HISTORY OF THE JOINT STRATEGIC TARGET PLANNING STAFF:

PREPARATION OF SIOP-64

VOLUME I -- NARRATIVE

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HISTORY & RESEARCH DIVISION
HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND
AUGUST 1964
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This volume has been placed in downgrading Group 1, which is the highest downgrading group assigned to the information in the source documents. The historian's analysis and consolidation of information from many sources, which individually may have lower downgrade provisions, results in a synthesis which may have wider implications than the material on which it is based. Therefore, individual downgrade instructions for each paragraph are not indicated, and all portions of this volume will be handled under the overall downgrading group.
Preface

The SAC historian's relationship to the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff is, like that of 96 other headquarters personnel, one of support. In addition to his normal duties, he is responsible for preparing the JSTPS history. To satisfy what the first deputy director of JSTPS called "... requirements which are obviously most important to any new staff of this nature," since 1960 the historian has prepared two histories covering the organization of the staff and the preparation of the first two SIOPs. This is the third in the series and covers roughly the period during which SIOP-64 was prepared, mid-1962 to late 1963. (U)

This history emphasizes development of SIOP-64 guidance, preparation of the plan, the growing influence of missiles on plan composition, and organizational changes. The historian has purposely avoided a step by step account of how the SIOP document was developed with its myriad details. Key steps in the process are mentioned, however. It has not been the historian's purpose to highlight discord, although there were differences of opinion and they are recorded where they concern planning factors; or to paint a picture of frictionless harmony, although the successful completion of three SIOPs since 1960 emphasized the ability of JSTPS elements to rise above parochial interests; but he has attempted to blend both, and, within the limits of his ability, to follow truth. (U)

During the time this history was being prepared, security policies involving documentation of JSTPS activities were changed and some types
of documents previously accessible to the historian (e.g., presenta-
tions of the final plan to the JCS and war gaming data) were placed
in the extremely sensitive (ESI) category. Joint Administrative
Instruction 210-1 forbids inclusion in the history of information
marked ESI. The historian was not able to modify this policy.
(U)

The historian wishes to express his appreciation for the assis-
tance given him in the preparation of this history by the JSTPS staff,
especially Lieutenant Colonel E. M. Crock, USAF, JSTPS Secretary and
Colonel R. E. Arn, USA, Service Representative to the JSTPS. (U)

Documents identified in footnotes as exhibits (Ex__) are on
file in the SAC History and Research Division. (U)
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Background

During the years immediately following World War II, and up until the beginning of the Korean War, no problems of coordinating strategic nuclear operations among U.S. forces arose, because only the Strategic Air Command was equipped to deliver atomic bombs. During the early 1950s, however, this monopoly ended as Navy carrier aviation and Air Force tactical units became able to deliver the newer family of lighter and less bulky weapons, and problems of control and coordination appeared. In March 1952 an ad hoc committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended, and the JCS themselves agreed, that facilities for lateral coordination between equal unified and specified commanders be established. The JCS appointed the Air Force Chief of Staff their executive agent for operation of the atomic coordination machinery. He, in turn, appointed CINCSAC his field representative. Two Joint Coordination Centers for operational coordination were set up, one in the Far East and one in Europe. They were designed for "after the fact" coordination, that is, they received, compiled, reviewed, coordinated, displayed, and relayed information concerning operations of the unified and specified commanders after hostilities began. (26)

But however desirable it might have been, post-hostility coordination did not go to the heart of the problem. Maybe the Joint Centers could resolve conflicts during hostilities, if they survived and could maintain effective communications with strike forces, but the best time to coordinate was before hostilities began. This became obvious during practice exercises of the centers. The JCS subsequently directed "before
the fact" coordination of plans. (70)

In 1954 the JCS asked each unified and specified commander of nuclear forces to prepare an atomic annex to his war plan and coordinate it with other theater commanders and CINCSAC. A Target Coordination Conference was held in 1955. In 1956 and each subsequent year thereafter through 1958 a World-Wide Conference was held. These conferences represented the first attempts at pre-hostility coordination. They were not entirely successful. Target lists, forces, and strike timing were compared and some conflicts were resolved. But the deeper problem of integrating strategic nuclear forces remained. Each commander brought to the conference a plan for nuclear strikes which best fulfilled his requirements. Since all the CINCs were equal in the chain of command, and the coordination machinery had no authority to compel agreement, none would agree to alter his plan in favor of another. (70)

With the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 (Public Law 85-599), passed by Congress on 23 July 1958, new emphasis was given to unity in strategic plans and operational direction. President Eisenhower's Secretary of Defense, Neil McElroy, gave his immediate attention to a system that brought to a head already sensitive issues of control of strategic forces, the Fleet Ballistic Missile (Polaris). The question was: How should this new strategic weapon be commanded and controlled? The Joint Chiefs, asked for their views, soon split into two factions. It
was essentially an Air Force-Navy encounter, with the Army as an on-
looker.* The Air Force advocated creation of a unified United States
 Strategic Command built around a nucleus of its own SAC. The Navy
 wanted a more natural evolution to take place: the Polaris should enter
 its inventory and be targeted in the same manner as naval weapons of
 the past. In the opinion of the Navy, coordination had worked well
 and it saw no problems resulting from the introduction of the Polaris.

Mr. McElroy allowed the issue of command arrangements for Polaris,
 the subject of a split JCS paper in May 1959, to lie dormant during his
 last six months in office.** He did, however, press forward on the re-
 lated but larger problem of improving target coordination. Asked his
 opinion, General Nathan Twining, Chairman of the JCS, wanted "fundamen-
tal changes" in the existing machinery. Again, in subsequent debate
 within the JCS, a consensus could not be reached on what the basic
 policy should be. Finally, under the direction of the new secretary,
 Thomas Gates, the issue was decided. On 1 August 1960, after over a
 year of consideration by the JCS and two Secretaries of Defense, Mr.
 Gates decided to establish a team of experts at SAC Headquarters, under
 the direction of the CINCSAC, to prepare a target plan for all United

* The Army believed the entire investigation was premature. (U)

** Secretary McElroy resigned in December 1957. Eventually, of course,
 the Polaris was assigned to unified commanders and no reorganization
 as envisioned by the Air Force was undertaken. (U)
States forces committed to initial strategic nuclear operations.* Thus the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff came into existence. (26)

The JSTPS prepared the first Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) within four months after the decision to set up the staff. Because of the requirement to have the plan done by December, and the attendant problem of bringing in new people and organizing them into a work force, it was natural that the staff should lean heavily on the experience of the SAC target planners already at Offutt AFB. Procedural methods, then, closely resembled those developed by SAC, and the first plan when finished closely resembled previous SAC war plans.]

In SIOP-63 greater emphasis was placed on flexibility and controlled response, two key words in the strategy lexicon of the new Kennedy Administration and its Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara. Guidance for SIOP-63 received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff was markedly different from that for SIOP-62 [Targets were to be grouped by task]
National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy

The JCS guidance for preparation of the SIOP represented the primary reference point for JSTPS planning. The staff shaped the plan to the requirements of the National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy (INSTAP). This policy was, of course, prepared by the JCS, but the CINCs and Director Strategic Target Planning were encouraged to submit recommendations, comments, and proposed changes. When completed, this guidance was the primary exposition of JCS and DOD policy with regard to strategic nuclear offensive operations in the event of general war. (5)
The salient feature of the first NSTAP prepared by the Kennedy Administration was the requirement, first expressed in guidance for SIOP-63, for greater flexibility and discrimination in the use of general war strategic nuclear forces. The SIOP-63 was a more complex plan and consequently a more difficult one to prepare. There was at least some question as to what degree our still largely

The commanders of unified and specified commands appreciated the need for greater latitude of choice and supported attempts to acquire it, but their experience had taught them that the more complicated a plan was the more difficult it was to execute. ¹

Discussions within the target staff concerning guidance for SIOP-64 began even before the 63 plan was presented to the JCS. They focused on the past plan and what needed to be changed for the future. ²

The CINCland Representative, Rear Admiral John J. Hyland, disagreed with several planning factors used in the previous plan. While he declined to present a formal dissent during presentation of SIOP-63 to the JCS, he did list his "principal reservations" concerning it as follows: ²
A staff position prepared at the direction of General Power defended the targeting methodology used in SIOP-63.
The Commander in Chief, Pacific, offered several comments to the
JCS for consideration in SIOP-64 guidance. He believed guidance for
the previous plan had not been explicit enough in stating that it repre-
sented an integrated effort for initial nuclear operations in general
war.
An especially knotty problem, one not solved to the satisfaction of either JSTPS or JCS during presentation of the

The director’s memo to the JCS also bore a reminder that the late arrival of SIOP-63 guidance had given the staff less time to prepare the plan than it had originally anticipated. If the effective date of SIOP-64 was to be 1 July 1963, then guidance should arrive by 1 September 1962.  

This problem of late arrival of guidance was but one part of the overall difficulty JSTPS had experienced in maintaining firm working schedules. The most permanent thing about the SIOP was its impermanence. The staff kept the current SIOP up to date while at the same time it prepared the future plan. In August the DSTP suggested a means to reduce the overlap in planning made necessary by the above. With minor changes, SIOP-63 guidance would be adequate for a considerable period of time. This would give tactical units and planning staffs at all levels added stability. The DSTP asked approval for extending SIOP-63 to 15 January 1964. This extension would enable the staff to conduct a more thorough analysis of SIOP-63. 

This issue of plan stability was discussed in a subsequent Policy Committee meeting. Although he favored some stabilization, the Deputy

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Director explained that the proposal to JCS was not to be construed as an "open-end" plan; new guidance, new intelligence, and changes in force structure would eventually dictate preparation of a new document. The representatives of CINCPac and CINCLant were in essential agreement with the extension, although the CINCLant representative qualified his agreement by asking that JCS consider the CINC's recommendations for improving SIOP-64 as applicable to the extension period.\(^{10}\)\(^{(5)}\)

The JCS chose to delay their answer on the issue of extension until they had completed SIOP-64 guidance.\(^{11}\) They then replied that the new plan should be put into effect at the earliest practicable date after 1 July 1963, but no later than 15 January 1964.\(^{12}\)\((\text{TS NOFORN})\)

The earliest date agreed upon within the staff was 1 December 1963, but in July this was extended one month.\[\]

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extended and only a few forces (mostly missiles) were coming into the plan during this period.\[\]

The JCS accepted it.*\[\]

During the period SIOP-63 was current, incidentally the longest duration of any of the three SIOPs to date, the plan was revised four times.* New revisions became effective 15 February, 15 April, 1 July, and 1 September 1963. The primary reason for them was the growth of the target system due to increased Soviet defensive and offensive strength. Other contributors were growth of the U.S. missile force in both ICEMs and guided air to surface missiles (GAM-77), increased numbers of B-52s and B-58s on alert, phasedown of B-47s, loss of Jupiter and Thor missiles, and additional intelligence.\[\]

Turning again to consideration of the SIOP-64 guidance, these instructions were received by JSTIFS in the middle of November. Initial evaluation indicated few substantive changes from previous guidance. Further analysis sustained this premise.\[3\]

The "Fundamental concept underlining guidance was to maximize U.S. power to attain and maintain strategic superiority which will lead to early termination of war on terms favorable to her and Allies."*\[5\]

* Targeting adjustments were made on a day-to-day basis.\[5\]
Objectives of the plan remained the same, although it was no longer specified as an annual document. They were: 17 (TS)
The Plan

In three years and as many plans the work of the JSTPS had followed a sequential pattern of development, beginning with the general -- preparation of methodology and concepts based on interpretation of JCS guidance -- and proceeding to the specific -- the labor of selecting targets and forces to attack them. (S)
Targets and forces were the two prime ingredients of the Single Integrated Operational Plan. The targets which together would eventually comprise the National Strategic Target List represented a distillation of thousands of potential targets in the [ ]
### Delivery Vehicles

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>SIOP-63 Aug 62</th>
<th>SIOP-64 Jan 64</th>
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*(ms)*

**Polaris is included in both Lant and Bwr totals. (U)**
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** Discussed in greater detail in the following section, "Missile Targeting." (U)
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As mentioned earlier, in SIOP-63 planning it had been difficult to control
Missile Targeting

The greater number of missiles available for targeting during SIOP-64 planning had a significant effect on JSTPS planning. The following section is devoted to a discussion of several missile targeting issues which arose during the period. *(*)

In SIOP-62 missiles had played an almost negligible part.* In SIOP-63 the total increased, but still such a small number were available (207 alert in August 1962) that they had to be used *

The SIOP Division, in a study completed in March 1963, concluded that procedures used in the previous plan to target missiles were not altogether adaptable to the new one and recommended changes. Before proceeding to its proposal, however, it will be necessary to examine briefly procedures used in the previous plan. *(*)

* On 31 December 1960 SAC had only 9 missiles on alert (Hist of SAC, Jul-Dec 60, B-78664, p 445). *(*)
The situation brightened during the SIOP-64 period, however. The SIOP Division's plan for SIOP-64
Given the opportunity to comment on this proposal, the CINCSAC representative, Brigadier General John C. Meyer, agreed with it entirely. Some other CINC representatives did not. The CINCPac Representative, Rear Admiral F. E. Nussle, \[\text{signature}\]
Subsequent experience, however, had confirmed that missile firings under controlled conditions* were not indicative of operational capability. It would not be until late 1964 or early 1965 that valid operational tests for all missile systems in the SIOP would be completed. The JCS sought to fill the gap with more

* Air Force Category III and Navy System Demonstration and Analysis (SDAP) programs. (U)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Missile</th>
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<th>CEP (ft)</th>
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<tr>
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<td>SIOP-63</td>
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<td>A-2</td>
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The CINCLant accepted this proposal as presented by the JCS. General Power did not accept it, neither in his capacity as CINCSAC, nor in his position as DSTP. The JSTPS did not think the proposed system was any more valid than the factors used in SIOP-63. The SIOP-63 factors were possibly too high, but the staff had considered the low confidence of missiles and cross targeted them not only with missiles, but with aircraft. It wished to continue using them until commanders could obtain additional data. Also, JSTPS warned that introduction of new reliability factors and CEPs would cause SIOP-64 planning to slip.\(^56\) (26)

The JCS's point was that experience to date did not substantiate figures used in SIOP-63.\(^57\)

The WSEG report suggested a prediction system based on the assumption that the test status of a system was a measure of its gross operational capability. The status of its testing would be the prime

* Operational reliability launches from Vandenberg AFB, but simulating as much as possible conditions at the operational base. This included using the operational missile and crew from a particular site. (U)
determinant, and it would not matter too much what system it was. The
JCS had based its UPS on factors suggested by WSEG, but had raised them
slightly for systems in the development and test phase.\textsuperscript{57} (PS)

In deciding upon what guidance to issue, the chiefs had three al-
ternatives to choose from: (1) They could use the CINCs estimates;
(2) They could use their UPS based on current approved test programs;
or (3) They could use a prediction system based on recent accelerated
test plans submitted by the CINCSAC. Following are the three sets of
factors based on the alternatives above.\textsuperscript{58} (PS)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Missile</th>
<th>Alternative 1</th>
<th>Alternative 2</th>
<th>Alternative 3</th>
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The JCS believed their UPS (Column 2) the most realistic of the
three because figures were based on currently approved test programs.
Reliability based on engineering estimates and development launches (Col-
umn 1) had the lowest confidence. Column 3 was based on approval and

* For Category A: WSEG, 0.6; JCS, 0.6.
For Category B: WSEG, 0.3; JCS, 0.4.
For Category C: WSEG, 0.0; JCS, 0.2.
initiation of future accelerated test programs without delays. 59

The official factors to be used in SICP planning were dispatched to the CINCs on 20 April. They were as follows: 60

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Missile</th>
<th>Reliability</th>
<th>Accuracy*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polaris A-1</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>1.0 NM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-2</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-3</td>
<td>.4 **</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlas D</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>.4 **</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Commenting on the problems of determining reliability, the JCS acknowledged that in the past estimates had probably been too optimistic. Still, no radical departure from previous estimates could be made, because it "... could be inconsistent and in some instances possibly embarrassing or even damaging to the US position." The chiefs called their UPS "conservatively optimistic," that is, it had more realism:

* No differences arose over accuracy and they remained virtually unchanged from the JCS's initial proposal. 58

** Changed to .2 as a result of data subsequently available from test programs and the disapproved acceleration of test program (Msg, JCS 1981, JCS to JSTFS, 07/13/22 Aug 63, B-95231).

*** Changed to 1.0 (Msg, JCS 1419, JCS to CINCSAC, info DSTP, 26/2310Z Jun 63, B-92703).
yet the differences between JCS and CINC estimates amounted mostly to only .1 or .2 of a point, so this would not alter significantly the overall damage expectancy calculated in the plan. 61 (25)
On 7 June 1963 the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Roswell Gilpatric, asked the JCS to study the problem and determine what was required to gain a capability. The JCS, in turn, asked DSTP and the CINCs to study the matter.
While U.S. missile strength grew during the SIOP-64 planning period with the arrival to combat ready status of additional hardened missiles, a countercurrent was also running -- the first liquid fueled intermediate range ballistic missiles left the inventory. During 1963 all Jupiter missiles were phased out. (8)

With its cousin the Thor, Jupiter had been sent overseas to give the Free World early missile strength until intercontinental range weapons became available. The Soviet Union's missile capability, as dramatically revealed by their "sputnik" orbital vehicle of October 1957, had caused the Department of Defense to accelerate the U.S. intermediate range ballistic missile programs, previously hampered by economy measures. Plans to place the SM-78 Jupiter missile on allied soil were in preparation by the end of 1957, but delays in site selection and diplomatic negotiations hampered its deployment overseas. (8)

The Jupiter squadrons in Italy and Turkey had not yet become operational when in the spring of 1961 the Department of Defense began holding what Secretary McNamara later called "consultations" with NATO authorities concerning the obsolescence of the system and the need for its replacement. (8) Here was a perfect example of the speed with which modern weapon systems tumble into technological obsolescence. (8)
No concrete steps could be taken toward removing the Jupiters, however, until a replacement was available. By 1963 one was ready -- the Fleet Ballistic Missile or Polaris. Secretary McNamara notified the JCS in January that the defense ministers of Italy and Turkey had been approached with proposals for the withdrawal. In a note to these two, the Secretary expanded on the issue of obsolescence he had raised earlier in a December 1962 NATO Ministerial Meeting. He explained that in 1957 the Free World was limited in the missile power it could muster, so Jupiter had an important part to play, but now enough advanced missiles were available to enable the alliance to replace it. Besides obsolescence, he emphasized that the missile's vulnerability made it relatively ineffective and presented a tempting and provocative target to the Soviets.

To sweeten the quid pro quo arrangement of Polaris for Jupiter, the Secretary was prepared to accelerate the delivery of F-104G fighters to Turkey and to deliver to Italy the Sergeant missile (supported by U.S. troops) to replace the obsolete Corporal. In the conduct of future negotiations Secretary McNamara emphasized to the JCS that it must be made clear that this change was a result of a natural evolution in weapon systems.76 (TS)

* This seems to be a reference to speculation after the Cuban crisis that a reciprocal missile withdrawal arrangement had been made with the Soviet Union ("you get your IREMs out of Cuba and I will get mine out of Western Europe"). When the question was put to him in February 1963, Secretary McNamara said the Cuban crisis had "absolutely, unequivocally nothing to do with it." (Statement by SecDef Robert McNamara, in Hearings, Subcommittee on DOD Appropriations, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., Part I, p 410.) (U)
The man whose operations would be most directly affected by the change was General Lyman Lemnitzer, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. He was concerned that the replacement of Jupiter by Polaris would mean an overall reduction in ICBM strength available to Allied Command Europe. He reasoned that Jupiter was more vulnerable than the Soviet missile sites against which it was targeted, nor, for that matter, was it more vulnerable than the F-104G.

In the Secretary of Defense's office, based on numbers alone, even when three Polaris submarines were added there, the swap had even less appeal to him. He cited a JSPS study which stated that 53 to 61 Jupiters would be lost. Add to this 51 Thor missile sites scheduled to be withdrawn from the UK and 10 to 112 ICBMs were lost. Although the JSPS did emphasize that further work would be required before actual damage expectancy could be determined.
The JSTPS retargeting actions, completed in mid-February, were summarized as follows:  

a. 20 Polaris replaced 20 Jupiters.

b. 9 Atlas and Titan (with larger warheads) replaced 12 Jupiters by adjusting MOLs.

c. 3 Atlas and Titan 3 Jupiters.

d. 10 Minuteman replaced 10 Jupiters.
General Lemnitzer was reported to be satisfied with plans for the 1 April missile posture after a presentation by General Crumm on 18 February. He was to raise one last issue, however.

(TS NOFORM)

This explanation did not entirely satisfy General Lemnitzer; he was responsible for informing the Standing Group of the NATO Military Committee.

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* There were only three wings, six squadrons, of Titan II mounting 4.5 to 9MT warheads programmed. (18)

** The Standing Group of the NATO Military Committee was the primary body responsible for the highest strategic guidance in areas in which NATO commanders operated. It was the body to which NATO commanders were responsible. (The NATO Handbook, 1962) (U)
of the military consequences of substituting three Polaris for the Jupiters.
would only aggravate the situation. This closed discussion on the issue.  

As mentioned earlier, JSTPS plans for replacing Jupiter with Polaris and SAC missiles were ready in February. The effective date of 1 April, when Jupiters in Italy and Turkey would be relieved of target assignments, remained valid. Actual dismantling in Turkey did not begin until 15 April. These missiles remained on alert 15 extra days and provided "bonus" coverage. An interim change to Revision 1 of SIOP-63, completed in March, incorporated the change.  

Plan Approval  

On 22-23 October 1963 the JCS, commanders in chief of the unified and specified commands, and Secretary of Defense McNamara attended two days of briefings on SIOP-64 (SecDef only on the 23rd).* Official approval of the plan came on 28 October, and the distribution of the basic plan to the using commands began the same day.  

The JSTPS Organization  

The JSTPS at Omaha, under the direction of General T. S. Power, CINCSAC, comprised three principal segments: the Office of the  

* The presentations during these two days were marked as extremely sensitive information (ESI) by JSTPS and could not be made available to the historian during his research for this history. The JAI 210-1, which concerns preparation of the JSTPS history, forbids release to the historian of information in an ESI category. (U)
the representatives of the CINCs, and the Planning Staff. Besides the Director, his office consisted of a deputy, four senior advisors from the services, and a secretariat for administration and personnel matters. Commanders in chief of unified and specified combat commands committing forces to the SIOP maintained a permanent representation at SAC headquarters for participation in development of the plan and for liaison purposes. The deputy director, service representatives, and CINCREPS together comprised the Policy Committee.* This committee determined policy and provided a forum for the resolution of differences which arose during the preparation of the plan. The National Strategic Target List Division and Single Integrated Operational Plan Division, as their titles reveal, were the two groups of intelligence and operations specialists who, in simple terms, developed the strategic target system and devised ways of attacking it within the general guidance of the National Strategic Target and Attack Policy. (U)

The meaning of JSTPS had shown a slight decline since preparation of the first plan in 1960. The Joint Table of Distribution (JTD) effective 1 July 1963 showed a decline in total number of from 186 to 182 with the elimination of the Communications Branch of SIOP Division.94 The next JTD, published 1 January 1964, but not effective until 1 July, cut

* The deputy acted as committee chairman and had no vote. The four service representatives and 5 CINC representatives were voting members. The chiefs of NSTL and SIOP Divisions were permanent observers at Policy meetings, but they had no vote. In case the committee was unable to resolve an issue (and a simple majority could not decide it), the Director made the final decision. (U)
the staff total still further to 180 with the loss of two spaces in the Materials Branch, NSTL Division. This Branch was eliminated entirely from the staff, but six other spaces were realigned within the staff. Also with the elimination of the Materials Branch, four key positions were lost, bringing the number down from 33 to 29. Twelve of the 29 key positions (all in NSTL Division) were not specified as to service affiliation. They would be filled by the best officer available. Of 180 officers and men assigned to JSTPS, 125 were Air Force, 10 Army, 42 Navy, and 3 Marine Corps.95

There were numerous personnel changes in the staff during the period.96 Most significant was the assignment of Vice Admiral Robert J. Stroh, USN, as Deputy Director to replace Vice Admiral Roy L. Johnson on 25 July 1963.97 Admiral Stroh was previously Commander, Carrier Division Six, Atlantic Fleet. Vice Admiral Johnson upon leaving the JSTPS became Deputy Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. Earlier, on 14 March, Major General Henry R. Sullivan, USAF, was assigned as SACEur's representative to the JSTPS. Previously he had been Chief, Plans Branch, Plans and Policy Division, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).98 (U)

Perhaps the most significant change in the JSTPS organization during the preparation of SIOP-64 was the stationing of NATO officers as part of SACEur's representation at Omaha. In terms of numbers it was insignificant; only four officers and two enlisted men were eventually to be assigned and only one had arrived by the end of 1963, but this small
group seemed to constitute a seedbed for future expansion of cooperation in nuclear matters between the U.S. and its NATO allies. (U)

The history of European partnership with the U.S. in nuclear matters is outside the scope of this narrative, but some background is believed necessary to provide a better frame of reference for discussion of the development of plans in 1963 for multinational representation with the JSTFS. (U)

Europe recovered psychologically, economically, and militarily from World War II under the aegis of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. This arrangement was generally satisfactory during the years immediately after the war. Although a wartime partnership with Great Britain had created a special nuclear relationship between that country and the U.S., congressional legislation greatly restricted dissemination of U.S. nuclear knowledge. During the 1950s, however, as Europe began to gain back its confidence, wealth, and power, the Soviet Union acquired thermonuclear weapons. The NATO allies began to question more and more the advisability of putting their reliance for protection against Soviet attack solely in the U.S. deterrent. They had come to believe that a share in nuclear control was the mark of a world power, and France especially went ahead on a unilateral course to develop its own nuclear force. One author has called the nuclear issue the "touchstone" of relations between the U.S. and its NATO allies. (U)

Thus, although from a U.S. standpoint it was most desirable for the allies to forego plans for acquiring the expensive impediments of a
national nuclear deterrent and to join in consultations as to the opera-
tions and management of the U.S. force, it was clear by the late 1950s
that this half-a-loaf approach would be unacceptable to our allies.
Equally unacceptable to the U.S. was the solution of national deterrents
which would threaten to fragment the collective security arrangements
built up since World War II and eventually lead to piecemeal defeat in
Europe. (U)

Beginning late in the Eisenhower Administration and continuing dur-
ing President Kennedy's Administration, a conscious program was begun of
expanding the participation of the Atlantic community in nuclear matters
without damaging the unity of NATO. This was what W. W. Rostow has
called a "... process of shared operational experience, consultation,
and debate ..." which would result in a "... widened common experi-
ence for the development of a solidly agreed Atlantic military doctrine."\(^{101}\)
Courses of action included a commitment to maintain the Alliance's unity;
the preparation of agreements on general guidance for using nuclear weap-
ons in case the Soviets attacked; steps to bring NATO nations more deeply
and directly into all nuclear strategy; and finally, active European par-
ticipation in the operation and control of strategic and tactical weapons.\(^{102}\)

(U)

The last two of the above objectives were given added impetus at
the Nassau meeting in late December 1962 between President Kennedy and
Prime Minister Macmillan of Great Britain. Out of Nassau came agreement
on a two part plan. Short term arrangements involved provisions for a
so-called inter-allied nuclear force to consist of an allocation of U.S.
strategic forces, the U.K. Bomber Command, and tactical forces in Europe.
The long term plan envisioned creation of a multinational nuclear force
featuring Polaris equipped submarines or surface vessels with mixed
crews.\textsuperscript{105} It is the initial objectives of the Nassau conference, eventu-
ally agreed upon during the NATO Ministerial Conference in Ottawa 22-
24 May 1963, which will concern us in this history, because one of them
was multinational representation with the JSTPS. (U)

Immediately following the Nassau Conference, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff set to work on ways to carry out the expressed desires of the Presi-
dent and the Secretary of Defense.\textsuperscript{104} A little over a month and a half
later Secretary McNamara was ready with his proposal for the short term.
It would provide international representation on SACEur's staff in Omaha,*
and an increase in non-US participation in targeting duties on SACEur's
staff at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Paris.
Mr. McNamara used the word substantive to indicate the degree of partici-
pation he expected non-US representatives to enjoy in planning, target-
ing, and coordination of SACEur's program at Omaha. The JCS was asked
to work out the details. That body, in turn, asked DSTP and CINCEur,
General Lyman Lemnitzer, for specifics upon which to base its reply.\textsuperscript{105}

\textsuperscript{(END) NOFORN)}

The JSTPS suggested altering SACEur's staff at Omaha by assigning
carefully selected officers, preferably of field grade. It contemplated

\textsuperscript{*} The SACEur staff at this time consisted of an Air Force colonel as
Chief, two lieutenant colonels, one lieutenant commander, and two
enlisted men. (U)
no change in SACEUR's operation, but there would have to be some relaxation of sensitive intelligence information not releasable to foreign nationals and possibly new legislation to allow release of restricted data information concerning nuclear weapons and their associated weapon systems.\textsuperscript{106} (S-NOFORN)

While the JSTPS reply to JCS had concerned itself with important but rather routine working relationships, in his answer General Lemnitzer discussed the broader political issues of such an arrangement from his vantage point. He believed it politically unwise for the U.S. to make the proposal "unilaterally" to NATO for increased SACEUR representation at Omaha. The U.S. should go first to SACEUR with the proposal and let him designate number, rank, and nationalities of the selectees. To him, a total of six officers with proper enlisted support was adequate for coordinating SACEUR's nuclear program with the SIOP. A general officer should head the group, with a UK deputy and officers from Italy, West Germany, and the Netherlands as staff planners. General Lemnitzer, like the DSTP, emphasized that basic changes in U.S. policies on release of information now withheld from NATO would have to be made.\textsuperscript{107} (T-NOFORN)

In his initial comments General Lemnitzer did not indicate his personal feelings or make a recommendation about the proposal. The JCS gave him that opportunity in early March.\textsuperscript{108} To him, the whole question rested on the release of documents. There was no immediate need to expand SACEUR's staff at Omaha; the present arrangement was
satisfactory. Politically, substantial allied participation in nuclear planning and operations already existed, and increased participation at lower levels in Allied Command Europe would probably have more meaning than a token increase at Omaha. But until wider dissemination of documents was possible, he would defer any expansion.\textsuperscript{109} (S-NOFOR\textsuperscript{M})

In an interim reply to Secretary McNamara's 5 February memo, the JCS, like USCINCEUR, believed the major obstacle to the kind of non-U.S. participation envisioned by the secretary was U.S. statutes forbidding release of certain nuclear information. They were not ready at that time to recommend how these changes should be made; their detailed analysis would come later. Meanwhile, they recommended no expansion at Omaha.\textsuperscript{110} (S-NOFOR\textsuperscript{M})

During the latter part of March and early April, the Joint Staff (JCS), with the assistance of JSTPS, SACEUR, and other interested agencies, prepared a draft JCS paper on multinational participation in nuclear planning. By this time the positions of JSTPS and SACEUR were clear: the target staff favored the international representation at Omaha; SACEUR believed more substantive participation could be obtained by first making changes at SHAPE. In final form by mid-April, the JCS paper became the full reply to the Secretary of Defense's memo. There had been no change in the JCS attitude. They emphasized again that present security policies prevented release to NATO of broad areas of information; unless changes were made, there would be no "substantive" participation. Possibly new legislation was needed. The Chiefs wished...
to postpone action on increasing the SACEur staff at Omaha and concentrate on increased participation at SHAPE. Thus, General Lemnitzer's arguments had been given great weight in the final JCS opinion.

(TS NOFORN)

The JCS position was rejected by Mr. McNamara. He said:

I strongly believe that it is in the long-range interest of the United States to include quality non-US NATO officers as part of SACEUR's coordination group at Omaha, and that such action will add to the cohesion of the Alliance.

He mentioned that both SACEur and DSTP supported his position,* and urged arrangements to be worked out as soon as practicable. The secretary intended to announce this concept at the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Ottawa in late May.**

The official announcement of this change was made by the NATO ministers following their 22-24 May meeting. It was one of several changes in the composition and organization of SACEur's nuclear forces approved. Following is the entire list:***

(a) Assignment of the United Kingdom V-Bomber force and three US Polaris submarines to SACEur;
(b) Establishment by SACEur on his staff of a Deputy responsible to him for nuclear affairs;**

* As we have seen, SACEur communications with JCS indicate the opposite to be true.

** Subsequently appointed to this post was Gen. F. V. P. Van Rolleghem, of the Belgian Air Force. (NATO Letter, Vol II, No. 9, Sep 63, p 26.)

(U)

NOFORN

TOP SECRET
(c) Arrangements for broader participation by officers of NATO member countries in nuclear activities in Allied Command Europe and in coordination of operational planning at Omaha;
(d) Fuller information to national authorities, both political and military.

This, it will be remembered, represented action on the first phase or short term proposals of the Nassau Agreement.*

With the decision made to go ahead with integration of allied officers at Omaha, many details had to be worked out. Problems of releasing sensitive documents no longer seemed so great. The bulk of the labor and cost would go into the so-called "sanitization" of sensitive SIOP documents not releasable to foreign nationals in their existing form. Documents would have to be recast to eliminate sensitive portions and then another set prepared for multinational use. The work could not be completed, however, until the JCS issued a sanitized version of SIOP-64 guidance (SN-1232-63). To JSTPS, an important aspect of this guidance was whether or not to divulge plans.

Heretofore, this information had not been presented in detail to NATO.** The JCS asked

* After Ottawa, the US CINCEur expected discussions on the longer range proposal for a so-called multilateral force to begin in earnest. This subject, however, is outside the scope of this history. (U)
the target staff to provide dates for completion of the sanitization process, assuming two alternatives in the wording of the final guidance. 117

The JCS guidance came on 5 July. It incorporated recommendations made by the JSTPS in a 13 May message, but differed little in substance from the basic SIOP-64 guidance in discussion of concepts.

This puzzled JSTPS: Would another version for multinational use only be forthcoming? Would one be made available for both the staff and allies to use? Was the guidance actually meant to be released? The JCS explained that it was not meant to be released. The original intent of providing sanitized SIOP guidance to non-U.S. members was reversed. It would, however, be included in the same form in the sanitized SIOP-64 Planning Manual. 120
Another question settled during this period was whether or not reliability figures of SIOP weapon systems should be released. The JCS originally said no; the Secretary of Defense thought they should be, but the JCS ultimately won its point, and the information was not released.\textsuperscript{126} (TS NOFORN)

The more routine physical preparations to accommodate the increased staff were completed rather quickly. Based on the assumption that the staff would consist of seven officers and four enlisted men (four officers and two enlisted men non-US), the JSTPS estimated modification to the SAC Headquarters building, equipment, and fixtures would cost $21,100.00.\textsuperscript{127} On 4 June the SecDef approved giving the Air Force this amount.\textsuperscript{128} The modification was completed in August. (3)
As indicated, far greater cost would be incurred in sanitizing documents. Following is a breakdown of these costs:

Initial cost of sanitizing documents $44,238.00
Modification in electronic data processing facility 12,500.00
Annual maintenance cost of documents 264,200.00

No requirement for additional SAC support personnel was anticipated.

Briefly, the main duties of the non-US SACEur representatives would be centered in the SACEur Air Room.

The JSTPS had endorsed the multinational proposal from the beginning, and in the working out of details it had consistently taken a liberal approach to problems of document sensitivity and working procedures. Clearly, however, the degree of success achieved in "substantive" participation by allied officers in nuclear planning would ultimately be measured, in the truest sense, by the spirit in which they were accepted as partners by the officers and men of the U.S. elements of the staff, and by the spirit with which working instructions were
Disestablishment of the JCSLG

When the JSTPS was established in August 1960, the JCS set up a liaison group at Omaha to act as its eyes and ears. The JCSLG was to assist DSTP to interpret JCS guidance and to keep the JCS informed of progress in the work of preparing the NSTL and SIOP.\textsuperscript{133} The Group consisted of five officers (2 Army, 1 Navy, 1 Air Force, and 1 Marine Corps) plus administrative support. \(\textcircled{6}\)

In October 1962 the Joint Staff (J-5), after a review of the terms of reference by which the group had been organized, asked the DSTP if, based on operating experience during the past two years, there was still a need for the function.\textsuperscript{134} General Power replied that in the early formative period of the target staff, with the time for development of the SIOP short, the group served a very useful purpose in providing timely liaison with the Joint Staff, but the staff's work had now settled into a more routine orderly cycle of preparing the plan and less day to day liaison was needed. Resolution of major problems concerning SIOP development usually required a meeting of the principals involved, that is, between JSTPS and Joint Staff personnel. While finding the liaison group
still "useful" and its cooperation "excellent," DSTP could not justify an "absolute need" for it.\textsuperscript{135} (c)

In view of the above, the JCS, on 30 July 1963, disestablished the JCSLG, to be effective on or about 1 September. Manpower spaces were to be reassigned to the Joint Staff.\textsuperscript{136} Certain functions formerly performed by the group were transferred to JSTPS.\textsuperscript{137} The liaison office was officially closed 30 August.\textsuperscript{138} (c)

Summary

The SIOP-64 was not different in any fundamental sense from its immediate predecessor. There were some slight changes in guidance received from the JCS, but these were elaborations on and refinements of the theme of controlled flexible response in strategic nuclear operations. Both the JCS and the target staff wished to give the plan more stability. It was questionable whether a completely new plan was needed each year. Certainly it was necessary to keep the SIOP current, but revisions could be made to the existing plan and then a new plan prepared only when sufficient time had elapsed to warrant one. Of course, political developments would have much to do with it; strategic nuclear strategy, and the SIOP, could be altered significantly by a new administration in 1964. (c)
targeting and force application phases of SIOP planning. The finished plan showed a continued increase over previous plans in numbers of targets to be attacked, and consequently in numbers of weapon systems and weapons committed. This was largely due to the growing Soviet missile force. This target system, which by its very nature demanded...

The JSTPS organization remained relatively stable, although there was a slight trend downward in total number of personnel assigned. The Joint Chiefs of Staff Liaison Group was disestablished in August 1963; after two years of experience it was decided that its function could best be performed directly between the staff and the JCS. The most significant organizational change which took place during the preparation of SIOP-64 was completion of arrangements for NATO representatives to be assigned to SACEur's staff at Omaha. (5)
FOOTNOTES

1. This short introduction is based on a more lengthy discussion in History of JSTPS: Background and Preparation of SIOP-62 (B-82767); and History of JSTPS: Preparation of SIOP-63 (64-B-51). The reader should also see Briefing, "Unity in Strategic Planning," prepared by CINCSACRep Lt Col F. N. Millen, 23 Sep 63 (B-93761), Ex 1.

1a. History of JSTPS; Preparation of SIOP-63, pp 5-6, 28-29, 64-B-51.


3. Memo for DDSTP, Maj Gen C. M. Eisenhart, Chief SIOP Div, "Recommended Staff Positions," 14 Jun 62 (B-83573), Ex 3.

4. Ibid.

5. Msg, CINCPac to JCS, 17/2200Z Jul 62 (B-83921).


7. Memo for JCS, from Gen T. S. Power, DSTP, "New Guidance for SIOP-64," 10 Jul 62 (B83785), Ex 4. For intrastaff discussions of these issues see Memo for the Director, from VADM Roy L. Johnson, Deputy Director, "Guidance for SIOP-64," w/1 Atch, 16 Jun 62 (B-83595), Ex 5.

8. Ibid.


10. Minutes of 53rd POLCOM Meeting, 30 Aug 62, 7 Sep 62, B-84727. This qualification on the part of CINCLANT was sent to JCS by msg, DSTP B-84444, JSTPS to JCS, "SIOP Planning Cycles," 01/1728 Aug 62.


12. Memo for DSTP, from Brig Gen M. J. Ingelido, Sec JCS, 15 Nov 62 (B-89921).

13. Msg, ALO 1130, USNMR SHAPE to JSTPS, 31/1635Z Oct 63 (B-94259); Memo, Maj Gen H. R. Sullivan, SACEur Senior Representative to JD, "Coordination of SIOP-64 and SACEur's Scheduled Program," 25 Jul 63, Atch 1 to B-93109.
14. Memo for JD, from VADM R. J. Stroh, DDSTP, "Effective Date SIOP-64," 31 Jul 63 (B-93109). Msg, JD 93109, JSTPS to JCS, 01/17/02 Aug 63.

15. Msg, JCS 1936, JCS to DDSTP, 02/21/12 Aug 63.


18. Briefing, "SIOP-64," presented by Lt Col H. L. Rauch, SIOP Div, to 57th Policy Committee Meeting, JSTPS, 16 Jan 63 (B-90779), Ex 6; Msg, JP B-94073, JSTPS to JCS, 18/20/15 Oct 63; Historian's comparison of SIOP-63 and SIOP-64 guidance documents.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.


29. JSM 1735-63, "Summary Review of JCS SIOP-64," from VADM H. D. Riley, Dir JS, to JSTPS, 16 Oct 63 (B-94097). This brochure was prepared by the Joint Staff from information submitted by JSTPS for JCS officers preparatory to presentation of the SIOP at Offutt AFB. A memo from VADM R. J. Stroh, DDSTP, to JD, 21 Oct 63, said "no major misinterpretations have resulted from comparisons."
30. Ibid.


33. JSTPS Progress Report, Week Ending 30 Aug 63, 6 Sep 63 (B-93608).

34. JSM 1735-63, "Summary Review of JCS SIOP-64," from VADM H. D. Riley, Dir JS, to JSTPS, 16 Oct 63 (B-94097).

35. Ibid. In the comparison of SIOP-63 and -64 weapons, some figures have been taken from Briefing, "SIOP-63 Force Structure," by Col E. A. MacDonald, Ch, DSTPPM, 19 Jun 62 (B-83668), Ex 10, Hist of JSTPS: Preparation of SIOP-63 (64-B-51).


37. Ltr, VADM R. L. Johnson, DDSTP, to JCS, "SIOP-63 Fallout Constraints," 1 Mar 63 (B-91271); JSTPS Progress Report, Week Ending 3 May 63, 9 May 63.

38. JSTPS Progress Report, Week Ending 7 Jun 63, 14 Jun 63; Ltr, VADM R. J. Stroh, DDSTP, to JCS, "SIOP-63 Fallout Constraints," 29 Aug 63 (B-93456).


40. Msg, JCS 3261, JCS to all unified and specified commands, DSTP, 28/135Z Oct 63 (B-94185).

41. JSM 1735-63, "Summary Review of JCS SIOP-64," from VADM H. D. Riley, Dir JS, to JSTPS, 16 Oct 63 (B-94097).


43. Ibid.

45. Memo, Brig Gen W. J. Crumm, Ch SIOP Div, to Senior Service Reps, CINCant, CINCPac, CINCAL, and CINCEur, "Missile Application, SIOP-64," 16 Mar 63, with 3 Atch, B-91452.


47. CINCPacRep Memo 00017-63, RADM F. E. Nuessle to JDD, "Missile Application, SIOP-64," 20 Mar 63 (B-91498).


50. Minutes of 58th Policy Committee Meeting, 22 Mar 63, 10 Apr 63, B-91720.

51. Minutes of 60th Policy Committee Meeting, 9 Apr 63, 25 Apr 63, B-91916.

52. Msg, JCS 9793, JCS to DSTP, 08/1228Z May 63, B-92092.

53. JCS 1620/392, "Missile Reliability and Accuracy Factors for SIOP Planning," with 3 Incls, 8 Apr 63 (B-91979).


55. Msg, CINCant to JCS, 25/1506Z Feb 63.

56. Msg, JD B-91185, JSTPS to JCS, 21/2311Z Feb 63. The CINCSAC's reasons for disagreeing with the proposal were similar, but he emphasized that the CINCs evaluation of system performance was more valid. (Msg, CINC B-91130, 20/1438Z Feb 63, Ex 7.)

57. JCS 1620/392, "Missile Reliability and Accuracy Factors for SIOP Planning," w/3 Incls, 8 Apr 63 (B-91979).

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

60. Msg, JCS 9566, JCS to CINCant et al., "Strategic Missile System Reliability and Accuracy Factors for SIOP," 20/2054Z Apr 63 (B-91823).
61. JCS 1620/392, "Missile Reliability and Accuracy Factors for SIOP Planning," w/3 Incls, 8 Apr 63 (B-91979).

62. Minutes of 62nd Policy Committee Meeting, 22 May 63.

63. Ibid.

64. Minutes of 63rd Policy Committee Meeting, 27 May 63.

65. Minutes of 65th Policy Committee Meeting, 18 Nov 63.

66. Msg, JCS 1257, JCS to USCINCEur et al., 14/2208Z Jun 63.

67. Msg, CINC 5025, SAC to JCS, n.s., 01/1520 Jul 63, Ex 8.

68. Msg, CINCLANT to DSTP, 18/1416Z Jul 63, B-92985.


70. Msg, CINCPac to DSTP, 19/0410Z Jul 63, B-92990.


73. Hist Study 90, Strategic Air Command Participation in the Missile Program, Mar 57-Dec 57, Vol I, pp 44-45 (B-67772).

74. Negotiations with Italy were not completed until March 1959, and those with Turkey until October. Originally SAC was designated as the responsible command for the SM-78. Later this responsibility was transferred to USAFE and SACEur. The first two squadrons, the 864th and 865th Strategic Missile Squadrons, were formed by SAC and deployed to Gioia del Colle, Italy, in late 1960. The 866th SMS was transferred to Cigli, Turkey, but without personnel and equipment in March 1961. By 20 June 1961 USAF had turned over the 864th and 865th squadrons to the Italian Air Force. A month later 20 missiles of the 30 assigned were on alert. The first site in Turkey to be declared operational was at Cigli on 6 November 1961. The last site was accepted by USAF on 26 February 1962. At the end of the month 14 of the 15 assigned missiles were operational. (Hist of SAC, Jun 58-Jul 59, p 283 (B-73951); Hist of SAC, Jul-Dec 59, p 331 (B-75571); Hist of SAC, Jul-Dec 60, p 212 (B-78664); Annual Historical Report 1961, USEUCOM, Chap VI, p 10 (B-83044); Annual Historical Report 1962, Chap VI, p 5 (B-92025). [6]
75. Statement by SecDef Robert McNamara, in Hearings, Subcommittee on
DOD Appropriations, Committee on Appropriations, House of Repre-

76. Msg, JCS 8079, JCS to USCINCEUR et al., 05/0125Z Jan 63 (B-90520).

77. Msg, JD B-90495, JSTPS to JCS, "Jupiter Withdrawal," 03/1700Z Jan
63.

78. Msg, ALO 28, USNMR SHAPE, Lemnitzer to JCS, 10/1837Z Jan 63
(B-90576).

79. Msg, JD B-90611, JSTPS to JCS, 12/1928 Jan 63.

80. Msg, JCS 8304, JCS to USNMR SHAPE et al., 19/1346Z Jan 63 (B-90691).

81. Msg, JCS 8700, JCS to DSTP (quoting SHAPE msg ALO 181), 19/1319Z
Feb 63 (B-91115).

82. Msg, JCS 8699, JCS to USNMR SHAPE, 19/1317Z Feb 63 (B-91114).

83. Msg, JD B-91186, JSTPS to USNMR SHAPE, Power to Lemnitzer, 21/2310Z
Feb 63.

84. Ibid.

85. Memo for JDD, JD, from Col D. H. Stapp MC, Senior Service Rep,
"Conference at USEUCOM and SHAPE . . .", 1 Mar 63.

86. Msg, ALO 307, USNMR SHAPE to JCS, 13/1146Z Mar 63 (B-91392). CINCl-
ent explained that the Polaris schedule through 1963 required three
ships be assigned to meet the requirement for one on station in the
Mediterranean. This meant an average of 1.46 alert subs on station
at any one time. Thus, 16 D02s were covered 100 per cent of the
time and 16 were covered 46 per cent of the time. (Msg, CINClent
to CNO et al., 15/1716Z Mar 63, B-91419). (PS)

87. Msg, JCS 9209, JCS to USNMR SHAPE, 23/1641Z Mar 63 (B-91523).

88. Msg, ALO 378, USNMR SHAPE to JCS, 01/1530Z Apr 63 (B-91579).

89. Msg, JCS 9400, JCS to USNMR SHAPE, 06/1650Z Apr 63 (B-91683).

90. Msg, JCS 8994, JCS to DSTP, 7/2353Z Mar 63; Msg, AFSMSD 89279,
CofS USAF to JCS, 30/1854Z Mar 63; Msg, ZIPPO 03-403, JFM to
CofS USAF, 30/2240Z Mar 63.

91. JSTPS Progress Report Week Ending 8 Mar 63, 14 Mar 63 (B-91378).

92. Msg, JCS 3261, JCS to unified and specified commanders, DSTP, 28/
1335Z Oct 63 (B-94185).
93. JSTPS Progress Report, Week Ending 20 Sep 63, 27 Sep 63.

94. Joint Manpower Program, FY-65-70, Ex 11.

95. Ibid.

96. See "Summary of Turnover of Key Individuals with JSTPS," Ex 12.

97. Bureau of Naval Personnel Msg 02/16/3 Z Jul 63; See also biography, Ex 13.

98. DAF AA-2288, 13 Dec 62; See also picture and biography, Ex 14.


102. Ibid., pp 858-859.

103. Department of State Bulletin, Vol XLVII, No 1229, 14 Jan 63, p 44.

104. Msg, JCS 7930, JCS to USCINCEUR et al., 22/18/18Z Dec 62.


106. Msg, JD 095, DSTP to JCS, "Multinational Participation . . .", 21/23/10 Z Feb 63, Ex 15. These recommendations were coordinated by Brig Gen W. J. Crumm, Chief, SIOP Division, with General Lemnitzer and his staff on 20 February. (Ltr, Gen T. S. Power, DSTP, to USCINCEUR, "Multinational Participation . . .," 15 Feb 63; Memo for JDD, JD, "Conference at USEUCOM and SHAPE . . .," 1 Mar 63, from Col D. H. Staep, USMC, Senior Service Rep, 1 Mar 63; Msg, NOFORM 215-3-S, Senior Rep SAC Zebra, for Gen Power from Gen Crumm, 20/18/73 Z Feb 63, Ex 16.) The JSTPS said the following documents required release: Basic SIOP; Annex C to SIOP; Annex F to SIOP; JSTPS Planning Manual; Source Data Instructions on Strike Timing; National Strategic DGZ List; National Strategic Target Data Base;
107. Msg, ALO 215, USNR SHAPE to JCS (from CINCEur signed Lemnitzer), 21/4062 Feb 63, Ex 17. A good portion of this document is devoted to problems of increased non-US participation in nuclear targeting at SHAPE.

108. Msg, JCS 9027, JCS to USCINCEur, 09/16582 Mar 63.


110. Msg, JCS 9199, JCS to DSTP, "Multinational Participation . . .," 22/22462 Mar 63; Msg, JCS 9206, n.s., JCS to USNRF SHAPE et al., 23/01024 Mar 63 (B-91511); Msg, JD 0140, JSTPS to JCS, n.s., 28/22272 Mar 63, Ex 19; Msg, JCS 9327, JCS to JSTPS, n.s., 02/00162 Apr 63; Memo (CM 467-63), Gen Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman JCS, to Dir JS, "Multinational Participation . . .," 30 Mar 63; Memo for the Record, Col A. J. Hussey, and Lt Col A. F. Brunelle, SIOP Div, "Trip Report," Atch 1 to Memo for JD, "Multinational Participation . . .," 15/23362 Apr 63.

111. Memo (JCSSM 326-63), Gen Maxwell Taylor, Chairman JCS, to SecDef, "Multinational Participation . . .," 20 Apr 63 (B-91933). This document listed what SIOP information would have to be released for substantive participation and specific items which because of their particular sensitivity must not be released. This latter information was: Preemptive attack options; SIOP information outside SACEur's area of interest; systems reliability factors; location of entry points, penetration areas, and corridors; ECM support; SIOP Jet Navigation Charts; consequences of execution; JCS emergency actions procedures except those affecting NATO; and routes and tactics of Polaris forces. (TS NOFORN)

112. Memo (Encl to JCS 2421/432), SecDef Robert S. McNamara, to Chairman JCS, "Multinational Participation . . .," 3 May 63 (B-92084).

113. Ibid.

115. Excerpts from speech by Gen Lyman Lemnitzer, CINCeur, at 4-7 Jun 63 session of the Western European Union, in NATO Letter, Vol II, Nos 7 and 8, Jul-Aug 63. Reaction to these steps in the public media was, on the whole, favorable, the main criticism being that they did not go far enough and that they were only temporary "repair jobs" and did not get to the heart of the problem, which was political control to influence any decision to enter nuclear war. (See Henry A. Kissinger, "NATO's Nuclear Dilemma . . .," The Reporter, Vol 28, No 7, 28 Mar 63; Robert R. Bowie, "Tensions Within the Alliance," Foreign Affairs, Vol 42, No 1, Oct 63; Alastair Buchan, "Partners and Allies," Foreign Affairs, Vol 41, No 4, Jul 63; Christian Science Monitor, 27 May 63; Wall Street Journal, 22 May 63.)

116. Msg, JD 0214, JSTPS to JCS, n.s., 02/2023 May 63; Msg, JCS 9854, JCS to DSTP, "Multinational Participation in Nuclear Forces Planning," 11/1520 May 63 (B-92128); Msg, JD B-92155, JSTPS to JCS, same subj, 13 May 63; Msg, JD B-92163, JSTPS to JCS, same subj, 16/2215Z May 63.


118. Msg, JD B-92163, JSTPS to JCS, "Multinational Participation in Nuclear Forces Planning," 16/2215Z May 63.

119. Msg, JCS 1519, JCS to DSTP, "Multinational Participation in Nuclear Forces Planning," 05/1330Z Jul 63 (B-92796).

120. Memo for the Record, Brig Gen W. J. Crumm, Ch, SIOP Div, "Sanitized NSTAP Guidance . . .," 16 Aug 63 (B-93333); Memo for JD, from VADM R. J. Storch, DDSTP, "Multinational Participation in Nuclear Forces Planning," 27 Aug 63 (B-93402).

121. Msg, JD B-92163, JSTPS to JCS, "Multinational Participation in Nuclear Forces Planning," 16/2215Z May 63; Msg, JDD B-92612, JSTPS to JCS, same subj, 18/2312Z Jun 63.

122. Msg, JCS 1227, JCS to USNMR SHAPE, n.s., 13/2124Z Jun 63 (B-92544); Msg, ALO 653, USNMR SHAPE, to JCS, "Ref JCS 1227," 20/1547Z Jun 63.

123. Memo for the Record, Brig Gen W. J. Crumm, Ch, SIOP Div, "JCS Decisions-3 Jul 63," 5 Jul 63 (B-92779).

124. JCSM 326-63, 20 Apr 63 (B-91933).

125. JCS 2421/432, 3 May 63 (B-92084).

126. Msg, JCS 9951, JCS to DSTP, "Multinational Participation in Nuclear Forces Planning," 21/1530Z May 63 (B-92237)
127. Msg, JDD 0244, JSTPS to JCS, 28/2120Z May 63.

128. Msg, JCS 1093, JCS to DSTP, 04/2055Z Jun 63.


133. JCS SM-963-60, "Terms of Reference for JCSLG," 27 Sep 60.


135. Msg, DSTP 0492, DSTP to JCS, 08/1575Z Nov 62.

136. Msg, JCS 1893, JCS to USA, CNO, CSAF, et al., "Reassignment of Personnel on Duty with JCS Liaison Group . . . ," 01/1846Z Aug 63. This message refers to SM-946-63, 30 Jul 63, which disestablished the group.
