantities of armaments; it unjustifiably linked several geographically separate countries (UK, France, and Nationalist China); it excluded reserve personnel, etc.

The JCS commented on three background papers for the Declaration on Disarmament. They believed that the three were "useful . . . in the development of future US negotiating positions." The subject of each paper, and the substance of the comments made by the JCS on each, were as follows:

1) "Phasing of Disarmament Measures": The JCS reemphasized their view that any treaty that might be signed should contain an "escape clause" to the effect that "disarmament should not adversely affect the security of any state."
(2) "CBR Measures": More emphasis should be given, in the opinion of the JCS, to the lack of adequate inspection techniques to assure against violations of an agreement involving these weapons.

(3) "Outer Space": Any agreement on this subject should require advance notification for all detectable launchings that might give rise to apprehension. Also, negotiations should be conducted in a manner that would not inhibit the US from attempting to develop outer space weapons in case the negotiation failed.

(5) JCSM-774-61 to SecDef, 9 Nov 61, JMF 3050
(30 Sep 61).

The JCS commented unfavorably on the disarmament program proposed by the Foster Panel. They recognized that disarmament was urgent but believed that urgency must not become the only basis for an arms control program. The "unswerving purposes of the Soviets toward world domination" should be kept in mind in developing a US disarmament position and should impose limits on US concessions. They noted that the Foster proposal assumed that there existed a need for immediate progress in reducing and controlling strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and that imbalances in other forms of military power would not become dangerous until a considerable reduction had taken place. The JCS said the effect of this would be to trade the US strategic nuclear superiority for "virtually no concession on the part of the Soviets." The US could not afford to reduce drastically its nuclear capability until effective means existed for enforcing international agreements; the balance of military power could be upset if the US and USSR reduced their nuclear capabilities without a concurrent elimination of the Soviet conventional superiority. The JCS believed the US Declaration on Disarmament was more acceptable, militarily, than the Foster Panel proposal and should be utilized as the basic US proposal.

(5) JCSM-550-61 to SecDef, 6 Dec 61, JMF 3050
(4 Oct 61) sec 1.

As requested by ASD (ISA), JCS commented on three background papers for the Declaration on Disarmament. While considering all of them "useful ... in developing future US positions to assist representa-tives at multilateral negotiations and at the United Nations," the JCS expressed some reservations, as follows:

(1) "Procedures for Reaching Disarmament Agreements" - This paper appeared to accept the viewpoint that the United States was obligated to con-tinue advocating general and complete disarmament (GCD) and to seek agreement first along broad lines, with meaningful details to be left until later. The JCS considered this approach dangerous because it would put off the development of any adequate verification and inspection system "through a period in which pressures to reach agreement will probably build up, resulting finally in US acceptance of less control than is necessary or the political orus of seeming to obstruct agreement." The paper should be rewritten to stress that the US would insist upon an adequate control system to be ready for operation before any agreement was implemented.
(2) "Cutoff of the Production of Fissile Materials and Reduction of Nuclear Stockpiles" - The JCS believed that any such cutoff should be linked to progress on other measures. The background paper on this subject was vague on this point; it apparently accepted, as a final US position, a mere negotiating proposal put forth by the US on 25 Sep 61, which did not specify the need for such a link.

(3) "Application of IAEA Safeguards to Transfer of Fissile Materials for Peaceful Purposes" - This paper should make it clear that there must be effective verification and inspection systems, and that the statute of the IAEA must be revised to insure against a veto of inspection by any possible evader, before the IAEA could be relied upon to insure that fissile materials made available for peaceful purposes were not diverted to military uses.

(S) JCSM-383-61 to SecDef, 27 Dec 61, JMF 3050
(30 Sep 61) sec 3.
JCS accepted as "useful," subject to certain comments, background papers for the Declaration on Disarmament relating to the following subjects:

1) "Limitations on Expenditures for Military Purposes" - The JCS considered it infeasible to limit armaments through monetary restrictions as long as Soviet society remained closed and Soviet bookkeeping was subject to manipulation. Such a limitation would be useful as an arms control measure only in conjunction with other measures, such as control of manpower and armaments. Access to military budgets and accounts might provide information that would be useful in evaluating data on force levels, material stockpiles, or armaments production.

2) "Prohibition of the Further Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons" - The JCS took exception to a section of this paper that argued in favor of a "no-transfer" agreement without adequate controls. At the least, there should be reference to the need to examine the feasibility of verifying the reduction of nuclear weapons stockpiles.

Commenting on a revision (the 9th) of the Foster Panel Program, the JCS reaffirmed the comments they had made on 5 December 1951 (JCSM-850-61) and added others. They noted that the first stage in the Foster program, lasting two years, would involve no inspection; thus the US would move toward the Soviet demand for non-inspection, giving way on a position that it had always upheld. The Panel had oversimplified the problem of establishing levels of military forces and armaments, they said. The JCS believed that any significant reduction in armaments should be preceded by actions indicating that the USSR was willing to accept restrictions; for example: aerial and ground surveillance, relaxation of barriers constituting the Iron Curtain, elimination of areas of tension such as Berlin and Southeast Asia, etc.

JCS commented on a draft DOD reply to ACDA on the Foster Panel Program (Revision 9). They found it "gratifying" that the reply supported JCS views for the most part, particularly on the point that numerical parity of strategic delivery vehicles was objectionable. The JCS felt that their comments should have made it clear that the concepts underlying the Panel proposal were militarily objectionable; however, there were indications that ACDA would attempt to introduce major aspects of it at Geneva or earlier. Hence, the DOD reply should clearly state that these should not be introduced in the absence of a decision by the Committee of Principals for Disarmament.

TOP SECRET
24 Feb 62

JCS reviewed an ACDA proposal to repeat an offer made on 16 Aug 1960, in the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee, (1) to end the production of fissionable materials for weapons use, (2) to make reciprocal transfers of such materials to non-weapons purposes, starting with 30,000 kilograms of U-235 to be transferred by each country. JCS believed (particularly in the light of recent Soviet weapons tests, which indicated great reduction in the amount of fissionable materials the Soviets would need to manufacture weapons) that proposals such as these should not be negotiated or implemented in isolation and should be offered for negotiation only in the context of an overall disarmament program. Implementation should be linked to progress in other areas of disarmament and should be preceded by a test program to verify research and development information accumulated during the four-year period of "no testing."
(C) JCSM-137-62 to SecDef, 24 Feb 62, JMF 3050
(18 Jan 62) sec 1.

27 Feb 62

The JCS judged that papers on "Renunciation of the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction" and "Seek to Reduce the Risk of War by Accident, Miscalculation and Surprise Attack and the Failure of Communications," prepared as background material for the Declaration on Disarmament, were useful. Concerning the former paper, the JCS said that certain portions dealing with the role of nuclear weapons in US strategy were subject to possible misidentification. However, they considered that the paper as written strongly supported their position opposing "declaratory renunciations" of the use of nuclear weapons. Therefore the JCS did not suggest revisions, which, they felt, might have the result of weakening the position adopted in the paper.
(C) JCSM-152-62 to SecDef, 27 Feb 62, JMF 3050
(30 Sep 61) sec 5.

28 Feb 62

JCS commented on a memo by ACDA dated 24 Feb 1962, proposing a US position at the forthcoming 18-Nation Disarmament Conference. JCS drew attention to the recommended statement of US arms control objectives that they had submitted on 29 Oct 1960, which they believed still valid. They gave special consideration to the ACDA recommendation that strategic delivery vehicles be separated from other categories of armaments so as to negotiate an agreement with the Soviets. Reductions in these vehicles, JCS believed, should be linked to reductions in Soviet conventional forces. The ACDA proposal on this point was inconsistent with the stated US Program for General and Complete Disarmament, dated 28 Sep 1961. Other general comments made by JCS (1) any disarmament program calling for major initial reductions should be preceded by demonstrations of a Soviet intent to lessen existing tensions; (2) an inspection system for use with the disarmament program should be tested and functioning before any irreversible reductions were made; (3) Communist China must be brought in at a very early stage.

(C) JCSM-155-62 to SecDef, 26 Feb 62, JMF 3050
(18 Jan 62) sec 2.
JCS commented on 21 position papers prepared for the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference. They offered no objection to seven of these. The other 14 were "suitable as a point of departure for initial negotiations," although JCS drew attention to some divergencies from their previously stated views. The subjects of these papers were: Similarities and Differences Between US and Soviet Approaches to and Programs for Disarmament; Strategic Nuclear Weapons; Delivery Vehicles; Outer Space; CBR Weapons; Measures to Contain and Reduce the Nuclear Threat; Conventional Armaments and Tactical Nuclear Delivery Vehicles; Armed Forces; Nuclear Test Ban; Transfer of Nuclear Weapons; Verification; International Disarmament Organizations; UN Peace Force; Staging, Transition and Time Limits; Measures to Reduce the Risk of War by Accident, Miscalculation, Failure of Communications or Surprise Attack.

(C) JCSM-170-62 to SecDef, 9 Mar 62, JMF 3050
(18 Jan 62) sec 2.

JCS submitted preliminary comments on tentative views expressed by ACDA in a letter of 22 March 1962 to SecDef. They noted that the President, on 9 March 1962, had established a US position on disarmament calling for reduction of 30 percent of all armaments across the board, as a first stage, and then urged that this position be upheld in detailed negotiations. JCS took exception to some of the criteria used by ACDA in defining armaments in various categories. They viewed the proposed elimination of AICBM as a "grave risk," which could jeopardize US security.

(C) JCSM-220-62 to SecDef, 28 Mar 62, JMF 3050
(24 Mar 62).

The Acting JCS Chairman, GEN LeMay, told SecDef that he opposed a provision in a draft treaty outline, proposed by ACDA for tabling at the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference, calling for destruction of all anti-missile systems in existence and prohibition of production and testing of such systems. The JCS, he pointed out, had consistently objected to the singling out of AICBM for elimination. The proposal apparently stemmed from the Foster Panel plan, which was based upon acceptance of nuclear parity; an effective AICBM could upset this parity and hence had to be singled out for elimination. GEN LeMay pointed out that the SecDef and JCS had twice rejected the Foster Panel plan, and that the President on 9 March 1962 had rejected an ACDA proposal to single out strategic delivery vehicles for early reduction, preferring instead an across-the-board arm reduction of 30 percent as proposed by DOD and JCS. This across-the-board reduction would recognize and accept US nuclear superiority. Defensive improvements such as an effective AICBM could make major contribution toward reducing population losses; therefore, the draft treaty should not make no reference to AICBM elimination.

(C) JCSM-637-62 to SecDef, 29 Mar 62, JMF 3050
(24 Mar 62).
Commenting upon an ACDA draft disarmament treaty, JCS held that the treaty format should be re-arranged to conform to that of the 25 Sep 51 plan. They opposed the tendency to introduce items involving the US nuclear capability as the initial subjects for negotiation; this encouraged negotiations toward immediate reductions in nuclear capability. JCS were concerned by recent practices within the arms control community, which resulted in measures being proposed without adequate time for review by interested agencies. A thorough evaluation should precede each proposal.

(C) JCSM-247-62 to SecDef, 4 Apr 62, JMF 3050 (29 Mar 62) sec 1.

JCS commented on a draft treaty on "General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World," dated 9 April, which the ACDA intended to submit to the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference. They considered it more nearly in consonance with their views than the earlier draft, but viewed with "grave concern" its continued reliance on inspection by random sampling—an untested and controversial concept. The JCS believed that US security was contingent upon provision for complete inspection. Other features that they criticized included: omission of Communist China, reduction of armaments by categories, elimination of armaments for reserve forces in Stage I (applicable to the US and the US reserve fleet, which had no Soviet counterpart), inclusion of launching pads as an item of armament, and some others.

(C) JCSM-259-62 to SecDef, 10 Apr 62, JMF 3050 (29 Mar 62) sec 2.

JCS considered acceptable the two revised background papers for the Declaration on Disarmament, on "CBR Measures" and "Outer Space," subject to incorporation of the comments they had submitted on 3 March 1962 (JCSM-170-62), on corresponding US position papers for the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference.

(C) JCSM-273-62 to SecDef, 16 Apr 62, JMF 3050 (30 Sep 61) sec 5.

JCS commented on certain issues relating to the draft treaty outline on disarmament tabled at Geneva by the US Delegation on 15 April 1962. They believed that verification and inspection were essential, but thought that the "zonal
inspection system in the draft could be made to serve. They opposed the trend, which had developed since 1961, toward negotiating the reduction of the US nuclear capability in isolation. They had misgivings over the proposal to set up an International Disarmament Organization to verify reduction in armaments. In reply to specific questions submitted to them, JCS argued that the treaty should not provide for a reduction of military bases in Stage I; should not define missile launching pads as "armaments"; and should include as parties all states having significant military capabilities, particularly Communist China. They could not agree to any force level reductions in Stage I below the stated US position of 2.1 million men.

(15) JCSH-229-62 to SecDef, 19 May 62, JMF 3050 (29 Mar 62) sec 4.

30 May 62

JCS commented on revised position papers for the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference. They reaffirmed the comments they had submitted on 9 March 1962 (JCSH-170-62) on the original drafts and recommended that the revisions be amended to reflect their views.

(17) JCSH-435-62 to SecDef, 20 May 62, JMF 3050 (18 Jan 62) sec 3.

15 Jun 62

JCS commented in some detail on a background paper, "Verification Requirements, " prepared for the Declaration on Disarmament. They believed that ACDIA, in preparing the paper, had watered down the requirements for an effective verification system, and the sense of obtaining an agreement; they recommended stronger provisions. At the same time, JCS commented on papers on "Peace Keeping" and "Military Expenditures." The first was merely a historical review and needed no comment; the second they judged adequate.

(19) JCSH-554-62 to SecDef, 15 Jun 62, JMF 3050 (30 Sep 61) sec 7.

27 Jun 62

JCS commented on the implications of reducing military bases in Stage I of disarmament, as provided in the draft treaty tabled by the US Delegation at Geneva on 13 April 1962. They concluded that "base reductions as a part of disarmament planning are not in the best interests of the security of the United States." US forces were "defensive and expeditionary in nature, committed to long external lines of communication and requiring overseas bases. In contrast, the Sino-Soviet bloc had "internal land-bridge lines of communication which facilitate the reestablishment of military bases concurrently with the initiation of offensive operations. Loss of overseas bases would adversely affect the Allies and would require abandonment of our forward strategy with certain reverent to the Fortress America concept."

JCS commented on a study by ACDA concerning the application of criteria of "destructive capability" to naval vessels. They believed that any limitations should be based on numbers of ships, not on tonnage. The role of the US Navy, in maintaining control and freedom of the seas (as contrasted with that of the Soviet Navy, designed to harass and cut sea lines of communication), made it important that the US retain complete flexibility in determining the size and configuration of retained ships. Moreover, the relative impact on the Soviets of a 30 percent Stage I reduction would be greater with a numerical than with a tonnage limitation.


A talking paper prepared for JCS use in discussions with SecDef, in connection with impending resumption of disarmament negotiations, argued that: "ACDA, in previous international discussions, had consistently weakened the US position. JCS recommendations regarding inspection and verification, nuclear parity, force levels, and other matters had been ignored. JCS were frequently given inadequate time to prepare their comments or were asked to submit recommendations on various alternatives all of which were unacceptable."

(This talking paper was approved, with minor changes, on 6 July 1962.)


DepSecDef requested JCS to study the implications of force level reductions to 2.1, 1.9 and 1.7 million men. The resulting JCS conclusions were less favorable to the reduction scheme than those given in JCSM-497-61, 21 Jul 61. Currently, US military strategy placed greater reliance on conventional forces than in earlier years. Therefore, JCS believed the 2.1 million proposal to which the US was committed should not be reduced, "because it is a last-ditch position below which the security risk would be extremely dangerous." Under the terms of this study, JCS believed 2.57 million would be required to man all armaments remaining after 30 percent reduction in types of arms specified. Reductions to either 2.1, 1.9 or 1.7 million would lower manpower to a point where the credibility of the US deterrent would be "dangerously and progressively impaired." No reductions should be considered until: (1) world tensions were significantly lessened for a sufficient period of time; (2) effective verification and control systems were established; and (3) Communist China became a party to the first stage of disarmament.

8 Jul 62

A JCS talking paper for a meeting with the President contended that ACDA had made "steady efforts" to weaken the US position on inspection and verification and on reduction of force levels. The Soviets, on the other hand, had shown no weakening in their attitude. Further US concessions would probably be counterproductive and would threaten US security if put into effect. It was important that JCS views on military consequences of disarmament proposals be solicited in time to allow them to be fully considered. It was recommended that the US return to Geneva with a "stiffer attitude.'"

(T) Talking Paper for JCS-Pres meeting on Resumed Disarmament Negotiations, 8 Jul 62, JMF 3050 (14 Jun 62) (1)

14 Jul 62

JCS commented on a draft treaty prepared by ACDA, banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. They noted that it did not provide for an effective verification system. Full reliance for detection was placed on national systems; no mandatory criteria or procedures for on-site inspection were laid down. It was not responsive to the President's desire that provision be made for inspections to detect preparations for testing. The JCS favored a comprehensive treaty covering all environments, with appropriate thresholds to avoid banning tests that could not be detected.

(C) JCSM-514-62 to SecDef, 14 Jul 62, JMF 3050 (6 Jul 62) sec 1.

19 Jul 62

In reply to a request from ASD (ISA), JCS commented on a revised draft (dated 11 July 1962) of a comprehensive test ban treaty prepared by ACDA. They considered that the provisions for verification and detection were excessively vague and reaffirmed their view that effective measures were essential. The JCS recommended insertion of a provision covering inspection of preparations for nuclear testing.

(C) JCSM-530-62 to SecDef, 19 Jul 62, JMF 3050 (6 Jul 62) sec 1.

26 Jul 62

JCS commented upon a DOD news release of 7 Jul 62, which had been widely interpreted to mean that a scientific breakthrough in underground nuclear test detection techniques had occurred, which permitted a major shift by the US at Geneva. However, JCS felt this was counterbalanced by other technical considerations, to the extent that no change in the US position regarding number and location of control posts was warranted.

(T) JCSM-556-62 to SecDef, 26 Jul 62, JMF 4613 (21 Jul 62)

9 Aug 62

JCS commented on a revised draft (dated 24 July 1962) of a comprehensive test ban treaty prepared by ACDA. They criticized it for its inclusion of weapons tests that could not be detected ("prohibition of undetectable tests constitutes an unpolicable moratorium"), for its vagueness concerning the detection system and on-site inspections, for leaving too much to be decided later by an international commission.
and for excessively involved withdrawal pro-
cedures. The JCS noted that the US seemed to
be relaxing its position regarding the need for
an international system of verification and
inspection, and they believed any such relaxa-
tion was unjustified. The comments they had
made on the earlier draft of the treaty (JCSM-
530-62, 19 July 1962) were still pertinent and
were reaffirmed.

(TS) JCSM-614-62 to SecDef, 9 Aug 62, JMF 3050
(6 Jul 62)

JCS commented on a revised draft treaty govern-
ting tests in the atmosphere, above the atmosphere,
and in the oceans. They noted that it had the
same defects as an earlier draft on which they
had commented on 14 July 1962 (JCSM-514-62)
(3) JCSM-525-62 to SecDef, 15 Aug 62, JMF 3050
(6 Jul 62) sec 2.

ASD (ISA) requested a supplemental study on
force levels, addressing the possibility of
civilianizing part of the current US armed forces.
JCS concluded that a major program of civil-
ianization was not feasible at any of the personnel
levels currently under study - 2, 57, 21, 1, 9,
and 1.7 million. Cadrization and mothballing
of combat units would result in an unacceptable
loss of combat effectiveness. Also, such units
could not be made combat-ready within the time
limits required by modern warfare.

(5) JCSM-525-62 to SecDef, 17 Aug 62, JMF 3050
(14 Jun 62) sec 2.

At the request of ASD (ISA), JCS commented upon
a revision, prepared by AODA, of Article V
(cov ering reduction, production, and verification
of armaments) of the treaty on General and
Complete Disarmament that the US had submitted
at Geneva on 18 April 1962. The JCS viewed with
concern the proposal to prohibit production and
testing of new weapons during Stage I, which
was intended to last three years but, they noted,
might last much longer if the agreement bogged
down. This latter consideration pointed to the
vital importance of having Communist China be
a party to the treaty. The JCS held that the
phrases "replacement in kind" and "new kinds of
armaments," used in the draft, should be inter-
preted so as to allow modernization of existing
weapons systems.

(7) JCSM-638-62 to SecDef, 16 Aug 62, JMF 3050
(29 Mar 62) sec 6.

ASD (ISA) requested comments upon the latest
AODA drafts of the atmospheric and comprehensive
test ban treaties. Concerning the latter draft,
dated 14 Aug 62, the JCS repeated their comments
concerning the AODA 24 July draft (JCSM-614-62 to
SecDef, 9 August 1962). Additionally, they
believed that the requirement that control
stations be manned by nationals of the country in
which they were located could not be met by
underdeveloped states. Also, they doubted
that seismic stations and communications net-
works could be constructed within the short
time specified. As to the limited test ban
treaty dated 17 Aug, JCS compared it with the
7 Aug draft (critiqued in JCSM-625-62 of 15 Aug) and urged reconsideration of the decision to delete the provision retaining the right to test underground. The JCS again objected to the complicated and inhibiting withdrawal procedures.

(TS) JCSM-645-62 to SecDef, 22 Aug 62, JMF 3050 (6 Jul 62) sec 3.

14 Sep 62

Outer Space
(Orbit of Weapons)

If the issue was raised, the US should seek to have the proposal transferred to the 18-nation Geneva Conference, where it could be discussed within the context of general and complete disarmament.

(TS) JCSM-719-62 to SecDef, 14 Sep 62, JMF 3050 (8 Sep 62) sec 1.

18 Sep 62

JCS commented on a memo by ACDA concerning non-diffusion of nuclear weapons. The memo said that the Soviet Union might now be willing to agree on a draft declaration to be issued on this subject, and it outlined possible provisions for such a declaration. JCS believed that the potential disadvantages of agreeing to issue this declaration far outweighed the advantages. The Soviets had a strong incentive not to allow diffusion of nuclear weapons to their allies, whom they could not trust; their apparent willingness to reach agreement on the subject was probably intended to create friction within the Western alliance. JCS believed that the proposed agreement, as outlined by ACDA, did not provide adequate safeguards to insure compliance. They assumed that many states would eventually acquire a nuclear capability; it might be in the US interest to assist friendly states in various ways.

(TS) JCSM-727-62 to SecDef, 18 Sep 62, JMF 3050 (23 Aug 62).

49 Sep 62

JCS noted that ACDA planned to reexamine US positions on disarmament during a recess in the Geneva Conference (8 Sep-12 Nov 62). On the basis of the trend of the past two years, JCS expressed fear that this review might be oriented toward developing "more negotiable and politically expedient proposals." They noted that, while the Soviets had stood pat,
the US had gradually moved toward accommodation to Soviet views. Specific examples of this process were cited. Moreover, ACDA had had a tendency to put forth negotiating positions before the basic proposals had been thoroughly evaluated. JCS favored a review of US positions on disarmament, but they believed the purpose should be to clarify US policy and to strengthen the supporting arguments.


Having reexamined the question of base reductions, JCS reaffirmed views stated in JCSM-485-62 of 27 June 1962. They recommended that the US adopt the position that "any base reduction must come as an unnegotiated consequence of reductions of tensions, armaments, and force levels."

(5) JCSM-741-62 to SecDef, 29 Sep 62, JMF 3050 (12 Jun 62) sec 2.

Commenting further on the question of a non-diffusion agreement, the Chairman reaffirmed the JCS views expressed on 18 Sep 62 (JCSM-727-62) and amplified them. The JCS believed, he said, that even the discussion of such an agreement would be inadvisable, because of its effect on the Western Allies. They also believed that the dangers of proliferation were overdrawn, and doubted that an agreement on non-transfer could in any way affect the Chinese Communists' nuclear development program. The proposed declaration might have an adverse effect on multilateral control of nuclear weapons.

(5) CM-1-62 to SecDef, 3 Oct 62, JMF 3050 (23 Aug 62).

JCS commented on a suggestion that the US take the initiative in proposing "nuclear-free" or "missile-free" zones in Latin America. As the Chairman had already told SecDef orally, the JCS believed that the US should neither propose nor accept such a plan, because (1) there was no assurance that it would lead to prompt removal of missiles from Cuba, (2) it would degrade US military flexibility "in our own back yard" while having no comparable effect on the USSR, and (3) the Soviets, having nothing to lose, would welcome discussion of the proposal. The US should focus on the current issue—the need to remove the missiles from Cuba—and not allow itself to be involved in endless arguments with other countries. If forced to negotiate, the US should agree to discuss a "nuclear-free" zone only after the Cuban missiles were removed.


JCS commented on a proposed realignment of weapons locations to separate them from population centers in the NATO and Warsaw Pact areas. They concluded that such realignment was undesirable. It would impose tactical limitations on the ability of deployed forces to accomplish assigned missions. While the change might induce the enemy to use a counterforce strategy, the benefits of this would be realized only if the Soviets stockpiled...
and used discriminate weapons. Rather than reducing tensions, it would increase apprehension of war, since it would expose NATO armed forces to attack by an enemy "undeterred by the prospects of a fruitless victory."

(TS) JCSM-803-62 to SecDef, 10 Nov 62, JMF 3050 (12 Jun 62) sec 3.

In response to a request by ASD (ISA), the JCS assessed the military impact of proposals to create nuclear-free or missile-free zones. They believed that such zones would work to the detriment of the United States, which, as a "world-wide" rather than a "continental" power, had deployed its strategic striking forces throughout the world. The existing deployment gave the US the advantage of short strike-timing (time from launch to target) and imposed upon the Soviet Union a considerable difficulty in targeting. A nuclear-free zone would sacrifice these advantages and force the US back to its continental base, bringing about a "disastrous reversal of the situation existing today." Moreover, the capabilities of US forces would be gravely weakened if they were not able to deploy tactical nuclear weapons. The JCS observed that a missile-free zone would be somewhat less damaging to the US than a nuclear-free zone. However, the US should oppose, and certainly should not initiate, proposals of either type.


The JCS were asked to comment upon ACDA papers addressing ways to reduce the risk of war by accident, miscalculation or communications failure. In response, they said that agreement to provide advance notification of military movements and maneuvers could have "serious disadvantages." While the Soviets operated on interior lines, the US required mobility in order to support its allies. Therefore, acceptance of this proposal could compromise ability to make rapid deployments. Indeed, the JCS believed military maneuvers were not a significant measure bearing on the risk of war by accident or miscalculation and hence should not be the subject of international discussion.

In response to an ASD (ISA) request for comments on draft articles and revisions of a disarmament treaty prepared by ACDA, JCS said these contained important concessions contrary to their previous recommendations. The article on reduction of armed forces omitted specific reference to verification of retained force levels. Language on reduction of military bases and facilities should await completion of pending study. Finally, transfer of fissionable materials to peaceful purposes should be in equal amounts by the US and USSR and be contingent upon cessation of production. Therefore, JCS believed this draft treaty should be held in abeyance pending further study.

(5) JCSM-9-63 to SecDef, 5 Jan 63, JMF 3050 (15 Dec 62).

Providing a study requested by ASD (ISA) on the subject of general disarmament cuts greater than 30 percent, JCS concluded that even a 30 percent reduction of armaments in conjunction with Stage I manpower limitations would be generally destabilizing and disadvantageous for the Free World. Any reductions greater than this would "gravely imperil" Free World security during Stage I disarmament. Also, the exclusion of Communist China from these agreements would jeopardize US ability to defend its interests in the Far East and was therefore militarily unjustifiable.

(18) JCSM-57-63 to SecDef, 23 Jan 63, JMF 3050 (15 Mar 62) sec 2.

In view of the need for a US response to a proposal to provide advance notification of military movements and maneuvers that had been tabled at Geneva, the JCS repeated the objections to entering such agreements that they had stated in JCSM-911-62, 17 Nov 62. As a diplomatic countermove, they recommended development of a proposal linking an advance notification measure with agreements to exchange military missions and observation posts. This would offset advantages the Soviet Bloc would enjoy through greater knowledge of NATO movements. The JCS noted that they were here modifying the stand taken in JCSM-950-61 of 6 Dec 61, where they had approved advance notification alone as a "confidence building" measure; they believed the Cuban missile crisis had demonstrated the importance of the ability to make timely and unheralded deployments.

(5) JCSM-96-63 to SecDef, 1 Feb 63, JMF 3050 (23 Oct 62) sec 3.

In a memorandum to SecDef JCS said they understood that ACDA was giving serious consideration to radical alterations in the US position expressed in the 27 Aug 62 draft treaty. JCS analyzed these supposed changes and concluded that too few on-site inspections were being considered; that unwarranted reliance was being placed on unproven "black boxes"; that effectiveness of the Atomic Energy Declassification System was uncertain; and that on-site inspection would be hindered by allowing the accused state to declare that a suspected event lay in a sensitive security area. The JCS considered that
such inadequate verification would "virtually provide an invitation to the Soviet Union to evade the treaty."

7) JCSM-37-63 to SecDef, 2 Feb 63, JMF 3050 (29 Jan 63).

In response to an ASD (ISA) request for comments on an ACDA position paper regarding a test ban treaty, JCS recommended extensive modification. They believed three cardinal principles must govern any test ban treaty. First, it must incorporate a detection, identification, and inspection system adequate to insure "the highest feasible probability" of discovering violations. Second, testing that could not be detected should not be prohibited. Third, withdrawal procedures should be simple. It had not been demonstrated that the ACDA system provided a "reasonable chance" for detecting evasions; this system would allow an unpoliced moratorium below the detection threshold. Also, it would prohibit withdrawal from the treaty for three years, which would be counter to US interest if the treaty was found unsatisfactory.

(TS) JCSM-136-63 to SecDef, 16 Feb 63, JMF 3050 (11 Feb 63) sec 2.

In response to a request from ASD (ISA), JCS reviewed an ACDA draft test ban treaty and recommended the following changes: (1) laboratory and propulsion tests should be permitted; (2) requirement for an international commission should be eliminated; (3) means of inspection should be given further study; (4) inspection should be allowed without submission by the requesting party of substantiating seismic data; (5) the US/UK and USSR each should have a quota of inspections on the territory of the other; (6) withdrawal should require only 60 days rather than six months.

(S) JCSM-160-63 to SecDef, 22 Feb 63, JMF 3050 (11 Feb 63) sec 4.

ASD (ISA) requested appraisal of an ACDA proposal that the US and USSR destroy 30 B-47s/Badjers per month. The JCS stated that the destruction of B-47 operational aircraft would cause a serious reduction in US strategic striking power. The clear military risks of this course of action would not be compensated for by any small gains accruing from its merits as a disarmament measure. The JCS opposed the latest ACDA proposal because:

(1) Owing to important targeting and cross-targeting considerations not appropriate for this document, it would present military problems of a serious magnitude.
(2) Even if a 1 July 1963 starting date for destruction were agreed upon, it would be physically impossible to satisfy the ACDA requirement to destroy aircraft only from the active inventory.
(3) The ACDA arguments opposing the rehabilitation of B-47s in inactive storage did not outweigh the military disadvantages of a more rapid phase-out of B-47s.

(S) JCSM-166-63 to SecDef, 8 Mar 63, JMF 3050 (7 Dec 62) sec 1.
In response to a request by ASD (ISA), JCS commented upon the most recent ACDA draft test ban treaty, dated 11 Mar 63, in light of the principles they had stated in JCSM-136-63 (16 Feb 63) and JCSM-160-63 (22 Feb 63). As previously stated, JCS felt that a primary deficiency lay in the prohibition of tests that were undetectable. Also, the requirement for detection of an event by four seismic stations in order to justify on-site inspection seemed unduly restrictive. Further, power of the Inspection Commission to visit territory of a nonpermanent member (i.e., other than US, UK and USSR) should be assigned by quota since any requirement for a majority vote might allow establishment of a sanctuary country. Finally, withdrawal procedures still were unduly restrictive. In sum, JCS believed there was "insufficient reliability" in the proposed treaty to give the US "adequate assurance" of detecting and fixing responsibility for treaty evasions. (C) JCSM-136-63 to SecDef, 19 Mar 63, JMF 3050 (11 Feb 63) sec 5.

Soviets could make major improvements through clandestine tests, the JCS believed the cumulative result of slow Soviet progress, while the US made no comparable gain, "could result in a decided and possibly irreversible advantage." In view of the gravity of the test ban issue, JCS recommended a more comprehensive examination before the US made any further commitments with respect to a test ban treaty. (TS) JCSM-241-63 to SecDef, 21 Mar 63, JMF 3050 (11 Feb 63) sec 3.

In response to a request by ASD (ISA), the JCS reviewed an ACDA study proposing a separable first state of general disarmament having primary application to the North Atlantic/European area. JCS considered this to be a completely new approach made in order to accommodate Soviet desires for (1) rapid disarmament, (2) emphasis on nearly total reduction of nuclear delivery systems, and (3) de-emphasis of inspection and international peacekeeping machinery. The JCS believed this would destroy any hope for acceptance of current US proposals for balanced, phased, safeguarded disarmament oriented to the continuation of a favorable political and strategic balance. ACDA had recommended acceptance of nuclear parity, production cut-off for major armaments, compression of the arms reduction period to two years, and verification through inspection of production facilities and of weapons destruction rather than verifying retained levels. Therefore, JCS recommended that the paper be rejected as dangerous to national security. Instead, the US...
should adhere to its present position of 30 percent across-the-board first-stage reduction in armaments, seek one-for-one replacement of weapons rather than production cut-off, and adhere firmly to the principle of verification and inspection of retained armament levels.

(S) JCSM-247-63 to SecDef, 23 Mar 63, JMF 3050 (17 Mar 63) sec 2.

JCS recommended that the US approach to any disarmament inspection arrangement should be to establish an organization independent of ACDA, staffed largely by military officers and monitored by a high-level steering committee. They observed that ACDA was the principal advocate of the disarmament agreement; if it were also to be charged with monitoring and evaluating Soviet compliance, "a clear conflict of interest would be created."
The US must exercise extreme vigilance while reducing its military capabilities; a quasi-military organization might best fulfill this need.

(C) JCSM-274-63 to SecDef, 8 Apr 63, JMF 3050 (18 Feb 63)

On their own initiative, JCS addressed the issue of whether or not a test ban was in the national interest. The US was on the verge of developing "clean" warheads and was progressing toward pure fusion warheads. These components, particularly important for tactical uses and effective ABMs, could be developed through underground tests. While the US observed a moratorium, however, the USSR might test clandestinely below the US detection threshold. If the Soviets did make technological advances and gained sole possession of an ABM, they could "increase substantially" their military pressure upon the Free World. It was apparent that the Soviets would not agree to any test ban providing essential guarantees of verification and inspection. Therefore, JCS considered that a treaty without a detection threshold under which the US could legally test would not now be in the national interest.

(S-NF) JCSM-327-63 to SecDef, 20 Apr 63, JMF 3050 (11 Feb 63) sec 7.

ASD (ISA) requested comments on an ACDA draft test ban treaty, dated 24 May 63. JCS noted there were no significant changes from the drafts of 11 and 23 March; all three contained no provision for allowing tests below the threshold of detection. JCS argued that this treaty could allow the Soviets to conduct "highly significant and valuable"
clandestine tests, which might easily enable them to move ahead of the US in areas of military importance. Accordingly, JCS stated that adoption of the treaty in its present form would be contrary to US security interests.

(TS-RD) JCSM-449-63 to SecDef, 13 Jun 63, JMF 3050 (11 Feb 63) sec 8.

17 Jun 63

JCS commented on a draft statement to be used by Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) before the Stennis Subcommittee. They suggested modifications and warned that, even with these changes, the statement should not be considered as an expression of JCS views on the subject of US/USSR military balance, which would be furnished later. They made the following comments on the paper:

(1) Its analysis of the possible gains to be achieved through "cheating," by clandestine tests, was incomplete.

(2) It underestimated the probable future effect of advances in nuclear technology on weapons systems.

(3) It failed to reflect the close relationship between offensive and defensive capabilities, that is, strategic delivery vehicles and ABM systems.

(4) It appeared to be contradictory, in that it assumed a condition of mutual strategic deterrence but at the same time postulated that tactical nuclear weapons would not be decisive in a limited war because escalation would be likely to occur.

(5) In summary, the JCS disagreed "basically" with what the draft statement said about the effect on the military balance, both of continued unrestricted testing and of clandestine Soviet testing under the proposed test ban treaty.

(TS-RD) JCSM-452-63 to SecDef, 17 Jun 63, JMF 3050 (6 Jun 63) sec 2.

22 Jun 63

JCS forwarded to SecDef a copy of the JCS comments on the nuclear test ban treaty submitted by them to the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Forces Committee. This statement had been formally approved by the JCS on 20 June 1963, but it was still under study and subject to modification.

The statement indicated that the JCS were not opposed to a "truly effective" treaty containing "effective safeguards." However, the JCS found the following deficiencies in the draft treaty:

(1) Most significant of all, it would prohibit all tests, including those having essentially no probability of detection; this would prohibit the US from testing while allowing the Soviets to test clandestinely.

(TS-RD) JCSM-452-63 to SecDef, 17 Jun 63, JMF 3050 (6 Jun 63) sec 2.
(2) The quota of seven on-site inspections was too few.
(3) The provisions governing on-site inspections were too restrictive.
(4) Withdrawal should be allowed after 60 days, not 120.

The JCS argued that, through clandestine testing, the Soviets could make great advances and relegate the US to a position of inferiority in both strategic and tactical weapons. This JCS view had been put forth during the drafting of the treaty.

(TS-RD) JCSM-463-63 to SecDef, 22 Jun 63.
JMF 3050 (6 Jun 63) sec 2.

9 Jul 63

For CJCS use at an HSC Meeting on 9 Jul 63, a talking paper was prepared that summarized JCS positions on the following subjects: Proposal to ban weapons of mass destruction in orbit; proposal to halt production of fissile materials, under appropriate safeguards; proposal to transfer fissile materials to peaceful uses; proposal for E-47/Badger destruction; proposal for exchange of military missions; proposal for advance notification of military movement and maneuvers; proposal to declare demilitarized zone; proposal to use budgetary data to check limitations on armaments.

(TS) SAAC-T-15-63, 9 Jul 63, JMF 3050 (9 Jul 63) (1).

9 Jul 63

LTET

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SAAC-T-12-63 (rev.) 9 Jul 63; JMF 3050 (9 Jul 63) (1).

27 Jul 63

ASD (ISA) requested the JCS to review a draft memo for the President prepared by ADOA on the destruction of medium bombers. This proposal provided for the destruction of 30 E-47s per
month, and it had been approved by SecDef on
23 May 63. The JCS repeated reservations express- 
ed previously (most recently in JCSM-186-63, 8 Mar 
63), that E-47s should not be removed from the 
active inventory ahead of the phase-out program in 
order to provide aircraft for the ACDA proposal. 
Also, the proposal should be specifically restricted 
to E-47s and Badgers, in order to preclude destruc-
tion of later-model aircraft such as the E-58. 
Finally, agreement to continue monthly destruction 
into a third year should be deferred until the end 
of the two-year program
(TS) JCSM-579-63 to SecDef, 27 Jul 63, JM 3050 
(7 Dec 62) sec 2.

7 Aug 63

At CJCS request, J-5 prepared a list of principles 
and criteria surrounding an acceptable disarmament 
treaty. After reviewing this study, the JCS 
questioned two underlying assumptions in its terms 
of reference: (1) that an equalization-of-forces 
disarmament program between NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact would maintain stability; (2) that deterrence 
could be established by abstention of each side 
from measures to defend its population and industrial 
areas. JCS contended that equalization of forces 
would not lead to stability; the concept of nuclear 
equalization was "counter to the time-tested US 
policy of maintaining nuclear superiority." In fact, 
equalization between such unlike alliances as NATO 
and the Warsaw Pact was not practically attainable. 
JCS considered that deterrence was best achieved 
through retention of a capability to engage and 
defeat the enemy at all levels of conflict in any 
geographic area.
(TS) SN-957-63 to CJCS, 7 Aug 63, JM 3050 
(9 Jul 63).

23 Aug 63

JCS informed Senator Richard E. Russell, Chairman, 
Senate Committee on Armed Services, that they had 
developed criteria for testing the adequacy of 
plans and programs in support of the treaty safe-
guards included in their statement on the limited 
test ban treaty made to the Preparedness Investi-
gating Subcommittee.

The four safeguards were: (1) the conduct of 
continuing underground nuclear tests; (2) the 
maintenance of laboratory facilities and programs 
in theoretical and exploratory nuclear technology; 
(3) the maintenance of facilities and resources 
necessary to resume atmospheric tests promptly, if 
needed; (4) the improvement of the US capability to 
monitor the terms of the treaty. The JCS set forth 
the criteria that they believed should be applicable 
to insure the adequacy of these safeguards.
(TU) LT7, CJCS to Sen Russell, 23 Aug 63, JM 3050 
(15 Aug 63) sec 1.
ACDA asked whether aerial reconnaissance was able to detect concentrations and preparations for a Soviet attack in Europe. The JCS indicated that available US reccce squadrons could "possibly" provide the necessary surveillance, but they recommended intensified low-altitude coverage and inclusion of non-US NATO units. JCS emphasized, however, that aerial inspection alone did not constitute an effective verification system for policing a force-level agreement. Also, the ability to detect enemy force concentrations would not necessarily give advance warning of surprise attack; it would be important to guard against the false sense of security engendered by an air inspection agreement.

(TS) JCSM-673-63 to SecDef, 29 Aug 63, JMP 9160/2410 (12 Aug 63).

JCS replied to several requests from ASD (ISA) for comment on various matters. One was the establishment of ground and airfield observation posts. In JCSM-170-62, 9 March 1962, JCS had stressed that the US should develop its own position on this matter in some detail before seeking agreement with the Soviets. To aid in developing a position, JCS had undertaken to develop an outline plan for establishing observation posts; pending its availability, they believed that the US should avoid detailed negotiations with the USSR or with its own allies. JCS also provided comments on the following proposals prepared as alternatives to a Soviet proposal of 28 November 1958:

1) Agreement limited to control posts alone: This would reduce considerably the possibility of detecting a rapid concentration of forces for a surprise attack, but would be acceptable as a separate agreement if (a) the control posts were located and operated so as to provide optimum safeguards against surprise attack, and (b) the procedures for advance notification, if any, were restricted to military movements directly related to NATO and did not include NATO-assigned submarine movements or unilateral US force deployments outside the area of Allied Command Europe-Warsaw Pact.

2) Agreement limited to control posts plus aerial photography: This should be sought in preference to (1) above. The aerial surveillance should be carried out on a 24-hour, all-weather basis, with no restriction on sensing equipment. The zone of aerial observation should be as large as possible. Negotiations on ground observation posts should seek provision for the use of unarmed aircraft to augment the capability of those posts.

3) Agreement providing for control posts, aerial photography, and a reduction of foreign troops in Europe: The US should oppose any major reduction or limitation of NATO forces in Europe until the causes of world tension had been reduced and an adequate verification system to police any force reduction agreement was in operation. An agreement on observation posts could be a first step toward achievement of this objective. Further, all proposals to reduce troops in Europe must be analyzed to make certain that they did not place NATO at a military disadvantage because of the shorter Soviet lines of communication. Assuming
reduction in the causes of world tensions, any major troop reductions would also have to be evaluated in terms of their impact on NATO strategy and force planning. A significant general purpose force reduction would result in greater reliance upon nuclear weapons and could lead to a downward trend in Europe's defense efforts at a time when the US was seeking to further build up its forces.

Concerning a specific plan to reduce foreign troops in Europe to five divisions on each side, JCS said this might be acceptable if it followed establishment of observation posts, aerial surveillance, and adequate verification procedures. It would require 2 British, 2 French, and 2 Belgian divisions to withdraw from West Germany to their national boundaries. The Soviets would have to withdraw 15 divisions from East Germany; hence NATO would make a relative gain. However, there was a risk that the Soviets might station volunteers or disguised units within East Germany.

(4) Agreement providing for control posts, aerial surveillance, and reduction of foreign troops in Europe, and removal of weapons of mass destruction from Germany: This would be unacceptable, since there appeared to be no satisfactory method of determining the yield of nuclear warheads "by verification procedures that would be acceptable from a security (restricted data) point of view. Further, there is no present indication of Soviet weapons of mass destruction in East Germany."

(5) Agreement providing for observation posts including airfields, but without aerial inspection, and for reduction of forces by one-third in Germany rather than in Europe: Airfields should be included among the observation posts, but aerial inspection should not be eliminated. The reduction of foreign forces by one-third in Germany would be unacceptable, because it would impose a reduction on US forces that could destroy the military and political cohesion of the alliance. A troop reduction would be acceptable if its size were left to be determined after a successful period of operation of effective observation posts and aerial inspection.

Based on the above analysis, JCS believed that the US should offer a comprehensive alternative to the Soviet proposal that would prevent NATO from becoming immediately involved in discussing troop reductions in Europe or removal of weapons of mass destruction from Germany. A proposal should be sought that was more compatible with NATO "political sensitivities and military planning." It should be based on the fundamental principle that the first step toward agreement between the two blocs should be to acquire agreed knowledge of the military forces and movements of the other side, beginning with a comprehensive control and inspection plan for the NATO and Warsaw Pact areas. The inspection area should be as large as possible; aerial inspection, observation posts with team mobility, and overlapping radar coverage should be included, but there should be no control or inspection of nuclear weapons as such. Such a plan, in the JCS view, would be more acceptable than any of the alternatives suggested; it would be limited in scope, but would provide for reduction in the
causes of tension and would provide a basis for testing Soviet intentions before further steps were taken.

(S) JCSM-685-63 to SecDef, 3 Sep 63, JMF 4991

10 Aug 63 sec 1.

JCS forwarded to SecDef a detailed plan, promised in JCSM-685-63 of 3 Sep 63, for observation posts in Warsaw Pact countries. The Appendix furnished a list of desired locations, as well as proposed composition and functions of mobile observation teams. JCS stated that analysis indicated that observation posts, coupled with mobile observation teams and aerial surveillance, could provide a measure of warning against conventional (but not nuclear) attack. Satisfactory mobility and communications constituted the keys to a militarily useful system.

(S) JCSM-773-63 to SecDef, 4 Oct 63, JMF 4991

10 Aug 63 sec 2.

7 Oct 63

ASD (ISA) requested comments on a draft memo for the Committee of Deputies and upon a proposal presented by Mr. Oromyko regarding weapons in space. In order to lessen the possibility of disadvantageous amendments, JCS favored a bilateral agreement rather than a resolution in either the UN or the 18-nation meeting. Also, they preferred a declaration of intentions to a formal treaty or joint executive agreement, because no means existed to verify Soviet compliance with banning of orbital weapons of mass destruction. Further, JCS feared that agreement might lead to a diminution of the US military space effort, with dangerous results; measures should be taken to prevent this. Finally, any joint declaration should contain a withdrawal provision. As to the Soviet proposal, JCS thought it should refer to "weapons of mass destruction" rather than "objects carrying nuclear weapons." Other changes were outlined in an Appendix.

(S) JCSM-785-63 to SecDef, 7 Oct 63, JMF 3050

1 Oct 63 sec 1.

8 Oct 63

JCS repeated their criticisms of the draft "Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament" tabled by the US at Geneva in April 1962. Stage I was inadequate for three reasons: there was no provision for participation by Communist China and all other militarily significant states; there was no requirement for an effective control organization to be in place prior to the start of reductions; limitations precluded testing of prototypes and modernization of retained armaments. Additionally, the treaty outlined a verification system that had not been proved reliable, and it lacked a clause allowing rapid withdrawal. At the end of Stage III, also, defense of the US would be entrusted to the United Nations, JCS believed that disarmament should progress by phased measures, beginning with the following progression: observation posts with limited mobility; partial aerial surveillance; mobile observation teams; full aerial surveillance. After these steps had been successfully tested, the nucleus of an inspection system for arms control agreements would exist. However, JCS believed the draft General and Complete Disarmament Treaty presented "an unwarranted risk" to US security because of the "vague, incomplete and untested safeguards described therein."

(S) JCSM-776-63 to SecDef, 8 Oct 63, JMF 3050

5 Jun 63 (5).

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The Special Assistant for Arms Control (SAAC) submitted a report commenting on a letter of 29 Aug 63 from Director, ACDA, which had listed US proposals tabled (or authorized for tabling) at the 19-Nation Disarmament Conference and still pending there. SAAC summarized the JCS position on each of these proposals, as previously expressed, and in some cases provided evaluations of the proposals in the light of the JCS views. The subjects of the proposals were as follows:

1. Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World. JCS views were stated in JCSM-269-62, 10 Apr 62; JCSM-389-62, 19 May 62. The present outline, though revised several times, was objectionable to JCS because it: (a) did not provide for participation in Stage I by Communist China; (b) did not provide for an effective control organization to be operational before Stage I began; and involved an untested verification system (Zonal Inspection Concept); (c) listed armaments in a manner disadvantageous to the US (by highlighting strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and AICBM's); (d) incorporated limitations in Stage I that would preclude modernization of authorized armaments and testing of improved armaments; and would not allow US withdrawal for reasonable cause and without undue delay. The JCS position was that disarmament should progress gradually and should require the USSR to display its sincerity; also that there should be an effective verification system.

2. Draft Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons in the Atmosphere, Outer Space, and Underwater. This draft was no longer relevant owing to the present Limited Test Ban Treaty. JCS views on the latter were that the risks inherent in it could be accepted if adequate safeguards were established.

3. Draft Treaty Banning Weapons Tests in All Environments. The ACDA version was unsatisfactory to JCS primarily because it would prohibit all tests, including those having essentially no probability of detection (thus preventing the US from testing while allowing the Soviets to test clandestinely). Also, it provided only seven on-site inspections, which were not enough, and too restrictive in the provisions governing these inspections.

4. Cut-off of Production of Fissionable Material. JCS views had been expressed on 23 Mar 61 (JCSM-182-61) and reaffirmed on 30 Aug 61; also 5 Jan 63 (JCSM-9-63).


7. Destruction of Medium Jet Bombers. JCS emphasized that B-47 aircraft should not be removed from active inventory ahead of the phase-out program in order to provide flyable aircraft for the ACDA proposal; had noted that destruction of medium jet bombers, if approved, should be restricted to B-47/BALGIR aircraft, and should not include later model aircraft such as the B-58; and had considered that any agreement to continue the monthly rate of destruction into a third year should be deferred until the end of the two-year program.
(8) Reduction of Armaments in Stage I: JCS
had commented in JCSM-638-62, 18 Aug 62;
JCSM-57-63, 23 Jan 63; JCSM-247-63, 23 Mar 63.

(9) Outer Space: JCS views expressed in
JCSM-765-63, 7 Oct 63.

(10) Risk of War Measures: Risk of war
measures contained in Section F of Stage I
compromised five elements, of which one (rapid
communications between Chiefs of State) had
already been implemented. The remaining four,
and JCS views thereto, were:
(a) Advance Notification of Military Move-
ments and Maneuvers: See JCSM-96-63, 1 Feb 63
(reaffirmed 30 Aug 63).
(b) Establishment of Observation Posts:
JCS had no reservations except to stress that,
before seeking agreement with Soviets, the Allies
should be consulted (JCSM-685-63, 3 Sep 63). JCS
had developed, and forwarded to SecDef, a plan
for establishment of observation posts, mobile
inspection teams, and aerial surveillance.
(c) Exchange of Military Missions: JCS
had no objection (see JCSM-911-62, 17 Nov 62).
However, they noted that an exchange between
NATO and the Warsaw Pact could be turned into
a form of recognition of the German Democratic
Republic (GDR). On the whole, JCS considered
the proposal desirable provided details were
negotiated on a basis of exact reciprocity.
(d) Establishment of an International Com-
mission to recommend further measures to reduce
the risk of nuclear war by accident, miscalcu-
ation, or failure of communications: No JCS
objection (see JCSM-170-62, 9 Mar 62).

(11) Nonaggression Pact: JCS considered it
undesirable to negotiate such a pact between
NATO and the Warsaw Pact in isolation from
the settlement of fundamental issues with the Soviets.

(12) Non-Dissemination of Nuclear Weapons:
JCS views were contained in JCSM-727-62, 18 Sep
62, but were currently being reexamined.

(13) Stage I Reduction of Armed Forces: JCS
views expressed in JCSM-489-62, 2 Jul 62, and
JCSM-9-63, 5 Jan 63. The draft treaty was
objectionable because it did not refer to verification
of retained force levels and called for
beginning of force level reductions before the
parties exchanged declarations concerning exist-
ing levels.

The SAAC report went on to list general
criteria established by JCS in October 1963 as
necessary for any acceptable arms control and
disarmament proposals. These criteria were as
follows:
(1) Reduction of world tensions should precede
any measures that would significantly reduce US
military capability.

(2) Agreements requiring significant reduction
in US military capability must provide for the
following before being implemented by the US:
(a) All militarily significant states must
agree to participate
(b) An effective verification system must
be established
(c) An effective control organization must
be established and operational

TOP SECRET
(4) The agreement should preclude any state or group of states from gaining a military advantage that would adversely affect US vital interests.

(5) There should be evidence that it was to the self-interest of participating nations to observe the treaty under consideration.

(6) Disarmament should proceed at a rate that did not jeopardize US security. Any agreement should provide for disarmament by stages, each properly safeguarded and with a definite time limit, and for verification of the implementation of each stage before transition to the next.

(7) Any agreement should permit US withdrawal for reasonable cause and without undue delay.

(8) In the initial phase of armaments-reduction, the power balance should be mentioned, and the US base structure should not be substantially altered.

(9) Military research and development should be permitted, at least during the early phases of disarmament.

(10) Limitations on armament production must not preclude replacement, repair, or modernization of authorized retained armaments, or the fabrication of prototypes for testing.

(11) Any prohibition on weapons of mass destruction in space orbit must not include a ban on all military space activities.

This statement of JCS views was sent to the Director, ACDA, by the JCS Chairman on 27 November 1963.

S: JCSM-202-63 to SecDef, 19 Oct 63, JMF 4991 (16 Sep 63).
At the request of ASD (ISA), JCS had reconsidered the concept of a Latin American nuclear-free zone. They reaffirmed the views expressed on 10 Nov 62 (JCSM-877-62), that a nuclear-free zone in Latin America or anywhere else would work to the detriment of the US and should be accepted only as part of a broader arms control agreement.

(S) JCSM-849-63 to SecDef, 1 Nov 63, JMF 3050 (7 Oct 63).

In response to request by ASD (ISA), JCS reviewed a staff paper on Stage I force levels, forwarded by the US Mission at Geneva. JCS did not agree that Western and Soviet proposals were near agreement on manpower ceilings. The USSR figure of 1.9 million included civilian employees, while the US figure was 2.1 million. Also, a common definition of "civilians" was not feasible because of inherent differences in the two societies and their military establishments. On another point, JCS argued that the level of reserves could best be reduced through agreement upon the level of retained armaments.

(S) JCSM-823-63 to SecDef, 1 Nov 63, JMF 3050 (3 Oct 63).

SecDef requested the JCS to comment upon an ACDA proposal for US-USSR exchange of military missions, to assist in "damping crisis situations." JCS believed this idea had little military value and should not be pursued. In crisis times, mission members could not provide better information than regular diplomatic personnel. The mission would have primarily an intelligence-collection function, and a relaxation of access and travel in the USSR would be necessary in order to perform this. JCS noted that coordination with US allies would be required before the bilateral negotiations were initiated.

(S) JCSM-869-63 to SecDef, 18 Nov 63, JMF 3050 (11 Oct 63).

ASD (ISA) requested JCS to develop (1) alternative proposals allowing reductions of US ground forces in Europe, possibly with other Allies replacing them, and (2) simplification of the Overlapping Radar Proposal contained in JCSM-885-63. JCS opposed any force reductions until there had been (1) a major reduction in the causes of world tension, (2) establishment of an adequate verification system, and (3) agreement upon revised NATO strategy. If reduction were agreed upon, the best military arrangements (owing to the distances involved) would be to station 5 US divisions in West Germany and return other units to their homelands; alternatively, political commitment might better be demonstrated by the stationing of 3 US, 1 UK, and 1 French division. There should be no reductions of tactical air and US support forces. An Appendix provided fuller information on the Overlapping Radar Proposal.

(TS) JCSM-887-63 to SecDef, 19 Nov 63, JMF 3050 (10 Oct 63) (1 sec 1).
JCS furnished views on certain criteria for US
support of a nuclear-free zone, promulgated by
Dept of State as the basis of US policy for
support of such zones. The criteria were as
follows: (1) nuclear weapons must not form a
part of the existing balance of power in the
area; (2) the initiative for such a zone should
come from the area concerned, with all or most
of the countries participating; (3) adequate
verification and inspection procedures would be
established; and (4) essential US transit rights
would be preserved. The JCS reaffirmed the views
they had set forth in JCSM-849-63 of 1 Nov 63.
The criteria were consistent with these views,
the JCS said, but were incomplete and should be
extended to incorporate the JCS conviction that
the establishment of a nuclear-free zone any-
where in the world must be in the context of a
broader arms agreement with the USSR.
(5) JCSM-555-63 to SecDef, 10 Dec 63, JMF 3050
(13 Nov 63).

Commenting on a draft position paper dealing with
military bases, prepared for use at the 18-Nation
Disarmament Conference, the JCS recommended that
the United States: (1) adhere to a strict interpre-
tation of the approved Presidential guidance
that the US discuss base reduction only after sub-
stantial progress had been made toward agreeing
on the reduction of armaments and armed forces;
(2) not consider exchanging lists of bases to be
reduced; (3) adopt the position that base
reductions must come only as a consequence of
reduction of tensions, of armaments, and of force
levels.
(5) JCSM-1011-63 to SecDef, 30 Dec 63, JMF 3050
(19 Dec 63).

JCS commented on several updated position papers
for use at the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference
when it reconvened on 21 January 1964. A paper
on Armed Force Reductions was approved as written.
Papers on other subjects were judged acceptable
with some modifications, as follows:
(1) Armaments: This should be modified to
reflect treaty language as tabled at Geneva on
10 Dec 1962, rather than the draft treaty out-
line of 18 Apr 1962. This recommendation had
already been made to ACDFA by the JCS Chairman on
27 Nov 1963. The position paper should be con-
sistent with the latest US position on Stage I
arms reductions as modified by JCS recommendations
(2) UN Peace Force: JCS agreed that such a
force was desirable in general, but until
agreements were reached that placed control in a
political mechanism to which the US could entrust
its security. Until such assurance could be had,
national capabilities should not be reduced below
the level of effective self-defense.
(5) Peace-Keeping Measures: JCS objected to
emphasis in this paper on achievement of progress
in substantive disarmament. The principal US
objective, they believed, should be to achieve
progress in more feasible separate measures that
would reduce tensions and would encourage politi-
cal settlements before any substantive disarmament
was undertaken.
(5) JCSM-1015-63 to SecDef, 30 Dec 63, JMF 3050
(19 Dec 63).
In response to a request by ASD (ISA), the JCS appraised acceptable limits of percentage reductions of forces in Europe. The JCS considered militarily acceptable the withdrawal of not more than 20 percent of foreign-based ground forces from Germany alone. Further study was necessary before recommendations regarding possible mutual reductions in air forces and logistic support troops would become possible.

(TS) JCSM-1015-63 to SecDef, 30 Dec 63, JMF 3050 (10 Oct 63) (1) sec 2.
The JCS commented on subjects in updated US position papers for the 15-Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC). They pointed out concerning the International Disarmament Organization that there was no provision for an effective control organization operational before the start of Stage I. Concerning military expenditures, the JCS offered no objection to the establishment of an Experts Commission of the Conference (as proposed in the papers) to examine information on military expenditures and budgets to facilitate understandings possibly leading to useful budgetary processes in the arms control field, but they recommended that limitations be established to prevent the divulging of sensitive or classified data.

(C) JCSM-5-64 to SecDef, 8 Jan 64, JMF 3050 (19 Dec 63) sec 2.

The JCS authorized the presentation to ACDA of a briefing containing an expression of their concern regarding possible impact of Stage I disarmament action on US. They believed that disarmament should progress by phased and safeguarded measures designed to approach disarmament gradually and to provide the USSR opportunity to display its sincerity. Partial steps would be conducive to detente, which must precede substantial disarmament. The JCS further believed that arms control proposals outlined planned that would meet JCS criteria (they included 14), be acceptable to US allies, and be more negotiable than the treaties then dormant in Geneva. Such proposals could begin with an agreement on observation posts and other Risk of War measures. When these measures were in effect, both sides would have the nucleus for an inspection system. The JCS suggested that some limited disarmament measures could be undertaken after a framework for verification had been established and, preferably, after Risk of War agreements had proved effective. Subsequently, the JCS (CM-1150-64, 14 Feb 64) stated that the above did not constitute a JCS policy position.

The JCS commented to SecDef on the second of two similar ACDA proposals to reduce nuclear delivery vehicles (NDEV) by 30 percent over a three-year period. The JCS criticized the original plan because its verification methods relied on intelligence rather than on site inspection; it considered NEVs in isolation from other weapons systems; its denied an ABM system to the US while merely cutting Soviet ABMs by 30 percent; it would limit US flexibility in targeting nuclear weapons, and especially because it called for a 30 percent reduction in US tactical NEVs without any reduction in the superiority of Soviet ground forces. These factors would reduce national security and create a deadlock in ENSO. The second ACDA plan, exempts most US tactical NEVs from the reduction, but the JCS remained opposed to such a basic shift in the US approach to disarmament. They saw it as accommodating Soviet objectives of isolating and limiting US nuclear strength and avoiding verification of remaining armaments.

(C) JCSM-5-64 to SecDef, 8 Jan 64; (E) JCSM, 25-64 to SecDef, 11 Jan 64; JMF 3050 (91 Dec 63) sec 2.
17 Jan 64

Disarmament (General) SNDV Cutoff of Fissionable Material NFZ

 Verification

The JCS submitted to SecDef recommended changes in a proposed statement by the President to the Geneva Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament. They recommended deletion of a paragraph calling for a freeze on strategic nuclear weapons systems, but subsequently withdrew that recommendation in light of SecDef's proposed revision of the paragraph and subject to their other suggested changes—including a statement on safeguarding the security of all nations. JCS concurred in a paragraph treating production of fissionable material with the understanding that it in no way affected production of availability of tritium. They did not concur in a subparagraph calling for establishment of nuclear-free zones, since they believed such a proposal militarily disadvantageous to the US.

(C) JCSM-41-64 to SecDef, 17 Jan 64; (C) JCSM-42-64 to SecDef, 18 Jan 64; both in JMF 3050 (17 Jan 64).

The JCS commented on the final position (Annex E) of the ACDA position paper on observation posts. The JCS suggested detailed changes to the plan to bring it into consonance with earlier JCS recommendations, including an increase in mobility of observation teams, inclusion of unrestricted organic communications for them, the use of sophisticated sensors of all types, rejection of host-country aircraft pilots, and increases in manpower and equipment.

(S) JCSM-49-64 to SecDef, 25 Jan 64, JMF 3050 (18 Aug 63) sec 4.

The JCS commented on an ACDA draft of instructions for the US Delegation at Geneva concerning a program of collateral measures on control of nuclear weapons, fissionable materials, and strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (NDVs). They recommended that the draft instructions be incorporated into a broader arms control package with specific safeguards involved in each measure fully developed by ACDA. Final judgment on the proposed instructions should be held in abeyance pending review of the revised information. The JCS understood that the ACDA paper had already been sent to Geneva, but they believed that their views were still pertinent for use in further development and refinement of the US position prior to negotiation.

(C) JCSM-27-64 to SecDef, 29 Jan 64, JMF 3050 (17 Jan 64)

The JCS found two updated position papers for ENDC on chemical and biological weapons and on staging, transition, and time limits generally suitable for use by the US Delegation at Geneva. They endorsed the need for an ACDA study of the arms control and disarmament aspects of chemical and biological weapons and requested an opportunity to review the study.

(C) JCSM-52-64 to SecDef, 30 Jan 64, JMF 3050 (19 Dec 63) sec 2.
The Soviet proposal called for the elimination of all NDVs during Stage I of the GCD treaty except for retention by the US and USSR, within their own territory, of a limited number of ICBMs, antimissile missiles, and surface-to-air missiles until the end of the disarmament process.

The JCS rejected the Gromyko proposal because of a lack of verification and peacekeeping features.

Commenting on a revised ACDA paper on military expenditures for use at the ENDC, the JCS considered the paper suitable for such use subject to incorporation of the following amendments: (1) require approval by the Committee of Principals to proposed language changes to the Outline Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament prior to tableing the changes at Geneva; (2) bring the terms of reference for the proposed subcommittee of experts into consonance with the terms of reference for the subcommittee concurred in by the JCS on 8 Jan 64 (JCSM-5-64); (3) maintain the current US position that there was doubt regarding the feasibility and acceptability of a formal limitation of military expenditures as an element of the disarmament process.

Commenting on an ACDA draft US position paper on nuclear-free zones (NFZs), the JCS reiterated their reservations on NFZs anywhere except in the context of a broader arms control agreement with the Soviet Union. Therefore they recommended that the draft US position paper be modified to add the following two criteria: (1) US opposition to any NFZ agreement unless it is part of a broader arms control agreement providing for Soviet concessions sufficient to compensate for any military disadvantage to the US; (2) inclusion of preservation of US transit rights, non-restriction of movement of naval ships and military aircraft, and respect
for the traditional sovereignty of a US Navy commissioned ship and US military aircraft to be exempt from inspection requirements.

(ST) JCSM-108-64 to SecDef, 11 Feb 64, JMF 3050 (19 Dec 63) sec 3.

In a review of an ACDA draft US Disarmament Measures Paper on outer space, the JCS emphasized that there should be: (1) no acceptance by the US of prelaunch inspection of space vehicles in connection with any agreement short of general and complete disarmament; (2) no deviation from the position that satellites for purposes such as observation and warning were not only non-aggressive in nature, but were of positive, peaceful value in reducing risk of war through accident and miscalculation. Even under GCD, the JCS had reservations on inclusion of prelaunch inspection as part of Stage I in view of technological changes that had taken place in satellite observation techniques, ballistic missile systems, and anti-satellite capabilities since the US position in that regard was formulated.

(TS) JCSM-121-64 to SecDef, 12 Feb 64, JMF 3050 (19 Dec 63) sec 3.

With reference to a proposed ACDA presentation at Geneva on "Illustration of Potential Effect of a Production Freeze on US Strategic Ballistic Missile Inventory," the JCS warned SecDef that such a presentation would disclose security information of great value to the Soviets. He suggested that US delegates in Geneva refrain from any explanations that went beyond guidance already furnished until the US Government developed its position of the freeze concept.

(C) OM-1195-64 to SecDef, 14 Feb 64, JMF 3050 (22 Jan 64) (B).

The JCS informed SecDef that a preliminary analysis of the effects of implementation of a freeze on strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles revealed problems of great complexity both in definition of specific elements involved in a freeze and in their subsequent negotiation. Such a freeze would require careful study of such subordinate questions as the replacement of vehicles that had passed out of production, the cut-off of fissile material production, changes in missile reliability, and the effect of further dispersal and hardening of missile launch sites upon probable consequences of a freeze. The JCS believed that the required comprehensive verification system would involve intrusion into national privacy of signatory countries to a greater extent than the USSR had ever been willing to accept. They considered that there was real doubt as to whether practical solutions could be found to meet the conditions necessary to make the freeze concept acceptable from the point of national security.

(TS-R2) JCSM-125-64 to SecDef, 15 Feb 64, JMF 3050 (22 Jan 64) sec 3.

Commenting on an ACDA paper on basic elements of a freeze on nuclear vehicles, the JCS stated it would be extremely difficult to find practical solutions to make the freeze concept acceptable from the point of view of national
security and yet sufficiently attractive to induce the USSR to negotiate seriously. The JCS were not in accord with the ACDA views on categories, replacement, hardening and dispersal, fissionable material cut-off, research and development limitations, and production facilities for new types. Consequently, they recommended modification of the ACDA paper prior to any release outside the US Government.

(TS-RD) JCSM-147-64 to SecDef, 22 Feb 64, JMF 3050 (22 Feb 64) (A) sec 1.

Commenting on an ACDA paper on verification of a freeze on strategic nuclear vehicles, the JCS found that the subject paper would apparently place major reliance on US intelligence for verification and made no provision for aerial surveillance and unscheduled on-site inspections, other than of production facilities, at US option. They believed that the verification system negotiated should be completely sufficient within itself to assure compliance to the agreement without reliance on US intelligence; intelligence should be relied on only to validate any list of installations, to crosscheck information obtained from the inspection system, and to establish priorities for the type and area of inspection. Any other role could compromise US intelligence sources with degradation of intelligence capability or hinder ability to confirm suspected violations. Thus before a US position on verification could be formulated, this JCS view of the role of intelligence in the verification process must be accepted. The JCS also concluded that consideration should be given to including launchers and fissionable material production under the freeze.

(TS-RD) JCSM-148-64 to SecDef, 22 Feb 64, JMF 3050 (22 Jan 64) (A) sec 1.

Responding to an ACDA request for a list of obsolete armaments that could be used in a weapons bonfire proposal, the JCS referred to their previous reservations concerning the ACDA proposal to destroy B-47s (most recently in JCSM-579-63, 27 Jul 63). The JCS submitted to SecDef a list that met the criteria defined by ACDA. They pointed out, however, that the list was based on a number of factors that were susceptible to change and requested that each specific proposal for destruction of armaments be submitted to the JCS prior to presentation at the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference.

(TC) JCSM-170-64 to SecDef, 3 Mar 64, JMF 3050 (13 Feb 64).

In comments on an ACDA paper on basic elements of a freeze on nuclear vehicles for use by the US Government in exploring the freeze proposal with NATO Allies, the JCS referred to their views of 15 Feb (JCSM-122-64) and 22 Feb (JCSM-148-64). They recognized that positions ultimately taken on the major security issues involved in a freeze would hinge on the type of verification agreed to with the Soviets. Until some indication of the Soviet position was obtained, the US position in discussions with NATO Allies must remain flexible. Subject to certain revisions, the JCS believed the ACDA
paper was suitable for use in NATO discussions, but they requested further opportunity to consider the matter before any exploratory discussions occurred at Geneva. With reference to replacement under production limitation, the JCS stated that limited differences in configuration between models of like type should be permitted.

(TS) JCSM-187-64 to SecDef, 5 Mar 64, JMF 3050 (22 Jan 64) (A) sec 3.

Commenting on an ACDA paper concerning inspection of a fissionable material production cut-off, the JCS noted that the paper was essentially confined to the broad concept of verification of a limitation on production and that the detailed features were to be the subject of further technical discussions. They forwarded to SecDef extensive revisions to the paper designed to: provide additional exceptions from production limitation in the case of tritium and fissionable material for use in explosives for peaceful purposes; provide additional guidelines for inspection of shutdown production facilities; point out that frequency of inspection would be a function of the degree of access to the facility inspected; emphasize a requirement for resident inspectors at certain production facilities; and present a summary of US intelligence capabilities to detect clandestine activity.

(TS) JCSM-222-64 to SecDef, 15 Mar 64, JMF 3050 (25 Feb 64).

Responding to an ASD(ISA) request for views on the effect of limiting or not limiting anti-aircraft defense as a part of a freeze on strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles, the JCS concluded: (1) To achieve its objective, a freeze proposal would, in theory, have to include air defense systems designed to counter the threat of strategic offensive nuclear bombers and cruise missiles, freezing not only the number of systems but also restricting qualitative improvements. In addition, redeployment of existing systems would have to be prohibited. In a freeze environment, it was not feasible to control the air defense variable in the offensive-defense balance and, therefore, maintenance of the strategic nuclear status quo could not be assured. (2) With quantitative, but not qualitative, limitation on existing strategic bombers and cruise missiles, and a quantitative limit on air defense system components (aircraft, missiles, launchers, and radars), but no limitation on qualitative improvements to components, the offensive capability of strategic bombers and cruise missiles would ultimately be severely degraded. (3) With a quantitative, but not qualitative, limitation on existing strategic bombers and cruise missiles and no qualitative or quantitative limitation on air defense systems, the most probable result would be acceleration of the degradation noted above.

(TS) JCSM-235-64 to SecDef, 21 Mar 64, JMF 3350 (22 Jan 54) sec 3.
24 Mar 64

The JCS gave approval to an ACDA proposal for the establishment of observation posts in the US, USSR, and Europe as a basis for exploratory talks with the USSR at Geneva, subject to detailed changes outlined by the JCS.

28 Mar 64

With reference to preserving the Multilateral Force (MLF) under an agreement to freeze strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, the JCS informed SecDef that the strategic forces currently programmed were necessary to meet military requirements of the US. They firmly opposed any course of action allowing construction and equipping of MLF under a nuclear delivery vehicle freeze agreement, if such action would result in significant degradation of US strategic nuclear delivery capability. The MLF project as currently planned could not be carried out in the event a verified freeze took effect in the near future without significant detriment to US strategic nuclear capabilities.

30 Mar 64

In further comments on verification of a freeze of strategic delivery vehicles, the JCS stated that the verification system must be capable of detecting violations of an agreement in a timely manner. They supported a system, to be used in conjunction with US intelligence, that would consist of three component parts: resident inspection of declared facilities, random aerial surveillance, and on-site inspection of suspicious areas.

31 Mar 64

The JCS advised SecDef that they approved the DOD-AEC agreement on responsibilities for maintaining a readiness-to-test posture under a limited test ban treaty, as proposed by the Assistant to SecDef for Atomic Energy. This involved rejection of the AEC-proposed version, in which the division of functions between the two agencies was considered to be unsatisfactory.

11 Apr 64

Commenting on an ACDA draft of instructions to the US Delegation at the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC), the JCS noted that the draft would authorize conduct of substantive discussions of issues upon which a US Government position had not yet been reached. They preferred that no exploratory discussions with the Soviets be undertaken at that time, but recommended that, if such discussions were held, they be conducted in such a way as not to prejudice or resolve issues still under consideration within the US Government.

4 May 64

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET
8 May 64

In reply to an ASD(ISA) request, the JCS amplified their conclusion (see JCSM-187-64, 5 Mar 64) that limited differences in configuration between models of like type should be permitted in the replacement policy for a freeze on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. They believed that no action should be taken that would preclude substituting models in production for models out of production. They recognized that this would entail acceptance of some limited external configuration differences between models. These limited differences could not be defined in a manner to satisfy all possibilities because the Soviet situation was relatively unknown. The replacement issue could be resolved only by joint US/USSR negotiation on a model-by-model basis prior to any agreement on limitation of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.

26 May 64

Responding to an ASD(ISA) request, the JCS commented on a revised ADCA paper on verification of a freeze on strategic nuclear vehicles. The JCS remained convinced that verification was one of the most fundamental and important aspects of the freeze proposal. They continued to question the negotiability of the type of verification system that would be adequate to provide reasonable assurance of compliance. The JCS recommended modification to the ADCA paper, but they had serious reservations as to the appropriateness of presenting a more detailed US position on verification than had already been presented to the EHDG. Until important aspects of verification had been resolved within the US Government, a complete concept for verifying a freeze agreement could not be formulated.

28 May 64

The JCS commented on an ACDA position paper on the cut-off of fissionable material production and transfer to peaceful uses as separable measures. They advised SecDef that an agreement to cut-off production of fissionable materials was advantageous to the United States if implemented before 1 July 1965. After that date the advantage would diminish rapidly as the USSR stockpiled fissionable materials. They also advised that the US had insufficient information to undertake the negotiation of the highly complex issues involved in a combined production cut-off and transfer of fissionable materials to peaceful uses. Also, such transfer without proper safeguards could lead to a proliferation problem.
In commenting on an ACDA revised paper prohibiting strategic missile prototype flight testing, the JCS stated that US security interests demanded that under any freeze agreement, research and development, including prototype testing, must be permitted.

(TM) JCMS-450-64 to SecDef, 29 May 64, JMF 3050 (22 Jan 64) (A) sec 5A.

In comments on an ACDA draft of instructions for the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC), the JCS noted that the draft instructions would authorize the US delegation to discuss verification of limitations on launchers privately with the Soviets and then in the ENDC before the basic issue of the extent of the limitations on launchers had been resolved within the US Government. They recommended that the draft instructions not be authorized for use either with the Soviets or in the ENDC until the basic US position had been established. They forwarded to SecDef a suitable revision of the draft instructions.

(TM) JCMS-457-64 to SecDef, 30 May 64, JMF 3050 (22 Jan 64) (A) sec 5A.

In response to the ACDA position paper on mutual US-USSR destruction of armaments, the JCS advised the SecDef that the current proposal included equipment programmed for the National Guard, the Reserves, and the Military Assistance Program, and that it would thus reduce the security of the United States. They also questioned the economic desirability of waiting for the E-47 until so that they might be destroyed in a bonfire agreement with the USSR.

(TM) JCMS-501-64 to SecDef, 10 Jun 64, JMF 3050 (26 May 64).

In response to a SecDef request, the JCS examined the security implications of a prohibition of testing in four specified areas under a freeze on strategic nuclear vehicles: (1) multiple reentry bodies; (2) ABM firings against ballistic missiles; (3) launching new types of missiles or rockets from hardened or mobile launchers; (4) repetitive launchings of new missiles or rockets employing reentry vehicles on suborbital trajectories exceeding 100 kms. After providing extensive discussion and justification, the JCS adhered to their previously expressed judgment that US security interests demanded that research and development, including prototype testing, be permitted under any freeze agreement.

(TM) JCMS-530-64 to SecDef, 19 Jun 64, JMF 3050 (22 Jan 64) (A) sec 5.

The JCS advised SecDef of the dangers of discussing with other nations the transfer of more than the publicly announced grade U-225 before more precise information on Soviet stockpiles could be obtained. They further advised that a production cutoff and transfer off US ability to meet projected weapons requirements and possible future needs would seriously reduce the JCS-562-64 to SecDef, 27 Jun 64, JMF 3050 (14 May 64) sec 2.
Commenting on an AGDA paper concerning the establishment of a "hot line" at the tactical level in Europe on a bilateral or inter-Alliance basis with the USSR, the JCS concluded that such an arrangement might be effective in further minimizing the tensions resulting from border incidents, but only if there was political agreement with the USSR that inadvertent overflights were not hostile acts.

(TS) JCSM-573-64 to SecDef, 30 Jun 64, JMF 3050 (17 Jun 64).

2 Jul 64

NPZ

(TS) JCSM-577-64 to SecDef, 2 Jul 64, JMF 3050 (23 Jun 64).

10 Jul 64

The JCS informed SecDef that they had no objection to the content of an AGDA-proposed joint statement relating to a reduction of military expenditures, including provisions for establishment of a subcommittee of fiscal experts and submission of annual budget reports to the UN Secretary-General, for possible use at the ENDC. The JCS said, however, that this position should in no way be interpreted to imply their agreement to negotiations of a reduction of military expenditures with the Soviets as a measure apart from general and complete disarmament (GCD). Even within the context of GCD, they believed reductions in military expenditures should be a reflection of the disarmament process and not a means of imposing disarmament. The JCS also recommended that positive controls be established on release of US military budget information to preclude divulgence of sensitive information.

(C) JCSM-585-64 to SecDef, 10 Jul 64, JMF 3310 (23 Jun 64).

12 Aug 64

Responding to an ASD(ISN) request for views on the Gomulka nuclear freeze proposal of 29 Feb 64, the JCS concluded that:

Freeze on Strategic Forces (Gomulka Proposal)

Verification

3) While, in theory, an effective verification system for a freeze on nuclear warheads within a specified area could be devised, the task would become extremely complex and would almost certainly demand such intrusion into the participating states as to render implementation infeasible.

(TS) JCSM-608-64 to SecDef, 12 Aug 64, JMF 3050 (2 Jul 64).
Commenting on an ACDA paper on an ABM and SNDV freeze, the JCS concluded that: (1) Degree to which unique technical distinctions could be effectively delineated would determine the detail to which strategic nuclear ABM systems could be defined and would influence the type of verification (degree of access) needed to provide adequate assurance of compliance with an agreement. (2) The ACDA definition of strategic ABM systems presupposed that no unique technical distinctions could be effectively established by the technical panel on ABM systems. Under that definition, free access to any suspicious activity would be the only way to achieve the necessary degree of assurance that no prohibited ABM systems were deployed, and hence the proposed verification system would not be adequate. Consequently, the JCS recommended that the definition and method of verification of deployment of strategic ABM systems be held in abeyance pending review of results of the technical panel and that further discussion of the ABM portion of the freeze proposal be withheld pending current DOD review of strategic and offensive and defensive forces. The JCS also stated that under any freeze on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, all categories of research and development should be allowed except operational systems development.

[S] JCSM-695-64 to SecDef, 13 Aug 64, JMF 3050 (25 Jul 64).

24 Aug 64

ADCA had prepared a draft position paper advocating increased effort toward reaching an international agreement on nonproliferation. The JCS advised SecDef that there were overriding factors that made it inappropriate to press for nonproliferation at that time. These factors were the critical stage of MLF negotiations, the necessity of advance consultation with NATO, and the ineffectiveness of such a proposed treaty without CHICOM participation.

[S] JCSM-726-64 to SecDef, 24 Aug 64, JMF 3050 (14 Aug 64).

The JCS submitted views to SecDef on the following alternative methods of arms reduction as proposed by ACDA: (1) a US-USSR freeze on 1 Jul 65 of the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive delivery vehicles, coupled with a 30 percent reduction in these vehicles over a three-year period; (2) same as one but extended to include general purpose armaments; (3) same as two except that percentage cuts would be taken on asymmetrical basis (i.e., US took larger cuts than USSR in strategic nuclear deliver vehicles and smaller percentage cuts in general purpose armaments). The JCS concluded:

Communist China

NPT

10 Sep 64

Freeze on Strategic Forces

SNDV

Force Reductions

Communist China
Communist China should be signatories to any arms reduction agreement under all three alternatives.

(7) UK, France, and

23 Oct 64

India

(5) JCSM-900-64 to SecDef, 23 Oct 64, JMF 3050
(14 Oct 64).

20 Nov 64

NPT

Commenting on an ACDA position paper on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons for use by the US Delegation at the UN, the JCS advised SecDef that the UN ought not to adopt any resolution interfering with US nuclear transit rights or US nuclear support capabilities for its allies. They found the tactics proposed by ACDA appropriate for this end. On specific issues, the JCS advised that inclusion of a nonacquisition pledge would reduce UN support for a desirable resolution that extension of the nonproliferation agreement to non-member nations would raise problems concerning recognition, and that the US ought to oppose the inclusion of any limitation on MLF.

(5) JCSM-975-64 to SecDef, 20 Nov 64, JMF 3050
(12 Nov 64).

11 Dec 64

NPT

The JCS commented to SecDef on an ACDA five-point program for high-level discussion with the USSR as a renewed and broad effort seeking to prevent further nuclear proliferation. The points and the JCS comments were as follows: (1) Intensified effort to negotiate a non-proliferation agreement. JCS continued their opposition (see JCSM-726-64, 24 Aug. 64) to expansion of current US efforts on nonproliferation. (2) 

CTBT

Freeze on Strategic Forces

SNDV

AEM

(3) Reinstatement of negotiations
looking toward the achievement of a comprehensive nuclear test ban. The JCS did not oppose the concept of a truly effective comprehensive test ban treaty, but they noted that one criterion for effectiveness was a verification system that would ensure an adequate probability of discovering violations and that would be in operation when the treaty went into effect.

(4) Proposal to extend the freeze concept to include reduction of an agreed number of NdVs and launch sites. The JCS stated that, prior to any substantive discussions outside the US Government, the exact terms of the proposal should be defined and subjected to extensive evaluation. (5) An understanding to halt construction of any new land-based ICBM launch sites and AEM launch sites after 1 Jul 65, while negotiating limitations on nuclear delivery vehicles. Since this was a new measure, it required additional study by the JCS.

(TS) JCSM-1031-64 to SecDef, 11 Dec 64, JMF 3050 (3 Dec 64).
29 Jan 65

Commenting on an ACDA proposal for the transfer of fissionable material to peaceful uses with demonstrated destruction of certain nuclear weapons, the JCS continued to have reservations (see JCSM-562-64, 27 Jun 64), considering that it offered no real advantage. With regard to the ACDA proposal, they recommended that the transfer of fissionable materials (and transfer of fissionable materials and transfer of fissionable materials) be discussed with other nations and that the proposed weapons destruction inspection and verification system be spelled out in detail and thoroughly field-tested. They also called for a study of Soviet fissionable materials production.

(TS-RED) JCSM-66-65 to SecDef, 29 Jan 65, JMF 3050 (31 Dec 64) (1).

4 Feb 65

In response to an action by the Committee of Principals, the JCS prepared a study to determine the number of Western foreign-based forces that could be withdrawn from Central Europe in response to a 50,000-withdrawal of Soviet foreign-based troops. The JCS concluded that withdrawal of additional foreign-based NATO troops was not warranted militarily. If overriding political considerations dictated such a withdrawal, the JCS stated that the number should be the minimum practical, but not more than 20,000. Withdrawal should be undertaken only under the following conditions: (1) full support of the NATO allies; (2) agreement by the NATO allies withdrawing forces that such forces would be kept in a high state of readiness; (3) establishment of an adequate verification system.

(TS-SENSITIVE) JCSM-83-65 to SecDef, 4 Feb 65, JMF 3050 (21 Dec 64).

13 Feb 65

The JCS informed SecDef that, in a reversal of their position of 11 December 1964 (JCSM-1031-64), they now objected to a proposal by ACDA for an informal understanding with the USSR not to provide SNDV to other states.

(s) JCSM-105-65 to SecDef, 13 Feb 65, JMF 3050 (19 Jan 65).

11 Mar 65

The JCS furnished SecDef their views on a Dept of State paper concerning assurances for India in the event of a second Chinese nuclear explosion. The JCS had no objection to the paper provided it was modified to eliminate: (1) the connotation that the US would provide nuclear support for any free Asian nation that wanted US help against CHICOM nuclear aggression, and (2) the impression that
the US was pressing for a comprehensive test ban, cessation of production of fissionable material, and transfer of such material from weapons to peaceful uses.

(25 Feb 65).

24 Mar 65

In further comments (see JCSM-173-65, 11 Mar 65) concerning US assurances to India in light of Chinese nuclear tests, the JCS urged that any implied broadening of the extent of US commitments be avoided. "On 16 and 18 Oct 64, the President had stated: "The nations that do not seek national nuclear weapons can be sure that if they need our strong support against some threat of nuclear blackmail, then they will have it." The JCS recommended that any additional assurances to India be considered on a case-by-case basis, with continuing close coordination between State and Defense, to include JCS review.

[5] JCSM-213-65 to SecDef, 24 Mar 65, JMF 3050
(25 Feb 65).

3 Apr 65

The JCS commented to SecDef on an ACD draft proposal for the mutual elimination of US and Soviet strategic bomber forces.

3 Apr 65

(TS-RD) JCSM-237-65 to SecDef, 3 Apr 65, JMF 3050
(15 Jan 65) sec 1.

9 Apr 65

13 Apr 65

Commenting on an ACD draft Presidential message to Soviet leaders suggesting various disarmament areas for exploration, the JCS recommended against transmission of the message because of increasing indications of Soviet insincerity and lack of interest with respect to arms control. If such a high-level communication was deemed necessary, the JCS recommended that it be limited, at most, to exploration of the following items: (1) non-proliferation agreement; (2) how to meet the security concern of states that forego nuclear
nuclear weapons; (3) a Soviet follow-up on the Khrushchev statement on planned cutbacks of fissionable material production; (4) some destruction of nuclear weapons in connection with the US fissionable material cutoff and transfer proposal; (5) areas of agreement on the general subject of nuclear-free zones in nonnuclear areas; (6) the establishment of observation posts and a reduction of total force levels in Europe. The JCS also pointed out that the ACDA paper contained no provision for prior coordination of the draft Presidential message with the principal NATO allies.

21 Apr 65
Security
Assurances

The JCS advised SecDef they had no objection to an ACDA draft for a UNGA resolution that provided for assurances of assistance to nonnuclear countries to resist the threat of nuclear aggression.

11 May 65
CTBT
Communist China

The JCS forwarded to SecDef a SAAC study on a comprehensive nuclear test ban. The report concluded that military disadvantages of such a test ban outweighed the possible advantages. The test ban could prevent the US from acquiring new types of nuclear weapons, from maintaining enough scientific personnel to continue study and to rapidly resume testing, and from testing the vulnerability of hardened missile sites, command and control facilities, and re-entry vehicles. At the same time it would allow the USSR to exploit its technological advantages in 10-100 MT weapons and to gain valuable information by clandestine testing with little risk of detection. The US ought not to deny itself the dynamic and unpredictable results obtainable by testing without greater compensatory returns than appeared likely in a test ban.

17 May 65
NPT

The JCS forwarded to SecDef a Joint Staff study on the security implications of a nonproliferation policy.
of nuclear protection might be required in order to convince a country to forego pursuit of an independent nuclear capability.
The JCS declined to make specific recommendations on an ACDA position on the inclusion of ABMs in a freeze on SNDVs and limiting the testing of SNDVs. They cited a lack of specific proposals and a lack of knowledge of Soviet willingness to participate.

(TS) JCSM-582-65 to SecDef, 28 Jul 65; JMF 3050 (8 Jul 65).

5 Aug 65

The JCS commented to SecDef on two ACDA papers on nuclear test bans. They opposed the two proposals for a comprehensive test ban treaty because there was no verification system that could prevent clandestine testing. Significant gains in knowledge could be obtained by the USSR in low-yield clandestine testing, which might change the military balance. The JCS also opposed a threshold treaty because it would freeze the Soviet advantage over the US in high-yield weapons and allow the USSR to overcome US advantages in low-yield weapons. The technical problems involved in complying with a threshold treaty would severely limit the testing of a conscientious nation. Neither kind treaty would prevent proliferation, but each would restrain US nuclear development in a period of increasing CHICOM strength.

(TS) JCSM-601-65 to SecDef, 5 Aug 65, JMF 3050 (19 Jul 65) sec 1.

5 Aug 65

Commenting on an ACDA proposal for a nonproliferation agreement, the JCS concluded that the US should not aggressively pursue such a treaty at that time. If political considerations dictated otherwise at the current EDC or in subsequent international conferences, the JCS listed the following interests that must be provided for: (1) continued US nuclear flexibility to include international or multilateral sharing; (2) continued current and possible future US nuclear dispersal and delivery arrangements; (3) clearly defined, adequate safeguards. The JCS also opposed introducing into any nonproliferation treaty limitations on the use of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear powers. In addition, no agreement should be obtained at the risk of weakening the NATO structure and downgrading the credibility of the US nuclear deterrent.

(TS) JCSM-602-65 to SecDef, 5 Aug 65, JMF 3050 (16 Jul 65).

13 Aug 65

(TS) JCSM-624-65 to SecDef, 13 Aug 65, JMF 3050 (30 Jul 65).

14 Aug 65

The JCS furnished SecDef their views on an ACDA-proposed US position relating to: (1) freezing the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive delivery vehicles; (2) reducing the US and USSR inventories of offensive SNDVs by significant amounts; (3) exploring the above possibilities during a temporary cessation of land-based fixed ballistic missile launcher construction, not to exceed 18 months in duration. The JCS
concluded that the US Government should not offer the ACDA position at that time. If it was determined that further consultation with the USSR on a freeze proposal should be undertaken, the JCS believed that, in lieu of a US attempt to respond to Soviet objections, the discussions should be confined to determining, in private, whether the Soviets were interested in the principle of coupling some reductions with the freeze and, if so, the magnitude of the reductions they would consider. The US should not offer any specific numbers as a basis for negotiation.

(TS) JCSM-633-65 to SecDef, 14 Aug 65, JMF 3050 (20 Jul 65).

The JCS commenting by request on an OSD study on alternative test ban proposals, informed SecDef that the study did not dissuade them from their view that a comprehensive test ban would be to the military disadvantage of the United States. The study was deficient because it was unduly optimistic about US detection and verification capabilities, did not assess fully the relative nuclear positions of the US and the USSR, and was unduly optimistic regarding Soviet intentions to abide by treaty terms unless to do so was in their own interest.

(TS-RD) JCSM-645-65 to SecDef, 21 Aug 65, JMF 3050 (11 Aug 65).

Responding to an ASD (ISA) request for elaboration of their opposition (JCSM-602-65, 5 Aug 65) to a provision in a nonproliferation treaty limiting the use of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states, the JCS stated that their objection was based on the following three points: (1) the US must retain flexibility in its strategy to assure its security under all conditions; (2) such a provision could conceivably be used to advance a total prohibition against nuclear arms; (3) currently, such a provision could result in a misinterpretation of the US effort in SEA by Communist China and North Vietnam. The JCS did not believe that the proposal to limit the use of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states recognized the realities of the US power position and that adoption of such a proposal would deny the US continuing political and military advantages associated with the psychological deterrent effect of US nuclear superiority. Furthermore, the provision would impinge on US nuclear deployment arrangements, encourage enemy resistance in South Vietnam, and invite aggression elsewhere. Consequently, such a proposal would be detrimental to US security interests.

(S) JCSM-677-65 to SecDef, 10 Sep 65, JMF 3050 (16 Jul 65).

In response to an ASD (ISA) request, the JCS commented on ACDA recommendations concerning proposed guidance for the US UN Delegation on exploration with the Soviets of possible significant reductions of SNDVs in connection with a freeze and a joint DOD-ACDA study, directed toward development of a spectrum of alternative acceptable reductions from which proposals might be selected and against which Soviet proposals could be evaluated. The JCS stated that the US should not offer any specific numbers of SNDVs as a basis for negotiation until the Soviets
indicated the magnitude of reductions they would consider. The Joint Staff was conducting a study of the security implications of a freeze on strategic offensive and defensive systems, including the impact of possible reductions. The JCS would forward appropriate recommendations after review of that study. They did not believe a DOD-ACDA study directed toward developing alternative acceptable reductions was necessary.

(3) JCSM-54-65 to SecDef, 14 Oct 65, JMF 3050 (1 Oct 65).

In response to an ASD (ISA) request, the JCS provided SecDef comments on principles for inclusion in a treaty covering the exploration of celestial bodies. They stated that the provisions of the treaty should not preclude the conduct of intelligence activities as deemed essential to US security. In addition, they considered that certain basic precautions should be exercised in the negotiation of a treaty to prevent any nation from gaining a substantial military advantage, including: (1) symmetry in obligations and responsibilities by all parties participating in space exploration with all obligations subject to verification; (2) freedom of each party to verify compliance of treaty terms by all other parties; (3) right of each party to withdraw when its security interests were threatened.

(5) JCSM-639-65 to SecDef, 24 Nov 65, JMF 9000 (17 Nov 65).

Responding to an oral request from ASD (ISA) for comment on a proposed UN resolution for the denuclearization of Africa, the JCS reaffirmed their views of 9 Apr 65 (JCSM-263-65).

(7) JCSM-249-65 to SecDef, 1 Dec 65, JMF 3050 (26 Nov 65).
CTBT
Verification

7 Jan 66

Freeze on Strategic Weapons

The JCS, commenting at his request, informed SecDef that they opposed a memorandum for the President recommending that he insert in his State of the Union message a proposal for a mutual freeze by the US and the Soviet Union on land-based fixed strategic-ballistic and antiballistic missile launchers. The proposed ban was to begin on 1 July 1966 and last 18 months. To agree to such a freeze, they said would be detrimental to US national security because there was no means of verification other than insufficiently reliable unilateral intelligence, and because the Soviet Union could covertly construct missile launchers that would significantly improve its strategic position.

(TS) JCSM-14-66 to SecDef, 7 Jan 66, JMF 3050 (5 Jan 66).
The JCS, responding to an oral request by ASD (ISA), said that they approved recommendations in an ACDA draft position paper for safeguarding peaceful nuclear facilities. The draft position was for use at the 16-Nation Disarmament Committee meeting on 27 Feb 66. The proposed safeguards were as follows: urge all governments to accept IAEA or similar international safeguards on all peaceful activities; endeavor to win wide acceptance for strengthening Article III of the currently tabled US draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons; and endeavour to win acceptance of an additional clause in the draft treaty for "safeguards on exports of source or fissionable material to nonnuclear states." Their support for Article III, the JCS stressed, was subject to the condition that it could not be interpreted as subjecting nonnuclear powers participating in nuclear weapons sharing arrangements to safeguards that would impair their participation in these arrangements.

(c) JCSM-23-66 to SecDef, 12 Jan 66, JNF 3050 (8 Jan 66).

The JCS commented on an ACDA memo to the Committee of Principals proposing a Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), banning underground tests down to a threshold of 4.75 seismic magnitude. While recognizing possible political advantages, they believed that there were important political disadvantages which, together with military disadvantages, would be overriding. These disadvantages included: ineffective policing provisions; unreliable verification; inexactitude of seismology; preclusion of development of high-yield area defense ABM systems; prevention of rectification of serious vulnerabilities in existing US ballistic missile forces; and impairment of US ability to maintain competence in nuclear weapons technology.

(TS-RD) JCSM-28-66 to SecDef, 13 Jan 66, JNF 3050 (17 Dec 65) sec 1.

Commenting on an ACDA draft position paper on verification of shutdown production reactors as an adjunct to an agreement on cutoff of production of fissionable materials, the JCS reaffirmed their position that a cutoff of production of PU 239 for weapons use would preclude the US meeting its projected weapons stockpile requirements. They provided the following comments on the ACDA paper:

(1) adequate verification must be provided so that no undue advantage could accrue to the Soviet Union through clandestine production of fissionable material; (2) the AEC should determine the effectiveness of the suggested inspection method and the International AEC or some equivalent international agency should conduct the inspections if it was not feasible to do them by means of reciprocal arrangements; (3) any agreement for a plant-by-plant shutdown should provide for shutting plants having the same production capacity; (4) any international inspection of productive facilities closed down in connection with a reciprocal reduction should be applied to comparable facilities; (5) the unilateral US offer, made at the NDC in Feb 64, to place one
shutdown production reactor under international inspection could result in the acquisition of US production techniques by non-US inspectors. (TS) JCSM-34-66 to SecDef, 15 Jan 66, JMF 3050 (7 Jan 66).

The JCS commented on an ACDA position paper on "Demonstrated Destruction of Nuclear Weapons to Obtain Fissionable Materials for Transfer to Non-weapons Uses," containing an annex to be tabled as a working paper at the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference. The JCS made no objection to this procedure, subject to two reservations: (1) demonstration procedures should be presented with emphasis on their tentative nature because they had never been fully tested, and (2) because of the continuing US need for fissionable materials for weapons use, discussion of tritium should be avoided until the USSR showed a serious interest in destruction of nuclear weapons and transfer of fissionable material to peaceful uses. (ST) JCSM-35-66 to SecDef, 15 Jan 66, JMF 3050 (18 Oct 65).

Commenting on a revised ACDA paper on nonproliferation, the JCS found the paper in consonance with their previously stated views (see JCSM-602-65, 5 Aug 65). They also pointed out that the problem of peaceful uses of nuclear energy had not been covered in the draft nonproliferation treaty and recommended that an article be added to cover this matter. The JCS cautioned that extreme care must be taken to prevent nonnuclear states from being allowed to frustrate the objective of the treaty under the cover of peaceful research. They also noted the ACDA indication that forthcoming US-UK talks might change the paper, recommending clearance of any substantive changes resulting from those talks with the US government agencies concerned, including the JCS, prior to acceptance. (TS) JCSM-36-66 to SecDef, 15 Jan 66, JMF 3050 (16 Jul 65) sec 2.

The JCS opposed an ACDA position paper favoring a CTBT. They believed that the military balance might already have been upset by important Soviet gains in nuclear technology, citing possible examples. They further believed that the Soviets might have begun to deploy an ABM, which the US must counter. The JCS pointed out that under a CTBT, but not a CTBT, the US could make the necessary advances. (TS-ND) JCSM-37-66 to SecDef, 15 Jan 66, JMF 3050 (19 Jul 65) sec 2.

In response to an ASD (ISA) request, the JCS commented on an ACDA-proposed position paper on limitations on arms transfers, which proposed that the US representative at the next session of the E1D express US interest in exploring ways of avoiding or containing an arms race in "sophisti- cated" military hardware in developing regions of the world. The JCS interposed no objection to the ACDA paper but pointed out that the complexity of the problems associated with the implementation of the proposal could easily negate its usefulness as a meaningful arms control measure. Care must
The JCS forwarded to SecDef their views on a proposed Presidential message drafted by ACD for presentation at the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference. They approved the following:

1. Offer to sign a foolproof nuclear non-proliferation treaty.
2. Proposal that all transfers of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes to countries not possessing nuclear weapons be under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.
3. Discouragement of nonnuclear powers from entering the nuclear arms race by strengthening the UN and other international security arrangements. They objected to the following:

1. Proposal to extend the present limited nuclear test ban treaty to cover underground nuclear tests.

In addition, there was no acceptable verification system.
2. Proposal for a verified halt in all production of fissionable materials for weapons use. The JCS reiterated the objections stated on 15 Jan 66 (JCSM-35-66).
3. Proposal for concurrent examination of issues involved in both a freeze on and reductions in SNDVs. The JCS believed progress should be made on a freeze proposal before taking up reductions.

The JCS, commenting at the request of SecDef, informed him that they opposed the proposal in a draft US position paper to authorize concurrent discussions of a freeze on and reduction in the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs). The proposed position was an extension of a statement by the US Ambassador at the UN General Assembly, in which he said the US would be willing to explore the possibility of significant reduction in the number of SNDVs if progress were first made in the exploration of a freeze on their numbers and characteristics. The proposed paper extended the US position beyond the statement to the UNGA by suggesting simultaneous discussions of a freeze and reductions without first obtaining progress on a freeze.

The JCS objected to this proposal because they believed it would be counterproductive to introduce new initiatives on matters in which the Soviet Union had shown no interest. Such action would
appear to encourage the Soviet Union not to respond to US arms control and disarmament proposals in the expectation that the United States would continue voluntarily to add concessions.

(3) JCSM-56-66 to SecDef, 28 Jan 66, JMF 3050
(20 Jul 65) sec 1.

The JCS informed SecDef that they had given serious consideration to arms control proposals to extend the LTET to cover underground nuclear explosions. To evaluate the security implications of further nuclear test restraints, the JCS had designated the USAP as the Executive Agent to establish a panel to produce the desired analysis. The JCS forwarded to SecDef the report of that panel, saying that it did not alter their previously stated views. They remained firmly opposed to either a CTBT or at

(TS) JCSM-77-66 to SecDef, 3 Feb 66, JMF 3050
(3 Sep 65).

The JCS forwarded a study of the security implications of a freeze on strategic offensive and defensive systems to SecDef. They noted that the study supported the basic arms control criteria they had submitted on 8 Oct 63 (JCSM-776-63), particularly with regard to the inadequacy of unilateral intelligence as the primary means of verification under a SNDV agreement, the necessity to pursue a vigorous R&D effort, and the implications of the Nth country problem.

(TS) JCSM-79-66 to SecDef, 4 Feb 66, JMF 3050
(10 Mar 65) sec 1.

The JCS opposed a Dept of State proposal that the US consider offering a reciprocal exchange of information with the USSR on procedures for insuring control of nuclear weapons. They stated that, in any open discussion and comparison of the two systems, the Soviets would have a distinct propaganda advantage because of the worldwide dispersal and advanced conditions of readiness of US nuclear weapons. In addition, they believed that providing information to the Soviets on the US command and control system might assist the USSR in improving the military effectiveness of their nuclear posture. They also considered that such an exchange could allow exploitation of the vulnerabilities of the US command and control system, would require the release of sensitive data, and could not avoid the sensitive issue of nuclear arrangements with US allies.

(S) JCSM-117-66 to SecDef, 26 Feb 66, JMF 3050
(1 Feb 66).

The CJCS commented on an ACDA-recommended course of action for use in responding to a statement by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko concerning nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. He referred to the JCS positions of 5 Aug 65 (JCSM-601-65) and 13 Jan 66 (JCSM-26-66) on peaceful uses of atomic explosions in conjunction with any nuclear test ban. The JCS believed that there was nothing in the current Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTET) to prohibit underground explosions for peaceful purposes so long as they did not cause radioactive debris outside territorial limits.

(S) DM-324-66 to SecDef, 29 Feb 66, JMF 3050
(17 Mar 65) sec 2.
The JCS gave general approval to an ACDA-prepared response to Premier Kosygin's proposal to include in the nonproliferation treaty a provision prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear powers, signatories to the treaty, that had no nuclear weapons on their territories. The JCS opposed the Kosygin proposal in any form, adding that the US ought to avoid the inclusion of a non-use provision in any nonproliferation treaty. If security assurances were necessary, they ought to take the form of a UN resolution, general in nature and not committing the US to a specific course of action. The inclusion of a non-use or a security assurance clause should require the US to reappraise the desirability of a nonproliferation treaty.

1 Apr 66

The JCS, in comments on tentative conclusions by ASD (ISA) on a JCS SSG study (JCSM-79-66, 4 Feb 66) and other studies on freeze and reduction of SNDVs made the following points:

1. Any consideration of reductions in SNDVs must be dependent on a verifiable freeze on the production of all strategic delivery vehicles and their related launchers. Otherwise an agreement to reduce an SNDV system would not prevent a buildup of replacement or alternate systems—a development that could only be observed by inadequate unilateral intelligence means.

2. The US should not agree to reduce its ICBMs in return for a reduction in Soviet MR/MBMs until a detailed analysis of the consequences could be made. To make the reduction without such an analysis could be to the US disadvantage because of the growing invulnerability of Soviet ICBMs as a result of site-hardening and growing offensive capability resulting from increased payloads.

3. The US should not exchange lists of weapons to be destroyed without first determining in private whether the Soviets were interested in coupling some reductions with a freeze. A simple exchange of lists without such a prior determination would support Soviet propaganda in favor of an uninspected ban on all nuclear weapons.

4. The present generalizations about the effect of a reduction in SNDVs on conventional and tactical nuclear forces were not valid. A precise delineation of the impact of such a reduction could only be derived from the provisions of a specific reduction proposal.

16 Apr 66

Commenting on a preliminary draft of a Latin American nuclear-free zone (LA NFZ) treaty, the JCS informed SecDef that there were substantial issues not fully covered in the draft treaty, such as the relationship of the NFZ to the OAS—a matter that had never been fully coordinated within the US Government. The JCS recommended that the Committee of Principals conduct a review of the overall implications of the LA NFZ.
9 May 66

The JCS opposed an ACDA proposal for an 18-month freeze on strategic forces during which the US would not initiate construction of any new fixed land-based offensive missile launchers on ABM launchers if the USSR would reciprocate. The JCS objected that the ACDA proposal would not cover mobile land-based strategic missiles; it depended on unilateral intelligence for verification; it could give the USSR a MIRV advantage; and it would inhibit US ABM deployment.

(TS) JCSM-244-66 to SecDef, 16 Apr 66, JMP 3050

21 May 66

Responding to an ASD (ISA) request for comments on an ACDA paper giving tentative conclusions regarding the proper US policy with respect to chemical and biological weapons, the JCS recommended that ACDA be informed that no action would be taken on its paper within DOD until a national policy on such weapons had been established, or at least until a general DOD position had been developed. The JCS reaffirmed their view that a national policy on chemical and biological weapons should be established as a matter of priority. Further, they believed that the arms control and disarmament aspects of the subject should not be considered until a national policy, or at least a DOD policy position, had been formulated.

(TS) JCSM-311-66 to SecDef, 9 May 66, JMP 3050
(2 May 66).

8 Jun 66

The JCS furnished views to SecDef on an ACDA memo to Members of Committee of Principals proposing a threshold test ban (TTB). After referring to the views already furnished on 13 Jan 66 (JCSM-28-66), the JCS added that the new developments cited by ACDA were insufficient to warrant acceptance of the 4.75 TTB proposal and the first step for carrying out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes should be an amendment to the existing Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT).

(TS-RD) JCSM-379-66 to SecDef, 8 Jun 66, JMP 3050
(17 Dec 65) sec 3.
15 Jun 66
The JCS commented on ACDA proposals for peaceful purpose nuclear explosions under TTB or under amendments to the existing LTB. They reiterated their opposition to a TTB (see JCSM-379-66, 8 Jun 66) and opposed any extension of the LTB at that time that would further curtail testing. They supported the ACDA proposal on LTB provided the following changes were made: deletion of the veto provision from the initial US negotiating position; provision of a precise definition of the radiation debris limitation.

15 Jun 66
In commenting on an ACDA proposal that the threshold test ban be discussed with the President, the JCS reiterated their views of 8 Jun 66 (JCSM-379-66).
If ACDA did forward the proposal to the President, the JCS requested that their views be included.

29 Jun 66
The JCS advised SecDef that the revised draft of the US nonproliferation treaty, approved by the Committee of Principals, was in consonance with previously expressed JCS views favoring the principle of nonproliferation, with two exceptions:
(1) There was no provision for clearly defined safeguards on peaceful nuclear facilities and programs to prevent nonnuclear states from developing nuclear weapons under the guise of peaceful research. The JCS reiterated the view expressed on 12 Jan 66 (JCSM-23-66) and 15 Jan 66 (JCSM-36-66) that clearly defined safeguards should be an integral part of a nonproliferation treaty.

(2) Proliferation was defined in terms of "physical access" rather than "control," which might lead the Soviet Union to press for abandonment of all NATO nuclear arrangements and consultative arrangements during negotiation of the nonproliferation treaty. The JCS believed that the draft treaty must insure that present nuclear arrangements or consultative arrangements were not jeopardized.

8 Jul 66
The JCS, commenting at his request, advised SecDef of the military factors involved in mutual troop withdrawal from Europe. The Secretary's request was in response to a communication from the SecState pointing out that political pressures might lead to a mutual troop withdrawal proposal at the NATO Defense Ministers' Meeting in July.
The JCS expressed the following views: (1) unilateral withdrawal of 5 to 10 Soviet divisions from East Germany would not be sufficient compensation for existing NATO shortages of 5 M-Day divisions and extensive short-falls in reserve forces; (2) any consideration of withdrawal of US forces alone must take into account current views of major allies; (3) a unilateral Soviet withdrawal might be designed to evoke troop reductions by NATO members; (4) withdrawal must be considered in terms of strategic warning and the time required to reintroduce forces; (5) until a suitable political basis for withdrawal could be established, it was not desirable to withdraw additional non-European
The JCS furnished SecDef their views on the acceptability of a proposal by Amb Goldberg designed to resolve the outstanding issue on the peaceful use of the celestial bodies treaty. As written, the article would call on parties to the treaty not to orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear or other mass destruction weapons and not to establish military bases or fortifications, not to test weapons, or not to conduct military maneuvers on celestial bodies. It would also allow the use of military personnel and equipment for scientific research. Amb Goldberg proposed deletion of the sentence covering the use of military personnel and equipment, to improve the prospect of Soviet agreement. The JCS believed that retention of the questioned sentence would result in an article less susceptible to conflicting interpretation and they concurred in the Goldberg proposal only as a final concession. The JCS were seriously concerned over the lack of US capability to verify the presence of weapons of mass destruction in orbit and believed that continued effort should be expanded toward its attainment. On a related matter, they posed no objection to the expansion of the scope of the treaty to include all of outer space.

Responding to an ASD (ISA) request, the JCS commented on an ACD paper concerning proposals for drafting a Latin American denuclearization treaty. The JCS believed that it would be in the overall US security interest to participate in a LA NFZ and provided it could be effectively implemented and that existing US nuclear presence and transit and overflight rights, as well as US protection of the Panama Canal, were not jeopardized. It would also be necessary that all Latin American states, including Cuba, participate. If these conditions could not be obtained, the JCS recommended that the US not support a LA NFZ.

The JCS furnished SecDef their views on a Dept of State proposal for a possible plan for making the benefits of peaceful purpose nuclear explosions (FLOWSHARE) available to the world while at the same time paving the way to amend the existing LTBT to include provisions along this line. They believed that an acceptable international arrangement for the control of peaceful purpose nuclear explosions must provide assurance that US design information would not be compromised and that other countries would not make significant gains in nuclear weapons technology under the guise of peaceful purpose explosions. The JCS considered that the State proposal could provide these assurances and they supported the proposal provided
that: (1) it not be used to further either a threshold or a comprehensive test ban; (2) "the one-for-one principle" be more precisely defined, with the aid of AEC-developed guidelines; (3) FLOWSHARE activities and experiments that were permissible under the LTET not be subject to international supervision; (4) no veto provisions be included in the plan. The LCS also supported proceeding with the currently planned FLOWSHARE nuclear excavation program since further delay could adversely affect US national security.

(TS) JCSM-531-66 to SecDef, 22 Aug 66, JMF 3050 (9 Aug 66).

10 Sep 66

Freeze on Strategic Forces

The LCS forwarded to SecDef a follow-on study on aspects of a SNDV freeze and reduction, supplementing the one supplied on 4 Feb 66 (JCSM-79-66). When used together, the LCS stated, the two studies formed an analytical data base that could aid in making preliminary judgements on specific freeze and reduction proposals. Analysis of the war game results in the study reinforced the earlier views of LCS regarding the difficulty of finding solutions to the many problems associated with practical application of a SNDV freeze and reduction proposal.

SNDV

In particular, the study revealed even more clearly than previous examinations the complex and potentially destabilizing nature of arms control proposals having SNDV freeze and reduction as their basis.

(TS) JCSM-574-66 to SecDef, 10 Sep 66, JMF 3050 (10 Mar 65).

22 Sep 66

The LCS recommended against either unilateral or mutual withdrawals of forces from Europe. Their recommendation was in response to a request from SecDef for amplification of their views of 8 July (JCSM-452-66) to take into account reductions of two divisions, four divisions, or a retention of major ground forces but a thinning out of support units and tactical air forces.}

(TS-RD) JCSM-605-66 to SecDef, 22 Sep 66, JMF 3050 (13 Jun 66) sec. 2.

29 Sep 66

Responding to an oral request from the Deputy ASD (Arms Control), the Director, Joint Staff, stated that the LCS had grave reservations as to the effects any extension of the Limited Test Ban Treaty would have on US security. The reasons for expressing reservations were: indications that the Soviet Union had already made important gains in nuclear weapons technology that could alter the...
military balance; prevention of US development of an optimum ABM system; and the absence of an acceptable verification system.
(TS) DSM-1261-66 to ASD(ISA), 29 Sep 66, JMF 3050 (20 Sep 66).

25 Nov 66

Tripartite Conference on Seismic Effects

The JCS commenting on an agenda prepared by ACDA, recommended to SecDef that US delegates to a proposed US-UK-USSR conference on seismic identification be limited to discussing currently unclassified technological information.

The JCS recommended that they be given an opportunity to review any agenda for the talks prepared by the USSR, that they be represented by an observer at the talks, and that any future arms control actions of similar magnitude be considered by the Committee of Principals.
(TS) JCSM-733-66 to SecDef, 25 Nov 66, JMF 3050 (8 Sep 66).
The JCS commented to SecDef on a draft State Department position paper on a possible freeze agreement on strategic forces. They said that they did not object to exploring with the Soviets means of leveling off strategic offensive and defensive forces, but this in no way affected their previous recommendations to deploy NIKE-X operationally in FY 1972. The US must first determine the extent, if any, of Soviet interest in limiting strategic arms. The JCS should review any specific arms control proposal before it went outside the US Government. The US should tell the USSR early in any discussions that it would address verification after a general area of agreement was determined.

Research, development, and prototype testing must be permitted and US planned improvements in missiles pursued. The JCS opposed any discussion of MIRVs with the USSR; they believed that any consideration of an AEM freeze must include SAMS with significant AEM capability, and they felt it essential that any agreement between the US and the USSR limiting strategic arms be formalized as a treaty.

The JCS informed SecDef that they had no objection to the use of a proposed ACDA position paper on security assurances and nonproliferation at the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) scheduled to convene in Geneva on 21 Feb 67. They stated, however, that they had serious
reservations regarding the inclusion in a UN resolution of negative assurances limiting the use of nuclear weapons. Specifically, they opposed any public declaration wherein the US should pledge not to use nuclear weapons.

(1) JCSM-96-67 to SecDef, 21 Feb 67, JMF 750 (2 Feb 67)

27 Feb 67

In a memorandum to SecDef, the JCS expressed concern that the current US position supporting an extension of the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) did not recognize the impact this would have on the US strategic posture. The JCS believed that a continuation of nuclear testing without further restriction was essential to the maintenance of the US deterrent posture.

(TS-RD) JCSM-109-67 to SecDef, 27 Feb 67, JMF 730 (18 Feb 67) sec 1.

14 Mar 67

In commenting to SecDef on a revised draft of the State Department position paper on strategic arms limitations on which they had commented earlier (JCSM-30-67, 19 Jan 67), the JCS said that the paper set forth a position "not in the national security interest of the United States." They opposed provisions that would foreclose a US option to deploy an ABM system and would degrade improvements to US strategic missile systems. 

Freeze on Strategic Forces

Verification

18 Mar 67

The Director, Joint Staff, recommended to ASD(ISA) that a copy of JCSM-96-67, 21 Feb 67, be furnished to ACDA. The JCS had received word informally that the DOD concurrence in the ACDA draft position paper on security assurances and nonproliferation had given ACDA the impression that the JCS had changed their position on negative security assurances. In fact, the Director pointed out, the JCS in the cited JCSM had indicated their continued opposition to inclusion of a clause in a unilateral verification should be confined to a limit on ABMs and a quantitative freeze on fixed, land-based offensive systems.

(TS) JCSM-143-67 to SecDef, 14 Mar 67, JMF 755 (13 Jan 67) sec 2.
TOP SECRET

proposed UN resolution that would limit the use of nuclear weapons.
(S) JCSM-344-67 to ASD(ISA), 18 Mar 67; (S) SAACM-73-67 to D/JS, 16 Mar 67; JMF 750 (2 Feb 67).

Commenting to SecDef on an ACDA memo recommending various actions that the US might take in conjunction with a decision to deploy the NIKE-X ballistic missile system, the JCS reaffirmed their conclusion that, of all the actions required to maintain a suitable strategic posture in the mid-range period, none was more necessary for US defense than deployment of NIKE-X. Adoption of the ACDA recommendations could seriously delay the NIKE-X deployment. The JCS held that no discussions on BMD limitations should be undertaken with the USSR, allies, or others prior to announcement of a US decision to deploy a NIKE-X ballistic missile defense system.
(TS) JCSM-493-67 to SecDef, 8 Sep 67, JMF 481 (28 Aug 67).

In presenting views to SecDef on an ACDA draft position paper relating to the treaty of Tlatelolco (Denuclearization of Latin America; see JCSM-502-66, 4 Aug 66), the JCS stated that the paper did not meet the requirements specified by them and that the US should not sign Protocol I of the Treaty /Protocol I. Parties outside the zone shall undertake the obligations of the treaty with respect to their territories within the zone. The JCS recommended that DOD object to further coordination or adoption of the present draft, that the US position be reevaluated on the basis of JCS views, and that JCS representatives participate in the formulation of interpretative statements. Should reevaluation result in a new proposed paper, the JCS would wish to reconsider the security implications of any recommendation that the US sign Protocol II. 
/Protocol II: Parties possessing nuclear weapons will respect the status of denuclearization of the zone, will not contribute to acts involving violation of obligations of the parties and will not use or threaten the use of nuclear weapons against the contracting parties./
(S) JCSM-559-67 to SecDef, 17 Oct 67, JMF 976/755 (27 Sep 67).

Again presenting views to SecDef on the Treaty of Tlatelolco (see JCSM-559-67, 17 Oct 67), on this occasion in connection with a draft talking paper for the President for use in a meeting with the President of Mexico, the JCS recommended an amendment that would, in the course of declaring US intention to sign Protocol II, also advise the Mexican President of US concerns with regard to the treaty's purposes and objectives. Subject to this amendment and to a condition that suggested interpretative statements be closely coordinated among all interested US agencies before final acceptance, the JCS concurred in the proposed talking paper.
(TS) JCSM-582-67 to SecDef, 26 Oct 67, JMF 976/755 (27 Sep 67), sec 2.

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The JCS recommended that any proposal be addressed by the Committee of Principals prior to discussion with Soviet representatives. Should a decision be made to pursue an agreement depending on unilateral verification as the primary means of determining compliance, the agreement should be limited to numerical restriction on ABMs and on fixed land-based offensive systems—elements for which a high degree of confidence existed as to the US capability for timely detection and evaluation.

(TS-SENSITIVE) JCSM-596-67 to SecDef, 2 Nov 67, JMF 755 (13 Jan 68) sec 2.

Commenting on a draft position paper on C-B warfare, prepared by ACDA for use in the UNGA, the JCS informed SecDef they had no objection except to the statement

(S) CM-2785-67 to SecDef, 27 Nov 67, JMF 313 (14 Nov 67).
16 Jan 68
In commenting to SecDef on a DPM that would recommend US signature of Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco (see JCSM-582-67, 26 Oct 67) and accompany this signature with an interpretative statement to influence international understanding of the treaty in a manner favorable to US interests, the JCS said that the proposed interpretative statement was satisfactory. They asked that State be informed of the understandings concerning overflights and in-port visits to Latin America upon which their concurrence was based. Since, in their opinion, a settled international understanding of the treaty that was in accord with the US interpretation must be a condition precedent to US ratification, the JCS recommended that the DPM be amended to make this condition clear, rather than relating ratification to gaining support for the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

(S) JCSM-32-68 to SecDef, 16 Jan 68, JMF 976/755
(27 Sep 67) Sec 2.

19 Feb 68
In connection with negative security assurances to be included in a draft UNSC resolution, the CJCS informed SecDef that the JCS considered that any form of negative security assurances to geographical areas outside the American Hemisphere would weaken the US nuclear deterrent, reduce military flexibility, and set a precedent that could lead to further restrictions on US nuclear options. He recommended that the US position be changed to reject any form of nuclear non-use commitment other than those required by the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

(S) CM-3023-68 to SecDef, 19 Feb 68, JMF 750
(2 Feb 67)

11 Apr 68
Having reviewed the revised draft NPT tabled jointly by the US and USSR at the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), the JCS noted that it was consistent with their previously stated views (JCSM-36-66, 15 Jan 66). They realized, however, that during the forthcoming UNGA session the non-use of nuclear weapons was almost certain to be addressed and that the US delegation was prepared to make public a US non-use commitment. The JCS therefore endorsed the recommendation made earlier by the CJCS (CM-3023-68), 15 Feb 68 that the US position be changed to reject any form of nuclear non-use commitment other than that required by the Treaty of Tlatelolco. In the event the position was not changed, they asked that prior to actual introduction or support by the USG of a non-use commitment, they be afforded an opportunity to comment on the actual proposal.

(S) JCSM-230-68 to SecDef, 11 Apr 68, JMF 751
(2 Apr 66).

15 Apr 68
Commenting on a Soviet proposal to the UNGA to ban military activities as well as nuclear weapons from the seabeds beyond the boundaries of national jurisdiction, the JCS informed SecDef that the long-range consequences of banning emplacement of nuclear weapons on the seabeds could be detrimental to the security of the United States.
JCS agreed that establishment of a UN specialized agency to encourage international cooperation in oceanography was in the US interest. (TS) JCSM-235-68 to SecDef, 15 Apr 68, JMF 731 (3 Apr 68).

17 Apr 68

In presenting views to SecDef on AGDA-proposed instructions to the US UN Delegation on the NPT and security assurances, the JCS repeated their opposition to a US commitment to nuclear non-use. They strongly opposed the US becoming a party to an NPT that had a nuclear non-use commitment in any form associated with it. They requested that SecDef take action to have the authorization to commit the US to a non-use obligation removed from the instructions to the US Delegation. If it was not to be removed, they asked that their views be brought to the attention of the President. (S) JCSM-249-68 to SecDef, 17 Apr 68, JMF 731 (2 Apr 68).

27 Apr 68

Commenting to SecDef on a draft AGDA position paper on arms control on the seabeds, the JCS reaffirmed the view that US support for arms control measures on the seabeds would not be in the national interest at that time (JCSM-235-68, 15 Apr 68).

(TS) JCSM-272-68 to SecDef, 27 Apr 68, JMF 731 (12 Apr 68).

11 May 68

The CJCS informed SecDef that the JCS, after considering a proposed DOD document on military implications of arms control proposals and restrictive legal regimes for the seabeds, continued to believe that the US should not support seabed arms control measures at that time. Such measures were considered to offer a potential for grave harm to US interests. (S) CM-283-68 to SecDef, 11 May 68, JMF 751 (3 Apr 68).

15 Jul 68

The Director, Joint Staff, forwarded to SecDef the views of the JCS on a proposed message by the President to the SHDC, which referred to a production cutoff of fissionable materials and a CTBT. The JCS recommended omitting...
Cutoff of Fissionable Materials

CTBT

statements on the cutoff and CTBT since they believed the military dangers in reiterating these previous offers outweighed the possible tactical advantages of pre-empting questions on them within ENDC. The JCS were concerned over the impact that a CTBT would have on the US strategic posture. They held that continuation of nuclear testing without further restriction was essential to the maintenance of the US deterrent posture and any further restriction would be contrary to the national interest. Efforts to achieve a CTBT, a threshold treaty, or any extension of present limitations on testing should be halted so that the US would not be confronted by a Soviet acceptance of such a proposal at a time most disadvantageous to the United States.

(5) JCSM-357-68 to SecDef, 15 Jul 68, JMF 755 (2 Jul 68) sec 2.

9 Aug 68

Strategic Arms Limitations

Verification

10 Aug 68

Seabeds

In providing views to SecDef on a proposed memo to the President on arms control on the seabeds the JCS recommended substitute wording designed to avoid foreclosing certain military options that had been reviewed and approved by the President.

(5) JCSM-497-68 to SecDef, 10 Aug 68, JMF 731 (12 Apr 68) sec 2.

24 Aug 68

With regard to a draft interim report by an interagency working group to determine when a cutoff in the production of fissionable materials would be to the net advantage of the United States, the JCS recommended that the study be terminated. In the future, the criterion for
Cutoff of Fissile Materials Verification Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT)

determining the feasibility of a cutoff should be the adequacy of the available fissile material at the time of cutoff to meet forecast weapon requirements. They did not object to the proposed change in the US position on verification provided the US was prepared to exercise immediately its right of withdrawal from the agreement in the event of detection of clandestine facilities. They opposed a cutoff of the production of fissile materials for weapons use at that time as being contrary to the national interest.

The JCS informed SecDef that until the prospects for, general outlines of, and possible implications of strategic nuclear arms limitation talks with the Soviets became more clear they considered a cutoff proposal would be imprudent and could involve major risks for the United States. They did not oppose a demonstrated destruction of nuclear weapons agreement provided it did not compromise US weapon design and construction, its procedures guaranteed that the USSR was positively destroying nuclear weapons, an inspection and verification system was tested to assure feasibility and practicality, and only weapons marked for retirement were destroyed. The JCS did oppose a plant-by-plant shutdown.

(10 Sep 68 Referring to a State draft message for dispatch to the US Mission NATO on the subject of Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT), the CJCS informed SecDef that the JCS had consistently held that reduction of world tension should precede arms control measures that would constrain US military flexibility. In light of the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia, he considered it inappropriate to suggest that the US and USSR begin SALT at present or in the near future. He therefore recommended against dispatch of the State message at that time.

(TS) CN-3642-68 to SecDef, 10 Sep 68, JMF 755 (29 Jun 68) sec 5.
29 Jan 69

A talking paper prepared for the use of SecDef and CJCS at the NSC meeting on 29 Jan 69 expressed the following positions: the NPT was still in the US national interest; the President should actively seek Senate approval and should follow this with immediate ratification; the US should use diplomatic pressure "where appropriate to advance the NPT but must use discretion to avoid disrupting existing defense alliances; if it was decided that NPT was not in the national interest, the President should nevertheless not abruptly seek disengagement.

(S) JCS 2482/18, 29 Jan 69, JMF 760 (21 Jan 69).

11 Feb 69

In a talking paper on SALT, approved by the JCS on 11 Feb 69, they took the position that the start of talks and tabling of a proposal should be deferred until completion of the US force posture review. In order to be ready should it become necessary to begin the talks prior to completion of the review, early action should be taken to define goals in order to establish objectives and principles.

(TS) JCS 2482/23, 12 Feb 69, JMF 750 (11 Feb 69)

4 Mar 69

Seabeds

Verification

(TS) JCS 2482/25, 3 Mar 69, JMF 752 (12 Feb 69)

6 Mar 69

In a memo to SecDef the JCS stated that they continued to oppose a CTBT, TTBT, or any extension of the present LTBT to the underground environment. They considered the continuation of nuclear testing without further restriction essential to the maintenance of the US strategic posture and held that any further restriction would be contrary to the US national interest.

(TS-RD) JCSC-127-69 to SecDef, 6 Mar 69, JMF 752 (12 Feb 69)
The Director, Joint Staff, and ASD(ISA) approved a talking paper for use by SecDef and CJCS at the NSC meeting on 12 Mar 69, where US positions for the forthcoming ENDC meeting would be discussed. The talking paper gave the following JCS positions, which differed from the OSD position on the same questions: (1) Within the ENDC the US should not reiterate its support for a verified CTB; rather, the US should publicly state its need for continued testing; (2) a cutoff-transfer-destruction agreement would not now be in the overall US security interest, since it would preclude meeting the JSOP weapons requirements for FX 70-71; therefore the US should not reiterate its support for such an agreement within ENDC.

The paper set forth a single OSD/JCS view on the other questions: (1) An agreement not on a CTB would not be in the net security interest of the US; no firm answer could be given on whether CTB would be acceptable in three years, irrespective of whether or not initial operational ABM and MIRV warheads had been achieved.

(2) Should it be found necessary to put forward a new cutoff-transfer-destruction proposal, the following modifications would be acceptable: (a) a lessened requirement for inspection, along the lines of the NPT inspection procedures, provided the US was prepared to exercise immediately its right of withdrawal upon detection of clandestine facilities; (b) omission of demonstrated destruction of nuclear weapons while retaining the transfer of agreed amounts of U 235 and plutonium to peaceful uses; (c) equal US and Soviet transfers of fissionable material to peaceful uses, in place of the previous US proposal for asymmetric amounts.

(3) A seabeds arms control agreement would not be in the overall US security interest.

(4) The US should present no specific proposal, and the ENDC should merely discuss "the factors vital to a seabeds arms control agreement."

(TS) JCS 2482/25-7, 12 Mar 69, JMF 752 (12 Feb 69), sec. 2.

In a memo to SecDef, the JCS reexamined the issue of a seabeds arms control treaty and again concluded that it was impossible to envision all of the ramifications affecting US security interests. The JCS believed that such a treaty was not now in the overall security interest of the US and would bear a potential for grave harm.

(TS) JCSM-242-69 to SecDef, 22 Apr 69, JMF 756 (11 Apr 69).

(JCS 2482/30-5, 30 Apr 69, JMF 756 (11 Apr 69).

The JCS reaffirmed their views (JCSM-519-68, 24 Aug 68, and JCSM-127-69, 5 Mar 69) that the LBTB should not be extended to the underground environment and that the US should avoid any agreement involving the cutoff of fissionable materials for weapons purposes.

(TS-RD) JCSM-256-69 to SecDef, 2 May 69, JMF 730 (26 Feb 69).
17 Jun 69

The JCS provided SecDef their comments on a study concerning preparation of the US position for SALT, prepared in response to NSSM-28. The JCS said that the study, after appropriate modification, would provide the basis for development of a strategic arms control proposal for discussion with the USSR. They emphasized the following points:

- Verification
- AEM
- Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV)
TOP SECRET

23 Jun 69

The JCS forwarded their views on the "Stop Where We Are" proposal (SWWA) to SecDef. The JCS considered SWWA to be more restrictive and comprehensive than NSSM-28 because it added five main constraints to those in NSSM-28. Package IV:

(1) Even greater constraints on advances in technology
(2) Prohibition on improvements in the throw-weight and accuracy of present ICBMs and SLBMs
(3) Restrictions on flight testing to pre-announced confidence firings of previously tested missiles
(4) Prohibition on the completion of the approximately 300 Soviet ICBM silos and 250 SLBM launchers currently under construction, which was probably not negotiable
(5) A freeze on the number of strategic
bombers and SAM launchers and a prohibition on the introduction of new types.

The JCS recommended that because SWWA contained numerous risks that made it unacceptable from a national security standpoint, it be eliminated from further consideration.

(TS) JCSM-390-69 to SecDef, 23 Jun 69, JMF 751 (18 Jun 69).

25 Jun 69

A lengthy talking paper on SALT, prepared for the use of SecDef and CJCS at the NSC meeting on 25 Jun 69, concluded with the following recommendations, among others:

(1) Since intergovernmental preparation for SALT had so far been dealing with illustrative packages, the US position, proposal, and negotiating tactics should now be developed on a priority basis. A drafting committee should be established to prepare, based on NSC guidance, a negotiating position and instructions to the delegation.

(2) No option as comprehensive as SWWA should be included in the US negotiating position.

(3) The "JCS opposition to a MIRV ban and a MIRV test ban/should/ be recognized in establishing a US position."

(TS) JCS 2482/23 15, 26 Jun 69, JMF 751 (6 Mar 69) sec 5.

17 Jul 69

SALT

Verification

Moratorium

(TS) JCS 2482/37-3, 18 Jul 69; (TS) ACSAN-41-69 to Henry A. Kissinger, 18 Jul 69; JMF 751 (2 Jul 69) sec 2.

13 Jul 69

In preparation for SALT the JCS set forth views on the suitability and desirability of applying restrictions on missile volume and throw-weight in any possible agreement. They concluded that volume and/or throw-weight limitations as applied to land-based or sea-based systems, either added to or in lieu of numerical limitations, were not suitable or desirable at that time.

(TS-RD) SM-473-69 to CJCS, 19 Jul 69, JMF 751 (25 May 69).

1 Aug 69

In view of an ACDA proposal to include a moratorium on missile testing early in SALT, the CJCS reiterated JCS views to SecDef. A mutual suspension of MIRV/MRV testing if the USSR would
agree to suspend starts of additional ICBMs and SLBMs would involve such risks and disadvantages that it would not be in the national security interests of the US. The CJCS, therefore, suggested that a moratorium of such dimensions be eliminated from further consideration at that time.

(TS) CM-4469-69 to SecDef, 1 Aug 69, JMF 756 (29 Jul 69).

26 Aug 69

Seabeds

In commenting on ACDA proposals for revision of a Soviet proposal for a seabed treaty, the JCS said it would be premature to discuss the 12-mile limit in connection with arms control negotiations before settling the question of transit rights and territorial seas. To do so would extend implicit recognition to the validity of the 12-mile territorial sea without achieving the right of navigation through and over straits. If the US were to concede a 12-mile limit on a seabed arms control zone without a prior, or at least a simultaneous, international recognition of the US free straits concept, the US bargaining position in the law-of-the-sea negotiations would be seriously prejudiced. The JCS reaffirmed their position that a seabed arms control treaty would not be in the overall interest of the US.

(S) JCSM-534-69 to SecDef, 29 Aug 69, JMF 756 (11 Apr 69) sec 2.

10 Sep 69

Seabeds

In commenting on a memo by DepASD (ISA) on the Soviet seabed proposal, the JCS maintained that the negotiating history should clearly indicate that all parties agreed that only "fixed" nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction and their associated "fixed" launching platforms were to be included in the treaty prohibitions. Holding open the option to deploy mobile submarines would permit the US to take advantage of its technological lead and offset the Soviet land deployment advantage. The JCS believed that the treaty should confer no rights beyond those of observation -- specifically, that the right of access or the obligation to supervise or assist should not be offered or implied -- and that not only the negotiating history but also the treaty itself should state. The JCS were still concerned that the DOD interest in future negotiations in law-of-the-sea matters would not be adequately protected by the proposed contiguous zone formulation. On this matter the JCS reaffirmed the positions expressed in JCSM-534-69, 28 Aug 69.

(S) JCSM-534-69 to SecDef, 10 Sep 69, JMF 756 (11 Apr 69) sec 2.

26 Sep 69

Seabeds

With respect to an ACDA proposal on a seabed arms control treaty, the CJCS advised SecDef that the JCS believed that measuring the coastal band from the sinuosities of the coastline was the option on base lines least detrimental to US security. Of alternatives proposed by ACDA the JCS found least detrimental the one that did not recognize Soviet "historic waters" claims. The treaty should not permit the USSR or others to deploy weapons or installations in historic waters claimed by them but not recognized by the US. In addition the treaty should not preclude observation activities
in any area covered by the treaty. "Should any future dispute on the zone of application be resolved in a manner that would prejudice US security interests, the withdrawal provision of Article V of the treaty should be invoked and this must be clearly understood within the US Government"

(S) JM-4596-69 to SecDef, 26 Sep 69, JMF 756 (11 Apr 69) sec 2.

3 Nov 69

SALT
(Options)
MIRV
Verification
Force
Reductions

4 Dec 69

In a talking paper on SALT, prepared for use by DepSecDef and CJCS at the Under Secretaries Committee meeting on 4 Dec 69, the following JCS positions were indicated, on matters of other than short-term or procedural concern:
(1) the US should not introduce the specific subject of MRV/MIRV but should state that the subject was implicit as a possible component part of the discussion of particular ballistic missile systems;
(2) a ban on MIRV development was not acceptable under any conditions thus far put forth;
(3) MIRV flight testing should continue, without suspension or stretch-out of MIRV test programs;
(4) it should be kept in mind that "the purpose of MIRV is to provide the capability for effectively targeting the expanded Soviet and Chinese Communist target structures as well as to insure penetration of Soviet BMD";
(5) the US approach to numerical reductions of strategic weapons should be cautious, and reductions should await a demonstration of good faith in abiding by a limitation agreement;
(6) there should be no moratorium on research and development, qualitative improvements on strategic forces, and ABM construction, but moratoriums of specified short duration on increases in total number of operational launchers for offensive missiles would be acceptable.

(S) JCS 2432/61-1, 9 Dec 69, JMF 752 (2 Dec 69).