<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>A-6 &amp; A-7</td>
<td>Coral Sea &amp; America Carrier Battle Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>F-111F</td>
<td>RAF Lakenheath</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>EF-111</td>
<td>RAF Upper Heyford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>KC-10</td>
<td>RAF Mildenhall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>KC-135</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>KC-10</td>
<td>RAF Fairford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>KC-135</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIBYA AIRSTRIKES - 14 APRIL 1986

MUNITIONS EXPENDED

**F-111F strike aircraft:**

- 2000-pound laser-guided bombs
- 500-pound high drag, gravity bombs

**A-6E strike aircraft:**

- 500-pound gravity bombs
- 750-pound gravity bombs

**A-7 and F/A-18 SAM suppression aircraft:**

- HARM missiles
- SHRIKE missiles
**Data on Aircraft Aborts**

**KC-10/KC-135 Tanker Support Aircraft**

No aborts

**EF-111 ECM Aircraft**

No aborts

**A-7 and F/A-18 SAM Suppression Aircraft**

No aborts

**F-111F Strike Aircraft**

Five aborts*

3 - systems degradation

2 - cause not reported

**A-6E Strike Aircraft**

Two aborts*

- cause not reported

(*NOTE: Pilots were directed in advance to abort if any system was not working properly before they reached their assigned target areas.*)
CHRONOLOGY

US OPERATIONS AGAINST LIBYA

14 APRIL 1986

12:13 p.m. EST 28 KC-10/KC-135 commenced departure from RAF Fairford and RAF Mildenhall.

12:36 p.m. 24 F-111s commenced departure from RAF Lakenheath and 5 EF-111s sortied from RAF Heyford. Four silent refuelings conducted enroute the target area.

NOTE: The above totals include spare aircraft.

5:45-6:15 p.m. USS AMERICA launched 6 A-6E strike and 6 A-7 strike support aircraft.

5:20-6:20 p.m. USS CORAL SEA launched 8 A-6E strike and 6 F/A-18 strike support aircraft.

6:54 p.m. Commenced ECM with EF-111s and SAM supression with A-7s and F/A-18s.

7:00 p.m. Commenced simultaneous attacks on BENINA AIRFIELD and the BENGHAZI MILITARY BARRACKS with 12 A-6Es and the AZIZIYAH BARRACKS-Tripoli and the SIDI BILAL TERRORIST TRAINING CAMP with 8 F-111s.

7:06-7:11 p.m. 5 F-111s conducted an attack on the TRIPOLI MILITARY AIRPORT, the final target.

7:13 p.m. All Navy strike aircraft confirmed "feet wet" (i.e. over the ocean, away from the libyan land mass) Unabl to confirm all USAF aircraft "feet wet".

7:15 p.m. SAR Forces alerted to search for a possible missing aircraft.

7:46 p.m. CORAL SEA strike aircraft back on deck.

7:53 p.m. AMERICA strike and primary support aircraft back on deck.

8:14 p.m. First return refueling confirms 1 F-111 missing.

10:16 p.m. 1 F-111 returning to UK diverted to Rota, Spain with over-heated engine.

11:24 p.m. Diverted F-111 reported safe on deck at Rota.

15 APRIL

3:10 a.m. All aircraft (less the 1 F-111 reported missing and the diverted F-111 in Rota) reported safe on deck in the UK.

10:00 p.m. SAR effort terminated. Negative result.

16 APRIL

5:01 p.m. F-111 which had diverted to Spain returned to RAF
U.S. OPERATIONS AGAINST LIBYÀ - APRIL 14, 1986

AIRCRAFT STATISTICS

USAF Tanker Support Aircraft

28 KC-10s and KC-135s, launched from RAF Fairford and RAF Mildenhall. (The original plan had called for 30 but only 28 were needed and only 28 were used.)

USAF ECM Aircraft

5 EF-111s, launched from RAF Heyford. (Only three of these took part in the attack: one returned to Great Britain with the F-111F airborne spares cited below, and the other was held in reserve for use if needed.)

USAF Strike Aircraft

24 F-111Fs, launched from RAF Lakenheath. (Six of these were airborne spares which returned to base as planned, after their initial refueling. The other 18 continued on; 13 of these attacked targets as designated in the attached chronology and 5 aborted.)

USN Strike Aircraft

14 A-6Es, launched from the USS AMERICA (6 aircraft) and CORAL SEA (8 aircraft). (Twelve of these attacked targets as designated in the attached chronology and two aborted.)

USN SAM (Surface-to-Air Missile) Suppression Aircraft

12 A-7s and F/A-18s, launched from the USS AMERICA (6 A-7s) and USS CORAL SEA (6 F/A-18s). (All of these attacked targets as designated in the attached chronology.)
Talking Paper for the Chairman, JCS, for Information

I. SUBJECT: US Operations Against Libya

A. CHRONOLOGY (EST)

14 APRIL
- 1213
  28 KC-10/KC-135 commenced departure from RAF Fairford and RAF Mildenhall.
- 1236
  24 F-111s commenced departure from RAF Lakenheath and 5 EF-111s sorted from RAF Heyford. Four silent refuelings conducted enroute the target area.
- 1745-1815
  USS AMERICA launched 6 A-6E and strike support a/c.
- 1750-1820
  USS CORAL SEA launched 8 A-6E strike a/c.
- 1854
  Commenced ECM/SAM supression.
- 1900
  Commenced simultaneous attacks on BENINA AIRFIELD, the BENGAZI MILITARY BARRACKS with 12 A-6Es and the AZIZIYAH BARRACKS-Tripoli and the SIDI BILAL TERRORIST TRAINING CAMP with 8 F-111s.
- 1906-1911
  5 F-111s conducted an attack on the TRIPOLI MILITARY AIRPORT, the final target.
- 1913
  All Navy strike a/c confirmed feet wet. Unable to confirm all USAF a/c feet wet.
- 1915
  SAR Forces alerted to search for a possible missing a/c.
- 2146
  CORAL SEA strike a/c back on deck.
- 2153
  AMERICA strike and primary support a/c back on deck.
- 2014
  First return refueling confirms 1 F-111 missing.
- 2216
  1 F-111 returning to UK diverted to Rota, Spain with over-heated engine. RTB Lakenheath 161501 EST
- 2324
  Diverted F-111 safe on deck at Rota.

15 APRIL
- 0310
  All a/c (less the 1 F-111 reported missing and the diverted F-111 in Rota) safe on deck in the UK.
- 2200
  SAR effort terminated. Negative results.
B. TARGET INFORMATION

BENINA AIRFIELD.
- TOT: 141900.
- Strike Information.
  -- 8 aircraft launched from USS CORAL SEA 141750 (9 planned).
  -- 6 arrived at target (5 with CBU-59 (APAM) each) and 1 with MK-82 each (500LB GP Bombs).
  -- 2 aircraft aborted - reasons unknown.
- Damage reports.
  -- 1 F-27 (Friendship) destroyed.
  -- 1 MIG-23 (Flogger) destroyed.
  -- 5 MIG-23 (Flogger) probably destroyed.
  -- 20 bomb craters on apron.
  -- 2 M-8 (Hip) helicopters destroyed.
  -- 1 M-8 (Hip) helicopter possibly destroyed.
  -- Numerous buildings with small holes in sides and roof.
  -- 12 "burn marks" indicating that 12 additional MIG-23s (Flogger) were destroyed and subsequently removed. Two pieces of heavy lift equipment were in evidence.

BENGHAZI MILITARY BARRACKS.
- TOT: 141900.
- 6 A-6Es launched from USS AMERICA at 141745 with Mk-82s (500LB General Purpose Bomb) each.
- All aircraft on target.
- No aborts.
- Damage assessment.
  -- Large storage building destroyed.
  -- Some MIG-23 (Flogger) shipping crates destroyed.
AZIZIYAH BARRACKS, TRIPOLI.

- TOT: 141900.

- Strike information.
  
  -- 9 aircraft launched from Lakenheath at 141236.
    
    --- 5 arrived at target with GBU-10's (2000LB Laser Guided Bomb) each.
      
      ---- 3 aircraft on target.
      
      ---- 1 aircraft dropped long.
      
      ---- 1 aircraft missing, crew remains in MIA status.
    
    --- 4 aircraft aborted.
      
      ---- 2 aborts for systems degradation.
      
      ---- 1 abort prior to last refueling.
      
      ---- 1 abort after last refueling.

-- Damage reports.

  --- Heavy damage to roof and front of headquarters building.

  --- At least 14 craters in area.

  --- Building across from French Embassy damaged.

  --- No observable damage to French Embassy.

  --- Battalion headquarters damaged.


SIDI BILAL.

- TOT: 141900.

- Strike information.

  -- 3 F-111s with GBU-10s (2000LB Laser Guided Bomb) each launched from Lakenheath at 141236.

     --- All aircraft on target.

     --- No aborts.

  -- Damage Assessment.

     --- 3 buildings (Naval Academy) damaged.
TRIPOLI MILITARY AIRFIELD.
- TOT: 141906 - 141911.
- Strike information.
  -- 6 F-111s launched from Lakenheath at 141236.
  -- 5 arrived at target with BSU-49s (500LB high drag bombs) each.
  -- 1 acft aborted for loss of terrain following radar.
- Damage reports (preliminary).
  -- All bombs on target.
  -- At least 3 to 5 probable IL-76 aircraft destroyed.
  -- Facility damage: To be determined.

C. MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION.
- Suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD).
  -- HARM (High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile)
    --- Tripoli targets:
    --- Benina targets:
  -- SHRIKE
    --- Tripoli targets:
    --- Benina targets:
- LIBYAN SCUD FIRING.
  -- At 151034, Libyans apparently fired 2 SCUD missiles at Lampedusa island (south of Sicily).
  -- Island is the location of a long range area navigation (LORAN) station operated by approximately 35 US Coast Guard personnel.
  -- Evacuation of 30 USCG personnel is complete with a skeleton crew of 5 USCG personnel remaining.
D. FORCES

- USS CORAL SEA CVBG.
  -- USS CORAL SEA (CV).
  -- USS BIDDLE (CG).
  -- USS DE WERT (FFG).
  -- USS WILLIAMS (FFG).
  -- USS J.L. BROWN (FF).
  -- USS CAPADANO (FF).
  -- CARRIER AIR WING 13.

- USS AMERICA CVBG.
  -- USS AMERICA (CV).
  -- USS TICONDEROGA (CG/AEGIS).
  -- USS DALE (CG).
  -- USS FARRAGUT (DDG).
  -- USS KING (DDG).
  -- USS HALYBURTON (FFG).
  -- USS ALYWIN (FF).
  -- USS PHARRIS (FF).
  -- USS VREELAND (FF).
  -- USS PETERSON (DD).
  -- CARRIER AIR WING 1.

- 48th TAC Fighter Wing (Lakenheath).
  -- F-111 (24).

- 20th TAC Fighter Wing (Upper Heyford).
  -- EF-111 (5).

- Tanker Task Force (Fairford/Mildenhall).
  -- KC-10 (19).
  -- KC-135 (9).

E. PERSONNEL IDENTIFICATION

- PILOT: CAPT. FERNANDO L. RIBAS-DOMINICCI
- WEAPONS OFFICER: CAPT. PAUL F. LORENCE
- NOK notified by USAF.

APPROVED BY __________________________________________________________________

DIRECTOR, J-3

________________________________________________________________________________

DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

Prepared by: __________________________________________________________________

INTERNAL STAFF PAPER
RELEASE COVERED BY
JCS MOP 39
ELDORADO CANYON Strike Forces (U)

REMARKS

1. Attached is a listing of all forces participating in Operation ELDORADO CANYON.

2. This information is provided in response to OPG tasking serial 005.

Attachments

a/s

Unclassified without attachments
STRIKE FORCES

U. S. NAVY:

**USS CORAL SEA - NORFOLK, VA**

USS BIDDLE (CG-34)
USS DE WERT (FFG-45)
USS WILLIAMS (FFG-24)
USS J. L. BROWN (FF-1089)
USS CAPADANO (FF-1093)

**CARRIER AIR WING - 13**

F/A-18 VFA 131/132 VMFA 314/323
A-6E VA 55
KA-6D
E-2C VAW 127
EA-6B VAQ 135
SH-3 HS-17

**USS AMERICA - NORFOLK, VA**

USS TICONDEROGA (CG-47 AEGIS)
USS DALE (CG-19)
USS FARRAGUT (DDG-37)
USS KING (DDG-41)
USS HALYBURTON (FFG-40)
USS ALYWIN (FF-1081)
USS PHARRIS (FF-1094)
USS VREELAND (FF-1068)
USS PETERSON (DD-969)

**CARRIER AIR WING - 1**

F-14 VF 102/33
A-7 VA 46/47
A-6E VA 34
KA-6D
E-2C VAW 123
EA-6B VMAQ 2
S-3A VS 11
SH-3 HS 32

U. S. AIR FORCE: 3RD AF IN USAFE

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<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>HOME BASE</th>
<th>LAUNCH BASES</th>
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<tr>
<td>F-111</td>
<td>48 TAC FTR WING</td>
<td>RAF LAKENHEATH</td>
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<tr>
<td>EF-111</td>
<td>20 TAC FTR WING</td>
<td>RAF UPPER HEYFORD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KC-10</td>
<td>STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND -</td>
<td>RAF FAIRFORD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(EUROPEAN TANKER TASK FORCE)</td>
<td>RAF MILDENHALL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KC-135</td>
<td></td>
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SUBJECT:
15 April Libyan Action

REMARKS

1. The attached proposed Talking Paper was prepared to provide a summary of the JCS SITREPs for use by CJCS for information.

2. Request approval and signature on attached proposed Talking Paper.

Attachment
a/s
Talking Paper for the Chairman, JCS, for Information

I. SUBJECT: 14 April US Strike Against Libya

A. Forces:

- USS CORAL SEA CVBG.
  -- USS CORAL SEA (CV).
  -- USS BIDDLE (CG).
  -- USS DE WERT (FFG).
  -- USS WILLIAMS (FFG).
  -- USS J.L. BROWN (FF).
  -- USS CAPADANO (FF).
  -- CARRIER AIR WING 13.

- USS AMERICA CVBG.
  -- USS AMERICA (CV).
  -- USS TICONDEROGA (CG/AEGIS).
  -- USS DALE (CG).
  -- USS FARRAGUT (DDG).
  -- USS KING (DDG).
  -- USS HALYBURTON (FFG).
  -- USS ALYWIN (FF).
  -- USS PHARRIS (FF).
  -- USS VREELAND (FF).
  -- USS PETERSON (DD).
  -- CARRIER AIR WING 1.

- 48th TAC Fighter Wing (Lakenheath).
  -- F-111 (24).

- 20th TAC Fighter Wing (Upper Heyford).
  -- EF-111 (5).

- Tanker Task Force (Fairford/Mildenhall).
  -- KC-10 (20) includes SR-71 support.
  -- KC-135 (22) includes SR-71 support.
B. Launch times.
- USAF: 141236.
- USS CORAL SEA (CVW-13): 141750.
- USS AMERICA (CVW-1): 141745.

C. Tripoli Military Airfield.
- TOT: 141906 - 141911.
- Strike information.
  -- 6 F-111s launched 141236.
  -- 5 arrived at target with BSU-49s (500LB high drag bombs) each.
  -- 1 acft aborted for loss of terrain following radar.
- Damage reports (preliminary).
  -- All bombs on target.
  -- At least 3 to 5 probable IL-76 aircraft destroyed.
  -- Facility damage: To be determined. Heavy cloud cover precludes further damage assessment.

D. Benina Airfield.
- TOT: 141900.
- Strike Information.
  -- 8 aircraft launched from USS CORAL SEA 141750 (9 planned).
  -- 6 arrived at target (5 with CBU-59 (APAM) each) and 1 with MK-82 each (500LB GP Bombs).
  -- 2 aircraft aborted - reasons unknown.
- Damage reports.
  -- 1 F-27 (Friendship) destroyed.
  -- 1 MIG-23 (Flogger) destroyed.
  -- 5 MIG-23 (Flogger) probably destroyed.
--- 20 bomb craters on apron.
--- 2 M-8 (Hip) helicopters destroyed.
--- 1 M-8 (Hip) helicopter possibly destroyed.
--- Numerous buildings with small holes in sides and roof.
--- 12 "burn marks" indicating that 12 additional MIG-23s (Flogger) were destroyed and subsequently removed. Two pieces of heavy lift equipment were in evidence.

E. Aziziyah Barracks, Tripoli.

- TOT: 141900.

- Strike information.
  --- 9 aircraft launched from Lakenheath at 141236.
  --- 5 arrived at target with GBU-10's (2000LB Laser Guided Bomb) each.
  --- 3 aircraft on target.
  --- 1 aircraft dropped long.
  --- 1 aircraft missing, crew remains in MIA status.
  --- 4 aircraft aborted.
    --- 2 aborts for systems degradation.
    --- 1 abort prior to last refueling.
    --- 1 abort after last refueling.

- Damage reports (preliminary).
  --- Heavy damage to roof and front of headquarters building.
  --- At least 14 craters in area.
  --- Building across from French Embassy damaged.
  --- No observable damage to French Embassy.
  --- Battalion headquarters damaged.
F. Benghazi Military Barracks.
- TOT: 141900.
- 6 A-6Es launched from USS America at 141745 with 16 Mk-82s (500LB General Purpose Bomb) each.
- All aircraft on target.
- No aborts.
- Damage assessment (preliminary).
  -- Large storage building destroyed.
  -- Some MiG-23 (Flogger) shipping crates destroyed.

G. Sidi Bilal.
- TOT: 141900.
- Strike information.
  -- 3 F-111s with GBU-10s (2000LB Laser Guided Bomb) each launched from Lakenheath at 141236.
    --- All aircraft at target.
    --- No aborts.
  -- Damage Assessment (preliminary).
    --- 3 buildings (Naval Academy) damaged.

H. Miscellaneous information.
- Suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD).
  -- HARM
    --- Tripoli targets:
    --- Benina targets:
  -- SHRIKE
    --- Tripoli targets:
    --- Benina targets:
- Recovery.

-- F-111 diverted to Rota, SP, for mechanical problems. It was escorted by an additional F-111. The escort rejoined the tanker and returned to Lakenheath. The divert aircraft is in a hangar awaiting repair.

-- 150310: USAF aircraft completed recovery.

- SAR.

-- Terminated 151745.

-- Forces:

- Libyan SCUD firing.

-- At 151034, Libyans apparently fired 2 SCUD missiles at Lampedusa island (south of Sicily).

-- Island is the location of a long range area navigation (LORAN) station operated by approximately 35 US Coast Guard personnel.

-- Evacuation of 30 USCG personnel is complete with a skeleton crew of 5 USCG personnel remaining.

APPROVED BY

______________________
DIRECTOR, J-3

DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

Prepared by:

______________________
1. The attached proposed message conveys a "Well Done" to the operational forces involved in the self-defense actions against Libya.

2. Request approval and signature on the attached proposed message.

Attachment
a/s
JCS WASHINGTON DC//CJCS//
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
CINCSAC OFFUTT AFB NE
COMSIXTHFLT
CTF SIX ZERO
CTG SIX ZERO PT TWO
3AF RAF MILDENHALL UK//CC//
20 TFW RAF UPPER HEYFORD UK//CC//
7 AD RAMSTEIN AB GE//CC//
48 TFW RAF LAKENHEATH UK//CC//
USS AMERICA
USS CORAL SEA
306 STRAT WING RAF MILDENHALL UK//CC//
COMCARAIRWING ONE
COMCARAIRWING THIRTEEN
11 STRAT GP RAF FAIRFORD UK//CC//
DET 4 95RW RAF MILDENHALL UK//CC//
SUBJ: WELL DONE

ON BEHALF OF THE PRESIDENT, CONGRATULATIONS ON A SUPERB JOB IN THE US SELF-DEFENSE ACTIONS AGAINST LIBYA. THE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF THIS OPERATION WERE EXEMPLARY, DEMONSTRATING FIRM AMERICAN RESOLVE TO RETALIATE AGAINST ANY ACT OF TERRORISM. EACH OF YOU SHOULD BE JUSTIFIABLY PROUD OF YOUR INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTION. YOUR EFFORTS HAVE SUCCESSFULLY IMPLEMENTED AMERICAN POLICY TO COUNTER TERRORISM, AND THE NATION IS PROUD. MAY I ADD MY PERSONAL THANKS TO THOSE OF THE PRESIDENT FOR A SUCCESSFUL OPERATION AND A JOB WELL DONE. WARMEST REGARDS, ADMiral WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR., CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.
IMMEDIATE
O 272135Z JAN 86
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC/J3/
TO USCINCORVAIHINGEN GE/ECJ3/
INFO CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
CINCUSAPE RAMSTEIN AB GE

SUBJ: OPERATION PRAIRIE FIRE - REQUEST FOR FINAL ROE (U)

REF: A. JCS 282228Z DEC 85
B. JCS 312234Z DEC 85

2. (FJS) REF A AND B OUTLINED ROE FOR PLANNING PURPOSES. REQUEST FINAL CONSOLIDATED ROE FOR PRAIRIE FIRE EXECUTION BE SUBMITTED FOR CONSIDERATION NLT 291200Z JAN 86.

DECL OADR BT

+++IMMEDIATE DELIVERY REQUIRED+++++

ACTION J3-JOD CODEWORD OFFICER (15)  
INFO DIRECTOR J-3 (1) DIRECTOR JOINT STAFF (1) 
NMCC DEP DIR OPS (1) CJCS CODEWORD OFFICER (2)

MCN=860275/05114 TDR=8602751135Z TAD=8602752138Z CDSN=MAK9808

PAGE 1 OF 1
272135Z JAN 86
FLASH
Z 070017Z JAN 86
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC/J3//
TO US CNCEUR VAHINGEN GE/ECJ3//
INFO US NMER SHAPE BE
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK

SUBJ: OPERATION PRAIRIE FIRE-ADDITIONAL TASKING (U)
REF: JCS 312234Z DEC 85

JCS (U)

2. (U) WE HAVE BEEN TASKED BY THE HCA TO CONDUCT ADDITIONAL
PLANNING IN CONJUNCTION WITH REF. ACCORDINGLY, AS AN ADDITIONAL
MISSION PARA 4. REF. CONDUCT DETAILED PLANNING AND BE PREPARED
TO CONDUCT FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION OPERATIONS (AIR AND SURFACE) IN THE
GULF OF SIDRA SOUTH OF 32-30N.
3. (U) FOR PLANNING PURPOSES, ASSUME THE ADDITIONAL FORCE TO BE
UTILIZED IS THE SARATOGA CVBG.
4. (U) BY REQUEST NOT LATER THAN 091400Z JAN 86, CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
INCLUDING TIME LINE TO EXECUTE ONCE THE SARATOGA CVBG ENTERS THE
MED, WITH DETAILED PLANNING TO FOLLOW. OPSEC IS PARAMOUNT.

DECL OADR BT

----------IMMEDIATE DELIVERY REQUIRED----------

ACTION J3-JOD CODEWORD OFFICER (T5)
INFO DIRECTOR J-3 (1) DIRECTOR JOINT STAFF (1)
NMCC DEP DIR OPS (1) CJCS CODEWORD OFFICER (2)
IMMEDIATE
O 120044Z JAN 86 ZFF4
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC//CJCS/
TO USNMR SHAPE 8E

SUBJ: FOR CHALLENGE (C) (U)

1. (C) TO FULLY ADDRESS ALL OPTIONS FOR A FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION
   CHALLENGE OF LIBYAN CLAIMS, REQUEST SOONEST YOUR RISK AND
   FEASIBILITY ASSESSMENTS OF: A) OPERATIONS IN THE FIR AND B) LIMITED
   OPERATIONS, DAY AND NIGHT, SOUTH OF 3230 NORTH USING ONLY TWO CVNGS
   FOR EITHER.

2. (TS) ADDITIONALLY, YOU SHOULD BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT STRIKES
   AGAINST THE FIRST FOUR PRIORITY TARGETS PLANNED UNDER PRAIRIE FIRE
   NOT LATER THAN 48 HOURS AFTER RECEIPT OF AN EXECUTE ORDER.

WARMEST REGARDS

DECL OADR BT

----------IMMEDIATE DELIVERY REQUIRED----------
IMMEDIATE

D 121428Z JAN 86
FK JCS WASHINGTON DC/J-3/
TO: CINCSAC OFFUTT AFB NE

SUBJ: PRAIRIE FIRE PLANNING (U)

BE ADVISED THAT ON 11 JAN 86 EUCOM WAS TASKED TO BE PREPARED TO
CONDUCT STRIKES AGAINST THE FIRST FOUR PRIORITY TARGETS PLANNED
UNDER PRAIRIE FIRE NOT LATER THAN 48 HOURS AFTER RECEIPT OF AN
EXECUTE ORDER.

DECL OADR BT

+++IMMEDIATE DELIVERY REQUIRED+++ (M.C.)

ACTION J3-JOD CODEWORD OFFICER (15)
INFO DIRECTOR J-3(1) DIRECTOR JOINT STAFF (1)
NMCC DEP DIR OPS (1) CJCS CODEWORD OFFICER (2)
FLASH
Z 220143Z JAN 86 ZFFK
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC//CJCS//
TO USCINCSEUR VAIHINGEN GE
INFO USNMR SHAPE BE
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK

SUBJ: ATTAINT DOCUMENT--ROE CLARIFICATION

REF: USCINCSEUR 191935Z JAN 86

1. REF MSG MOST APROCIATED AND WAS VERY HELPFUL TO SECDEF AND
   JCS AS THE DECISION CONCERNING EXECUTION APPROACHES.

2. IN ORDER TO INSURE WE HAVE PROVIDED YOU EVERYTHING YOU NEED
   ON ROE, REQUEST ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON FOLLOWING:
   A. IF SUPPLEMENTAL ROE ARE DESIRED FOR PRESENCE
      ONS, SURFACE COMBATANTS AND AIR) IN THE FFR NORTH OF 32-30N.
   B. IF SUPPLEMENTAL ROE ARE DESIRED FOR FORN ONS (SURFACE
      COMBATANT AND AIR) SOUTH OF 32-30N.
   C. IF SUPPLEMENTAL ROE ARE AUTHORIZED TO WHAT LEVEL OF COMMAND
      WILL THE SUPPLEMENTAL ROE, BY ROE ITEM NUMBER, BE SUB-DELEGATED.
   D. REGRET SHORT FUSE, BUT REQUIRE RESOLUTION ASAP IN ORDER TO
      APPROVE PRESENCE OPERATIONS COMMENCING AT 240001Z JAN 86.

DECL CAGD BT

----------IMMEDIATE DELIVERY REQUIRED----------
************** CLERK/DUTY OFFICER***************
INSURE THE NICKNAME "ATTAINT DOCUMENT" ARE WRITTEN ON THE...
*************** OUTSIDE OF THE ENVELOPE ***************

ACTION TERM SVC(1) CJCS CODEWORD OFFICER(2)
INFO DIRECTOR J-3(1) DIRECTOR JOINT STAFF(1)
J3-JOD CODEWORD OFFICER(15) NMCC DEP DIR OPS(1)

MCR=860/2 0043: TCH=86022/014Z TAD=86022/0148Z CDR=MAX=404

PAGE 1 OF 1 220143Z JAN 86
IMMEDIATE

0 220144Z JAN 86 ZFFL
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC//CJCS//
TO USCINCUR VAHINGEN GE
INFO USCINCUR NORFOLK VA
USCINCUR HONOLULU HI
USNRA Ft GEORGE G HEADE MD
USNRA SHAPE BE
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE

SUBJ: OPERATION ATTAIN DOCUMENT (U)
REF: USCINCUR 191930Z JAN 86
1. (NS) AS RESULT OF JCS MEETING TODAY, BE PREPARED TO EXECUTE
PRESENCE OPS (REF MSG) NOT EARLIER THAN 240000Z JAN 86.
2. (NS) FOR USCINCUR: REQUEST YOU IMMEDIATELY FILE A NOTICE OF
INTENT TO CONDUCT FLIGHT OPERATIONS IN THE LIBYAN FLIGHT
INFORMATION REGION COMMENCING AT 240000Z JAN 86 FOR A PERIOD OF
SEVEN DAYS AND BE PREPARED TO EXECUTE PRESENCE OPERATIONS
COMMENCING 240001Z JAN.

DECL OADR BT

----------IMMEDIATE DELIVERY REQUIRED----------

*************** CLERK/DUTY OFFICER**************
INSURE THE NICKNAME "ATTAIN DOCUMENT" ARE WRITTEN ON THE
OUTSIDE OF THE ENVELOPE ***************

ACTION TERM SVC (1) CJCS CODEWORD OFFICER (2)
INFO DIA JSJ CODEWORD OFFICER (2) NAIC TEAM CHIEF (1)
J3-JRC CODEWORD OFFICER (1) DIRECTOR J-3 (1)
DIRECTOR JOINT STAFF (1) J3-JOD CODEWORD OFFICER (15)
NMCC DEP DIR OPS (1)
SUBJ: PUBLIC AFFAIRS PLAN FOR PRESENCE OPERATIONS

REFS: A. CINCUSNAVEUR 2311572 JAN 86
     B. USCINCUEUR 2317282 JAN 86

1. (U) THIS IS A OASD(PA)/OJCS COORDINATED MESSAGE.

2. (U) REF A, AS MODIFIED BY REF B, IS APPROVED WITH THE FOLLOWING CHANGES:

   A. (U) CHANGE THE NOTE FOLLOWING STATEMENT, IN PARA 2C TO READ,
      QUOTE NOTE: IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILE REACTION BY LIBYAN FORCES
      AND/OR RESPONSE BY US FORCES, PROPOSED STATEMENT AND SUPPORTING
      QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS WILL BE FORWARDED SEPARATELY ASAP.
      UNQUOTE.

   B. (U) DELETE FROM 44: (OR YES AS APPROPRIATE)

   C. (U) DELETE PARAGRAPH 4.

3. (U) PROPOSED STATEMENT AND Q'S AND A'S IN REFS A AND B, AS
   MODIFIED ABOVE, ARE DECLASSIFIED ON RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE AND ARE
   AUTHORIZED FOR USE IN RESPONSE TO MEDIA QUERIES. QUERIES SHOULD BE
   ANSWERED AT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL. PARAGRAPH 4 REF A REMAINS
   CLASSIFIED TOP SECRET AND PROTECTED WITHIN THE SYSTEM.

4. (S) REQUEST YOU PROVIDE ASAP EXPANDED Q AND A'S ELABORATING ON
   PARA 4 REF A TO COVER POSSIBLE FUTURE OPERATIONS.

DECL OADR BT

IMMEDIATE DELIVERY REQUIRED

ACTION DIRECTOR JOINT STAFF (1)
INFO DIA JSJ CODEWORD OFFICER (2) NMIC TEAM CHIEF (1)
     DIRECTOR J-3 (1) J3-JRC CODEWORD OFFICER (1)
     J3-JOD CODEWORD OFFICER (15) NMCC DEP DIR OPS (1)
     OJCS CODEWORD OFFICER (2)
IMMEDIATE
0 072249Z FEB 86
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC//DJS-PA//
TO USCINCUEUR VAHINGEN GE//ECPAO//
INFO SECEDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD-PA/DPL/
CON WASHINGTON DC
USNMR SHAPE BE
COMSTXHFLT

SUBJ: PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE: ATTAIN DOCUMENT (AD) (U)
REFS: A. CINCUSNAVEUR 051032Z FEB 86 (PASEP)
B. USCINCUEUR 061605Z FEB 86 (PASEP)
C. SECEDEF 061225Z FEB 86 (NOTAL)

1. (U) REFs A AND B PROVIDED PROPOSED PA GUIDANCE FOR AD II AND
III. UPON EXECUTION, Q'S AND A'S IN REF A ARE APPROVED FOR USE IN
RESPONSE TO MEDIA QUERY ONLY, WITH THE FOLLOWING CHANGES:
A. DELETE A3B. CHANGE A3A TO READ A-3 PROPOSE FOLLOWING RESPONSE
FOR OPS NORTH OR SOUTH OF 32-30 NORTH: THE US WILL BE (HAS BEEN)
CONDUCTING OPERATIONS IN THE TRIPOLI FIR IN INTERNATIONAL
AIRSPACE OVER INTERNATIONAL WATERS. WE ARE NOT DISCUSSING
SPECIFICS OF OUR OPERATION WITHIN THE FIR. (FYI--OUR INFORMATION
POLICY IN CASE OF AN INCIDENT WOULD BE TO INCLUDE APPROXIMATE
LOCATION, EVEN IF SOUTH OF 32-30).
B. USCINCUEUR PAO PROVIDE ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS 6, 10, 11, 12 AND
13 AS APPROPRIATE.
C. IN QUESTIONS 10, 15, AND 18 DELETE GULF OF SIDRA AND REPLACE
WITH TRIPOLI FIR.
D. QUESTION 23 SHOULD READ AS FOLLOWS: CAN YOU PROVIDE A LISTING
OF THE OPERATIONS IN THE FIR SINCE 1981?
3. (M) WHILE CURRENT POLICY REMAINS PASSIVE RESPOND TO QUERY
ONLY, YOU SHOULD BE AWARE A MORE PRO-ACTIVE PUBLIC AFFAIRS POLICY
IS BEING DISCUSSED WITHIN DOD FOR AD. AS A RESULT, YOU MAY WANT TO
BEGIN PLANNING FOR SHORT-NOTICE TASKING FOR MORE ACTIVE MEASURES,
SUCH AS, P-3 MEDIA EMBARK OR CV MEDIA EMBARK.
4. (U) FOR ALCON. PER REFS A AND B, CHANGE A-11 TO REF C TO READ
IN OCTOBER 1984, USS INDEPENDENCE, USS AMERICA AND USS DWIGHT D.
EISENHOWER WERE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AT THE SAME TIME.
5. (U) THIS IS A JCS/DOD COORDINATED MESSAGE.

DECLAS: OADR BT BT

+

IMMEDIATE DELIVERY REQUIRED

CLERK/DUTY OFFICER

INSURE THE NICKNAME "ATTAIN DOCUMENT" ARE WRITTEN ON THE
OUTSIDE OF THE ENVELOPE

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE NOTE MSG ADDRESSED TO PA/PLEASE PASS
IF APPROPRIATE

ACTION J3-JOD CODEWORD OFFICER(5)
INFO DIRECTOR J-3(1) DIRECTOR JOINT STAFF(1)
NMCC DIP DIR OPS(1) CJCS CODEWORD OFFICER(2)
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE(1)
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<td>Import Alexandria</td>
<td>Coral Sea</td>
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<td>Import Trieste</td>
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<td>3-9 MAR</td>
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<td>Ops West Med (11-12 Date X with France)</td>
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<td>(12-23 Exercise Sardina-86* with Italy)</td>
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<td>(13-14 US-Only Missile Exercise)</td>
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<td>7-17 MAR</td>
<td>Saratoga Sched Not Yet Firm (Naveur Adding to Sardina-86)</td>
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<td>23-30 MAR</td>
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<td>23 MAR</td>
<td>Proposed Three CVBG FON</td>
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*NOTE: Workup with three CVBGs prior to proposed FON Ops will require modification (cancellation of all or portions) of Sardina-86
IMMEDIATE
O 081529Z MAR 86
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
TO USCINCNEUR WAIHINGEN GE/J3/
INFO USNMR SHAPE BE
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK

SUBJ: OUTFIT OP SARATOGA BG (U)
REF: USCINCNEUR/J3 211236Z FEB 86
(U) REFERENCED PROPOSAL IS APPROVED FOR PLANNING.
DECL OADR BT

+++IMMEDIATE DELIVERY REQUIRED+++++++
1. The attached proposed message approves USCINCEUR's request to change the reporting times for the SITREPs for ATTAIN DOCUMENT III that were established in our ATTAIN DOCUMENT III Execute Order.

2. These new times are as follows:
   - First SITREP arrives NLT 220900Z Mar 86 (0400EST) for the 24-hour period 210400Z to 220400Z with projections for 220400Z to 230400Z.
   - Next SITREP arrives NLT 222100Z (1600EST) for the 12-hour period 220400Z to 221600Z with projections for 230400Z to 031600Z.
   - Next SITREP arrives NLT 230900Z for 221600Z to 230400Z with projections for 231600Z to 240400Z.
   - Subsequent SITREPs arrive 0900Z and 2100Z.

3. Recommend J-3 approve and sign the attached message.

Attachments
a/s

References
* Telecon USCINCEUR
** JCS 150027Z MAR 86 (Execute Order)

Classified by Director
Declassify on CMD
P 182229Z MAR 86
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC/J3/
TO USCINCPLANT NORFOLK VA
USCINCPLANT VAHINGEN GE
USCINCPLANT HONOLULU HI
CINCUSAFE OFFTUTT AFB NE
DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO USNMR SHAPE BE
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE

SUBJ: CHANGED SITREP TIMES - ATTAIN DOCUMENT III

REFS: A. TELECON USCINCPLANT 18 MAR 86.
B. JCS 150027Z MAR 86.

1. (SCIF) REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS IN PARA 5 OF ATTAIN DOCUMENT III EXECUTE ORDER AS CHANGED AS FOLLOWS: THE FIRST SITREP WILL ARRIVE NLT 220900Z MAR 86 FOR THE 24 HOUR PERIOD FROM 210400Z TO 220400Z WITH PROJECTIONS FOR 220400Z TO 230400Z. THE NEXT SITREP WILL ARRIVE NLT 222100Z FOR THE 12 HOUR PERIOD 220400Z TO 221600Z WITH PROJECTIONS FOR 230400Z TO 231600Z. THE NEXT SITREP WILL ARRIVE NLT 230900Z FOR THE 12 HOUR PERIOD 231600Z TO 240400Z. SUBSEQUENT SITREPS WILL ARRIVE NLT 0900Z AND NLT 2100Z AS ABOVE.

2. NOT THE CONTENT DESCRIBED IN REF MSG PARA 5 A THROUGH 5 H REMAIN UNCHANGED.

DECL OADR BT
Background Paper for the Chairman, JCS, concerning USEUCOM NOI filing for operations in the Tripoli FIR.

I. (U) SUBJECT USEUCOM Notice of Intent (NOI) Status (U)

II. (U) MAJOR POINTS

A. [U] Tripoli FIR NOIs were filed as follows:
   - 22 Jan for 24 - 31 Jan ATTAIN DOCUMENT I ops. (Tab A)
   - 10 Feb for 12 - 15 Feb ATTAIN DOCUMENT IIA ops. (Tab B)
   - 28 Feb for 01 - 04 Mar ATTAIN DOCUMENT IIB ops but flights not conducted. (Tab C)

B. [U] Flight ops were conducted 12 March with SARATOGA aircraft from WMED but no NOI was filed.

C. [U] NOI is filed (Copy not yet available) for flight ops in FIR 13 Mar but these ops will not be conducted.

D. [U] NOI will be filed 14 Mar for 151200Z - 162359Z Mar 86. Actual flight ops (CORAL SEA aircraft) will be conducted 15 - 20 Mar.

E. [U] NOI will be filed 17 Mar for 19 - 20 Mar ops in FIR (CORAL SEA aircraft).

F. [U] NOI will be filed 19 Mar for flight ops (Helos) for 201200Z - 211200Z Mar.

G. [U] NOI will not be filed for the 3 CVBG TACAIR flights in FIR 21 - 22 Mar unless the 10 day NOI for ATTAIN DOCUMENT III is directed. NOI for 23 Mar and beyond is being staffed.

APPROVED BY
DIRECTOR, J-3
DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

Prepared by:

Attachments
TAB A--NAS SIGONELLA 220310Z JAN 86
TAB B--NAS SIGONELLA 100001Z FEB 86
TAB C--NAS SIGONELLA 280804Z FEB 86

INTERNAL STAFF PAPER
RELEASE COVERED BY JCS MOP 39

Classified by Director, J-3
Declassify on OADR
Background Paper for the Chairman, JCS, concerning ATTAIN DOCUMENT IIB Notice of Intent (NOI).

I. SUBJECT. NAS SIGONELLA NOI 280804Z FEB 86 (U)

II. MAJOR POINTS

A. ATTAIN DOCUMENT IIB operations in the Tripoli FIR were originally planned for the period of 1 to 4 March 1986. The USCINCEUR Concept of Operations for ATTAIN DOCUMENT IIB was briefed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 25 February 1986 in anticipation of approval for the Execute Order. The Concept of Operations included the filing of an NOI 48 hours in advance of flight operations. If the Execute Order had been approved, the NOI would have been filed NLT 262359Z for operations 1 to 4 March 1986 as planned.

B. The result of the 25 February ATTAIN DOCUMENT IIB briefing was the 27 February request to SecDef (Tab A) for cancellation of the planed 1 to 4 March operations. Upon a favorable reply from SecDef on 28 February the ATTAIN DOCUMENT IIB cancellation order was transmitted at 280015Z FEB 86. (Tab B)

C. CTF-60 in anticipation of conducting ATTAIN DOCUMENT IIB operations filed a pro-forma NOI 280445Z FEB 86, which was transmitted into ICAO channels by NAS SIGONELLA at 280804Z FEB 86 (Tab C). Upon receipt of the cancellation 28 Feb, planned flight operations in the Tripoli FIR were not conducted and both CORAL SEA and SARATOGA proceeded to port calls in Naples, IT and Malaga, SP respectively.

APPROVED BY ___________ DIRECTOR, J-3

DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

Prepared by:

Attachments

TAB A--CM-182-86 27 Feb 86 *Mediterranean Operations (U)
TAB B--JCS 280015Z FEB 86
TAB C--NAS SIGONELLA 280804Z Feb 86

INTERNAL STAFF PAPER
RELEASE COVERED BY JCS MOP 39

Classified by Director, J-3
Declassify on OADR
IMMEDIATE
O 192052Z MAR 86
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC//J3/C3S//
TO USINCRED MACDILL AFB FL
INFO USINCEN VAIHINGEN GE

SUBJ: DEPLOYMENT APPROVAL OF JCS - CONTROLLED COMMUNICATIONS
ASSETS FOR OPERATION ATTAIN DOCUMENT (U)

1. (C)

2. (U) THIS IS NOTIFICATION TO DEPLOY COMMUNICATIONS ASSETS IAW JCS
MOP 167 TO SUPPORT OPERATION ATTAIN DOCUMENT.

3. (C) REQUEST TAKE ACTION TO DEPLOY COMMUNICATIONS LISTED IN
PARA 4 BELOW IN SUPPORT OF THE FOLLOWING OPERATION.

   1 - NAME: OPERATION ATTAIN DOCUMENT
   2 - OPERATIONAL LOCATION: LINDSEY AB, GE FOR FURTHER
       DEPLOYMENT.
   3 - DURATION OF REQUIREMENT: AS SOON AS PRACTICAL FOR ESTIMATE
       LESS THAN 30 DAYS.
   4 - SUPPORTED CINC: (POC) EUCOM: SECURE 6416.
      DROP 6 (6420 DURING NON DUTY HOURS) LINDSEY AB:
      (AV) 339-3521.
   5 - CHOP: UPON ARRIVAL LINDSEY AB, GE.
   6 - MODE OF SHIPMENT: PRIORITY AIR.

4. (C) UNITS AND LOCATIONS AS FOLLOWS:

   UNIT: JCSE
   OP LOCATION: LINDSEY AB, GE
   EQUIPMENT: AN/URC-101/110
   QUANTITY: 10
   RADIOS WITH ANT,
   AC/DC, PWR SUP,
   KY-57 AND ASSOC
   COSEC FILL DEVICES
   AND CABLES

5. (U) ALL TRANSPORTATION AND PERSONNEL SUPPORT COSTS INCLUDING PER
   DIEM (LESS PAY AND ALLOWANCES) INCIDENT TO THE DEPLOYMENT AND
   RECOVERY, WILL BE FUNDED BY EUCOM.

6. (U) DIRECT LIAISON IS AUTHORIZED AMONG ALL CONCERNED. KEEP JCS
   INFORMED. NOTIFY JCS OF COMMITMENTS OR CIRCUMSTANCES (AND TIMING
   THEREOF) WHICH PREVENT SUPPORTING THIS DEPLOYMENT.

3. (U) OJCS/C3SDQ POC IS VON 227-0007, KY-3 2809.

DECL OADR BT

---------IMMEDIATE DELIVERY REQUIRED---------

---------------------------------------------
CLERK/DUTY OFFICER-------------------------
---------------------------------------------
INSURE THE NAME "ATTAIN DOCUMENT" ARE WRITTEN ON THE
---------------------------------------------
OUTSIDE OF THE ENVELOPE---------------------

ACTION J3-JOD CODEWORD OFFICER(15)
INFO DIRECTOR J-3 (1) DIRECTOR JOINT STAFF (1)
                NMCC DEP DIR OPS (1) CJCS CODEWORD OFFICER (2)

MCN=66078/06719   TDR=66078/2052Z   TAD=66078/2104Z   CDSN=MAJB34
PERSONAL FOR GENERAL LAWSON, INFO ADMIRAL MOREAU, GENERAL DONNELLY, AND GENERAL ROGERS FROM GENERAL KELLEY

SUBJ: OPERATIONS IN THE VICINITY OF LIBYA

REF: USCINCEUR 21153Z MAR 86

1. SECSTATE AND SECDEF HAVE AGREED THAT STATE WILL SEND A MESSAGE BETWEEN 1700 AND 1800 EST SATURDAY 22 MAR 86 (222200Z-222259Z) TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS THAT WE ARE REAFFIRMING OUR MARITIME RIGHTS IN THE GULF OF SIDRA, SOUTH OF 32°30N BUT WILL REMAIN OUTSIDE TERRITORIAL LIMITS. FURTHER, WE WILL PERFORM AIR AND SURFACE PENETRATIONS INTO THE GULF OF SIDRA. COUNTRIES TO BE NOTIFIED WILL BE BELGIUM, ITALY, UK, TUNISIA, EGYPT, AND FRANCE.
2. [REDACTED] NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY ORCHESTRATED BY DOD AND DOS AND IT IS IMPORTANT THAT NOTIFICATION TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS DOES NOT OCCUR OUTSIDE OF AGREED UPON CHANNELS. THEREFORE DO NOT NOTIFY YOUR COUNTERPARTS.

WARM REGARDS

DECL OADR -
**OJCS SUMMARY SHEET**

**TO:** CJCS  
**THRU:**  

**SUBJECT:** ATTAIN DOCUMENT III Termination (U)

**REMARKS**

1. [U] Attached proposed messages direct USCINCEUR to terminate Operation ATTAIN DOCUMENT III and provide further guidance for Operation PRAIRIE FIRE.

2. [U] The attached EXECUTE ORDER (TAB A) directs USCINCEUR to terminate Operation ATTAIN DOCUMENT III NLT 1800 Libyan time, 27 March 1986.

3. [U] The attached REVISED ALERT ORDER (TAB B) for Operation PRAIRIE FIRE directs USCINCEUR to be ready to execute PRAIRIE FIRE NLT 48 hours after notification plus time required to conduct strike(s) with TOT optimization.

4. (U) Recommend approval and release of the attached messages.

5. (U) Requires SecDef approval

**Attachment a/s**

**Classified by Director, J-5**  
**Declassify on QADR**

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**ACTION OFFICER**

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**DATE OF PREPARATION**

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PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM ARE OBSOLETE.
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE
COMSIXTHFLT

SUBJ: EXECUTE ORDER--ATTAIN DOCUMENT III TERMINATION {U}

REFS: A. JCS 150027Z MAR 86 {EXECUTE ORDER} {NOTAL}
     8. USCINCEUR 211236Z FEB 86 {NOTAL}

1. THIS IS AN EXECUTE ORDER BY AUTHORITY AND DIRECTION OF THE
   SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.

2. SITUATION. OBJECTIVES OF "ATTAIN DOCUMENT III" HAVE BEEN MET.

3. MISSION. TERMINATE "ATTAIN DOCUMENT III" AND RETURN TO
   NORMAL OPS.

4. EXECUTION.

   A. COURSE OF ACTION:

      1. AT 1200 LIBYAN TIME (1100Z), 27 MAR 86, TICONDEROGA
         SAG WILL COMMENCE TRANSIT OUT OF THE GULF OF SIDRA. SAG WILL
         COMPLETE TRANSIT TO NORTH OF 32-30NB NOT EARLIER THAN 1600
         LIBYAN TIME (1500Z), 27 MAR 86. SAG TRANSIT WILL BE A GRADUAL
         RPT GRADUAL DEPARTURE.

      2. SARATOGA BG OUTCHOP SCHEDULE IN REF B APPROVED.
         COMMENCE TURNOVER 31 MAR 86.
A. [U] OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS: IAW REF A.

5. [U] ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS: CONTINUE TWICE DAILY COMMANDER'S SITREP, IAW REF A. FINAL SITREP DUE 280400Z MAR 86.

8. [U] COMMAND AND CONTROL: IAW REF A.

7. [U] PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE: PA GUIDANCE TO BE PROVIDED SEPCOR.

8. [U] DRLAUTH ALCON. KEEP JCS INFORMED.

DECL OADR
IMMEDIATE
O 272100Z MAR 86
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC/J3/
TO CINCAD PETERSON AFB CO
USCINCENT MACDILL AFB FL
CINMAC SCOTT AFB IL
USCINCRED MACDILL AFB FL
CINCASC OFFUTT AFB NE
INFO CSAW ASWATHING DC
CSAF WASHINGTON DC

SUBJ: JCS SITREP NO. 6 FOR "ATTAIN DOCUMENT III" CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN OPERATIONS

1. [U] COMSIXTHFLT HAS COMPLETED FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION OPERATIONS IN THE GULF OF SIDRA. THE SURFACE ACTION GROUP (SAG) WITHDREW NORTH OF 32-30N AT 271432Z MAR 86.

2. [U] THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR THE PERIOD 271200Z TO 271432Z IS DERIVED FROM USEUCOM AND OTHER SOURCES FOR "ATTAIN DOCUMENT III."

A. [U] COMPLETED OPERATIONS.

1. [U] SURFACE.
   (1) THE NAVY BATTLE FORCE CONSISTING OF USS AMERICA, USS CORAL SEA, AND USS SARATOGA CONTINUED OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AS DISENGAGEMENT OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED BY THE SURFACE ACTION GROUP (SAG) THAT INCLUDES USS TICONDEROGA, USS SCOTT, AND USS CARON.
   (2) SINCE INITIAL PENETRATION BELOW 32-30N (241100Z MAR 86) THE SAG HAS OPERATED CONTINUOUSLY FOR 75 HOURS BELOW 32-30N AND EXITED THE AREA AT 271432Z MAR 86.

2. [U] AIR.
   (1) TWO FIGHTER AIRCRAFT CROSSED 32-30N, PENETRATED TO 31-35N/18-00E, CONDUCTED OPERATIONS, AND RETURNED TO BASE. NO LIBYAN REACTION NOTED.
   (2) 271200Z - 271400Z, CAP STATIONS ONE AND TWO CONTINUOUSLY MANNED AS WELL AS SSS/SUCAP SUPPORT TO SAG.

B. [U] PROJECTED OPERATIONS.

AIR OPERATIONS WILL CONTINUE IN THE TRIPOLI FIR UNTIL 272359Z MAR 86.

C. [U] INTELLIGENCE. NO CHANGE FROM PREVIOUS REPORT.

D. [U] PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE. SECOND MEDIA EMBARK SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED 26 MAR. RESULTED IN HALF-HOUR ON-CAMERA INTERVIEW WITH COMSIXTHFLT AND CTF 60. MEDIA EMBARK PROPOSED FOR 27 MAR CANCELED. CHINFO WORKING REQUEST FROM PETER JENNINGS, ABC-TV, TO CONDUCT TAPED INTERVIEW WITH COMSIXTHFLT TO BE USED FOR ABC'S FEATURE "PERSON OF THE WEEK."

E. [U] WEATHER. WIDELY SCATTERED RAINSHOWERS AND THUNDERSTORMS WILL BE OVER THE MEDITERRANEAN. WINDS WILL BE WEST TO NORTH AT 10 TO 20 KNOTS EVERYWHERE EXCEPT NORTHEASTERN LIBYA WHICH WILL HAVE WINDS FROM THE SOUTHWEST TO SOUTH AT 10 TO 25 KNOTS BECOMING WEST TO NORTH AT 10 TO 20 KNOTS LATER IN THE PERIOD.

3. [U] THIS CONSTITUTES THE FINAL JCS SITREP FOR "ATTAIN DOCUMENT III."

DECL OADR BT

ACTION J3(3)
INFO JCS(4) DJS(1) SJCS(1) J3:NMCC(1) NIDS(1) DOCDIV(1)

MCSN=86086/0724B TOR=86086/2117Z UAD=86086/2123Z CDSN=MAJ230

PAGE 1 OF 1

272100Z MAR 86
IMMEDIATE
O 0114172 APR 86
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC//J3//JOD//
TO USCINCANT NORFOLK VA
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
CINCSAC OFFUTT AFB NE
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
INFO SECEDEF WASHINGTON DC
CNO WASHINGTON DC
CMC WASHINGTON DC
DIA WASHINGTON DC
DMA WASHINGTON DC
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE

SUBJ: CHANGE OF NICKNAME FOR OPERATION PRAIRIE FIRE (S)

1. [Redacted]

2. [Redacted]

DECL OADR BT

IMMEDIATE DELIVERY REQUIRED

ACTION J3-JOD CODEWORD OFFICER (15) (M)
INFO J3-JRC CODEWORD OFFICER (1) DIRECTOR JOINT STAFF (1)
NMCC DEP DIR OPS (1) CJCJ CODEWORD OFFICER (2)
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (1) DIA JSJ CODEWORD OFFICER (2)
1. (S) The attached proposed Chronology SITREP No. 1 satisfies request for periodic updates.

2. (U) Recommend approval and signature on attached Background Paper.

Attachment

a/s

Classified by Director, J-3
Declassify on OADR
(U) Background Paper for the Director for Operations

I. (U) SUBJECT. ELDORADO CANYON Chronology; SITREP NO. 1

II. (U) MAJOR POINTS. The following information has been provided by USEUCOM concerning ELDORADO CANYON activity as of 142000 EST.

A. (U) Air

- The USAF F-111s and EF-111s and the necessary KC-10/KC-135 tanker support sortied from RAF Lakenheath, RAF Upper Heyford, RAF Mildenhall, and RAF Fairford in Great Britain starting at 141256 EST. The USN A-6 strike aircraft and the Navy support launched from USS CORAL SEA and USS AMERICA at 141830 EST. The TOT time, centered on 141900 EST, was achieved as shown.

- Strike Operations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOT TIME</th>
<th>TARGET</th>
<th>A/C</th>
<th>ORDNANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>141906</td>
<td>TRIPOLI MILITARY</td>
<td>6 F-111</td>
<td>BSU-49 each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141911</td>
<td>AIR FIELD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

REMARKS:
NR 6 aircraft aborted prior to TOT. Five (5) across target.

Damage Assessment:

141900   BENINA AIR FIELD   2 A-6   MK-82 each
          7 A-6E   APAM each

REMARKS:
One (1) aircraft aborted prior to TOT.

Damage Assessment:

Classified by Director, J-3
Declassify on OADR
141900  TARABULUS BARRACKS (AZIZIYAH)  9 F-111  GBU-10

REMARKS:
NR 9 aircraft aborted prior to TOT. Eight (8) across tar.

Damage Assessment:

141900  BENGHAZI MILITARY BARRACKS (JAMAHIRIYAH)  6 A-6E  MK-87

REMARKS:

Damage Assessment:

141905  SIDI BILAL TERRORIST TRAINING CAMP  3 F-111  GBU-10

REMARKS:

Damage Assessment:
ELDORADO CANYON CHRONOLOGY SITREP NO. 2 (U)

1. (U) The attached proposed Chronology SITREP No. 2 satisfies request for periodic updates.

2. (U) Recommend approval and signature on attached Background Paper.

Attachment

a/s

Classified by Director, J-3
Declassify on OADR
I. (U) SUBJECT. ELDORADO CANYON Chronology: SITREP NO. 2

II. (U) MAJOR POINTS. The following information has been provided by USEUCOM concerning ELDORADO CANYON activity as of 142200 EST.

A. (S) Air

- The USAF F-111s and EF-111s and the necessary KC-10/KC-135 tanker support sortied from RAF Lakenheath, RAF Upper Heyford, RAF Mildenhall, and RAF Fairford in Great Britain starting at 141256 EST. The USN A-6 strike aircraft and the Navy support launched from USS CORAL SEA and USS AMERICA at 141830 EST. The TOT time, centered on 141900 EST, was achieved as shown.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOT TIME</th>
<th>TARGET</th>
<th>A/C</th>
<th>ORDNANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>141906 to 141911</td>
<td>TRIPOLE MILITARY AIR FIELD</td>
<td>6 F-111</td>
<td>BSU-49 each</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

REMARKS:
6 aircraft aborted prior to TOT. Five (5) across target.
Damage Assessment: TBD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOT TIME</th>
<th>TARGET</th>
<th>A/C</th>
<th>ORDNANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>141900</td>
<td>BENINA AIR FIELD</td>
<td>2 A-6</td>
<td>MK-82 each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 A-6E</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>APAM each</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

REMARKS:
One (1) aircraft aborted prior to TOT.
Damage Assessment: TBD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOT TIME</th>
<th>TARGET</th>
<th>A/C</th>
<th>ORDNANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>141900</td>
<td>TARABULUS BARRACKS</td>
<td>9 F-111</td>
<td>GBU-10 each</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CLASSIFIED BY DIRECTOR, J-3
DECLASSIFY ON OADR

INTERNAL STAFF PAPER
RELEASE COVERED BY
JCS MOP 39
REMAMKS:
NR 9 aircraft aborted prior to TOT. Eight (8) across target. One (1) F-111 from this mission is reported missing.

Damage Assessment: TBD

141903 BENGHAZI MILITARY  6 A-6E MK-82 each BARRACKS (JAMAHIRIYAH)

REMAMKS:

Damage Assessment: TBD

141905 SIDI BILAL TERRORIST 3 F-111 GBU-10 each TRAINING CAMP

REMAMKS:

Damage Assessment: TBA
- Recovery: 2 F-111s diverted to Rota, SP due to mechanical problems.
  
  B. (97) Surface (nothing to report)

APPROVED BY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS
Prepared by: [Redacted]
REMARKS

1. (U) The attached proposed JCS Chronology SITREP No. 3 satisfies request for periodic updates.

2. (U) Recommend approval and signature on attached Background Paper.

Attachment

a/s

Classified by Director, J-3
Declassify on OADR
WORKING PAPER
DESTROY WHEN NO LONGER NEEDED

(U) Background Paper for the Director for Operations

I. (U) SUBJECT. ELDORADO CANYON Chronology; SITREP NO. 3

II. (U) MAJOR POINTS. The following information has been provided by USEUCOM concerning ELDORADO CANYON activity as of 150400 EST.

A. (G) Air

(1) The USAF F-111s and EF-111s sortied from RAF Lakenheath and RAF Upper Heyford; the necessary KC-10/KC-135 tanker support sortied from RAF Mildenhall and RAF Fairford in Great Britain starting at 141256 EST. The USN A-6 strike aircraft and the Navy support launched from USS CORAL SEA and USS AMERICA at 141830 EST. The TOT time, centered on 141900 EST, was achieved as shown.

(2) One (1) F-111 is reported missing.

(4) Strike Operations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOT TIME (EST)</th>
<th>TARGET</th>
<th>A/C</th>
<th>ORDNANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>141906 to 141911</td>
<td>TRIPOLI MILITARY AIR FIELD</td>
<td>6 F-111</td>
<td>BSU-49 each</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

REMARKS:
One (1) aircraft aborted prior to TOT. Five (5) across target.

Damage Assessment: TBD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOT TIME</th>
<th>TARGET</th>
<th>A/C</th>
<th>ORDNANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>141900</td>
<td>BENINA AIR FIELD</td>
<td>2 A-6, 7 A-6E</td>
<td>MK-82 each, APAM each</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

REMARKS:
One (1) aircraft aborted prior to TOT. Eight (8) across target.

Damage Assessment: TBD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOT TIME</th>
<th>TARGET (AZIZIYAH)</th>
<th>A/C</th>
<th>ORDNANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>141900</td>
<td>TARABULUS BARRACKS</td>
<td>9 F-111</td>
<td>GBU-10 each</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INTERNAL STAFF PAPER
RELEASE COVERED BY
JCS MOP 39

Classified by Director, J-3
Declassify on OADR
REMARKS:
One (1) aircraft aborted prior to TOT. Eight (8) across target.

Damage Assessment: TBD

141900 BENGHAZI MILITARY 6 A-6E MK-82 each
BARRACKS (JAMAHIRIYAH)

REMARKS:
Damage Assessment: TBD

141905 SIDI BILAL TERRORIST TRAINING CAMP
3 F-111 GBU-10 each

REMARKS:
Damage Assessment: TBA

(5) Libyan Reactions:

-- 142235 Unconfirmed report of AAA in central Tripoli area.

(7) Missile expenditures:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EAST TGT</th>
<th>WEST TGT</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HARM:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHRIKE:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(8) Recovery:

-- One F-111 diverted to Rota, SP due to mechanical problems escorted by a second F-111. The escort rejoined the tanker and returned to home base. The divert aircraft is in hangar awaiting repair.

-- 150310 F-111s and tankers on deck in UK.

B. (x) Surface (nothing to report)

APPROVED BY  

Prepared by: J-3 Response Cell, JOD Ext 52532/Secure 2796
OJCS SUMMARY SHEET

TO: VCCAT

SUBJECT: ELDORADO CANYON Summary (U)

REMARKS

1. (U) The attached background paper provides the latest summary of events relating to the subject operation against Libya.

2. (U) Recommend approval and signature on the attached Background Paper.

Attachment
a/s

Classified by Director, J-3
Declassify on OADR

ACTION OFFICER

COORDINATION/APPROVAL

DATE OF PREPARATION

CLASSIFICATION

PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM ARE OBSOLETE.
Background Paper for the Chairman, JCS for Information

I. SUBJECT: ELDORADO CANYON Summary (U)

II. MAJOR POINTS  The following information is the latest summary of events relating to the subject operation against Libya as of 150700 EST.

A. (U) Targets/Aircraft Assigned:

1. Tripoli Military Airfield/6 F-111F. 
   - One F-111F aborted prior to TOT.
2. Benina Airfield/9 A-6E.
   - One A-6E aborted prior to TOT.
3. Tarabulus Barracks (Aziziyah)/9 F-111F.
   - One F-111F aborted prior to TOT.
   - One F-111F lost during the strike.
4. Benghazi Military Barracks (Jamahiriya)/6 A-6E.
5. Sidi Bilal Terrorist Training Camp/3 F-111F.

B. (U) US missile expenditures - 36 HARM, 12 SHRIKE.
   - No confirmed results.

C. (U) Libyan reaction--unconfirmed AAA and SAM firings.

D. (U) US losses - one F-111F missing. SAR ongoing with no results.

E. (U) Battle damage assessment (BDA) - Post strike pilot reports all weapons dropped in the Benghazi complex. Several secondary fires - vehicles and aircraft burning at Benina Airfield. No reports on USAF strikes on targets in Tripoli area.

F. (U) Remarks: One F-111F recovered at Rota, SP. 16 F-111F recovered at home station. All Navy aircraft recovered aboard ship. All tankers and support aircraft recovered safely.

APPROVED BY

Prepared by:

VVCAT

INTERNAL STAFF PAPER
RELEASE COVERED BY
JCS MOP 39

Classified by Director, J-3
Declassify on OADR
FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF UP-TO-3 CVBG'S AND 1 BB SAG SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED TO NEUTRALIZE LIBYAN POWER PROJECTION CAPABILITY INCLUDING THEIR TACTICAL AIR FORCES, AIR DEFENSE FORCES AND SEAPOWER. COMMANDERS ESTIMATE SHOULD INCLUDE RECOMMENDED ACTIONS FOR PROTECTION OF STRIKE FORCE.

E. (U) FOR USCAINANT AND USCCAOCP REQUEST YOU PROVIDE USCINCIRCL INFORMATION CONCERNING AVAILABILITY OF CVBG'S AND BB SAG.

F. (U) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS:
   1. (U) TENTATIVE C-DAY, 1-HOUR: NOTIFICATION PLUS 36 HOURS.
   2. (U) ANTICIPATED D-DAY: NOTIFICATION PLUS 36 HOURS.
   3. (U) ANTICIPATED P-DAY LENGTH OF OPERATION: TBD.

   (4) (U) PROPOSED P-DAY:

   (5) (U) ITALIAN ALLOW: KEEP THE JCS INFORMED.

5. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

A. (U) TRANSPORT:
   1. (U) ABILITY: MOVEMENT PRIORITY: 1B1.
   2. (U) CONTACT STRATEGIC AIR RESOURCES MAY BE REQUIRED. LONDON USES AND SHOULD APPLY AS REQUIRED AND ADVISE JCS OF ANY PROBLEMS/SHORT FALLS.
   3. (U) FUNDING FOR TRANSPORTATION COSTS WILL NOT BE PROVIDED BY JCS. PARENT SERVICE(S) OF EMPLOYING UNIT(S) WILL FUND OPERATIONS.
   4. (U) COMMANDERS SHOULD BEGIN TO CAPTURE COSTS AND EXPENDITURES UPON RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE.
   5. (U) REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS: CJCEC IS AUTHORIZED TO USE OPREP-1 REPORTING AS REQUIRED. NORMAL OPERATIONAL REPORTING AS PRESCRIBED IN JCS PUB 9. MOVEMENT OF FORCES WILL BE REPORTED JAN APPROVED JCS PROCEDURES.

B. (U) OPSEC AND DECEPTION GUIDANCE: ELEMENT OF SURPRISE IS ESSENTIAL. EVIDENCE OF THE PREPARATIONS FOR A CONDUCT OF U.S. FORCE MOVEMENT WILL LIKELY GENERATE CONSIDERABLE OUTSIDE INTEREST. PROTECT OR CONTROL THOSE INDICATORS WHICH MAY COMPROMISE OUR CLASSIFIED INTENTIONS AND/OR CONVEY UNDESIRED SIGNALS TO OUR ENEMIES.

--- IMMEDIATE DELIVERY REQUIRED ---

ACTION TERM SVC*: JCS CODEWORD OFFICER: (MC)
INFO DIRECTOR 2321: JUC CODEWORD OFFICER: (MC)
DIRECTOR JOINT STAFF: JUC CODEWORD OFFICER: (MC)
MCC DIRECTOR: JUC CODEWORD OFFICER: (MC)
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE: JUC CODEWORD OFFICER: (MC)
JCS TEAM CHIEF: (MC)

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED: 27

MCN 85362/00300  TAD 85362/224Z  CDA 85362/23382

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SECT 01 OF 02

COPY NUMBER

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JCS MESSAGE CENTER

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

--- PAGE 28 ---

JCS MESSAGE CENTER
FLASH
Z 280125Z DEC 85
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC//J3/\nTO USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE//J3/\n
SUBJ: LIBYAN STRIKE PLANNING

1. (FOUO) A strong possibility exists that there is a Libyan connection with the Abu Nidal organization which is believed to be responsible for the 27 Dec bombings at the Vienna International Airport and Rome's Fiumicino Airport. We have been tasked to develop military retaliatory options against Libya.

2. (FOUO) Request you be prepared to support our activities with detailed strike planning data, including land-based and CVGB tactical air options. We expect to be able to provide more definitive guidance by 281700Z Dec.

(U) Best regards.

DECL DADR BT

--------IMMEDIATE DELIVERY REQUIRED---------

ACTION J3-JOD CODEWORD OFFICER (15) DIRECTOR J-3 (1) DIRECTOR JOINT STAFF (1) NACC DEP DIR OPS (1) CJCJ CODEWORD OFFICER (2)

MCN=85362/00310 TDR=85362/0125Z TAD=85362/0128Z CDSN=MAJBS55 PAGE 1 OF 1 280125Z DEC 85
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JCS MESSAGE CENTER

FLASH
USAF WASHINGTON DC
USAF HAWTHORNE AFB FL
USAF MACDILL AFB FL
USAF SCOTT AFB IL
USAF MACDILL AFB FL
USAF NAS JAX FL

DIRECTOR J-3/3 DIRECTOR Joint STAFF (J)

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (DOD) JCS CODE WORD OFFICER(2)

MCN=85365 05658 OR=85365/23512 TAD=86001/00012 CSN=MMKBE46

PAGE 1 OF 1
Final Section of O2

OF THE MISSION AND PROTECTION OF FRIENDLY FORCES. MINIMIZE
CIVILIAN CASUALTIES AND DAMAGE. PREEMPTIVE STRIKES AGAINST
LIBERIAN AIR DEFENSES ARE NOT AUTHORIZED. IF FOLLOW-ON
OPERATIONS ARE DIRECTED, ADDITIONAL RAO WILL BE PROVIDED, IF
REQUIRED.

6. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.
   A. AIRLIFT PRIORITY: 1B.

6. (U) FUNDING WILL NOT BE PROVIDED BY JCS. PARENT SERVICES OF
EXECUTING FORCES WILL FUND OPERATIONS. COMMANDERS AND AGENCIES
SHOULD BEGIN TO CAPTURE EXPENDITURES BY CATEGORY.

C. REPORTING: COMMANDERS ARE AUTHORIZED TO USE DFMP 1
REPORTING. SUPPORTED COMMANDER SHOULD BEGIN SUBMITTING DAILY
SITREPS TO JCS UNTIL RECEIPT OF THIS ORDER. REPORTS SHOULD BE AS
OF 2400 DAILY TO ARRIVE AT D 0002 DAILY. DETAILED AFTER-ACTION
REPORTS SHOULD BE SUBMITTED AS FOLLOWS: FIRST IMPRESSIONS, 24
HOURS AFTER COMPLETION OF OPERATION; CHRONOLOGY OF ACTIONS, 48
HOURS AFTER COMPLETION; AND LESSONS LEARNED, 7 WORKING DAYS AFTER
COMPLETION.

D. OPSEC AND DECEPTION: SURPRISE IS ESSENTIAL TO MINIMIZE
US LOSSES. PERSONNEL WILL BE BRIEFED ON OPSEC PROCEDURES.

7. (U) COMMAND AND CONTROL.
   A. WHERE CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS RESOURCES ARE NOT SATISFYED
BY ASSIGNING OR SUPPORTING UNITS, THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER SHOULD
VALIDATE AND FORWARD THESE REQUIREMENTS VIA JCS MP 167. REQUEST
FOR SUPPORT SHOULD BE PRIORITIZED BY SUPPORTED COMMANDER.

B. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS: USCENTCOM IN USEINCINCEP, USCENTCOM
USENCINCEP, USENCINCEP, USENCINCEP, USENCINCEP, USENCINCEP,
CINCSAC, AND DIA ARE SUPPORTING COMMANDERS, DIA.

TSVC ZDF REQUIRED

IMMEDIATE DELIVERY REQUIRED

ACTION TERM SVC** JS-JOC CODEWORD OFFICER-(15)
INFO DIRECTOR J-311 DIRECTOR JOINT STAFF(1)
NSC DEP DIP (PS) (1) (1) (JSJ CODEWORD OFFICER(1)
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE(1) DIA JSJ CODEWORD OFFICER(1)
DNC CHIEF(1)

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 2

SOURCE CDSM-MKBS47
1. (U) The attached proposed script will be the operations portion of a briefing of ELDORADO CANYON to be given to the Israeli Defense Minister at Intelligence at the SECRET level. The operations portion is primarily an introduction for the intelligence briefing on BDA and that-strike developments. The only planned additional briefing aids are the two unclassified maps previously used by SecDef and others in briefing the raid.

2. (U) Recommend J-33 approval of attached script.
BRIEFING FOR
FOR MG SHAHAK, ISRAELI DIRECTOR FOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, 20 MAY 1986

Good afternoon, sir. I am Current Operations, J-3, JCS

Provide overview of the raid to provide a background for Intel briefings and discussions.

(u) The mission was to conduct simultaneous night strikes against five directed targets. Specifically, the raid was to damage/destroy combat swimmer school at Murrat Sidi Bilal terrorist-training facility, damage/destroy Qadhafi's terrorism HQ and C3 apparatus at Azziziya as well as the Jamahiriya Guard Barracks at Banghazi, and protect the striking US forces from Libyan air threat while damaging Libya's IL-76 power/logistics projection capability.

(u) The general concept of operations was to use F-111Fs from Great Britain against the three western-most targets in Tripoli; that is, the Sidi Bilal Training Facility, the Azziziya Barracks and Headquarters, and the Tripoli...
Military Airport; and on the eastern targets, A-6Es from the USS CORAL SEA and USS AMERICA were scheduled against Benina Air Base and the Benghazi Barracks and Alternate Headquarters. Tactical support was to be provided by aircraft from the two carriers and KC-10s and EF-111s launched from Great Britain. Staging the F-111s closer was not considered a realistic option since third country diplomatic clearance would be required. This presented an OPSEC problem eliminating the element of surprise and increasing the risk to striking forces. Lack of overflight rights for the F-111s complicated planning and execution but was within operational parameters. Due to the long range (2800 nm, one way), the mission required additional tanker aircraft to be deployed to the UK. Additional spare F-111s were planned in case of avionics failures during the long flight. The most experienced, trained, formed crews were chosen for the mission.
Of the aircraft attacking the Aziziyah Barracks, there was one F-111 that did not return, he apparently went down off the coast about four miles north of Tripoli. There was an immediate SAR initiated which continued for a day and a half after the aircraft was reported lost, with no indication either visual or electronic that anyone had survived.

The effectiveness/cooordination of the Air Force and Naval forces has been assessed as superb. Perhaps the most telling fact is the exact on time TOT by forces based 3000 miles apart. A very complex joint strike plan successfully integrated strike and strike-support (ESM, ECM, EW, CAP, SAR) air and naval forces. The aircrews, as the primary strike planners, were given the flexibility to develop attack plans and force packages. Each target area had several desired target elements (aim points). The selection of aim points and munitions was left to the crews attacking that target area.
(u) Sir, unless you have any operational questions, specific EDA and Libyan reactions will now be covered by my colleagues from DIA.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
JCS MESSAGE CENTER

SUBJECT: ATTAIN DOCUMENT - WARNING ORDER (U)

This is a warning order. Request Commander's estimate for NCA consideration. Nil 012000Z Jan 86.

1. Message situation: Libya continues to claim airspace and territorial waters in excess of those normally recognized by international law. The US government intends to challenge these excess claims by conducting freedom of navigation operations in the Gulf of Sidra.

2. Message situation: When directed by the NCA, to demonstrate US resolve and capability against Libya, US forces in the Gulf of Sidra will conduct operations in international waters, including freedom of navigation operations in the Gulf of Sidra. Additional forces will be prepared to conduct attacks on Libyan mainland targets in response to any Libyan aggression against US forces. In addition, the Gulf of Sidra operations plan will conduct operations within and above the Tripoli FIR for an extended period of time, to be determined.

3. Message situation: A - (A) course of action: Plan for conduct of both day and night challenges of both airspace and territorial sea claimed by Libya in excess of 12 nm. Operations should be planned no closer to Libya than 12 nm. Prepare to protect challenging forces from Libyan hostile reaction. Be prepared to conduct TACAIR strikes and naval gunfire missions against Libyan targets in response to any Libyan hostile actions against challenging forces.

4. Action: 23 - 300 commander officer(s) (U/U)  

SECTION 01 OF 02

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 2
FLASH
2 081801Z JAN 86 ZFF4
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC/CJCS/ 
TO USCINCANT NORFOLK VA
USCINCEUR VAIIHGEN GE
INFO USNMR SHAPE BE

SUBJ: ATTAIN DOCUMENT--USS SARATOGA CVBG

1. (U) THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS DIRECTED THE USS SARATOGA CVBG TO PROCEED IMMEDIATELY TO THE CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN SEA.

2. (U) OPSEC CONTINUES TO BE A PARAMOUNT PLANNING CONSIDERATION.

3. (U) WARMEST REGARDS.

DECL OADR BY

+++++++IMMEDIATE DELIVERY/REQUIRED+++++++ 
********************************************** 
** CLERK/DUTY OFFICER** ********************************************** 
** INSURE THE NICKNAME "ATTAIN DOCUMENT" ARE WRITTEN ON THE ** 
** OUTSIDE OF THE ENVELOPE **

ACTION J3-JDD CODEWORD OFFICER (15) (R,C)
INFO DIRECTOR JOINT STAFF (1) NMCC DEP DIR OPS (1)
CJCS CODEWORD OFFICER (2)

MCH=86008/04963 TOR=86008/18042 TAD=86008/18142 CDSN=MAC279
JCS MESSAGE CENTER

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

CINC/SCAP: Provide aerial refueling and aerial reconnaissance support as requested by supported or supporting commanders.

1. This is a warning order. This message supersedes reference.

2. All copies of this reference should be destroyed. Request commander's estimate for NCA CONUS CONvoX at 1004 EST 19 Jan 86.

3. Any situation, Libya contains to claim airspace and territorial waters in excess of those normally recognized by international law. The US government intends to challenge these excessive claims by conducting freedom of navigation operations in the Gulf of Sidra.

4. Aircr of the NCA, to demonstrate US resolve and capability against Libya, will conduct operations in the Gulf of Sidra. Additionally, US forces will be prepared to conduct attacks on Libyan mainland targets in response to any Libyan aggression against US forces. In addition to the Gulf of Sidra operations, plan to conduct presence operations north of the Gulf (within and above the troop fit) for an extended period of time to be determined.

5. (U) Execution

6. (U) Course of action: Plan for conduct of both day and night challenges of both airspace and territorial sea claimed by Libya. In excess of 16x16, operations should be planned no closer to Libya than 12x12. Be prepared to protect challenging forces from Libyan hostile reaction. Be prepared to conduct other missions against Libya's targets in response to any Libyan hostile actions against challenging forces. In addition to the Gulf of Sidra operation, plan to conduct presence operations north of the Gulf within and above the troop fit for an extended period of time to be determined.

8. (U) Major combat forces:

7. (U) Immediate delivery required.

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FLASH
Z 082311Z JAN 86 ZFF4
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC//CJCS//
TO US CINC EUR VAHINGEN GE//ECDC//
INFO USMAR SHAPE B6

EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN LAWSON, INFO GEN ROGERS, FROM GEN KELLEY, ACJCS
SUBJ: ATTAIN DOCUMENT (U)
REFS: A. JCS 080049Z JAN 86
     B. US CINC EUR 081100Z JAN 86

1. (U) APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING
OPERATION ATTAIN DOCUMENT. FOLLOWING RESPONSES ARE KEYED TO
SUBPARAGRAPHS OF PARAGRAPH 1, REF B:
   A. (TS) YOUR REQUEST FOR 24-HOUR EXTENSION OF THE SUSPENSE FOR
COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE IS APPROVED. REQUEST AS DETAILED A CONCEPT
OF OPERATIONS AS POSSIBLE UNDER THE TIMELINES.
   B. (TS) BY SEPARATE MESSAGE, YOUR RECOMMENDED OPTIONS FOR
OPERATION PRAIRIE FIRE WILL BE APPROVED FOR FURTHER PLANNING
AND WE WILL REQUEST A DETAILED STRIKE PLAN FOR THAT OPTION.
UPON JCS APPROVAL OF THE STRIKE PLAN, PRAIRIE FIRE SITEOPS WILL
BE DISCONTINUED. ADDITIONALLY, YOUR RECOMMENDATION TO MODIFY
THE DAILY SITEOP REQUIREMENT TO READ "AS OF 0600Z DAILY TO
ARRIVE NLT 1200Z DAILY" IS APPROVED. A MODIFICATION TO JCS
WARNING ORDER WILL CONTAIN THIS CHANGE.

2. (U) WARMEST REGARDS.

DECL OADY B1

---IMMEDIATE DELIVERY REQUIRED---
********** CLERK/DUTY OFFICER**********
INSURE THE NickNAME "ATTAIN DOCUMENT" ARE WRITTEN ON THE
---OUTSIDE OF THE ENVELOPE---

ACTION TERM SVC (1) J3-10D CODEWORD OFFICER (15) (M)
INFO DIRECTOR JOINT STAFF (1) NMCC DEP DIR OPS (1)
CJCS CODEWORD OFFICER (2)

MCN=86008/03726 TQR=86008 TAD=86008/2314Z CDSN=MAJ193
PAGE 1 OF 1 082311Z JAN 86
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

11 January 1986

Subject: Demonstration of US Resolve and Capability Against Libya (25)
3. In response to your tasking to develop a plan to demonstrate resolve and capability against Libya, the Joint Chiefs recommend:
5. [DELETED] If this timing is not acceptable, the three-CVBG operation could be conducted 16 days after movement instructions are issued to the USS AMERICA CVBG.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR.
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
IMMEDIATE

0 131855Z JAN 86
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC/J3/J33/
TO USCINCCLANT NORFOLK VA
USCINCCEUR VAILINGEN GE
USCINCPCAC HONOLULU HI
USCINCSC OFFUTT AFB NE
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
INFO CSAF WASHINGTON DC
CSAF WASHINGTON DC
CIA WASHINGTON DC
USNAR SHAPE BE
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK

SUBJ: MODIFICATION TO ALERT ORDER--PRAIRIE FIRE 18

REFS: A. JCS 082139Z JAN 86--REQUEST FOR DETAILED STRIKE PLAN
     B. JCS 31223Z DEC 85--ALERT ORDER
     C. USCINCPCAC 110135Z JAN 86 (NOTAL)

1. (U) THIS MESSAGE CONFIRMS MODIFICATIONS TO NCA GUIDANCE
   PREVIOUSLY PASSED SEPARATELY TO SOME ADDRESSEES BY OTHER MEANS.

2. (C) FOR USCINCCLANT: REQUEST DETAILED STRIKE PLANNING (REF A)
   ARRIVE JCS NLT 171000Z JAN 86.

3. (U) REF B IS MODIFIED AS FOLLOWS:
   A: (C) ADD TO PARA 5B (MAJOR COMBAT FORCES): USS SARATOGA CVB-11".

4. (C) FOR USCINCCEUR: IN LIEU OF CURRENT DAILY PRAIRIE FIRE AND
   ATTAIN DOCUMENT SITREPS, REQUEST SITREPS TWICE EACH WEEK WITH A
   REPORTING TIME AS OF 1200Z EVERY MONDAY AND FRIDAY. EACH SITREP
   SHOULD COVER THE PERIOD SINCE THE LAST SUBMISSION AND PROJECT
   ANTICIPATED OPERATIONS/EVENTS UNTIL THE NEXT SUBMISSION.

DECL UADR BT

IMMEDIATE DELIVERY REQUIRED

ACTION J3-J10 CODE WORD OFFICER (15)
INFO J3-JRC CODE WORD OFFICER (1)
      CODE WORD OFFICER (1)
      DIRECTOR JOINT STAFF (1)
      NMCC DEP DIR OPS (1)
      NMCC CIA/NSA REP (2)
      EJCS CODE WORD OFFICER (2)
      DJA JSJ CODE WORD OFFICER (2)

PAGE 1 OF 1
131855Z JAN 86
SUBJ: OPERATION ATTAIN DOCUMENT—MISSION DIRECTIVE SERIAL 004 (U) REF: JCS 000492 JAN 86 (SHARING CIPR)

4. A. THIS IS AN OPERATION ATTAIN DOCUMENT MISSION DIRECTIVE AND IS ISSUED FOR PLANNING. THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS APPROVED ALERTING FORCES FOR EXECUTION OF THIS MISSION DIRECTIVE. REQUEST SUPPORTED COMMANDER'S GENERAL CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS AND MISSION TAKING 48 HOURS AFTER RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE. INFO JCS.

U. EXECUTION.

U. (1) LIAISON FORCES WILL SUPPORT AND AUGMENT THE MISSION DIRECTIVE.

U. (2) JOINT FORCES WILL SUPPORT AND AUGMENT THE MISSION DIRECTIVE.

U. (3) SUPPORT FORCES WILL SUPPORT AND AUGMENT THE MISSION DIRECTIVE.

U. (4) SUPPORT ASSETS WILL SUPPORT AND AUGMENT THE MISSION DIRECTIVE.

U. (5) MISSION DIRECTIVE WILL BE SUPPORTED BY SUPPORTED COMMANDER'S GENERAL CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS AND MISSION TAKING 48 HOURS AFTER RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE. INFO JCS.

U. MISSION. DEMONSTRATE UNRESOLVED AND CAPABILITY AGAINST LIBYA. USCENTCOM WILL CONDUCT OPERATIONS TO KEEP LIBYAN ARMY FORCES EVENTUAL AS TO US INTENTIONS, AND SIGNAL LIBYAN, EUROPEAN AND ARAB OBSERVERS THAT THE US HAS THE CAPABILITY AND THE WILL TO CONDUCT MILITARY STRIKES, IF NECESSARY.

U. (1) DAMA UPON COMPLETION OF DUAL EVAG ERED WORLDWIDE, INCREASE THE TEMPO OF OPERATIONS WITHIN THE TRIPOLI FUR WITH DAY AND NIGHT AIR AND SURFACE COMBATANT OPERATIONS. CARRIERS SHOULD REMAIN OUTSIDE THE FUR DURING THIS PERIOD. PLAN TO COMMENCE OPERATIONS NO EARLIER THAN 210001Z JAN 86.

U. (2) CARRIERS WILL BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT AIR AND SURFACE PENETRATIONS OF ILLEGALLY EXCESSIVE LIBYAN CLAIMED TERRITORIAL SEAS AND AIRSPACE IN THE GULF OF SIDRA BELOW 32:

U. (3) CARRIERS MUST BE PREPARED TO EXECUTE OPERATIONS IN PRAIRIE FIRE.

U. (4) IMMEDIATE DELIVERY REQUIRED.

ACTION TERM SYM(1) WMC (USA REP(2))
CJCS CODEWORD OFFICER(3) DIA 3JS CODEWORD OFFICER(4)
INFO DIRECTOR 3-3 CIC-JC CODEWORD OFFICER(5)
DIRECTOR JOINT STATES(6) JJ-JC CODEWORD OFFICER(7)
WMC DEF CIF OPS(8) WHOP TEAM CHIEF(9)
SUBJ: MODIFICATION TO ALERT ORDER--PRAIRIE FIRE

REFS: A. USCINCEUR 211215Z JAN 86--DETAILED STRIKE DATA
B. JCS 082139Z JAN 86--REQUEST FOR DETAILED STRIKE PLAN
C. JCS 312234Z DEC 85--ALERT ORDER

1. LET THIS MESSAGE CONFIRMS MODIFICATIONS TO NCA GUIDANCE
PREVIOUSLY PASSED BY OTHER MEANS.
(U) Background Paper for the Chairman, JCS, for information

I. (U) SUBJECT. Libyan Anti-ship Missile Threat to US FIR/FON Operations (LCS) [Redacted]

II. (U) MAJOR POINTS [Redacted]
FYI:

- IOWA presently inport Norfolk. Scheduled underway 18 Feb for Caribbean FLEETEX and CENTAM presence ops through 12 March. IOWA will transit Panama Canal 24 Feb for EASTPAC ops.

- Participation in Libyan FON 23-29 March would require departure from Norfolk NLT 10 March. Additionally should have minimum of 2 wks prep for Med deployment in Norfolk, i.e., should leave Caribbean to arrive Norfolk NLT 25 Feb or be held in Norfolk now. Tab B shows BBBG sked.

APPROVED BY

DIRECTOR, J-3

DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

Prepared by:

Attachments
TAB A--DIA Memorandum for the Chairman, JCS, 15 February 1986
TAB B--BBBG SAG Schedules
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Mediterranean Operations (U)

1. (TS) During the past several months, elements of EUCOM have operated inside the Tripoli FIR on two separate occasions. During the period 23–29 March, EUCOM will conduct a deliberate Freedom of Navigation challenge below 32 degrees 30 minutes North using both air and surface elements. This FON challenge will involve elements of three carrier battle groups and will be deliberately planned and executed.

2. (TS) In the intervening period between 27 February and 23 March, the Chiefs recommend that the EUCOM Commander be given maximum flexibility in conducting operations off the coast of Libya with the following constraints:

   a. No Freedom of Navigation challenge will be conducted during this period nor will any elements of the force operate south of 32 degrees 30 minutes North.

   b. The decision to file a Notification of Intent (NOI) will be left to the EUCOM Commander.

   c. All elements of the EUCOM force are authorized to operate within the Tripoli FIR at the discretion of the EUCOM Commander.

   d. Normal peacetime Rules of Engagement will apply, with the addition of the following three ROE:

      These are the same ROE which have been in effect for the previous two FIR operations.

CLASSIFIED BY: CJCS
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR
3. CINCEUR will continue to be prepared to conduct retaliatory operations against Libya within 48 hours of an execute order in response to either linkable terrorist acts or hostile acts of aggression committed against US forces.

4. (TS) Request approval of the above as soon as possible.

WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR.
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
SUBJ: ATTAIN DOCUMENT II CANCELLATION

REF: A. JCS 062217Z JAN 86 (MOD WARNING ORDER--ATTAIN DOCUMENT)
B. USCINCUS 101150Z JAN 86 (COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE--ATTAIN DOCUMENT)
C. JCS 311907Z JAN 86 (ALERT ORDER--ATTAIN DOCUMENT II/III)
D. USCINCUS 061200Z FEB 86 (OPERATION--ATTAIN DOCUMENT TWO OPORD)
E. JCS 061212Z FEB 86 (ATTAIN DOCUMENT II, III, AND III EXECUTE ORDER)
F. USCINCUS 091149Z FEB 86 (EXECUTE ORDER--ATTAIN DOCUMENT II, III, AND III)
G. JCS 091149Z FEB 86 (ADDENDUM--ATTAIN DOCUMENT II)

ATTACH THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS DIRECTED CANCELLATION OF ATTAIN DOCUMENT II BRAVO OPERATIONS SCHEDULED FOR 1-4 MARCH 1986. CONTINUE PLANNING FOR ATTAIN DOCUMENT III OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD 23-29 MARCH 1986. ADDITIONALLY, BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT OPERATION BRAVO immediately 48 HOURS AFTER RECEIPT OF EXECUTE ORDER.

1. NORMAL OPERATIONS IN THE CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN AREA TO BE RESUMED WITHIN THE FOLLOWING GUIDELINES:

A. ALL ELEMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMAND ARE AUTHORIZED TO OPERATE WITHIN THE TRIPOLI FIR ABOVE 32-30N AT THE DISCRETION OF USCINCUS.

B. THE DECISION TO FILE A NOTIFICATION OF INTENT (NOI) TO CONDUCT FLIGHT OPERATIONS IN THE TRIPOLI FIR WILL BE LEFT TO USCINCUS.

C. FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION CHALLENGES BELOW 32-30N IN THE GULF OF SIDRA WILL NOT BE CONDUCTED UNLESS SPECIFICALLY DIRECTED BY JCS.

2. IN REPORTING, REQUEST USCINCUS PROVIDE SCHEDULE OF INTENDED OPERATIONS IN THE TRIPOLI FIR FOR THE PERIOD 28 FEB TO 23 MAR 86. AND NOTIFY JCS 72 HOURS IN ADVANCE OF ANY CHANGES TO PROPOSED SCHEDULE OF OPERATIONS IN THE TRIPOLI FIR. ADVANCE NOTIFICATION IS REQUIRED TO ENSURE ADEQUATE RSA SUPPORT.


----------IMMEDIATE DELIVERY REQUIRED----------
---------------------CLERK/DUTY OFFICER--------------------

INSURE THE NICE NAME "ATTAIN DOCUMENT II" ARE WRITTEN ON THE OUTSIDE OF THE ENVELOPE

ACTION DIA 35J CODEWORD OFFICER(1)
33-JC9 CODEWORD OFFICER(1)

IN: JCS 35J CODEWORD OFFICER(1) MWCC CHIEF(1)
DIREKTOR J-3(1) DIREKTOR JOINT STAFF(1)
MWCC DEP DIR OPS(1) JCS CODEWORD OFFICER(1)

MCN=86059-00080  FNR=86059/00152  IAD=86059/00202  CDN=MAJ7880  PAGE 1 OF 1
2000152 FEB 86
ATTAIN DOCUMENT OPERATIONS

PURPOSE:
- PROVIDE INFORMATION ON ATTAIN DOCUMENT OPERATIONS
- OBTAIN DECISION ON ATTAIN DOCUMENT II B OPERATIONS
  1-4 MARCH EXECUTE ORDER
ATTAIN DOCUMENT OPERATIONS

II B: FIR OPERATIONS 1-4 MAR 86
ISSUES
- NOI

- CV SOUTH OF 34-20N

- LITTORAL COUNTRY NOTIFICATION
ATTAIN DOCUMENT II B FIR OPS

ISSUES

1. NOI
   - DO NOT FILE (USCINCEUR PREFERRED)
   - FILE FOR EXTENDED PERIOD 280001Z FEB - 052359Z MAR
   - LITTORAL COUNTRY NOTIFICATION PROBLEM WITH NOT FILING

2. CV SOUTH OF 34-20N
   - FIR OPS TO DATE CV'S ABOVE 34-20
   - A/D III CV(S) IN FIR
   - USCINCEUR REQUESTED RELAXATION OF FIR OPS CONSTRAINTS FOR CV'S TO OPERATE BETWEEN 34-20N AND 33-40N
JCS-APPROVED SUPPLEMENTAL ROE (FIR OPS ONLY)
ATTAIN DOCUMENT III OPERATIONS

III: FON OPERATIONS 23-29MAR 86

ISSUES - TIMEFRAME OF OPERATION

- TIMEFRAME OF CHALLENGE(S)

- ROE

[Redacted] TOP SECRET
ATTAIN DOCUMENT III FON OPS

ISSUE

TIMEFRAME - DURATION OF ENTIRE OPERATION - NOW BOUNDED 23-29 MAR

OF ONS

TIMEFRAME - PERIODIC EXCURSIONS AS DETERMINED BY COMSIXTHFLT

OF FON
ATTAIN DOCUMENT III

CONCEPT OF OPS
19 MAR - FILE NOI FOR 210001Z-312359Z

21/22 MAR - CVBG WORKUPS/TRANSITION FROM WMED TO CMED
CONCEPT OF OPS CON'T

CV FLT SCHEDULES

- NORTH OF 32-30N
  -- SARATOGA 2245-1100
  -- AMERICA 1100-2315
  -- CORAL SEA 0415-1745

- SOUTH OF 32-30N
  -- SARATOGA 1915-1100
  -- AMERICA 1100-0245
  -- CORAL SEA 0245-1915
CONCEPT OF OPS (CONT'D)
SUBJECT: ATTAIN DOCUMENT II (U)

1. [REDACTED] YOU HAVE BY NOW RECEIVED AN ALERT ORDER CALLING FOR FTR OPERATIONS BY TWO CVBGs DURING THE PERIOD 10-14 FEB 86. AS WITH ATTAIN DOCUMENT I, THESE OPERATIONS SHOULD BE CONDUCTED NORTH OF 32 DEGREES 30 MINUTES NORTH WITH AN N01 FILED NOT EARLIER THAN 48 HOURS PRIOR TO COMMENCING OPERATIONS.

2. [REDACTED] I WILL KEEP YOU POSTED AS EVENTS UNFOLD HERE. IN TURN, I WILL BE DISCUSSING WITH SECDEF YOUR PLANS FOR FON'S, ETC., AND ANY ADVICE YOU MIGHT HAVE ON FIR OPS, F0N PENETRATION OR RETALIATORY STEPS.

3. [REDACTED] I APPRECIATE THE GREAT WORK THAT YOU AND YOUR STAFFS HAVE DONE IN PLANNING AND EXECUTING OPERATIONS THIS FAR.

WARMEST REGARDS, BILL

DECL OADR BY

IMMEDIATE DELIVERY REQUIRED

********** CLERK/DUTY OFFICER **********
INSURE THE NICKNAME "ATTAIN DOCUMENT" ARE WRITTEN ON THE OUTSIDE OF THE ENVELOPE

ACTION TERM SVC (1) CJCS CODEWORD OFFICER (2) (M.C.)
INFO DIRECTOR JOINT STAFF (1) J3-JOD CODEWORD OFFICER (16)
NMCC DEP DIR OPS (1)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JCS MESSAGE CENTER

JCS 032160 15 MAR 86

ATOMIC DROPS TARGET I AND J
CLINICIAN OFICIAL 9 K

ATOMIC DROPS TARGET I AND J
CLINICIAN OFICIAL 9 K

DATE: FEB 86

REFERENCE: JCS 022160 JAN 86 (NO COPY ORDER)
USCINCIRUS 101110Z JAN 86 (COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE)
C JCS 311992Z JAN 86 (DIRECT ORDER)
D USCINCIRUS 061200Z FEB 86 (OPERATIONAL DIRECT ORDER)

5jun 86

2. PLANNED AGENCY: JCS. JCS 022160 JAN 86 (NO COPY ORDER)
USCINCIRUS 101110Z JAN 86 (COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE)
C JCS 311992Z JAN 86 (DIRECT ORDER)
D USCINCIRUS 061200Z FEB 86 (OPERATIONAL DIRECT ORDER)

5jun 86

3. PLANNED AGENCY: JCS. JCS 022160 JAN 86 (NO COPY ORDER)
USCINCIRUS 101110Z JAN 86 (COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE)
C JCS 311992Z JAN 86 (DIRECT ORDER)
D USCINCIRUS 061200Z FEB 86 (OPERATIONAL DIRECT ORDER)

5jun 86

4. PLANNED AGENCY: JCS. JCS 022160 JAN 86 (NO COPY ORDER)
USCINCIRUS 101110Z JAN 86 (COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE)
C JCS 311992Z JAN 86 (DIRECT ORDER)
D USCINCIRUS 061200Z FEB 86 (OPERATIONAL DIRECT ORDER)

5jun 86

6. PLANNED AGENCY: JCS. JCS 022160 JAN 86 (NO COPY ORDER)
USCINCIRUS 101110Z JAN 86 (COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE)
C JCS 311992Z JAN 86 (DIRECT ORDER)
D USCINCIRUS 061200Z FEB 86 (OPERATIONAL DIRECT ORDER)

5jun 86


c

DECL GARR BY

1 FEB 86

3jun 86

5jun 86

7jun 86

9jun 86
SUBJ: ATTAIN DOCUMENT III—EXECUTE ORDER 1274

REF: A. JCS O823102 JAN 86 (COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE—ATTAIN DOCUMENT)
    B. USNCEUR 100101JAN 86 (COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE—ATTAIN DOCUMENT)
    C. JCS 0823102 FEB 86 (EXECUTE ORDER 1274)
    D. USNCEUR 090116FEB 86 (EXECUTE ORDER 1274)
    E. USNCEUR 090116FEB 86 (EXECUTE ORDER 1274)
    F. JCS 0823102 JAN 86 (ATTAIN DOCUMENT III—EXECUTE ORDER 1274)
    G. JCS 0823102 JAN 86 (ATTAIN DOCUMENT III—EXECUTE ORDER 1274)
    H. JCS 0823102 JAN 86 (ATTAIN DOCUMENT III—EXECUTE ORDER 1274)

NORTH—USNCEUR WILL ENSURE THAT A NOTICE OF INTENT (NOI) IS FILED 24 HOURS PRIOR TO COMMENCING OPERATIONS IN THE OPERATIONAL AREA. THE ACTUAL FOR CHALLENGE WILL BEGIN AT 0100, 30 MAY 86, AND WILL END AT 2359, 1 JUNE 86. NO COMBAT GROUPS ARE TO BE ENGAGED IN COMBAT DURING THE OPERATIONAL AREA.

The actual for challenge will consist of:

A. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK
   B. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK
   C. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK
   D. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK
   E. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK
   F. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK
   G. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK
   H. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK

The operation is to be conducted in the following manner:

1. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK
2. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK
3. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK
4. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK
5. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK
6. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK
7. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK
8. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK

The operation will be conducted in the following manner:

A. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK
B. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK
C. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK
D. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK
E. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK
F. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK
G. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK
H. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK

The operation will be conducted in the following manner:

A. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK
B. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK
C. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK
D. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK
E. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK
F. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK
G. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK
H. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK

The operation will be conducted in the following manner:

A. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK
B. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK
C. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK
D. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK
E. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK
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H. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK

The operation will be conducted in the following manner:

A. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK
B. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK
C. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK
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E. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK
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H. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK

The operation will be conducted in the following manner:

A. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK
B. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK
C. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK
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H. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK

The operation will be conducted in the following manner:

A. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK
B. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK
C. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK
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The operation will be conducted in the following manner:

A. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK
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H. A NOTICED ROAD BLOCK
BAD ADMINISTRATION AND STATISTICS FOR REF C
REPORTING. SUPPORTED COMMANDER'S STAFF TO ARRANGE TO USE TWICE DAILY
WT 0900Z AND 1300Z AS OF 1900Z AND 1300Z. RESPECTIVELY. STAFFS
TO COMMENCE 2300Z MAY BE AND SHOULD COVER THE LAST 12 HOURS OF
OPERATIONS AND PLANNED EVENTS FOR THE NEXT 12 HOURS AND INCLUDE
BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING
A) NIGHT TIME DATA AND TIMES FOR BOTH SURFACE AND AIR UNITS
SOUTH OF 22' 30' NORTH
B) NIGHT SURFACE UNIT'S OPERATIONS REPORT
C) NIGHT NUMBER OF US AND LEBANESE SCARED ZONE
E) NIGHT CAP STATIONS USED
F) NIGHT CHRONOLOGY OF INCIDENTS/INTERCEPTS WITH LEBANESE MILITARY
G) NIGHT ACTUAL INCIDENTS/INTERCEPTS (IF ANY)
H) NIGHT CHRONOLOGY OF MEDIA ACTIVITIES, PLANNED AND
COMPLETED IF ANY AND ANY PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED OR SUPPORT
REQUIRED.
2. (D) COMMAND AND CONTROL.
A) NIGHT COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. USENING R USE SUPPORTED
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IMMEDIATE

C 150019Z MAR 92
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
TO JCS MESSAGE CENTER

SUBJECT: TARGET UPDATE/REQUEST FOR DETAILED STRIKE PLAN--PRAIRIE FIRE

REFS: A. JCS 3112342 DEC 88.
B. JCS 0031291 JAN 88.
C. USCENTCOM 2112351 JAN 88.

2. REFERENCE A (PRAIRIE FIRE ALERT ORDER) PROVIDED A LISTING OF TARGETS CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE FOR FURTHER PLANNING. REFERENCE B FURTHER REFINED TARGETING AND REQUESTED DETAILED STRIKE PLANS. REFERENCE C PROVIDES STRIKE PLANNING FOR APPROVED TARGETS TO DATE.

3. MANY PRAIRIE FIRE TARGETS HAVE BEEN REVISED BY SECDEF AND JCS. THE FOLLOWING TARGETS HAVE BEEN APPROVED FOR FINAL DETAILED MISSION PLANNING:

*******IMMEDIATE DELIVERY REQUIRED**********
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JCS MESSAGE CENTER

FLASH
220020Z MAR 86 01010
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC/JCS/1
TO USMCN CGMC MACDILL AFB FL
USMCN CGMC MC DENV FL
USMCN CGMC HANNOVER AG
USMCN CGMC OFFUTT AFB NE
DGSA FT GEORGE H WASHINGTON DC
DNA WASHINGTON DC
INFO CSA WASHINGTON DC
CSAF WASHINGTON DC
CIA WASHINGTON DC
CINCINMACUHER LONDON UK

SECTION 01 OF 02

SUBJ: REVISED PRAIRIE FIRE ALERT ORDER (I)
REFS: A. JCS 222232 DEC 65 (PRAIRIE FIRE WARNING ORDER) (NOTAL)
B. JCS 150207Z MAR 86 (NO III EXECUTE ORDER) (NOTAL)

1. JCS THIS IS AN ALERT ORDER. THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS AUTHORIZED EXECUTION PLANNING DELIMINATED BELOW. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO CONSOLIDATE PREVIOUS PRAIRIE FIRE PLANNING AND PROVIDE CURRENT ICA INFORMATION. THIS MESSAGE SUPERcedes ANY CONFLICTING DIRECTIVES/GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN EARLIER MESSAGES.

2. (I) SITUATION: LIBYAN LEADER GHADAFI HAS THREATENED TO ATTACK US FORCES SHOULD THEY OPERATE IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS IN THE GULF OF SIDRA SOUTH OF 32°10'N/6. SINCE THE UNITED STATES INTENDS TO CHALLENGE GHADAFI'S ILLEGITIMATE CLAIMS ON INTERNATIONAL WATERS AND AIRSPACE IN THE GULF OF SIDRA, PLANNING FOR RETALIATION AGAINST HOSTILE LIBYAN ACTION IS PRUDENT.

3. (I) EXECUTION. (NOTE: MISSION STATEMENT IS NOT MEANT TO IMPLY DISREGARD OF LIBYAN THREAT TO ATTACKING FORCES). 

4. (I) EXECUTION. (NOTE: MISSION STATEMENT IS NOT MEANT TO IMPLY DISREGARD OF LIBYAN THREAT TO ATTACKING FORCES). 

5. (I) EXECUTION. (NOTE: MISSION STATEMENT IS NOT MEANT TO IMPLY DISREGARD OF LIBYAN THREAT TO ATTACKING FORCES). 

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29. (I) EXECUTION. (NOTE: MISSION STATEMENT IS NOT MEANT TO IMPLY DISREGARD OF LIBYAN THREAT TO ATTACKING FORCES). 

30. (I) EXECUTION. (NOTE: MISSION STATEMENT IS NOT MEANT TO IMPLY DISREGARD OF LIBYAN THREAT TO ATTACKING FORCES). 

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED: 24
Point Paper for the OPG

SUBJECT: Libya's Attack Capability (U)

1. (U) PURPOSE: Response to JSF Tasking 008.

2. (U) MAJOR POINTS:

   - (S) To some extent the lack of air and naval activity is a result of bad weather. A further factor with regard to air assets is the emphasis on air defense which has restricted air operations. An attempt to limit possible losses is probably also a factor.
Immediate Delivery Required

Action:

CIC: CODEWORD OFFICER III
JC: CODEWORD OFFICER II
JCS: CODEWORD OFFICER II
DIA JCS: CODEWORD OFFICER III
EUCOM: T-341
CENTCOM: J-341
AFCENT: CODEWORD OFFICER III
JOINT STAFF: WDC DEF/OP-1

USCINCUC:

SUS: PRAIRIE FIRE ALERT ORDER -- SECOND REVISION V0
REF: A. JCS 15020/2, MAP 88 REVISED PRAIRIE FIRE ALERT ORDER
B. JCS 15020/3, MAP 88 KAD III EXECUTE ORDER
C. USCINCUC 260005, MAP 88 ACE III SITE REP 09-30 V0

1. Situation: Termination of current document III operations in the Gulf of Sidra allows U.S. forces to alter response time for operation PRAIRIE FIRE.

a. Mission: No change from Ref A.

b. Execution: No change from Ref A except as noted below.

1. Military targets list in priority order.

a. No change from Ref A.

b. No economic targets in priority order.

a. No change from Ref A.

b. No Japanese COMBAT FORCES.

c. No change from Ref A except delete USS SARATOGA CV65.

d. Concept: Planning for operation PRAIRIE FIRE RETAILER STRIKE AGAINST Libyan mainland targets previously identified should continue within the following parameters until 10 April 1986:

1. Not infusing CV65 TACAIR. Notification plus 48 hours plus time required to conduct strike(s) with TOT optimization.

2. Not infusing US-BASED F-111S. Notification plus 48 hours plus time required to conduct strike(s) with TOT optimization.

3. Post-strike SP-71 mission: Be prepared to conduct SP-71 post-strike reconnaissance at first light following PRAIRIE FIRE strike. Launch and recovery bases for SP-71 to be determined by coordination between USCINCUC and SAC.

4. Operational constraints: No change from Ref A.

b. USCINCUC: No change from Ref A.

C. USCINCUC: Continue planning for augmentation of USCINCUC with CV65.

D. CINCUS: Provide airlift support as requested by supported forces and supporting commanders.

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DECL: GASP B
SUBJECT: PRAIRIE FIRE Update

REMARKS

1. (TS) Attached Talking Paper for Deputy Secretary of Defense addresses current status of Operation PRAIRIE FIRE.

2. (U) Recommend approval and signature on attached Talking Paper.

Classified by Director, J-3
Declassify on OADR
(U) Talking Paper for the Deputy Secretary of Defense for information

I. SUBJECT: Operation PRAIRIE FIRE Update

II. KEY POINTS:

- Operation PRAIRIE FIRE (retaliatory strikes on Libyan mainland targets) strike force consists of:
  
  - 2 CVBGs, USS CORAL SEA and USS AMERICA.
  
  - UK-based F-111s.

- 2 CVBGs, USS AMERICA and USS CORAL SEA, as well as UK-based F-111s, are prepared to execute Operation PRAIRIE FIRE within 48 hours of receipt of execute order.

  - F-111 option continues to require diplomatic clearance.

  - USS CORAL SEA outchops 10 April en route CONUS.

- After 10 April only the USS AMERICA will remain in the Mediterranean.

- It is anticipated that after 10 April 86 the response time to execute Operation PRAIRIE FIRE may be extended to 96 hours from receipt of execution order.
III. SUMMARY: US forces are positioned to respond to any Libyan act of aggression. Barring any Libyan acts of aggression CVBG schedules will be carried out, reducing the number of CVBGs in the Mediterranean to one (USS AMERICA) by 10 April. The USS AMERICA possesses the capability to execute Operation PRAIRIE FIRE. In addition, UK-based F-111s may be utilized if appropriate.
DECISION BRIEF: ATTAIN DOCUMENT III

FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION

CHALLENGE

SOUTH

OF

32-30N
ATTAIN DOCUMENT III BRIEFING

OUTLINE

- ATTAIN DOCUMENT I/II OPERATIONS
- USCINCEUR CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS—-ATTAIN DOCUMENT III
- ISSUES
- EXECUTE DECISION
ATTAIN DOCUMENT III
CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN OPERATIONS

ATTAIN DOCUMENT I -- 24 TO 31 JANUARY 1986
ATTAIN DOCUMENT II ALFA -- 12 TO 15 FEBRUARY 1986
MARCH OPERATIONS

MARCH 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
CORAL SEA INPORT NAPLES INPORT MALAGA INP PALMA A/D III
SARATOGA A/D III
LONG RANGE RANDOM AIR
SURF/HELO
SURF SAG WITH HELO
VP/VQ IN FIR
AMERICA INCHOP 19 MARCH A/D III
ATTAIN DOCUMENT III

MISSION: CONTINUE TO DEMONSTRATE U.S. RESOLVE AND CAPABILITY AGAINST LIBYA.

CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS AND AIRSPACE INCLUDING FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION OPERATIONS IN THE GULF OF SIDRA SOUTH OF 32-30N.

BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT ATTACKS ON LIBYAN MAINLAND TARGETS IN RESPONSE TO ANY LIBYAN AGGRESSIONS AGAINST U.S. FORCES (OPERATION PRAIRIE FIRE.)
ATTAIN DOCUMENT III

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

19 MAR  -  FILE NOI NLT 19 MARCH (DURATION AT USCINCEUR DISCRETION)

21/22 MAR  -  CVBG WORKUPS/TRANSITION FROM WMED TO CMED

23 MAR
ATTAIN DOCUMENT III
PROJECTED CVB6 COMPOSITION

USS AMERICA
USS TICONDEROGA (CG-47 AEGIS)
USS DALE (CG-19)
USS FARRAGUT (DDG-37)
USS KING (DDG-41)
USS HALYBURTON (FFG-40)
USS ALYWIN (FF-1081)
USS PHARRIS (FF-1094)
USS VREELAND (FF-1068)

USS CORAL SEA
USS YORKTOWN (CG-48 AEGIS)
USS RICHMOND K TURNER (CG-20)
USS SCOTT (DDG-995)
USS CARON (DD-970)
USS DE WERT (FFG-45)
USS DONALD B BEARY (FF-1085)
USS PAUL (FF-1080)
USS AINSWORTH (FF-1090)
USS GARCIA (FF-1040)

USS SARATOGA
USS BIDDLE (CG-34)
USS JACK WILLIAMS (FFG-24)
USS CAPODANNO (FF-1093)
USS JESSE L BROWN (FF-1089)
ATTAIN DOCUMENT III
PROJECTED AIRWING COMPOSITION

USS AMERICA
(CVW-1)

USS CORAL SEA
(CVW-13)

USS SARATOGA
(CVW-17)
ATTAIN DOCUMENT III

TASK ORGANIZATION
ATTAIN DOCUMENT III

TASK ORGANIZATION (CONTINUED)

ANTI-AIR WARFARE

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
CONCEPT OF OPS CON'T

CV FLT SCHEDULES

- NORTH OF 32-30N
  -- SARATOGA 2245-1100
  -- AMERICA 1100-2315
  -- CORAL SEA 0415-1745

- SOUTH OF 32-30N
  -- SARATOGA 1915-1100
  -- AMERICA 1100-0245
  -- CORAL SEA 0245-1915
CONCEPT OF OPS (CONT'D)

- 16 CAP STATIONS

  -- OPS NORTH OF 32-30N

  --- MIN 6 A/C FOR DAY AND 4 A/C NIGHT
  --- 2 E-2C DAY/1 E-2C NIGHT (1 ON 30 MIN ALERT)

  -- OPS SOUTH OF 32-30N

  --- MIN 12 A/C DAY OR NIGHT
  --- MIN 2 E-2C (1 ON 30 MIN ALERT)
ATTAIN DOCUMENT III

ISSUES: DURATION OF FON OPERATIONS

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
ATTAIN DOCKET III

ISSUE I

DURATION OF FON OPERATIONS

- ALERT/EXECUTE ATTAIN DOCUMENT II ALFA ORDERS-
  "BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT ATTAIN DOCUMENT III FON OPS 23-29 MARCH 86."

- INFORMAL LIAISON WITH EUCOM "FOUR DAYS OF OPERATIONS APPROPRIATE."

- RECOMMENDATION: APPROVE FON OPERATIONS FOR THE PERIOD 230001Z TO 261800Z MARCH 1986.
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

SUPPLEMENTAL MEASURES
ATTAIN DOCUMENT III
GAME PLAN

- JCS APPROVE DURATION OF OPERATIONS (FOUR DAYS).

- JCS APPROVE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (AS DISCUSSED).

- BRIEF/OBTAIN NSC AND NCA APPROVAL FOR EXECUTION (NLT 14 MAR).

- CONDUCT CONGRESSIONAL WAR POWERS ACT CONSULTATIONS (17-21 MAR.).

- TRANSMIT ATTAIN DOCUMENT III EXECUTE ORDER (UPON NCA APPROVAL).
ATTAIN DOCUMENT III
GAME PLAN-TIME LINE

MARCH 1986:

11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN ROGERS, USCINCEUR; GEN LAWSON, DCSINCEUR; GEN WELCH; CINCSAC; LTG ODOM, DIRNSA; AND RADM BROOKS, DEPDIR DIA
FOR JCS SUPPORT FROM ADM CROWE, CJCS

UBJ: EXECUTE ORDER--OPERATION ELDORADO CANYON

REFS: A. JCS 232010Z MAR 86 (REVISED ALERT ORDER)
    B. JCS 262345Z MAR 86 (P.F. ALERT ORDER--SECOND REVISION)
    C. USCINCEUR 221800Z MAR 86 (REVISED OPORD)
    D. HQ USAFE 233445Z MAR 86 (REVISED OPORD)
    E. HQ USEUCOM ED 55-47 (PEACETIME ROE), 1 SEP 83
    F. JCS 083224Z APR 86 (REVISED ELDORADO CANYON ALERT ORDER)
2. [Redacted] This is an Executive Order by authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense.

3. [Redacted] Situation. On 5 April 1986 terrorists supported by the government of Libya detonated a bomb in a Berlin night club causing the death of 1 American soldier and injuries to several others. The United States government has proof that this incident was directed by Libya's Qadhafi. In addition, evidence is mounting that the government of Libya is attempting to develop a global terrorism campaign against Americans and US interests. The Department of Defense has been directed to execute retaliatory operations as a result of these developments.
5. [U] EXECUTION.

A. [U] COURSE OF ACTION:

9. [FS] ADDITIONAL TARGETING INSTRUCTIONS:
D. FORCES AVAILABLE:

(1) USS AMERICA CVBG.

(2) USS CORAL SEA CVBG.

(3) UK-BASED F-111'S.

(4) APPROPRIATE SUPPORT ELEMENTS.

E. CINCSAC: PROVIDE AIR REFueling AND RECONNAISSANCE
SUPPORT AS REQUESTED BY SUPPORTED OR SUPPORTING COMMANDERS.

F. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS:

(2) DESIRED TOT WINDOW: HOURS OF DARKNESS NOT EARLIER THAN 1200 00 35 APRIL 85 (LIBYAN TIME) AND NOT LATER THAN 1505478 APRIL 86 (LIBYAN TIME). USCINCEUR IS AUTHORIZED TO REQUEST DELAY IN TOT SHOULD MILITARY EXIGENCIES DICTATE.

(3) DURATION OF OPERATIONS: DURATION OF STRIKE OPERATION: 24 HOURS. DURATION OF FOLLOW-ON OPERATIONS: TO BE DETERMINED.
(II) MINIMIZE COLLATERAL DAMAGE. MAKE EVERY REASONABLE
ATTEMPT TO LIMIT DAMAGE TO OTHER THAN DESIGNATED MILITARY
TARGETS.

(5) TELEPHONIC COMMUNICATIONS REFERENCE THIS OPERATION
WILL BE KEPT TO AN ABSOLUTE MINIMUM UNTIL STRIKE EXECUTION.
Dirlauth Alcon. Keep JCS informed.

5. Administration and Logistics.

A. Airlift Priority: 181.

B. Funding: Funding will not be provided by JCS. Parent services of executing forces will fund operations. Commanders and agencies should capture expenditures by category.

C. Reporting Instructions:

1. USCINCEUR will provide JCS with actual TOT no later than H minus 12 hours via secure telecom referencing Para 5A of this message. This suspense cannot be slipped as information must be provided to the NCA, and will be used to make necessary notifications.

2. Commanders are authorized to use OPREP 1 reporting.

3. Supported commander should anticipate continuing twice-daily SITREP reporting commencing with first TOT. SITREPs should arrive at JCS no later than 0900Z and 2100Z.

4. Preliminary strike results will be submitted to JCS as soon as possible after aircraft recovery.
(5) Detailed strike results will be submitted to JCS no later that TOT plus 24 hours.
(6) Other operational reporting requirements will be forwarded as developed.

(7) Detailed after action reports should be submitted as follows: first impressions, 48 hours after completion of operation; chronology of actions, 96 hours after completion; and lessons learned, 7 working days after completion.

D. OPSEC and deception guidance: surprise is essential for minimizing US losses. Indicators which will convey US intentions will be monitored and should be closely controlled.

E. Classification guidance and special handling. Release of information relating to Operation Eldorado Canyon is not authorized without JCS approval.

7. Public Affairs Guidance. Public release of information about these operations is not authorized. Anticipate any announcement of Eldorado Canyon operations will be made by the NCA after operations commence. Information not specifically released will remain classified. Public and media queries should be taken
AND REFERRED TO OASD(PA) (AUTOVON 227-5131) OR TO DJSPA THROUGH THE NMCC. USCINCEUR SHOULD SUBMIT PROPOSED PA GUIDANCE FOR THIS OPERATION.

8. (U) COMMAND AND CONTROL. USCINCEUR IS THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER. CINCSAC IS THE SUPPORTING COMMANDER. NSA AND DIA ARE SUPPORTING AGENCIES.

DECL OADR
SUBJ:  JCSSTREP 001--OPERATION ELDORADO CANYON (EU)
1. (U) MAJOR POINTS.  THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS BEEN PROVIDED
BY USEUCOM CONCERNING ELDORADO CANYON ACTIVITY AS OF 150000 EST.

A. (U) AIR:
1. (U) THE USAF F-111'S AND EF-111'S SORTED FROM RAF LAKEHEATH
AND RAF UPPER HEYFORD; THE NECESSARY EC-130's TANKER
SUPPORT SORTED FROM RAF WILDSHELF AND RAF FAIRFORD IN GREAT
BRITAIN.  LAUNCHES STARTED AT 141256 EST.  THE USAF STRIKE
AIRCRAFT AND THE NAVY SUPPORT LAUNCHED FROM USS CORAL SEA
AND USS AMERICA AT APPROXIMATELY 141745 EST.  THE TIMES ON
TARGETS (TOT) BEGAN AT 141900 EST.  AND IS SHOWN BELOW FOR
EACH TARGET.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(TOT TIME)</th>
<th>(TARGET)</th>
<th>(ACFT)</th>
<th>(ORDNANCE)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>141906 TO 141911</td>
<td>TIRPOIL MILITARY</td>
<td>F-111</td>
<td>BU-59 EACH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141911</td>
<td>AIR FIELD</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

REMARKS:  ONE (1) AIRCRAFT ABORTED PRIOR TO TOT.  FIVE (5)
AIRCRAFT ACROSS TARGET.

B. (U) WEATHER FORECAST:  SOUTH-CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN
(1) 15/1000Z APR 85:  PARTLY TO MOSTLY CLOUDY SKIES COVER THE
AREA WEST OF TIRPOIL WITH MOSTLY CLEAR SKIES OVER THE REST OF
THE AREA.  WINDS VARIABLE AT LESS THAN 10 KTS.  VISIBILITY
GREATER THAN 7 MILES.  SEAS FORECAST 4 TO 7 FT.
(2) 16/0000Z APR 85:  SKIES MOSTLY CLEAR
EC-130'S TANKER SUPPORT LAUNCHED FROM RAF WILDSHELF
AND RAF FAIRFORD IN GREAT
BRITAIN.  LAUNCHES STARTED AT 141256 EST.  THE USAF STRIKE
AIRCRAFT AND THE NAVY SUPPORT LAUNCHED FROM USS CORAL SEA
AND USS AMERICA AT APPROXIMATELY 141745 EST.  THE TIMES ON
TARGETS (TOT) BEGAN AT 141900 EST.  AND IS SHOWN BELOW FOR
EACH TARGET.

C. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS.  MEDIA POOL ENGAGED IN USS AMERICA JIB
ACTIVATED AT NAPLES, ITALY.
JCS
SSO DA
CNO
AFSSO USAF
CMC
CINCPAC
USCINCPAC
SSO REDCOM
USSOUTHCOM
SSO SAC

SY SEC SHAPE

aaaaa
FOR GEN WICKHAM, SSO DA; ADM WATKINS, CNO; GEN GABRIEL, AFSO USAF; GEN KELLEY, CMC; GEN HERRES, CINCAD; ADM BAGGETT, USCLANT; GEN CRIST, SSO CINCENT; GEN LAWSON, DCINCEUR; GEN CASSIDDY, CINMAC; ADM HAYES, USCPAC; GEN MAHAFEEY, SSO REDCOM; GEN GALVIN, USSOUTHCOM; GEN WELCH, SSO SAC; GEN ROGERS (USCINCEUR), SY SEC SHAPE FROM ADM CROWE, CJCS

SUBJ: RETALIATION AGAINST LIBYA

2. EDS ON 5 APRIL 1986 TERRORISTS SUPPORTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF LIBYA DETONATED A BOMB IN A BERLIN NIGHTCLUB CAUSING THE DEATH OF ONE AMERICAN SOLDIER AND SERIOUS INJURIES TO NUMEROUS OTHERS. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS PROOF THAT THIS INCIDENT WAS DIRECTED BY LIBYA'S QADHAFI. IN ADDITION, EVIDENCE IS MOUNTING THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF LIBYA IS ATTEMPTING TO DEVELOP A GLOBAL TERRORISM CAMPAIGN AGAINST AMERICANS AND US INTERESTS. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO EXECUTE RETALIATORY OPERATIONS AS A RESULT OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS.
3. Our retaliatory strikes will start at 142400Z Apr 86. We will use both F-111's from the UK and A-6's with appropriate support from Coral Sea and America. The following is a summary of pertinent information on each strike target:
6. Initial planning for this operation (Eldorado Canyon) was limited by the NCA to those CinCs who had an immediate and direct involvement in striking these five targets.

8. I will provide you periodic updates about the operations as information becomes available.
9. (U) WARMEST REGARDS.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY TO ADDRESSEE ONLY.

DECL OADR
Background Paper for the Chairman, JCS for Information

I. SUBJECT: ELDORADO CANYON Summary (U)

II. MAJOR POINTS The following information is the latest summary of events relating to the subject operation against Libya as of 150700 EST.

A. (U) Targets/Aircraft Assigned:

1. Tripoli Military Airfield/6 F-111F.
   - One F-111F aborted prior to TOT.
2. Benina Airfield/9 A-6E.
   - One A-6E aborted prior to TOT.
3. Tarabulus Barracks (Aziziyyah)/9 F-111F.
   - One F-111F aborted prior to TOT.
   - One F-111F lost during the strike.
4. Benghazi Military Barracks (Jamahiriyyah)/6 A-6E.
5. Sidi Bilal Terrorist Training Camp/3 F-111F.

B. (U) US missile expenditures - 36 HARM, 12 SHRIKE.
   - No confirmed results.

C. (U) Libyan reaction—unconfirmed AAA and SAM firings.

D. (U) US losses - one F-111F missing. SAR ongoing with no results.

E. (U) Battle damage assessment (BDA) - Post strike pilot reports all weapons dropped in the Benghazi complex. Several secondary fires - vehicles and aircraft burning at Benina Airfield. No reports on USAF strikes on targets in Tripoli area.

F. (U) Remarks: One F-111F recovered at Rota, SP. 16 F-111F recovered at home station. All Navy aircraft recovered aboard ship. All tankers and support aircraft recovered safely.

Approved by
Prepared by

INTERNAL STAFF PAPER
RELEASE COVERED BY
JCS MOP 39

Classified by Director, J-3
Declassify on OADR
REMARKS

1. *(U)* The attached proposed JCS Chronology SITREP No. 4 satisfies request for periodic updates.

2. *(U)* Recommend approval and signature on attached Background Paper.

Attachment (3 pages)

a/s

Classified by Director, J-3
Declassify on OADR
I. (U) SUBJECT. ELDORADO CANYON Chronology; SITREP NO. 4

II. (U) MAJOR POINTS. The following information has been provided by USEUCOM concerning ELDORADO CANYON activity as of 150800 EST.

A. (U) Air

(1) The USAF F-111s and EF-111s sortied from RAF Lakenheath and RAF Upper Heyford; the necessary KC-10/KC-135 tanker support sortied from RAF Mildenhall and RAF Fairford in Great Britain starting at 141256 EST. The USN A-6 strike aircraft and the Navy support launched from USS CORAL SEA and USS AMERICA at 141830 EST. The TOT time, centered on 141900 EST, was achieved as shown.

(2) One (1) F-111 is reported missing.

(4) Strike Operations:

<table>
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<th>TOT TIME (EST)</th>
<th>TARGET</th>
<th>A/C</th>
<th>ORDNANCE</th>
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<tr>
<td>141906 to 141911</td>
<td>TRIPOLI MILITARY AIR FIELD</td>
<td>6 F-111</td>
<td>BSU-49 each</td>
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</table>

Remarks:
One (1) aircraft aborted prior to TOT. Five (5) across target.

Damage Assessment: TBD

| 141930  | BENINA AIR FIELD                | 2 A-6  | MK-82 each         |
|         |                                 | 7 A-6E | APAM each          |

Remarks:
Two (2) aircraft aborted prior to TOT. Seven (7) across target.
Damage Assessment: Preliminary
- Runway operational
- Several aircraft damaged
  -- 1 F-27 destroyed
  -- 1 FLOGGER destroyed
  -- 1 probable FLOGGER destroyed
  -- 20 bomb craters on apron

141900
TARABULUS BARRACKS (AZIZIYAH)
9 F-111  GBU-10 each

REMARKS:
Two (2) aircraft aborted prior to TOT. Four (4) across target, 3
effective, 1 dropped long (vicinity French Embassy). One
aircraft lost radar; 1 aircraft unable to ID target; 1 aircraft
was late arrival, missed TOT. Ordnance not expended, jettisoned
over water.

Damage Assessment:
Preliminary
- Heavy roof damage
- 3 craters in the area
- Building across from French Embassy damaged, but no
  observable damage to the French Embassy.

141900
BENGHAZI MILITARY BARRACKS (JAMAHIRIYAH)
6 A-6E  MK-82 each

REMARKS:

Damage Assessment:
Preliminary
- Large storage building destroyed.
- Some FLOGGER shipping crates destroyed.

141905
SIDI BILAL TERRORIST TRAINING CAMP
3 F-111  GBU-10 each

REMARKS:

Damage Assessment:
Preliminary
- 3 buildings damaged at the naval academy.
(5) Libyan Reactions:

- 142235 Unconfirmed report of AAA in central Tripoli area.
- 142238 E-2C reports SAM from Tripoli fired at CAP. Unconfirmed.

(7) Missile expenditures:  

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<th>WEST TGTS</th>
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<tr>
<td>SHRIKE:</td>
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</table>

(8) Recovery:

- One F-111 diverted to Rota, SP due to mechanical problems escorted by a second F-111. The escort rejoined the tanker and returned to home base. The divert aircraft is in hangar awaiting repair.

- 150310 F-111s and tankers on deck in UK.

B. Surface (nothing to report)

APPROVED BY ________________________ VCCAT

Prepared by: J-3 Response Cell, JOD
Ext 52532/Secure 2796
Search and Rescue (SAR) (U)

1. (U) Attached Background paper, subject above, is provided for information.

2. (TS) Paper compares capabilities of Navy SAR helo (SH-3), USAFE SAR Unit (HH-53B), and PAVE LOW II helo (HH-53H).

3. (TS) Paper recommends supporting deployment of 67 ARRS from the United Kingdom if USEUCOM desires. Diplomatic clearance and approval for Italian staging would be required. Sigonella likely staging base.

4. (TS) Paper does not recommend deployment of PAVE LOW.

5. (U) Recommend approval.

Classified by Director, J-3
Declassify on OADR
(U) Background Paper for the Chairman, JCS

I. (U) Subject. Search and Rescue (SAR)

II. (TS) Background. SAR requirements and planning will be refined in detail by EUCOM. The responsibility for SAR at sea and ashore will be shared by USN and USAF assets. MARG assets may be utilized if positioned appropriately.

III. (TOP) Key Points

- USAFE SAR unit – 67 ARRS.
  -- Stationed at RAF Woodbridge, UK.
  -- Five HH-53B (air refuelable and armored).
  -- Five HC-130 (tanker/command and control).
  -- Crews are qualified for night SAR with night vision goggles.

  -- HH-53s routinely deploy from UK to Sigonella and Aviano. Diplomatic clearance and approval would be required.

- HH-53H – PAVE LOW III.
  -- No significant advantage over HH-53B for SAR.

    --- Primary advantage over HH-53B is night navigation systems for deep insertion/exfiltration.

    --- USEUCOM has previously indicated that he did not require the PAVE LOW aircraft for SAR.

  -- Stationed at Hurlburt AFB, FL.

INTERNAL STAFF PAPER
RELEASE COVERED BY
JCS MOP 39
- Navy SAR.

-- Two SH3 from HC9 - primary mission combat SAR.

--- Currently deployed to the Sixth Fleet.

--- Aircraft are armored.

--- Crews are qualified for night SAR with night vision goggles.

--- Not air-refuelable - can be refueled in hover off stern of ship.

-- Other Navy helos have limited overwater SAR capability.

- SAR general.

-- Some USAF SAR pilots are deck qualified for shipboard recovery, if necessary. HH-53B and H do not have folding rotors.

-- Response time can be shortened if SAR aircraft are on airborne alert off shore Libya during TOT (OPSEC is a consideration if this option is exercised). MARG aircraft can be utilized if positioned appropriately.

-- Fighter CAP required.

-- Water pick-up's are preferable if crews can get "feet wet."

-- Overland rescue high risk both day or night.
IV. Bottom Line. Recovery at sea with fighter cap has high probability of success. Overland rescue may not be possible due to the threat. (As an example, SAR from downtown Hanoi was virtually impossible.)

V. Recommendation. Support deployment of 67 ARRS from the United Kingdom to support operation if USCINCEUR desires. Do not recommend deployment of PAVE LOW.

APPROVED BY ___________________________ DIRECTOR, J-3

_______________________________ DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

Prepared by: ___________________________
2. (U) Recommend approval and signature on attached Point Paper.

Attachment
a/s

Classified by Director, J-3
Declassify on OADR
(U) Point Paper for the Assistant to the Chairman, JCS, for information
Attachment
TAB—COD Support to Sixth Fleet
COD SUPPORT TO SIXTH FLEET

COD CAPABILITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Distance (NM)</th>
<th>Weight (LBS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US 3A</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>5,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2,940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-2</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>8,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>6,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Grumman C-3A Carrier On-board Delivery aircraft, developed from the E-2A Hawkeye. The nose-probe is for flight trials only.

Classified by Director, J-3
Declassify on OADR
MAP OF OPERATIONS

C-1 FROM ROTA, SPAIN

CRITICAL LEG PAYLOAD:
8,000 LBS ROTA - SIGONELLA
NO VIND
NO ALTERNATE
2. (U) Information for response to two questions is not available in the Joint Staff (e.g., How was planning conducted with political leadership?). The response area in the attached paper is annotated ***OCJCS/OAsstCJCS to indicate these questions must be answered by the Chairman's staff group or Assistant to CJCS.

4. (U) Recommend DJS approve/sign the attached point paper.

Attachments
a/s

Reference:
*HASC Letter dated 24 April, 1986 (OSD Control # 32135)

Regraded CONFIDENTIAL when attachment is removed.
Point Paper for Information

I. SUBJECT: Responses to Congressional Questions (U)

II. MAJOR POINTS

A. Operational Planning.

Q. Who was responsible for the planning?

(U) JCS and USCINCEUR using the procedures of Crisis Action System (CAS) contained in Volume IV of the Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS).

- When did planning for this or other Libyan contingencies begin? Why?

- What organizations participated in the planning?

- JCS/EUCOM interface?

(U) Excellent at all levels. Included face-to-face liaison at staff and command levels; including discussions between SecDef and VADM Kelso.
- Role of EUCOM components, if any?
  
  (U) As the forces which would execute the strike, they developed the primary, detailed plans.
  
  - How was planning conducted with political leadership?

*** OCJCS/OAsstCJCS

- How was Air Force/Navy coordination effected?

  (U) In addition to the coordination inherent in the unified staff at HQ USEUCOM, liaison officers were exchanged among the planning locations.

Q. What was the primary concept of operations?

  (U) Simultaneous night strike against five NCA-directed targets to ensure the elements of surprise, mass, and saturation of enemy defenses.

  - What were the principal objectives of this operation?

    (U) Response to the American death resulting from the Libyan bombing of a West Berlin disco; demonstration of US resolve and capability against Qadhafi-sponsored terrorism, and weakening of Qadhafi's ability to control worldwide terrorism from Libya.

  - What did the raid seek to accomplish?

  - What was the organizational structure and chain of command?

    (U) Secretary of Defense through the JCS to USCINCEUR to Commander, Central Mediterranean Operations.

  - Concept for C³?

    (U) USCINCEUR designated COMSIXTHFLT as the officer in tactical command (OTC) and Commander, Central Mediterranean Operations (COMCENTMEDOPS), to coordinate detailed joint planning/deconfliction efforts, to integrate other command/agency assets into the tactical operations area, and to conduct operations set forth for this operation. USCINCEUR delineated the area of the CENTMED in which COMCENTMED had this authority.
Q. How were options formulated and analyzed?

(U) Following CAS procedures, the guidance, objectives, and direction given to SecDef/JCS were passed to CINCEUR and his components. From this, US CINCEUR and the executing forces developed feasible military options to support the mission. These plans (options) were reviewed, modified, and revised at successive levels of command through JCS to the Secretary and the President.

- Were off-the-shelf contingency plans used?

(U) Yes, as a point of departure for developing the detailed strike plans against specific targets.

- How many options were examined and by whom?

- Were the options mutually exclusive in scope? (e.g. military vs. economic objectives or did they overlap?)

Q. Who made the choice of the options used and why?

(U) The President approved recommendations of the CINC/JCS/SecDef.

- To what extent did military and civilian leadership interact?

***OCJCS/OAsstCJCS
Q. Intelligence input to decision making.

- Overall quality.

- What did we know about actual terrorist connections for the targets chosen?

- What did we know about Col Qadhafi's whereabouts at the time of the attack?

- What specific sources were used in establishing the target list?

- What did we know about occupancy of the targets?
Q. What were the rules of engagement used?
- Why were they chosen?

- What was the estimate of their effects?

(U) ROE were appropriate.

Q. How was the raid composition chosen?

- Why were F-111s chosen?

(U) Unique capabilities to conduct a long-range, high payload, night, low-level mission delivering precision-guided munitions.
- Who made the choice?
(U) The President approved recommendation of the CINC/JCS/SecDef.
- Was there any attempt to bring the Air Force in even if not operationally warranted?
(U) No
- Why not beef up the carriers with more A-6s?

- Could F-111s have been staged anywhere closer?
(U) Yes, with third country diplomatic clearance. However, this would present another OPSEC problem since a deployment of a force this size would have likely eliminated the element of surprise. This would greatly have increased the risk to striking forces.

- What was the effect of lack of overflight rights on the decision process?

- Was normal unit integrity considered/maintained?
(S) Yes, the crews were all dedicated formed crews.

B. Performance.
Q. In general, did the raid do what it set out to do?
YES
- What were the specific results of the raid, target by target, as compared with the objectives?
- Analyze the reasons for the difference between objectives and results.

Q. How well did specific systems perform?

(U) Specific data has not yet been received, but indications are that systems performed well within expected, acceptable limits.

- Were any extraordinary preparations made for the operation?

(U) No.

- Compare results with specs and normal experience.

(U) Specific data has not yet been received, but indications are that systems performed well within expected, acceptable limits.
Q. Why weren't certain planned targets struck?

Q. Assessment of the efficacy of command arrangements and effectiveness/coordination of the Air Force and Naval forces?

(U) Outstanding/superb. Perhaps the most telling fact is the exact on time TOT by forces based 3000 miles apart. A very complex joint strike plan successfully integrated strike and strike-support (ECM, C3CM, EW, CAP, SAR) air and naval forces.

Q. To what extent did the rules of engagement contribute to the results?

(U) ROE were appropriate and provided the operational latitude to plan and conduct the strike in a tactically sound manner.

- How much flexibility did the crews have during the actual operation?

Q. To what extent did efforts to limit collateral damage affect the outcome?

(U) The direction to limit collateral damage was only prudent due to the proximity of civilian housing and facilities. This resulted, however, in a more-difficult, more-demanding mission for the aircrews.

- What was the effect of limitations on aircraft attacks based on systems operability?
Q. How much unplanned damage actually occurred and why?

(U) For known BDA see Enclosure.

- To what extent did Libyan SAMS or other non-US weapons contribute to the damage in Tripoli?

Libyan SAMS and other non-US weapons caused damage in Tripoli to an unknown extent. Evidence to support this view was provided by Libyan and international media television footage showing SA-2 and SA-3 SAM booster rockets (purportedly pieces of downed US aircraft) being pulled from wrecked buildings. The SA-2 booster rocket, for example, is 8.5 feet long, 3 feet in diameter, and weighs approximately 1060 lbs after fuel expenditure. Despite the self-destruct feature found on Soviet SAMS, it is not impossible that one or more of the SAM warheads may actually have exploded on impact, causing even more destruction in the immediate area. Finally, it is noted that falling shrapnel from conventional AAA weapons, many of which were observed active during the night of the raid, may have caused additional casualties and/or damage since AAA rounds will explode on contact with the ground if not fused.

Q. To what extent did sophisticated electronics (jamming, ELINT, COMINT, etc.) contribute to the outcome?
Were the outputs of various sensors coordinated? To what extent would better coordination have helped the mission?

Q. What was the Libyan response to the raid?

- (U) Benina Airfield had runway lights on and radio navigation aids operating at the time of attack.

- ECM used on F-111s, A-6s, etc?

- SAMS/AAA fired?
Q. What does post attack battle damage assessment reveal?

- SAM sites hit and source of info?

- Actual target damage?

For known BDA, see Enclosure

- Sources of information?

For known BDA, see Enclosure

Q. What deficiencies in intelligence collection and processing show up in the operation?

C. Lessons learned.

Q. If considered a success

- What contributed that should be provided for in the future and why?

(U) The joint system works. The iterative JOPS CAS process allowed everyone involved to understand the objectives and plan accordingly. C3 was clear and understood resulting in a successful execution.

Q. At each level in planning/execution, what did you learn?
Q. What would you do different (in hindsight)?

Q. What should someone else do different (in hindsight)?
OJCS SUMMARY SHEET

TO: J-3

SUBJECT: US Naval Presence in the Mediterranean Sea (U)

REMARKS

1. (U) The attached point paper for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff is provided for information pertaining to the timelines associated moving the ENTERPRISE CVBG from the I.O. to the Mediterranean.

2. (U) Recommend approval of the attached proposed point paper.

Attachment a/s

Classified by Director, J-3
Declassify on OADR

ACTION OFFICER

COORDINATION/APPROVAL

<table>
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<th>EXTENSION</th>
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DATE OF PREPARATION: [Blank]

CLASSIFICATION: [Blank]
(U) Point Paper for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, for information

I. (U) SUBJECT. US Naval Presence in the Mediterranean Sea

II. (S) MAJOR POINTS. The following time lines are associated with moving the USS ENTERPRISE CVBG from the I.O. to the Mediterranean (as of 101200Z APR 86).

A. (S) Current position 21-00N/61-30E-220 Mi.SE of Muscat.

SUEZ DATA (Tab A):
Distance to SUEZ: 2300NM
Time to SUEZ at 25 kts-92 hrs Arrivial time (140800Z)
at 20 kts-115 hrs (150700Z)
at 16 kts-144 hrs (161200Z)

Cumulative time to CENTMED (ALLOWS 8 hrs for Northbound transit) at 25 kts-132 hrs Arrival time (160000Z)
at 20 kts-163 hrs (170700Z)
at 16 kts-202 hrs (182200Z)

B. CAPE OF GOOD HOPE DATA (Tab B):
Distance to Gibraltar: 9800NM Gibraltar to CENTMED:1300NM
Time to GIB at 25 kts-392 hrs Arrival time (262000Z)
at 20 kts-490 hrs (302100Z)
at 16 kts-613 hrs (052000Z MAY)

Cumulative time to CENTMED
at 25 kts-444 hrs Arrival time (282300Z)
at 20 kts-550 hrs (031400Z MAY)
at 16 kts-694 hrs (091100Z MAY)

III. (S) Considerations:

B. If authorization is granted it may be cancelled upon execution of ELDORADO CANYON.

C. CINCPAC requested 2 combatants and a TAO remain in Gulf of Oman if ENTERPRISE directed to the Mediterranean. Recommend USS BAGLEY/USS REASONER (short-legged FFs) remain for Gulf of Oman presence mission.
Attachments:
TAB A--ADPLO Chart for Suez Transit (S)
TAB B--ADPLO Chart for Cape of Good Hope Transit (S)

Reference:
* USCINCPAC 070117Z APR 86
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Observations on Libyan Operations (U)

Classified by CJCS
Declassify on OADR
6. (U) The Joint Staff has begun work to remedy the deficiencies outlined in the first paragraph and is reviewing the other areas mentioned above.

WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR.
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Libyan Strike Options (U)

1. (U) Per verbal instructions of the J-30, attached talking paper for CJCS concerning US CINCEUR capability to conduct strike operations against Libya is forwarded for information.

2. (U) Options considered include using 1 CVBG, 2 CVBGs, and/or UK-based F-111s.

3. (U) Recommend approval and signature of the attached talking paper.

Attachment
a/s

Classified by Director, J-3
Declassify on OADR
Talking Paper for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff for Information

I. SUBJECT: Libyan Strike Options (DES)

A. Target List (in priority):
B. Forces Available:

- USS AMERICA CVBG:

- USS ENTERPRISE CVBG (currently in IO):

- USS CORAL SEA CVBG (currently in Med, scheduled to outchop 10 April):
C. Strike Options:
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JCS MESSAGE CENTER

2:04:32Z JAN 05 ZFFA
FM: JCS WASHINGTON DC//JCS//
TO: USCINCEUR VALHAGEN GE//ECGCE//
INFO USArmy SHAPE BE

SUBJ: OPERATION PRAIRIE FIRE (U)
REF: USCINCEUR 031540Z JAN 05

1. APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS AND CONCERNS CONTAINED IN THE
REFERENCE. WITH RESPECT TO RULES OF ENGAGEMENT THE FOLLOWING HOE,
KEYED TO PARA. 170 OF THE REF. ARE APPROVED FOR PLANNING:

(Confidential redacted)

F. (U) WARMEST REGARDS

DECL GANDY

IMMEDIATE DELIVERY REQUIRED

ACTION J2-JCS CODEWORD OFFICER(15)
INFO DIRECTOR J-3(1) DIRECTOR JOINT STAFF(1)
WCC DEP DIR OP-1(1) JCS CODEWORD OFFICER(2)

MCN=86004/02867 TOR=86004/1744Z TAD=86004/1745Z CDSN=MAK785

PAGE 1 OF 1
IMMEDIATE
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FM JCS WASHINGTON DC//CJCS//
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USCINCUSNAVAFOR EUR ASIAN
USCINCUSNAVAFOR E U.S.
INFO CSA WASHINGTON DC
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CINCUSNA LONDON UK
CINCUSNAVFLUT NORTHERN VA

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USCINCUSNAVAFOR E U.S.
CINCUSNA LONDON UK
CINCUSNAVFLUT NORTHERN VA

SUBJ: EA6B SUPPORT--PRAIRIE FIRE 407
REF: USCINCUSNAVAFOR EUR ASIAN

3. (U) DIRLUTH ALCW. KEEP JCS INFORMED.

DECL UADR BY

****** IMMEDIATE DELIVERY REQUIRED ******
NMCC: DODPASS TO DIRECTOR J3

ACTION TERM SVC(1) J3-JOD CODEWORD OFFICER(15)
INFO DIRECTOR J-3(1) DIRECTOR JOINT STAFF(1)
NMCC DEP DIR OPS(1) CJCS CODEWORD OFFICER(2)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JCS MESSAGE CENTER
+++EXCLUSIVE+++

 Flynn R/EX/JCS/33100 1000525

FLASH
Z 160525Z APR 88 IFF-4
FN JCS WASHINGTON DC/JCS/
TO USDAO LONDON UK

SUBJ: RETALIATION OPERATIONAL AGAINST LIBYA

DEAR JOHN,

1. (U) I REALLY APPRECIATE YOUR EFFORTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS FOR OUR SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS AGAINST LIBYA. THE USAF ASSETS FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM PLAYED A SIGNIFICANT ROLE AND WITHOUT THEM OUR EFFORTS WOULD HAVE BEEN GREATLY DISTILLED. I AM PROVIDING THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION TO KEEP YOU INFORMED OF BOTH THE PLANNING AND THE RESULTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ATTACK AGAINST LIBYA.

2. (U) WARMEST REGARDS, SIGNED BILL (WILLIAM J. CROH, JR., CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF). UNQUOTE.

DELL GOOD BY

---

TNSK. DDF REQUIRED
DELIVER ONE HARD COPY TO GMCC/DOD (1)
JJ ADDED PER GMCC/CIO

ACTION JCS(4) TNC SVC(1)
INFO JCS(3) GMCC/DOD(1)

MCN=86706/01495 TGR=86106/05252 JAP=86106/06052
CDSN=MAJ8632

PAGE 1 OF 1
160525Z APR 88
ELDORADO CANYON Quick Look

REMARKS

1. The attached proposed Background Paper provides a quick look for the Chairman.
2. Recommend approval and signature on attached Background Paper.

Attachment
a/s

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED Upon
Removal of Attachment
(U) Background Paper for the Chairman, JCS

I. (U) SUBJECT. ELDORADO CANYON Quick Look

II. (U) MAJOR POINTS. The following information has been provided by USEUCOM concerning ELDORADO CANYON activity as of 151030 EST.

A. [ST] Air

TARGET: TRIPOLI MILITARY AIRFIELD

TOT TIME: 141906 to 141911 (EST)

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT:
- Pilots' report.
  -- All bombs on target.
  -- At least 6 probable IL-76 aircraft destroyed
  -- Facility damage to be determined.

STRIKE INFORMATION:
- SIX F-111s with [BSU-49 each departed RAF Lakenheath at 141236 EST.
- Five (5) across target.

ABORTS: One (1) aircraft aborted prior to TOT due to loss of terrain following radar.

TARGET: BENINA AIR FIELD

TOT TIME: 141900

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT:
Preliminary
- Several aircraft damaged
  -- 1 F-27 destroyed
  -- 1 FLOGGER destroyed
  -- 1 probable FLOGGER destroyed
  -- 20 bomb craters on apron

STRIKE INFORMATION:
- Eight A-6Es departed from CORAL SEA at 141750 EST.
- Six (6) on target.
- Five aircraft with [CBUs and one with [MK-82s.

ABORTS: Two aircraft abort, cause unknown.

INTERNAL STAFF PAPER
RELEASE COVERED BY
JCS MOP 39

Classified by Director, J-3
Declasssify on OADR
TARGET: AZIZIYAH BARRACKS TRIPOLI
TOT TIME: 141900

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT:
Preliminary
- Heavy roof and front of building damage
- 6 (at least) craters in the area
- Building across from French Embassy damaged, but no observable damage to the French Embassy.

STRIKE INFORMATION:
- Nine F-111s with GBU-10s each departed RAF Lakenheath at 141236 EST.
- Five aircraft over target.
- Three aircraft on target/one aircraft dropped long (vicinity French Embassy).
- Missing F-111 from this strike.

ABORTS:
- Four aborts total.
  -- Two aborts due to systems degrade.
  -- One abort before last refueling.
  -- One abort after last refueling.

TARGET: BENGHAZI MILITARY BARRACKS (JAMAHIRIYAH)
TOT TIME: 141900

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT:
Preliminary
- Large storage building destroyed.
- Some FLOGGER shipping crates destroyed.

STRIKE INFORMATION:
- Six A-6Es with MK-82s each launched from USS AMERICA at 141745 EST.
- All aircraft on target.

ABORTS: None.
TARGET: SIDI BILAL TERRORIST TRAINING CAMP

TOT TIME: 141905

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT
Preliminary
- 3 buildings damaged at Sidi Bilal (naval academy).

STRIKE INFORMATION:
- Three F-111s with GBU-10s each departed RAF Lakenheath at 141236 EST.
- All aircraft on target.

ABORTS: None.

B. [8] Total USAF a/c from UK: 24 F-111s, 5 EF-111s, 19 tankers.

C. [8] HARM/SHRIKE Employment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BENINA TGTS</th>
<th>TRIPOLI TGTS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<td>HARM:</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHRIKE:</td>
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D. [8] Recovery:
- One F-111 diverted to Rota, SP due to mechanical problems escorted by a second F-111. The escort rejoined the tanker and returned to home base. The divert aircraft is in hangar awaiting repair.
- 150310 F-111s/EF-111s and tankers on deck in UK.

E. [8] Search and Rescue (SAR)

F. [8] Reconnaissance:

APPROVED BY _______________________________ DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS

Prepared by: J-3 Response Cell, JOD
Ext 52532/Secure 2796
REMARKS

1. (U) The attached proposed JCS Chronology SITREP No. 5 satisfies request for periodic updates.

2. (U) Recommend approval and signature on attached Background Paper.

Attachment

a/s

Classified by Director, J-3
Declassify on OADR
(U) Background Paper for the Director for Operations

I. (U) SUBJECT. ELDORADO'CANYON Chronology: SITREP NO. 5

II. (U) MAJOR POINTS. The following information has been provided by USEUCOM concerning ELDORADO CANYON activity as of 151600 EST.

A. (S) Air

TARGET: TRIPOLI MILITARY AIRFIELD

TOT TIME: 141906 to 141911 EST

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT:
- Pilots' report.
  -- All bombs on target.
  -- At least 3 to 5 probable IL-76 aircraft destroyed
  -- Facility damage to be determined.

STRIKE INFORMATION:
- Six F-111s with BSU-49 each departed RAF Lakenheath at 141236 EST.
- Five (5) across target.

ABORTS: One (1) aircraft aborted prior to TOT due to loss of terrain following radar.

TARGET: BENINA AIR FIELD

TOT TIME: 141900 EST

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT:

- Several aircraft damaged
  -- 1 F-27 destroyed
  -- 1 FLOGGER destroyed
  -- 5 probable FLOGGERS destroyed
  -- 20 bomb craters on apron
  -- 2 MI-14 helos destroyed
  -- 1 MI-14 helo possibly destroyed
  -- Numerous buildings with small holes in sides and roof
  -- 12 "burn marks" may indicate that 12 additional FLOGGERS were destroyed and have been removed by 2 pieces of heavy lift equipment.

STRIKE INFORMATION:
- Eight A-6Es departed from CORAL SEA at 141750 EST.
- Six (6) on target.
- Five aircraft with CBU53s and one with MK-82s.

ABORTS: Two aircraft abort, cause unknown.

INTERNAL STAFF PAPER
RELEASE COVERED BY JCS MOP 39

Classified by Director, J-3
Declasify on OADR
TARGET: AZIZIYAH BARRACKS TRIPOLI

TOT TIME: 141900 EST

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT:
- Heavy roof and front of building damage
- Qadhafi's tent collapsed
- 6 (at least) craters in the area
- Building across from French Embassy damaged, but no observable damage to the French Embassy.
- Battalion headquarters damaged.

STRIKE INFORMATION:
- Nine F-111s with GBU-10s each departed RAF Lakenheath at 141236 EST.
- Five aircraft over target.
- Three aircraft on target.
  -- One aircraft dropped long.
  -- Missing F-111 from this strike.

ABORTS:
- Four aborts total.
  -- Two aborts due to systems degrade.
  -- One abort before last refueling.
  -- One abort after last refueling.

TARGET: BENGAZI MILITARY BARRACKS (JAMAHIRIYAH)

TOT TIME: 141900 EST

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT:
- Large storage building destroyed.
- Some FLOGGER shipping crates destroyed.

STRIKE INFORMATION:
- Six A-6Es with MK-82s each launched from USS AMERICA at 141745 EST.
- All aircraft on target.

ABORTS: None.
TARGET: SIDI BILAL TERRORIST TRAINING CAMP

TOT TIME: 141905 EST

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT
Preliminary
- 3 buildings damaged at Sidi Bilal (naval academy).

STRIKE INFORMATION:
- Three F-111s with GBU-10s each departed RAF Lakenheath at 141236 EST.
- All aircraft on target.

ABORTS: None.

B. (8) Total USAF a/c from UK: 24 F-111s, 5 EF-111s, 19 tankers.

C. (8) HARM/SHRIKE Employment

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D. (9) Recovery:
- One F-111 diverted to Rota, SP due to mechanical problems escorted by a second F-111. The escort rejoined the tanker and returned to home base. The divert aircraft is in hangar awaiting repair.
- 150310 F-111s/EF-111s and tankers on deck in UK.

E. (8) Search and Rescue (SAR)

- SAR terminated after sunset 15 April.
G. Surface

- 151300 EST Sixth Fleet positioning forces to protect Lampedusa Island south of Sicily and conduct evacuation of 30 USCG personnel if required in response to two rockets impacting in the water vicinity of the US Coast Guard station reported at 151034 EST.

APPROVED BY ____________________________ VCCAT

Prepared by: J-3 Response Cell, JOD
Ext 52532/Secure 2796
FLASH
7 080224Z APR 86
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC/CJCS/
TO USINCIRU YAININGEN GE
DIVNSA FT GEORGE G RODE ND
INFO CSA WASHINGTON DC
CJA WASHINGTON DC
JCS WASHINGTON DC
DURER SHAPE BE
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE

SUBJ: REvised TERRORIST COUNTRY ALERT ORDER APR

REF: A JCS 220202Z MAR 86
B JCS 202345Z MAR 86

ACTION J-33 CODEWORD OFFICER(1)
DIA 333 CODEWORD OFFICER(2)
INFO DIRECTOR J-3(1) J-3 JCS CODEWORD OFFICER(1)
DIRECTOR JOINT STAFF(1) HHC DEP DIA OPS(1)
CINCUSAFE CODEWORD OFFICER(1) BJORIC TEAM CHIEF(1)

DECL DUR BT

--------IMMEDIATE DELIVERY REQUIRED--------

7. MUST BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT TACTICAL AIR RETALIATORY STRIKES
AGAINST THE ABOVE TARGETS IN ADDITION TO THOSE LISTED IN REFS A AND
B NO LATER THAN 48 HOURS (PLUS TIME REQUIRED TO CONDUCT STRIKES WITH
TGT OPTIMIZATION) AFTER RECEIPT OF EXECUTION ORDER.

5. (a) FORCES AVAILABLE:
   A. USG AMERICA CVW 6
   B. USG CORA, SCA CVW
   C. AIR BASED F-111'S
   D. APPROPRIATE SUPPORT ELEMENTS

6. (a) PREPARE DETAILED OPORDER INCLUDING NUMBER OF STRIKE
    AIRCRAFT, ORDNANCE REQUIRED, AND RECOMMENDED TOT FOR EACH NEW
    TARGET, AND ANY OTHER ITEMS FOR JCS/SECRET CONSIDERATION NO LATER
    THAN 1001020Z APR 86

7. (a) WARMEST REGARDS
Introduction

Good morning. I am and this is We were both deeply involved in planning, execution and follow up to the US strikes against Libya on 15 April 1986 - Operation ELDORADO CANYON.

Purpose

This briefing responds to the request on 24 April by the Chairman and the ranking Minority member of the House Armed Services Committee for a report (by 15 May) on the preparations for and conduct of the operation. Both Adm Crowe and Secretary Weinberger have reviewed and approved this briefing. You are reminded that it is TOP SECRET.

Overview

This briefing covers Operation ELDORADO CANYON including background, concept, execution and results.

Background

By way of background I will quickly review events and planning which preceded the 5 April bombing attack at the Labelle Disco in Berlin which resulted in two dead including SGT Ford and 230 injured including 64
Americans. Planning for Libyan contingencies began in 1980. JCS and USCINCEUR were the principal responsible organizations. As a result of a clear Libyan threat to US forces, USCINCEUR was first directed to plan for the protection of US forces from Libyan attack and retaliatory strikes against Libya in August of 1980. This tasking was later recodified in tasking documents in 1983. The specific targeting and force packaging which resulted in the April 15 strikes began on December 28, 1985 following early indications that Libya was behind the terrorist attacks at Rome and Vienna airports. As a consequence, by 5 April numerous contingency plans were on the shelf and they served as a point of departure for developing the detailed strike plans against specific targets.

From January to March, while contingency planning was underway, we conducted a series of operations inside the Tripoli FIR. Then from 23 to 27 March we conducted Freedom of Navigation operations below the 32030' "Line of Death". Libyan hostile reaction to these operations resulted in the sinking of two Libyan patrol craft and attacks on SAM sites at Sirte. The FIR and NCOM OPS also enabled us to exercise our Command and Control systems and liaison so that by 14 April we were confident that we could handle the very demanding joint operation which followed. Throughout this period the JCS/EUCOM interface was excellent at all levels. This
included face-to-face liaison at staff and command levels, including discussions between SecDef and Adm Crowe with VADM Kelso, COMSIXTHFLT; Adm Moreau, CINCUSNAVEUR; Gen Lawson, DCINCEUR; and Gen Rogers, CINCEUR.

I will return to detailed planning in a few minutes.
We knew the following about each of the targets.
Decision to Strike

Following the La Belle Disco bombing and the clear evidence that Libya directed it, the President directed an attack against Libya's terrorist infrastructure. It was intended primarily to preempt or disrupt further Libyan operations abroad. Additionally, it would signal to Libya that state-sponsored terrorism carries a high cost, would weaken Libyan conventional power projection, and encourage those opposed to the policies of the Qaddafi regime. This guidance, the objectives, and direction given to SecDef/JCS were passed to CJCEUR and his components. From this, USCINCEUR and the executing forces developed feasible military options to support the mission. These plans (options) were reviewed, modified, and revised at successive levels of command through JCS to the Secretary and the President.
As you can see the interaction between the military and civilian leadership was continuous. At each level great care was taken to provide clear, unambiguous guidance without micro-managing commanders in the field. The chain of command was never bypassed.

Mission
Concept of Operations
Command and Control

The chain of command throughout Operation ELDORADO CANYON was from the Secretary of Defense through the JCS to USCINCEUR to Commander, Central Mediterranean Operations. For streamlined C3, USCINCEUR designated COMSIXTHFLT as the officer in tactical command (OTC) and Commander, Central Mediterranean Operations (CONCENTMEDOPS), to coordinate detailed joint planning/deconfliction efforts, to integrate other command/agency assets...
the tactical operations area, and to conduct this operation. USCINCEUR delineated the area of the CENTMED in which COMCENTMED had this authority. The EUCOM components, as the forces which would execute the strike, developed the primary, detailed plans. Further to enhance Air Force/Navy coordination, liaison officers were exchanged among the planning locations in addition to the coordination inherent in the unified staff at HQ USEUCOM.

Rules of Engagement

The following special rules of engagement for operation ELDORADO CANYON were approved. These rules are in addition to peacetime rules of engagement and those previously approved for operation ATTAIN DOCUMENT (Gulf of Sidra operations):
- Minimize collateral damage. Make every reasonable attempt to limit damage to other than designated military targets.

- ROE were chosen because through the iterative planning process, USCINCEUR had requested ROE that he considered necessary to conduct the mission. These recommendations were reviewed and modified throughout the planning process and finally approved by the SecDef and the President.

- We believe the ROE were appropriate.
The Libyan response from the Benina Airfield was relatively light. There were surface-to-air missiles fired, but the aircrews on that strike easily avoided the surface-to-air missiles. However, against the Benghaz
Barracks and alternate Headquarters, the anti-aircraft fire and surface-to-
air missile fire was very intense. Against the Sidi Bilal Terrorist
Facility, the Libyan response was fairly light. Against Aziziyah Barracks
and Headquarters, the Libyan response was very heavy. Additionally, flares
were fired into the air; apparently an attempt by the Libyans to illuminate
the sky to aid their anti-aircraft fire. Against the Tripoli Military
Airport, they had light to moderate AAA and surface-to-air missile response.
Of the aircraft that aborted on the western side, there were three aircraft
that aborted prior to the strike against Aziziyah Barracks. One was due to
an engine hot light and that aircraft later landed at Rota and was repaired
and proceeded on back to Great Britain. One had an engine instrument
failure; one had an afterburner failure and was not able to complete the
strike. Additionally, over that target, one had a generator failure.
Against the Tripoli Military Airport, one aircraft aborted with failure of
his terrain-following radar. Against Benina Air Base, one A-6 aborted in
the air. The reason for the two A-6 aborts at Benina is unknown. At Sidi
Bilal and Benghazi Barracks, all aircraft that were scheduled made their
strikes. Additionally, over the Aziziyah Barracks, there was one F-111
that did not return. Whether he dropped his bombs on the target or not is not
clearly known, and he apparently went down off the coast about four miles
north of Tripoli.
Performance

The raid accomplished the overall assigned mission. Target results are based on a comparison of target damage as compared to the instructions given in the EXECUTE ORDER, including the desired targets and the no-strike areas.
The reasons for the difference between objectives and results vary but our review suggests the following factors combined to produce a very demanding, "busy cockpit" mission:

- Sophisticated, integrated, high threat environment.
- Long flights prior to target.
- Heavy AAA and numerous SAM firings.
- Conservative interpretation of national guidance (all weapon systems fully operational) complicated mission tactics beyond the level normally encountered in combat or combat training.

Specific systems performed well within expected acceptable limits. No extraordinary preparations were made for the operation. Contingency plans had been made for additional targets but they were not selected for this mission.

The efficacy of command arrangements and effectiveness/coordination of the Air Force and Naval forces is assessed as superb. Perhaps the most telling fact is the exact on time TOT by forces based 3000 miles apart. A very complex joint strike plan successfully integrated strike and strike-support (ECM, C3CM, EW, CAP, SAR) air and naval forces. ROE were appropriate and provided the operational latitude to plan and conduct the strike in a tactically sound manner.

The aircrews, as the primary strike planners, were given the flexibility to develop attack plans and force packages. Each target area had several desired target elements (aim points). The selection of aim points and
munitions was left to the crews attacking that target area. While the direction to limit collateral damage and minimize the risk to the aircrews may seem to have reduced flexibility on the target run (no alternate targets), it was the complexity of five simultaneous attacks which demanded the carefully orchestrated run-ins and attack axes.

The direction to limit collateral damage resulted in a more-difficult, more-demanding mission for the aircrews. Command elements of the executing forces interpreted the direction to limit collateral damage very conservatively. This led to requirements of redundancy in operating weapon delivery systems not specifically required by ROE or national-level guidance. Specifically, all delivery systems had to be fully operational to attack a target; additionally, there were not alternate targets to attack in case of minor system degrade in only one delivery system. The loss of systems, therefore, simply reduced the number of weapons to be delivered on the targets. There was some unplanned damage. It occurred because, as expected, not every munition dropped by our aircraft hit precisely on the intended target. In short, we missed a few. Additionally, Libyan SAMs and other non-US weapons caused damage in Tripoli to an unknown extent.

Evidence to support this view was provided by Libyan and international media television footage showing SA-2 and SA-3 SAM booster rockets (purportedly pieces of downed US aircraft) being pulled from wrecked buildings. The SA-2 booster rocket, for example, is 8.5 feet long, 3 feet in diameter, and weighs approximately 1050 lbs after fuel expenditure. Despite the self-destruct feature found on Soviet SAMs, it is not impossible that one or more of the SAM warheads may actually have exploded on impact, causing even more
destruction in the immediate area. Finally, it is noted that falling shrapnel from conventional AAA weapons, many of which were observed active during the night of the raid, may have caused additional casualties and/or damage since AAA rounds will explode on contact with the ground if not fused.
The Libyan air defense system was surprised. A great deal of confusion was noted. Benina Airfield had runway lights on and radio navigation aids operating at the time of attack.
The joint planning and operations system worked well. The iterative process allowed everyone involved to understand the objectives and plan accordingly. C3 was clear and understood resulting in a successful execution.

Additionally, we confirmed that our sophisticated equipment works. Without that sophistication this mission was simply undoable. No other nation on earth could have done it.
The mission was accomplished despite the most severe political constraints against very tough targets.

Communications planning was thorough and complete. As a result, communications support was not a limiting factor for the operation.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JCS MESSAGE CENTER

JCS STAFF

SECESTATE WASHINGTON DC
CSA WASHINGTON DC
SADF WASHINGTON DC
CCASD PETERSON AFB CO
USSPACE PETERSON AFB CO

SECECURITY WASHINGTON DC
SCAMSC SCAMPUS AFB IL
USSPACE PETERSON AFB CO

DECCO FORT WORTH TX

DCS WASHINGTON DC

CRNAV WASHINGTON DC

DCI CAYMAN STATION VA

DESTATE WASHINGTON DC

GENERAL D C McGEORGE G MEADE MD

DODIN BRUSSELS BE

STRIKE INFORMATION:
- TWO (8) A-10'S WITH FOUR (4) GBU-10'S EACH DEPARTED RAF LAKENHEATH AT 141236 EST.
- FIVE AIRCRAFT OVER TARGET.
- THREE AIRCRAFT ON TARGET.
- ONE AIRCRAFT DROPPED LONG.
- LANDING F-131 FROM THIS STRIKE.

ABORTS:
- FOUR ABORTS TOTAL.
- TWO ABORTS DUE TO SYSTEMS DEGRADED.
- ONE ABORT BEFORE LAST REFueling.
- ONE ABORT AFTER LAST REFueling.

TARGET: BENGHAZI MILITARY BARRACKS (JAMAHIRIYAH)
TOT TIME: 141900 EST

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT:

STRIKE INFORMATION:
- SIX (6) A-10's WITH FOUR (4) GBU-10's EACH LAUNCHED FROM AMERICA AT 141745 EST.
- ALL AIRCRAFT ON TARGET.

ABORTS:
- NONE.

TARGET: SIDI BILAL TERRORIST TRAINING CAMP
TOT TIME: 141900 EST

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT:
PRELIMINARY

- THREE (3) BUILDINGS DAMAGED AT SIDI BILAL (NAVY ACADEMY)

STRIKE INFORMATION:
- THREE (3) F-111's WITH FOUR (4) GBU-10's EACH DEPARTED RAF LAKENHEATH AT 141236 EST.
- FIVE AIRCRAFT ON TARGET.

ABORTS:
- NONE.

TOTAL USAF A/C FROM US: TWENTY-FOUR (24) F-111's, FIVE (5) EF-111's, NINETEEN (19) TANKERS.

C. ANNEX:
AYT MAINT/REPAIR EMPLOYMENT:
BENGHAZI TOTS TRIPOLI TOTS TOTAL
HAIR:
SHREDE:

D. CRITICAL RECOVERY:
- ONE F-111 DIVERTED TO NOTA, SP DUE TO MECHANICAL PROBLEMS ESCORTED BY A SECOND F-111. THE ESCORT REJOINED THE TANKER AND RETURNED TO HOME BASE. THE DIVERTED AIRCRAFT IS IN HANGAR ANCHORING REPAIR.
- 190310 F-111/3/EF-111/3 AND TANKERS ON DECK IN UK.

H. (U) WEATHER: 18-17 APRIL, PARTLY CLOUDY TO CLEAR OVER BT

TOTAL: COPIES REQUIRED 35
STRIKE INFORMATION:
- Nine (9) F-111's with GBU-10's each departed: Lakeview at 161220 EST.
- Four aircraft over target.
- Three aircraft on target.
- One aircraft dropped long.
- Missing F-111 from this strike.

ABORTS:
- Four aborts total.
- Two aborts due to systems degrade.
- One abort before last refueling.
- One abort after last refueling.

TARGET: BENGAZI MILITARY BARRACKS (JAMABIMBA)
TOD TIME: 154000 EST

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT:

- Three (3) buildings damaged at Sidi Bilal (Mabul a)
- Three (3) F-111's with GBU-10's each departed: Lakeview at 161220 EST.
- All aircraft on target.

ABORTS: None.

LA A MARY TOTAL USAF AVG FROM UK: TWENTY-FOUR (24) F-111's

LA B MARY SHREVE Employment

BEING (24) TROOPED (24) TOTAL

SHRED: [Redacted]

LA D MARY RECOVERY:
- One (1) F-111 diverted to Rota, Sp due to mechanical problem. Escorted by a second F-111. The escort required the and returned to home base. The divert aircraft is in awaiting repair.
- 1600 EST F-111's and tankers on deck in UK.

• (U) WEATHER: 18-17 APR, PARTLY CLOUDY TO CLEAR ON.
IMMEDIATE

O 160000Z APR 86
FH JCS WASHINGTON DC
TX WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
SECRET WASHINGTON DC
CSAF WASHINGTON DC
CMC WASHINGTON DC
USCG WASHINGTON DC
USCG HQ OFFICE VA
USMC HQ MARINE DEPASHINGTON DC
GULF WASHINGTON DC
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JCS MESSAGE CENTER

FINAL SECTION OF 02
NORTHERN LEBANON AND THE GULF OF SIDBA. VISIBLES Restricted TO
1-6 MILES, IN BLOWING SAND AND DUST. WINDS SOUTHEAST 10-20 KNOTS
SOUTHWEST. SEAS 2-5 FEET.

2. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS. NO CHANGE.

DECL 0209 87

ACTION 33(6) SECDEF(8) ATS-202(1)
INFO 16(3) 035(4) 1032(9) 032(2) 028(1) HUSP(11)
SAFE

SPECIAL

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 35
ELDORADO CANYON

MISSION

- CONDUCT RETALIATORY AIR STRIKES AGAINST LIBYA

- AS DIRECTED BY NCA
ELDORADO CANYON

TARGETS

- MILITARY TARGETS
ELDORADO CANYON

PROBABLE TARGETS
ELDORADO CANYON

TIME LINES
(EXECUTE ORDER 082100Z (1600 EST))
ELDORADO CANYON

FORCES AVAILABLE

- UK-BASED F-111s
ELDORADO CANYON

NOTICE OF INTENT

- SHOULD NCA DIRECT EXECUTION OF ELDORADO CANYON, NOTICE OF INTENT (NOI) SHOULD NOT BE FILED.

-- WOULD ALERT LIBYA'S AIR DEFENSES
ELDORADO CANYON
ROE (CONTINUED)
EUCHAR DETAILED STRIKE PLAN

IL-76'S - TRIPOLI INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

NOTE: MINIMUM OF 4 F-111 ACFT OVER TARGET, IF ALL 6 FMC PRIOR TO INGRESS, ALL SIX ACFT WILL STRIKE TARGET
NOTE:  MINIMUM OF 4 F-111 ACFT OVER TARGET, IF ALL 6 FMC PRIOR TO INGRESS, ALL SIX ACFT WILL STRIKE TARGET
EUCom Detailed Strike Plan

SA-5 Complex, Sirte Libya

USAF

USN
EUCOM DETAILED STRIKE PLAN
EUCOM DETAILED STRIKE PLAN

SIDI BILAL TERRORIST TRAINING CAMP

USN

USAF
EUCom Detailed Strike Plan
EU COM Detailed Strike Plan
EUCOM DETAILLED STRIKE PLAN
IMMEDIATE
ZDSX RUEKJCS1223 0991647
091513Z APR 86 ZDS ZFF4 CORRECTED COPY
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC//CJCS//
TO USCINCWNAH FT GEORGE MEADE MD
INFO USCINCWNAH VIAHINEN GE
DIA WASHINGTON DC
DIRNSA NSA FOR GENERAL ROGERS, USCINCWNAH
USMAR SHAPE BE

4. (U) REQUEST ADVISE SOONEST WHEN MISSIONS COULD BE PLANNED FOR
MEDITERRANEAN USERS.
5. (U) WARM REGARDS.

DECL UADR BY

IMMEDIATE DELIVERY REQUIRED

ACTION TERM SVC(1) J3-JOD CODEWORD OFFICER(15)
INFO J3-JRC CODEWORD OFFICER(1) DIRECTOR JOINT STAFF(1)
WMCC DEP DIR OPS(1) CJCS CODEWORD OFFICER(2)
DIA JSJ CODEWORD OFFICER(2)