EXTENDED CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS RELATING TO DISARMAMENT (Revised Version)

Historical Division
Joint Secretariat
Joint Chiefs of Staff
18 January 1960

Copy 1 of 10 copies

C 7650

EXCISED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 5USC552 (b)(1) 88-F01-0862 #60
Part I

Atomic Energy
1945-1950

26 Jun 45

The San Francisco Conference adopted the Charter of the United Nations. Included in the Charter were provisions for discussing disarmament. Article 11 stated: "The General Assembly may consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both." Article 26 provided: "In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 47, plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments."

NVT, 27 Jun 45, 12:1.

23 Oct 45

In anticipation of a discussion between the President of the United States and the Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom and Canada, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised President Truman that "the United States should retain for the present all existing secrets with respect to atomic weapons, . . ." The Joint Chiefs of Staff further stated that "they regard it as of great military importance that further steps of a political nature should be promptly and vigorously pressed during the probably limited period of American monopoly, in an effort to forestall a possible race in atomic weapons and to prevent the exposure of the United States to a form of attack against which the present defenses are inadequate. Such political measures might include: . . . Continued discussions both within the United States and with foreign governments, including discussions within the United Nations Organization, as to methods of international control for restricting or outlawing the use of atomic weapons and for encouraging the full development of atomic energy for the benefit of mankind. The possibility that other nations may succeed in developing atomic weapons in the not too distant future suggests that the question of political controls is a matter of immediate importance."

[28] Ltr, JCS to Pres., "Military Policy as to Secrecy Regarding the Atomic Bomb," 23 Oct 45, based on JCS 1471/4, same subj, same date, CCS 471.6 (6-15-45) sec 1.

15 Nov 45

The President of the United States, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the Prime Minister of Canada met together in Washington to consider the possibility
of international action: (a) to prevent the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes, and (b) to promote the use of recent and future advances in scientific knowledge, particularly in the utilization of atomic energy, for peaceful and humanitarian ends. The three leaders proposed "that at the earliest practicable date a Commission should be set up under the United Nations Organization to prepare recommendations for submission to the Organization. . . . In particular the Commission should make specific proposals: (a) For extending between all nations the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful ends, (b) for control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes, (c) for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, (d) for effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions." 


27 Dec 45

The Foreign Ministers of the United of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States, meeting in Moscow, "agreed to recommend, for the consideration of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the establishment by the United Nations of a commission to consider problems arising from the discovery of atomic energy and related matters." They proposed the text of a resolution for this purpose.


24 Jan 46

The General Assembly of the United Nations approved the proposed resolution, sponsored by the United of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the United States, France, China, and Canada, establishing Commission on Atomic Energy. The Commission was charged with making specific proposals: "(a) for extending between all nations the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful ends; (b) for control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes; (c) for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction; (d) for effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions. The work of the Commission should proceed by separate stages, the successful completion of each of which will develop the necessary confidence of the world before the next stage is undertaken."


14 Jun 46

Mr. Bernard Baruch, the United States Representative on the U. N. Atomic Energy Commission, presented a proposed plan of control, based on the Acheson-Lilienthal report of 15 March 1943. The plan provided for (1) international control of atomic energy at the source with an Atomic Development Authority exercising complete managerial control of all raw materials, processes, and plants; (2) promotion of peacetime benefits of atomic energy;
(3) strategic distribution of activities, plants, and stockpiles throughout the world; (4) freedom of access into all countries for representatives of the international authority; (5) fixing of penalties for violations; and (6) abrogation of the veto power on decisions providing for punishment of violations. The control system was to come into effect by stages and gradual disclosure of atomic secrets was to be made only after the controls had been thoroughly tested.


17 Jun 46

The Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded four individual replies to Mr. Baruch in answer to his request for their views on the control of atomic energy. In brief, the Chiefs were in general agreement that (1) effective international control of production was necessary; (2) the pre-eminent position of the United States in regard to atomic energy must be maintained until effective control of all phases is assured; (3) a workable system of international inspection was the primary essential of control; (4) and (5) the greatest deterrent to illegal use of atomic weapons would probably be fear of automatic retaliation by the other United Nations.

Admiral Nimitz, General Eisenhower, and General Spaatz expressed doubt about the efficacy of international agreements governing the use of atomic bombs during war. Admiral Nimitz and General Eisenhower expressed uncertainty about the attitude of the American people toward automatic retaliation against nations which might violate international agreements prohibiting the employment of atomic weapons or other means of mass destruction.


19 Jun 46

Andrei Gromyko, Soviet representative to the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission, advanced his government's proposals, which, in effect, would have made each government responsible for policing itself. The Soviet Union called for the immediate outlawing of atomic weapons, suggested the establishment of two committees, one on the exchange of scientific information and the other on control of atomic energy, and insisted upon retention of the veto, leaving to the Security Council the punishment of violations.


30 Dec 46

After more than a hundred conferences, the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission agreed by a vote of 10-0 (Poland and the Soviet Union abstaining) to approve a plan for atomic control substantially the same as recommended by Mr. Baruch. The first report of the Commission submitted to the U.N. Security Council on 31 December 1946, included the following recommendations: (1) there must be a strong and comprehensive system of control and inspection; (2) such an international system of control and inspection should be established and defined by a treaty or convention; (3) such a treaty or convention should provide for (a) an international control agency, (b) no veto power
The Security Council rejected 12 proposed Soviet amendments to the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission's first report. The effect of the Soviet proposals would have been to substitute the Soviet plan (see above, 19 June 1946) for the U.S. plan. Unable to resolve Soviet-Western differences, the Security Council transmitted the record of the debate to the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission, requesting it to continue its deliberations.


The U.N. Atomic Energy Commission by a vote of 10-1 (USSR) Poland abstaining, adopted its second report for transmittal to the Security Council. The report expressed the following principles: "1. Decisions concerning the production and use of atomic energy should not be left in the hands of nations. 2. Policies concerning the production and use of atomic energy which substantially affect world security should be governed by principles established in the treaty or convention which the agency would be obligated to carry out. 3. Nations must undertake in the treaty or convention to grant to the agency the rights of inspection of any part of their territory subject to appropriate procedural requirements and limitations." Consideration of amendments proposed by the Soviet Union had not led the Commission to revise the general recommendations of its first report. NYT, 12 Sep 47, 1:3.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to request the Secretary of Defense to inform the Secretary of State that they considered "it to be of overriding importance to the future security of the United States that an international system, acceptable to the United States, be devised and accepted by all nations which will prevent any nation's building up weapons of mass destruction to the extent which will permit it to undertake general aggressive warfare." The Baruch plan was the only proposal advanced to date which the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed would, if mutually agreed by all, adequately safeguard the future.
security of the United States. The plan, they pointed out, provided for the detection of violations and the enforcement of sanctions. They considered that both of these safeguards were mandatory for future U.S. security.

(5) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Draft Proposal for the Armaments Regulation Program," 10 Oct 47, derived from JCS 1731/35, same subj, 30 Sep 47, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 29.e N/H, 16 Oct 47, indicates that the SecDef forwarded these views of the JCS to the Sec of State on 14 Oct 47.

By a vote of 9-2 the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission agreed to transmit its third report to the Security Council, declaring that it had reached an impasse and could not prepare a draft treaty. It summarized the majority position on control of atomic energy (substantially the Baruch plan of 14 June 1946) and stated that the Soviet Union had held this plan to be an unwarranted infringement of national sovereignty. The Soviet Union had also insisted that a convention outlawing atomic weapons and providing for destruction of existing weapons must precede any control agreement. The majority of the Commission considered that the Soviet-proposed convention, without safeguards, would offer no protection against non-compliance. The Commission, feeling that the disagreement arose from a situation beyond its competence, recommended that negotiations on the Commission level be suspended until the U.N. General Assembly found that the situation was more appropriate or until the permanent members of the Commission found, through prior consultations, that there existed a basis for agreement.


The U.N. General Assembly rejected a Soviet proposal to recommend the preparation of a draft convention on the prohibition of atomic weapons and a draft convention on the establishment of effective international control over atomic energy, both to be signed and brought into operation simultaneously. The Assembly, over the negative votes of the Soviet Union and its satellites, approved the general findings and recommendations of the first report of the Atomic Energy Commission and the specific proposals of the second report as constituting the necessary basis for establishing an effective system of international control. Expressing its deep concern over the impasse in the Commission's work, the Assembly asked the six permanent members to consult together to determine whether there existed a basis for agreement on international control and on eliminating atomic weapons. The Assembly called upon the Atomic Energy Commission to resume its sessions and proceed to the further study of such subjects as it considered practicable and useful.

The principal features of the General Assembly-approved plan for the international control of atomic energy are as follows:

1. There should be a strong and comprehensive international system of control, defined by treaty and administered by an international control agency.
2. Decisions regarding the production and use of atomic energy should not be left in hands of nations, but should be carried on by the international agency or by nations only under license from the agency.

3. Nations must undertake in the treaty to grant to the agency rights of inspection of any part of their territory subject to appropriate procedural requirements and limitations designed to prevent possible abuse of the powers given to the agency.

4. An international treaty to outlaw national production, possession, and use of atomic weapons, standing alone, would fail (a) to ensure the use of atomic energy only for peaceful purposes, and (b) to provide for effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect the complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions. The agreement on atomic energy must be embodied in a treaty providing for a comprehensive system of control, including guarantees and safeguards adequate to ensure the carrying out of the terms of treaty and to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions.

5. The treaty would provide that the rule of unanimity of the permanent members, which in certain circumstances exists in the Security Council, would have no relation to the work of the agency. No Government would possess any right to veto over the fulfilment by the agency of the obligations imposed upon it by treaty, nor would any Government have the power, through the exercise of any right of veto, or otherwise, to obstruct the course of control or inspection.

6. The treaty should provide a schedule for completion of the transitional process of control over a period of time, step by step, in an orderly and agreed sequence leading to the full and effective establishment of international control of atomic energy.

7. The treaty should include provisions specifying the means and methods of determining violations of its terms, setting forth such violations as would constitute international crimes, and establishing the nature of the measures of enforcement and punishment. There would be no legal right, by veto or otherwise, whereby a willful violator of the terms of the treaty could be protected from the consequences of violation of its terms.


20 Jul 49

The U.N. Atomic Energy Commission adjourned indefinitely after confirming that further work was useless until the six permanent members had reported a basis for agreement. Dept of State Bulletin, vol XXI (8 Aug 49), p. 181.

Aug - Nov 49

Representatives of the six permanent members of the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission (Canada, China, France, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and the United States) held consultative meetings during this period. In a separate
joint statement to the General Assembly, the five Western Powers declared that the consultations had not succeeded in bringing about agreement with the Soviet Union, but "had served to clarify some of the points on which there is disagreement."


23 Sep 49
President Truman announced the first Soviet atomic explosion.


23 Nov '49
The U.N. General Assembly requested the permanent members of the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission to continue their consultations. It recommended that all nations limit the individual exercise of their rights of sovereignty in the control of atomic energy to the extent required for the promotion of world security and peace.


19 Jan 50
The consultations were suspended when the Soviet representative left the Security Council in protest against the continued recognition of Nationalist China.


9 Mar 50
The Joint Chiefs of Staff gave the Secretary of Defense their views on the question, "Should the Baruch plan be enlarged to include other forms of armaments?" They reiterated their views of 10 October 1947 that the Baruch plan was the only proposal publicly advanced to date that would, if mutually agreed to by all nations, adequately safeguard the future security of the United States. They pointed out that the plan had been formulated when the United States enjoyed an atomic monopoly, but that this condition had now ceased. "Although the Baruch plan is still the only plan concerning international control of atomic energy which might adequately safeguard the security of the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that that plan must no longer be considered except as inseparably related to plans for the international regulation of all other armaments and internal security forces, including police forces. . . . the United States cannot accept agreement on the one without concurrent agreement on the other." Their views, they continued, were not to be construed as justifying any weakening of the U.S. position on either control of atomic energy or regulation of other armaments; on the contrary, "if any modification (other than the requirement for concurrent agreement) is to be considered in the terms of the present United States positions regarding control of atomic energy or regulation of armaments, it should be on the side of strengthening, rather than weakening, their terms, for the international situation is such that the safeguards originally established are more than ever essential."

In a later Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "International Control of Atomic Energy and International Regulation of Armaments," 9 Mar 50, derived from JSSC draft not published in the green, CCS 471.6 (8-15-45) sec 18-A.
President Truman, in an address to the U.N. General Assembly, reiterated the three basic principles upon which any successful plan of disarmament must rest: (1) it must include all kinds of weapons; (2) it must be based on unanimous agreement; (3) it must be foolproof, and based on safeguards which would be adequate to give immediate warning of any threatened violation. The President suggested the desirability of bringing together the work of the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission and of the U.N. Commission for Conventional Armaments. Dept of State Bulletin, vol XXIII (6 Nov 50), pp. 721-722.
26 Jun 45

The Charter of the United Nations authorized the General Assembly to consider the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and made the Security Council responsible for formulating plans to be submitted to the members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.

NYT, 27 Jun 45, 12:1.

29 Oct 46

Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov in an address to the U.S. General Assembly urged early consideration of a general reduction in world armaments, including atomic weapons. U.S. Ambassador Austin replied the next day that the United States would not repeat the mistake of the 1920s by disarming unilaterally. He stated that a requirement would exist for effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying states against the hazards of violation and evasion.

NYT, 30 Oct 46, 12:1; 31 Oct 46, 12:1.

6 Dec 46

The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to provide "Military Guidance on the Regulation of Armaments" to the U.S. representatives on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations and to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. The guidance given was as follows: (1) disarmament or regulation of armaments should not be agreed to unless applicable to, and accepted by, all nations; (2) there must be effective safeguards, including inspection, not subject to veto; (3) atomic energy should be dealt with by the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission; (4) a final action was taken on U.S. proposals on atomic energy, but was premature and futile to go beyond the discussion stage on other disarmament or regulation of armaments matters; (5) no commitments regarding disarmament or regulation of armaments, other than those pertaining to atomic energy, should be made until a reappraisal of the world situation could be made upon: (a) conclusion of peace treaties with former enemy powers, and (b) conclusion of agreements for providing contingents of armed forces to the U.N. Security Council.

(8) Memos, JCS to Representatives on MSC and to "Military Guidance on the Regulation of Armaments," 6 Dec 46, derived from JCS 1731/1 as amended, 30 Nov 1944, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 15.

14 Dec 46

The U.N. General Assembly recommended that the Security Council "give prompt consideration to formulating the practical measures, according to their priority, which are essential to provide for the general regulation or reduction of armaments and armed forces and to assure that such regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces will be generally observed by all participants
not unilaterally. Specific mention was made of the need for practical and effective safeguards.


31 Dec 46

The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to inform President Truman of their belief that armaments were a consequence, not a cause, of international tension. The need for armaments arose from the existence of conflicting international aims and ideologies and would pass only with the passing of the reasons for conflict. "Consequently the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not consider that commitments toward the regulation of armaments or disarmament should be made prior to or independently of the solution of other problems affecting world peace generally, and specifically, the security of the United States." They reiterated to the President their views expressed to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on 6 December 1946.

(8) Ltr JCS to Pres, 31 Dec 46, derived from JCS 1731/3, 19 Dec 46, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 15.

13 Feb 47

The U.N. Security Council agreed to establish a Commission for Conventional Armaments and directed it to submit proposals for (a) general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, and (b) practical and effective safeguards in connection with regulation and reduction of armaments. Specifically excluded were matters falling within the purview of the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission.


14 May 47

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved and sent to the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, copies of JCS 1731/22, "Guidance for Discussions on the Military Aspects of Regulation of Armaments." They requested that a copy be forwarded to the Secretary of State. This paper listed fourteen principles, among which were the following:

(1) the United States should not disarm unilaterally;

(2) an essential prelude to the implementation of a program of disarmament was the establishment of effective safeguards, to include inspection and punishments;

(3) the veto must be eliminated;

(4) the first step must be the establishment of an effective system for international control of atomic energy (the Baruch plan);

(5) the next step should be the establishment of an effective system for international control of other major weapons of mass destruction; and

(6) pending establishment and implementation of the above principles, discussions regarding armaments regulation should be directed toward solution of the questions of how and when armaments should be regulated and reduced rather than toward solution of the question of what elements of armaments should be regulated and reduced.

(8) JCS 1731/22, 8 May 47, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 21.

2 Aug 48

The U.N. Commission for Conventional Armaments agreed, over the objections of the Soviet Union and the Ukrainian S.S.R., to advise the Security Council that: (1) it considered to be within its jurisdiction all armaments and armed forces, except atomic weapons and weapons of mass destruction having characteristics comparable in
destructive effects to those of the atomic bomb; and
(2) it recommended the following principles to govern
the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed
forces: (a) the system should embrace all states; (b)
there must be international confidence and security,
but the regulation and reduction of armaments and the
existence of confidence were reciprocal, (c) conditions
essential to international confidence included an adequate
system of agreements with respect to contributions of
armed forces, assistance and facilities by Members,
effective control of atomic energy; and conclusion of
peace settlements with Germany and Japan; (d) armaments
and armed forces must be limited to those consistent
with, and indispensable to, maintenance of peace and
security and must not exceed those necessary for the
implementation of Members' obligations and the protection
of their rights under the U.N. Charter; (e) the system
must include adequate safeguards, including supervision;
and (f) provision must be made for effective enforcement.

Dept of State Bulletin, vol XIX (29 Aug 48),
pp. 267-268.

25 Sep 48
Soviet Representative Vyshinsky proposed to the U.N.
General Assembly that all existing land, naval, and air
forces of the five great powers be reduced one-third
during the year as the first step in the reduction and
regulation of armaments.

Dept of State Bulletin, vol XIX (3 Oct 48) p. 441;

19 Nov 48
The U.N. General Assembly rejected the Soviet proposal
and resolved that the aim of reducing conventional arma-
ments and armed forces could only be attained in an
atmosphere of real and lasting improvement in inter-
national relations. The Assembly recommended that the
Security Council pursue its study of regulating and
reducing conventional armaments and armed forces through
the Commission for Conventional Armaments.


1 Aug 49
The U.N. Commission for Conventional Armaments, over
objections from the Soviet Bloc members, adopted a French
plan for a census and verification of armed forces and
armaments of Member states.


18 Oct 49
The U.N. Security Council was unable to adopt the plan
submitted by the Commission for Conventional Armaments
because of a Soviet veto. The Council rejected a Soviet
proposal that would have recognized as essential the sub-
mission by States of information both on armed forces and
conventional armaments and on atomic weapons. The Council
adopted a proposal to transmit the records of the discus-
sions to the U.N. General Assembly for information.

Council on Foreign Relations, The United States in
The U.N. General Assembly approved the proposals submitted by the Commission for Conventional Armaments on the submission and verification of full information by Member states on their conventional armaments and armed forces. The Assembly recognized that implementation of the proposal would require unanimity among the permanent members of the Security Council, a unanimity which had not been reached. It recommended that the Council continue its study of this matter through the Commission for Conventional Armaments.


President Truman, in an address to the U.N. General Assembly, suggested the desirability of bringing together the work of the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission and of the U.N. Commission for Conventional Armaments.

Part III

Atomic Energy and Conventional Armaments

1950-1954

13 Dec 50

The U.N. General Assembly established a Committee of Twelve, composed of representatives of the Security Council as of 1 January 1951, and Canada. The Commission was charged with considering and reporting to the Sixth Session on ways and means whereby the work of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments might be coordinated and placed under a new consolidated disarmament commission. In the preamble to the resolution establishing this body, the Assembly recognized these points: (1) effective regulation and reduction of national armaments would substantially diminish the "present danger of war," relieve the heavy economic burden of armaments, and permit greater use of resources for man's betterment; (2) regulation and reduction of armaments, to be effective, must cover weapons of all kinds, must be based on unanimous agreement, and must include every nation having substantial armaments and armed forces; and (3) any plan for the regulation and reduction of armaments must be based on safeguards that would secure the compliance of all nations.


19 Jul 51

The President approved the basic principles and the conclusions contained in NSC 112. [NSC 112, a report by a State-Defense working group entitled "Formulation of a United States Position with Respect to the Regulation, Limitation, and Balanced Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments," had been approved by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS 1731/50, 22 June 1951, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 35.)] The basic principles were as follows: (1) first step in the field of regulation of armaments and armed forces must be achievement of international agreement on the general principles involved; (2) international control of atomic energy is inseparably related to international regulation of armed forces and all other forms of armaments; and (3) international control of atomic energy must be based on the U.N. plan or upon some no less effective plan. The conclusions approved by the President included the following: (1) a system of disclosure and verification of armed forces and armaments logically would be the first step in the implementation of an agreed international program for the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of armaments and armed forces; (2) such disclosure and verification should be continuous and all embracing; (3) the process should be carried out by stages, beginning with less sensitive information and proceeding to more sensitive information only with satisfactory conclusion of previous stages; (4) a program should call for the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction...
of armed forces and armaments to a level which would substantially decrease the possibility of a successful initial aggression; (5) if armed force could be so limited that resort to its use as an instrument of national policy would be much less likely, the conflict between the intentions of the West and the Soviet orbit might be resolved through other means; (6) the program should be open to all states and should initially include states whose military resources were so substantial that their absence from the program would endanger it. Soviet European satellites and Communist China must be included; (7) there must be provision for the administration of adequate safeguards; (8) a proposal for disclosure and verification with adequate safeguards would be advantageous to the United States if accepted by the Soviet Union and advantageous for propaganda purposes if rejected by the Soviet Union. 

(28) NSC 112, 6 Jul 51, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 35.

11 Jan 52

The U.N. General Assembly, adopting the recommendation of the Committee of Twelve, abolished the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments and established a Disarmament Commission under the Security Council. The Disarmament Commission was charged with preparing proposals to be embodied in a draft treaty for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, and for effective international control of atomic energy. The Commission was to be guided by the following principles: (1) there must be continuing progressive disclosure and verification of all armed forces and armaments; (2) verification must be based on effective international inspection; (3) unless a better or no less effective plan was devised, the U.N. plan for international control of atomic energy should continue to serve as the basis of international control of atomic energy; (4) there must be an adequate system of safeguards to ensure observance of the disarmament program; and (5) the treaty should be open to all states and should provide what states must become parties before the treaty entered into force.


5 Apr 52

The United States representative on the U.N. Disarmament Commission submitted a working paper on disclosure and verification of armed forces and armaments. This paper proposed proceeding by five stages from less sensitive to more sensitive information. Progress from one stage to the next would occur only after full verification of the information disclosed during the stage. Methods of inspection were spelled out in detail.


24 Apr 52

The United States Representative on the U.N. Disarmament Commission submitted a working paper on the essential principles for a disarmament program. The paper was designed to clarify the indispensable ingredients and objectives of a comprehensive disarmament program and to
The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to inform the Secretary of Defense of their objection to a proposal by the Department of State to proceed through all stages of a system for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification of information about armaments and armed forces before agreement had been reached on a system of effective international control of atomic energy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out that this proposal was not in accord with NSC 112 (19 July 1951) and that disclosure of information about the U.S. atomic energy program, even if accompanied by such verification as might be accepted by the Soviet Union, would jeopardize the security of the United States unless prior agreement had been reached and control procedures had been developed for atomic energy as embodied in the U.N. plan or any other equally effective plan for the control of atomic energy.

(Memo) JCS to SecDef, "United States Position on Regulation of Armaments and Armed Forces," 30 Apr 52, derived from JCS 1731/63, same subj, same date, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 39.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff [agreed to inform] the Secretary of Defense of their comments on a proposal by the Department of State on the numerical limitation of armed forces. In a working paper for submission to the U.N. Disarmament Commission, State had incorporated a formula proposing that maximum limits of armed forces should not exceed the lower of the following: (1) one percent of a nation's population, or (2) a fixed numerical ceiling somewhere between one million and one and one-half million, with possible relatively minor adjustments to avoid disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace. The Joint Chiefs of Staff enumerated "numerous and serious" military disadvantages to this formula. They were of the opinion that submission of this proposal as a working paper would not be consistent with the security interest of the United States.

(Memo) JCS to SecDef, "Numerical Limitation of Armed Forces - RAC (NS) D-4," 20 May 52, derived from JCS 1731/65, same subj, 15 May 52, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 40.

The French, U.K. and U.S. representatives to the U.N. Disarmament Commission submitted a working paper on the numerical limitation of armed forces that included the formula for numerical limitation to which the Joint Chiefs of Staff had objected (20 May 1952).
4 Sep 52
The U.S. Representative to the U.N. Disarmament Commission submitted a working paper on the elimination of bacteriological warfare. 

20 Jan 53
In his inaugural address President Eisenhower stated: "... we stand ready to engage with any and all others in joint effort to remove the causes of mutual fear and distrust among nations so as to make possible drastic reduction of armaments." He stated that the sole requisites for undertaking such an effort were that—in their purpose—they be aimed logically and honestly toward secure peace for all; and that—in their result—they provide methods by which every participating nation would prove good faith in carrying out its pledge. 

25 Feb 53
The National Security Council charged the Senior NSC Staff with the task of reviewing "Armaments and American Policy." This review was prompted by a report of a Department of State Panel of Consultants (Dr. Vannevar Bush, chairman) submitted in January 1953. The report recommended greater flexibility in American policy on the question of disarmament. 
(Circulated as JCS 1731/74, 5 Mar 53, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 43. NSC Action No. 725, 25 Feb 53.

16 Apr 53
President Eisenhower stated in a public address that, as progress in the settlement of other political problems strengthened world trust, we could proceed concurrently with the reduction of the burden of armaments. Agreements could properly include: (1) limitation, by absolute numbers or by ratio, of military and security forces; (2) commitment by nations to set agreed limits upon proportion of total production of certain strategic materials to be devoted to military purposes; (3) international control of atomic energy to promote its use for peaceful purposes only; (4) limitation or prohibition of other categories of weapons of great destructiveness; and (5) enforcement by adequate safeguards, including a practical system of inspection under the United Nations. 

29 Jul 53
The U.S. Senate unanimously adopted Senate Resolution 150. This resolution emphasized that the U.S. people and the Congress ardently desired peace and the achievement of a system under which armaments, except for the maintenance of domestic and international order, would become unnecessary. The resolution stated that it was the declared purpose of the United States to seek by all peaceful means the conditions for durable peace and concurrently with progress in this respect to seek, within the United Nations, agreements by all nations for enforceable limitations of armaments in accordance with the principles set forth in President Eisenhower's address of 15 April 1953. 
The National Security Council adopted two recommendations of the NSC Planning Board report NSC 112/1, 1 September 1953. The approved recommendations were as follows: 
(1) the United States should initiate no new substantive disarmament proposals in the Eighth regular session of the U.N. General Assembly, and (2) the United States should introduce a proposal affirming the principles of President Eisenhower's speech of 16 April 1953, and in particular the statement that as progress in the settlement of other political problems strengthened world trust, we could proceed concurrently with the problem of reducing the burden of armaments. The National Security Council did not adopt a recommendation that the United States should review in the next session of the U.N. General Assembly the record of its effort to achieve agreement on disarmament and emphasize that the proposals previously submitted by the United States either unilaterally or jointly with France and the United Kingdom provided a comprehensive approach to genuine disarmament negotiations. However, the Council agreed that this recommended review could be included in the proposed reaffirmation of President Eisenhower's speech. The Council further recommended to the President that the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission be appointed as a special committee to review NSC 112 (19 July 1951).

(25) NSC Action No. 899, 9 Sep 53.

The National Security Council agreed that the following U.S. position on disarmament at the U.N. General Assembly would be consistent with NSC Action No. 899 (9 September 1953): (1) An acceptable disarmament system must meet one test, that of effective safeguards to ensure compliance of all nations and to give adequate warning of possible evasions and violations; (2) past proposals by the United States had been designed to meet this test, but the United States was not inflexible in believing that these proposals were the only ones meeting these criteria; (3) the United States was constantly reviewing the disarmament problem, hoped other nations would do likewise, would examine any new proposals made by others, and would put forward new ideas as they were developed; and (4) if required during the session, the United States might take the position that it still supported the basic principles of its past proposals, subject to review of the details in the light of recent developments.

(26) NSC Action No. 909, 17 Sep 53.

The U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution that called upon all member states to intensify their efforts to assist the U.N. Disarmament Commission and suggested that the Commission study the desirability of establishing a subcommittee consisting of representatives of the Powers principally involved. This subcommittee was to seek in private an acceptable solution and report to the full commission as soon as possible, in order that the latter might study and report on such a solution not later than 1 September 1954.

8 Dec 53
In a speech before the U.N. General Assembly President Eisenhower stated that the United States "is instantly prepared to meet privately with such other countries as may be 'principally involved' to seek 'an acceptable solution' to the atomic armaments race which overshadows not only the peace, but very life, of the world." He proposed that the governments principally concerned "begin now and continue to make joint contributions from their [atomic] stockpiles" to an International Atomic Energy Agency to be set up under the aegis of the United Nations. The proposed agency would be responsible for impounding, storing, and protecting the contributed materials. Its most important responsibility would be to devise methods by which fissionable material would be allocated to serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind.

18 Feb 54
The Foreign Ministers of France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States, meeting in Berlin between 25 January and 18 February 1954, agreed that their governments "will subsequently hold an exchange of views to promote a successful solution of the problem" of armaments as provided in the U.N. General Assembly resolution of 28 November 1953.

19 Apr 54
The U.N. Disarmament Commission established a subcommittee consisting of representatives of Canada, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States to meet in private and seek a solution of disarmament problems under the terms of the U.N. General Assembly resolution of 28 November 1953.

13 May - 22 Jun 54
The subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission met in London. The Soviet delegate took the position that there could be no progress until certain principles advocated by the Soviet Union were accepted by the West. The Soviet delegate called for unconditional prohibition of nuclear weapons without safeguards, one-third reduction of all armed forces and armaments, inspection without infringement upon national sovereignty, etc. His proposals were rejected by the West; he in turn rejected two Western proposals described below, and the meetings ended without agreement having been reached.

25 May 54
The U.S. Representative to the subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission submitted a working-paper on methods of implementing and enforcing disarmament programs. The paper proposed the establishment of a U.N. disarmament and atomic energy development authority composed of the members of the U.N. Security Council and Canada. The broad objectives for establishing such a control organ were as follows: (1) to provide international control of atomic energy to ensure its use for peaceful purposes only; (2) to supervise programs for limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments; (3) to supervise
the safeguards necessary for enforcement, including disclosure and verification; and (4) to assure each participating nation that other states were observing the agreements. The proposed authority was to derive its rights and powers from a disarmament treaty. Among the proposed powers were the following: (1) to function by majority rule; (2) to determine the details of the time and manner of enforcing agreed reductions, limitations, and prohibitions provided by the treaty; (3) to organize and conduct inspections and aerial surveys; and (4) to station personnel permanently in countries adhering to the treaty. Violations would be reported to the Security Council and the General Assembly.


11 Jun 54

The French and U.K. representatives to the subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission submitted a memorandum on the phasing and timing of the elements of a disarmament program. The phases, each of which would begin only when the control organ reported that it was able to enforce the agreed prohibitions and reductions, were as follows: (1) a limitation of military forces and military expenditures to the levels of 31 December 1953; (2) completion of fifty percent of the agreed reductions of conventional armaments and armed forces, to be followed by cessation of the manufacture of nuclear and other prohibited weapons; (3) completion of agreed reductions of conventional armaments and armed forces, to be followed by total prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and conversion of existing stocks of materials for peaceful purposes.


30 Sep 54

The Soviet representative to the U.N. General Assembly proposed that the French-UK memorandum of 11 June 1954 be accepted as the basis for drafting an international disarmament and atomic energy control treaty. A Soviet draft resolution introduced at this time by Mr. Vishinski conceded that armed forces and conventional armaments might be reduced by fifty percent before action was taken to prohibit nuclear weapons. In addition, the Soviet resolution proposed a system of inspections of a more comprehensive nature than previous Soviet proposals.


4 Nov 54

The U.N. General Assembly passed three resolutions on disarmament. The first concluded that a further effort should be made to reach agreement on comprehensive and coordinated proposals to be incorporated in a draft international disarmament convention. This resolution called upon the subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission to reconvene for private discussions. The second resolution referred to the Disarmament Commission a proposal by India for an armaments truce pending establishment of the disarmament convention. The third resolution requested the U.N. Secretary General to prepare a working paper giving a documentary summary of the present positions of the great powers.

Confronted with this difference of views, the National Security Council recommended that the President designate "an individual of outstanding qualifications" as his Special Representative to conduct a further review of U.S. policy on the control of armaments. Further, the Council agreed that, pending completion of this review, the public position of the United States in the United Nations would be as follows: (1) continued support of the current U.S. positions, including the U.N. plan with adjustments in emphasis to take account of the presently accumulated stock-piles and the existence of sufficient nuclear material for foreseeable peacetime uses; and (2) avoidance of a position that would materially prejudice the possible introduction of later proposals.

NSC Action No. 1328.

Representatives of Canada, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States, meeting as the subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission, began secret talks in London, as requested by the U.N. General Assembly (4 November 1954). Advancing proposals at variance with the Vyshinsky statement of 30 September 1954, the Soviet representative called for a freeze on armaments and armed forces at the level of 1 January 1955. He also proposed destruction of all nuclear weapons and the institution of an international control system. (DC/SC 1/12/Rev 1, 25 Feb 55, annex to DC/71, Oct 55.) He subsequently expanded upon these proposals, suggesting the establishment of a temporary control commission to supervise the freeze of the status quo in armaments and armed forces. A second stage would include fifty per...
of the agreed reductions in armaments, armed forces, and military budgets. A permanent control commission would be eventually (DC/SC 1/19/Rev/1, 19 Mar 55, annex 8 to DC/71) established. However, the Soviet representative refused to elaborate on these proposals when asked for clarification by the Western powers. On 19 April the French and U.K. representative introduced a memorandum amending their memorandum of 11 June 1954 to provide that a complete prohibition of use of nuclear weapons would come into effect after the completion of seventy-five percent of agreed reductions of conventional armaments and armed forces. (DC/SC 1/24, 19 Apr 55, annex 13 to DC/71.) On 21 April the four Western powers introduced a draft resolution on principles of control. DC/SC 1/25, 21 Apr 55, annex 14 to DC/71.) However, the discussions in the subcommittee during March and April 1955 were inconclusive.


9 Mar 55

(TF) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "British Proposal for Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments," 9 Mar 55, derived from JCS 1731/114, same subj, 5 Mar 55, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 50.

19 Mar 55

President Eisenhower announced the appointment of Mr. Harold Stassen "as Special Assistant to the President with responsibility for developing, on behalf of the President and the State Department, the broad studies, investigations, and conclusions which, when concurred in by the National Security Council and approved by the President, will become basic policy toward the question of disarmament."


10 May 55

The Soviet representative to the subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission, still meeting in London, introduced a new resolution that, in the words of the U.S. representative, used "ideas and language which are similar in many respects to the views put forward for many years--by Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States." The Soviet resolution apparently accepted the following Western proposals: (1) a two-stage program that first regulated conventional armaments
and then disposed of Nuclear weapons (the program was to be completed in two years, however, whereas the Western Powers had proposed no time limit); (2) the Anglo-French compromise formula for eliminating nuclear weapons after completion of seventy-five percent of the program for reducing conventional armaments; (3) the Western proposal for specific numerical limitations for all conventional armaments and armed forces (the Soviet Union called for ceilings of 1,500,000 for the United States, China, and the Soviet Union; 650,000 for France and the United Kingdom; the reductions to be reached in two fifty percent installments in 1956 and 1957); (4) a single international control authority instead of the temporary and permanent authorities proposed in March 1955 by the USSR; and (5) the Western proposal for a freeze on conventional weapons, armed forces, and military expenditures simultaneously with the first stage of the program. In addition, the Soviet resolution called for (6) a moratorium on testing nuclear weapons; (7) progressive dismantling of military bases on foreign soil, with elimination of all bases to be completed some time after 1957; (8) evacuation of all foreign troops from Germany; (9) limitation of Germany to internal police forces, the limitation to be enforced by the Big Four; and (10) participation of Communist China in the control scheme as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council.

The Soviet proposal did not provide for the cessation of nuclear weapons production until the second stage, nor did it provide for the institution of control machinery that met Western criteria.

(3) DC/SC 1/26, Rev 2, 10 May 55, annex 15 to DC/71; Dept of State Bulletin, vol XXXII (30 May 55), pp. 960-965.

18 May 55

The subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Committee agreed to recess its talks until 1 June, when sessions were to resume in New York. After one meeting in New York, the subcommittee adjourned sine die.


26 May 55

The National Security Council noted and discussed Mr. Stassen's first progress report on "Proposed Policy of the United States on the Question of Disarmament." The Council referred the report to the departments and agencies for comment and requested Mr. Stassen to submit a further report in light of these comments.

The first progress report contained an outline of a disarmament plan couched in general terms. The plan was based on the following premises: (1) a cardinal aim of the United States should be to prevent the Soviet Union from achieving the capability of destroying the United States by a surprise attack; (2) the United States now had meaningful superiority in nuclear weapons and delivery systems, but this lead would decrease markedly with time; (3) a leveling-off of all armaments, including cessation of nuclear production, in the near future would leave the margin of Free World superiority unimpaired; (4) during the next ten years the Soviet Union would attain the capability of effectively destroying the United States.
through surprise attack; within the next five years the United States and its allies would attain the capability of effectively destroying the Soviet Union and would retain this capability even if a surprise attack were first launched against the United States; and (5) a leveling-off of armaments, say in two years, would stop the United States and the Soviet Union short of nuclear capability sufficient for mutual annihilation. Achievement of this end would bring accomplishment of the cardinal aim of U.S. policy.

After setting forth essential principles to guide U.S. policy and desirable principles that should influence U.S. policy, the report proposed that "the United States should now endeavor to reach an initial agreement with the USSR and with all major countries on a first phase plan." The report listed the following among the features of the plan: (1) Leveling-off all armament efforts at an early fixed date; (2) establishment of an international armaments commission with the right to observe and inspect all existing armaments; (3) leveling-off of armaments efforts only when the inspection service was ready and in place on the date fixed; (4) requiring all nations to disclose on parallel dates in stages all existing armaments and to submit to verification of the disclosures by inspection; (5) a moratorium on nuclear weapons testing; (6) provision for renegotiation of the agreements and for termination by renunciation in the event of violations confirmed by the control authority; (7) enforcement by machinery of the United Nations; and (8) control of nuclear material other than weapons for peaceful uses. The United States would make it clear that this first-phase plan was considered as a prelude to future agreed reduction in the present level of armaments, both conventional and nuclear.


The Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted to the Secretary of Defense their comments on Volume I of Mr. Stassen's progress report. Pointing out that considerable elaboration and clarification were needed, the Joint Chiefs submitted a number of "preliminary" comments. The Chiefs enumerated four general observations. First, "The Report, by concentrating on the necessity for arriving at an armaments agreement primarily directed toward preventing wide-scale devastation which might occur in general war, tends to obscure the implications to United States security of a continuation of the Cold War, which is a more immediate prospect." Second, "It is considered that the United States, in assessing the benefits which could accrue from a limitation of armaments agreement, should not ascribe undue weight to its value as a safeguard against surprise." Third, the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out that the "arms race" to which the report frequently referred was a misnomer for the American and Allied policy of endeavoring "to set a level of forces and armament expenditures which can be maintained over the long term, with due consideration for economic and other factors which affect the well-being of their people." Should an arms race become necessary, the United
States could increase its production many fold, well outstripping the Soviet Bloc. Fourth, the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated that there was no evidence of a change in Soviet objectives and stated that "experience has shown that past international agreement on the limitation of armaments has not averted war, but instead, has served to permit the rearmament of the violator without awakening timely counteraction by the intended victims of the aggressor."

In conclusion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that, in the absence of a revolutionary change in Soviet intentions and ambitions, "there is less risk to the security of the United States in the continuation of current armament trends than in entering into an international armaments limitation agreement." Concurring in the objective of maintaining the initiative for peace, the Joint Chiefs of Staff "would favor, in principle, a comprehensive and carefully phased program for the international control of atomic energy and the limitation, reduction and regulation of all armed forces and armaments, if implemented subsequent to or in conjunction with the settlement of other vital international problems." The following objectives should be insured: (1) the concurrent elimination of Communist aggression and subversion; (2) a progressive rollback of the Iron Curtain and creation of an Open World; and (3) not leaving for subsequent and independent negotiation the major issues having serious implications to U.S. national security.

(25) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Progress Report on the Control of Armaments Made to the President and the NSC by the Special Assistant to the President on 26 May 1955," 16 Jun 55, derived from JCS 1731/118, same subj, 14 Jun 55, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 51.
23 Jun 55

After consulting with departments and agencies, Mr. Stassen submitted to the National Security Council a revision of his progress report. The revised report was prefaced with the statements "there is general agreement . . . that the proposed new policy . . . is preferable to the existing policy . . ." and "there is broad agreement . . . upon the major premises and principles set forth in Volume I . . . ." Mr. Stassen also listed questions remaining for decision on which there was a difference of views. He recommended that the revised first phase plan be given limited Presidential approval for discussion with Canada, France, and the United Kingdom and that the results of these consultations and further studies by U.S. departments and agencies be reported to the National Security Council. The revised plan

(TS) Memo, ExecSecy NSC to NSC, "U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments," 23 Jun 55, w/encl, "Volume IV, Special Staff Study for the President."

27 Jun 55

The Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded to the Secretary of Defense their comments on Volume IV of the Stassen report. They pointed out that their favorable comments on certain features of the earlier plan should not be construed as "general agreement . . . that the proposed new policy . . . is preferable to existing policy." They objected that the revision did not make

They added that their four general comments of 16 June 1955 still applied to the revised version of the plan. They stated that the first-phase plan, as modified, would not diminish the risks of leaving major issues for independent and subsequent negotiations and that therefore the plan was "not suitable as a United States proposal for control of armaments or as a basis for the United States position in international discussions on this subject."


28 Jun 55

The Secretary of Defense, in a long memorandum to the President, endorsed the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Volumes I and IV of the Stassen report. The key issue highlighted by Mr. Wilson was that of sequence; the Department of Defense believed that reduction of international tension was necessarily antecedent to armaments limitation. Accordingly, he recommended that (1) the first-phase plan not be approved until major political issues had been resolved and that consultations with Allies on the plan not begin at present; (2) resolution of major issues be clearly a precondition to arms leveling-off and
reductions; (3) that nonaggression through mutual deter-
rence, rather than disarmament, be accepted as the only path to a just and lasting peace; and (4) at the forth-
coming Geneva conference of the Heads of Government, the United States express its willingness to work on a listing of all specific political problems currently contributing to international tension, and its willingness to col-
laborate in good faith on the resolution of such problems.


The National Security Council discussed Mr. Stassen's report and the comments by the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Council agreed that the United States, as interrelated parts of its national policy, should take the following actions: (1) actively seek an international system for regulation and reduction of armed forces and armaments; (2) concurrently make intensive efforts to resolve other major international issues; and (3) meanwhile continue the steady development of the strength in the United States and the Free World coalition required for U.S. security. The Council further agreed that the acceptability and character of any inter-
national system for the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces depended primarily on the scope and effectiveness of safeguards, particularly the inspection system. The President directed Mr. Stassen, in consultation with interested departments and agencies, to: (1) develop feasible methods of inspection that would be acceptable on a reciprocal basis to the United States; (2) modify the proposed plan to conform with such an inspection system; (3) take into account in the plan the President's proposal for an international pool of atomic materials to be used for peaceful purposes; and (4) make a further report to the President and the Council after these steps had been completed.

President Eisenhower, at the Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, proposed that the Soviet Union and the United States take steps: "To give to each other a complete blueprint of our military establishments, from beginning to end, from one end of our countries to the other; to lay out the establishments and provide the blueprints to each other.

"Next, to provide within our countries facilities for aerial photography to the other country--we to provide you the facilities within our country, ample facilities for aerial reconnaissance, where you can make all the pictures you choose and take them to your own country to study; you to provide exactly the same facilities for us and we to make these examinations--and by this step to convince the world that we are providing as between ourselves against the possibility of great surprise attack, thus lessening danger and relaxing tension. Likewise we will make more easily attainable a comprehensive and effective system of inspection and disarmament, because what I propose, I assure you, would be but a beginning."
The President proposed that the four nations instruct their representatives on the subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission to give "priority effort to the study of inspection and reporting. Such a study could well include a step-by-step testing of inspection and reporting methods." Outlining the proper sequence for action, the President continued, "The United States is ready to proceed in the study and testing of a reliable system of inspections and reporting and, when that system is proved, then to reduce armaments with all others to the extent that the system will provide assured results."


23 Jul 55

The Geneva Conference adopted a directive calling upon the Big Four Foreign Ministers to take note of the proceedings in the Disarmament Commission, to take account of the views expressed at the Conference, and to consider whether the four states could take further useful initiative in the field of disarmament.


19 Aug 55

The Joint Chiefs of Staff commented to the Secretary of Defense on Mr. Stassen's request for views of the Department of Defense on the question whether the force levels proposed by the United States in 1952 should be withdrawn during the next sessions of the Disarmament Sub-committee or allowed to remain in force as tentative or preliminary objectives for relative ultimate ceilings. The Chiefs concluded that (1) "the force levels proposed by the United States in 1952 should be withdrawn now," and (2) "if it is politically infeasible to withdraw the proposals regarding fixed numerical ceilings on armed forces, they should be treated as originally intended, i.e., as illustrative, as the basis for discussion, and as a line of departure in developing realistic force level figures should agreement on other substantive features of an arms arrangement be achieved."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff expanded upon these conclusions in their memorandum to the Secretary of Defense. At the same time they agreed in principle to the proposal by Mr. Stassen that the United States in negotiations in the subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission recommend the arrangement of reciprocal exchange of a small technical panel to make pilot inspections "to endeavor to design and recommend from the technical standpoint the most effective and feasible system of inspection, reporting and control . . . ."


19 Aug 55

The Joint Chiefs of Staff furnished the Secretary of Defense with a practical outline to implement the broad concept of the Presidential proposal made at the Geneva Conference on the subject of disarmament, and provided a detailed definition of the term "complete blueprint of our military establishments." The outline plan submitted to the Secretary of Defense had as its objective "to provide against the possibility of surprise attack between the United States and the USSR, thus lessening danger and relaxing world tension." "Blueprint of military
establishments" was defined as "the complete order of battle of all major land, sea, and air forces, and a complete list of military plants, facilities, and installations with their locations." Each nation was to station observers for verification at key locations and to be permitted unrestricted, but monitored, aerial reconnaissance. The exchange of information was to be accomplished in progressive steps as mutually agreed. Information to be disclosed and verified included: (1) weapons and delivery systems suitable for surprise attacks, (2) transportation and telecommunications, (3) armed forces, structure and positioning of armed forces, and (4) additional facilities as mutually agreed upon by the two governments.

(23) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Disarmament," 19 Aug 55, derived from JCS 1731/129, same subj, 18 Aug 55, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 53.

29 Aug 55

The subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission resumed meetings in New York. On 29 August the U.S. representative presented an outline plan for the exchange and verification of information essential to provide against the possibility of surprise attack.


This U.S. proposal was substantially the same as the JCS outline plan of 19 August except for the omission of two paragraphs that dealt with limitations and future procedures. (TOP SECRET)

2 Sep 55

The Joint Chiefs of Staff commented to the Secretary of Defense on a disarmament paper by the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not agree in all particulars with the U.K. Chiefs of Staff, they were in agreement that the immediate aims of the Soviet disarmament proposal of 10 May 1955 were "the disintegration of NATO, the removal of American forces from all foreign bases, the prevention of West German rearmament, and the banning of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction." They considered that "the continuing Soviet emphasis on banning the use of nuclear weapons is obviously directed toward eroding the political cohesion of the West and undermining the will of the Allies to employ these weapons in war. In the light of these objectives, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that, while the USSR may have a genuine desire that their disarmament proposals be accepted, the proposals themselves cannot as yet be taken as evidence that the Soviets sincerely desire an equitable and effective system of world disarmament. While purporting to meet in general the previous Western conditions, the Soviet proposal still contains certain fundamental differences which render it unacceptable to the West in its present form."

(24) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "U.K. Chiefs of Staff Disarmament Paper," 2 Sep 54, derived from JCS 1731/130, same subj, 24 Aug 55, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 53.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded to the Secretary of Defense their comments on a paper prepared by Mr. Stassen proposing the exchange of a panel of technical experts to conduct test inspections. The Chiefs pointed out that such an exchange of technical inspectors should not be proposed until after the Soviet Union had accepted the President's Geneva proposal. "If the proposal for the exchange of a Technical Panel were to be introduced and accepted prior to acceptance of the President's Proposal, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that it would detract seriously from the significance of the latter and, in all probability, would militate against its acceptance by the USSR. It is therefore recommended that the Stassen proposal, if formally introduced into the Disarmament Subcommittee discussions, be linked to and predicated upon prior acceptance by the USSR of the President's Proposal." In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested changes in the body of Mr. Stassen's paper.

(26) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Disarmament Policy Planning," 2 Sep 55, derived from JCS 1731/135, same subj, 1 Sep 55, OCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 55.

Mr. Bulganin, Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers, wrote to President Eisenhower criticizing, but not rejecting, the President's Geneva proposal for exchange of blueprints and aerial photography of territory. While not objecting in principle to the proposed bilateral exchange of military information between the United States and the Soviet Union, Mr. Bulganin stated that he considered "it would be better, however, if such information concerning armaments were submitted by all states, and not only by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., to the international organ of control and inspection ...." He considered, further, that the establishment of such an international control organ would become significant only if agreement were achieved on the reduction of armaments and on measures for the prohibition of atomic weapons. Turning to the question of aerial photography, Mr. Bulganin pointed out that (1) neither the United States nor the Soviet Union was without allies in whose territory forces and military installations were located, (2) aerial photography should be extended to such forces and installations, (3) it was questionable whether these other states would permit the overflight of foreign aircraft, and (4) in any event, this step would not halt the arms race and, hence, would not remove the threat of a new war. Mr. Bulganin reiterated Soviet proposals for numerical ceilings on armed forces, for prohibition of atomic weapons, and for the establishment of ground control posts in large ports, at railroad junctions, on automobile highways, and at airfields. He considered that agreement on these Soviet proposals would "open the way toward solution of other questions which concern the problem of disarmament."


The Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded to the Secretary of Defense their comments on Mr. Bulganin's letter (19 September 1955). After pointing out that the Soviet
proposals did not provide an effective inspection and control system, the Chiefs recommended that the reply to Mr. Bulganin: (1) reiterate the purposes of the President's Geneva proposal and press for its acceptance by the Soviet Union, and (2) indicate clearly and unmistakably that the United States considered the establishment of a reliable system of reporting and inspection to be an essential prelude to any agreement on the reduction or limitation of armaments.

Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Disarmament Planning," 30 Sep 55, derived from JCS 1731/140, "Bulganin Note to the President on Disarmament Planning," 28 Sep 55, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 55.

7 Oct 55

The subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission agreed to forward the record of its discussions to the Commission. The subcommittee then recessed, planning to reconvene after the Geneva conference of foreign ministers.


11 Oct 55

President Eisenhower sent an interim reply to Mr. Bulganin, promising to give further study to the questions raised in the note of 19 September 1955. He expressed the hope that the Soviet Union could agree on the U.S. Geneva proposal, not as a cure-all, but "to show a spirit of non-aggressiveness on both sides and so to create a fresh atmosphere which would dispel much of the present fear and suspicion." (1) Deputy State Bulletin, vol XXXIII (24 Oct 55), pp. 843-844.

19 Oct 55

The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to forward to the Secretary of Defense a detailed plan for the implementation of the President's Geneva proposal. In developing the plan the Chiefs had considered that the Presidential proposal was an initial and integral step in any system for inspection and control of an arms agreement. Further, they considered that a comprehensive inspection system must be pointed toward providing against armed attack. The Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed that the military portions of the comprehensive inspection system should be accomplished in three steps: (1) the initial step (the Eisenhower proposal) during which there would be initiated that portion of the system essential to verification of military information exchanged between the United States and the Soviet Union; (2) the comprehensive step, during which the system would be expanded to include more far-reaching data and more participating nations; and (3) the multilateral step, during which other nations, formerly not included, would be drawn into the system. The detailed plan set forth the objects to be inspected, the organization of the inspecting group, the personnel requirement of the system, the communications network, etc.


20 Oct 55

Mr. Bulganin replied to President Eisenhower's note of 11 October 1955. He expressed satisfaction that the
President had remarked favorably on the Soviet proposal to establish control posts and key locations.

NYT, 23 Oct 55, 311.

21 Oct 55

The U.N. Disarmament Commission met at the request of the Soviet representative, but adjourned sine die without taking action on the report of its subcommittee.


27 Oct 55 - 16 Nov 55

The Big Four Foreign Ministers, meeting in Geneva, discussed disarmament inconclusively. They agreed, in general, on the need to develop a comprehensive program for disarmament but were at variance over the system of safeguards. The Western delegates stressed the pointlessness of agreeing to abolish nuclear weapons as long as there was no known method to guarantee compliance. The Soviet Union, although acknowledging the difficulties of control, continued to press for both prohibition of nuclear weapons and reduction of armaments.

The U.S. delegation argued for the adoption of the President's Geneva proposal, but the Soviet representative stated that his government would not accept this plan independently of a general disarmament agreement. He did, however, agree to give favorable consideration to the idea of aerial photography as a means of control in the concluding stage of a disarmament program.

The apparent forum for further discussions of disarmament will be the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission.


1 Nov 55

Volume V of Mr. Stassen's "Progress Report on Proposed Policy of the United States on the Question of Disarmament" was submitted to interested departments and agencies for written comment prior to its presentation to the National Security Council and the President.

This report included a summary of the JCS plan for a comprehensive inspection system. It also reiterated the conclusion of Volumes I-IV that a sound agreement on armaments, with thorough and effective inspection, would be highly desirable for the United States, and would greatly improve the prospects for a just and durable peace, provided the U.S. remained on the alert and maintained substantial military strength.

Three priority objectives for U.S. policy were recommended for adoption: (1) providing against the possibility of great surprise attack by (a) opening up the Soviet Union and other Communist territory to effective inspection, (b) establishing current accountability of the movement of forces, and (c) maintaining thoroughly dispersed and alert U.S. armed strength; (2) preventing, retarding, or minimizing the development of nuclear weapons capability by countries other than the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States; and (3) preventing, retarding, or minimizing the establishment of substantial intercontinental missile capability and of an expanded nuclear weapons capability by the Soviet Union.
The report recommended courses of action to attain these objectives. The United States should continue to press for acceptance of the President's Geneva proposal; it should agree to reciprocal inspection and accept modest initial reductions in conventional forces on a reciprocal basis if these reductions were tied to acceptance of the President's proposals. The United States should propose that satellites and intercontinental and outer space rockets be developed through international collaboration for peaceful purposes; it should contribute to the opening up of the Soviet Union by cultural exchange programs. At the same time, the report recommended that the United States not agree to the elimination of existing stocks of nuclear weapons and not accept reduction or limitations of armaments on armed forces unless an adequate inspection system to verify these limitations were in place. Further, the United States should not agree to withdraw from overseas bases prior to major verified reduction of Soviet weapons-carrying capability and prior to the resolution of major issues of tension. The report also recommended some additional actions subordinate to the priority objectives. Finally, it included recommendations on the provisions to be incorporated in an armaments agreement.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff commented to the Secretary of Defense on Mr. Stassen's Volume V. They stated that they were restudying their plan for an inspection system "to determine the feasibility of a substantial reduction in personnel and resources required for its implementation." Pending the completion of this restudy, they desired to reserve comment on the sections of Volume V that dealt with numbers of inspectors, scope, and approximate cost of the system. They pointed out, however, that the efficacy of the proposed system could only be determined by testing it.

Turning to the section of Volume V that recommended U.S. policy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that considerable revision would be required before the policy would constitute satisfactory guidance to the departments and agencies concerned. The format embodying the policy created "doubt as to whether it represents a departure from the concept of proceeding step-by-step from the President's Proposal to a comprehensive disarmament program, the implementation of each step being predicated upon the functioning of a reliable inspection and reporting control system. Further, the courses of action recommended do not appear, in many instances, to be directly related to each other or to any particular step."

In addition to these general comments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested specific amendments. A basic suggestion was that the first priority objective be the establishment of effective inspection to provide against surprise attack by the Soviet Union.

Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Proposed Policy of the United States on the Question of Disarmament (NSC Action 1419)," 18 Nov 55, derived from JCS 1731/149, same subj, 16 Nov 55, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 57.
23 Nov 55

Admiral Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, announced that another explosion had taken place in the current Soviet test series. This explosion, in the range of megatons, was the largest thus far in the Soviet Union.


7 Dec 55

The Secretary of Defense forwarded the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Volume V to Mr. Stassen. Secretary Wilson emphasized four points. First, he pointed out the essentiality of making sure that each step taken on the limitation and balanced reduction of armaments enhanced the security of the United States. "We must preserve our deterrent strength until we have a reliable substitute."

Second, Mr. Wilson emphasized "the importance of exploring ways and means of minimizing the effect of surprise attack as a preliminary to negotiations on a broader scale."

Third, he asked for clarification and elaboration of the report. Finally, he reserved comment on that portion of the report dealing with the inspection system until the Joint Chiefs of Staff had completed their restudy.

*(TS)* Ltr, SecDef to Mr. Stassen, 7 Dec 55, Circulated as N/H of JCS 1731/149, 9 Dec 55, CSS 092 (4-14-45) sec. 57.

16 Dec 55

A revision of Mr. Stassen's Volume V was circulated to the National Security Council. This revision incorporated modifications suggested by interested departments and agencies. It recommended portions of the report for immediate adoption and suggested deferring decision on other portions about which the departments and agencies had been unable to reach agreement.

*(TS)* Memo, ExecSecy NSC to NSC, "U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments," 16 Dec 55, w/encl, revised Vol V, CSS 092 (4-14-45) sec 57.

16 Dec 55

The U.N. General Assembly by a vote of 56-7 (Soviet bloc) passed a resolution endorsing President Eisenhower's Geneva proposal. The resolution urged that the states concerned, particularly those on the subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission, should continue their endeavors to reach agreement on a disarmament plan and should, as initial steps, give priority to early agreement on and implementation of: (1) "such confidence-building measures" as the Eisenhower plan for exchange of military blue-prints and mutual aerial inspection and the Bulganin plan for establishing control posts at strategic centers, and (2) all such measures of adequately safeguarded disarmament as are now feasible.


20 Dec 55

The Joint Chiefs of Staff commented to the Secretary of Defense on Mr. Stassen's revised Volume V. They considered "that the revised statement of Policy now recommended by Mr. Stassen for approval reflects in most cases their previous detailed comments but in its totality is still lacking in clarity. For example, it is not clear whether the concept of proceeding step-by-step from the President's Proposal to a comprehensive disarmament program is to be
maintained." In addition to further detailed comments on the revised policy statement, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the Secretary of Defense reaffirm his desire to examine the details of the comprehensive plan before Mr. Stassen's report was brought before the National Security Council.

(JPS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Proposed Policy of the U.S. On the Question of Disarmament (NSC Action 1419)," 20 Dec 55, derived from JCS 1731/155, same subj, 19 Dec 55, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 57.

21 Dec 55 The Deputy Secretary of Defense proposed that the National Security Council delay decision on Mr. Stassen's revised report until the members could be afforded an opportunity to assess the policy as a whole, and in all of its implications.

(JPS) Memo, ExecSecy NSC to NSC, "Proposed Policy of the U.S. on the Question of Disarmament," 21 Dec 55, w/encl, Memo, DeptySecDef to NSC, same subj, same date, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 57.

22 Dec 55 The National Security Council discussed Mr. Stassen's revised Volume V and noted that Mr. Stassen, in light of the discussion and after further consultation with the responsible departments and agencies, would submit a further revision for Council consideration prior to the forthcoming meeting of President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Eden.

(JPS) NSC Action No. 1496.

22 Dec 55 The Joint Strategic Plans Committee submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a revision of the detailed plan for the comprehensive armaments and armed forces inspection system. This revision had been drafted in light of comments by Vice Admiral L. C. Stevens (USN-Ret) and Dr. Stefan T. Possany.

(JPS) JCS 1731/156, "Disarmament Planning," 22 Dec 55, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt 5.