1. Following the internal political events of 18 March 1970 in Cambodia and the Presidential determination of 22 April 1970 to assist the Government of Cambodia in its struggle to maintain its independence, U. S. assistance consisted with the delivery of individual weapons, ammunition and uniforms. These items were delivered on an irregular and “unscheduled” basis and, to the extent possible at the time, were coordinated by MACV and the U. S. Embassy, Phnom Penh.

2. With the 22 May announcement of a $7.9 million IAP for Cambodia, the Secretary of Defense provided guidelines and constraints as follows:

a. Partial support for force of 55,000 which would not include high cost sophisticated items such as tanks and aircraft.

b. Key the program to the existing Cambodian military structure and equipment.

c. Ground forces should be developed as lightly armed infantry supported by 60mm and 81mm mortars and 105mm howitzers with limited mobility provided by trucks, armored cars and light tanks already in the Cambodian Armed Forces inventory.

d. Only T-25 aircraft to be supported.

e. Limit Naval support to small patrol craft.

f. Provide minor munitions stock levels for U. S. type weapons and T-25 aircraft.

g. Provide air/ground and other communications equipment for current operations.

3. MACV assigned the Support Task (ST) within the MACV J-4 section. The responsibilities of the ST were to organize and manage the out-of-country aspects of the $7.9 million program for military assistance to Cambodia.

4. In mid-June, the office of the Political/Military Counselor was established in the U. S. Embassy, Phnom Penh with the responsibility for in-country management of the Cambodia IAP. During the early days of its existence, the POL/ MIL office relied almost entirely upon the members of the Defense Attaché Office for the conduct of the program.

5. On 30 January the Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia was activated. This team consisted of 60 personnel, 15 of which were stationed in Cambodia, attached to the American Embassy and working under policy guidance provided by the Ambassador. Technical guidance and operational direction was provided by the Chief, MACV located in Vietnam.

6. The 15 personnel authorized to be in-country were generally obtained from MACV assists and on relative short notice were located in-country. Upon arrival
the immediate task was to quickly gain a detailed knowledge of the Armed Forces or organization and capabilities. Based on this initial survey the FY71 MAP (165 million plus $20 million of military related aid) would be shipped into country and distributed. The three priorities were:

a. Train and equip combat forces.

b. Develop and equip a logistics base.

c. Establish a schools system that would sustain both priority 1 and 2.

7. On 26 May 1971 an agreement was reached to increase the in-country team to 75 people. A copy of the resultant reorganization is attached at Tab A.

FORCE STRUCTURE:

1. FANK organizations have been based on French concepts that have proven increasingly cumbersome for the type of war being fought in Cambodia. The basic combat element was the battalion, some of which were separate and others formed into brigades. The basic organizational structure consisted of two broad categories. These forces that were directly under the control of the General Staff for operations throughout Cambodia and are principally used to execute General Lon Nol's offensive strategy for the eventual expulsion of the communists. The second category known as Regional Forces are those forces that belong to the Regional Commander. In many cases they were recruited, trained and partially equipped by the Regional Commander. They are used as he sees fit to clear his region of the enemy, protect routes and bridges, and provide security as necessary for the passage of General Reserve Units throughout his region. On some occasions, General Reserve Units will be assigned to regions for specific operations.

2. With the sudden growth of FANK through recruitment of volunteers the organization became increasingly difficult to control. There was a proliferation of units of strength which were not known to the General Staff and an increasing activity in an area which can be characterized as paramilitary forces. This stemmed from General Lon Nol's reluctance to refuse any offers of help from the populace based probably on a fear of blunting their enthusiasm.

3. From the point of view of the FANK it became increasings difficult to insure that MAP supported units were receiving the equipment destined for them. As the size of FANK grew the demand for arms and ammunition increased and the stream of FANK arms was being dispersed into an ever increasing pool of requirements. Consequently, in April 1971, the Ambassador presented a letter to the President of the Council of Ministers asking: (1) That all recruitment cease, (2) That FANK take an accurate count of personnel within Cambodia the U.S. was prepared to support a total force of 220,000 men by the end of FY71 and, (3) That FANK should develop a force structure reflecting the above strength.

4. The FANK General Staff responded by developing a general reserve of 14 infantry brigades, 2 para brigades, and 1 each armor, artillery, engineer, signal and transportation brigades plus an MR force of 5,500 men. For the basic unit, with battalion, in some regions, being allocated to the RZ Commander as his reserve and in one region a brigade. Overall strength was set for each region within which the RZ Commander had to re-use or increase his present strength.
The general staff was reorganized to add a single Chief of Staff, around force commander, assistants for operations, personnel, logistics, parops, and training and moved the technical service directorates from the national defense staff level to the General Staff level. There were other minor changes in special staffs and the creation of a Military Assistance Directorate at the Ministry of Defense level to work with the U.S. MAC. FAKW is presently in the process of translating and reproducing the actual upon ToEs to be used for the FY72 force structure. Concurrently they are selecting the brigades that will be supported under the FAF. The latter poses political as well as organizational problems because there are some brigades that have many more than the four battalions authorized by the adapted ToEs. Additionally there is the obvious material benefit plan a certain practice in Japan around a "FAK supported unit."

MAP PLAN PREP:

1. Because of the cumulative and recurrin nature of the information required for input to the various tables and sections of the MAP Plan, folders have been prepared for:
   a. Political and Economic analysis.
   c. Internal Security.
   d. Local Defense Indent.

2. The NIEIC (MAC) through access to Area I documents and passageways in related fields, FAKW reports, and "SAI" reports and passageways screen this information to determine its application to the above fields and accumulate the data for periodic up dates and annual plan submissions.

3. It is recommended that Area MAC be tasked early in the planning cycle to prepare those portions of the plan that are not on their expertise.

CIVIL DEFENSE PLANNING IN THE FAF

1. Of the 20 million dollars programmed for this purpose, 11,319,005 dollars remain to be committed. The following areas, by priority, have been identified for funding:
   a. Improvement package for ports of Mien Bech and Kompong Son.
   b. Bridging for priority II-1C.
   c. Reo bases.
   d. Plasticizing material for sandbags.
   e. Bridging to complete country-wide requirements.
   f. MAI.

2. Total estimated costs of the above projects is $15,269,612 for a shortfall of $3,370,777.
3. Additional funding has been requested by 

S. Additional funding has been requested by 

S. Additional funding has been requested by

The training plans are prepared to support the training and equipment of the YAP units. These training plans are designed to provide a quick check on where the program stands at any particular point in time and as a cross check to see that unit activation, training, and equipping follows a logical order.

End Utilization Program

1. End item utilization files have been prepared in conjunction with the plan folder which contains guidance from NEFC(NW) and U.S. Embassy. This guidance is included in the plan prepared by NEFC(NW) and executed according to the SOP prepared by NEFC(ND). The plan folder is locked up with folders on each YAP supported battalion which contain:


b. Biographic data on unit officers.

c. Major items of equipment list.

d. Authorized and assigned strengths.

e. Area of operations.

f. Initial issue list.

g. Copies of inspection check lists.

h. Latest enemy contact/operation.

2. Inspection check lists have been developed and printed to guide those individuals making visits/inspections in obtaining information necessary to meet statutory requirements for end item utilization and properly evaluate the unit's effectiveness.

3. In conjunction with the UAT, schedules are prepared on a monthly basis of units to be visited. These schedules provide a quick reference of units checked, those planned for visits and over the course of time provide a control to see that all units are checked as required by the SOP.

Training

1. The current in-country training capability is extremely limited, particularly the training of leaders. With few exceptions all specialist training must be accomplished out of country, primarily in South Vietnam. Any problems exist ranging from an incompetent Director General of Instruction (DGI) Staff to an extreme reluctance to train in Vietnam. (See Tab E). This fact sheet depicts the type of coordination problems constantly being faced by the NEFC training representatives. Tab C provides a training overview.

2. A concentrated effort has been made to establish the training in-country. The initial estimate was to have the school in operation by the end of CY71; however, the Director has expressed such an interest in the program that
1. **The FAW Logistical System in Tech Service oriental ship in the same way as the U.S. Logistical System was prior to 1962. The Bureau of Logistics which controls the out alms of the system is located at the Ministry of Defense in Phnom Penh. Within this four store building, there are approximately 1,100 people who keep the records and give the orders to the various services. The services are Ordnance, Signal, Munitions, Ammunition, Medical Administration, Petroleum (which is a separate service), and will shortly include transportation. Each of the services have a depot, or similar center, in or near Phnom Penh.**

2. **Administration and stock control for all of the services is being centralized under the CM. All requisitions and work orders are processed in this building. Each unit in FAW has a representative in Phnom Penh to request support and ship material to the unit. There is a national distribution system as we would think of one.**

3. The Ordnance Corps has two depots, an ammunition depot at Kambol, just west of Phnom Penh and a Maintenance and Supply Depot at Loveck. The ammunition depot was started in January of this year and can store approximately 4,000 tons of ammunition. The Loveck depot was built under the old MAP program and is large and modern. At Loveck there are three large buildings, the first is an automobile fourth wheel. This building has machinery for engine and assembly rebuild, hay vehicle rebuild, tire recaulking, forging, machining, heat treating, and other associated tasks. The nearby warehouse has bin storage for 25,000 lines and storage areas for assembling, tools and weapons. However there are no weapons stored there. The ammunition building has a large small arms ship, an artillery shop and a storage area. That is no optics shop at Loveck.

4. Other buildings include a Headquarters, 600 KV generating plant, a school and several smaller warehouses. There is a lot, a hard stand area present, crowded with supply vehicles. About 500 meters from the other buildings there are 20 ammunition storage buildings which are empty.

5. The depot is presently in very limited operation due to a lack of security in the area and the depletion of it's staff to fill the combat units during the early stages of FAW expansion. The area also contains a fuel storage area capable of storing 10,000 gallons. An unused airfield (runway) just northwest of the depot complex along that is 5,000 feet long by 100 feet wide and is constructed of laterite and grime. At PrekSEI (junction of HNR and NI) to Km South of the depot site, 177 lines can be accommodated. The Loveck depot should be able to provide fourth wheel support to all of the ordnance equipment likely to be provided under the current FAW program if it is in full operation.

6. In Phnom Penh, FAW has a direct support automotive shop and an arms repair shop. (See Tab E) The automotive shop was recently started in a former rural police garage as we are ready for the old F.P. and Russian MAP Programs. Many of the personnel are presently undergoing specialists training in Vietnam. As additional tools are provided, and as manuals and repair parts arrive, this shop should attain a reasonably high production rate.

7. The armament repair shop has 15 highly skilled repair men in operation.
This shop is also limited in its lack of manuals, tools, and repair parts.

3. As in Phnom Penh the ordnance corps has three search as with the automotive shop and is used for repair parts storage. It is near the ammunition shop and is used for storage of salvage equipment. The third is in the city downtown. The basketball court there is used for women's paint and issue. This operation will be moved to new uses near the former airfield as soon as better security is provided there.

4. In the military regions the ordnance corps has small detachments at each military region headquarters. These vary in size from 3 in XI to 28 in XI and have little or no contact with Phnom Penh.

10. The quartermaster corps also has a large depot at Longvek. There are four warehouses built under the old and there for their use, each is approximately 2,000 sq ft. There are also two smaller buildings 100 sq ft each which are for a shoe factory and a sewing factory, and there is a headquarters.

11. The shoe factory is in limited operation with about 20 personnel assigned. The sewing factory was moved to Phnom Penh. The rest of the depot is unused except for one warehouse being used as a barracks for the guards and their families.

12. In Phnom Penh, the all coraps operates a facility which consists of a warehouse for temporary storage of uniforms, boots, canned rations, and raw materials, a sewing room with 100 sewing machines for making mosquito netting and a puttering room for making uniform parts to be sewn together at the three civilian uniform factories. All four factories in Phnom Penh are reportedly producing 3,000 pairs of boots per year and 3,000 uniforms per day for the army.

13. The quartermaster in Field is also the Finance Corps.

17. In the 5's, the has little or nothing in the way of representation.

15. The Army Signal Corps has its base depot at an airfield which is approximately 1 1/2 miles of Phnom Penh on 23/4. Any depot consists of a large maintenance building with approximately 150 personnel assigned.

16. While they lack manuals, tools, test equipment, and parts, they seem fairly well trained and are making a valiant effort to keep PAVN's signal equipment in operation. There are also 3 warehouses, one of which is refrigerated for better storage. The signal corps operates a battery factory for taking M-30's at any depot and a small school. This depot recently suffered a rocket attack resulting in the loss of a warehouse.

18. Additionally the signal corps has a small maintenance detachment in each consisting of 7 or 8 men and a small amount of equipment. These detachments are rarely visited and lack tools, parts, and manuals.

19. The Antitank Corps has its depot on 22 Jan at the 5th 1/3 west of Phnom Penh. The depot was badly damaged on 22 Jan in a rocket and sapper attack. This damage has never been repaired. The repair parts warehouse was completely destroyed and much equipment damage occurred.
19. It was the intention of the engineers to build a new depot about 3 km northwest of Phnom Penh rather than try and repair the old complex which was a poor operation anyway. They were in the process of buying some land for this purpose. However, a large building by the railroad for diesel locomotive repair and finished about a year before the March 13 change of government may be made available to the engineers. This building is over 300 meters by 100 meters in size, has 2 overhead travelling cranes of 3 t and a 10 ton capacity and will make an ideal depot. All of the machinery to place this shop in operation is stored in Phnom Penh.

20. The Engineer Corps has 2 Light Battalions in the ME's and is only barely functioning in Phnom Penh. Most of the engineering work in Cambodia is presently being performed by the Bureau of Public Works, which is Cambodia's Civil Engineering Agency. They are functioning and do almost all of the construction presently being performed.

21. The Medical Corps has two hospitals in Phnom Penh. The 701st Evacuation Hospital which is in the center of the city and the 101st Evacuation Hospital which is near the Ministry of Defense. The 701st is going to be closed because the building is being taken over by the Ministry of Education. The 101st will be expanded to 400 bed capacity and will become the main military hospital for Cambodia. Additionally, the Medical Corps has ten warehouses in Phnom Penh. One is for pharmaceuticals and the other for medical equipment.

22. In each military region except ME 2 there is a small hospital. The ME 2 hospital was destroyed some months ago. These hospitals will soon be expanded to 100 beds each under the KAI.

23. The Petroleum service is not presently supported. It has a storage depot just north of Phnom Penh on the Mekong River. The depot was built under the old MAP and is slowly sliding into the river. Two tanks are leaking badly and are unstable. The service has five 1200 gallon tankers and two pumps. It also has a small detachment in each ME which primarily works from drums. These vary from 2 to 7 men.

24. Most PML services for PAM are provided by the three civilian fuel companies, Jeeo, Shell and Tola Khaner. During March, a PML specialist was provided by J4 PAVO to conduct a PML survey within Cambodia. This study was completed and a report furnished PML on 23 April 1971. Action was initiated to provide the recommended training to PML PML personnel. The balance of the recommendations to provide a new PML Farm north of Phnom Penh, obtaining two complete fuel systems supply points plus 20 5,000 gallon and 15 1,200 gallon tankers plus sufficient fire fighting equipment for each SSA and PML depot were forwarded to HOAS rear for future year programming.

25. PANK does not presently have a Transportation Corps. There is one transportation half brigade under the PANK G-4 near Pochechong Airport which has 150 serviceable trucks, 50 of which are M35A2's. This brigade will soon receive 300 U.S. commercial trucks assembled in Australia and 350 U.S. military trucks. To control this five fold increase, PANK plans to create during FY 72 a Transportation Service on a par with the other technical services. There is almost no transportation support in PAK's except that
each M. has a small number of vehicles for local use. NR 2 for instance has 2 Chinese trucks and some requisitioned civilian buses.

2. In order to overcome some of the problems mentioned earlier, KAN plans to adopt a logistical system very similar to that found in AUS's Central Logistical Command.

27. Under the G-4 there are two types of units. The technical services with their depots in or near Phnom Penh with provide wholesale support to the NR's, and the military region logistical commands which provide retail support to the units in that military region. The Military Region Logistics commands are also tech service oriented and provide full logistics capabilities. The NRIC for NR 5 will be formed when tactically possible.

28. Each of these NRIC's will come under the 24 and will have as their mission providing logistical services to the forces in that military region, much in the same way as the area logistics command perform their functions for the NR's in Vietnam.

29. The subordinate detachments of the NRIC's will receive technical support, equipment, personnel, and back-up maintenance services from their parent service.

30. In FY 72 each of these NRIC's will be expanded according to the troop and equipment density in their la. They will also be provided with contact team capability so that they can provide support for combat operations.

31. Probably the main advantage of the new KAN proposal is that there will be a local logistical commander in each NR to control these detachments and see to it that they are properly supported with repair parts, tools, trained personnel, etc. The command and control structure will be greatly simplified from the present KAN system in which each tech service tries to control all its units all over the nation directly.

32. All of the logistical units in the FY 71 force structure have been activated and requests for funding and shipment of supplies have been made. A large number of the personnel to man these units will soon be sent to 373 for training. As these people return from their schooling and as supplies are delivered, the capabilities of the logistics units will improve a great deal. They will still be hampered by a lack of trained management personnel and by new unit 3-4's do not understand requisitioning and work order procedures and it will be some time before the logistical network includes all of the units in KAN. Another of the problems here is the lack of uniformity between the technical services which makes learning the procedures extremely difficult.

33. To summarize the logistical situation, the present system is poor. It will improve greatly in the near future, but it has a long way to go to be able to efficiently perform its mission.

MAP JACKVAN Changing:

1. Up until January of 1971, KAN supplies were coming into Cambodia in a trickle. There was no requirement to store anything. Items were distributed as quickly as they came in. The KAN 3-4 handled the receipt and issue of all stocks.
2. As the MAP began to increase in tempo, and as repair parts and difficult to identify items began to arrive, the situation changed quickly. The G-4 could no longer handle the volume of supplies coming in. The technical services could not respond to requirements placed on them because none of the material that had arrived had gone through them. They did not know what had arrived or where it had gone.

3. The system of keeping all of MAP’s receiving records in a ledger book at the BANK G-4 in French and without stock numbers became unsatisfactory as the volume increased and identification became more and more difficult.

4. As a result of a study requested by MAP, a new office was established at ministerial level. All incoming MAP supplies are physically brought to a complex of warehouses near Pochentong Airfield for identification and breakout except for N and Munitions which are throughout and weapons which still go to the city Sportif until the security at the MAP warehouses is improved.

5. The Foreign Assistance Office, as it is known, also has an office at the Ministry of Defense which has representatives from each technical service and from the Navy, Air Force, and from G-4. These representatives bring requests for supplies from their respective services to this one central point and inform the appropriate services when supplies arrive for distribution to or through their service.

6. Two major files have been started there. One file is a major items file showing the number of items received by type and their distribution. The other file is a unit file showing what end items are authorized to each MAP supported unit and what they have on hand.

7. The MAP has been in existence for about 3 weeks, and while a great deal of headway is being made there, it will be some time before it is fully operational.

5. A logistical survey was requested from GI (MAP). The 5-day survey was completed on 15 June 1971 and was briefed to the Ambassador (Amb), Phnom Penh, Brigadier General Nataxis, and 1-11TF members. The study essentially isolated logistical choke points and recommended additional spaces; non-Cambodian, to be inserted into the system. A breakout of the recommended spaces and their location is attached at Tab F.

APPLICATION

1. BANK is gradually improving its ability to properly account for and inventory ammunition. Weekly ammunition reports now include ammunition stored at sub-depots and at the various military region headquarters. This improved reporting system should reduce the number of emergency resupply air shipments and allow more accurate forecast of requirements which in turn will allow optimum supply of most needed ammunition by barge and LST which is the most economical method of delivery for sustained operations. Future plans by BANK include the use of the port of Kompong Som to receive deep draft ships
directly from CONUS or Okinawa, capable of delivering 4 or 5 months supply of ammunition at a time.

2. An ammunition survey team was requested and is presently in country. The mission of the team is to survey FAM's ammunition Logistic System, pinpoint problem areas, recommend those functional areas that require technical assistance and determine minimum manpower requirements and staffing patterns to upgrade the system. Recommendations should include the types of technical assistance and units or locations to receive this assistance. The intent of the assistance will be to develop the existing FAM ammunition Logistic system to a point where it not only can manage the present programmed input of MAF ammunition but also to assist FAM so that it can expand its operations to determine, forecast, and program ammunition requirements, determine consumption and delivery rates and establish realistic basic load and project stocks. The following areas of interest will be surveyed.

a. Allocation and stock record accounting at all levels.
b. Stock status reporting system.
c. Receipt, storage, and issue procedures.
d. Determination of basic loads for combat, service, and para-military units.
e. Facilities requirements storage and ports.
f. USA and APG requirements.
g. Training requirements.
h. Any other area deemed pertinent to the development of the FAM Ammunition Logistic System.

3. Ammunition expenditure rates were computed on a monthly basis, forwarded to FAM on 27 July and constituted the initial monthly ammunition requisition for August 1970. With necessary adjustments for changes in weapon density and more accurate experience factors, the basic rates for each month's requisition were then regularly computed and forwarded to FAM(SMG). These lists included both FAM and foreign munitions required by FAM. The latest FAM computed basic load attached at Tab 3.

4. Associated with the ammunition expenditure factors development, FAM began in early August to provide the POL/AIL office with a weekly inventory of ammunition by type in the FAM depots. The objective of the ammunition resupply program was to provide munitions for combat, training, and the establishment of a modest war reserve in FAM depots. Because of the lack of combat and FAM's limited but slowly growing capability to receive, inventory, and distribute munitions, the development of a modest war reserve has not yet been very successful.

5. A revetted ammunition storage area is being constructed at the Pochentong Airfield which will provide larger, better protected and less vulnerable storage facilities. When this facility is completed the amounts of air munitions will be gradually increased to take full advantage of these facilities and establish an adequate reserve.
6. PAVN is expanding their major ammunition depot at Potboul south of Phnom Penh to relieve the present congested and vulnerable facilities. Several modules are under construction with plans for an additional 20-25 modules. When completed these facilities will provide protected storage for considerable more ammunition which should be sufficient to establish sufficient reserves to support major operations. The latest fact sheet concerning this ammunition depot is attached at Tab II. The Ministry of Public Works is presently completing construction. Ammunition activities 1 February to 18 June 1971 are attached at Tab I.

NAVY:

The Navy although suffering from an extreme lack of equipment is essentially well organized and well trained. The expansion under the planned FY 72 force structure is not expected to cause any large problems. A description and an assessment of the Navy capabilities is attached at Tab J.

AIRFORCE:

The Airforce is presently being reconstituted however the pace of insertion of aircraft is dependent on providing sufficient security. The Airforce is slowly being converted from a flying club to a viable force. They have completed an air operations center and are providing schedules of sorties to the PAVN. A complete overview of the Air Force is attached at Tab K.
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ADDITIONAL DUTY

FUNCTIONS OF THE DEFENSE (F/D)

1. Establishes a relationship of mutual trust and confidence with the Ministry of Defense and the 3rd Armed Forces.

2. Evaluates requirements and in coordination with the Chief, U.S. Diplomatic Missions, Cambodia makes recommendations concerning the MAP.

3. Directs the activities of the Military Equivalent Delivery Team (MED) within the Republic of Korea.

4. Advises the U.S. Ambassador on all matters pertaining to the Military Assistance Program to Republic of Korea.

5. Advises and assists the Chief, MAC in planning and programming the long and mid-range MAP for the 3rd Armed Forces.

6. Provides liaison with the MAC JCS and selected elements of 3rd Armed Forces.

7. Ensures that timely feeder information is submitted to MAC/TAC rear for preparation of required MAC consolidated reports.

8. Constantly reviews MAP plans and provides that expertise required in the execution of the military assistance effort in Cambodia.

9. Performs other duties as directed.
ADDITIONAL DUTY

ADMIN OFFICER - Branch Immaterial

1. Responsible for the receipt, control, distribution and dispatch of all classified and unclassified correspondence and electrical messages within HECD(24h).

2. Requisitions and maintains the supply of publications and forms necessary to the operation of the HECD(24h).

3. Controls the process, distribution and dispatching of official mail.

4. Advise and assist on matters pertaining to personnel actions and personnel services.

5. Prepares and consolidates feeder reports as required.

6. Initiates personnel actions for in country clearances for TDY personnel.

7. Prepares and recommends revisions on the HECD Joint Table of Distribution as required.

8. Coordinates transportation requirements for the permanent staff and TDY personnel.

9. Monitors the housing and messing facilities and maintains the property account of the furniture in the personnel billet.
FUNCTION OF ADMIN NCO

PRIMARY DUTIES

1. Responsible for receipt, control, distribution, and dispatch of all classified and unclassified correspondence and electrical messages.

2. Requisitions and maintains a supply of publications and manuals necessary for the efficient operation of the NSCC(FB).

3. Reproduces materials as required.

4. Assists on matters pertaining to personnel services.

5. Maintains information records pertaining to the NSCC(FB).

SECONDARY DUTIES

1. Prepares and coordinates in-country clearances for TD personnel.

2. Arranges accommodations and transportation for TDW personnel.

3. Performs other duties as required.
FUNCTIONS OF ADMIN SPECIALIST (YEMEN)

1. Assist the Admin NCO concerning:
   a. Receipt, control, distribution, and dispatch of all classified and unclassified correspondence and electrical messages.
   b. Acquiring and maintaining a supply of publications and manuals necessary for the efficient operation of the LDC(F/LO).
   c. Reproducing materials as required.
   d. Assisting on matters pertaining to personnel services.
   e. Maintaining information records pertaining to the LDC(F/LO).

SECONDARY DUTIES

1. Assists the Admin NCO concerning:
   a. Preparing and coordinating in-country clearances for TDY personnel.
   b. Arranging accommodations and transportation for TDY personnel.

2. Performs other duties as required.


1. Provides typing service for MED.8(P.8)

2. Maintains files and prepares correspondence as directed.
Para 03 Line 01

FUNCTIONS OF CIADF  
AND \HARRIERS DIVISION

1. Serves as JIC (P/0) as additional duty.

2. Provides liaison with Government of Korea Republic (GKR) Joint General Staff (JGS) and selected elements of S.R. Armed Forces (S.R.A.F.)

3. Responsible for:

   a. Preparation of training portion of the KFOR Cambodia.

   b. Coordinating accomplishment of KFOR training in coordination with S.R. and Third Country Forces.

   c. Monitoring all KAP funded training of S.R. Forces in third country and the Continental United States.

   d. Research preparations, implementation, supervision and presentation of the host country army, navy, and air force KAP training progress.

   e. Monitoring negotiations of agreements for third country training and performance files for units and personnel receiving third country training.

   f. and item use of KAP furnished equipment to include periodic maintenance evaluations of KAP equipment assigned to KFOR units.

   g. Assisting in the preparation of tables of organization and equipment and other authorization documents.

   h. responding changes concerning KFOR structure.

   i. Providing a source of expertise of U.S. armies in evaluating the requirements of Cambodian elements.
ACTIONS OF CHIEF OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS OFFICE

1. Prepares training portion of the 1AF Cambodia.

2. Coordinates accomplishment of MA training in coordination with J-2 and third country forces.

3. Monitors all AAF-funded training of OPC forces in third country and the Continental United States.

4. Responsible for research preparation, implementation, supervision, and presentation of the host country army, navy, and air force MA training program.

5. Assists in and monitors negotiations of agreements for third country training and performance files for units and personnel receiving third country training.

6. Coordinates travel arrangements for units and individuals.

7. Coordinates schedules for offshore training.

8. Attends training conferences.

9. Provides on-site liaison to major J-2AF training centers.
FUNCTIONS OF OPERATIONS OFFICER

1. Assists in preparation of training portion of the NAR for Cambodia.

2. Assists in coordinating accomplishment of NAR training in coordination with U.S. and third country forces.

3. Assists in research, preparation, implementation, supervision, and presentation of the host country army, Navy, and air force NAR training program.

4. Attends training conferences.

5. Provides on-site liaison to major GKHAF training centers.
FUNCTIONS OF LIATION OFFICER

1. Provides liaison with the G-3/3G on matters pertaining to training of COMAFF and technical use of G-3 furnished equipment.

2. Performs periodic maintenance evaluations of MAP equipment assigned to G-3/G-4 units.

3. Observes and reports on use of MAP material.

4. Assists in the preparation of tables of organization and equipment and other authorization documents.

5. Makes recommendations concerning changes in COMAFF structure.

6. Provides a source of expertise of U.S. agencies in evaluating the requirements of Cambodian elements.
FUNCTIONS OF LIAISON OFFICE:

1. Provides liaison with the OCC on matters pertaining to training of CKNAP and technical use of U.S. furnished equipment.

2. Performs periodic maintenance, evaluation of CK equipment assigned to CK NP units.

3. Observes and reports on use of CK material.

4. Assists in the preparation of tables of organization and equipment and other authorization documents.

5. Makes recommendations concerning changes in CKNAP structure.

6. Provides a source of expertise to agencies in evaluating the requirements of Cambodian elements.
FUNCTIONS OF S1 LOG STAFF OFFICE

1. Advises the CINCPAC and CINCPACFWD on all matters concerning military assistance and logistical requirements in country.

2. Performs liaison with DLA and logistical staff agencies and selected CARAF elements.

3. Responsible for priority, delivery, and acceleration, deferral, or cancellation of deliveries.

4. Recommends or takes actions for the acceleration, deferral, or cancellation of deliveries.

5. Requisitions or calls forward programmed supplies, equipment, and munitions to assure timely availability to meet in-country requirements.

6. In coordination with the CARAF logistical elements, conducts a continuing review of stocks in depots and declares excess such the material as is no longer required.
FUNCTIONS OF LOG STAFF OFFICER (A.F. Ranks)

1. Advises the Sr Log Staff Officer in the planning and development of the G/RAF and air munitions portion of the MA.

2. Provides liaison with the Cambodian Air Force on matters pertaining to logistical support of the Air Force.

3. Assists in the preparation of the table of organization and in particular the equipment required for air force units.

4. Responsible for the development of the procedures necessary to insure receipt, storage, issue and final disposition of the equipment in accord with MA directives.

5. Observes and reports on the use of material furnished and personnel trained by MA funds.

6. Provides a source of expertise in the use of MA equipment and in logistical systems.

SUGGESTIONS

1. Assists in establishing priorities of Air Force MA equipment.

2. Arranges for MA repair/maintenance support beyond that of the organic capability of the MA/AF units.
FUNCTIONS OF LOG STAFF OFFICER (NAV)

PRIMARY DUTIES:

1. Evaluates requirements and makes recommendations concerning military assistance to the Government of Khmer Republic (KhN) naval forces.

2. Provides the expertise on U.S. Navy equipment provided the KhN Navy.

3. Monitors the activation, training, and operational readiness of KhN Naval units and recommends revisions of U.S. Navy equipment accordingly.

4. Advises the Sr Log Staff Officer in the planning and development of the Navy and ammunition portion of the NAV.

5. Observes and reports the utilization of U.S. material and services given to the KhN Navy and personnel trained by the U.S. and by Third Country at U.S. expense.

6. Arranges the receipt, transfer of NAV material and services to the NAV Navy.

7. Is the NAVCO point of contact for the exchange of information on naval forces, budgets, weapons, and capabilities.

8. Develops a mutual trust and confidence with the KhN Naval Headquarters and other operational forces of KhN.

SECONDARY DUTIES:

1. Ensures efficient use of assets (boats and stores) delivering NAV material to KhN.

2. Recommends certain water borne delivery means of military equipment peculiar to the logistic system.

3. Performs other functions as required.
3. Functions of Log Staff Officer (S-10)

1. Provides liaison with HQS Chief of Transportation and USAF transportation units on all matters pertaining to transportation requirements.

2. Provides technical expertise on the use of USAF provided transportation equipment.

3. Performs periodic maintenance evaluation of USAF transportation equipment used in USAF units.

4. Observes and reports on the use of USAF transportation material.

5. Makes recommendations to the Sr Log Staff Officer concerning structure of transportation units.

6. Coordinates and makes recommendations for revisions of the USAF.

7. Insures that the receipt, storage, and distribution of transportation equipment and material is appropriately documented in accord with USAF directives.
FUNCTIONS OF LOG STAFF OFFICER (CIJ) 

1. Provides liaison with 31/M Chief of Quartermaster and USAF Quartermaster units on all matters pertaining to Quartermaster requirements.

2. Provides technical expertise on the use of USAF provided Quartermaster equipment.

3. Performs periodic maintenance evaluation of USAF Quartermaster equipment assigned to USAF units.

4. Observes and reports on the use of USAF Quartermaster material.

5. Takes recommendations to the 3rd Log Staff Officer concerning structure of Quartermaster units.

6. Coordinates and makes recommendations for revision of the U.S. NA.

7. Insures that the receipt, storage, and distribution of Quartermaster equipment and material is appropriate; documented in accordance with all directives.
FUNCTIONS OF MEDICAL SUPPLY Lifting 9.

1. Provides liaison with GHQAP Director of Health Services and GHQAP medical units and activities on all matters pertaining to medical requirements.

2. Provides technical expertise on the use of U.S. provided medical equipment.

3. Performs periodic maintenance evaluations of MAP medical equipment assigned to GHQAP units.

4. Observes and reports on the use of MAP medical material.

5. Makes recommendations to the Sr Log Staff Officer concerning structure of medical units and activities.

6. Coordinates and makes recommendations for revision of the U.S. MAP.

7. Insures that the receipt, storage, and distributions of medical equipment and material is appropriately documented in accordance with MAP directives.
FUNCTIONS OF ILSTAFF OFFICE (00)

1. Provides liaison with CNAP Chief of Ordnance and 3rd Army ordnance units on all matters pertaining to ordnance requirements less ammunition.

2. Provides technical expertise on the use of U.S. provided ordnance equipment.

3. Performs periodic maintenance evaluation of 3rd Army ordnance equipment assigned to CNAP units.

4. Observes and reports on the use of CNAP ordnance material.

5. Makes recommendations to the 4th Log Staff officer concerning structure of ordnance units and maintenance activities.

6. Coordinates and makes recommendations for revision of the 3rd Army directives.

7. Insures that the receipt, storage and distribution of ordnance equipment and material less ammunition is appropriately documented in accordance with CNAP directives.
1. Provides liaison with the TRAF Chief of Signal on all matters pertaining to area of communication.

2. Provides technical expertise on the use of M.P. provided signal equipment.

3. Performs periodic maintenance evaluations of M.P. signal equipment assigned to TRAF units.

4. Observes and reports on the use of M.P. signal material.

5. Makes recommendations to the Sr Log Staff Officer concerning structure of Signal units.

6. Coordinates and makes recommendations for revision of the M.P. MAP.

7. Ensures that the receipt, storage, and distribution of signal equipment and material is appropriately documented in accord with MAP directives.
FUNCTION OF LOG STAFF OFFICER (3.3.6)

1. Provides liaison with the USAF Chief of Engineers on matters pertaining to engineering.

2. Provides technical expertise on the use of U.S. provided engineer equipment.

3. Performs periodic maintenance evaluations of USAF engineer equipment assigned to USAF units.

4. Observes and reports on the use of USAF engineer material.

5. Makes recommendations to the Sr Log Staff Officer on the USAF structure of engineer units.

6. Coordinates and makes recommendations for revision of the USAF structure.

7. Insures that the receipt, storage, and distribution of engineer equipment and material is appropriately documented in accord with USAF directives.

CONSIDERARY DUTIES

1. Coordinates with the Bureau of Public Works in efforts to assist the USAF engineer in engineering equipment and materials.

2. Performs other duties as assigned.
FUNCTION OF G-35 SUPPLY OFFICE (G3)

1. Provides liaison with the CRCAF Chief of Ordnance on matters pertaining to ammunition.

2. Provides necessary information and recommendation for the determination of supply rates and attrition factors for ammunition and weapons, to include addition or deletion of material from the HRM.

3. Keeps informal records on the receipt of ammunition and weapons by the CRCAF.

4. Continually evaluates the capability and effectiveness of the CRCAF to properly account for storage, distribution, and maintenance of ammunition and weapons in the depot supply system as well as troop units.

5. Prepares analysis and submits ammunition reports as required.

6. Reviews troop and force structure plans to insure supply densities are consistent with programs.
F.R.A. Line 11

P.A.S.T. DEBLACK SUPPLY DEP. (A)

1. Monitors all F.R.A. supplies received in country.

2. Insures document and accountability of all Army type F.3 equipment in
accord with TAB directives.

3. Observes the issue of Army F.A. supplies in accord with the original
requisition.

4. Insures the temporary storage of the supplies received, and secures
and checks items for serviceability.

5. Generates a monthly status report of receipts for all F.A. equipment
received in country.

6. Provides technical expertise for transfer of accountability for material
between F.R.A. and S.P.O.
FUNCTIONS OF AMMO RECORD SPECIALIST

1. Receives, receipts and coordinates the documentation on all supplies received via air.

2. Inspects the supplies as to quantity and condition against air manifest.

3. Coordinates transportation from air dock to holding area.

4. Insures the supplies are transported to temporary holding areas and secured.

5. Coordinates the receipt of the daily ammo reports with the ammo officer.
1. Control the requisitioning of all spare parts within the S&L of Navy.

2. Ensures that Navy supply procedures are adequate to meet the requirement for accountability.

3. Provides the expertise on NAVSUP matters.

4. Coordinates with CNWR rear on availability of repair parts peculiar to Navy equipment.

5. Coordinates with WJG's rear on shipments of repair parts peculiar to Navy equipment.

6. Develops a mutual trust and confidence with the Navy headquarters logistic organization and other field organizations.

7. Assists the naval requirements officer as directed.
1. Controls requisitioning for all aircraft repair parts within the GMA Air Force.

2. Coordinates operating procedures between aircraft maintenance and supply.

3. Coordinates with MEET to ensure availability of aircraft and aircraft repair parts.

4. Coordinates with MEET on shipments of repairable aircraft and repair parts.

5. Coordinates actions between the MAT (Maintenance Assistance Team) and GMA Air Force maintenance.

6. Generates daily aircraft status reports.

7. Generates special weekly status reports on particular (F-19) aircraft.

8. Coordinates the use of aerospace ground equipment (AGS).

9. Performs other duties as assigned.
FUNCTIONS OF COM CENTER SUPERVISOR (SC)

1. Monitors all MAP communication supplies received in country.

2. Insures documentation and accountability of all army type MAP communication equipment in accord with MAP directions.

3. Observes the issue of Army RA communication supplies in accord with the original requisition.

4. Insures the temporary storage of the communications supplies received, and secures and checks items for serviceability.
Section B
SUBJECT: Shortage of Vietnamese to Khmer Interpreters/Translators

1. PRELIM: To present the current status on the continuing shortage of Vietnamese to Khmer interpreters/translators.

2. DESCRIPTION:

   a. Vietnamese to Khmer interpreters now being utilized in the Republic of Vietnam number approximately 51. The bulk of these interpreters are utilized in the Company Training Program at Lang Son FEC.

   b. The training of specialists for the Logistics Command creates an additional requirement for 40 Vietnamese to Khmer interpreters/translators.

   c. The Khmer system for managing the existing pool of interpreters/translators is inadequate for the following reasons:

      (1) The present system of locating substantial numbers of qualified personnel is not functioning.

      (2) Within the Khmer Armed Forces there are a substantial number of personnel who can qualify as interpreters. All units should be screened to identify qualified personnel and their names and records should be maintained in a special pool.

      (3) A system of categorizing skill levels is necessary in order to manage the interpreter pool. Categories should include technical interpreters/translators; general interpreters/translators; interpreters and translators.

      (4) In the future, the requirement for interpreters will increase. The FY 72 training program presently being developed relies quite heavily on the use of Vietnamese military schools and training centers. The present requirement for 100 interpreters/translators will increase at least three fold.

      (5) There is a need to establish a system whereby interpreters/translators can be rotated back to OKH. Under the present system, once an interpreter/translator is sent to OKH, he remains there for extended periods of time without compensation such as incentive pay and accelerated promotions, while his contemporaries return to their families and country.

3. CURRENT STATUS:

   a. FY 71 training program is presently short 110 Vietnamese to Khmer translators/interpreters.
MEDICO (P'H)  

10 April 71  

SUBJECT: Shortage of Vietnamese to Khmer interpreters/Translators

b. Forty Vietnamese/Khmer translator/interpreters are required immediately for the Logistics Command Training Program. Several increments of students have already arrived in SVN to await the start of their training. Unless the interpreters/translators arrive in SVN within the next few days, the Central Training Command will cancel all Logistics Command training.

c. A concerted effort must be made to improve the procurement methods and management procedures for translators and interpreters.

d. The Vietnamese Language School in Saigon is prepared to accept 5 Khmer students on short notice. This will help to alleviate a small part of the long range shortage. Both long and short term solutions are necessary.

e. A recent government decision to sever living allowances formerly paid to interpreters serving in SVN will undoubtedly affect future recruiting and retention of interpreters.

Copies Furnished:  
CH Sak Sak Sakheorne  
G Thappana Nginn  

CH LIAI L. KHUN  
C L, TFA  
Deputy Chief, MEDICO (P'H)
Section C
PANK TRAINING

1. Considerable progress has been made in the area of PANK training since January 1971. The January and February months were spent becoming acquainted with key staff members of the Direction General de l'Instruction (DGI) and researching the entire spectrum of the training field.

2. It was immediately evident that the in-country training capability of the Khmer Army was almost non-existent in terms of meaningful quality and quantity and was therefore totally unprepared to absorb the rapid expansion of ground forces. Moreover, there existed an acute shortage of competent training cadre and staff expertise at both the training centers and military service schools now in existence. A central training command (DGI) exists but is far from being functional. The key staff officers of DGI appear to be in their present positions because they can have very little affect on the status quo. Their decision making authority is practically non-existent. The only training center operating in mid-February was Kambol, some 13 km from Phnom Penh. Its prime product was a six-week company refresher training program. Military Service Schools for the Army were few in number and relatively non-significant in terms of quality production. Air Force training, with the exception of pilot training, was limited to OJT, material oriented, and not compatible with U.S. standards or equipment. Navy training was small scale, equipment oriented, and conducted to some degree by French instructors.

3. The pending inflow of U.S. MAP equipment would overtax the present training system unless an alternate solution could be found which would allow for continued training of PANK forces in a third country while simultaneously building an effective training base. The only training assets available to accomplish this task were in Thailand and RVN. The Thai resources are extremely limited in terms of quantity, and although Thailand could absorb some of the training workload, it was evident that the bulk of third country training would have to be conducted in RVN. MACV/ATSC began to force structure the 1971 Khmer Armed Force of approximately 190,000 men while simultaneously developing a Third Country Training Program which would train the Khmer Army around combat units, Naval Forces and Air Forces. Included in the FY72 training program are provisions for building a cadre training base at the training centers and the military service schools.

4. The goal is to make the Khmer Republic self-sufficient in training by the end of FY72. The FY72 program is very ambitious in terms of numbers trained especially in the cadre training bases. Gradually the in-country training centers and military service schools should be able to absorb the bulk of tactical and specialist training. In order to accomplish all this training PANK High Command proposes to have four operational training centers by January 1972, Kambol, K.G. Speu, Prey Sar, and Sisophon. Sisophon will be used as a battalion training center, Kambol and K.G. Speu will transition into company training programs similar to the ongoing program in RVN. Prey Sar will train instructor cadre and also pre-train company recruits destined for training centers in RVN.

5. Training of leaders in sufficient numbers to meet expansion requirements is one serious problem facing PANK. PANK proposals to establish a Combined
Arms School at K. C. Kanthot (capacity 300 to 800) and a Tech Services School somewhere in the Phnom Penh area. This should allow for a considerable increase in officers and MCC's production for all the Arms and Services.

6. Language training to meet in-country, CONUS, and Third Country requirements (interpreters/translators, low density courses in RVNAF schools, etc.) A facility has been acquired in Phnom Penh and considerable progress is being made toward a low density beginning on or about 1 July 71. An English Language lab will be an integral part of the Language School facility. The proposed in-country training facilities for AVN/K and MNK are expected to remain relatively stable during FY72.

7. All the above briefly describe progress that has been made since Jan 71, however, many problem areas exist which will impede further development of the concepts and plans now in existence. A discussion of problem areas follows:

a. Small Unit Leadership:

Considerable shortfall exists in this area. Some 3000 SUL's were programmed to be trained in CONUS during FY71 training program. To date none have attended. The first increment of 500 departed during June 71. This program was in shortfall since November of 1970. The only stumbling block facing AVN/K was that educational requirements were too prohibitive to produce large numbers of potential SUL's. A suggestion was made that combat experienced corporals be selected from existing units and that the educational standards be lowered to allow for promotion to Sergeant upon completion of training. Several months delay was encountered along with much red tape, but now the barrier appears to be broken. This however reflects the lack of problem solving techniques of the DIII staff.

b. Officer Training:

Quantity and quality officer training continues to be a problem. Political appointments are common and too much emphasis is placed on educational requirements. CCS programs at K.C. Komnang has been very poorly conducted. A Special Officers Leadership Course is programmed in FY72 (CONUS training). Five officers will attend a 14 week course qualifying them to be CCS cadre in-country. Follow-on training for officers in the tech services or combat arms will then complete a meaningful officer production system. The FANK High Command has not approved of this concept. Navy and Air Force officer production systems are satisfactory for their present force structure.

c. Language Training:

The Language School proposed for Phnom Penh appears to be moving ahead with little difficulty. Instruction of Khmer students in the Vietnamese Language is expected to create internal problems between GKH and press etc. One possible solution is to sell the school as an international language facility where other languages will be taught at some future time Thai, Lao, etc. It is anticipated that some persuasion will be necessary to accomplish the VW Language training.
d. Need for advisors:

Third country advisors will be required if SVN is to achieve self sufficiency in training by the end of FY72. Training of cadre in RVN establishes momentum, but unless advisors are provided at each T.C. and the DGI, meaningful progress cannot be expected.

e. Poor Staff Supervision:

The weakest link in the training chain at this time is the DGI staff. There exists only 2 or 3 qualified staff officers who have the desire to move ahead. The remainder of the staff must be described as "deadwood". The three officers in positions of authority, in fact, work an average of 4 hours per day and accomplish very little in that time. They are barely able to keep up with the Khmer training in RVN. Reorganization of the DGI staff is necessary.

f. Training Center Facilities:

Engineer support of existing and proposed training centers has been nonexistent. Unless considerable effort, either U.S. or CRK, is expended to expand and improve facilities, there is grave doubt that meaningful quality and quantity training will be accomplished in-country. A great deal of verbal emphasis has been placed on Khmer desires to "do our own training", however, the financial and material support required to accomplish needed construction has never been provided. Living conditions sanitation and training facilities are inadequate.

8. Summary: Day to day progress has been made in the training program for CRK. The road ahead will be very difficult and demands a significant number of qualified, motivated Khmer officers at the training centers, and military service schools, but most important of all, the DGI staff. The High Command must be made to realize that the present non-functioning DGI staff will only hinder the common goal of self-sufficient in country training.
Section D
FACT SHEET

SUBJECT: Language Training

TO: Mr. Ladd
FROM: DESCHMEDTO (AND)

PROBLEM: Establishment of a Language Training Program in the Khmer Republic.

DISCUSSION:

1. Language training is a continuing requirement and one which will have a material impact on the success or failure of the training program for the Khmer Armed Forces.

2. The FY 72 training program requires that the following language training be accomplished:

a. 60 officers to be language qualified in English to attend advanced service schools in the U.S. (This number accounts for training of one primary and one alternate per training slot.)

b. Approximately 100 personnel to be language qualified in English to meet in-country requirements.

c. 145 officers to become language qualified in Vietnamese in order to attend low density officer courses in RVN.

d. Approximately 410 Khmer personnel will be required to perform duties as Vietnamese interpreters and/or translators. They are the key to successful completion of the various training programs being scheduled for the FY72 training program in RVN. These personnel will be taught to speak Vietnamese.

3. During the period 19-23 April 1971, three experts in the language training field were brought to Phnom Penh for the purpose of conducting a Language Training Program Survey. The results of this survey are as follows:

a. Facilities exist which can support the training program outlined in b above. These facilities are located as the Directeur Generale De L'Instruction, near Pochentong Air Base. It is estimated that space for 16 classrooms and a 20 position language laboratory is available. The laboratory equipment would be purchased from MAP funds.
b. Both long and short range plans were developed for the training of a permanent Khmer faculty. Short range plans call for a temporary VN faculty to conduct training until Khmer instructors can be trained in Vietnam and C-223.

c. ANK appears to be very interested in this training program. A Commandant has been appointed and he is currently touring OLI language facilities in Thailand, Laos and Cambodia. Col Kiac Kosal.

d. Future plans could include training in other Asian languages.

4. The heart of a successful language program is a sound testing program. Control and administration of tests for off-shore candidates cannot be turned over to Cambodian personnel. There will be a continuing need, in-country, for one Defense Language Institute (DLI) Department of the Army civilian employee (CS-11). This individual will be the Test Control Officer. He should be programmed to arrive in-country one month prior to completion of classroom facilities (completion not expected before Dec 71).

RECOMMENDATION: That approval be obtained for one JA civilian to enter the country for the purpose of becoming the Test Control Officer as well as the American Administrator of the DLI Language School in Phnom Penh.

WILLIAM L. McCLINTON

CPT, CSA

Deputy Chief, 54TH (F40)

Post Script:

Approval has been obtained to increase the in-country strength by one additional space to accommodate the required JA civilian space. Two 20 language laboratory facilities have been programmed for FY71.

Start date for the school is estimated on July 1971.
Section E
1. The Ordnance U.S. Company (V.A.EL. 3.MK) was recently started in Phnom Penh at two locations.

2. The automotive shop was started in January 71 at the former royal police garage in the Toul Kork district of Phnom Penh. The building, when first acquired was filled with junk and old salvage vehicles and had been unused for several years. This excellent structure was built under the old HAP and has 23 automotive repair bays, 5 grease pits, room for an office, tool room, machine shop, component repairs, tire repair, battery charging and service and a large parts storage area with racks and bins.

3. Initial provisioning of tools and equipment for this shop was obtained from two sources: the first was from tool sets left at Lovek from the old HAP which were still in boxes and ready for issue. These items included a 10 kw generator, a complete contact and emergency tool set, 20 automotive tool kits, a large tire dumper, and various other sets such as fuel and electric tool kits, welder's tool kits, work benches, parts storage cabinets, etc. The second source was Russian "Service Station Sets" purchased from the Soviet Union three years ago and stored at Lovek. There were seven complete sets (one per HAP and one for Phnom Penh) at the depot. These sets include compressors, motor-generator test stands, injector test stands, hydraulic jacks, engine repair stands and various tool kits and sets. One nearly complete set was moved to the shop and set up. (Many of the smaller tool kits have not yet been delivered.)

4. There are 70 people assigned to this shop; however 40 are presently in Saigon for training.

5. The second part of the Ordnance U.S. Company is the Armament Shop and warehouse located in the old Ordnance Compound which is about four blocks from the royal hotel in Phnom Penh.

6. There are 15 repairmen working in the shop. These personnel were formerly at Lovek and are highly skilled and productive.

7. A few of the tools ordered under V.A.EL. 3.MK for the Ordnance U.S. Co. have started to arrive. As the rest of the equipment and vehicles arrive and personnel return from training the Ordnance U.S. Co. should be able to achieve a high productivity rate.

7. The warehouse is presently filled with old weapons for which V.A.EL. has no ammunition and is also being used to store repair parts.

NOTES:

1. The most serious problem in the Ordnance Corps at the present time is that of repair parts. The present system is used by the French supply system. Stock records are kept by ends item rather than in A.S.I sequence.
1. There are five different stock record cards in use, and demand data is
accumulated. However, all the cards are not used. As in general, the records
are poor. Since the ordnance cards do not use a "fringe deck" a large
number of the stock record cards have had no entries for years. This
makes it very easy to take a stock record card for an item even when it is a
stockage item or not.

2. The requisitioning system is also cumbersome; and does not lend itself
readily to interface with the computer system.

3. New requisitions consist of a letter sent through the 3-4 to
ordnance listing all the parts needed without stock numbers. The letter
must be marked from clerk to clerk for stock action and then becomes a
material release order. It is returned to the unit which takes the letter
to the warehouse for pick-up of items.

4. This system should be converted to a single line system for ease of use.
Stock record cards should be standardized on the 187th Vietnamese card
because that is the card the Vietnamese are trained in. Technical
assistance in the form of U.S. military or civilian personnel or
knowledgeable third country nationals will be needed to develop a responsive
ordnance supply system.

5. A second major problem area is the status of the ordnance detachments
in the "11th ARVN regions. These vary in size from 3 men in one, 2 to 29
men in another. These detachments are too small and too poorly equipped to perform
their mission. In order to make these organizations effective, tools and
equipment at Locat (Russian and L stimulus to the USA. Personnel
returning from schooling in Vietnam should be assigned to the USA. ordnance
detachments, and the military region logistical functions should be activated;
thus providing each technical service detachment in the various ARVN local
commander who will be responsible to the USA. Commander's needs and will
supervise the local logistics units. I will insist that the USA. detachments receive their share of the personnel, tools, equipment, parts, and
technical assistance provided by this.
Section F
<table>
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<tr>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>INVENTORY</th>
<th>TECHNICAL</th>
<th>SIGNAL</th>
<th>SPECIALIST</th>
<th>RECEIVING</th>
<th>SHIPING</th>
<th>MATERIALS</th>
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</table>

**SKILL AND MAJOR DUTIES:**

1. **INVENTORY MANAGEMENT SPECIALIST:**

   a. At the FAC/TECH Service/Air Force/Navy level - Development of procedures to provide MILMARK interface to include requisitioning objectives, determination of stockage levels, follow-on repair part support requirements, stock accounting and record card posting and to provide liaison between MILS/TECH/AIR/AVXK.

   b. At the MILS level - To assist and provide training in the development of procedures for Field Stock Control Direct Support activities to include ASL/PLJ determination, direct exchange programs, and end-item use surveillance for MILS.
2. TECHNICAL CATALOG SPECIALIST:

To assist and provide training in the establishment and utilization and updating of technical libraries to include supply catalogs, identification lists, cross-reference lists, interchange and substitution, master data files, micro film reading and other related catalog and research activities.

3. STORAGE SPECIALIST:

To assist and provide training in the development of procedures for the receipt, storage and issue of material to include establishment of locator systems, maintenance-in-storage surveillance, scheduled and unscheduled inventories and classification of unserviceable repairables for inclusion in out-of-country repair and return programs.

4. RECEIVING AND STORING SPECIALIST:

To assist and provide training in the development of procedures for the receipt, identification, reconciliation to documentation, trans-shipment to using unit at the FAC warehouse level and to assist the technical service at the depot level as required to include break-out and distribution.

5. MATERIAL SUPPLY/INSPECTION:

To assist and provide training in the development of procedures at:

a. AWK level - Certification of items in stock or being returned from units for serviceability prior to installation on aircraft to include on and off base repairables and to assist in the out-of-country repair and return program.

b. MEDICAL ITEMS - Certification of drugs, anti-biotics and pharmaceuticals and to assist in management of medical supplies and equipment.

6. Recommend that the technical assistance personnel requirements be obtained as stated for a minimum period of one year. Then, prior to the expiration of the one year period that a re-evaluation be made of the degree of self-sufficiency status on the part of Wh/AFWA/KP Person nel, the progress toward total transition to the S.P. HILSTILP interface and that technical assistance personnel be either phased-out, phased-down or increased in those areas indicating a revision in personnel requirements as a result of the re-evaluation study.
### Unit of Fire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon Type</th>
<th>Rounds per Weapon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Automatic Pistol</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submachine Gun</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle/M1/M16/Carbine/AK47</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Machine Gun</td>
<td>1,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Automatic Rifles</td>
<td>1,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Medium Machine Gun</td>
<td>2,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Heavy Machine Gun</td>
<td>1,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grenade Launcher</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mortar 50 MM</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mortar 31/32 MM</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortar 412/120 MM</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>57 MM R/R</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>75 MM R/R</td>
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<tr>
<td>106 MM R/R</td>
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<tr>
<td>75 12: Tank Gun</td>
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<td>75 MM AA Gun</td>
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<td>37 MM AA Gun</td>
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<tr>
<td>105 MM Howitzer</td>
<td>175</td>
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<tr>
<td>100 MM How/Gun</td>
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<tr>
<td>122 MM How/Gun</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grenade Frag</td>
<td>60 per 400 man battalion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grenade Off</td>
<td>48 per 400 man battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenade Inc</td>
<td>6 per 400 man battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenade Rifle</td>
<td>10 per 400 man battalion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Units going into combat authorized to draw up to three units of fire. The next higher headquarters can draw up to two units of fire.

3. Para military units may draw up to three units of fire but must work out their own reserve.
Section H
SUBJ: Operations and storage conditions at Kambol Depot

1. **Purpose:** To present the facts concerning the critically understaffed depot and the urgent requirement to improve storage conditions at Kambol Depot prior to the rainy season.

2. **Discussion:**
   a. Kambol Depot is the major FANK ammunition depot located approximately 7 km west of Pochentong Airfield. The majority of all ammunition is stored there.
   b. Major construction of 7 modules, defenses, and road net to improve facilities and reduce the safety hazards has been underway for approximately 3 months. There is every indication that necessary construction will not be completed prior to the rainy season and that the facilities will be rendered useless for the following reasons:
      1. Crushed rock hardstands for each module have not been inplaced nor rack provided.
      2. Construction of a hard surfaced crushed rock road net has not begun.
      3. The earth barricades have not been completed nor a drainage system provided.
   c. There are but 50-60 personnel assigned to operate the depot. Even under ideal conditions, modules with hardstand, forklift, etc., an installation of this size need an organization of 200 personnel as a minimum. A proposed TO & E of this size was given to FANK for consideration.
   d. TO & E equipment for MAP support, 200 man Depot Company, has been requested and funded. No equipment has arrived as yet. Ordered message no, 971, 010921Z March 1971.
   e. These unsatisfactory conditions and suggested corrective actions have been discussed with responsible FANK officers. Also, a written report was submitted to the Chief of Ordnance.
   f. FANK has indicated that the request for additional personnel has been forwarded to G1, and requests for rock and engineer support made to the engineers and the Ministry of Public Works. They have had the requirement for approximately 3 months.
3. Current Status:

a. The Ministry of Public Works is reportedly preparing to subcontract to a commercial firm for rock.

b. Construction is presently almost stopped.

c. 31 is still evaluating the request for personnel.

4. Conclusions:

a. Approximately 20% of all ammunition presently stored at Kombol Depot will become unserviceable during the rainy season due to flooding, etc.

b. It will be extremely difficult to move ammunition in and out, if not impossible.

c. The module barricades will erode and collapse.

d. There will be no adequate place to store minimum essential ammo to sustain operations, much less establish a 30 day supply in-country without creating extremely hazardous conditions and losing 20% of ammo to the elements. This may preclude bringing in additional ammunition.

e. This situation can possibly be corrected if immediate action is taken during the next 30 days.

Copy Furnished
PANK G4
PANK Chief of Ordnance

WILLIAM L. VAUGH
CCL, USA
Deputy Chief, MEDIC(F&D)

Note: Work by the Ministry of Public Works began on 1 June 1971.
Section I
AMMUNITION ACTIVITIES 1 FEBRUARY - 30 JUNE 1971

1. The majority of FARK ammunition activity have been necessarily centralized in and around Phnom Penh.
   a. The majority of the troops have been marshalled there in defense of the capital.
   b. The airfield and the river port are at present the only locations where ammunition is brought in.
   c. The main depot of Kambol (Kantork) is there.
   d. The permanent ammunition facilities at Louvek are not secure and therefore cannot be used.

2. The object of the ammunition supply program is to establish a 30 day supply of ammunition in country and to eventually expand the distribution system and storage facilities to accommodate a 60 day supply based on ARVN expenditure rates. The more routine delivery of ammunition by barge and air during the period mid March, April, and May, and a reduction in combat operations has allowed FARK to accumulate approximately 20 days of supply for the majority of U.S. items.

3. The supply system is controlled at the highest level, with requisitions being signed by Military Region Commanders and the release orders signed personally by the G4. The G4 controls the allocation of all ammunition.

4. The majority of the ammunition (2500 tons) is stored at Kambol depot (some 7 KM west of Pochantong Airfield, which is operated by Chef Service Des Munition under the Bureau de Matériel (Chief of Ordnance) Ministry of Defense Nationale. This organization also operates small sub depots in the 2nd Military region at Kompong Speu (76 tons) at the 3rd Mar at Battambang, (230 tons), and the 4th Mar at Senreak, (100 tons). These sub depots handle all tech service supplies and have about 15 men each. At the same time the G4 operates an emergency supply point in Phnom Penh (79 tons), supply points at Kompong Som (11 tons), Kompong Speu (292 tons), Kompong Cham (138 tons), Sihanouk (87 tons), and Battambang (71 tons) in support of combat units. The amounts stored at these locations vary depending on troop density and difficulty of resupply.

5. FARK has the ability to keep detailed accounting records but presently lacks sufficient numbers of trained personnel to analyze statistical data and to determine and program requirements. The lack of a logistical communication net coupled with the lack of logistical personnel at regional level and supply personnel at unit level makes it extremely difficult to obtain on a routine basis reports as to ammunition in the hands of troops and accurate consumption data.

6. At present approximately 40% of the units other than those in and around Phnom Penh and ammunition units furnish any reports. The combat units that furnish reports do so on an irregular basis which tends to lessen their real value.
7. PANK G4 has been working extremely hard to establish a system of basic loads for various units and to establish consumption rates based on weapon density and actual expenditures. This has been further complicated by the simultaneous rearming and reorganization of the entire army.

8. The first study on basic loads and actual consumption data was completed 19 May 1971 for the Neak Loung area by G4. It is an excellent attempt to establish the mechanics of accumulating statistical data and determining requirements.

9. From the preceding it is obvious that the dual channel of responsibility for ammunition supply is awkward to say the least. This situation should be eliminated with the proposed reorganization of PANK where the tech services will be under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (the present G4).

10. PANK is critically short of tech service personnel, much less trained ammunition personnel. As of 19 May 1971, there were but 30 men present for duty at the Kambol depot. This makes it physically impossible to properly store and segregate the ammunition stored there. The personnel are hard pressed to physically receive and issue ammunition. They are to be commended on their ability to maintain as accurate accountability as they do. PANK is aware of this and the Chief of Ordnance has pleaded for more people, but to no avail. There is virtually no AME available at the depot other than a crane which is considerably awkward for handling pallets, and one or two old commercial forklifts which frequently break down. There is but one rough terrain forklift in the country; it must remain at the airport for the unloading of all cargo including ammunition. The few personnel available at the depot are unskilled in the techniques of stevedoring and material handling. Most of their efforts are wasted because of the lack of training.

11. Kambol depot is presently under major construction. Nine (9) storage modules (2 large storage sheds for small arms included), to contain 3 storage sheds each, a road net and perimeter defensive positions are being built. There was considerable delay by the Ministry of Public Works in providing crushed rock for hardstands and the road net. It was a funding problem as all necessary funds were tied up in the national budget. The engineers also failed to properly compact the earth berm which forms the modules. The first rock was not provided until 15 May 1971, yet the detail requirements were known since February. Indication are that the necessary construction will not be completed until well into the rainy season which will mean that the earth berm will erode or collapse and that a considerable amount of ammunition will become unserviceable due to water damage.

12. Since ammunition is the single largest item in the MAP Program and the easiest to effectively audit and observe utilization, it is imperative that present ammunition activities by PAVN be expanded beyond the one staff officer. The value of the ammunition that can be saved from deterioration (by proper storage techniques), and the value of ammunition that can be saved by proper programming and routine delivery (stock control), is considered to be sufficient justification to warrant additional U.S. military personnel to give more detailed technical instruction and assistance down to the first line supervision level on a routine basis. Presently, there is but one staff
officer assigned who must limit his activities to auditing the accountability for ammunition and evaluating logistic procedures. In the event military personnel cannot be provided, "Third Country Nationals" could be utilized provided they have French and English language capability.

13. Efforts should be made to establish another base depot at Kompong Som so that ammunition can be brought in by deep draft vessels in larger quantities and at considerably less transportation costs than the present air and barge delivery. This will serve two purposes; to reduce the vulnerability of FANK to losing all of its ammunition in one major attack on Kambol, and to physically force FANK to expand their operations on both sides of Pich Nil Pass. A base depot at Kompong Som would eventually allow FANK to move ammunition by road, rail, and water to the North, East, and West.

14. Efforts should also be made to establish an advance ammo depot in Battambang capable of being resupplied by road, rail, and air. Rail supply could be effected via Thailand if necessary. This will allow sustained operation out of the second largest population center and along the shores of the Tonle Sap.

15. In summary within 13-24 months with minimal technical advisory support and modest logistical aid, FANK could have an effective ammunition supply system exceeding in efficiency and economy that presently enjoyed by the U.S. and ARVN in Vietnam, and at the same time have an internal audit system that exceeds that presently required of U.S. Army conventional ammunition activities anywhere.
Section
APPENDIX A

NAVAL SITUATION


a. Naval Organization: The NC is directed by a headquarters at the head of which is the Chief of Staff who is responsible for all operation, logistic, and administrative matters of the NC. The headquarters is composed of the following bureaus and services:

1st Bureau - Personnel and Instruction
2nd Bureau - Intelligence
3rd Bureau - Operations
4th Bureau - Logistics and Transport
5th Bureau - Welfare, Social Action, and Propaganda
Technical Service - In Charge of Repair and Maintenance of Ships and Boats
Financial Services - Procurement and Payment
Health Service - Health
Radio Service - Radio and Radar
Interior Service - Headquarters General Service

The organization of the headquarters is equally divided in the two regions at shores' line of NC.

(1) The operational organization of the NC is divided into two regions.

(a) The Maritime Region which is composed of all the Cambodian Sraf from the Vietnam Frontier to the Thailand Frontier. It possesses a maritime subdivision which is at Kompong Som and is composed of a support post and some coastal batteries (Koh Yor and Leu Iran). The maritime force is composed of 2 P's, 1 L41T, 1 L42, and some small craft.

(b) The Riverine Region which is composed of all the bodies of water in the interior of Cambodia, principally the riverine sectors: Mekong, upstream; Sekong, downstream; Bassac, and Tonle Sap (lake included). Its headquarters is at Chru Shang, river. Its internal organization is the same as the maritime region and is in turn identical for the navy headquarters organization. However, there exists at the heart of the riverine region an also in the maritime region specialized repair shops which are technically supported by the navy headquarters. The operation force of the region is composed of:

A Naval Assault Division
A Transport Group composed mostly of Boats
An L41 Serving as Command Ship
A Group of 3 Watch Posts assigned in accordance with the Water Security Plan of the Capital
b. Principal Missions:

(1) Surveillance and security of 400 KM of coast and 30 KM of islands.
(2) Surveillance of 4 large rivers, some navigable channels in the interior and of the Great Lake Region (1200 KM of waterway).
(3) Mission of police and customs inspector in collaboration with competent civil authorities. Transport of troops and material for the benefit of the army and the civilian population in out of the way areas. Transport of troops in operations and their provisioning. Frequent fire support missions for benefit of troops in operations paralleling these riverine operational forces.

c. KNK Training:

(1) Recruiting and Basic Training.

(a) Recruits are initially enlisted for a term of six years; minimum age is sixteen. All recruits receive one to three months of basic training at the conclusion of which, all those with an educational level of 9-10 years receive specialized training for three months and those with an educational level of 11-12 years receive specialized training for five months. These two groups receive completion certificates at the end of their course. The others are detailed to shipboard and marine assignments, with a formalized on the job training period of one month.

(b) Currently only four ratings are undergoing the three and five month training. They are:

- Engine Mechanics
- Radiomen
- Electricians
- Gunners

(c) On the job one month training is conducted in the above rating groups as well as in:

- Quartermaster
- Armorer
- Marine Tactics
- Boatswain Mate
- Yeoman
- Nurse
- Storekeeper/Commissary Man
- Truck Driver

(d) Approximately 500 men are in training at any one time.

(2) Officer Training: All of the senior officers attended the French Naval Academy. After 18 March, the KNK established an CCS, and have so far graduated 31 officers. There are now 98 officer candidates enrolled in the 6 month course. Some officer candidates who have finished the
university with an engineering degree, receive direct technical instruction as well as OCS courses. (There are now 7). All officer candidates have 12 years or more of education. All officer candidates receive training in Marine Tactics as well as Nautical subjects.

(3) Training Facilities:

(a) The enlisted training center is located about 200 yards south of the Chri Chang War Naval Base. Most of the training is conducted in one very large building which is divided into classrooms. The classrooms are adequate for the size of the classes. The training facility though is about at peak capacity. Many men live with their families and must sleep on floors and cots in the training building. There are no enlisted quarters. The students through usually stand guard duty in shifts throughout the night, and therefore sleep on post.

(b) A new officers school has just been constructed and will house and train the OCS students.

(4) Conduct of Classes: The officer and enlisted courses are taught by a staff of 9 French instructors (2 officers and 7 petty officers), NNX officers (graduates from the last officer class, assigned officer instructors, and headquarters staff guest lecturers), and NNX senior petty officers. Each student is either given a handout before each class or is required to keep complete notes. The instructors use lesson plans in all classes. Classroom work is combined with practical work in shops and on boats. Training aids are used in classes when they are available. Courses are mainly taught in French, with only a few taught in Cambodian. All printed material is in French.

4. Repair Capabilities: The Chief of the Central Technical Bureau at NNX Headquarters has the overall responsibility for repairs. Directly under him are his staff and the commanding officers of the two repair facilities as outlined on the diagram.

(1) The repair facility at Chri Chang War is supported by 9 shops. These are:

(a) The Electrical Shop which has the capability of rewinding generators and electric motors. It has rewinding equipment and a locally made jacking dolly.

(b) The Electronic Shop has a marginal capability for repairing radios. It is lacking test equipment and most of that which is held is old Japanese and French equipment.

(c) The Machine Shop is capable of fabricating some spare parts. Shop equipment includes old but operable French lathes, a milling machine, shaper, and other smaller equipment.

(d) The engine shop which is capable of making repairs to diesel engines. Shop equipment consists of one engine lift dolly, a test stand (which is lacking a dynamometer which is on order) and other engine repair equipment.

(e) The damage control shop which is capable of making repairs and overhauling fire fighting and diving equipment.
(e) A carpentry shop which is capable of fabricating small wooden boats, and pieces of furniture. Shop equipment includes band saws, planer, blade sharpener, drill press and other wood shop equipment.

(g) A battery shop which is capable of completely rebuilding old batteries. Equipment consists of a distilling plant and a battery charging unit.

(h) A welding shop which is capable of effecting welding repairs. Shop equipment includes two gas and two electric arc sets and a heat treatment oven.

(i) An auto repair shop which is capable of rebuilding auto engines. Shop is equipped with 3 pits, overhead engine lift, engine lift dolly, portable air compressor and tire repair equipment.

(2) Also at Chiu Chang War there are two supply warehouses; one devoted to technical repair parts, and the other to general stores and consumables.

(3) There is a floating drydock rated at 360 tons which is capable of lifting craft as large as PC's (limited to 3 meters width), but stability becomes marginal with craft this large. There is no crane capability at the drydock.

(4) There is a 14 and 40 ton marine railway, both of which are inoperable due to the low water level in the dry season, and due to silting in the wet season.

(5) A 20 ton Letorneau hoist is used for hoisting craft out of the water and placing them on skids.

(6) A 5 ton mobile cherry picker is also available for transport and installation of engines.

(7) The repair facility at Heang is supported by 7 shops. These are:

(a) An electrical shop which has the capability of repairing generators, voltage regulators, and motors. It is equipped with a test stand, rewinding equipment and a pressure impregnating tank.

(b) An electronic shop which has a limited capability for repair of solid state components and can repair radio and radar equipment.

(c) A carpentry shop which is capable of manufacturing board lumber.

(d) A torpedo shop which is capable of repair and charging of 14K 14 torpedoes. An HP air bank and compressor are installed.

(e) A machine shop which is capable of fabricating spare parts. Equipment includes a five ton overhead crane, lathes, milling machines, power hacksaw and other machine shop equipment.
(f) An ordnance shop capable of repairing 3 inch and smaller guns.

(g) A welding shop capable of effecting welding repairs.

(h) Craft lift facilities include a 100 ton marine railway and two 20 ton mobile cranes, one of which is inoperative. The later facility is in poor condition and is unable to support a crane at this time.

(9) Thus, with these two repair facilities we can overhaul small craft, but has a very limited capability for overhaul of their PEs and LCU's.

e. Floating Assets

(1) Riverine:

(a) LCM-5 (6)

TA04
TA07
TA14
TA17
BIL142
VTA11

(b) LCM - Monitor (3)

AC1 through AC3

(c) LCVP (3)

VA23
VA26
VA28
VA29
VT01
VT04
VT09

(d) Chinese Patrol Boats (3)

V21 through V23

(e) French Vedettes (5)

VE51
VE52
VE54
VE56
Comité

(f) Yard Tug (YTL) (2)

2011
2013
(a) FAX (1)
*.*

(h) Thai Boats (9)
V321 through V329

(i) Air Boats (2)
No designation

(j) LCU (2)
T912 (Ammunition Store Only)
T917

(k) Gun Barges (2)
MC1
MC2

(l) Customs Boats (1)
VAX 2

(m) Miscellaneous (1)
La Republique

(n) LCI (1)
P112

(2) Maritime Region

(a) Large Ships (5)
J311 (RC)
3312 (RC)
J111 (LM)(L)
T915 (LC7)
T916 (LCT)

(b) Thai Junks (10)
FMM-5
FMM-7
FMM-90
MPK 14 through 29
(3) General:

(a) Although there are 71 craft listed above, fully 22 of these craft were unable to get underway under their own power and only 27 were completely able to accomplish their mission.

(b) Of these craft PA17, AG3, YA2, and YA29 were captured from the South Vietnamese, and they have requested return of these craft. Additionally, all the Thai junks had been captured, and Thailand in turn has requested return of these craft.

f. Logistics:

(1) The Chief of the Central Technical Bureau is the cognizant supply authority on all spare parts in the technical line, while the Chief of the Fourth Bureau is the cognizant supply authority for all other material.

(2) MNS has two warehouses at Phuui Chang for Naval Base (CCU), Phnom Penh. One is utilized for the storage of repair parts and is 75' X 200 feet. A general material warehouse is adjacent and in addition houses a uniform fabrication shop. Portions of this second warehouse may possibly be used for future storage of repair parts if required.

(3) CCU is operated roughly as a naval supply center for the MNS. All requirements from afloat and shore based units are channeled through CCU. Seven personnel are assigned at each CCU warehouse. All supply operations of receipt, storage, issue, and maintenance of stock records are performed in the warehouses.

(4) All standard catalogs now held are obsolete and outdated, the oldest published in 1955 and the latest in 1962. Current catalogs and technical aids have been requisitioned. The present storage/records system is inadequate. All parts for a specific engine/equipment are stowed together and stock records are segregated in a like manner in part number sequence (i.e., .71 diesel engine parts). In January 1971, the MNS logistical system could not efficiently respond to increased operations in areas of:

(a) Identification of material requirements
(b) Transmitting requirements to MAP
(c) Receiving/storage
(d) Recording demand, expected receipts and draw out data
(e) References on stock records as to parent equipment application, allowance parts lists, etc.
(f) Part numbers/FSN's cross reference to superseding numbers
(g) Stockage/requisitioning objectives
2. Present Situation

a. Naval Organization

(1) SNK includes:

(a) Forces constituting maritime, riverine, and ground elements called maritime or riverine forces.

(b) Some ground units charged with supplying the requirements of the forces and permitting their deployment (regions, sectors, bases).

(2) SNK has as its head, the Commander of the Navy, Chief of Headquarters.

(3) The Commander of SNK exercises his authority on the intermediary of the "Central Command" which includes:

(a) The headquarters
(b) The Cabinet
(c) The Services
(d) The inspectorship

(4) The organization of SNK falls under the following principles:

(a) Unit of authority - this unit is realized at the head of SNK in the person of its commander. This principle is of a general application. A force, an element of a force, a ground unit, are always commanded by a unique authority.

(b) Distinction between administration and command: Command and administration consist to two distinct functions in the employment of the force and ground units.

(i) The command foresees orders and directs the utilization of forces.

(ii) The administration permits the functioning of the diverse elements of SNK by furnishing to the commander the means to act.
b. Definition of Functions

(1) Commander of MNK, Chief of Headquarters

(a) The commander of MNK exercises command and directs the administration of the Navy.

(b) He is especially charged with preparing the maritime forces to complete their mission in times of peace and war and establishing the Naval program and executing it.

(c) In the operational functions, the commander of MNK is assisted by the assistant Chief of Staff for Tactics.

(d) In the logistical functions, he is assisted by the assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics.

(e) Subordination - The Commander of MNK reports directly to the Minister of National Defense. He receives from him, all directives concerning political activities and administration of MNK. On the other hand, he receives from the Chief of the PANK General Staff, directives concerning operational activities.

(2) The Headquarters

(a) The headquarters of MNK is a military body under the Commander. It includes the bureau and central bureaus.

(b) The central bureaus are the logistical governing bodies of MNK.

(c) The entire central bureaus report to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics, who coordinates their work and activities.

(d) The central technical bureau (personnel, materiel, maintenance, studies - designs).

(e) The central commissary bureau (personnel, bookkeeping, subsistence, Navy commercial materials, munitions).

(f) The central hydrographic bureau (hydrographic work).

(g) The central health bureau (personnel, medicine, surgery, hygiene, epidemic control).

(h) The central Bureau of Instruction (training, instruction programs, personnel orientation, examinations and meetings).

(i) The central radio, radar and sonar bureau.
(3) Bureaus:

(a) They furnish to the commander all the necessary elements of information for him to take action and employ his forces to realize and obtain operational military objectives.

(b) They report to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Tactics, who coordinates their work.

(c) 3rd Bureau - Operations and Training

(d) 4th Bureau - Ships of the Fleet, materiel, transportation, supply, infrastructure.

(e) 5th Bureau - Sports, recreation, social action, propaganda, psychological action.

(4) The Cabinet.

(a) The cabinet is a liaison body, functioning close to the commander of MNK. It is charged with external relations.

(b) The Secretariat General and the Bureau of the Aide-de-Camp are attached to the cabinet.

(5) The Services.

(a) There are two services directly attached to the Commander of MNK. Financial service and preparation and execution of the budget, purchasing and requisitioning.

(b) Administrative center: Pay and allowances

(6) The Inspectorship: The Inspector-General, Bureau of MNK is charged with planning and organizing general inspections, inspections or control techniques of units, and to verify the execution or orders given by the Commander of MNK. The inspector leads a bureau of studies and documentation having as its mission to inform the commander and to make studies on the proper measures and techniques to improve the work of MNK.

(c) The Regions

(1) Territorially, MNK exercises its scope or action in two regions.

(a) The maritime region which encompasses the high seas and the coastline of Cambodia (800 Km long) as well as some islands.

(b) The riverine region which is principally composed of all the navigable rivers in the interior of Cambodia (1200 Km long) such as the Mekong, Tonle Sap, Bassac and the lakes. Each region is divided into several sectors in which are established bases, military repair shops of the fleet, and subordinate Naval Forces.

(2) Subordination
(a) The commander of the region reports directly to the Commander of MNK.

(b) He exercises through his headquarters, his authority on all the units of MNK based in his region, with the exception of the Naval or Riverine action forces, for which however, he must assume logistic support.

(c) The commander of the region therefore represents "the support forces."

c. **The Action Forces (Riverine or Maritime)**

   (1) In each region MNK has at its disposal action forces who report directly to the commander of MNK.

   (2) They have their headquarters which posses all the proper resources for Naval or Riverine Missions fixed by the Commander of MNK.

d. **Static Forces:** These forces are constituted by the regional companies of Marines, whose mission it is to defend the passes, coastal batteries and lookout posts. They theoretically report to the region commander, but can be placed in reserve and under the direct orders of the Commander of MNK.

e. **Principal Missions:**

   - Protection of Mekong convoys
   - Protection of Maritime and Riverine frontiers
   - Protection of territorial waters
   - Protection of fish, wildlife, and other maritime riches
   - Ensure the security of waterways
   - Transport troops and materials to assist the army
   - Participate in combined operations
   - Aid the civil customs and police authorities

f. **MNK Training:** There are now 102 officers in the 6 month course, and they are presently undergoing instruction in the new officer training building. To date, 127 officers have been graduated from the course.

g. **Repair Capabilities:** The facilities remain unchanged with only the addition of a few pieces of shop equipment.

h. **Floating Assets:**

   (1) Additional assets are as follows:

   (a) PBR (20)

   VP5 through VP24 (less VP13)

   (b) ASPB (2)

   E1

   E2
i. Logistics:

(1) Presently in the MNK, Logistics is the responsibility of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics, who is directly under the MNK Chief of Staff.

(2) Under him are the Central Bureaus. They include:

(a) The Central Technical Bureau
(b) The Central Commissary Bureau
(c) The Central Hydrographic Bureau
(d) The Central Health Bureau
(e) The Central Radio, Radar, and Sonar Bureau
(f) The Central Bureau of Instruction

(3) At the region level, of which there are two (Maritime and Riverine), the region headquarters has the logistics responsibility. Specifically, the region services perform the logistical function in their own specialized areas which are:

(a) Communications
(b) Technical
(c) Commissary
(d) Hydrographic
(e) Health

(4) The Assistant Chief of Staff for logistics has an additional duty as the MAP coordinator for MNK. He is assisted by the Chief of the Central Technical Bureau. All requests for MAP material are channeled through this office.

(5) Specific Improvements are:

(a) Master cross reference listings have been received. In addition, recent receipt of Allowance Parts Lists for specific craft/components has been a positive factor in obtaining FSN's. Past part number lists submitted to Saigon and subsequently returned with FSN's has helped, but is time consuming. A cross reference file had been compiled locally of part numbers ordered coupled with an FSN when the part number is received.

(b) A standardized form "MAP Material Request" has been introduced which provides for the recording of all known data of a requirement. When subsequently ordered by HEDTC Saigon, it is returned to MNK for posting of Due In's for stock records and identifies the material on receipt.

(c) Due to RANK requirements of an itemized letter report of all receipts, streamlining of local procedure is not presently possible.
(d) U.S. Navy stock record cards have been introduced into the MNK Logistical system. Conversion of MNK stock records (approximately 10,000) is proceeding rapidly. USN stock cards represent the initial loads for P&H's and LCM6's. Expected receipt procedures were accomplished satisfactorily and actual receipt and recording of material went well. So far there has been little demand activity, so usage data is rather slim.

3. Future Plans

a. Naval Organization

(1) To be able to exercise effective actions both in times of peace and war, and to dispose of these valuable potentials, MNK is counting on an effective total of 25,000 men at the end of June 1978, with the following forces of 16 ships on the high seas and 650 small units and boats.

(2) Personnel

(a) With an effective base of 7,000 men which will be realized in June 1972, MNK will proceed to recruit 3,000 men per year.

(b) The ratio of officers to men will be 1 to 20 and of petty officers to men 1 to 6.

(3) Infrastructure

(a) At the end of June 1978, MNK will have the following shore based establishments:

3 principal bases
11 Secondary bases
8 Coastal batteries
10 lookout posts

Security will be assured by regional companies of Marines with an overall strength of 8,000.

b. Principal Missions: No change.

c. MNK Training

(1) In view of supplying valuable personnel to the boats and shore units, MNK hopes to realize the effective total as follows at the end of June 1972:

(a) Officers - 432
(b) Petty Officers - 1616
(c) Crew - 4952
(d) Total - 7,000
(2) The partitioning of personnel in the various units is found in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Officer</th>
<th>Petty Officer</th>
<th>Crew</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 71</td>
<td>364 (1)</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>3,136</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End Jun 72</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>1616</td>
<td>4952</td>
<td>7,000 (2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Taking as a ratio: one officer for 20 men, one petty officer for 6 men, we have an excess of officers and petty officers.

1) The figure 364 represents the number of officers already active, comprising 1.8 student officers who will graduate from school near the end of September 1971.

2) Up to the end of June 1972, we have a deficit of 2000 men, which is to be obtained in the space of 15 months.

d. Repair Capabilities

(1) In Fiscal Year 1972 it is planned to improve the facilities at Chruï Chang War and Ream, and MNK plans new facilities at Neak Loeung, Kompong Chhnang and Kaam Sam War. Specifically the planned improvements to existing repair facilities and MNK's planned establishment of new facilities will be as follows:

(a) At Chruï Chang War:

Fiberglass Repair Shop
5 Ton Overhead Crane in the Engine Shop
30 Ton Mobile Crane
Additional Shop Equipment

(b) At Ream:

30 Ton Mobile Crane
New Pier
Gyro Compass Repair Shop
50 Ton and 600 Ton Marine Railway
Additional Shop Equipment

(c) At Neak Loeung, two shop buildings consisting of a machine shop, an ordnance shop, an electrical shop, a welding shop and a carpentry shop.

(d) At Kompong Chhnang, one shop building consisting of a machine shop, a welding shop and a battery charging shop.

(e) At Kaam Sam; same as Kompong Chhnang.
In addition a mobile repair base is planned. It is especially designed to provide sustained support for river patrol boats.

The base is composed of six sections, four with superstructures measuring 110 feet by 30 feet and two smaller units 60 X 30 feet. The larger units provide berthing, office and repair spaces while the smaller ones serve as floating piers and fuel storage containers.

The base is a self-contained support craft. It can operate for a minimum of thirty days without being resupplied and can produce fresh water at a rate of 15,000 gallons a day. Complete repair facilities are on board to do anything from changing an engine to repairing the hull of one of the fiberglass craft.

The craft has a sufficiently shallow draft to be moved virtually anywhere in Cambodia on the major rivers and the great lake.

At the end of Fiscal Year 1972, there will still be a limited capability for overhaul of LCM's and LCU's, but complete repair can be made to all other craft. Minor repairs will be able to be accomplished at Neak Loung, Kompong Chhnang, and Kam San Bar, without requiring return of the craft to Phnom Penh. A major repair base is envisioned in the future at the great lake, with other minor facilities at Kratie and Kompong Cham.

It must be emphasized that all repair personnel are well qualified in their specialties, and the current technical training of new personnel is adequate to meet a modern expansion of LCM repair facilities.

C. Programmed Assets (FY 72)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Craft</th>
<th>On 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 LCM</td>
<td>4 Sep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 LCU</td>
<td>1 Sep and 1 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 LKU</td>
<td>1 Sep - 1 Jan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 LGU</td>
<td>6 Sep, 2 Oct - 2 Jan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 LCW</td>
<td>1 Oct - 1 Mar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 LGU</td>
<td>1 Oct - 1 Jan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 LCM-6</td>
<td>1 Nov and 1 Dec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 LCM-6</td>
<td>3 Sep, 7 Nov, 13 Jan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 LCK</td>
<td>2 Oct - 2 Dec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 LCB</td>
<td>1 Jan and 1 Feb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 YTL</td>
<td>1 Jan and 1 Feb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 YTJ</td>
<td>1 Feb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 XSF</td>
<td>1 Dec - 1 Aug and 3 Sep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Armed Junks</td>
<td>4 Oct - 4 Dec and 2 Jan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
f. **Logistics:**

(1) **Immediate projects** for improvement of the ARVN logistics system are the identification of all materials on hand to Federal Stock Numbers, and conversion of stock records to U.S. Navy type records.

(2) **Longer range projects** will be the complete re-warehousing of material by Federal groups. Additionally, more warehouse men will be assigned and more warehouse space will be assigned.

4. **Project Safe Pier:**

a. What started off as a project to construct an ammunition unloading facility on the Chrol Chang War Peninsula has turned into a full port improvement project for Phnom Penh. Considering this project to be in the military related fund area, over five million dollars have been requested for port improvement, broken down as follows:

    - 2 Delong Piers: $2,000,000
    - 12 Forklifts (7000 lbs): $134,400
    - 2 Forklifts (1500 lbs): $35,000
    - 10 Truck mounted cranes (20 tons): $436,000
    - 2 Tugs (150 hp): $50,000
    - 1 Floating Crane (60 ton): $200,000
    - 6 Conveyor Belts: $50,000
    - 1 Sand Dredge: $50,000
    - 5 Radios: $2,500

    **Installation and Misc:** $1,722,000

    **TOTAL:** $5,233,000

    *This improvement to the port will quadruple its handling capability.*

5. **Mekong Special Zone**

a. The Mekong Special Zone had been established mainly to provide security for Route 1, and the Mekong River. It is comprised of 14 Companies of the Fourth Brigade, and commanded by Colonel Srey Meas.

b. A high priority has been placed on equipment requirements for these forces. They have one of the top priorities in next fiscal years program (72).

c. Colonel Srey Meas is presently constructing 9 fixed positions along the Mekong on both sides of the river north of Neak Leung. He plans in the future to construct 6 more positions and increase his forces.
PUBLIC AFFAIRS

22 January 1971

1. Security:

The disastrous results of the 22 Jan 71 attack on Da Nang AB stand as a monument to the lack of security plans and procedures in VVAF. During this attack a squad of 11-15 sappers, the entire MiG and foreign jet fighter inventory plus numerous cargo and support aircraft were destroyed. Two hangars and all other key buildings on the base were destroyed as well as the major ammunition dump. Security at other VVAF Air Bases was comparable.

2. L, M, and N:

For all intents and purposes no logistic planning capability existed. An extremely limited budget provided only day by day emergency purchases of supplies and materials. The aircraft maintenance capability was limited to an organizational (O:) level with skill levels of 1, 4 and a very few 5 level mechanics. No field (F) maintenance capability existed. The supply system had ceased to function in 1965. However 3 large warehouses full of untrained aircraft parts for B-52s, etc. and a wide variety of foreign aircraft was located on Da Nang AB.

23 January 1971

1. Security:

a. On 23 January a study was performed of the defense construction requirements for Da Nang AB, by a team of specialists from 347th AF under the direction of Colonel L. Whitley. A detailed plan was developed including blue prints and materials lists. This plan was approved in amended form by U.S. Ambassador and General Lon Nol for implementation. Materials were requisitioned and construction began within a few days of the new year. Since that time progress has been steady with occasional work stoppages due to lack of transportation for materials into this country. Currently all perimeter triple concertina wire, 12 guard towers and 13 of 44 Armored revetments have been completed. In addition 12 expedient revetments constructed of 55 gallon drums and sandbags have been erected for 5-10 and Mi-1 type aircraft. Individual fighting positions and small bunkers are located at close intervals entirely around the perimeter. One 512 man security battalion has been trained in Vietnam and has assumed security duties at this station. 400 4-man arms have been provided to arm additional base personnel who augment the security battalion.
b. On 27 February a 7th Air Force team surveyed Lattamabang A3 to determine the construction requirements. Again a detailed plan was developed complete with bills of materials. This plan was approved 3 March and the materials ordered. To date no materials have been delivered for this project. Due to the initiative of the Air Base Commander much improvement has been made against sapper type attacks. A six foot high barbed wire fence has been erected around the perimeter, individual fighting positions and bunker positions ring the inside of the perimeter, several guard towers have been erected, a mobile reaction force has been organized and a good communications network established. Further, an outstanding coordinated plan between the WMK base commander and the SAK (Army) military region commander has been developed. All available automatic and heavy weapons have been emplaced and all available troops have been armed and trained. No attacks by G/K/A troops have occurred at this base.

c. On March 19th an AVK team was dispatched to team A4 to perform a survey of this airfield and to develop a defense construction plan. This team was only provided a USAF Civil Engineer as an observer. A plan was developed, complete with blue prints and a bill of materials. The project at this base will require a great deal of engineer construction effort. Coordination between SAK engineers and AVK is continuing on a weekly basis as this project progresses. No materials have been delivered for this project at this time.

1. In addition the initial planning is underway for the development of defenses of airfields at Siem Reap and Kompong Cham during FY 72.

2. L, M and N:

   a. Logistic planning efforts are being undertaken. Very little capability for this type of work exists among the A3 personnel. They have identified a few people with some talent in this type work and are slowly developing some logistic plans.

   b. Maintenance capability has increased somewhat. Through out country training and some limited CJF instruction by the 3 man Air America Team, a limited operational maintenance capability has been developed to support the small inventory of possessed aircraft. The main thrust of this effort has been in producing a small tactical air strike capability as well as a tactical airlift and Medivac in country capability. A plan for upgrading AVK maintenance capability was submitted and initial action to prepare a program to support this plan was undertaken to begin in FY72. The plan consists of three phases. Phase one involves the development of a capability to support 76 strengths. During this phase, emphasis will be placed on training for aircraft general mechanics, the procurement of individual general aircraft mechanical tool kits and Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE). Phase two involves the development of a field maintenance (FM) capability with the appropriate branches and shops. Emphasis will be placed on technical specialists training, procurement of specialized tools and the equipping of FM shops. Phase three consists of expanding on the FM capability, on an item by item basis to develop a depot level maintenance capability within the limits of indigenous military and commercial sources.
in support of phase one, training of OM mechanics for O-11, P-47H and U-1A aircraft has been initiated. 30 Aircraft general tool kits have been delivered and the remainder are on order. No ATE equipment has been delivered but adequate amounts to support the projected 33 for FY 72 have been ordered.

c. In support of phase two, surveys of the provision, aero re air, sheet metal, electrical, hydraulic, instrument and armorment shops have been conducted by experienced specialists in these individual areas from 7th AF HQ. These specialists have prepared reports indicating the existing and recommended level of facilities, machinery and equipment, special tools, individual tool kits, materials and stocks, training and technical publications. Further action has been undertaken in that two of the specialists have returned to country and observed the implementation of their recommendations in the instrument and electrical shops. Upgrading to FM operational level in these two shops is forecast for August.

d. The supply problem was approached on a three phase program also. The first phase was a complete rewarehousing project. Identification and inventory of the materials on hand followed by the removal of all foreign and extraneous items was the first step. Due to the huge volume of items, the lack of trained supply technicians and the absence of technical publications this project has progressed very slowly. In the process several millions of dollars worth of serviceable and repairable aircraft parts and engines have been discovered. To date the large bulky items and the majority of the foreign parts have been identified and removed from the warehouses. Phase two is the reusing of the warehouse locations by Federal Stock Codes, the relocation of the in-country resources in accordance with the codes and a concurrent inventory of material on hand. Phase three will involve the input of new U.S. MAF material to support the US aircraft and equipment. Phase one is approximately 50% complete, 30% of phase two is complete and the initial requisitions for 14 day levels of new material for phase three began 25 May. Supply specialists G/J type training is being conducted concurrent with the project.

PROJECTED

1. Security:

a. The construction of security defenses at Fuchtning are forecast to proceed in a satisfactory manner with the determining factor being the support provided by F/RK engineers. The major portion of the required materials are on hand. Only the materials required for the perimeter lighting and the matting for the second revetted area are still outstanding. At current rate of progress the project will be completed by 1 September. The personnel situation is not as promising. Only one of the 3 required battalions for this base has been trained and the forecast for procurement and training of additional security personnel remains uncertain since it is controlled by ARM.
b. The project at Battambang has been on work stoppage for material since March. Forecast deliveries indicate the majority of the materials will arrive in the next 60-90 days. Past experience indicates the progress at this location will be very rapid with the construction being completed in three to six months. Once again the procurement and training of security personnel will lag well behind the construction program.

c. The key to the successful implementation of the first phase of the Lon Noi Plan. Until AVNK can operate fighter bombers, forward air controllers and gunships out of this location, operations along the lines of communications in southwest Cambodia cannot be readily supported nor these areas kept under constant air surveillance. Materials are on order for this location. They can be delivered in bulk via sea direct to Kompong Som. The primary restraint will be the lack of an engineering effort required to prepare this site for activation. Current estimates by their engineers indicate six months of work after the construction begins. This latter date has not been established.

d. The formal surveys and the detailed planning for the additional bases at Siem Reap and Kompong Cham are scheduled for June of 71. Materials for these sites have already been programmed in the 72 MAC plan.

2. L, M and S:

a. Logistic programming remains a major problem in AVNK. Lack of trained logistic personnel, complacency due to the presence of U.S. personnel and the flow of material without an effort on their part to plan and program will inhibit the development of any in-house capability. The minimal token effort being accomplished will not greatly improve until some firmer and more productive approach is made to this problem by AVNK.

b. The maintenance upgrading will proceed satisfactorily now that a firm foundation for the development has been established. Inputs for logistical planning and programming have been made by the survey's performed by 7th AF. The continued build up of the ON and EM capability is assumed by the programmed training of personnel, the input of tools and equipment, and the upgrading of physical facilities. To date this area is by far the strongest and best organized of any function in AVNK.

c. The supply system development will continue to progress in a satisfactory manner after the initial major reorganization and rewarehousing is completed. Again a firm foundation has been established and the operating system designed to interface with that of the U.S. and other SEA supply systems. Training of personnel will most likely be the primary restraint. As the program progresses from phase one and two to phase three it will be essential that a close surveillance of supply requisitions be maintained to avoid exceeding authorized and desired stock levels.

d. Material deliveries have been confined basically to those required for airfield security construction. Aircraft insertion has been limited by the lack of security to 5 additional H-19's to provide medivac, 15 C-130's to support the establishment of a viable Tactical Air Control System, 2 additional C-47's and 8 U-1A for expanded airlift capability.
e. In summary, the foundation has been laid for the rapid expansion of AVNK to a 7000 man tactical air force, which should be fully capable of supporting the military operations in Cambodia during Phase one of the Lon Nol plan.

TRAINING:

1. The presidentially directed program of reconstitution of the AVNK force structure presented extremely complicated training requirements to meet proposed air craft insertion time tables and insure the Cambodian forces had the capabilities to utilize the equipment upon receipt.

2. A new and unique pilot training program was developed first. A basic program of 60 flying hours over a 90 day period was begun in mid February at Battambang Air Base. Upon completion of this phase all pilot trainees are then directed into the various specialized aircraft requirements i.e. T-28D fighters, C-47 transport, C-13 Forward Air Control and so forth. The training is then continued in much the same manner as the Army Air Corp trained pilots in early World War II. The trainees are utilized as co pilots in their assigned aircraft, working with fully qualified pilots, for a period of 4 1/2 months. The students are then upgraded to operationally ready pilots by the use of instructor pilots for the next 4 1/2 months. By utilizing close command and scheduling control, the Huner Air Force has the capability to train an adequate number of pilots to provide a minimum of one crew/aircraft, minimum to maintain a CI combat ready rating, through July 1972. At this point in time, pilot output will exceed requirements and a crew ratio of 1.7/aircraft should be attained by March 1973. Utilizing a nine month input lead time, a revised training program can be instituted to give more detailed formalized basic, pilot training, 120 hours, prior to specialization to produce higher quality end products. Due to the language difficulties, high cost, and extremely long lead times required by third country training the above plan was adopted as the most responsive to Khmer requirements.

3. The training to fill technical specialty requirements was met with a three phase plan.

a. The most qualified technicians were selected, by specialty, for upgrade training in new U.S. supplied aircraft and equipment. These small cadre were then sent to South Vietnam for training with U.S. units. Every effort was made to insure an English speaking capability to limit interpreter requirements. Upon completion of training, these personnel are then utilized as CTI instructors and supervisors to qualify all other personnel.

b. A requirement for a total of 40 additional technicians was established to support the anticipated increased maintenance and supply workloads. To accomplish this, Montanna Air Base developed temporary classroom facilities and training plans. The classroom instruction began in late February 1971 and was completed 30 April 1971. These students are now working as CTI trainees, in groups, by specialties for a period of 60
days. Upon completion, these personnel will have reached 3 level skills and can be utilized as individual team mechanics under continuing CJT programs to improve skill levels.

c. Battambang Air Base reinstituted their technical training courses to provide the additional supervisory personnel, officer and NCO, to control the increased number of support personnel. As a result, AVK will have the technically qualified personnel in the numbers required to effectively utilize the aircraft and equipment on the current insertion programs scheduled through FY 72.

OPERA VNS:

1. As discussed earlier in this report, the effectiveness of the tactical operations of AVK was marginal to unsatisfactory in early February 1971. The daily average sortie rate by strike aircraft was six per day. Normally 3 preplanned strikes at 1000, 1400, and 1600 were their daily strike effort. The data upon which these strikes were selected was generally 4 days and often over a week old. The results of the strikes were highly questionable. There were no forward air controllers to direct strikes, conduct visual recon or coordinate with ground commanders.

2. The immediate requirement for forward air controllers was met by training 3 FAC pilots in OI-5 aircraft in South Vietnam to double as FAC and FAC lns. Initially four OI-5 aircraft were inserted in March 1971 and the FAC program began in earnest. The first three FAC pilots upgraded two additional pilots and 3 additional OI-5 aircraft were inserted. Cambodian FAC pilots would the Cambodian Special Military Region daily and were responsible to conduct all airstrikes by Cambodian fighters. By virtue of their new daily, contact with ground commanders in their area of responsibility, AVK became more responsive to ground requirements. The shift from preplanned airstrikes on outdated intelligence was able to immediate airstrikes in support of ground operations and remaining preplanned targets were hit on the basis of current verified intelligence. FAC sortie rates tripled with no increase of aircraft from 6 per day to 18 per day and often 24 per day.

3. Airlift capabilities were in need. Although six C-47s were in the inventory in flyable condition, our management and control left low utilization rates. That little airlift was available was normally used up by AVK requirements. By simple management adjustments and better planning, AVK was able to improve the utilization of airlift to the point that it now has the capability to support the majority of its in country requirements at present levels. The problem still existing is FAC not utilizing and not often aware of the AVK capabilities. That problem will be discussed in part of the next section.
AIR OPERATIONS CONTROL CENTER

1. In order to effectively control and utilize all resources, AVK needed some form of centralized control. This requirement was met with the development of an air operations control center located at AVK headquarters and Tactical Air Control units at each of the active airfields. In addition TACs are programmed for each new airfield as these fields become operational as forward operating locations in FY 72. These sites will all be tied together by communications via the MIL-103 radio pallet consisting of GFR, VHF, MF, and HF radios. The command and control procedures are modeled after the system presently utilized by 7th Air Force in Japan.

Vietnam and is compatible to insure continued support by all allied Air Forces operating in Southeast Asia. In addition to AVK personnel manning the control center, a PAK 52, 34, 35 and one senior officer for validation and clearance authority for airstrike requests are permanently assigned to the center. This will accomplish two-fold results, insure response to PAK as to the capabilities and effective utilization of these capabilities offered by AVK.

2. The AVK is now in the process of detaching an AG that can be completely controlled by AVK resources. This program will operate in size to preclude requiring assistance from 7th Air Force sources. The primary purpose is to establish command and control procedures and techniques to prepare for the complete control of all air assets supporting Cambodian. The FAC "A" aircraft will no longer be utilized by 7th Air Force and the FAC at Da Nang would merely respond to requests received from the AG. As Cambodian FACs were established, the tactical AGs will be expanded so that AVK would not only exercise command and control but also have tactical responsibility for the entire country. It would use allied aircraft to support their requirements only when Cambodian resources were not capable to meet demands. The goals at present are for the AG to be prepared for command and control of air resources in Cambodia by 1 January 1972. Current available force structure figures indicate that complete tactical control by AVK resources alone are far into the future and no definite time frame has been established.

CHALLENGE AND NEEDS

1. Virtually a complete reorganization of command and staff functions were required to obtain effective utilization of AVK resources. Upon arrival in country the Air Force was in reality controlled by one man. If he were not available no decisions or actions could be taken.

2. Recommendations to Colonel R. J. Batte in the methods required to restructure his command and staff, he requested and was provided organizational and function charts upon which FAC Air Force units are based. The resulting reorganization is a great improvement especially in the delegation of authority. Job titles are generally quite dissimilar from FAC positions, but functions are normally compatible and foresee no difficulties in coordination and cooperation.
PROJECT AIMS:

There are no problem areas that cannot be overcome with time. The main difficulty in training, and this process is extremely slow due to English language capability being critical, third country assistance is not responsive in the time frame required. Therefore immediate training must be accomplished in country to meet the more immediate requirements with shorter term supplemental training accomplished out country. Current programs indicate that AVWX will have reached the point of self sufficiency in this area by mid 1972.

OTHER COMMENTS:

A complete detailed report on each project completed or in progress in the operations and training field is on file in the AVWX section, AECOM(705), record.