IV. B. 1.

EVOLUTION OF THE WAR

THE KENNEDY PROGRAM AND COMMITMENTS

1961
UNITED STATES - VIETNAM RELATIONS
1945 - 1967

IV.B.1.

EVOLUTION OF THE WAR

THE KENNEDY PROGRAM AND COMMITMENTS: 1961
V.B.4. THE KENNEDY PROGRAM AND COMMITMENTS: 1961

FOOTNOTES — CHAPTER I

1. NIE 63-59, 26 May 1959, "Prospects for North and South Vietnam"
2. Durbrow (Saigon) message to State (61)
3. NIE 63.1-60, 23 August 1960, "Short Term Trends in South Vietnam"
5. CINCPAC Command History, 1960, p. 142
6. NIE 63.1-60, 23 August 1960
7. Young Memorandum to Dizz (copy attached to Young Letter to Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric, 24 April)
8. Saigon message to State 1656, 4 December 1960
9. CAS message (Lodge) to White House (65)
10. Coolidge Commission Report, January 1960 (Item 1, Recommendations)
1. DEPTEL 1054 to Saigon, 3 February 1961

2. Saigon message 276, 4 January 1961


5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.


9. Hilsman, Roger, To Move a Nation (Doubleday), p. 419

10. State message 1054, op. cit.

11. Ibid.

12. Saigon message 1444, 8 March 1961

13. Saigon message 1466, 16 March 1961

14. DEPTEL 1218 to Saigon, 23 March 1961

15. Saigon message 1650, 3 May 1961
FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER III


3. NIE 50-61


5. Public Papers of the President: John F. Kennedy, 1961, p. 261

6. Ibid., p. 306


8. The "implementing agent" language is from an NIE dated 5 October on Bloc support for the Viet Cong. But similar formulations are commonplace throughout the record. See, for example, the opening section of the Taylor Mission Report, or the opening section of the Rusk/McNamara Memorandum for the President dated 11 November 1961.

9. Lansdale Memorandum to Richard Bissell (CIA), Gilpatric Task Force, Tab 19

10. NSAM 52, 11 May 1961

11. Gilpatric Task Force file, Tab 13

12. Ibid., Tab 20


14. Gilpatric Task Force file, Tab 23

15. Ibid., Tab 26

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16. “Ibid., Tab 29

17. “Ibid., Tab 28

18. “Ibid., Tab 29 (Line-in/Line-out draft from State which shows both the Defense draft and the State-proposed revisions). The changes cited are from the section headed "Political and Economic Objectives."


20. “Ibid., Tab 31. (Copies of the summary section only were distributed as attachments to NSAM 52.)


22. Political Annex to May 6 (Final) Draft

23. Papers of the Presidents, op. cit., p. 356

24. President Kennedy's Letter to Ngo Dinh Diem, 8 May 1961

25. Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum to Chairman, JCS, 8 May 1961, Subject: "Vietnam."


27. JCSM 320-61, 10 May 1961

28. NSAM 52, 11 May 1961

29. “Ibid.

30. Gilpatric Task Force Drafts, Political and Economic Section

31. “Ibid.

32. “Ibid.

33. OSD Task Force (Vietnam) files - Dr. D. Ellsberg Paper

34. “Ibid.

35. Deputy Secretary of Defense files. Among other things, states that Vice President Johnson will find Diem "as interested in cattle as any Texan, and as interested in freedom as Sam Houston." Concludes "Here is our toughest ally in Asia... a 60-year old bachelor who gave up romance with his sweetheart to devote his life to his country."
FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER IV

1. Saigon message 421, 1 October 1961
2. Saigon message 1743, 15 May 1961
3. Vice President Johnson Memorandum for the President, 23 May 1961
5. President Diem Letter to President Kennedy, 9 June 1961
6. Joint Action Program Proposed by the Vietnam-United States Special
   Financial Groups, undated, but submitted to President Kennedy
   approximately July 25.
7. NSAM 69, 11 August 1961
9. According to notes in the Task Force files. We do not have cita-
   tions for the JCS Memo or McGarr's messages. Lansdale's
   Memorandum to Gilpatric also alludes to such proposals.
10. Saigon message 1503, 27 May 1961
11. Diem Letter to Kennedy, 9 June 1961
13. Note found in Secretary of Defense files.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. State Department, "First 12-Month Report," 1 September 1961
18. Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 544
19. Saigon message, 29 September 1961
20. Quoted from an untitled, mimeographed paper in Secretary of Defense's
   files. The only marking on the paper is the usual note "Secretary
   of Defense has seen." Probably it was a product of a Laos, or South-
   east Asia working group.
21. Ibid.
22. NIE 14.3/53-61


1. JCSM 717-61
2. Ibid.
4. SNIE 53-2-61, "Bloc Support of the Communist Effort Against the Government of SVN," 5 October 1961
5. Washington Post, 10 April 1968
6. SNIE 10-3-61, "Probable Communist Response to Certain SEATO Undertakings in SEA."
8. William Bundy Memorandum for Secretary McNamara, 10 October 1961.
13. Saigon message 488, 13 October 1961
16a. Ch'nam Saigon message to JCS, 23 October 1961
19. BAGUIO message 0005, 1 November 1961
20. BAGUIO message 0006, EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT, 1 November 1961
21. Summary Section, Taylor Mission Report, p. 8
22. Ibid., p. 24
23. Ibid., pp 8, 9
24. Ibid., p. 11
25. Ibid., p. 14
27. Summary, Taylor Report, p. 8
28. Appendix A, Section III, Taylor Report
30. Appendix B, Taylor Report, p. 1
31. Ibid., p. 2
32. Ibid., p. 1
33. Ibid., p. 1
34. Summary, Taylor Report, p. 5
35. Ibid., p. 19
36. Ibid., p. 25
37. General Maxwell Taylor's Letter to the President, transmittal of Taylor Mission Report
38. Summary, Taylor Report, p. 5
39. Ibid., p. 6
40. Ibid., p. 11
41. Saigon message 545, 25 October 1961
42. CHMAAG Saigon message to JCS, 24 October 1961
43. Saigon message 541, 25 October 1961
44. CHMAAG Saigon Letter to Secretary of Defense, 11 November 1961
45. Saigon message 541, 25 October 1961

46. Ibid.

47. Saigon message 536, 25 October 1961
FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER VI

5. Ibid.
6. DEPTEL 545 to Saigon, 4 November 1961. The language cited in the footnote is the only completely unambiguous indication of how far the U.S. hoped to go in putting Americans into a direct position of influence in the Vietnamese government and army. But there is plenty of language in the Taylor Mission Report that suggests as much and there is a rather blunt statement, quoted at the end of Section II of this chapter, which Nolting was told to pass on to Diem in explaining the U.S. offer.

7. Sorenson, op. cit., p. 737, says senior advisors "on Vietnam," which presumably did not include someone like George Ball, then Undersecretary of State, who has been widely reported to have opposed any combat troop commitments.

As we will see, Galbraith is also on record against troops. Rusk is on record as deferring combat troops in a Joint McNamara/Rusk memorandum which appears to have been drafted after the President had made his decision (it contradicts a memorandum McNamara signed only three days earlier). We do not know whether Rusk, like McNamara, was reversing his position.

9. BAGUIO message 0006, 1 November 1961, EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT
10. USDEL Hakone to State, Section 6, 1 November 1961
11. Saigon message 575, 31 October 1961
12. Staff memoranda, 2 and 6 November 1961, by Colonel Kent, OSD(ISA)
15. Ibid.

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16. Memorandum for the President from McNamara, Gilpatric, JCS, 8 November 1961 (TS)

17. Rusk/McNamara Memorandum for the President, 11 November 1961 (TS)

18. NSAM 111, 22 November 1961

19. Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 547

20. DEPTEL 618 to Saigon, 14 November 1961

20.a. DEPTEL 619 to Saigon, 14 November 1961

21. Ibid.

22. Saigon message 678, 18 November 1961

23. Saigon message 687, 22 November 1961

24. Bangkok message, Galbraith to the President, 20 November 1961

25. New Delhi (Galbraith) message 9941 for the President, 21 November 1961


27. Saigon message 708, 25 November 1961

28. DEPTEL 619 to Saigon, 14 November 1961

29. DEPTEL 693 to Saigon, 7 November 1961


32. Ibid.