Mr. Paul F. Pineo  
Federation of American Scientists  
307 Massachusetts Avenue, NE  
Washington, DC 20002

Dear Mr. Pineo:

This responds to your March 22, 1994, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for a copy of the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) Special Defense Acquisition Fund Fiscal Year 1993 Annual Report to the Congress. Our April 7 interim response refers.

DSAA has provided the enclosed record as responsive to your request. Mr. Glenn A. Rudd, Deputy Director, an Initial Denial Authority, has determined that the blackened portions are exempt from release. The exempt material is currently and properly classified in accordance with Executive Order 12356, Section 1.3, (a)(1), concerning military plans, weapons, or operations; and, Section 1.3, (a)(3), concerning foreign government information. Accordingly, this material has been withheld pursuant to Title 5 USC 552 (b)(1).

You have a right to appeal Mr. Rudd's decision to withhold this information. Any such appeal should offer justification to support an additional release and should be received in this Directorate within 60 calendar days of this letter's date.

There are no chargeable costs for processing this request in this instance.

Sincerely,

D. J. Blakeslee  
Acting Director  
Freedom of Information and Security Review

Enclosure

Ref: 94-F-0810
DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY
SPECIAL DEFENSE ACQUISITION FUND
ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS
FY 1993

TAB A  SEC 53 (a)(1)  SDAF FY 1993 PROCUREMENTS
TAB B  SEC 53 (a)(2)  SDAF FY 1994 PLANNED PROCUREMENTS
TAB C  SEC 53 (a)(3)  SDAF FY 1993 SALES
TAB D  SEC 53 (a)(4)  SDAF FUND EVALUATION
TAB E  SUPPORTING FACT SHEETS FOR MAJOR ITEMS TAB A
TAB F  FY 1993 IMPLEMENTED CASES FOR TAB C
TAB G  REPLENISHMENT SALES AND RECOUPMENTS FOR TAB C
### SDAF FY 1991 PROGRAM

<table>
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<tr>
<th>ITEM DESCRIPTION</th>
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<th>QUANTITY</th>
<th>PROGRAM VALUE</th>
<th>OBLIGATED IN FY 1993</th>
<th>OBLIGATED TOTAL</th>
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<td><strong>APACHE AH-64A Helicopter Support</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APACHE TADS</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3,446,750.00</td>
<td>50,000.00</td>
<td>50,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APACHE Helmet Unit</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>693,977.16</td>
<td>42,884.64</td>
<td>42,884.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UH-1H Helicopter (Rehab)</strong></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22,236,739.80</td>
<td>21,196,137.98</td>
<td>21,196,137.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>31,097,605.96</strong></td>
<td><strong>26,009,161.62</strong></td>
<td><strong>26,009,161.62</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Rescission of $55 M was effective in Oct 93 and will be reflected in the annual report next year.
SPECIAL DEFENSE ACQUISITION FUND (SDAF) FY 1994-95 PROCUREMENT PLANNING DECISIONS:

As part of the non-defense discretionary program savings in the FY 1994 budget, the administration eliminated the obligation authority for the SDAF FY 1994. By eliminating the authority to obligate, significant savings in the budget will occur in the outyears as disbursements decline and the receipts from sales continue. This action is in accordance with the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1994 (P.L. 103-87).

As obligations were not authorized beyond the FY 1993 program there is no FY 1994 procurement plan.
FY 1993 SALES ANALYSIS

# of SDAF Cases: 133  --  $ Value of SDAF Cases: $171.77M

- 10 Countries with Largest $ Value of SDAF Cases:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>$ Value of SDAF Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>$65.3M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>$26.6M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>$18.0M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>$13.7M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>$12.3M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>$10.4M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>$5.7M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>$3.2M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>$2.2M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>$1.7M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 10 Countries with Greatest # of SDAF Cases:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th># of SDAF Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- % of SDAF Sales Cases by Region:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>$ Value of SDAF Cases</th>
<th>% of Sales</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Asia/Pacific</td>
<td>$71.54M (41.6%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe (incl. Canada)</td>
<td>$24.56M (14.3%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Near East/South Asia</td>
<td>$58.56M (34.1%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>$1.90M (01.1%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American</td>
<td>$15.21M (08.9%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>$171.77M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The largest programs involved the sales of Standard Missiles valued at $42.84M to Taiwan; Patriot Missiles valued at $24.26M to Saudi Arabia; and TOW 2A Missiles and Kuwait.

Equally important are SDAF sales of critical lower dollar value items to friends and allies of the US. Secure communications items were sold to NATO in order to insure NATO interoperability of secure communications. Small arms, ammunition, night vision goggles, and tactical radios were sold to Bolivia, Colombia and Ecuador for drug interdiction programs. Patrol boats were also sold to Senegal in support of biodiversity.

Replenishment Sales and Recoupments:

#: 42  --  $ Value: $27.4M

Details of these sales are outlined at TAB G.
SECTION 53 (A)(4)

FY 1993 SPECIAL DEFENSE ACQUISITION FUND EVALUATION

TRADITIONAL SDAF:

The Special Defense Acquisition Fund supports significant foreign policy advantages by providing early and economical delivery of U.S. manufactured equipment to friends and allies, enhancing their security, while protecting U.S. readiness. While U.S. forces are withdrawing worldwide, resulting in excessing of some equipment, the changing roles of the Defense Department and close friends and allies of the U.S. require differing types and quantities of material.

During FY 1993, SDAF procured small boats, secure communications equipment to support interoperability with NATO and other allies, HMMWV vehicles, Standard ship-to-air missiles, Harpoon air-to-surface or surface-to-surface missiles, tactical radios, and conventional ammunition. The fund also continued with the refurbishment of UH-1H helicopters and the program to procure replacement F-5 aircraft structural components.

ANTI-NARCOTICS:

SDAF has been procuring items specifically intended to support counternarcotics efforts and drug eradication efforts since FY 1989 pursuant to Section 51 (a) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). Sales during FY 1993 to Bolivia, Colombia, and Ecuador include ammunition, small arms and machine guns, and night vision support equipment. In anticipation of continuing counternarcotics requirements, in FY 1993 SDAF procured small boats, aviation ground support equipment, tactical radios, small arms ammunition, and vehicles, and continued the refurbishment of UH-1H helicopters.

BIODIVERSITY:

SDAF contributed to biodiversity efforts in FY 1993 by selling two 51 foot patrol boats to Senegal, along with mounted machine guns.

SUPPORT OF FIELDED EQUIPMENT:

As in previous years, SDAF is supporting equipment previously provided to friendly governments through sales, leases, and assistance programs by purchasing ammunition, missiles, and ground support equipment. SDAF is continuing to fund the development of additional replacement components for the worldwide F-5 fighter fleet. This permits the F-5 to remain operational, decreasing the need to introduce higher technology aircraft in new regions.
CURRENT FUND STATUS:

With the decision to decapitalize the fund beginning with FY 1994, and the rescission of $65 million of FY 1993 obligation authority, new procurements in FY 1993 were slowed. As these will be the final procurements for the fund, priorities for certain programs changed. Because of this, funding was accelerated for the F-5 system to complete the planned multiyear procurement. Since the political climate in the world is also changing, the traditional programs funded through SDAF are no longer needed, such as missile systems and howitzers. New acquisition programs for the FY 1993 funding were scrutinized carefully to ensure continued requirements.

SUMMATION:

Since FY 1982, SDAF has been an important tool in meeting the defense requirements for friendly governments while maintaining the U.S. inventories by preventing diversions. The numbers of withdrawals and diversions from U.S. stocks diminished significantly with the infusion of funding for anticipated urgent foreign requirements. SDAF was a key to immediate satisfaction of material needed by allies during Desert Storm operations, preventing diversion of equipment urgently needed by U.S. troops. The fund has fully served the original intent as authorized by Congress, and continues through sales to contribute to the favorable outcomes for U.S. foreign policies and defense objectives.
THE FOLLOWING ARE FACT SHEETS ON THE MAJOR END ITEMS PURCHASED IN FY 1993.
ITEM: AIM-9S SIDEWINDER MISSILE

DESCRIPTION: The AIM-9S Sidewinder is a fire and forget, air-to-air missile capable of Mach 2.5+. The Sidewinder can be launched from the major fighter aircraft in the U.S. inventory including the F-4, F-14, F-15, F-16, and F-18, and from foreign built Harriers and Tornados. Since 1985 the SDAF has purchased 2,100 missiles (9M version). All of the missiles are committed to FMS sales. The AIM-9S is the same as the AIM-9M less guidance control system counter-counter measures capability. The Sidewinder has been repeatedly requested by foreign governments in emergency situations, including Egypt, Israel, Korea, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, UAE, and UK. These countries have requested and received missiles on an immediate basis from either the SDAF or USN/USAF inventories. The SDAF is purchasing 375 missiles (9S version) to meet some of the anticipated requirements, and a limited amount of support/test equipment.

PROGRAM DATA:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
<th>$ VALUE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>35,392,733</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

POTENTIAL CUSTOMERS: Finland, Israel, Korea, Saudi Arabia, and Taiwan.
ITEM: F-5 COMPONENT UPGRADE

DESCRIPTION: Twenty-three foreign countries have purchased F-5 aircraft. About 1,000 continue to receive U.S.A. support especially in the coordination of inventory-wide maintenance requirements and in the resolution of safety of flight issues. The F-5E/F is a very cost effective aircraft that presently sells for approximately $8M. Aircraft sophistication, limited support equipment requirements, and low flying hour costs make this an ideal self defense fighter and/or lead in fighter for many nations with restricted budgets.

In the SDAF FY 1992 F-5 structural component upgrade program, the SDAF procured lower and upper longeron, and bulkhead replacement kits. As a continuation to the F-5 program in FY 1993, SDAF is procuring 25 wing sets, additional longeron kits, and horizontal stabilizers for a total of $37,625,000. It is expected that these components will be sold within the next five years.

PROGRAM DATA:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY</th>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
<th>$ VALUE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>F-5 Wing Sets</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>Upper Longeron Kits E/F</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>Upper Longeron Kits A/B</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>2,125,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>Lower Longeron Kits A/B/F</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>Horizontal Stabilizer A/B/E/F</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>Upper Longeron Engr Service</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>Lower Longeron Engr Service</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>Bulkhead Modification Kit</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>1,631,545</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

POTENTIAL CUSTOMERS: Taiwan, Singapore, Tunisia, Indonesia, Thailand, Brazil, Greece, Korea, Philippines, Spain, Turkey, and Honduras.
ITEM: HAWKEYE T56-A-427 Engine

DESCRIPTION: The E-2C HAWKEYE is an all-weather, carrier-based airborne early warning system and command and control aircraft, with additional missions including surface surveillance coordination, strike and interceptor control, search and rescue guidance, and communications relay. The E-2C HAWKEYE is the only user of the T56-A-427 engine, which was production installed in Navy aircraft produced after 1986. Production of the E-2C HAWKEYE ends after completion of the FY 1992 buy; however, the Navy will continue to operate their HAWKEYES until 2015. The Navy will upgrade their older models, which includes retrofit of the T56-A-427 engine. We anticipate that current FMS HAWKEYE users will want to upgrade their aircraft with the same package as the U.S. Navy.

The SDAF purchase bridges the production gap and maintains the engine line over the FY 1993 production cycle. Engine procurements in 1994 are scheduled to support the U.S. Navy retrofit program. This should save the Navy an estimated $3-5M in shutdown/restart costs.

The nine engines being purchased by the SDAF will allow the FMS users to initiate modernization of their aircraft coincident with the U.S. Navy.

PROGRAM DATA:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
<th>$ VALUE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

POTENTIAL CUSTOMERS: Egypt, Israel, Japan, and Singapore.
ITEM: UH-1H HELICOPTER REFURBISHMENT

DESCRIPTION: The UH-1H Helicopter is a medium-lift utility aircraft used in air rescue, civilian support, medical evacuation, and troop movement. It is used throughout the world, and is particularly useful in areas of rough terrain where air transportation is necessary.

The cost of new helicopters, currently, is too high for many foreign countries facing insurgencies or external threats. The acquisition of used but refurbished helicopters is less expensive and a practical solution to their needs.


In 1993 SDAF procured an additional 10 helicopters which completes SDAF’s participation in the contract with a total of 140 UH-1H refurbished SDAF helicopters. The 10 SDAF helicopters have been requested and placed on an FMS case awaiting country signature. Of the 140 helicopters, 98 have been delivered, 22 are in various stages of production or are awaiting delivery, and 20 have FMS cases being prepared, but are not yet signed.

PROGRAM DATA:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8,420,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>24,868,732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>23,580,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4,236,760</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

POTENTIAL CUSTOMERS: Oman and Jordan.
FY 93 SDAF PROGRAM
FACT SHEET

ITEM: APACHE SUPPORT

DESCRIPTION: Several support items are required for the eight Apache helicopters purchased in FY 1992 by the SDAF. In the FY 1993 program, SDAF is procuring five support items for a total of $5,921,657.00. Delivery should be coincident with the delivery of the SDAF Apaches. The items could also be sold as spares for other Apache customers if not required by the country purchasing the SDAF helicopters. These items have long leadtimes, and are essential spares for the operation of the Apaches.

The Target Acquisition and Designation Sight (TADS) provides the copilot/gunner with capabilities for target search, detection, recognition, and laser designation by means of direct-view optics, television, and forward-looking infrared sensors that may be used singly or in combination depending on tactical or weather/visibility conditions.

The Captive Boresight Kit (CBK) ensures that the 30MM automatic gun, external stores racks, Pilot Night Vision Sensor (PNVS), and Target Acquisition and Designation Sight (TADS) are properly aligned with the aircraft so that the munitions will be delivered accurately on target.

The Pilot Night Vision Sensor (PNVS) is a helicopter pilotage system that provides high resolution thermal imagery, enabling the pilot to fly nap-of-the-earth missions at night and in adverse weather, and to penetrate battlefield obscurants such as smoke and blowing dust or sand.

The Integrated Helmet and Display Sight System (IHADSS) are used by the pilot and copilot of the Apache for communication. The SDAF purchased 56 helmet units to meet a portion of the anticipated requirements.

PROGRAM DATA:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
<th>$ VALUE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TADS</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3,446,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBK</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>954,810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNVS</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>826,120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IHADSS</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>693,977</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

POTENTIAL CUSTOMERS: Greece, Israel, Korea, Saudi Arabia, and UAE.
ITEM: AMMUNITION

DESCRIPTION: Each year the SDAF has procured ammunition ranging in size from 5.56MM to 155MM. Selection criteria for procurement is based on foreign demand, U.S. inventory levels, production line status, and lead time. In FY 1993, DSAA procured three types of ammunition for a total of $4,996,575.

The Cartridge, 30MM: HEDP, M789 HIGH EXPLOSIVE DUAL PURPOSE ammunition was designed for the 30MM Automatic Cannon - Chain Gun M230 used on the Apache helicopter.

The Cartridge, 40MM: Practice, M781 is a fixed, practice-type ammunition designed to be fired from 40MM Grenade Launchers M79 and M203 (attached to the M16 series rifle).

The AN-M8 HC smoke hand grenade is used to generate white smoke for screening activities of small units. It is also used for ground-to-air signalling.

PROGRAM DATA:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
<th>$ VALUE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30MM: M789</td>
<td>97,405</td>
<td>4,306,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40mm: M781</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>408,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMOKE GRENADE</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>282,300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

POTENTIAL CUSTOMERS: Central and South American countries, the Middle East, and NATO allies.
ITEM: AMMUNITION LOADER MAGAZINE BOX

DESCRIPTION: A select, but small number, of weapon support items have been procured by the SDAF to assist in the fielding and support of U.S. end items. In FY 1993, SDAF is purchasing eight magazine box ammunition loaders. The ammunition loaders are used to load and download bulk ammunition for the 30MM gun (Apache weapon).

PROGRAM DATA:

<table>
<thead>
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<th>QUANTITY</th>
<th>$ VALUE</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>189,976</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

POTENTIAL CUSTOMERS: Greece, Israel, Korea, Saudi Arabia, and UAE.
ITEM: AVIATION PETROLEUM TEST KIT

DESCRIPTION: The Aviation Petroleum Test Kit is used to determine temperature and API gravity, free water content, and particulate contaminants in aviation fuels in conjunction with operating the Forward Area Refueling Equipment (FARE). The Test Kits are crucial for detecting fuel contaminants in remote and forward battle areas where the FAREs are deployed in support of aviation equipment.

Fifty FARE systems were previously purchased by the SDAF in FY 1990. The Aviation Petroleum Test Kits being procured by SDAF will be used with these FAREs or to meet other open requirements.

PROGRAM DATA:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
<th>$ VALUE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>240,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

POTENTIAL CUSTOMERS: Central and South American countries, Philippines, Greece, Korea, and Middle East countries.
### Fiscal Year Sales Summary Report

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FMS Case</th>
<th>Case Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>AT-B-JAM</td>
<td>81MM C256</td>
<td>2,859,600.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT-B-JAM</td>
<td>GRENADE G963</td>
<td>58,009.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT-Q-JCX</td>
<td>COMSEC KG-84</td>
<td>7,412.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT-Q-JHE</td>
<td>COMSEC KY1ID</td>
<td>75,020.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT-Q-JIR</td>
<td>COMSEC KY1ID</td>
<td>7,502.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT-Q-JJF</td>
<td>COMSEC KY1ID</td>
<td>150,040.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT-Q-JJO</td>
<td>COMSEC KO118</td>
<td>852.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>AT-Q-JMG</td>
<td>COMSEC KY1ID</td>
<td>15,004.00</td>
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<td>AT-Q-JM</td>
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<tr>
<td>AT-Q-JZ</td>
<td>COMSEC KO118</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Total Australia</td>
<td>3,195,175.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>BA-B-JBI</td>
<td>M16A2 RIFLE, TOOL KITS SA</td>
<td>509,995.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA-B-JBK</td>
<td>5.56MM A059, 5.56MM A064</td>
<td>193,856.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>BA-B-JBI</td>
<td>RADIO PRC-77, NV GOGGLE TS, RAD1OGRM114B</td>
<td>29,672.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>BA-B-JBM</td>
<td>HYDRA 70</td>
<td>574,096.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA-Q-JWZ</td>
<td>A1H-7M</td>
<td>4,437,960.00</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Total Bahrain</td>
<td>5,745,579.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>BB-B-JAB</td>
<td>7.62MM A131, 40MM B546</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>BE-Q-JGV</td>
<td>COMSEC KY1ID</td>
<td>90,024.00</td>
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<td>BE-Q-JJL</td>
<td>COMSEC KY1ID, COMSEC KO118</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Total Belgium</td>
<td>215,694.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>BL-B-JAR</td>
<td>5.56MM A059, 5.56MM A062, 7.62MM A131, SIG ILL L314</td>
<td>76,871.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>BL-B-JAS</td>
<td>MACH GUN M60, GREN LCH 203, PISTOL, M9, M16A2 RIFLE. MACH GUN 249</td>
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<td>BL-B-JAT</td>
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<td>Total Bolivia</td>
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<tr>
<td>CI-B-JAB</td>
<td>UH-1 REHAB</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Total Chile</td>
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<tr>
<td>CA-B-JAC</td>
<td>MACH GUN M60</td>
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<tr>
<td>CN-Q-JVY</td>
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<td>Total Canada</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO-B-JBE</td>
<td>NV GOGGLE TS</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO-B-JBF</td>
<td>PISTOL, M9, TOOL KITS SA</td>
<td>786,303.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO-B-JBG</td>
<td>GRENADE G881, 9MM A363, 81MM C256, 40MM B546</td>
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**SPECIAL DEFENSE ACQUISITION FUND 12/21/93**

**FISCAL YEAR SALES SUMMARY REPORT**

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|          | Total Oman         |
| NC-Q-JAB | FLARE MJU-8        |
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| NE-Q-JZX | COMSEC/CV3591     |
|          | Total Netherlands  |
| N1-B-JAA | NV GOGGLE, NV GOGGLE TS |
|          | Total Nigeria      |
| NG-Q-JZA | COMSEC/CV3591     |
|          | Total Norway       |
| NZ-B-JAE | 155MM M286        |
| NZ-Q-JCW | COMSEC STU/B       |
| NZ-Q-JHV | COMSEC KY71D       |
| NZ-Q-JVS | COMSEC            |
|          | Total New Zealand  |
| PI-B-JAO | RADIO PRC126       |
|          | Total Philippines  |
| PT-B-JAM | MACH GUN M60, TOOL KITS SA |
| PT-B-UKQ | NV GOGGLE TS       |
|          | Total Portugal     |
| SK-Q-JAA | HEAT, SIFT 82-0031.01 STD PATROL CRAFT FAST-51' MK4 |
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**Total United Kingdom**

|             |                                                   | 118,916.00 |

**Total 93**

|             |                                                   | 171,509,308.00 |
## SPECIAL DEFENSE ACQUISITION FUND 12/21/93

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**TOTAL 93**

27,399,195.96
THE RELATIONSHIP OF POLITICAL DIVISIONS TO NATIONALITY
IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Statement of the Problem: To provide information on the question,

"To what extent do the present boundaries of the nations of the Middle East reflect the unity of the people within those boundaries toward the attainment of a common national goal?"

General Considerations Affecting National Unity

The modern history of the Middle East has been characterized by emerging nationalism seeking a natural ethnic and geographic context for itself. In the process, social pressures have been generated to reconcile nationalism with political boundaries which at present inadequately express the scope and complex configurations of the various types and degrees of national consciousness.

The problem of nationalism in the Middle East is manifestly a dichotomous one. It falls into two distinct categories according to demographic criteria. On the one hand is the phenomenon of Arab Nationalism, common to all the Arab peoples irrespective of political divisions into separate states, and which transcends the particularist nationalism of individual countries; on the other, is the more conventional nationalism found in the non-Arab countries, which is inherently restricted to a specific geographical area. In certain respects both are subsumed under Pan-Islam, the civilization that has given the entire area its unique character as a single cultural complex.1


Of the new ideas imported into the Middle East from the West, nationalism and political democracy have been the most radical. This new ideology, with its material and secular orientation and the emphasis it placed on ethnic and geographic factors, was in direct conflict with the traditions and historic development of Islam, which revolved around the concepts of religious universality, political theocracy, and exclusive sovereignty. Originally Islam was a religion; later it became a state; and finally evolved into a culture. Today all three aspects have been synthesized in Arab Nationalism, which has come to dominate the life of the Middle East, motivating and giving direction to the course of political events.2


Basically Arab Nationalism is amorphous and depends on context for its form and specificity. Though the Arabs are in many fundamental respects a national unit, and vis-a-vis the non-Arab world are conscious of a national affinity with other Arabs, they are not by any means a united people. Several factors contribute to this lack of unity.3

The prevailing socio-psychological conditions of the area are somewhat analogous to the situation in Europe during the Middle Ages. Rather than national loyalties defined by political institutions, loyalties are decentralized locally along communal lines. The average Arab, except for the few intellectuals and the sophisticated political elites, thus identifies himself as a member of a particular social group according to-ethnic, religious, cultural, or tribal ties. Generally this communal allegiance is experienced personally as a concrete part of everyday life and is focussed on the leader of the group to which one belongs. Any larger social context, such as the state, is at the present time for most people little more than an abstraction without even symbolic reality. The patterns of social organization remain essentially feudal; its parochial units have no concentric order of increasingly generic scope leading up to a universal awareness of common interests on a national level.  


Historically, Middle East politics above the communal level have been predicated upon personalities rather than institutions. Powerful individuals repeatedly have risen and through conquest organized large but short-lived states. These usually had no political, cultural, traditional, or economic justification to exist as nations, other than that they were under the suserainty of a single ambitious ruler or ruling class. The present political division of the Arab world into its respective sovereign states is equally the product of historical accident. 5

5 Fisher, The Middle East, pp. 77-143.

Most of these states were created and given their present form as an arbitrary expedient, either for foreign imperialist considerations or as a compromise with the internal complexities and conflicting interests of the inhabitants of various regions. Few have natural frontiers based on clear geographic, social, economic, or historical factors. The political divisions therefore tend to be artificial and unstable. 6


Religion is perhaps the most important factor militating against Arab unity. Confessional differences, felt intimately and intensely, have created serious cleavages not only between Moslems and non-Moslems but also between the various Moslem sects. The puritanical Wahabis of Arabia, for example, despise other Moslems for being decadent and lax in their faith, and in turn are criticized as primitive reactionaries. These religious loyalties often reach a point where they replace ethnic differences, so that a Shi'ah Moslem Arab considers a Sunni Moslem Arab an alien, and the Sunni looks upon a Maronite Christian Arab as a foreign enemy. 7

All of the Middle East countries, with few exceptions, are confronted with serious minority problems which have held back consolidation into national states. In some cases a large ethnic group has been denied national unity and split up among several states so as to form an unassimilable minority in each. Scores of other smaller minorities exist in scattered communities to form rejected or dissident elements that cannot be integrated into the surrounding population. Under the Ottoman Empire a modus vivendi to deal with this minority problem had been found in the millet system, whereby minorities enjoyed communal administrative autonomy. With the creation of the modern Arab states the system was discontinued and a more-or-less proportional legislative representation in the central government, along the Western pattern, was substituted. This has, for the moment at least, proven to be conducive to internal political instability, for by giving minorities recognition only on the state level the minorities per se are politically ineffective and no longer even have any control over their own local affairs. The situation is particularly frustrating when the size of the minority is large.

From a regional point of view, the major ethnic minority in the Middle East is the Kurds. They pose a serious problem, not only because of their large numbers, but also because they have been split up among several countries and yet have successfully resisted assimilation. An ancient people, who, despite a history of adverse political circumstances have retained their ethnic integrity, the Kurds speak a group of dialects that constitute a linguistic family related to Persian. They are organized along tribal patterns, lead a semi-nomadic existence, and are mostly Sunni Moslems. In the past they have been exploited as an instrument of policy by both the Turks and Russians as a counterbalance to other minorities, especially against the Armenians.

The Kurd tribes inhabit an arc extending from Kermanshah in the northwest of Iran, through the northeastern districts of Iraq and Syria, that cutting across western Soviet Armenia, and taking in a large part of eastern Turkey. The entire territory is loosely referred to as Kurdistan. A few additional smaller communities are scattered in other areas. A 1948 estimate placed their distribution at one and a half million in Turkey, 800,000 in Iraq, 600,000 in Iran, 250,000 in Syria, and 20,000 in Soviet Armenia.

Although thus artificially segmented into separate elements that are isolated from each other by the frontiers of five different countries, the Kurds have continued to exercise a strong sense of national consciousness. Consequently they have not reconciled themselves to the division, nor to their status as minorities, and have frequently been in conflict with the authorities in each of the states where they are found. At times, as in Syria, Iraq, and Iran, they have undertaken civil uprisings and large-scale insurrections in an effort to win recognition as an autonomous national minority. In 1945 an independent Kurdish
Republic was briefly established during the period of Soviet-sponsored Azerbaijan autonomy, but was overthrown after the Iranian reoccupation the following year.11


As a group, the Kurdish people are not sufficiently united or organized to assert themselves politically. Thus they do not strive effectively for consolidation and establishment of their own national state. For the present they remain so many disident minorities.

A smaller but no less sensitive ethnic minority problem that is also of an international nature is the Armenians. With a continuous national history going back to the sixth century B.C., they are racially distinct, speak an independent language, and have their own Christian national church. Only in Russia do they have any formal political recognition of their national identity in the small autonomous republic of Soviet Armenia. Outside of Soviet Armenia there are scattered Armenian communities of varying size in a number of Middle Eastern States. Those of Syria and Lebanon are the largest, amounting to approximately 150,000 in the former and about 75,000 in the latter. Considerably smaller numbers are located in Egypt, Iraq, Iran, and Jordan. They are highly educated, economic and social position, however, gives them an importance beyond their size.

With respect to their host countries, the Armenians have the status of foreign refugees, both because of ethnic and cultural differences and their agitation for a national state in which to settle permanently. Locally, their political orientation is toward other Christian minorities. Thus, for the present, it appears that they will remain outside any national unity that might develop in the particular countries where they are now found.

The Assyrians constitute yet another ethnic minority posing nationality problems that defy solution. They are Nestorian Christians speaking a Syriac language and have their own national church. Thus, though their numbers are not large, totalling perhaps under 150,000 in separated communities in Iran, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, and Iraq, linguistic and religious differences set them apart from the surrounding population. It is unlikely that their small numbers and scattered distribution will ever permit any degree of political recognition as a national group.12

12 RIIA, The Middle East, pp. 56ff, 60f; Fisher, The Middle East, pp. 171-173, 304.

Other ethnic minorities, who are religious minorities as well, are the few Circassian colonies located in various countries, and the once large Jewish communities in most of the urban centers of the Middle East. The bulk of the latter, since the establishment of Israel, have emigrated and the remainder no longer exist as significant minority groups.13


However, besides ethnic minorities, other less intrinsically defined group distinctions exist solely by virtue of context.
In most cases an overlapping of several contexts occurs either within or across the political divisions into which the Middle East is currently divided. Some of these are historical, some social; others are economic or geographic. Many internal and external factors affect the national unity of the respective countries. Thus, since the interaction of these factors and their relationship to present national boundaries vary from state to state, each country will be examined individually.

The Arab Countries

Egypt

Of all the Arab countries Egypt best represents a national entity. The present geographical area corresponds to the distribution of a homogeneous population with an ethnic, cultural, economic, and political unity. The remarkable cohesion among the Egyptian people, which has been characteristic throughout history, is due largely to the geography of the land. The great bulk of the population has always been concentrated in the Nile valley, where over a long period of time a distinct racial sub-type has emerged from racial intermixtures. By now the population has become standardized enough to make the average Egyptian physically distinguishable as such.14

The Middle East 1958, pp. 93-95; RIIA, The Middle East, pp. 164f.

The population according to United Nations estimates of 1956 numbers 23,410,000, and is composed of more than 91% Moslems, the majority of whom are Sunni, and less than 8% Christians. Most of the Christians are Copts, who comprise the only minority group of any significance. However, the Copts do not consider themselves a political minority, nor have they in recent times been so identified by the Moslem majority. Racially they are the purest descendants of the ancient Egyptians. They have the same legal status as other Egyptian subjects, and are in all cultural respects Arabs; even the Coptic liturgy is Arabic. Similarly, many of the adherents of the other Christian sects of Egypt are Arabs. The few nomadic Bedouin also constitute a minority group, but only on cultural grounds, for they are Moslem Arabs.15


For almost the entire country, Arabic is both the official and vernacular language. The only exceptions are, besides the resident foreign colonies found in the larger cities, the sparse Berber-speaking villages in the western oases and the Nuba Nubians who inhabit the Nile valley above Aswan. However, although written Arabic is standard throughout the Arab world, the spoken Egyptian dialect differs from all other dialects of Arabic in the pronunciation of certain consonants and in the use of certain idiomatic expressions. These differences are sufficient to lend Egyptian Arabic a uniqueness that makes it readily identifiable as a distinct national dialect.16

RIIA, The Middle East, p. 166; The Middle East 1958, pp. 3f, 94f, 121.
Thus, the present boundaries of the Egyptian state are congruent to an integrated and a wholly-contained nationality unit. There are no dissident minorities of political significance within, nor politically isolated Egyptian national elements outside in other states. The only unrealized national aspirations of Egypt are directed outward, as the would-be leader of Pan-Arabism, championing the ideal of political unification for the entire Arab world. Egypt's particular interest in the Sudan, which has been essentially opportunistic in character and imperially motivated, is largely unrequited by the Sudanese.

Sudan

The Sudan as a country first came into being when it was conquered by Turko-Egyptian forces early in the nineteenth century and was organized for administrative purposes into roughly its present form. Due to Egyptian exploitation and British-Egyptian rivalry for control, as well as internal causes, Sudan did not realize any semblance of national existence until very recent times.17


The population is estimated at 10,200,000, and is made up of a complex pattern of racial and cultural groups. It is probably the least homogeneous of any Arab state. The majority of Sudanese are Arabized Moslems, totalling about 6 million, who inhabit the north and central regions, but there are about 3 million negroid pagans in the south, and more than a million people in other non-Arab tribes in the west and east. The country is thus divided into two culturally contrasted zones marked by radical differences in race, language, religion, and outlook. Each area is occupied by a variety of separate ethnic sub-groups. Furthermore, the Moslems are split into two politically antagonistic sects, the Mahdists and the more orthodox Mirghani. Christians constitute a relatively insignificant minority, the largest element, the Catholic, numbering only 162,000.18

18 The Middle East 1958, pp. 299, 324; RIIA, The Middle East, pp. 417-425; Izzedin, The Arab World, pp. 120-123.

Since Sudan's independence dates back only to 1956, it is too early to judge whether her present boundaries adequately express a united national state. At the moment, the political consciousness of her people is not developed enough to conceive of nationality in terms of political institutions. The radical racial and cultural differences among the many elements of her population might prove that topographic and economic boundaries are too superficial a basis for national unity. A potential separatist minority exists in the south particularly. Similarly, the historic and ethnic affinities of the Arabized majority, carried along by the momentum of Arab Nationalism, may seek political identification with a larger national unit. On the other hand, the sheer variety and number of population elements may make for a cosmopolitan harmony if not unification.

Syria

From Roman times until the First World War the term "Syria" had been loosely applied to designate the whole of a territory stretching from the Euphrates to the Mediterranean, and from Sinni
to southern Turkey, an area now forming the modern states of Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Israel, and large sections of Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The events of the First World War helped crystallize Arab Nationalism along the lines of such a "Greater Syria", but the dictates of foreign imperialist policy, as well as internal rivalries, prevented its realization. The idea of a Greater Syria has remained in many quarters a political aspiration to the present day, although for the moment eclipsed by the ascendency of Egypt and the more comprehensive Arab Nationalism sponsored by Nasser.¹⁹

¹⁹ The Middle East 1958, p. 341; RIIA, The Middle East, pp. 467-472.

The modern state of Syria owes the fact of her existence, as well as the geometry of her boundaries, to external circumstances. The country came into being as a result of the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the subsequent French Mandate. Since there was no natural basis for such a political unit, the Syrian state has not been able to achieve a consciousness of national unity and completeness in her people. The population, numbering 3,856,000 according to U.N. estimates of 1956, is made up of many racial, cultural, linguistic, and religious elements having little in common. There is thus a variety of politically significant minorities.²⁰


Most of the population are sedentary Arab-speaking peoples who are mainly Sunni Moslems. The interior desert is inhabited by Bedouin nomads organized into independent tribes who no more identify their nationality as Syrian than do the Bedouins in neighboring countries. Approximately 250,000 Kurds, who have a national and linguistic identity of their own, are located in the north, cut off by the frontier from their kinsmen. On several occasions the Kurds have undertaken large-scale uprisings against the central authority. In the northwest many Turkomans, as well as acculturated Turkish-speaking Arabs, occupy an area that formerly had been an autonomous Sanjak under the French Mandate. The 150,000 Armenians, who are Christians and have their own language, form large communities in the cities. Other racial-linguistic-religious minorities, which although small have an importance disproportionate to their size because of their relatively high economic and educational level, are the Circassians, Assyrians, Greeks and Jews.²¹

²¹ The Middle East 1958, pp. 342, 361; World Almanac, p. 383; RIIA, The Middle East, pp. 56-60.

The large number of Druses concentrated in the south, perhaps 100,000 or more, are ethnically distinct and practice an occult religion which is usually considered as not being technically a Moslem sect. For a period of years the Druses had their own autonomous state of Jebel Druse under the French Mandate. Ismaili Moslems predominate in the Salamiya district, while almost a half million Alawis, who have a composite Christian-Moslem-pagan religion, occupy the Jebel Ansariyeh. Next to the Sunni, the Alawis form the second largest religious group in Syria, and they too had autonomous status under the French Mandate. Finally, there is the surprisingly large Christian minority, totaling
about 430,000, which is divided up into many sects; no less than ten separate churches are actively represented.22

22 The Middle East 1958, pp. 342, 361; RIIA, The Middle East, pp. 365f; Morrison, Middle East Survey, p. 21.

The characteristically fierce intransigence of each of these many minorities has tended to preclude political cooperation or effective coalition-government within the context of the Syrian state itself. However, it is significant that in the larger context of Pan-Arab Nationalism a certain unanimity of national feeling prevails. The recent plebiscite as to whether Syria should join the United Arab Republic proved to be overwhelmingly favorable. The event clearly established that the boundaries of the Syrian state do not reflect a national entity.

Iraq

The existence of Iraq as a national state has some tenuous historic justification, although the boundaries are largely arbitrary. The country was created out of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire following the first World War when a conjunction of imperialist interests in Turkish Arabia resulted in various compromises for the political division of the spoils. Al-Iraq had been the Arab name for a loosely-defined territory which included the Tigris-Euphrates region known as Mesopotamia, and under the Turks contained the separately administered vilayets of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul. It had not been in modern times a national political unit, nor had the designation ever been applied to as large an area as the frontiers now encompass. The scope of the present boundaries is unrealistic, if not capricious, for it includes sections that are properly by ethnic, economic, or geographic criteria parts of other countries. Depending upon perspective, it can be considered either too large or too small.23


The population, according to U.N. estimates of 1956, numbers 4,842,000, and is made up of many shades of racial and cultural mixtures. Arabic, the official and most widely used language, is spoken by about 75 per cent of the people. Approximately 17 per cent speak Kurdish, and are predominant in the north; four per cent, who are mostly in the east, use Persian; three per cent speak dialects of Turkish and are found in the northwest; and Syriac, current in the Nestorian Christian communities in the north, together with Armenian occur among perhaps one per cent. Much of the area of Iraq is occupied by nomad tribes. The Bedouin who inhabit the Syrian Desert in the west, as well as non-Arab tribes in the north and east move regularly between Iraq and one or more neighboring countries.24

24 Ibid., pp. 255f; World Almanac, pp. 363f; The Middle East 1958, pp. 172, 182.

Over 90 per cent of the population are Moslems. The Arabs of upper Mesopotamia, the Bedouins, the Kurds, and the inhabitants of Baghdad and Basra are mainly Sunnis, while the remaining Arabs of the south and the Iraqi Persians are Shi'ah. The Sunni and Shi'ah sects are suspicious and intolerant of each
other. The Shi'a hold a conditional majority, inasmuch as they slightly outnumber the Sunni Arabs but are less than the Sunni Arabs and Kurds, who are also Sunnis, combined. Iraq thus, along with Iran and Yemen, is one of the three countries where Shi'a adherents are in the majority. 25

25 RIIA, The Middle East, pp. 53f, 256-259; The Middle East 1958, p. 192.

Christians are found in all of the principle towns but are concentrated especially in the Mosul district. The largest Christian group are the Chaldeans, among whom the Chaldean Rite, which is identified with the Assyrians, is the most important. The Assyrian Christians constitute a distinct ethnic minority with their own national church, language, and history. 26

26 RIIA, The Middle East, pp. 59ff, p. 259; Fisher, The Middle East, pp. 100-112.

Until the initiative was seized by Egypt, Iraq had been the leader in directing Arab Nationalism toward the political realization of a "Greater Syria". In large measure this was indicative of Iraq's lack of self-sufficiency as a nation state in her present form.

Lebanon

In many respects Lebanon is a microcosm of the whole Middle East. Its present boundaries do not reflect the national unity of a people inhabiting its area. On the contrary, as recent events have demonstrated, the conflicting irreconcilable loyalties articulated by the various elements of the population have generated internal pressures that threatened the political collapse of Lebanon as a state.

Because the racial affinities of the Lebanese are many and complex, the population is often referred to as "Levantine". Almost all Middle-Eastern ethnic strains are represented. Arabic is the official and vernacular language current over the entire country. However, despite these common denominators, religious differences pose insurmountable barriers that divide the population and isolate one group from another. The resulting divisions are not merely cultural, but political and economic, and manifest themselves socially and psychologically. 27


The territory of "Mount Lebanon" proper was originally the area immediately east of Beirut but was later gradually extended to include the coastal strip directly north and south of Beirut. It has had a national character and a tradition of political identity going back to the Crusades and formally acknowledged in Ottoman times when the Porte granted it autonomy within the Empire. The French during the Mandate continued to recognize Lebanon's traditional autonomous status. However, after it had been expanded into "Great Lebanon" and took in surrounding territories occupied by various Moslem peoples, the original national character was lost. 28

28 Ibid., pp. 267-270; RIIA, The Middle East, pp. 467-473.
Lebanon's population, according to U.N. estimates of 1956, is 1,250,000, almost evenly divided between Moslems and Christians. The Christians are mainly Maronites, a Uniate sect of the Roman Church, but also include substantial numbers belonging to several other denominations. The Moslems are about equally distributed between Sunnis and Shi'is, plus the 77,000 Druzes, whose secret religion is not strictly a branch of Islam. The Maronites are concentrated for the most part in the old "Mount Lebanon" centering around Beirut; the Sunnis are found through the northern districts, while the Shi'is inhabit the southernmost area along the Israeli frontier; the Druzes are located between the latter two. Small numbers of other ethnic and religious minorities also exist. Approximately 21 per cent of the total population is made up of refugees from Palestine.29

Thus, so many diverse population elements in close juxtaposition within the confines of a single small political unit, and with none predominating, has at best made only for compromise in an effort to achieve a working political balance, as a sort of dialectic between opposing forces. The result has been a continuing re-emphasis of existing differences, which has not been conducive to the development of a unified Lebanese nation. In fact, during the current crisis in Lebanon there have been indications that some Moslem Lebanese felt a greater sense of national identity with Syria than with their Christian countrymen. The present boundaries do not reflect a homogeneous national unit. Altering them to comply with existing population divisions would mean the dissolution of Lebanon as a state.

Jordan

Of all the Arab countries Jordan probably has the least national basis for existence as a sovereign independent state. Both the fact of her existence and the geometry of the boundaries were arbitrarily determined by political expediency and historical circumstance.

Jordan's population can be divided racially between the Arabs living east of the Jordan River, who are ethnically akin to the Bedouin desert peoples of Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, and the sedentary Arabs of the Jordan valley and Samaria-Judea, who are of mixed racial stocks. There are also small colonies of Circassians from the Caucasus, as well as a few Armenians. However, the population element that has had the greatest impact on the recent course of events in Jordan is the Palestinian refugees.30

In 1948 before the Arab-Israeli war Jordan's population was approximately 400,000 and consisted mainly of pastoral Bedouins. It is now, according to U.N. estimates of 1956, 1,500,000. The increase is accounted for partly by the 400,000 residents of the west bank of the Jordan, the territory annexed in 1948. But the Palestinian refugees who fled to Jordan number 475,000. In addition, another 100,000 Palestinian settlers, not classified as refugees because they are tradesmen and professionals who have been absorbed into the economy, have also established themselves in Jordan. Altogether, the original Jordanians are outnumbered three to one. Furthermore, since the Palestinian refugees and
settlers and the west-bank residents are mostly sedentary townsmen with a different culture and outlook, the indigenous Jordanian population finds itself in the position of a minority in its own country both in kind as well as number. However, the most disruptive influence on national unity are the refugees, who form a discontented minority that amounts to one-third of the total population.31

31 The Middle East 1958, pp. 246-249; RIA, The Middle East, pp. 352-351.

Religion does not play a very important divisive role in separating the population into elements, largely because it is overshadowed by other factors. Over 80 per cent of Jordanians are Sunni Moslems, while 100,000 Christians, living mainly in the towns, and small groups of non-Sunni Moslem sects, make up the remainder.32

32 The Middle East 1958, p. 257; RIA, The Middle East, p. 351.

The overriding problem of Jordan is the limited natural resources and low level of economic development in relation to size of population. Jordan is not a self-sustaining country. The fact that her present boundaries do not reflect an economic unit may well preclude an organic national state ever being achieved. All political considerations aside, the territory of Jordan belongs naturally, according to ethnic, economic, geographical, and historical criteria, to one or more national complexes other than Jordan.

Saudi Arabia

The Arabian peninsula has neither historical nor political unity. All of its inhabitants are Moslems and speak Arabic, but because of territorial rivalries it has been divided up into several states independent of each other. By far the largest and most important is the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

The population of Saudi Arabia, estimated at roughly 7,000,000, is homogeneous and of relatively pure racial composition. It is mostly Bedouin or of Bedouin descent, except for the coastslands of the southwest and east where it is of mixed racial stocks. However, there are no ethnic minorities as such. The great majority of the peoples are Sunni Moslems of the Wahabi persuasion, although the Hasa region in mostly Shi'ah. Wahabism, an austere puritanical sect, is the chief reform movement of Islam. Besides being the vehicle of Saudi Arabian national feeling, it has gained considerable importance through control of the pilgrimages to Mecca and as custodian of the holy places, thus lending Saudi Arabia a powerful influence over the Moslem world.33

33 The Middle East 1958, pp. 28-39; RIA, The Middle East, pp. 31-85.

Generally, there appears to be little consciousness of national unity among the people. Their insular isolation from outside as well as from one another, the primitive conditions, and the cultural patterns of tribal life have all made for a parochial outlook and communal loyalties. The present boundaries of the country are largely established by geography, rather than
ethnic or economic criteria, and where Saudi Arabia confronts the interior of neighboring coastal states their frontiers are not even demarcated. 34

So far, political institutions have not evolved enough to give expression to whatever sense of national identity the inhabitants of its territory possess or are potentially capable of developing. The current economic revolution that is occurring as a result of the oil industry might eventually make it possible for Saudi Arabia, in much the same physical form she now has, to become a self-contained national state.

Yemen

Yemen is the only other completely independent sovereign state of the Arabian Peninsula. Next to Saudi Arabia in population, her estimated 5 million people are of uniform racial and cultural composition. Practically all are Shi'a Moslems of the Zaidi sect. There apparently are no dissident minorities of any consequence, nor any displaced Yemeni in other states. 35

Although the country has historical antecedents going back to 950 B.C., there is little national basis for the present boundaries, either in an ethnic or geographic sense, other than isolation. As an indication, the interior frontier with Saudi Arabia is not clearly defined. The predominantly feudal patterns of social organization that prevail do not make for political consciousness of national unity in the bulk of her people. 36

Minor States of the Arabian Peninsula

Stretching from Yemen along the southern and eastern coasts of Arabia to the northern shores of the Persian Gulf is a collection of principalities and petty sheikdoms bound together by treaties with Great Britain. These are further broken down into individual tribal territories. With the exception of the Aden Protectorate, Muscat and Oman, and Kuwait, few have populations over 100,000. They exist as separate states largely because of imperialist and economic considerations. Their respective boundaries hardly reflect national units. 37

The Non-Arab Countries

The non-Arab countries of the Middle East are characterized by a less equivocal national identity. Each is a distinct national unit historically, ethnically, linguistically; and politically. With the exception of Israel, they have a relatively consolidated national population contained within their present boundaries. However, except for Iran, they manifest some degree
of irredentism or encourage immigration to repatriate nationals isolated in other countries. Conversely, all three have internal minority problems.

Turkey

The beginnings of Turkey's national identity go back to the Seljuk Turks of the eleventh century, but it was under the Ottomans in the late thirteenth century that Turkey was consolidated politically into the nucleus of a great empire which persisted until the end of the First World War. The rise of Turkish national consciousness of being an ethnic, linguistic, and political unit, however, is relatively recent. It first manifested itself in the Pan-Turanian and Pan-Ottoman movements of the nineteenth century. The peace settlement after the First World War of necessity restricted its development to a more limited but at the same time more specific and natural context.

By virtue of situation, the modern state of Turkey has the advantage of a measure of physical integrity as a geographic unit which is not enjoyed by most countries of the Middle East. The designation Asia Minor is synonymous with the territory that makes up the greatest part of Turkey. Only three per cent of her total area lies beyond the Bosphorus in Europe.38

38 RIAA, The Middle East, pp. 506-508, 510f; The Middle East 1958, pp. 373ff; Ansen, The Middle East World Center, pp. 15-17.

The Turkomans who conquered Turkey were of western Mongoloid ancestry, but because of their relatively small numbers contributed little to the racial character of the Turkish people. The present population is primarily a mixture of Mediterranean and Armenoid strains. Compared to other Middle Eastern countries, the Turks are to a high degree homogeneous; sufficiently so, to form a united nation-state in the Western sense.39

39 The Middle East 1958, p. 372.

The population, according to U.N. estimates of 1956, is 24,797,000. The Turkish language, which was introduced in Seljuk times, is spoken over most, but by no means all, of the country and is now written in Roman script. It belongs to the Ural-Altaic family, and dialects of Turkish are spoken in an area extending across central Asia as far as northwest China. Ninety-eight per cent of the population is Moslem, most of whom are Sunni, but there are four or five million of the Shi'ah sect who are treated as a distinct group apart from the Sunni majority.40


There are a number of linguistic and religious minorities. The largest and most troublesome are the Kurds, estimated at one and a half million, who occupy large areas of southeastern Turkey. Incipient Kurdish nationalism, which broke out in revolt in 1925, 1930, and 1937, is a serious internal problem, although it has not developed into an organized separatist movement coordinated with Kurd minorities in other countries. The Arabic-speaking minority, also in the southeast, is about 250,000, while the Greeks are at present only about 100,000. In the late 1920's a
million and a half Greek residents living in Turkey were returned to Greece in exchange for 700,000 Turks who were repatriated. Most of the remaining Greeks are concentrated in Istanbul, as are the Armenians who were once widespread but now number no more than 65,000. In the northwest 68,000 Circassians still retain their ethnic identity. Other minorities, speaking Hebrew, Laz, Georgian, and a few other languages, together total perhaps an additional 250,000.41


Since 1930 there has been a continuous immigration of Moslem Turks from the Balkans amounting to an estimated 400,000. In 1950 and 1951 Bulgaria alone deported 158,000 until Turkey closed the frontier. Many Turks still live outside Turkey in former Ottoman provinces. The 80,000 on Cyprus serve to support in part Turkey's claim to the disputed island.42


Despite these internal divisions, modern Turkey is one of the few integrated nation-states in the Middle East. The political unit described by the present boundaries in general corresponds to a complete nationality unit.

Iran

Persia has had a long history of political identity and a continuity of cultural integrity as one of the world's great civilizations. Although a long train of Promethian renaissances can be traced back to Achaemenian times, her existence as a nation in the modern sense goes back to the Safavid revival of the sixteenth century. Because of geographic location, many peoples have passed through or settled in the country, so that present-day Iran has numerous ethnic elements of widely differing origin. Despite repeated invasions and periods of foreign domination, the Persians largely preserved their national character and assimilated the invaders. Much of the cultural content of the Islamic civilization is of Persian derivation. However, inherent national character has not in recent times manifested itself in political unity as a nation-state.43


The estimated population of Iran, as of 1955, is approximately 18,000,000, excluding the nomad tribes who probably number an additional one or two million. Several languages are current. Modern Persian, which is written in Arabic characters, is the only official language and is spoken in the north and center of the country, where most of Iran's population is concentrated. Older forms of New Persian are also spoken however. Various dialects of Kurdish are found among the Kurd tribes, who number about 600,000 and live in the region of the Zagros mountains of the northwest. The Kurds form the main dissident minority of political significance. Some Turkish-speaking tribes, who together total perhaps 500,000, are also located in the same general area, as well as in the northeastern sections. Baluchi occurs in
the extreme southeast, while Luri is current among both the
350,000 Lurs and about 200,000 Bakhtiaris of the northwest. There
are a few Arabic-speaking groups in the southwest, and minor
isolated communities of other linguistic minorities also exist.44

44 RIIA, The Middle East, pp. 374f; The Middle East 1958,
p. 144ff, 150; World Almanac, p. 363.

The great majority of the population is Moslem, predominant-
ly of the Ithna Ashari version of the Shi'ah sect. Only about
seven or eight per cent are Sunni, mainly among the Kurds, Turk-
mans and Baluchis, and the remaining few are Christians, Jews,
Baha'i, or Zoroastrians. Of the non-Moslems, the 120,000
Armenian Christians located in the larger towns are the only group
of any important size. Iran is considered the center of the
Shi'ah faith and contains shrines and holy cities to which
pilgrimages are made by Shi'ah Moslems from other countries.
Thus, a common religious bond exists to some extent between Iran
and Iraq, as well as with Yemen, the three countries where
Shi'ahs are in the majority.45

45 The Middle East 1958, p. 150; Fisher, The Middle East,
pp. 283-286; RIIA, The Middle East, p. 375.

In addition to differences of language and religion, internal
decentralizing influences have held back the latent conscious-
ness of national unity from finding expression in political insti-
tutions on the state level. Established demotic patterns are
local in scope. The social organization of most of the sedentary
population is feudal, and that of the migratory nomads, tribal.
Group identities have been further defined by tradition and
custom. These factors, coupled with widespread poverty and back-
wardness, make for rigidly drawn distinctions between population
elements at the expense of over-all unity. The resulting social
attitudes and outlook are thus parochial. Nevertheless, in
general the present boundaries, except for the northwest, accu-
rate describe by Middle East standards a self-contained
national entity.

Israel

As a polity, the modern state of Israel did not evolve
organically but came into being by design. The present boundaries
have little natural basis, for the frontiers were defined by
armistice agreements signed with neighboring Arab states and
correspond to the military front as it existed in 1949. However,
in the most literal sense they do reflect the national unity of
people, for they are the product of dynamic national aspiration
almost exclusively.46

46 RIIA, The Middle East, pp. 301-306; The Middle East 1958,
p. 205.

The population, which keeps increasing with the continual
flow of Jewish immigrants, numbered an estimated 1,943,480 as of
August, 1957, of which 1,733,163 were Jews. Of the 210,317
non-Jews, approximately 145,000 were Moslems, mainly of the Sunni
sect. The remainder consisted of 50,000 Christians, 20,000
Druzes, and small numbers of other minorities. Hebrew, in its
Sephardic form of pronunciation, is now the dominant language
both officially and as the vernacular. Arabic, which had
formerly enjoyed equal status under the British Mandate, has greatly declined following the flight of the 868,000 Palestinian Arab refugees.47

The fact that the Israeli national state is intrusive and is rapidly building up an internal need for territorial expansion, that in the process must further dislocate other ethnic groups, has proved to be a strong stimulus to Arab Nationalism. Reaction to Israel brought a measure of Arab unity by providing a specific focus and highlighting common bonds that transcend lesser differences between various elements. Conversely, Arab antagonism has tended to give Israeli nationalism an exaggerated solidarity. The immediacy of the Arab threat has made for a defensive consciousness of national identity, in some respects almost to the point of chauvinism. Thus, for the moment at least, the population contained within the present political limits of Israeli territory represents the greatest national unity of any country in the Middle East.48

The accidental configuration of the present boundaries of Israel is of necessity transitional. Although these boundaries reflect a self-contained national unit ethnically, they do not coincide with any logical geographic or economic unit. Nor do they reflect any basis for a stable balance between opposing national pressures contending for hegemony over the same area.

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CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS RELATING TO THE EMPLOYMENT OF U.S. FORCES IN LEBANON (U)

FIRST INSTALLMENT
8 November 1957 - 15 July 1958

Special handling of this paper is requested. Access should be limited to individuals requiring the information herein in order to carry out their special duties.

HISTORICAL DIVISION
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
20 November 1958

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8 Nov 57
Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy, in a letter to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, requested the urgent preparation of an operational plan "for possible combined U.S.-U.K. military intervention in the event of an imminent or actual coup d'etat in Lebanon and/or Jordan." Mr. Murphy proposed that the plan be prepared by JCS officers in collaboration with British military authorities in the US. He emphasized that the project would be on a contingency basis only, as no decision had been taken to intervene in Jordan or Lebanon under the contemplated circumstances.

(DD) Ltr, DepUSecState to CJCS, 8 Nov 57, CCS 381 (8-23-57) see 2.

8 Nov 57
According to the New York Times, a violent Egyptian radio and press campaign against Jordan's King Hussein, openly calling for his assassination, had been going on for several days. The Egyptian propaganda barrage was causing Western and neutral diplomats to fear that a new crisis was in the making in the Middle East.

NYT, 9 Nov 57, 1:4.

14 Nov 57
The JCS designated Maj Gen Verdi B. Barnes, USA, Chairman of the Joint Middle East Planning Committee, to represent them in planning with representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff for possible US-UK military intervention in the event of a coup d'etat in Jordan or Lebanon. Gen Barnes was instructed to use as basic guidance the plan recently prepared by JMEPC for unilateral US military action in the same circumstances and to take the forces allocated in that plan as the maximum possible US force contribution. JCS believed the forthcoming plan should be written in terms of a coordinated operation by US and British forces, without a combined command structure. It should not envisage any US logistical support of British units but should if possible provide for use of British facilities on Cyprus for US air operations and staging purposes. To maintain close liaison and gain planning assistance, Gen Barnes was authorized direct contact with CINCNEIM and USCINCEUR. Plans produced by the US-UK representatives would be submitted to the JCS for final US approval.

(DD) Msg, JCS to USCINCEUR, CINCNEIM, and CINCSAC, JCS 932741, 1523592 Nov 57, CCS 381 (8-23-57) see 2.

15 Nov 57
Following JCS-State agreement on the text, JCS sent a message to USCINCEUR, CINCNEIM, and CINCSAC defining the plans urgently required for rapid US military action to re-establish order and the authority of a government friendly to the US in Jordan or Lebanon should the government of either country be overthrown by coup d'etat. The plans were to be based on CINCSACOMME OPLAN 215-56 and terms of reference in the current message, derived from an outline plan produced by JMEPC. The JCS
instructed CINCEUR to prepare plans in coordination with CINCNEM for the movement of forces. CINCNEM, in his role as CINCSPECOMME, would have operational control of the forces upon their arrival in the Middle East. He was instructed to prepare plans in coordination with CINCEUR for employment of the forces to accomplish the mission. Coordination of planning with the UK might be directed later, but no discussion with British personnel would take place until ordered.

(2376) Msg, JCS to US CINCEUR, CINCNEM, and CINOSAG, JCS 932740, 152353Z Nov 57, reproduced in (2376) JCS 1887/410, "Plan for U.S. Military Action in Jordan or Lebanon (2376)," 18 Nov 57, CCS 381 (8-23-57) see 2.

15 Nov 57

The US Ambassador in Amman submitted his estimate of what the Jordanian public reaction would be to US-UK support of Iraqi and Saudi Arabian intervention to help put down a coup against King Hussein. He foresaw no serious repercussions so long as US-UK support was chiefly logistical and involved no appearance of Western forces in or over Jordan. Active air support, however, would cause a strong adverse reaction, and a full military effort that placed Western ground forces in Jordan would generate violent revulsion, a wave of friendship for the USSR, and charges of "imperialist" interference. Direct US-UK support of King Hussein in the absence of Iraqi or Saudi Arabian intervention would have the most serious repercussions of all, and would result in the eventual removal of Hussein once the Western powers withdrew. In sum, unless Iraq and Saudi Arabia would be willing, in the event of a coup beyond Hussein's power to control, to make a substantial effort to continue the pro-Western monarchy in Jordan, no government with a Western orientation could exist in that country unless the US and UK were willing to turn Jordan into a permanent military base amidst a hostile population. On the other hand, if a successful coup were allowed to occur in Jordan, the successor government would be dedicated to immediate union with Syria, and Jordan would shortly cease to exist as an independent country.

(2376) Msg, Amman to SecState, 988, 15 Nov 57, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) see 65.

16 Nov 57

Acknowledging the JCS instructions of the previous day concerning plans for US intervention in case of a coup d'état in Jordan or Lebanon, CINCSPECOMME pointed out the importance of avoiding a situation requiring the Sixth Fleet and USAFE to carry out an emergency evacuation while engaged in combat operations. He recommended that plans be coordinated at once with the State Department for evacuation of US nationals from at least Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt, beginning not later than the alert for Phase I of the intervention plan. Two days later JCS informed him that the question of timely evacuation would be discussed with the State Department.
16 Nov 57

The US Ambassador in Jordan reported that King Hussein planned to take immediate steps to form a close relationship with Iraq and Saudi Arabia. His project aimed at political, economic, and military understandings among the three Western-oriented countries. Hussein also expressed concern over the possibility of internal uprising or an attack from outside by Syrian and/or Israeli forces. In either event he planned to request Iraqi military assistance.

18 Nov 57

Planning discussions began between the JCS representative and representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff regarding possible US-UK military intervention in Jordan or Lebanon. The staff conversations ended, with completion of the plan, on 25 November.

18 Nov 57

CINCSPECOMME informed the JCS that he had completed a draft Tab A to Course of Action 8 in the revision of his OPLAN 215-56 submitted on 27 September, designed to serve as the plan for possible US intervention in Jordan or Lebanon outlined in the JCS instructions of 15 November. Meanwhile, CINCSPECOMME requested the earliest possible JCS action on his proposal that the above-mentioned revision to OPLAN 215-56 (which would become OPLAN 215-58) be approved as the basic plan covering the case under consideration and similar situations in the Middle East.

18 Nov 57

At a joint meeting in Damascus of Syrian members of the Chamber of Deputies and visiting members of Egypt's National Assembly, the legislators unanimously called on the governments of Egypt and Syria to establish a federal union of the two countries. In Cairo, the Egyptian Parliament seconded the move.

19 Nov 57

In answer to an urgent plea from Nasser, the Soviet Union agreed to give Egypt economic assistance. A Soviet announcement also stated that the two countries had reached agreement on "military matters."

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- 3 -
The US Ambassador in Jordan was informed of the US position that a closer association among Jordan, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia would be considered a constructive development, provided it were a spontaneous indigenous move. Hence the US would not actively sponsor King Hussein's project in this regard, but the US would continue to encourage Iraq and Saudi Arabia to give political and economic assistance to Jordan and, in the event of need, military support.

20 Nov 57 Msg, SecState to Amman, 1227, 20 Nov 57.

The US Ambassador in Lebanon reported that the Lebanese Government had taken steps on 18 and 20 November to improve internal security. Besides establishing controls over the Palestinian refugees and visa requirements for Egyptian nationals, the penal code had been modified to permit the death penalty for terrorism.

21 Nov 57 Msg, Beirut to SecState, 1660, 21 Nov 57.

Lebanon and Pakistan issued a joint communique announcing their agreement to strengthen the security of the two countries against "any form of subversion now threatening them." The communique also stated that the two governments planned future talks aimed at strengthening their economic and cultural ties.

24 Nov 57 NYT, 25 Nov 57, 2:3.

The US Ambassador in Jordan reported that at a formal audience King Hussein had reviewed at length current US-Jordan relations and had requested a reappraisal and definition of the basic US position on the Israeli problem. Hussein felt that the US should adopt firmer restraints on Israel and a clearer policy in support of Jordan. Expressing grave concern over the economic situation of Jordan, the King desired assurance of continuing US financial support for the future.

24 Nov 57 Msg, Amman to SecState, 1074, 25 Nov 57.

The US Ambassador in Amman was authorized to inform Jordan that the US was prepared to make available up to $10 million in FY 1958 to help finance Jordanian development projects. The program should concentrate on a limited number of major projects to stimulate local economy, particularly land and water development and phosphate and potash production.

25 Nov 57 Msg, SecState to Amman, 1276, 25 Nov 57.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the plan for US military action in Jordan or Lebanon prepared by JMEPO. A summary of the plan had already been transmitted on 15 November 57 to USCINCEUR, CINCNE, and CINCSAC for use as a basis for the preparation of detailed plans.

27 Nov 57 Dec On JCS 1887/410, "Plan for U.S. Military Action in Jordan or Lebanon (28); CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec 2.
27 Nov 57
The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved Tab A of Appendix VIII (Course of Action 8) to Annex A to CINCSPECOM's OPLAN 215-58 for emergency use and pending final approval, subject to certain specified modifications. The approved Tab A covered deployment of US forces to Lebanon or Jordan in the event of a coup d'etat.

(TG) Msg, JCS to CINCSPECOM, JCS 933332, 272257Z Nov 57, derived from (TG) JCS 2034/41, Memo by CHM JMEPO, "Recommendations on Tab 'A' of Appendix VIII to Annex 'A' of CINCSPECOM Op Plan 215-58 (U)," 26 Nov 57, CCS 381 (3-14-49) sec 5.

27 Nov 57
The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Secretary of Defense that they had prepared a tentative plan for US military action in Jordan or Lebanon in case of a coup d'etat in either country, and that the planned operations were dependent on (1) staging bases for US forces at Adana, Turkey, and in Libya and Cyprus, (2) overflight rights in Israel, and (3) staging and overflight rights in France, Italy, Greece, England, and Canada. The Secretary was asked to communicate this information to SecState and request him to take action to insure the availability of these rights.

On 6 December, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) informed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he had personally presented the above memorandum to Mr. William M. Rountree, the Assistant Secretary of State concerned with Middle Eastern affairs.

(TG) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Staging Rights in Turkey, Libya and Cyprus Plus Overflight Rights of Israel (U)," 27 Nov 57, CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec 3, derived from (TG) JCS 1887/410, same file, sec 2. (U) Memo for Record, sgd Kearney, 6 Dec 57, attached to above OJCS memo.

28 Nov 57
The Secretary of State instructed the US Ambassador in Jordan to reassure King Hussein of continuing US interest in the stability, independence, and integrity of Jordan. As evidence of the US attitude, the Ambassador would cite the current aid programs and past US action toward aggression as demonstrated in the case of the Israeli invasion of Suez.

(TG) Msg, SecState to Amman, 1294, 28 Nov 57.

3 Dec 57
The JCS informed CINCSPECOM that his draft OPLAN 215-58 (revision of OPLAN 215-56) had been approved, subject to certain modifications. Pending development by CINCSPECOM of supporting sections and annexes, the JCS approved references to OPLAN 215-56 for interim guidance, and the use of suitable portions of Appendix VIII to Annex A to OPLAN 215-58 in completing the Jordan-Lebanon contingency plan.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Secretary of Defense that they believed the unsatisfactory politico-military situation in the Middle East posed a serious threat to the security of the US and the Free World. Exploitation of that situation by the USSR resulted in a spread of Communist domination that could not be prevented by military measures alone. Hence, immediate and decisive US political and diplomatic action was imperative to stabilize the Middle East under conditions favorable to the Free World. The Joint Chiefs of Staff declared that the US political effort must directly attack the basic Arab-Israeli problem, from which all other difficulties in the area stemmed. They considered that its resolution depended on: (1) the fixing of agreed boundaries for Israel, (2) a Western guarantee that Israel would stay within the boundaries thus fixed, and (3) settlement of the Arab refugee problem. The Joint Chiefs of Staff affirmed that the threat to US security if the US failed to take the initiative in solving the problem was so great as to transcend the interests of any minority group within the US. If SecDef concurred, JCS recommended that he forward the above views to SecState with the recommendation that the matter be brought before the National Security Council as a matter of urgency.

Memo, CSA to SecDef, "Resolution of the Middle East Question (U)," 4 Dec 57, derived from (20) JCS 1887/409, same subj, 19 Nov 57, CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec 4.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) informed JCS of the State Department's opinion that accelerated delivery of a squadron of F86F aircraft to Iraq, as had been recommended by the JCS, would be politically unwise at present, but that the early establishment of an air-defense capability in Iraq was politically important. Hence the State Department favored an immediate survey to determine the minimum requirements of the Iraqi Air Force in this regard. The Assistant SecDef indicated that the Department of the Air Force would be requested to undertake the survey, as a step toward refining a military assistance program for Iraq.

Memo, Asst SecDef (ISA) to C/CS, "Military Assistance to the Middle East (U)," 10 Dec 57, circulated as (27) JCS 1887/420, 16 Dec 57, CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec 4.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff noted the conclusions in a report by the Joint Middle East Planning Committee that (1) US military support should be provided to Iraq and Saudi Arabia if those nations were to take military action to counter a coup d'etat in Jordan, and (2) details regarding this US military support would require discussion with military representatives of Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The support would include airlifting advance Iraqi and token Saudi Arabian ground forces into Jordan,
and providing supplies for these forces, fighter-
fighter aircraft for Iraq with maintenance and
training support, and information and assistance
through US liaison teams posing as observers.
Meanwhile US forces would maintain air surveillance
of Jordan's frontiers and stand ready to intervene
in the operation if necessary.

31 Dec 57

Foreign Minister Rifai of Jordan stated that his
country would need an average of $50 million in US
aid a year for five to ten years to help finance
her economy and armed forces.

8 Jan 58

The Joint Chiefs of Staff reported to the Secretary
of Defense on the advisability of furnishing mili-
tary equipment requested by the Lebanese Army.
Unwilling to endorse the entire Lebanese request
because of its excessive concern with major end
tems, the Joint Chiefs of Staff certified that US
military objectives in the Middle East would be
served by supplying selected items of military
equipment that would give Lebanon increased cap-
ability to maintain internal security and some
capability to defend against aggression.

10 Jan 58

The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Secretary of
Defense that the plan requested by the Deputy
Secretary of State on 8 November 1957 for possible
combined US-UK military intervention in case of an
imminent or actual coup d'état in Jordan and/or
Lebanon had been prepared. On reviewing the plan,
the JCS had found it to be a suitable basis for
detailed operational planning. They considered,
however, that such planning should not be conducted
for the time being because of the possibility of
compromising the plan and thereby jeopardizing the
US position both in the United Nations and with the
remainder of the Arab world. The Secretary was
requested to obtain the concurrence of SecState in
these views.

15 Jan 58

The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Secretary of
Defense that to insure adequate communications
support of the plan for possible US military inter-
vention in Jordan or Lebanon they recommended the
clandestine establishment, if politically feasible,
of a military medium-high-power radio transmitter
in Amman, Jordan. The JCS requested that SecDef obtain the approval of the State Department for this undertaking.

(25) Memo, CJCS to SeoDef, "Plan for U.S. Military Action in Jordan or Lebanon (U)" 15 Jan 58, derived from (TS) JCS 2034/46, GCS 381 (3-14-49) sec 6.

15 Jan 58

The US Embassy in Damascus reported a strong revival of the Syrian movement for union with Egypt, backed by most Syrian political leaders. The Embassy suggested that the US was in no position to check this movement and would be wasting its prestige in openly opposing so popular a cause. While domination of Syria by Nasser was obviously far from attractive, it seemed the lesser of two evils when compared with the only apparent alternative: Communist entrenchment in Syria so substantial that it could only be dealt with by force from outside.

(26) Msg, Damascus to SecState, 134, 15 Jan 58.

20 Jan 58

The JCS approved the final version of Tab A to Appendix VIII to Annex A of CINOSCOMME's OPLAN 215-58, subject to certain modifications made after the tentative approval of Tab A on 27 November 1957 and the following: The plans should be sufficiently flexible to permit implementation with fewer than the total allocated forces, if the JCS determined that the total forces were not needed. The JCS also informed CINOSCOMME that they approved the prestocking of certain supplies at Adana, Turkey.


22 Jan 58

The National Security Council adopted NSC 5801/1, "Long-Range US Policy Toward the Near East," which superseded NSC 5428, approved 23 July 54. NSC 5801/1 was approved by the President on 24 January 1958.

NSC 5801/1 described four major US objectives in the Middle East: (1) to maintain for the US and its allies the resources, strategic positions, and passage rights of the area, and to deny to the Soviet bloc strategic positions and control of Middle East resources; (2) to maintain stable, friendly, and progressive governments in the Middle East; (3) to achieve an early resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute; and (4) to prevent further extension of Soviet influence and reduce existing Soviet influence.

To achieve these objectives, the US would, in general: (1) provide Free World leadership and assume major responsibility for the Free World in the Middle East; (2) seek to guide Middle East revolutionary and nationalistic pressures into orderly channels, not antagonistic to the West;
(3) encourage the economic development of the area and be prepared, if necessary, to increase US economic aid; and (4) provide military aid to friendly countries.

In support of this general guidance, the US would, among other things:

1. Implement the policy established by the American Doctrine; support but not join the Baghdad Pact; and, if necessary, accept a neutralist orientation of Middle East states and provide assistance to neutralist states in order to develop local anti-Communist strength.

2. Proclaim US support for the ideal of Arab unity. Discreetly encourage the ultimate federation of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Iraq, or of two of these states, and to this end strengthen Iraqi and Saudi influence in Jordan, while at the same time providing economic and military aid to Jordan. Seek continuing Israeli acquiescence in these moves concerning Jordan.

3. Seek to counterbalance Egypt's preponderant position of leadership in the Arab world by strengthening more moderate Arab states. Seek to determine if the West could profit from Nasser's neutralist policies, and, if so, assist Egypt where a clear-cut aid pro quo could be arranged.

4.

5. Maintain support of the present Iraqi regime, but encourage trends toward the peaceful establishment of a more broadly-based moderate progressive government. Encourage Iraq to exercise constructive leadership within the Arab world.

6. Provide Lebanon with political support and with military assistance for internal security problems.

7. Keep the UK currently informed, and work with it on Middle East problems to the extent compatible with US area objectives. Inform the French generally, but with caution, and consult and exchange views with other Free World countries.


27 Jan 58

The US Ambassador in Beirut was instructed to advise President Chamoun and Foreign Minister Malik that the US had decided to provide a limited number of modern jet fighters to Lebanon, the exact number and type to be determined later, and to facilitate the purchase of additional aircraft by Lebanon. He was also to advise them that the US was considering other forms of aid for Lebanon. (The US planned to supply six Hawker Hunter Mark VI jets, with the expectation that Lebanon would purchase six more, and was contemplating additional grant military assistance to include a small number of light tanks.)
30 Jan 58

The US Ambassador was instructed to inform Jordan that $20 million from US FY 1958 funds were earmarked for budgetary support during Jordan’s FY 1959.

(8) Msg, SecState to Amman, 1828, 30 Jan 58.

30 Jan 58

At the final public meeting of the Baghdad Pact conference in Ankara, Secretary of State Dulles told the delegates that the US was fully committed to back up the defenses of the Pact powers. He stated that Congressional approval of the American Doctrine had the same effect as actual US membership in the Baghdad Pact.

-- NYT, 31 Jan 58, 1:1.

1 Feb 58

Egypt and Syria issued a proclamation announcing their intention of uniting as one state, to be named the United Arab Republic, with "one flag, one army, one people." Presidents Kuwatly of Syria and Nasser of Egypt were to address their parliaments on 5 February, and the peoples of Syria and Egypt were to vote in a plebiscite within 30 days on the question of union and the choice of a head of state for the new nation. The proclamation hailed the prospective merger as a step toward a general union of Arab states.

-- NYT, 2 Feb 58, 1:3, 4:1, 5:1.

3 Feb 58

The US Ambassador in Jordan was officially informed by Jordan that Saudi adherence to the proposed Arab Union of Iraq and Jordan was contingent upon Iraqi withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact. Saudi Arabia had also indicated that it would be impossible to provide the $15 million promised Jordan for the next FY. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union had made overtures to Jordan regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations and had offered unlimited economic and technical aid. Therefore, Jordan requested public support by the US for the proposed organization of pro-Western Arab states, no US opposition to Iraqi withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact, and $60 million in US assistance for all purposes, including replacement of the Saudi default.

(8) Msg, Amman to SecState, 1433, 3 Feb 58.

5 Feb 58

The US Ambassador in Iraq reported on a meeting called by Crown Prince Abdulillah, which the British Ambassador also attended. According to Abdulillah, the very existence of Iraq was being threatened by the imminent union of Egypt and Syria. Iraq therefore contemplated taking various actions, including military intervention, to overthrow the Syrian regime prior to the plebiscite scheduled for 21 February, and thus frustrate Nasser’s project. The Crown Prince desired an indication of the attitude of the US and UK toward the Iraqi proposal, as well as the extent of support that might be expected.

(8) Msg, Baghdad to SecState, 1283, 5 Feb 58.
5 Feb 58
The Secretary of State instructed the US Ambassador in Jordan to inform King Hussein that, although the US favored Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon establishing closer political relations among themselves, any public expression of US approval in the absence of substantial progress toward realizing such a goal would serve no useful purpose. The Ambassador was also instructed to convey reassurances that Jordan's essential needs would continue to receive sympathetic consideration by the US.

(8) Msg, SecState to Amman, 1873, 5 Feb 58.

5 Feb 58
President Kuwaty of Syria formally announced Syria's union with Egypt. In the same speech he nominated President Nasser of Egypt to be President of the United Arab Republic (UAR) and said that he would be the first to votes for Nasser in the plebiscite to be held on 21 February.

NVT, 6 Feb 58, 5:1.

7 Feb 58
The US Ambassador in Iraq reported that he had been advised by Crown Prince Abdulillah that Iraq was preparing to move troops into Jordan as soon as possible, should they be requested by King Hussein when he and King Faisal met on 9 February.

(25) Msg, Baghdad to SecState, 1294, 7 Feb 58.

8 Feb 58
An analysis by the US Embassy in Damascus discounted doubts expressed in other quarters about the durability of the Egyptian-Syrian UAR, stressing: (1) the unifying influence of the existence of Israel; (2) the lack of Syrian nationalism except as part of the "Arab nation"; (3) the awareness of Nasser of the possible threats within Syria to the union; and (4) the strong internal political reasons for Syrian adherence to the union.

(8) Msg, Damascus to SecState, 2207, 8 Feb 58.

12 Feb 58
Nuri informed the US Ambassador in Baghdad that he had been asked to form a new Iraqi government, but his acceptance depended on US willingness to provide Iraq with adequate air strength. He specifically wanted two squadrons of jet interceptors, with necessary training personnel, before he would agree to assume office.

(28) Msg, Baghdad to SecState, 1327, 12 Feb 58.

14 Feb 58
Iraq and Jordan signed an agreement for the union of the two kingdoms. Under the Arab Union agreement, both King Faisal II of Iraq and King Hussein of Jordan were to retain their thrones, but there was to be a large measure of unification in defense and administration. During its five months' existence, the new state was sometimes called, in the press and elsewhere, the Arab Federation, but in the official usage of the US State Department it was the Arab Union (AU).

NYT, 14 Feb 58, 1:2.
18 Feb 58  A Lebanese Foreign Ministry spokesman announced that Lebanon would join neither the UAR nor the
Arab Union.  
NYT, 19 Feb 58, 2:3.

20 Feb 58  

The establishment of the Arab Union would not solve the most
important domestic problems of either Iraq or Jordan, and might, indeed, make some of them more serious. The radical nationalists in Iraq, however, would probably not create a serious security problem, and the principal internal threat would come from Jordan's Palestinian population. Nevertheless, if the Arab Union survived its initial difficulties and was able to capitalize on Iraqi economic resources, its long-term prospects would be favorable.  

20 Feb 58

21 Feb 58  The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed CINCNEIM to prepare a basic operational plan, based on CINOSPECOMME
OPLAN 215-58, for US military action in limited war-situation in the Middle East. The plan should provide the basic intelligence, logistics, communications, and command arrangements required. Tabs to the plan should then be prepared to cover certain specific operations (for which operational plans were already in existence): protection of US nationals and interests, action to deter or intervene in Arab-Israeli hostilities, and intervention in Jordan and/or Lebanon. Data for preparation of additional tabs would be furnished by the JCS when they felt the situation called for further specific operational plans.

(45) SW-126-58 to CINCNEIM, "Military Planning for the Middle East (c)", 21 Feb 58, derived from
(47) JCS 1887/433, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 68.

21 Feb 58  In plebiscites in Egypt and Syria, voters gave almost unanimous approval to the joining of the two countries in the United Arab Republic and elected Nasser the first President of the UAR.
NYT, 23 Feb 58, 1:2.

25 Feb 58  The US Government officially recognized the Government of the United Arab Republic (UAR). In a statement announcing recognition, the State Department said that it had noted the assurances of the UAR that it intended to respect and observe its international obligations, including all existing obligations of Egypt and Syria.
26 Feb 58  
A visit of UAR President Nasser to Damascus was reported to be arousing enthusiasm among the Moslem population of nearby Lebanon. Many of the Lebanese Moslems were travelling to Damascus to join in the pro-Nasser demonstrations in that city. Christian leaders in Lebanon were reportedly fearful that the formation of the UAR might endanger the independent future of their country.  
NYT, 27 Feb 58, 5:5.

28 Feb 58  
According to a CIA report, Ali Abu Nuwar, exiled former Jordanian Chief of Staff living in Syria, was plotting to overthrow King Hussein and to bring Jordan into the United Arab Republic. Also associated with Nuwar was an Iraqi clique planning to overthrow King Faisal and bring Iraq into the UAR.  

3 Mar 58  
Nuri became Premier of Iraq. He had resigned from this position in June 1957 because of ill health, but his great prestige made him the only possible leader to head the Iraqi Cabinet during implementation of the Arab Union, recently formed by Iraq and Jordan.  
NYT, 4 Mar 58, 3:5.

5 Mar 58  
Lt. Col. Abdul Hamid Serraj, the Syrian Army's "strong man," charged at a news conference in Damascus that King Saud of Saudi Arabia had attempted to procure the assassination of President Nasser and a Syrian Army coup d'etat, led by Serraj, who was then to form a new Syrian Government not allied with Egypt. Serraj showed reporters photostats of three checks from Saud totaling 1,900,000 pounds. He asserted that Saud's go-between had stated that the US Government was aware of these plans and would lead the way in recognizing the new Syrian Government that Serraj was supposed to establish.  
NYT, 6 Mar 58, 1:2.

7 Mar 58  

(38-47) Mag, US CINCEUR to JCS, 7 Mar 58, DA IN 99028 (8 Mar 58), CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec 5.
8 Mar 58

President Nasser of the United Arab Republic and the Crown Prince of Yemen signed an agreement federating their two countries. Under the agreement Yemen was to retain its existing regime and international status, but the federation was to have "unified armed forces" and a united foreign policy.


11 Mar 58

In Manila for the SEATO Conference, British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd told Secretary Dulles that during his stopover at Baghdad he had found Iraqi leaders in a very jittery state, visibly worried about the continued existence of the regime. Unsettling factors appeared to be the impact of Nasser's appeal in Iraq and the unpopularity of the projected Iraqi tie with Jordan in the Arab Union. The Iraqi leaders had pressed Lloyd for British assistance, which the UK was willing to give, and Lloyd now turned to Secretary Dulles for US support. Specifically, Lloyd desired a US extension of credit to Iraq and the provision of fighter aircraft to that country.

(22) Msg, Manila to SecState, SECTO 12, 11 Mar 58, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 68.

11 Mar 58

In response to Secretary of State Dulles' report of his conversation with Selwyn Lloyd (see above item), the State Department provided the Secretary with a suggested reply to the British request. The US Government agreed to the urgent necessity of supporting the Arab Union and was willing to match the proposed British contribution of the 50,000 pounds for an Iraqi propaganda project. The US would find greater difficulty in extending credit, but it was prepared to consider assisting individual development projects in Jordan and Iraq. While willing to give assurance of the intention of providing Iraq with fighter aircraft, the US Government could not act until the report of the US survey team, scheduled to leave shortly for Iraq, had been received. The US wished to impress the Iraqi leaders with the importance of making the Arab Union a real federation, within which Iraq would assist Jordan. The US also wished to emphasize its belief that Iraq and Jordan should not attempt any military move against the UAR.

(23) Msg, SecState to Manila, TOSEC 22, 11 Mar 58, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 68.

12 Mar 58

The US Ambassador in Baghdad, in reporting his estimate of the position of the Iraqi regime, stated that the Iraqi Army and policy showed no signs of disaffection, and no effective leadership or organization existed among the political opposition. Further, he felt that Prime Minister Nuri and the Crown Prince could weather Nasser's expected propaganda offensive.

(24) Msg, Baghdad to SecState, 15:13, 12 Mar 58.
12 Mar 58
The US Ambassador in Lebanon predicted that the new United Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria would generate increasing tensions in the Middle East. He anticipated that Lebanon would be subjected to severe internal and external pressures, which might lead the government to ask for fulfillment of existing British, French, and US promises of support. The Ambassador felt that the American Doctrine would not be applicable in this case, unless the UAR moved closer to Communism than seemed probable at the moment. He suggested that the State Department "might wish to have in mind what answer to given when I am summoned to Palace at midnight and asked for instant help."

(2) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 3033, 12 Mar 58, DA IN 100429 (13 Mar 58).

12 Mar 58
The US Ambassador in Jidda reported that the Egyptian military advisers to Saudi Arabia had left, and that the USMTM had been requested by the Saudi Minister of Defense to assume expanded training responsibilities.

(3) Msg, Jidda to SecState, 881, 12 Mar 58.

13 Mar 58
The National Security Council noted the President's request that the Department of State, in consultation with the Department of Defense, urgently explore what types of US support might be given to the governments of Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia if required or requested in the immediate future. This was NSC Action 1875, approved by the President on 15 March.

(16) Memo, Dep SecDef to SecArmy, et al., "Possible U.S. Actions in Support of Pro-Western Nations in the Near East (3)," 19 Mar 58, enc to (48) JCS 1887/442, Note by Secys, same subj, 24 Mar 58, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 69.

14 Mar 58
The State Department directed the US Ambassador in Jidda to inform King Saud that the US was willing to undertake to the fullest extent possible the functions formerly performed by the departing Egyptian military advisers.

(3) Msg, SecState to Jidda, 1284, 14 Mar 58, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 69.

18 Mar 58
The US Ambassador in Beirut was requested to apprise Chamoun of the US position on Lebanon's presidential election and efforts to amend the constitution to permit Chamoun to succeed himself. The US viewed the issue as a domestic political problem which, though having a bearing on the internal security situation, could only be decided by the Lebanese. Therefore the US would remain impartial and aloof. For the Ambassador's information, the US would not attempt further to dissuade Chamoun from seeking re-election and at the same time would avoid any indication of supporting him. However, if circumstances so required, covert assistance might be considered.

(48) Msg, SecState to Beirut, 3626, 18 Mar 58.
The US Ambassador in Beirut was instructed to renew to Foreign Minister Malik the assurances of the US determination to support the territorial integrity and independence of Lebanon in the face of external aggression and internal subversion. The US would be prepared to consider giving Nasser a direct warning if convincing evidence appeared that he was planning an aggressive move against Lebanon.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff requested CINCSPECOMME to prepare, as a matter of priority, plans for dealing with a possible coup d'état in Saudi Arabia. The plans were to cover action to protect US nationals and interests, to maintain order, to re-establish the authority of a friendly government, and, possibly, to deter a coup if one seems imminent.

King Saud issued a decree vesting the main responsibility for the formulation and execution of Saudi Arabian domestic and foreign policy in Crown Prince Faisal.

CINCSPECOMME submitted an outline operation plan for dealing with a possible coup d'état in Saudi Arabia, in accordance with his instructions of 22 March. On 7 April 1958 the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave general approval to this plan, pending submission of the completed version for review.
27 Mar 58

The US Ambassador in Beirut reported that a meeting to crystallize opposition to the re-election of President Chamoun took place at the home of former Foreign Minister Henri Pharoan. The 50 participants, including prominent Christians and Moslems, signed a resolution that called for a combined Christian and Moslem effort to oppose Chamoun's re-election and warned that the people were justified in using all available means to prevent a renewal of the presidential term. Ambassador Mclintock believed Chamoun would seek another term, in which case internal disturbances might lead to a civil war.

(7) Mag, Beirut to SecState, 3242, 28 Mar 58, DA IN 104691 (29 Mar 58).

28 Mar 58

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the Secretary of Defense request the Secretary of State to reconsider the decision not to undertake negotiations for staging and prestocking rights at Adana Air Field in Turkey.

(35) Memo, CJCS to SecDef, "Staging and Prestocking Rights in Turkey, Libya and Cyprus (G)," 28 Mar 58, CSS 361 (8-23-57) sec 6, derived from (35) JCS 1887/439, same file, sec 5.

28 Mar 58

The Chief of Staff, Army, pointing out that NATO shield forces in Western Europe might be weakened at a critical time by the withdrawal of US Army combat troops for contingency operations in the Middle East, recommended that the CONUS-based Strategic Army Corps be used as an alternate source of troops for such operations. On 15 May 1958, at the request of its originator, this recommendation was withdrawn from consideration by the JCS.

(35) JCS 1887/444, Memo by CSA, "Utilization of Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) for Contingency Operations in the Middle East (S)," 1 Apr 58, and (S) N/H of JCS 1887/444, 15 May 58, CSS 361 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 69.

28 Mar 58

The Department of Defense recommended to the Department of State that an appropriate agreement be negotiated with Lebanon, or a Presidential determination instrument (under the Mutual Security Act) be instituted, in order to make Lebanon eligible for grant military aid, specifically the items of military equipment recommended by the JCS on 8 January 1958.

(35) Ltr, Spec Asst to Dep Asst SecDef (ISA) to Spec Asst for Mutual Security Coordination, Dept State, 28 Mar 58, encl to (35) N/H of JCS 1887/426, 7 Apr 58, CSS 361 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 67.

1 Apr 58

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the State Department considered the clandestine establishment of a radio transmitter in Amman, Jordan, to be politically infeasible at the present time. (See item of 15 January 1958.)
7 Apr 58

The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff that they considered the plan prepared by US and British staff officers for possible US-UK military intervention in Jordan or Lebanon to be a suitable basis for detailed coordination operational planning. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not believe that such detailed planning was required at the present time.

(26) SM-252-58 to Reps of Br Chfs of Staff, "Contingency Plans for U.S.-U.K. Military Action in Jordan and/or Lebanon (26)," 7 Apr 58, CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec 6, derived from (26) JCS 1887/427, same file, sec 5.

9 Apr 58

The US Ambassador in Beirut transmitted a formal Lebanese request for $15 million in US aid. The aid was to be applied to urgently needed economic and technical development projects, the specific nature of which would be determined in subsequent negotiations. The Lebanese Government hoped the requested funds could be allocated immediately from US appropriations for foreign aid in the current fiscal year ending 30 June 58.

(5) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 3395, 11 Apr 58.

10 Apr 58

CINCSPECOMME submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review his completed plan for possible military intervention in Saudi Arabia, in accordance with his instructions dated 7 April. The completed plan was in the form of a Tab B to Appendix VIII of Annex A to CINCSPECOMME OPLAN 215-58.

(26) Ltr. CINCSPECOMME to CJCS, "CINCSPECOMME OPLAN 215-58," 10 April 58, Encl to (26) JCS 2034/55, Note by Secys, "Supplement to CINCSPECOMME OPLAN 215-58 (U)," 6 May 58, CCS 381 (3-14-49) sec 8.

10 Apr 58

The British military member of the US-UK Working Group told the group that the British disagreed with the JCS view, expressed in the memorandum of 7 April, that detailed coordinated operational planning for possible US-UK military intervention in Jordan or Lebanon was not required for the time being. He said the British would like to have a team of planners work with the JCS in rewriting and extending the plan, in view of changed circumstances in the area, and that they believed the major area commanders, at least, should be included in the planning.

14 Apr 58 The New York Times correspondent in Cairo reported that the Egyptian propaganda campaign against Jordan's King Hussein had increased greatly in severity and was apparently aimed at stirring up a pro-Nasser revolt among Jordan's Palestinian population.

NYT, 15 Apr 58, 5:2.

14 Apr 58 The New York Times correspondent in Beirut reported that skirmishing between government and opposition forces in Lebanon had reached the point where the country was on the verge of civil war. The Lebanese Army was being deployed to prevent a Syrian-supported revolt by northern tribes.

NYT, 15 Apr 58, 2:3.

19 Apr 58 Crown Prince Faisal of Saudi Arabia announced that his Government would not join the United Arab Republic or the rival Arab Union, but would cooperate with both.

NYT, 20 Apr 58, 1:7.

23 Apr 58 The JSSC submitted a report on the responsibilities to be assigned the US Military Representative for the Middle East and the optimum location for his headquarters. On 13 June, this report was withdrawn from further consideration by the JCS.

(JSSC) JCS 1887/450, Rpt by JSSC, "U.S. Military Representation in the Middle East (U)," 23 Apr 58, and (JSSC) N/H of JCS 1887/450, 13 Jun 58, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47), sec 69.

23 Apr 58 The State Department informed the British Embassy in Washington of the US decision to supply jet aircraft to Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq. Twelve Hawker Hunter Mark VI aircraft were going to Jordan, and six to Lebanon, within the next three months, all to be supplied through offshore procurement in the UK. The US requested the UK to assume responsibility for training. A squadron (15 aircraft) of F66's would go to Iraq, with a small number of these being provided, and training started, as soon as possible.

(U) Msg, SecState to London, 7564, 23 Apr 58, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 69.

29 Apr 58 The US Ambassador in Beirut was instructed to inform Malik, in response to a Lebanese request for US grant aid from funds appropriated for FY 1958, that all such funds had already been committed. Further, because of constitutional limitations governing appropriation procedure, the US was unable to make a long-term commitment to support a Lebanese development program but could only consider assistance on a year-to-year basis.

(U) Msg, SecState to Beirut, 4106, 29 Apr 58.

29 Apr 58 The US Ambassador in Beirut was instructed to deliver a letter from the Secretary of State to Malik, which was intended to forestall any possible repudiation of the American Doctrine by Lebanon because of misinterpretation of its implications. The letter
emphasized that adherence to the Doctrine placed no obligation on Lebanon and involved no commitment to assist the US in the event of hostilities between the US and any country. The relationship between the US and Lebanon continued to be based on the principles of the UN Charter and the US desire to see Lebanon maintain its independence and sovereignty.

(27) Mag, SecState to Beirut, 4107, 29 Apr 58.

29 Apr 58

In a message to Secretary Dulles, Iraqi Foreign Minister Jamali declared that US support of Lebanese President Chamoun was essential to keep Lebanon aligned with the West and thus prevent Nasser and the USSR from dominating the Middle East.

(27) Mag, Khartoum to SecState, 913, 29 Apr 58.

29 Apr 58

The US Ambassador in Jordan reported that King Hussein, at the specific request of Chamoun, had agreed to provide 500 small arms with a supply of ammunition as soon as possible. These weapons were to be used to equip Chamoun's personal supporters, rather than the regular Lebanese armed forces.

(27) Mag, Amman to SecState, 1850, 29 Apr 58.

30 Apr 58

The State Department directed the US Ambassador in Baghdad to inform Nuri and King Faisal that the US, following the survey team report and consultation with the UK, had decided to provide Iraq with a squadron of 15 F86F jet aircraft (see item of 23 April 58).

(27) Mag, SecState to Baghdad, 2827, 30 Apr 58,
CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 70.

30 Apr 58

UAR President Nasser conferred for three hours with Soviet Premier Khrushchev in Moscow.

NYT, 1 May 58, 7:1.

30 Apr 58

The State Department announced the release of certain blocked funds of Egypt (now UAR), in recognition of the satisfactory agreement recently concluded between the UAR and the Suez Canal Company.


4 May 58

The US, British, and French Ambassadors in Beirut, believing that the Lebanese situation was likely to become critical within another week, agreed on a joint appreciation of the situation, for urgent consideration by their governments. President Chamoun was almost certain to seek amendment of the constitution and stand for re-election, but disorders would have to be expected if he was successful. The three Ambassadors concluded that the West, faced with a choice of supporting Chamoun or standing aloof, would have to support Chamoun, despite the risks, since Western failure to back him would have an adverse effect on the friends and allies of the West in the entire Middle East.

(27) Mag, Beirut to SecState, 3647, 4 May 58,
COJCS files.
8 May 58  
Iraqi Foreign Minister Jamali told correspondents that the Iraqi Ambassador in Cairo had been directed to protest strongly to the UAR Foreign Minister over inflammatory Cairo radio broadcasts aimed at Iraq.  
NYT, 9 May 58, 2:3.

8 May 58  
Nasib Metni, a "crusading" Lebanese editor, was shot down outside his Beirut home by two gunmen in what was generally regarded as a political killing. Metni, whose paper was considered pro-Communist, had been an outspoken critic of the Chamoun government.  
NYT, 10 May 58, 6:1.

10 May 58  
The Lebanese Army moved into Tripoli to restore order after the United States Information Service library in that city was sacked and burned late the previous evening by armed men demonstrating against the Lebanese Government. The rioting had been set off by the assassination of opposition editor Nasib Metni, on 8 May.  
NYT, 11 May 58, 1:4, 20:5.

11 May 58  
The US Embassy in Beirut urgently recommended an airlift of police equipment to Beirut to support the Lebanese security forces. The recommended equipment included tear gas projectiles, grenades, guns, and masks, and submachine guns, rifles, and ammunition.  
(6) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 3770, 11 May 58, OGCJS files.

11 May 58  
The US Ambassador reported that the crisis in Lebanon was "rapidly reaching a very serious state." President Chamoun had that morning rejected an opposition demand that he resign. Later in the day Lebanese Army commander Gen Chehab had declined a proposal by moderates that he become Prime Minister as a compromise measure that would allow Chamoun to complete his term yet forestall his re-election. An outbreak of violence appeared likely as the next step.  
(6) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 3772, 11 May 58.

11 May 58  
The US Ambassador in Beirut forwarded President Chamoun's request that the US airlift twenty tanks with ammunition to strengthen Lebanon's security forces. While advised by the Military Attache of the current impracticability of such an airlift, Ambassador McClintock recommended on political grounds that the US Government make an immediate favorable response to the Lebanese request. He believed that nothing short of arrival of the tanks within two weeks, by whatever means, would sustain the confidence of Lebanese leaders in the pledges of support the US had given.  
After presenting the request for tanks to the Ambassador, Foreign Minister Malik said that he and Chamoun, "thinking out loud," were wondering if the time had not come to plan for the deployment of a US Marine division in the event Syrian-Egyptian aggression, now indirect, became more overt. On receiving McClintock's strongly unfavorable reaction, Malik stressed that "this was the "most tentative sort of thinking.""
The US Ambassador in Beirut reported his firm belief, based on conversations with Chamoun, that the Lebanese President intended to request President Eisenhower to send US Marines if Syrian forces, irregular or otherwise, appeared in any numbers on Lebanese soil.

The US Ambassador in Lebanon transmitted Malik's reply to the Secretary of State's letter of 29 April 58. Malik concurred generally in the views expressed by the Secretary and suggested that whatever misunderstandings existed about the relationship between Lebanon and the US under the American Doctrine were the result of enemy propaganda exploiting the past inadequacy of US aid to Lebanon. In order to eliminate that propaganda vulnerability he requested a US commitment of substantial financial assistance for the first year of Lebanon's six-year economic development plan. Malik also expressed concern over reaction to any appearance of US reproachment with Nasser; he recommended the US position be made clear to reassure those who might misinterpret it.

The British and US Ambassadors in Beirut stated in a joint appreciation that Gen Chehab had the means to control the situation without outside help, unless there were massive intervention from Syria. He will, however, "was vacillating at best, and lacking at worst." His resolution would be strengthened if Chamoun were to declare publicly that he did not intend to seek re-election.

The Secretary of State requested the Ambassadors in Jordan and Lebanon to advise those two governments that the US would supply on a grant basis 12 British Hawker Hunter Mark VI jets to Jordan and 6 similar aircraft to Lebanon. Additional numbers would be provided in the future as the capacity to absorb and maintain them was established.

An armed insurrection in Beirut, aimed at overthrowing the Lebanese Government, was put down by army troops and the police after a day of intermittent street fighting. One of the three US libraries in the capital was sacked and burned, and a major pipeline of the IPC was cut. A state of alert, one step from martial law, was decreed and a curfew imposed in Beirut. Tripoli was reported still in a state of siege, with fighting going on between insurrectionists and the army. The Cairo and Damascus radios...
were on the air all day, urging the Lebanese to overthrow their government.

NYT, 13 May 58, 1:1.

12 May 58

The Arab Union of Iraq and Jordan was formally established.

NYT, 13 May 58, 4:5.

13 May 58

At a meeting in Beirut during the morning with the US, British, and French Ambassadors, President Chamoun described the situation in Lebanon as "very grave," although not yet desperate, and requested each Ambassador to forward an oral message to his Chief of State recalling the guarantees given to Lebanon regarding the maintenance of its integrity and independence. The Ambassadors should stress the possibility of a need for armed intervention within 24 hours of an appeal by the President or Government of Lebanon. Chamoun had not yet decided to ask for foreign troops, but would probably make his decision within the next 24 hours. All three Ambassadors suggested to Chamoun that an appeal to the UN Security Council be made simultaneously with any request for tripartite intervention.

(TS) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 3826, 13 May 58, OCJCS files.

13 May 58

The US Ambassador in Beirut warned the State Department that, if the US intervened to maintain the integrity and independence of Lebanon, it would be a "capital political mistake" to support a second term of office for President Chamoun. Such support would provide grounds for charges that Western "imperialist" powers were intervening in local politics against what would be presented as the "will of the people."

(TS) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 3832, 13 May 58, OCJCS files.

13 May 58

Secretary of State Dulles authorized the US Ambassador in Beirut to inform President Chamoun that a request for Western military assistance should be made only under the most compelling necessity, where the integrity of Lebanon was genuinely threatened and where its own forces were insufficient for protection. Nevertheless, upon request from the President and Government of Lebanon, the US would send combat forces to that country with the dual mission of protecting US nationals and property and of assisting Lebanon "in its military program." To meet US constitutional requirements the Lebanese request should be made in terms of this mission and not as an appeal under the American Doctrine, since President Eisenhower was not authorized to send troops with an avowed purpose of fighting for Lebanon's independence unless there was armed aggression from a country controlled by International Communism. In practice, however, the presence of US troops would free Lebanese forces from guard duties, and the exercise of the right of self-defense might further engage US forces in operations against the rebels.
The US Government stated three further conditions regarding the circumstances under which Lebanon might ask for intervention: (1) at least concurrently with any public request to the US, Lebanon would complain to the UN Security Council about outside interference in its internal affairs; (2) some Arab states would publicly support the Lebanese appeals to both the US and the Security Council; and (3) Chamoun would not push his candidacy for re-election should this appear to divide seriously the support necessary to preserve the integrity and Western orientation of Lebanon.

The US Ambassador was informed that the US and UK, working in concert, believed that French participation in the military operations would be "unproductive," but that the French Ambassador in Beirut might be informed of the above.

(C) Msg, SecState to Beirut, 4271, 13 May 58, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 1.

13 May 58

Wishing to be certain that the Lebanese situation was truly understood, the US Ambassador in Beirut emphasized the following points: (1) Chamoun had been legally elected President of Lebanon, and his term did not expire until 23 September 58; (2) Chamoun had not been charged, even by his most bitter political opponents, with any crimes or misdemeanors in office; (3) the extreme opposition demand that he resign "instantly" had no legal basis. Chamoun had made no public statement regarding his intention to seek to amend the constitution to permit his re-election; (4) therefore, the call of the opposition for a general strike and resistance to Lebanese law enforcement agencies was outright "sedition and rebellion."

(C) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 3840, 13 May 58, DA IN 115907-C (14 May 58).

13 May 58

Ambassador McClintock reported indications that pro-Chamoun supporters had begun to falter because of their belief that the Lebanese Army would not decisively control the security situation. It was felt the only solution was to form a new cabinet with Gen Chehab as Prime Minister. Chamoun was said to have agreed tentatively to this plan, but Chehab was willing to accept the position only if the general strike and armed disobedience ceased and providing he had complete support from Parliament. An opposition spokesman, however, had told the Ambassador it was "too late" for any scheme that retained Chamoun in office. Opposition forces would accept nothing less than Chamoun's "immediate resignation," with Chehab to be Prime Minister-President of a "national government."

(C) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 3847, 13 May 58, DA IN 116028 (14 May 58).

13 May 58

The State Department authorized Ambassador McClintock to evacuate himself, US government employees, and their dependents from Lebanon whenever he determined it was necessary. He was informed
that the US Navy had ordered two destroyers to proceed to a position six hours from Beirut, with an estimated arrival 132100Z. These ships were to be used for evacuation only if commercial means were not available.

(8) Msg, SecState to Beirut, 4259, 13 May 58.
(9) Msg, SecState to Beirut, 4274, 13 May 58, DA IN 115928 (14 May 58).

13 May 58

The US Embassy in Beirut was instructed to inform the Government of Lebanon that internal security equipment would arrive by air within the next few days and 18 tanks in approximately two weeks.

(10) Msg, SecState to Beirut, 4273, 13 May 58, DA IN 115933 (14 May 58).

13 May 58

CNO directed CINCNELM to sail amphibious forces with both Marine battalions toward the Eastern Mediterranean as soon as practicable, without publicity.

(11) Msg, CNO to CINCNELM, 24953, 132307Z May 58, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 1.

13 May 58

In a conversation with US Ambassador McClintock during the evening, Gen Chehab said the situation in Lebanon was under control, although the Army was stretched to its utmost. He stated that he had told President Chamoun he could not guarantee the loyalty of the Moslem elements of the Army in the event of Western intervention. Later, McClintock saw Chamoun, who seemed more relaxed and confident than earlier in the day and who now said he did not think it would be necessary to send for foreign troops.

(12) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 3863, 14 May 58, OCJCS files.

13 May 58

Lebanese Foreign Minister Malik, at a news conference, accused the UAR of being directly responsible for "massive interference" in his country. He cited a number of incidents as evidence of UAR responsibility for the Lebanese revolt. Lebanon, he said, had sent a note of protest to the UAR. Fighting continued throughout the country, and parts of northern Lebanon were reported to be in rebel hands.

NYT, 14 May 58, 1:4.

14 May 58

US Ambassador McClintock presented in detail to President Chamoun the US Government's answer to the Lebanese President's appeal of the previous day (see relevant items of 13 May). Chamoun expressed the hope he would not need foreign aid, but thanked McClintock for this immediate and impressive manifestation of US support. He agreed with the US reservation concerning French participation, doubted that France would be in a position to send troops anyway, and explained he had felt it necessary to include France in his appeal since France had given guarantees to Lebanon. Chamoun also left no doubt that he fully understood the US stipulation that he would not push his candidacy for re-election if this course appeared dangerous to Lebanese stability.

(13) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 3869, 14 May 58, OCJCS files.
14 May 58

Confirming a telephone call to CINCNEIL by Vice Adm R. E. Libby, Deputy CNO (Plans and Policy), JCS directed Adm Holloway to note the recent State Department message to the US Embassy, Beirut (see item of 13 May 1958), and to act in general consonance with the contingency plan for US-UK military action in Jordan and/or Lebanon. Adm Libby's call, the JCS message, and a subsequent CNO message constituted authority for CINCNEIL to engage in combined planning with the British.

(25) Msg, JCS to CINCNEIL, JCS 941734, 141200Z

14 May 58

The JCS informed US CINCNEIL, CINCJAN, and CINCNEIL that in view of the internal situation in Lebanon, President Chamoun might soon request US assistance. These commands, accordingly, were directed to take appropriate precautionary steps in order to be able to implement on short notice the plan for US military action in Jordan and/or Lebanon.


14 May 58

The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed CINCNEIL of the British view that combined forces used in a Lebanon operation should be under US command, and that US forces should precede British forces into Lebanon. These two points were agreeable to the State Department and the JCS.


14 May 58

The US Ambassador to Lebanon cabled that in view of the worsening situation in Tripoli, he was advising Americans there to evacuate to Beirut. The British were taking similar action, and both embassies were attempting to arrange the evacuation in a manner to avoid creation of panic among Lebanese Christians in North Lebanon.

(25) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 3875, 14 May 58, DA IN 116057.

14 May 58

The French Charge in Washington expressed to Assistant Secretary of State Rountree his Government's determination to participate in any intervention in Lebanon, whatever the risks. Rountree emphasized the dangers of putting French troops into Lebanon and indicated strong US opposition to French participation.

(25) Msg, SecState to Beirut, 4298, 14 May 58, CCJCS files.

14 May 58

The US Government announced that it was doubling the strength of the Marine force with the Sixth Fleet and that a shipment of police equipment was
being airlifted to Lebanon. The State Department issued a statement of encouragement to the Lebanese Government, but President Eisenhower, at his press conference, refused to comment on the situation. In Lebanon itself, the situation was reported as improving, despite continuing agitation by Cairo and Damascus radios and repeated demands for the Lebanese opposition that Chamoun resign immediately.


14 May 58

The Government of the UAR in Cairo refused to accept the Lebanese note of protest that charged the UAR with "massive interference" in Lebanon.


14 May 58

The US Embassy in Baghdad reported that Prime Minister Jamali had sent a message to Lebanon pledging Iraq's willingness to assist the Lebanese Government in any way considered feasible in the present crisis, and encouraging that government to resist to the utmost the "aggression being undertaken by forces of Nasserism and Communism."

(47) Msg, Baghdad to SecState, 1870, 15 May 58, DA IN 116320.

15 May 58

Lebanese Foreign Minister Malik gave the US Ambassador an urgent message from Chamoun. Excited by reports of alleged Syrian troop movements across the border, Chamoun wanted the US to know that he might need armed help "not in 72 hours or 48 hours or 24 hours but in 6 hours." Ambassador McClintock attempted to calm Malik and stressed the need to verify what appeared to be rather vague and unreliable intelligence reports. Reporting to the State Department, McClintock noted that he had informed Chamoun on 14 May of the presence of US destroyers six hours from Beirut (see item of 13 May), which, the Ambassador suggested, might have accounted for Chamoun's six-hour time limit.

(46) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 3906, 15 May 58, OCJCS files.

15 May 58

As authorized by the State Department, Ambassador McClintock told Gen Chehab that the highest authorities in the US Government were impressed with the manner in which the General was handling a difficult situation, and that they had sent him their best wishes for success. This greatly pleased Chehab.

(8) Msg, SecState to Beirut, 4232, 14 May 58; (9) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 3941, 16 May 58. Both in OCJCS files.

15 May 58

CINCNEELM informed JCS that two amphibious groups, each carrying a Marine BLT, had sailed for the Eastern Mediterranean, with the first echelon expected to arrive in an area about 60 miles west of Beirut at 1930Z May, and the last echelon at 2110Z May. Task Force 60 would leave at high speed at 1907Z May to conduct exercises in the Ionian Sea. Preliminary staff level planning talks
were held with the British on 15 May. They were progressing smoothly and would be continued on 16 May in hopes of completing a draft outline plan as quickly as possible.  

(25) Msg, CINCNEWM to JCS, 4232, 152225Z May 58, JCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec I.

15 May 58

King Husseini advised the US Ambassador in Jordan that he intended to consult with Iraq on joint intervention should the UAR take open military action in Lebanon. He requested that the US urge Chamoun to appeal to the UN Security Council immediately, before the situation deteriorated to a point where outside intervention was the only course left to preserve Lebanon.  


16 May 58

In a conversation during the morning with US Ambassador McClintock, Gen Chehab expressed his contempt for Lebanese politicians on both sides, but stated his fear that, unless the fighting ended, there was great danger of open Moslem-Christian strife. He, himself, refused to head the government, and would stand by Chamoun until the end of his legal term of office, but not beyond that time. Chehab still believed a facesaving solution was possible (presumably without intervention), if Chamoun would give guarantees to all elements in Lebanon of his intention not to succeed himself. He felt that the three Western Ambassadors should immediately impress upon Chamoun the need for these guarantees.  

(27) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 3937, 16 May 58, OCJCS files.

16 May 58

The US Ambassador in Beirut, on his own initiative, emphasized to President Chamoun the importance of Chamoun's issuing a statement that he did not seek re-election. The President made no comment except to thank him.  

(28) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 3949, 16 May 58, OCJCS files.

16 May 58

In response to a query from CINCSPECOMME, JCS informed Adm Holloway that the State Department had been requested to secure overflight and staging rights from Turkey, Libya, France, Italy, and Greece. The Department, however, was reluctant to approach these Governments until the decision was made to intervene in Lebanon. In the absence of such rights, CINCSPECOMME was nevertheless to proceed, ignoring the legal question to the extent required to execute his plan.  

16 May 58

Air Marshal Sir William Dickson, Chairman of the British Chiefs of Staff, informed General Twining of the great satisfaction in London with Admiral Holloway's cooperation and the progress of US-UK planning. With regard to the immediate situation, he expressed the anxiety of the British Government over the fact that, until the US amphibious force then moving east in the Mediterranean actually reached the Levant, effective assistance could not reach Lebanon in less than 48 hours if called for. Dickson suggested advancing the readiness of US and British forces to be flown into Lebanon, urging particularly that consideration be given to bringing US forces in Germany to an immediate state of alert.


16 May 58

The JCS directed US CINCEUR and CINC NELM to bring one battle group and the necessary airlift for it to a state of readiness to permit arrival on Lebanese airfields within 24 hours of an execution order, assuming such airfields were safely held by the Lebanese Army. JCS assumed that US CINCEUR and CINC NELM would arrange for fighter cover. British troops on Cyprus were being brought to the same state of readiness.


16 May 58

CINC SPECOMME submitted outline plan BLUE BAT, the US-UK plan for combined military intervention in Lebanon, to the JCS. The plan had been given general approval by the British Chiefs of Staff. In substance, BLUE BAT provided for Adm Holloway to command the combined US-UK forces as CINC AMBRITFOR, with other US officers commanding US-UK land, air, and naval forces, in an intervention to support a friendly Lebanese Government or, if necessary, to re-establish its authority; the forces would assist in the maintenance of order and protect US-UK nationals and interests. The operation would include two US airborne battle groups, two US Marine BLT's, and a British infantry brigade group, supported by US-UK naval and air forces, with US forces being committed first. The initial objective of the operation was the Beirut area, after which operations would be expanded to include other essential areas.

[LET] Msg, CINC SPECOMME to CNO, 4650, 162001Z May 58, COS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 1.

16 May 58

The JCS held a meeting with State Department representatives to discuss the latest political and military information regarding possible intervention in Lebanon. It was believed that Jordan, Iraq, and Turkey were all willing to give open assistance if the US-UK intervention in Lebanon occurred.
In response to NSC Action 1875 (see item of 13 March 58), the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted their views to the Secretary of Defense concerning possible US actions in support of pro-Western nations in the Middle East. They noted that plans had already been prepared for possible military intervention in the area, including specifically the deployment of US forces to Jordan, Lebanon, or Saudi Arabia. They emphasized, however, that if the long-range US objectives in the Middle East were to be achieved without resort to force, bold political action and carefully planned economic measures were necessary. Accordingly the Joint Chiefs of Staff renewed their earlier recommendation (see item of 4 December 57) that three steps be taken to resolve the basic Arab-Israeli problem: agreement on fixed boundaries for Israel, establishment of a reasonable guarantee that Israel would not thereafter expand territorially, and solution of the refugee problem.

In the politico-military realm, the JCS recommended that the US Government consider seeking an invitation to provide additional support to the UN Emergency Force in order to broaden its mission in maintaining the Arab-Israeli armistice. The US might also take measures to make affiliation with, or support of, the Arab Union more attractive to Saudi Arabia. Purely military actions that JCS recommended the Department of Defense propose to the State Department included the following: (1) provide Iraq with one or two squadrons of fighter/bomber aircraft, as previously recommended; (2) improve existing limited early warning and air control radar capabilities of the countries under consideration; (3) expand the MAAG in Iraq to deal with Arab Union matters; (4) assist the Arab Union and Saudi Arabia in developing a greater capability for coordinated internal security by giving military aid and training support; and (5) establish a small training mission in Lebanon.

On 1 July 1958 the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) informed JCS that all the above recommended military actions had been approved; some had been implemented in part while others found to be politically infeasible at present would remain under active consideration.

(A) Memo, CJCJ to SecDef, "Possible U.S. Actions in Support of Pro-Western Nations in the Near East (c)." 16 May 58, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 70, derived from (A) JCS 1887/452, same file, sec 69. (A) N/H of JCS 1887/452, 8 Jul 58.

In a public address upon his return to Cairo from the USSR, Nasser charged that Lebanon was attempting to turn its "purely domestic dispute" into an international incident with the UAR, in order to invoke foreign assistance. He asserted that the UAR had
no part in the dispute and had no intention of interfering in Lebanese internal affairs, but would not accept other foreign interference.

(ce) Msg, Cairo to SecState, 3006, 17 May 58, DA IN 117303 (18 May 58).

17 May 58

At a Saturday morning meeting, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved plan BLUE BAT as submitted by CINCSPECOMME on 16 May. Notification of this action was sent to CINCSPECOMME at 1616Z.


17 May 58

The Joint Chiefs of Staff disapproved a proposal by Adm Holloway to furnish plan BLUE BAT to the US and British Ambassadors in Beirut, to be held by them until an actual operation was directed and then passed to the senior friendly Lebanese military commander. The JCS directed that information given to the Ambassadors be restricted to the broad outlines necessary to facilitate execution of the plan.


17 May 58

CINCUSAFE informed CSAF that to satisfy the airlift requirements for BLUE BAT, he would need an additional 26 C-124's to deploy the entire airborne battle force in 24 hours, or 12 C-124's to deploy it in 72 hours. With no augmentation, a total of five or six days would be required. Less than two hours later, USAF directed COMMATS to deploy immediately 26 C-124 aircraft to bases in Europe.

(ce) Msg, CINCUSAFE to CSAF, ODC 8 RM 975, 171616Z May 58, DA IN 117124; (ce) Msg, USAF to COMMATS, TS 9720, 171752Z May 58. Both in CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 1.

17 May 58

In identical communications to the US and UK, the Government of Pakistan voiced its concern over the situation in Lebanon and expressed the hope that the lawful Government of Lebanon would receive necessary assistance.

(ce) Msg, Karachi to SecState, 2882, 17 May 58.

17 May 58

The Department of State issued a statement confirming reports that consideration was being given to the sending of US troops to Lebanon to protect American lives and property if the Lebanese security forces were unable to do so and if the President of Lebanon requested the US troops. In another statement, the Department said that planned arms shipments to Lebanon, augmented in some cases, were being speeded up, so that the Lebanese Government could defend the territorial integrity and independence of Lebanon.

NYT, 18 May 58, 1:4.
The Soviet Government, through its official news agency, accused the US of hatching a new plot in the Middle East by interfering in the internal affairs of Lebanon. The Soviet statement said that the US Sixth Fleet had received urgent orders to support the political maneuvers of certain Western Embassies in Lebanon, and warned that these Western activities would lead to "serious" consequences for Lebanon and the Middle East.

NYT, 19 May 58, 8:3.

Secretary Dulles and his advisers met with JCS, OSD, and CIA representatives to discuss the necessity of finding a solution to Lebanon's internal political problems without intervention and of lessening the British "enthusiasm" for immediate military action. Intervention would put the US in the position of supporting Chamoun's continuance in office against the terms of the Lebanese constitution and possibly without Lebanese Army support. It was agreed that the State Department should endeavor to discourage the presentation of a Lebanese complaint to the UN Security Council, since disadvantages of a UN presentation seemed to outweigh the advantages. The group also concluded that, since the Lebanese Army apparently had the situation in that country under control, the US should de-emphasize the prospect of military action and play down military preparations, but in view of the "great explosive potentialities" in Lebanon, the readiness of US forces must be maintained. Meanwhile, efforts should be made to induce Chamoun to find a solution to Lebanese internal political problems on his own. It was mentioned that messages instructing the appropriate US Ambassadors to request overflight and staging rights had been prepared, for dispatch when an actual decision to intervene occurred.


CINCSEL reported that the Sixth Fleet was now well into the Eastern Mediterranean. The Carrier Striking Force would be held approximately 12 hours steaming time from a position to support a landing in Lebanon, and amphibious forces would be approximately 12 hours from Beirut.

(25) Mag, CINCSEL to CNO, 5513, 191641Z May 58.

The JCS informed CINCSPECOMME that, in view of the possible international repercussions, it was preferable that he remain in London rather than board his flagship, unless, in his opinion, the situation required his presence.

(25) Mag, JCS to CINCSPECOMME, JCS 941961, 191732Z May 58, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 1.
The US Ambassador in Beirut reported that his British and French colleagues—said their Governments were separately sending small amounts of automatic weapons for use by Lebanese security forces. The Ambassador also noted that the recent US shipment of five plane-loads of police equipment had very much gratified the commandant of the Lebanese gendarmes. Gen Chehab, with more trained pilots than aircraft, had asked the UK for three Vampires. The Ambassador learned the following day that the British had decided to provide four Vampire jets, probably to arrive on 22 May.

(25) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 4028, 19 May 58.
(26) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 4043, 20 May 58. Both in OJCJS files.

The State Department instructed the US Ambassador in Lebanon to make clear to Chamoun that if he reached the point of requesting US-UK military intervention, the US would strongly object to French participation in the operation. The Ambassador was to ask Chamoun to restrict any approach to the French to a request for other forms of assistance, specifically excluding French armed forces.

(26) Msg, SecState to Beirut, 4390, 18 May 58, OJCJS files.

The State Department directed the US Ambassador in Beirut to raise the question with Chamoun of broadening his Government as one means of averting civil war in Lebanon. If Chamoun replied that this was impossible without his renouncing a second term, the Ambassador was to emphasize the importance of insuring the continuous existence of a genuinely independent Lebanon and the continuation of pro-Western policies. This approach had been agreed to by the British and French.

(26) Msg, SecState to Beirut, 4400, 19 May 58, OJCJS files.

The French Ambassador in Beirut told his US and British colleagues that the right-wing Christian, pro-Chamoun Phalangist Party had requested France to provide it with arms and demolition experts and to ask the Government of Israel to undertake diversionary measures, presumably against Syria. Paris was willing only to supply arms and had given Ambassador Roche discretionary power in the matter. The US and British Ambassadors both argued strongly against the provision of arms to any but duly constituted Lebanese Government security forces.

(26) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 4046, 20 May 58, OJCJS files.

The US Ambassador in Beirut reported that the Government of Lebanon had decided to submit Lebanon's case to the UN Security Council, and on the following morning had agreed to lodge a complaint with the Council of the Arab League as well.

(26) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 4084, 21 May 58.
20 May 58
In a press conference discussion of the application of the American Doctrine to the situation in Lebanon, Secretary Dulles pointed out that the authority of the Doctrine was not limited to cases in which international Communism was involved. He noted that the Mansfield amendment, added by Congress to the Administration's original version of the Doctrine, declared the independence and integrity of the Middle East nations to be vital to peace and the national interest of the US, and that this was "certainly a mandate to do something if we think that our peace and vital interests are endangered from any quarter." Questioned further, he declined to say categorically that this provision gave the Administration clear authority to go to the defense of an independent country without further recourse to Congress.


22 May 58
The Lebanese Government lodged a formal complaint with the UN Security Council, charging the United Arab Republic with endangering peace in the Middle East by interfering in Lebanon's internal affairs. According to the complaint, the United Arab Republic was responsible for the infiltration of armed bands from Syria into Lebanon and for supplying arms to individuals in rebellion against the legal government of Lebanon.

NYT, 23 May 58, 1:2.

22 May 58
CINCSPECOMME, pointing out that the Sixth Fleet, with Marines, was scheduled to remain within 12 hours of Lebanon, recommended that the BLUE BAT alert status of the Army battle group and its airlift--permitting deployment from Europe to the objective area within 24 hours--be changed to one permitting deployment within 48 hours. He added, however, that the additional C-124's flown to Europe for BLUE BAT should be retained there until the Lebanese situation eased.

(28) Mag, CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 6537, 221651Z May 58, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 2.

23 May 58
In response to CINCSPECOMME's recommendation of the previous day, the JCS approved reduction of the alert status for BLUE BAT of the Army battle group and its airlift to permit arrival in the target area within 48 hours instead of the previously directed 24 hours. The JCS also indicated the airlift augmentation stationed in Europe might be reduced.

(28) Mag, JCS to USCINCEUR, et al., JCS 942253, 231509Z May 58, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 2.

23 May 58
The State Department informed the US Ambassador in Beirut that it shared his concern over the likelihood that the political initiative in Lebanon might pass to the opposition, and that, when this occurred, Chamoun might seek foreign intervention as his
"trump card." The Department directed the Ambassador to reiterate to Chamoun the conditions necessary for US intervention, emphasizing that Western forces should be requested only under the most compelling necessity. Under no circumstances would US forces intervene where Lebanese forces were unwilling to fight. Chamoun, directed the Department, should be disabused of any idea that he could refrain from decisive action to solve the Lebanese political problem because he felt he could count on foreign forces to back him against domestic opposition.

(25) Msg, SecState to Beirut, 4482, 23 May 58, OCJCS files.

23 May 58

Less than 72 hours after a Lebanese request to US officials for mortar ammunition, 1,000 rounds each for 60-mm and 81-mm mortars reached Beirut. The speedy delivery was greatly appreciated by Lebanese security officials.

(28) Msg, USARMA Beirut to DEPTAR, CX 97, 23 May 58, DA IN 119205 (24 May 57), JMEPG Lebanon Msg File.

27 May 58

USCINCEUR reported to JCS that, in response to the JCS directive reducing the BLUE BAT alert status of the Army battle group and its airlift (see item of 23 May 1958), USAR had indicated its desire to withdraw the MATS augmentation aircraft from Europe. USCINCEUR believed that these aircraft were still necessary for the execution of his mission, and he recommended that they be retained in his theater until the alert status was further reduced to 72 hours or more. The Joint Chiefs of Staff disapproved this recommendation the following day.

(25) Msg, USCINCEUR to JCS, EC 9-2778, 271658Z May 58, DA IN 119998 (28 May 58); (26) Msg, JCS to USCINCEUR, JCS 942490, 282011Z May 58. Both in GCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) see 2.

27 May 58

The UN Security Council met to take up the Lebanese complaint against the United Arab Republic. Discussion of this question was postponed, however, until conclusion of the Arab League Council's consideration of it. See items for 6 June. 

NYT, 28 May 58, 10:2.

27 May 58

Premier Sami Solh of Lebanon, in a national broadcast from Beirut, stated that his Government did not intend to amend the Constitution to permit re-election of the President and that President Chamoun had never approached the Premier on this question. However, he did not say categorically that Chamoun would not seek a second term.

NYT, 28 May 58, 8:4.

27 May 58

CINCNEUR reported that a squadron of the Iraqi Air Force and approximately 1,500 Iraqi Army troops had arrived in the Amman area in mid-May to participate in the Jordan Army Day Parade on 25 May.
The withdrawal of some 3,000 Saudi Arabian Army troops from Jordan was completed on 20 May.

28 May 58

A US Navy vessel bearing 18 American tanks, with ammunition, arrived at the port of Beirut and began unloading. The Lebanese Army took direct delivery from shipside.

(2) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 4310, 28 May 58, DA IN 120476 (29 May 58).

28 May 58

The US Government recognized the establishment of the Arab Union of Iraq and Jordan.


29 May 58

Ambassador McClintock reported that the Lebanese political impasse continued, but efforts were being made to find a compromise solution, mostly centered around Chehab becoming Prime Minister. Since Prime Minister Solh's declaration two days earlier that his government would not sponsor Chamoun's re-election, demands that Chamoun resign immediately were less strong except among extreme oppositionists.

(2) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 4333, 29 May 58, DA IN 121044 (31 May 58).

30 May 58

The Patriarch of the Maronite Catholic Church in Lebanon stated at an unusual press conference that he feared the situation in Lebanon had become too grave for compromise, and suggested that the time would soon come for President Chamoun to "take a trip." He had previously proposed that Chamoun be permitted to serve out his term as President after turning over actual control of the Government to Gen Chehab, the Commander of the Lebanese armed forces.

NYT, 31 May 58, 1:6, 5:1.

30 May 58

The US Air Attache in Ankara reported that the Turks continued to be deeply concerned over the crisis in Lebanon and were seeking every opportunity to lend support to Chamoun. On 23 May, according to Foreign Minister Zorlu, the Turks had begun an airlift to Lebanon of 1,000 submachine guns and ammunition.

(2) Msg, USAIRA Ankara to CSAF, 3008452 May 58, CAF IN 89322 (31 May 58).

2 Jun 58

The US Ambassador in Beirut described the current situation in Lebanon as a precarious lull brought on by a military and political stalemate. There were indications of a steady build up of anti-government irregulars but no evidence that any centralized rebel command organization existed. The main political issue was quieted for the moment by the fact that the regular Parliamentary session had concluded without considering a constitutional amendment to permit Chamoun’s re-election. A special session would be called later to elect a new President.
The US Ambassador in Iraq transmitted a formal Arab Union representation regarding the Lebanese situation. The Arab Union Government believed the time had come for the American Doctrine to be invoked and the insurrection to be quelled by US and British forces as the only way to save Lebanon.

US intervention could keep any pro-Western government in office, but it would be difficult to create a stable situation not clearly dependent on US forces. A US-supported regime would be widely opposed and probably would not long survive the withdrawal of Western forces.

UAR reaction against US intervention would be sharp, and would include increased propaganda, continued covert assistance to the Lebanese rebels, and probable sabotage against Western oil interests. The governments of Jordan and Iraq would welcome the intervention, but there would be strong adverse popular reaction. Saudi Arabia would probably seek to avoid involvement, as would Israel. Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan would almost certainly support the US move. Adverse reaction would be intensified if the UK participated in the operation.

Soviet reaction to US intervention in Lebanon would probably be confined to vigorous diplomatic and propaganda action. If the intervention were extended to include US military action on UAR...
territory, the Soviets would react more strongly, possibly in increasing military assistance and providing "volunteers." It was unlikely, however, that the USSR would take any action that it estimated would involve serious risk of general war.

"area conflagration" was likely within the next year or so as the result of a collapse of Jordan, an Israeli preventative military action, or a resort to force by Nasser or his opponents. Further, the situation in Lebanon might develop in a way that would bring the hostile forces in the Middle East into open conflict.

In Lebanon the UAR was arming and encouraging the predominantly Moslem opposition to President Chamoun. Should Moslem elements gain the upper hand, they would probably not be able to take all of Lebanon into the UAR, but Moslem parts of the country might attempt to secede, which would almost certainly precipitate a civil war. Whatever the immediate outcome of the Lebanese crisis, however, the trend in that country would probably be in the direction of neutralism.

In Iraq the conservative anti-Nasser regime was considered to be in firm control. Although there was opposition and little popular support, the government controlled the army and was likely to be able to maintain itself in power for the next several years.

Lebanese Parliamentary Speaker Oseirian summoned all deputies to convene on 24 July to elect a new President.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendation of Adm Burke that, since the situation in the Mediterranean had become relatively stable, all amphibious forces (and attached units) assigned to CINCSPECOM in augmentation of the normal strength of the Sixth Fleet should be withdrawn at the earliest possible date. CNO was authorized to allow CINCEM to return these augmenting forces at his discretion. Adm Burke indicated that he would coordinate with the State and Defense Departments before dispatching the authorizing message to CINCEM.
The Arab League Council concluded its meetings in Benghazi, Libya, on Lebanon's complaint of interference in Lebanese internal affairs by the United Arab Republic, without adopting any resolution.

The Soviet representative characterized Malik's presentation as "unconvincing." The representatives of the US, Britain, and France, however, appeared to regard Loutfi's disclaimer as insufficient to offset the evidence presented by Malik.

In a conversation with the US Ambassador in Cairo, Nasser denied that he sought to incorporate Lebanon in the UAR or dominate its government. All he wanted was a Lebanese government that would...
not be hostile. He renewed proposals he had made earlier for a joint US-UAR approach to the Lebanese problem. This would have called for Chamoun to finish his term, Chehab to become Prime Minister, and amnesty to be offered to Lebanese rebels, with Nasser doing his best to induce the Lebanese opposition to accept this plan. A US offer to forward these ideas to Chamoun, without endorsing them, was viewed by Nasser as being of dubious value, since Chamoun would not accept them unless they had US backing. He suggested, however, that the US might offer these ideas as its own, after which, if Chamoun reacted favorably, Nasser would do all he could to get the Lebanese opposition to go along with them.

Ambassador Hare concluded that, for reasons not clear and probably rather complex, Nasser desired to liquidate his commitments in Lebanon and bring the crisis there to an end.

(26) Msg, Cairo to SeaState, 3241, 7 Jun 58.
(27) Msg, Cairo to SeaState, 3244, 8 Jun 58.

9 Jun 58

During a White House consultation between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan, with their advisers, Secretary Dulles stressed the objectives of maintaining a pro-Western government in Lebanon and supporting the Arab Union of Jordan and Iraq. He believed that recent Lebanese developments were in a direction that made a need for US-UK intervention less likely, but he warned that "we are not in the clear yet by any means." Armed intervention he described as the lesser of two evils, but still an evil.

Prime Minister Macmillan thought it would be very difficult to keep President Chamoun in power for a second term. President Eisenhower agreed, saying that to attempt it "would be asking for even more rebellion." Regarding the possibility of finding a vigorous pro-Western successor to support, a State Department official said Gen Chehab was "probably the best available prospect.

President Eisenhower, Prime Minister Macmillan, and their advisers discussed the provision of aircraft to Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq (see items of 23 and 30 April 1958). The US representatives restated the US intention of purchasing by offshore procurement in the UK six Hawker Hunter VI aircraft for Lebanon and twelve for Jordan. The UK representatives indicated that three of these aircraft could be provided to each of the two countries within six weeks after receipt of a letter of intent from the US, with the balance being provided within six months. Gen Twining stated that every effort would be made to provide the letter of intent within a week. It was agreed that the RAF would conduct the training of Lebanese and Jordanian forces receiving the aircraft. Gen Twining agreed to have four F86F aircraft flown into Iraq, within two weeks, with the balance of 11 aircraft (making a full squadron) to be delivered within three months. Training in Iraq would be provided by the US.

[36] Asst SecDef (ISA), Memo for Record, "MAP Planes for Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq," 10 Jun 58, encl to (26) JCS 1887/463, Note by Secys, same subj, 16 Jun 58, CCS 3/1 EMMEA (11-19-47) see 71.

10 Jun 58

Lebanese Government forces won a crucial test of strength against a larger rebel force under Kamal Jumblatt, who had made a surprise attempt to cut the Beirut-Damascus road. At the same time, the Government defeated an effort by other rebel forces to take Tripoli.

NYT, 11 Jun 58, 3:4; 12 Jun 58, 4:5.

10 Jun 58

The US Ambassador in Iraq reported a political crisis was developing because of the Arab Union's financial predicament. Prime Minister Nuri had offered his resignation to King Faisal, declaring that the Arab Union could not stand unless its immediate budgetary problem was quickly solved and long-term financial strength was gained by adding Kuwait to the Union. The King had told the British Ambassador he feared Nuri's resignation would mean the end of the Arab Union and in very short order the royal family "would find it impossible to carry on as they would have nothing to offer." Faisal desired that his views be conveyed to Prime Minister Macmillan in Washington for urgent consideration by him and the President. The US Ambassador concurred in the recommendations made by his British colleague that the US and UK give immediate assurance of financial assistance to cover the AU budget deficit, agree to seek ways of solving the long-term financial difficulties confronting the Arab Union, and prevail upon Kuwait to join the Union.

[37] Mag, Baghdad to SecState, 2039, 10 Jun 58.

10 Jun 58

Jordanian Prime Minister Rifai told the US Ambassador that King Hussein was deeply concerned that Lebanon would slip into the UAR orbit if Jordan and Iraq did not take positive action to intervene. The King proposed that Iraq and Jordan arm selected tribes
living along the Syrian border and encourage raids in an effort to pin down UAR security forces. Also he favored shutting off road and rail communications into Syria in order to squeeze the UAR economically and generate discontent among Syrians already irritated by UAR controls. So far, however, Hussein's attempts to arrange discussion of his proposal with Iraqi officials had been rebuffed.

(◊) Msg, Amman to SecState, 2130, 11 Jun 58, DA IN 123920 (12 Jun 58).

11 Jun 58

The Lebanese Government's request for this assistance had originally been directed to King Hussein of Jordan, who had relayed it to Iraq.

(◊) 16 Jun 58, DA IN 125078.

11 Jun 58

The State Department directed the US Ambassador in Beirut to inform Chamoun that Nasser had indicated he might be willing to use his influence to end dissidence in Lebanon provided it was understood that Chamoun would finish his term, Chehab would become Prime Minister, and the opposition would be granted amnesty. The US was forwarding this to Chamoun as a matter of loyalty to Lebanon, and not because it endorsed or trusted Nasser's proposal. When informed of this proposal, Chamoun replied that he distrusted Nasser and was unwilling to deal with him.

(◊) Msg, SecState to Beirut, 4710, 11 Jun 58; (◊) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 4629, 11 Jun 58. Both in OJCS files.

11 Jun 58

The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed CINCHELM to prepare a contingency plan that would expand CINCSPREAD OPLAN 215-58 to provide for implementation of the American Doctrine in Iraq.

(◊) Mag, JCS to CINCHELM, JCS 943139, 1120312 Jun 58, derived from (◊◊) JCS 1887/458, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 70.

11 Jun 58

The UN Security Council, by a vote of 10 to 0 (the USSR abstaining), adopted a resolution authorizing the Secretary General to send a UN observer group to Lebanon "to ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other materiel across the Lebanese borders."

12 Jun 58  UN Secretary General Hammarskjold set up a three-man commission to implement the Security Council resolution requiring the sending of an observer group to Lebanon. Hammarskjold made clear that the observers were "not a police force," like the UN Emergency Force on the border between Egypt and Israel. The observers would not intervene with direct action; rather, he considered that their presence was "essential and useful as a contribution to the preventing of possible illegal traffic." They would stay within the boundaries of Lebanon, would be assisted by field agents detached for the purpose from the UN Truce Supervision Organization, and would report any smuggling of arms or personnel through the UN Secretary to the Security Council.

NVT, 13 Jun 58, 4:1.

12 Jun 58  President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan sent a message to AU Premier Nuri in regard to financial support for the Arab Union. On the assumption that the Union would become operative on 1 July 58, the US was prepared to make available up to $25 million for the period 1 July - 31 March 59, which would cover the entire Jordanian share of the Union budget and leave an estimated excess of $6.25 million to be applied to the Iraqi share. The UK would contribute up to $4 million to the Union budget.

[LET] Msg, SecState to Amman, 2730, and to Baghdad, 3233, 12 Jun 58.

12 Jun 58  In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that they had found acceptable from the military point of view a draft political directive, prepared by the US-UK Working Group on the Middle East, to be addressed to appropriate military commanders should the US and UK decide to intervene militarily in Lebanon. The directive stated that the US and UK were entering Lebanon at the request of the Lebanese Government to provide military assistance in the face of massive interference from the outside that had disrupted Lebanese security and gravely threatened the country's independence. Western forces were being provided to help protect US-UK lives and property and "to assist the Government of Lebanon in its military program for the preservation of the independence and integrity of Lebanon." Operations would be limited to Lebanese territory and would employ the minimum force necessary to attain the objectives, with military tasks being turned over to Lebanese authorities as soon as possible. Withdrawal would be carried out as soon as the Lebanese Government was able to act with sufficient force by itself. A US-UK warning had been issued that any interference with the operations in Lebanon would be met with force. The directive instructed the military commanders to seek advice on political matters relating exclusively to Lebanon from the US and British Ambassadors in Beirut, whose views would be controlling. (The final clause
above reflects the addition of a clarifying sentence approved by JCS on 17 June 58.)

JCS 1887/465, Note by Secys, "Lebanon Situation (U)," 18 Jun 58, and N/H of JCS 1887/465, 26 Jun 58, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 2.

13 Jun 58

Prime Minister Nuri of the Arab Union, upon receiving the message of 12 June from President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan, expressed bitter disappointment over what he considered an inadequate amount of US-UK financial support for the Union's budget. Working himself up to a dramatic pitch, he delivered an ultimatum to the effect that either the US and UK would provide an additional $6 million to cover the estimated nine-month AU budget deficit, and Kuwait would be made to join the Arab Union, or he would resign and allow the Arab Union, along with Western influence in the Middle East, to collapse. The US Ambassador commented on Nuri's emotional reaction as evidence of the low value placed on the Arab Union by its two partners, and as confirmation that the US would have to underwrite its budget if the Arab Union were to become a reality.

(05) Mag, Amman to SecState, 2153, 13 Jun 58.

13 Jun 58

The US Ambassador in Beirut cabled that the Lebanese Government had urgently requested 8,000 rounds of 75-mm ammunition. Ambassador McClintock estimated that the cost of airlifting this ammunition was beyond Lebanon's financial resources, and he strongly recommended that the USAF fly one C-124 with an initial shipment to Beirut without charge. The balance could be sent by sea at commercial rates.

(07) Mag, Beirut to SecState, 4684, 13 Jun 58, DA IN 124620 (14 Jun 58).

14 Jun 58

Fairly serious fighting took place in Beirut, originating in an attempt by opposition forces to liberate political prisoners who might have furnished incriminating evidence to the UN observers. Lebanese Army action frustrated the attack. At 1700Z, Prime Minister Solh informed the US Embassy that either the UN Secretary General should immediately furnish police forces or the US might wish to send units of the Sixth Fleet to protect US lives and property. He said the situation in Beirut was out of control and asked the US Ambassador to bring his message to the attention of President Eisenhower. Reporting on this, Ambassador McClintock said that while the situation in Beirut was grave, he did not believe it was necessary to do more than place the Sixth Fleet on immediate alert. He did, however, urgently recommend that the two US destroyers within six hours steaming time of Lebanon be moved closer in at dawn of 15 June and that he be authorized voice radio communication with the ships.

(035) Mag, Beirut to SecState, 4726, 14 Jun 58, OCJCS files.
At about 1600Z, Lebanese Foreign Minister Malik telephoned Assistant Secretary of State Rountree and said that he had heard from Chamoun that the situation in Lebanon was critical. Malik did not request US intervention but indicated that such a request might be imminent. Later reports from US sources in Beirut showed the immediate situation to be somewhat improved, but indicated that the long-term prospects remained gloomy.

Msg, SecState to Beirut, 4773, 14 Jun 58, OCJCS files.

Secretary of State Dulles was sufficiently disturbed by the flareup in Beirut to leave a class reunion at Princeton and return to Washington for an emergency conference at the State Department and a telephone conversation with US Ambassador McClintock in Beirut. He then told reporters the situation in Beirut was "serious but not alarming."

NYT, 15 Jun 58, 1:8, 15:1, 19:1.

In response to a request from the US Ambassador in Beirut, COMSIXTHFLT ordered two US destroyers to take station 30 miles off Beirut, out of sight of the shore. The destroyers might be used for a show of force or to fire a covering bombardment for the evacuation of US nationals. They were to contact the US Embassy in Beirut every half hour on a clandestine circuit. COMSIXTHFLT also directed the two destroyers to be prepared to escort a US attack
cargo ship carrying three LCM's for the Lebanese Government into Beirut or to some other designated point, at the call of the US Naval Attache in Beirut.


15 Jun 58

Lebanese Foreign Minister Malik, having requested an urgent Sunday morning meeting with Assistant Secretary of State Rountree, explained that Chamoun had informed him that the situation in Lebanon had again deteriorated, with Syrian parachutists and Egyptian-trained Palestinians joining the fighting. Chamoun wanted an immediate answer, to give to the Cabinet, to the question: would the US intervene militarily at once if asked? Rountree replied that he could give no answer suitable for transmission to Chamoun by telephone, but that an answer would be sent through the US Ambassador in Beirut. Later in the day, Malik asked Rountree if he could tell Chamoun, with US approval, to "hold firm—do not yield." The Assistant Secretary replied that he could not, since this could readily be misinterpreted. While the US agreed that Chamoun should not yield on any matter fundamental to Lebanon's independence, he should not refuse any reasonable internal political compromise.


15 Jun 58

The State Department informed the US Ambassador in Beirut of Assistant Secretary Rountree's conversation with Malik that morning (see above item) and directed him to inform Chamoun that the US position on military intervention in Lebanon had not changed. He was to recall for Chamoun the US terms that the declared purpose of intervention would be to protect US lives and property and to assist Lebanon "in its military program" for the preservation of the country's integrity and independence, and that Lebanese security forces would have to exert a maximum effort to defend their country. The Ambassador was also to stress the changed situation resulting from the fact that Lebanon had recently sought and obtained: a UN Security Council resolution placing observers in the country. The US would find it very awkward to take action that would appear to disregard the existence of this UN effort.

Accordingly, if Chamoun, accepting the US terms reiterated above, came to believe that intervention was necessary, the US suggested that an emergency UN Security Council session be called. There Lebanon would report that a stepped-up campaign to extinguish Lebanese independence before the UN observation effort could be organized was obviously in progress, that Lebanon was no longer able unaided to protect both foreign life and property and its own independence, and that therefore certain countries were being invited to send troops to protect their nationals,
freeing the Lebanese forces to concentrate on defense of the country's integrity.

(24) Msg, SecState to Beirut, 4790, 15 Jun 58, OCJCS files.

15 Jun 58

At 1830Z, Malik telephoned Secretary of State Dulles. He said that any Middle Eastern country inviting armed intervention by the West would be the subject of "shame and reproach" for generations, and, therefore, there were three prerequisites to such a request: (1) it should be made only in extremis; (2) there should be some Arab participation in, or support of, the intervention, even if token, perhaps by Iraq and Jordan; and (3) the action must have the moral support of either the UN Security Council or General Assembly. Secretary Dulles told Malik that this was a statesmanlike approach, and coincided with the US view.


15 Jun 58

At a late Sunday afternoon White House meeting, the President and representatives of the State and Defense Departments, CIA; and USIA discussed the situation in Lebanon. Secretary Dulles said that Malik's latest telephone call (see above item) had been helpful, although the views expressed were not necessarily those of Chamoun or the rest of the Lebanese Government. The Secretary warned that intervention under present conditions would lay the US open to charges of undermining the UN observation effort, which Lebanon itself had requested. He agreed with the view expressed in a message just received from the British Foreign Secretary, that military action in Lebanon should be withheld until a further attempt to settle the matter in the UN had been made.

The President discussed the weakness of Lebanese leadership, the dangers of intervening before the UN had reported its own action was ineffective, and the difficulties that would be imposed by unfavorable popular reaction in Lebanon. If the US intervened, it might well have to remain indefinitely, and he recalled as pertinent the arguments the US had advanced against the Anglo-French intervention in Egypt in 1956, particularly "where would it lead; where would it end?" Secretary Dulles stated, however, and the President agreed, that if Chamoun requested US intervention, and the US did not respond, every pro-Western government in the area would disappear. The US, therefore, had little or no choice.

The President commented that if the US was forced to act, everything possible should be done to make the intervention under the most favorable auspices and circumstances, and the Lebanese Army should be bolstered so that US forces could be quickly withdrawn. He directed Gen Twining to have the JCS study the "military possibilities and problems involved."
(Assigned to JMEPG, this study was cancelled on 22 July 58.) He also asked for examination of the possibility of giving Lebanon "massive military support," possibly accompanied by technicians, as an alternative to intervention.


15 Jun 58

On the recommendation of Ambassador McClintock that deterioration of the Lebanese situation made it necessary, the State Department declared a Phase I emergency for Lebanon, directing that dependents desiring evacuation be moved to Italy.

Mag, Beirut to SecState, 4750, 15 Jun 58. DA IN 125026. (G) Mag, SecState to Beirut, 4793, 15 Jun 58, DA IN 125180 (16 Jun 58).

15 Jun 58

The US Ambassador in Beirut reported to the State Department his conclusions after a long talk with Gen Chehab. Chehab saw no prospect of quelling the insurrection by his own means, although he was willing to continue to fight defensively. US military officers in Beirut, however, felt that the Lebanese armed forces, led with initiative and conviction, could put down the civil war, although at a high cost in casualties. Nevertheless, so long as Chehab was in command, the Lebanese Army probably would not act to end the fighting. Chehab did not welcome the prospect of Western intervention but felt it was inevitable. His troops would not oppose this intervention and would probably cooperate in a lukewarm manner. It was necessary, concluded McClintock, to "get a new general" before the West intervened.

Mag, Beirut to SecState, 4746, 15 Jun 58, OCJCS files.

15 Jun 58

In a conversation with the US Ambassador in Beirut, Chamoun declared that it was clearly impossible for the Lebanese armed forces to restore order until Gen Chehab was removed from command. Chamoun feared, however, that Army demoralization after Chehab's dismissal might permit the rebels to gain control of Beirut. Hence he seemed to him safer to wait until after a Western landing to remove the General.

Mag, Beirut to SecState, 4756, 15 Jun 58, OCJCS files.

15 Jun 58

The US Ambassador in Beirut concurred in the recommendations of the US UN Ambassador that the US should encourage the Secretary General to enlarge the UN Observer Group in Lebanon quickly to a total of about 500 men. Ambassador McClintock pointed out that the UN observers could not succeed in their mission unless they were present in sufficient numbers to patrol the means of access to Lebanon.

Mag, Beirut to SecState, 4760, 15 Jun 58, OCJCS files.
15 Jun 58  The French Ambassador in Beirut expressed to the US Ambassador his feeling that any US-UK intervention in Lebanon should include a token French participation. Ambassador Roche said that with DeGaulle in power it was practically certain that France would insist on participating.

4(3) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 4767, 16 Jun 58, OCJCS files.

15 Jun 58  The French Embassy informed the State Department that a French warship was moving to the Lebanon area with instructions to remain outside territorial waters for the present. The action was designed solely to protect French nationals and had not resulted from a Lebanese request for assistance. The French naval commander had been ordered to establish contact with US and British commanders in the area upon his arrival there.

4(3) Msg, SecState to Beirut, 4811, 16 Jun 58, OCJCS files.

15 Jun 58  UN Secretary General Hammarskjold announced that he would go to Lebanon to investigate the situation there. Meanwhile, Norwegian Maj Gen Odd Bull, the first member of the three-man UN Observer Group, arrived in Beirut.

NIT, 16 Jun 58, 1:8, 3:2.

16 Jun 58  During the morning the US Ambassador in Beirut gave President Chamoun a letter conveying the US terms for intervention, in accordance with the State Department's instructions of the previous day (see Item of 15 June 58). Chamoun read the letter carefully and said he agreed with all points. Ambassador McClintock, speaking for the three Western Ambassadors in Beirut, urged Chamoun to take resolute steps against the opposition and to announce definitely that he would not be a candidate for re-election. The Ambassador also stressed the US objections to French participation in any intervention, and Chamoun agreed to limit his request to the French to one seeking material only.

4(3) Msgs, Beirut to SecState, 4773, 4774, 16 Jun 58, OCJCS files.

16 Jun 58  The US delivered five F-86F aircraft to Iraq. The ten remaining planes of the squadron being provided Iraq were scheduled for delivery by 17 September 1958.

4(3) N/H of JCS 1887/452, 8 Jul 58, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 69.

16 Jun 58  At 1825Z, a US attack cargo ship completed transfer of three LCM's to Lebanese crews at a rendezvous 20 miles west of Tripoli, as arranged by the US Naval Attache in Beirut.

At 1915Z, Chamoun summoned a US Embassy official and gave him a handwritten Arabic text of a resolution signed that day by each member of the Cabinet authorizing Chamoun to call for friendly military intervention "when he thinks fit." Chamoun appeared desperate, as evidenced by the fact that he entrusted not only this document but also his wife's jewels to the American official. He definitely feared an attack on the palace that night.

(As) Msgs, Beirut to SecState, 4795, 4818, 17 Jun 58, OCJCS files.

Fighting in Beirut dwindled to a few sporadic outbursts of rifle fire and explosions, but rebel leader Salam said there would be a full civil war if President Chamoun did not resign.

NYT, 17 Jun 58, 1:6.

The US Atlantic Fleet announced that a five-ship amphibious force and a Marine battalion of 1,800 men would depart for the Mediterranean on 25 June to relieve a similar force retained there beyond its scheduled date of return.

NYT, 17 Jun 58, 2:6.

In a morning conversation with the US Ambassador in Beirut, Chamoun was calm and apologetic over his excitement of the previous evening (see item of 16 June 58), indicating that matters were well in hand. On instructions from the State Department, Ambassador McClinton reiterated that Chamoun should make every attempt to solve Lebanon's problems through the UN before asking for Western intervention. With regard to the Cabinet's authorization to call for friendly intervention that Chamoun had received the previous day, the President emphasized that this was "for stand-by use" and that he had no intention of calling for outside assistance except as a last resort.

(As) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 4812, 17 Jun 58;
(As) Msg, SecState to Beirut, 4814, 16 Jun 58. Both in OCJCS files.

The French Ambassador in Beirut informed his US and British colleagues that Chamoun had said he would include France in any request for Western assistance. The French, however, would apparently send only a warship to protect French lives. In another conversation that day, Chamoun told a US representative that he would only ask for French participation in military staff work, a possibility that the US Ambassador regarded as dangerous. On 18 June, Chamoun made a similar statement to the British Ambassador, who immediately argued against the idea.

(As) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 4833, 17 Jun 58.
(As) Msgs, Beirut to SecState, 4846, 4855, 18 Jun 58. All in OCJCS files.

At his news conference, Secretary of State Dulles described the Lebanese crisis as one causing "considerable anxiety" to those who believed in the
independence and integrity of the countries of the Middle East. He declared that the US was ready to support any move to increase the size of UN border patrols in Lebanon. Moreover, he stated, if the US were called on to provide physical as well as diplomatic support for the Government of Lebanon, it "would be inclined to go along with that also."

NYT, 18 Jun 58, 1:1, text, 14:2-6.

17 Jun 58

The Iraqi Government asked the UAR press attache in Baghdad to leave the country, accusing him of activities against the interests of the Arab Union.

NYT, 18 Jun 58, 3:5.

18 Jun 58

CINCSPECOMME informed CNO, among other things, that the readiness of British ground forces to participate in BLUE BAT was not affected by the situation in Cyprus. CINCSPECOMME believed French participation should be excluded if possible, since French association with the US-UK venture would be politically damaging and operationally confusing.

(MS) Mag, CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 3714, 180141Z Jun 58, JMBFG Lebanon Msg File.

18 Jun 58

The US Ambassador in Beirut reported that British intelligence had definitely identified a Lebanese working with the UN Observer Group as an Egyptian spy whose mission was to keep the UAR informed of contemplated movements of UN observers. The British Ambassador had informed Gen Burns of the UN Observer Group.

(MS) Mag, Beirut to SecState, 4859, 18 Jun 58, OCJCS files.

18 Jun 58

Speaker Osseiran of the Lebanese Parliament warned the US Ambassador in Beirut that if there were foreign intervention in Lebanon, he would regard it as an infringement of Lebanon's sovereignty and would personally lead the battle against the foreign forces. French participation in a foreign intervention, he said, would be even worse, because of the deep-seated anti-French feeling in Lebanon. Reporting on this conversation, Ambassador McClintock commented that Osseiran undoubtedly represented a majority of Moslem Lebanese, who were violently opposed to any Western intervention.

(MS) Mag, Beirut to SecState, 4861, 18 Jun 58, OCJCS files.

18 Jun 58

In response to a question at his press conference, President Eisenhower said he would not forecast the circumstances under which the US might take military action in Lebanon. Such action, he said, would be dependent upon the judgment of the UN observer team in Lebanon and of Secretary General Hammarskjold, who was due to arrive there on 19 June.


19 Jun 58

UN Secretary General Hammarskjold arrived in Beirut and began talks with UN observers and Lebanese leaders on the question of bringing peace to Lebanon.

NYT, 20 Jun 58, 1:2-3.
Jordanian Prime Minister Rifai told the US Ambassador that Turkey had informed both Iraq and Jordan that if they wished to send troops to aid Lebanon, safe passage across Turkish territory was guaranteed and the Turkish Government would provide both sea and air transport for the final move from Turkey to Lebanon. Jordan was not responding favorably to this proposal, since it was learned that the Lebanese appeal for Iraqi-Jordanian assistance, via Turkey, had been originated personally by Foreign Minister Malik in Washington and not officially by President Chamoun.

Msg, Amman to SecState, 2197, 19 Jun 58.

The US Ambassador in Beirut gave Chamoun a lengthy message from Secretary of State Dulles explaining the President's remark at his press conference of 18 June. In sum, Dulles restated the US view that Lebanon should call for an emergency session of the UN before requesting US help, that the US had confidence in Chamoun and would do all it could to assist him, and that Lebanon had the capacity to solve its problems without recourse to foreign military aid. Chamoun replied that he would not request intervention "unless the knife is at my throat." Reporting his conversation, Ambassador McClintock concluded that Chamoun was in one of his optimistic moods, but that he was doing little or nothing to find a solution to the situation.

Msg, SecState to Beirut, 4890, 19 Jun 58;
Msg, Beirut to SecState, 4930, 20 Jun 58.
Both in OCJCS files.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed US CINC NEUR that, for political reasons, the State Department was unwilling to negotiate for additional staging rights at Adana, Turkey, on a long-term basis. The Department was prepared to request these rights on an urgent basis in the event of the implementation of BLUE BAT, and no difficulty was anticipated. The previous JCS instructions directing necessary action even in the absence of these rights still applied. On the question of prestocking rights, however, the State Department was willing to approach Turkey.

Msg, JCS to US CINC NEUR, JCS 943672, 20213CZ Jun 58, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 2.

CINC NEUR and the British Chiefs of Staff discussed proposals made by C-in-C British Middle East Land Forces to enlarge the forces and extend the planning for BLUE BAT in view of the apparently increasing morale and determination of rebel forces in Lebanon. CINC NEUR opposed these changes as unnecessary, holding that BLUE BAT was adequate to meet initial objectives and that the plans were sufficiently flexible to be expanded as the situation dictated. CINC NEUR's position was concurred in by CNO.

Msg, JCS 1887/469, Memo by CNO, "Report of CINC NEUR's Discussion With British Chiefs of Staff," 26 Jun 58, and (2) Nach of JCS 1887/469, 27 Jun 58, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 3.
During a conversation with the US Ambassador in Beirut, Chamoun confirmed once more that he did not desire Iraqi or Jordanian military intervention at that time.

20 Jun 58


22 Jun 58

UN Secretary General Hammarskjold arrived in Cairo for talks with UAR President Nasser. "Diplomatic sources" in Beirut said he would ask Nasser to halt his anti-Lebanese propaganda campaign and to close the Syrian-Lebanese frontier in order to stop the movement of supplies to the Lebanese rebels.

NVT, 23 Jun 58, 1:6, 3:1.

26 Jun 58

CINCSPECOMMC submitted to the JCS his estimate of the military and political situation in Lebanon. Despite reports of a formidable build-up of rebel forces, he did not view the fighting strength of the insurgents as commensurate with their numbers. Hence the BLUE BAT operation remained feasible, although there would probably be a longer period of fighting and higher casualties, especially among the Lebanese.

[52] CINCSPECOMMC to CNO, 6044, 261706Z Jun 58, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 3.

26 Jun 58

Former Lebanese Premier Rashid Karami, rebel leader in Tripoli, told reporters he would fight any UN police force sent to Lebanon. He denied receiving aid from Syria, but warned that he expected outside help in case of an "attack" on Lebanon. Karami said he supported Gen Chehab for the presidency.

NVT, 27 Jun 58, 4:6.

26 Jun 58

The Soviet press denounced the idea of a UN police force for Lebanon as "foreign intervention" and a threat to peace. It warned that the USSR would not stand idly by in such an event.

NVT, 27 Jun 58, 4:5.

27 Jun 58

Adm Sir Michael Denny of the BJSM, Washington, presented an aide-memoire to JCS in which the UK called for a revision of BLUE BAT to include simultaneous landings at both Beirut and Tripoli. Noting that opposition strength had increased and the effectiveness of the Lebanese Army had lessened since the plan was first drafted, the British saw a danger of rebel violence against US and British lives and property in Tripoli in the event of a Western landing at Beirut alone.


27 Jun 58

Lebanon charged in the UN that the movement of weapons and personnel across the border from Syria into Lebanon was continuing and, indeed, had actually increased, despite the presence of UN observers. The Lebanese delegation issued this charge after it became known at the UN that Secretary Hammarskjold
would not recommend a UN police force to guard the Lebanese border.

\textit{NYT}, 28 Jun 58, 4:8.

29 Jun 58

The US Ambassador in Jordan reported Prime Minister Rifai's statement that both he and King Hussein were gravely disturbed that Dag Hammarskjold's recent visit to the Middle East had not generated forthright UN action on the Lebanese problem, since they believed that unless a UN or US-UK police force were provided to seal the Syrian-Lebanese border, the Chamoun government was doomed. Chamoun's fall would further elevate Nasser's prestige in the Arab world and would encourage insurrection in Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. In discussions with Hammarskjold during his visit, Rifai had made clear that if Jordan became convinced the UN was either unable or unwilling to resolve the Lebanese situation, the Jordanian leaders would not wait for an emboldened Nasser to step up his subversive campaign against their country but would launch a counterattack against the UAR.

\textit{67} Msg, Amman to SecState, 2271, 30 Jun 58, DA IN 129292.

30 Jun 58

At a meeting between Secretary Dulles and Lebanese Foreign Minister Malik, the latter made pointed queries regarding the value and validity of the US pledge to assist Lebanon. Secretary Dulles replied that the US intended to take every practical measure to prevent a victory for Nasser and Communism and to demonstrate to Middle Eastern governments that friendship with the West was an asset, not a liability. He stressed, however, that US intervention in present circumstances would generate great opposition both in the area and within the UN, since it could not honestly be said as yet that the UN effort in Lebanon had failed. Dulles urged that Chamoun busy himself with selecting a successor to the presidency who truly reflected the Lebanese spirit of independence and would not compromise with Nasser. The US would help such a successor with economic and other assistance.

\textit{67} Msg, SecState to Beirut, 5097, 30 Jun 58.

1 Jul 58

The three Western Ambassadors in Beirut urged President Chamoun to attempt to reach a political solution by announcing his intention not to seek re-election and by forming a widely based government of national union in order to facilitate an eventual compromise. Chamoun's reply was an angry one, in which he blamed his difficulties on his identification with the West. He declared that had he broken his Western ties and turned to a policy of "positive neutrality" he could easily have been re-elected for a second term. Charging that the US, UK, and France were weakening in their guarantees of Lebanese integrity and independence, he demanded to know where he stood with respect to these guarantees. US
Ambassador McClintock immediately replied that, as far as the US was concerned, there had been no lessening of readiness to intervene if necessary. (TS) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 14, 1 Jul 58; OCJCS files.

1 Jul 58

At a news conference in Detroit Gen Nathan F. Twining declared that the US was ready to send troops into Lebanon if the situation required it. "We are prepared for any eventuality--all-out war or limited war--right now," he said.

NYT, 2 Jul 58, 4:5.

2 Jul 58

The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied to the British proposal that BLUE BAT be revised to include simultaneous landings at both Beirut and Tripoli (see item of 27 June 58). The JCS shared the British concern for Western lives and property in Tripoli, but, after consultation with Adm Holloway, they had concluded that the operational concept of BLUE BAT was sound and that all of the forces allocated were required to execute it. Should the UK nevertheless consider it essential to secure Tripoli as part of the initial operations, this might be accomplished by landing additional British forces at Beirut and deploying them northward overland, or by a simultaneous operation by additional British forces against Tripoli. If this was agreeable, the JCS would direct Adm Holloway, as CINOCAMBRITFOR, to modify BLUE BAT to include planning for this additional phase of the operation.


2 Jul 58

Lebanese Foreign Minister Malik gave Secretary Dulles an informal note outlining a suggested program for solving the Lebanese problem short of Western intervention. It called for increased political and material support for Lebanon by the West, including provision of military and technical advisers. Malik also suggested a larger UN observer group and renewed action in the UN, "prudent" Iraqi and Turkish troop movements, and measures to exploit the internal difficulties in Syria.

(25) Msg, SecState to Beirut, 31, 2 Jul 58; OCJCS files.

3 Jul 58

President Chamoun confirmed to Western representatives that the Lebanese Government had made tentative approaches to Iraq about the possibility of joining the Arab Union or otherwise forming a defensive military alliance with Iraq and Jordan.

(27) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 100, 3 Jul 58; (28) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 113, 4 Jul 58. Both in OCJCS files.

3 Jul 58

The Lebanese Ambassador in Washington submitted a request to the State Department for $40 million in economic aid, $20 million of which he said was
needed urgently. The State Department representative with whom he talked pointed out certain practical difficulties but said the request would be studied.

Msg, SecState to Beirut, 50, 3 Jul 58, OCJCS files.

UN Secretary General Hammarskjold stated at a news conference that, to his knowledge, there was no foundation for a charge that "massive infiltration" of men and arms into Lebanon was currently taking place.

N.Y.T, 4 Jul 58, 1:2, 6:4-5.

The UN Observer Group in Lebanon, in its first report to the Security Council, failed to confirm Lebanon's charges that men and arms were being smuggled across the border from Syria. Some success had been achieved by observer teams in penetrating rebel-held territory, but they had often been handicapped, or entirely frustrated, by firing in their vicinity, mined roads, destroyed bridges, or a simple refusal of opposition leaders to admit them to areas under those leaders' control. In all the foregoing instances, the report said, the observer teams "appear to have touched upon sensitive spots which are in areas claimed by Government sources to be supply and infiltration routes." Those rebel bands that the observers had been able to inspect were found to be equipped with mortars, bazookas, machine guns, hand grenades, and land mines of many makes. It had been impossible to determine how these arms had been acquired, or whether any of the men had infiltrated from outside Lebanon, though there was little doubt that the "vast majority" of the men were Lebanese.

N.Y.T, 5 Jul 58, 2:3-8.

A French Foreign Ministry spokesman said it seemed "incontestable" to his Government that there had been "considerable infiltration" into Lebanon.

N.Y.T, 5 Jul 58, 3:3.

A British Foreign Office spokesman stated, in effect, that his Government was holding to its position that Lebanon had justified her charges against the United Arab Republic in the UN Security Council. The U.K. saw no reason to modify the stand previously taken by its representative in the United Nations.

N.Y.T, 7 Jul 58, 1:6, 4:5.

Lebanese Foreign Minister Malik told a reporter at the United Nations that his Government took "strong exception" to the report by the UN Observer Group in Lebanon. He noted the distinction between the term "massive infiltration," used by Hammarskjold, and the "massive intervention" charged by Lebanon against the UAR in the Security Council. The latter term, Malik said, included Cairo radio broadcasts and also money sent by the United Arab Republic to the rebels.
The Lebanese Government's comments on the Observer Group's report were set forth in detail in a formal statement made public the next day and circulated among members of the Security Council. This statement challenged the validity of the UN report, since its conclusions all related only to rebels and weapons that the rebel leaders had allowed the Observer Group to see. Lebanon asserted that the rebel-held weapons included heavy types that only governments could supply, that rebel training and assembly camps were being operated in Syria, and that the UAR radio and press attacks on the Lebanese Government were as virulent as ever. Therefore, the statement concluded, Lebanon's charges against the United Arab Republic remained "undiminished and intact."

NYT, 8 Jul 58, 5:1; 9 Jul 58, 8:3-8.

8 Jul 58

The US Ambassador in Beirut, at the direction of the State Department, informed Chamoun that the US considered any formal relationship between Lebanon and the Arab Union a matter to be decided between those two governments (see item of 3 July 58). The US suggested, however, that any overt step such as a defensive military pact might be inopportune and might further disturb matters in Lebanon. Chamoun made no comment on this presentation.

[25] Msg, Beirut to SecState, 206, 8 Jul 58;
[26] Msg, SecState to Beirut, 96, 7 Jul 58. Both in OCJCS files.

9 Jul 58

The Pakistani Finance Minister suggested to the US Ambassador in Karachi that if UN intervention in Lebanon did not materialize, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan might encourage Iraq to give Lebanon military assistance.

[27] Msg, Karachi to SecState, 85, 10 Jul 58.

10 Jul 58

President Chamoun of Lebanon made a firm statement for the first time that he would leave office on 23 September 1958 and not seek re-election. He made the statement to the Associated Press in Beirut.

NYT, 11 Jul 58, 6:1.

11 Jul 58

The US Ambassador in Beirut reported various indications, including a statement to him by the Commandant of the Lebanese security forces, that military intervention by Iraq, or by Iraq and Turkey, was being considered by President Chamoun.

[28] Msg, Beirut to SecState, 243, 10 Jul 58;
[29] Msg, Beirut to SecState, 256, 10 Jul 58. Both in OCJCS files.

In a conversation with the British Charge in Beirut, Chamoun stated that Chehab was the only man who could receive sufficient votes on 24 July to be elected President. Asked if it would help if the three Western Ambassadors told Chehab separately that he should accept the presidency, Chamoun agreed.
The US Ambassador recommended to Washington that this step be taken. (TS) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 325, 12 Jul 58, OCJCS files.

12 Jul 58

According to the Lebanese Minister of Finance, the Lebanese Cabinet decided to postpone indefinitely consideration of a defensive military alliance with the Arab Union. (TS) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 342, 13 Jul 58, OCJCS files.

12 Jul 58

The UN Observer Group in Lebanon announced an agreement with rebel leaders by which it achieved at least limited access, for the first time, to all Lebanon's 172-mile frontier with the Syrian province of the United Arab Republic. NYT, 13 Jul 58, 23:1.

14 Jul 58

The US Ambassador in Baghdad reported that a group of Iraqi Army officers had executed a swift coup d'etat at 0230Z. Fighting had been limited, and by dawn the capital city appeared relatively normal, except for local patrol activity and jubilant crowds. The formation of a "Republican Government of Iraq," with a cabinet of Colonels and leftist civilians, had been announced over Baghdad Radio. (U) Msg, Baghdad to SecState, 52, 14 Jul 58.

14 Jul 58

During the morning, President Chamoun summoned the US Ambassador in Beirut and demanded US military intervention in Lebanon within 48 hours. Chamoun, angered and highly excited, charged that the Western governments had consistently underestimated his warnings of danger in the Middle East, and now developments in Iraq had proved him to be right. Not only had the US ignored his warnings, but the UN had been "blind," and Secretary General Hammarskjold had given carte blanche to Nasser. Chamoun wanted US intervention without any more inquiries or specifications or conditions. If the Sixth Fleet was not there within 48 hours, he would at last know where the US stood with respect to its assurances of support. The Lebanese President said he had already made a similar request of the British and would shortly ask for French intervention, although he understood that the French lacked the means to undertake anything beyond a token operation.

Reporting on his interview with Chamoun, the US Ambassador noted that the Lebanese President's request had been made orally and without any other intelligence than what he had heard from the Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad radios, plus a single message from the British Embassy in Baghdad. (SCS) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 358, 14 Jul 58, CCS 361 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 3.

14 Jul 58

The US Ambassador in Iraq sent an assessment of the situation in Baghdad following the coup d'etat, admittedly based on limited information. The revolt
appeared to have wide backing from the Iraqi public, Army, and Air Force, with no indications of a countermove by any loyalist forces. Numerous conflicting reports had been received of the fate of King Faisal, Nuri, and the Crown Prince. Although he had reports that one American had been injured and perhaps two killed in mob violence, and the sentiment of street crowds was clearly anti-Western and pro-Nasser, the Ambassador saw no sign of strong anti-American feeling. He predicted, however, that any US intervention in Lebanon would produce strong hostility toward the US.

{47} Msg, Baghdad to SecState, 116, 14 Jul 58, DA IN 132806 (15 Jul 58). {48} Msg, Baghdad to SecState, 117, 14 Jul 58.

14 Jul 58

The State Department informed the US Embassy in Beirut that the President was meeting with Congressional leaders at 1830Z. Barring strong opposition at this meeting, it was likely that the response to Chamoun's request for intervention would be in the affirmative.

{48} Msg, SecState to Beirut, 189, 14 Jul 58, OCJCS files.

14 Jul 58

Ambassador McClintock reported certain discrepancies in the statements made by President Chamoun to the US, British, and French Ambassadors. The most important was Chamoun's request for US military intervention in Lebanon within 48 hours, whereas the British and French had received a 24-hour demand. All three diplomats were struck by the fact that Chamoun had made this important request solely on the basis of reports from radios Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad, whose broadcasts he would normally have distrusted. Noting that as yet there was no hard evidence of an increased military threat to Lebanon, Ambassador McClintock felt that the decision to intervene must be taken in Washington in the light of broader considerations affecting the entire Middle East. "So far as Lebanon alone is concerned, we cannot as of mid-day discern need for so portentous a step."

{48} Msg, Beirut to SecState, 366, 14 Jul 58, DA IN 132609.

14 Jul 58

The US Ambassador to Lebanon learned through the French Ambassador that upon first hearing the news from Iraq, Gen Chehab had passed word to opposition leaders that they must not take any action. Chehab appeared confident that the Lebanese rebels would remain quiescent under this threat.

{48} Msg, Beirut to SecState, 383, 14 Jul 58, DA IN 132716.

14 Jul 58

The Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded to the Secretary of Defense the text of warnings to aircraft and shipping in the area of BLUE BAY operations, which had been approved by both the British and US Chiefs of Staff. The Secretary of Defense was requested to obtain State Department approval for the dissemination
of these warnings upon the initiation of military operations.


14 Jul 58

King Hussein urgently requested through the US Ambassador in Jordan that the US provide tankers and emergency pipelines for the importation of petroleum products into Jordan via Aqaba in order to meet the needs of his security forces. He also informed the Ambassador that he had assumed authority as acting President of the Arab Union in the absence of King Faisal, and intended to put down the Iraqi rebellion by using the Jordanian Army and loyal Iraqi units. Hussein, greatly concerned over the Lebanese situation, urged the US to intervene militarily, if necessary, to keep Chamoun's pro-Western government in power.

*Msg, Amman to SecState, 79, 14 Jul 58.*

14 Jul 58

Following completion of the regular NSC meeting, the President held a special meeting in his office to consider the current developments in the Near East in the light of a briefing by the Director, CIA. Present at this meeting were the Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Treasury, the Acting Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, JCS, the Director, CIA, the Special Assistant to the President (NSA), and other staff officials.

*Record of Actions by the NSC at its 372d Meeting, 14 Jul 58.*

14 Jul 58

President Eisenhower requested an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council as early as practicable on the morning of Tuesday, 15 July, to consider the situation in the Middle East. He decided on this course after a series of conferences with Congressional leaders and other officials.

*NYT, 15 Jul 58, 1:8.*

14 Jul 58

Prime Minister Macmillan, near the end of the day, ordered 6,000 British troops to prepare for quick movement to the Middle East. This order followed a Cabinet meeting of six and a half hours at which Government leaders discussed emergency plans for joint action with the United States in regard to the coup d'etat in Iraq. The possibility of armed intervention in Iraq with British paratroop forces from Cyprus was discussed at the Cabinet meeting, according to "informed sources" in London, in case it should be necessary to protect the lives of more than 2,700 British and Commonwealth citizens in Iraq. The Prime Minister also discussed the Middle East situation with President Eisenhower by telephone during the day.

*NYT, 15 Jul 58, 1:5, 4:3.*
14 Jul 58

The United States cut off all military aid to Iraq until the situation there could be clarified. Officials stated that the move was without prejudice to any policy decision in the future. MVT, 15 Jul 58, 5:5.

14 Jul 58

The US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia cabled that news of the Iraqi monarchy's downfall was jubilantly received by all levels of opinion in Saudi Arabia except the King's entourage and that the event was being hailed as a victory for Arab unity. Most Saudis appeared to believe that establishment of a pro-UAR regime in Iraq would make likely a closer association of the Saudi Arabian Government with the UAR.

(c) Msg, Jidda to SecState, 50, 14 Jul 58, DA IN 132773 (15 Jul 58).

14 Jul 58

At 2223Z, CNO directed CINCNELM and COMSIXTHFLT to land Marines in Lebanon at 1300Z, 15 July, and to sail the entire Sixth Fleet eastward as soon as possible. The Lebanese were not to be notified of the forthcoming landing prior to 1000Z, but the US Naval Attache in Beirut might be informed earlier. In a further message at 2249Z, CNO said execution of BLUE BAT Situation One in its entirety had not been ordered because discussion was in progress concerning whether the British would follow the Marines into Beirut or go into Iraq. CNO directed, however, that the BLUE BAT concept be followed as far as possible.

(c) Msg, CNO to CINCNELM, COMSIXTHFLT, 142223Z Jul 58; (TS) Msg, CNO to CINCNELM, COMSIXTHFLT, 142249Z Jul 58. Both in CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 3.

15 Jul 58

The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed USCINCUR and other commanders of the scheduled Marine landing in Lebanon and directed them to take no action that would disclose the imminence of US military operations. After the landing, CINCUR was to bring one battle group and its airlift to a state of readiness that would permit arrival at Beirut airfield within 24 hours of an execution order, or, if airdrop was required, within 36 hours. CINCUR was to be prepared to follow with a second battle group. Twenty-six C-124's were being flown to Europe, with their movement to be completed within an estimated 36 hours. COMTAC was directed to provide day-fighter, fighter-bomber, and reconnaissance aircraft for BLUE BAT, scheduling their arrival at Adana to begin
20 hours after issuance of an execution order.

15 Jul 58 At 0336Z, the State Department informed the US Ambassador in Beirut of the forthcoming Marine landing in Lebanon and directed him to inform Chamoun no later than 1000Z—that is, at least three hours prior to the landing—that this action was being taken in response to Chamoun’s request and that the US expected full cooperation from the Lebanese armed forces. Shortly before the landing, the Ambassador was to request that the Lebanese Government close the Beirut airport.

15 Jul 58 Sixth Fleet units were underway at 0500Z and were proceeding toward the objective area at their best speed.

15 Jul 58 At 0830Z, the US Ambassador in Beirut informed Chamoun of the forthcoming US landing and restated the political terms under which it would occur. He cautioned the President against disclosure to members of the Government who might transmit the news outside Lebanon prior to the beginning of the operation. Pointing out that the British were not landing in the initial phase and might not land at all, the Ambassador also suggested that it was unnecessary to request French participation. A few minutes later, he repeated this observation to the French Ambassador, who agreed that since the landing was to be solely a US operation, there was no need for French participation.

15 Jul 58 Ambassador McClintock, agreeing with President Chamoun that there would be psychological advantage in making the initial US landings with an impressive show of force as possible, sent a message to the Task Force Commander suggesting the fullest use of tanks and air cover.

15 Jul 58 The US Ambassador in Lebanon reported that Chamoun had kept Gen Chehab uninformed of the imminent landing of US Marines in order not to allow time for staging an Army coup. Upon receiving definite word of the operation from the Ambassador, Chehab had urgently requested that the actual disembarkation of troops be avoided lest reaction to that
event cause the disintegration of the Lebanese Army, inactivating the force that theretofore had loyalty sustained the Chamoun regime. The Ambassador promised to convey Chehab's professional opinion to the Task Force Commander and to recommend that, if possible, the ships be docked in Beirut with the Marines remaining on board. The Ambassador subsequently learned his message had not reached the commander in time.

(6) Msg, Beirut to SeeState, 401, 15 Jul 58, DA IN 133066.

15 Jul 58
Minutes before the scheduled Marine landing in Lebanon the US Ambassador telephoned Gen Chehab about a report that the General was sending troops to arrest President Chamoun. Chehab expressed astonishment but said that he did fear an Army coup against the President. Chehab repeated that his hand would be strengthened by a delay in the US landing. The Ambassador warned Chehab that US forces were landing in support of the legitimate government of Lebanon and that there would be most disagreeable consequences if the Lebanese Army moved against the chief of state. Chehab, accordingly, said that he would "recommend" that the coup against Chamoun be stayed.

(6) Msg, Beirut to SeeState, 402, 15 Jul 58, OCJCS files.

15 Jul 58
The 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, landed at Beirut at 1300Z. By 1410Z the airfield had been secured. CONSEXTHFLT reported that the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, would land at about 150000Z July.


15 Jul 58
President Eisenhower announced that, in response to an urgent request from President Chamoun, he was sending "a contingent of United States forces to Lebanon to protect American lives and . . . encourage the Lebanese Government in defense of Lebanese sovereignty and integrity." The initial announcement came in the form of a statement to the press at 1320Z. Later in the day, the President issued a message to Congress and made a radio and television speech to the nation. All of these statements were substantially the same. Mr. Eisenhower emphasized that US troops would be withdrawn as soon as the UN took "further effective steps designed to safeguard Lebanese independence."

NYT, 16 Jul 58, 1:8; texts, 2:3-8.

15 Jul 58
The US Military Attache in Amman reported that lack of petroleum and other supplies would prevent any offensive action by the Jordanian Army. The Army was currently taking precautions against internal disturbances—not preparing for a move into Iraq.

(6) Msg, USARMA Amman to ACSI DEPTAR, C 25, 151317Z Jul 58, DA IN 132952.
At the UN, US Ambassador Lodge pledged that the Marines would be withdrawn from Lebanon as soon as
the UN was able to ensure Lebanon's continued
independence. He declared that events in Iraq and
Lebanon had "demonstrated a ruthlessness of
aggressive purpose which tiny Lebanon cannot combat
without support from friendly nations." Lodge
introduced a resolution calling for: (1) immediate
cessation of illegal support of the Lebanese rebels;
(2) continuation of the activities of the UN
Observer Group; (3) consultation by the Secretary
General with Lebanon and other UN members to make
additional arrangements, including the use of an
international military force, to protect Lebanon's
territorial integrity and independence; and (4) full cooperation from all governments concerned.
The US position was supported by the British, French,
and Canadian delegates. Earlier, the Soviet Union,
backed by the UAR, attacked the US intervention,
charging that the US had committed an "act of
aggression against the Arab world" and introducing
a resolution that called on the US to withdraw its
troops forthwith. One Soviet delegate told a
reporter that Soviet and other "volunteers" might
go to the Middle East.


CNO directed CINCLANTFLT to outload and prepare to
sail to the Middle East the 2d Marine Division
(minus) and such Marine aviation units as could be
lifted.

 Msg, CNO to CINCLANTFLT, 293/40, 151419Z
 Jul 58.

The State Department directed the US Ambassador in
Beirut to arrange a meeting at the earliest
opportunity between the US military commander in
Lebanon and the head of the UN Observer Group. The
Ambassador was to see that no actions were taken in
the field that might allow the US to be blamed for
a premature withdrawal of the Observer Group.

 Msg, SecState to Beirut, 213, 15 Jul 58, OCJCS files.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed CINCPECOM
USCENTCOM, and other responsible commanders to
execute the US portion of BLUE BAT, as modified by
the substitution of COMTAG aircraft specified earlier
on 15 July.

 Msg, JCS to CINCPECOM, et al., JCS 944755, 151508Z Jul 58, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58)
see 3.

King Hussein urgently requested the US Government to
relieve Jordan's desperate petroleum situation by
airlifting sufficient fuel oil and gasoline to meet
minimum civil requirements.

 Msg, Amman to SecState, 101, 15 Jul 58,
DA IN 132951.
15 Jul 58 The US Ambassador to Jordan reported that both King Hussein and Prime Minister Rifai enthusiastically endorsed the US intervention as the only means to preserve Lebanon's integrity and independence. For expediting the US landing in Lebanon, Hussein had decided not to form a new AU cabinet at present, but instead had asked Rifai to retain the added positions of AU Foreign Minister and Minister of Defense. The Ambassador was advised that the Iraqi forces stationed near Amman had been permitted to return to Baghdad with full equipment because of Hussein's desire to avoid bloodshed; the Iraqi commander had threatened to use force if he were detained.


15 Jul 58 The Soviet news agency Tass denounced the US landing in Lebanon as an "open act of aggression" and ridiculed President Eisenhower's explanation. Pravda characterized the move as "a direct act of war and open piracy." The Government of the United Arab Republic reacted similarly, charging that the US landing in Lebanon constituted "another Suez."

NVT, 16 Jul 58, 15:5, 11:5.

15 Jul 58 Lebanese rebel leaders issued a statement accusing the US of aggression against their country. The US, they said, the statement, had "destroyed its claim of faithfulness" to the UN Charter and had "failed to respect the principles of freedom of peoples to decide their own fate." One rebel leader, Saeb Salam, called on all Lebanese "to stand and defend your fatherland with your blood."

NVT, 16 Jul 58, 12:5.

15 Jul 58 The US Ambassador in Beirut complained to the State Department that, contrary to the instructions contained in the BLUE BAT political directive (see item of 12 June 58), US military commanders were not heeding his instructions concerning what he felt were political matters. This was interfering with his "extremely delicate endeavor" to keep the Lebanese Army from "disintegrating." Moreover, the Lebanese Army looked to him to interpret US military actions, but, almost four hours after the start of the operation, he had not been able to establish contact with the US commanding officer. He requested that the US military commander be instructed to get in touch with him and to take his judgment on matters of "vital political importance."

[58] Msg, Beirut to SecState, 406, 151836Z Jul 58, DA IN 133525 (16 Jul 58), CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) see 3.

15 Jul 58 The French Government informed the State Department that it approved of US intervention in Lebanon but did not consider it desirable to join in the operation at present, particularly since the British
were not involved. The French were, however, maintaining a small naval force in the Eastern Mediterranean.

\[\text{DA IN 133522 (16 Jul 58).}\]

15 Jul 58

A flood of unconfirmed and often contradictory reports about the situation in Iraq gave a murky picture of events in that country. The fate of King Faisal, Premier Nuri, and Crown Prince Abdulillah was unclear. Martial law had been extended to all of Iraq, and assemblies of more than five persons were banned. The situation appeared to have become calm, although there were rumors—denied in Baghdad—that some Iraqi Army units and tribes had refused to accept the new regime. Iraqi troops in Jordan were reported to be withdrawing toward the Iraqi border, and the Amman radio claimed that these forces were marching on Baghdad to counterattack the rebels. The Baghdad radio declared that Iraq had broken its Arab Union tie with Jordan.

\[\text{NYT, 16 Jul 58, 1:2, 14:2.}\]

15 Jul 58

The new Prime Minister of Iraq, Brig Gen Abdul Karim Kassem, assured the US Ambassador that his regime desired friendship with the US. He declared that American lives and property were safe, but if the Embassy should conclude that it was necessary to evacuate its citizens, safe convoy overland or freedom of air flight would be guaranteed. The Ambassador also reported a radio announcement that Nuri had been hanged.

\[\text{DA IN 133190 (16 Jul 58).}\]

15 Jul 58

The US Ambassador to Jordan reported that King Hussein had asked the UK what action it and other Baghdad Pact members proposed to take to crush the revolt in Iraq and restore the pro-Western government. Feeling that nothing short of substantial military intervention in Iraq could preserve the Free World's position in the Middle East, Hussein was disturbed that a day had passed without a British reply. Should the Baghdad powers intervene, he was willing to send Jordan's army into Iraq to participate in the action, if meanwhile US troops entered Jordan to maintain internal security. As another move against the new Iraqi regime, Hussein requested the US Government to freeze all Arab Union funds in the US and release them only when he, as the AU's legal head, authorized the withdrawal.

\[\text{DA IN 133255 (16 Jul 58).}\]

15 Jul 58

In a radio statement at 1800Z, President Chamoun said that his government, beset by plotters against Lebanese freedom and sovereignty and disappointed by the failure of the Arab League and the UN to help matters, had sought guarantees under the UN Charter, particularly Article 51, to regain peace and freedom.
His short statement made no specific mention of the West or the US landing, but his remarks were followed by a resume of President Eisenhower's announcement that US forces were being dispatched to Lebanon.

(U) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 412, 15 Jul 58, OCJCS files.

15 Jul 58
In a statement issued by the Turkish Foreign Minister, Turkey expressed its complete approval of the US action in Lebanon. The Prime Minister of Sudan also supported the US landing and called the event the "turning point towards stability." The official Yugoslavian news agency, however, criticized the unilateral US action in Lebanon as threatening to precipitate a new world war.


15 Jul 58
At 2100Z, CINCNORAD directed subordinate commands to assume a state of increased readiness in conformance with CONADR 55-3, 1 Nov 55, as amended.

Msg, CINCNORAD to COMMPOEMR STEAART /SIC7 AFB, et al., 152100Z Jul 58, CAP IN 63346 (15 Jul 58), JLEP Lebanon Msg File.

15 Jul 58
The Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded to CINCSPECOMME a revised political directive for BLUE BAT (see item of 12 June 58). The State Department also sent a copy to the US Ambassador in Beirut. As compared with the draft approved by JCS in June, the revised version:

1. omitted all references to the UK;

2. did not refer to "massive interference from outside" as the reason for the Lebanese request for assistance;

3. used more direct phraseology when describing the US purpose as "to assist the Government of Lebanon in maintaining the independence and integrity of the country and to ensure the protection of US life and property";

4. stated that US forces would be withdrawn when the Lebanese Government was able to act with sufficient force by itself, or after the UN had assumed the responsibilities undertaken by the US;

5. directed CINCSPECOMME to establish liaison and cooperate with the UN Observer Group;

6. omitted the statement that a warning had been issued that any interference with the US operations would be met with force; and

7. strengthened slightly the instruction to regard the US Ambassador's views as controlling on political matters relating exclusively to Lebanon.

(Msg, JCS to CINCSPECOMME, JCS 944787, 152122 Jul 58, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 3.
(Msg, SecState to Beirut, 217, 15 Jul 58, OCJCS files.

- 67 -
CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS RELATING TO
THE EMPLOYMENT OF U.S. FORCES IN LEBANON (U)

SECOND INSTALLMENT
16 July - 30 October 1958

HISTORICAL DIVISION
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
29 December 1958
16 Jul 58  USAFE reported that the first aircraft carrying BLUE BAT Force A (187th Airborne Battle Group) to Adana from Germany were scheduled to depart at 160630Z and to arrive at 1420Z. The last aircraft would depart at 161330Z and arrive at 170300Z.

(PS) Mag, USAFE to JCS, TS 1369, 160445Z Jul 58, JMEPG Lebanon Msg File.

16 Jul 58  CINCSPECOMME, aboard the TACONIC 1000 yards off Red Beach near the Beirut airport, reported that the airfield had opened at 0600Z for normal operations and commercial traffic. The 3rd BLT, 6th Marines, had begun landing at 0530Z, with the mission of taking over defense of the airfield from the 2nd BLT, 2nd Marines. Brig Gen Wade had gone ashore at 0530Z and would represent Adm Holloway with the US Ambassador.

(PS) Mag, CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 1810, 160644Z Jul 58, JMEPG Lebanon Msg File.

16 Jul 58  At the Direction of the State Department, the US Ambassador in Beirut called on the senior members of the UN Observer Group to urge that the Group continue its work and to offer US cooperation and support. With some bitterness the Group's Chairman charged that the US landing had undone their work, and he informed Ambassador McClintock that the Observer Group was ceasing all activities. McClintock argued against this and urged that the Group at least continue aerial observation from the Beirut airport. The UN representatives refused to give a definite answer at that time other than to state that there would be no liaison between the Observer Group and US forces. During the day the UN Observer Group issued a statement disclaiming any link or desire for a working relationship of any sort with the US forces in Lebanon.

(PS) Mag, Beirut to SecState, 442, 17 Jul 58;


16 Jul 58  On instructions from Secretary Dulles the US Ambassador in Amman reaffirmed to Prime Minister Rifai the previous US pledges to assist Jordan in preserving its independence and integrity.

(PS) Mag, SecState to Amman, 100, 15 Jul 58.

(PS) Mag, Amman to SecState, 122; 16 Jul 58.

16 Jul 58  CINCSPECOMME informed CNO that at 1000Z there were sufficient Marines ashore in Lebanon to carry out sustained operations. There had been no hostile reaction to the landing, the civil population appeared friendly, and air reconnaissance had disclosed no military activity elsewhere in Lebanon. The 3rd BLT, 6th Marines, had completed landing and had taken over the airfield, releasing the 2d BLT, 2d Marines, which had begun moving north at 0655Z to enter the city of Beirut and secure the approaches and harbor area.

(PS) Mag, CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 1824, 161004Z Jul 58, JMEPG Lebanon Msg File.
In Iraq, troops that had carried out the coup returned to their barracks, leaving only a few guards to protect foreign businesses and embassies in Baghdad. Brig Gen Nadim Rubaiya, new President of the Republic's Council of State, arrived triumphantly from Jidda, where he had been Ambassador to Saudi Arabia. Brig Gen Abdul Karim Kassem, leader of the movement that had proclaimed the Republic on 14 July, took the post of Premier. Baghdad radio officially confirmed the deaths of King Faisal, Crown Prince Abdullilah, and Premier Nuri.

NRT, 17 Jul 58, 1:6;

The Chief of the Iranian intelligence and security organization told a US representative that Turkey and Iran would be ready to use their forces to intervene in Iraq if the US would station troops in Jordan.


Ambassador McClintock talked with President Chamoun and Gen Chehab during the morning. Chehab repeated his objections to US deployment in Beirut, but finally agreed to consider a gradual movement into the city by small detachments. On word from Gen Wade, McClintock told Chehab, who expressed surprise, that Lebanese artillery and tanks had taken up positions along the road leading from the airport to the harbor area. He suggested that the General accompany him to make arrangements for the safe passage of the Marines.

The two proceeded in the Ambassador's car toward the airport, where they found the US advance blocked by Lebanese tanks and recoilless rifles. Here, shortly after 0900Z, they met Adm Holloway, who had come to investigate the halt in the Marine advance. After some delay, the two Americans succeeded in persuading Chehab to accompany them in the car and lead the column past the tanks. Chehab also issued the necessary orders to his troops and arranged for a Lebanese officer-escort for the Marines.

The first group having passed the tanks, Chehab proceeded alone with it, while Holloway and McClintock returned to find the other groups still delayed by the Lebanese tanks. Ordering all of the remaining Marines to close up behind them, the Admiral and the Ambassador proceeded through the deployed tanks without incident toward the harbor area. This, commented Adm Holloway, "seemed to act as moral suasion of the first order."

Most of the Lebanese Army forces, including most of the senior staff officers, who were believed to be responsible for the delaying tactics, disappeared from the scene. Holloway and McClintock personally led the column to the harbor area, completing the movement by about 1300Z without further major incident.

(6) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 428, 161733Z Jul 58, DA IN 133462, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 3. (TS) Msg, CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 1621, 161156Z Jul 58; (6) Msg, CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 2142, 162056Z Jul 58; both in JMEPG Lebanon Msg File.
After completing the deployment of the Marine battalion to the Beirut harbor area (see above ¶tem), Ambassador McClintock and Adm Holloway during the afternoon called on President Chamoun, who expressed thanks for the speedy and effective Marine landing and directed the Lebanese Army to cooperate with US forces and allow their free circulation in Beirut. Arrangements were made with Gen Chehab for Lebanese liaison officers to serve with the Marines. Having concluded, with Ambassador McClintock, that a landing at Tripoli was unnecessary, Adm Holloway determined to land the 1st BLT, 5th Marines, north of the Beirut harbor area to occupy additional objectives and consolidate further the US control of the city. Adm Holloway, however, reported his belief that it would be necessary eventually to occupy all of Lebanon.

During the conference with President Chamoun, Adm Holloway indicated that the US contemplated landing greater forces than were needed solely for the maintenance of Lebanese independence. Chamoun replied that he would welcome and assist a larger deployment of US forces, which he believed would maintain not only Lebanon's independence but also the integrity of other friendly countries in the Middle East.

At the UN, the Swedish delegate denounced the US action in Lebanon and declared that the US landing was not justified under Article 51 (covering "collective self-defense") of the UN Charter. Earlier in the day, the Soviet and UAR delegates also denied the applicability of Article 51 to the US action. Actually, US delegate Lodge had not stated that the US action had been taken under Article 51, although President Eisenhower, in his statement of 15 July, had said that the UN Charter recognized "the inherent right of self-defense," and the British and Lebanese delegates to the UN had stated that the US had acted under Article 51.}

The Soviet Union issued an official statement demanding the immediate withdrawal of US troops from Lebanon and calling on the UN to "take urgent and vigorous measures to curb aggression." The Soviet statement--delivered to the US Ambassador in Moscow and then made public--declared that the USSR could not "remain passive toward events creating a serious threat" in an area close to its frontier and that the Soviet Union reserved "the right to take the necessary measures dictated by the interests of peace and security." At the same time, the USSR formally recognized the new Iraqi Government, and Tass announced that Soviet land and air forces would hold maneuvers along the Iranian and Afghan borders.

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16 Jul 58

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16 Jul 58  Communist China issued an official statement demanding the immediate withdrawal of US troops from Lebanon. The US action, said the statement, was a violation of the UN Charter and an "extremely grave warlike adventure" aimed at suppressing Arab independence and creating world tensions. In another announcement, Communist China proclaimed its recognition of the new Government of Iraq.

NYT, 17 Jul 58, 4:5.

16 Jul 58  A British War Office official told the US Military Attaché in London that British Forces, Arabian Peninsula Command, had been alerted for action "anywhere in Persian Gulf Area at moments notice." British units would be employed in Jordan if King Hussein so requested.

(S) Msg, USARMA London to DEPTAR, C 69, 16 Jul 58, DA IN 133560.

16 Jul 58  President Eisenhower, at a conference with State and Defense Department officials, decided that an emergency airlift of petroleum products to the Government of Jordan should be implemented on an urgent basis, in response to Jordan's request of 15 July.

(S) Ltr, Actg Asst SecState for Econ Affairs to Dep Asst SecDef (S&L), 16 Jul 58, CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec 6.

16 Jul 58  President Eisenhower requested the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to report on what the US could do to strengthen the military position of Turkey and Iran. In addition to aid programs involving only indigenous forces, he was to consider special American-manned units if they could be employed to advantage.


16 Jul 58  Deputy Undersecretary of State Robert Murphy was sent to Lebanon by President Eisenhower, as the President's special political representative. He left Washington by air with instructions to do everything possible to "restore peace and order" in Lebanon and to assist President Chamoun to this end.

NYT, 17 Jul 58, 11:1.

16 Jul 58  At a North Atlantic Council private session on the Lebanese situation the US representative presented an official statement on the US intervention. General support of the US action and of forthcoming moves in the UN was expressed. During the discussion the British representative said that the UK was not participating in the intervention because its assistance might be required elsewhere in the Middle East.

(S) Msg, Paris to SecState, POLTO 217, 16 Jul 58, DA IN 133806 (17 Jul 58).
16 Jul 58 Headquarters USAF directed MATS to add ten more C-124s to those at Rhein Main Air Base in Germany as soon as possible in order to bring the total number of C-124s to thirty-six for use in operation BLUE BAT.


16 Jul 58 At 1600Z the Austrian Foreign Minister informed the US Ambassador in Vienna that large numbers of US aircraft, other than those already cleared for passage, had flown over Western Austria in military formation during the day. The flights had attracted such public notice that the Austrian Government found it necessary to issue immediately a press release saying that strong representations had been made to the US Embassy calling the overflights an intolerable violation of Austrian air space. The press release stated that Austria was not in a position to give permission for military overflight "to any state whatever." The Foreign Minister confided that his government felt compelled to make such a public declaration in order to preserve its status of neutrality and maintain its ability to refuse possible future requests for overflight from the USSR or its satellites.

(6) Msg, Vienna to SecState, 168, 16 Jul 58, DA IN 134178 (18 Jul 58).

16 Jul 58 Ambassador McClintock reported that the landing of US Marines 24 hours previously had had a marked effect on the Lebanese crisis. Opposition forces seemed stunned and political maneuvers for the election of a new President had been completely disrupted by the event. The Speaker of the Parliament protested the US action but was not nearly as violent as when he had previously predicted to the Ambassador that he would personally lead Lebanese armed resistance to a US landing (see item of 18 June 58).

(6) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 430, 16 Jul 58, DA IN 133756 (17 Jul 58).

16 Jul 58 In a communique issued at the close of a Baghdad Pact meeting of the heads of state of Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan--originally planned to include King Faisal of Iraq--the participants praised the US action in Lebanon and affirmed their intention of maintaining the Baghdad Pact. The three heads of state also sent a message to President Eisenhower, congratulating him on his "bold and appropriate decision."

NYT, 17 Jul 58, 7:8, 11:1.

16 Jul 58 King Hussein at 1700Z formally requested US-UK military intervention in Jordan. He based the request on the critical situation facing Jordan as a result of the Lebanese crisis, rebellion in Iraq, and on information that a VAR-inspired coup was scheduled to take place within 24 hours. Hussein pledged that Western forces would not be called on to crush civil disorders directly, but would be used only to repel external aggression, back up the security forces, and prevent outside subversive elements from taking over the country.

- 5 -
In London, after receiving Hussein's request, Prime Minister Macmillan held a three-hour Cabinet meeting late in the evening and made two telephone calls to President Eisenhower; his Government decided to fly British troops into Jordan.

(20) Mag, Amman to SecState, 132, 16 Jul 58.

16 Jul 58
CINCSPECOMME, at 1801Z, issued a change to the BLUE BAT plan that removed all references to British participation in the operation.

(20) Mag, CINCSPECOMME to CNO, et al., 2071, 161801Z Jul 58, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 3.

16 Jul 58
COMSIXTHFLT informed CNO of word received from the US Naval Attaché in Paris that four French warships were due to arrive off Beirut early on 17 July. Their announced mission was to protect French nationals; they reportedly carried no troops.

(2) Mag, COMSIXTHFLT to CNO, 1896, 161835Z Jul 58, JMEPG Lebanon Msg File.

16 Jul 58
British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd flew to Washington to discuss the Middle East situation. He was accompanied by Air Marshal Sir William Dickson of the British Chiefs of Staff.

NYT, 17 Jul 58, 1:4.

16 Jul 58
Lebanese Foreign Minister Malik told a State Department official there was a good chance that the US military intervention in Lebanon would help the Lebanese in solving their internal problems. However, if this action was all the US Government had in mind regarding the Middle East, it would be "one of greatest farces in history, comparable to Suez multiplied by one hundred." The US decision to withdraw its forces must be made in consideration of the entire Middle East situation; otherwise the events that had recently taken place in Baghdad would be duplicated in Beirut within a few months.

(2) Mag, SecState to Beirut, 256, 16 Jul 58, DA IN 133962 (17 Jul 58).

16 Jul 58
UAR President Nasser, in a statement released in Cairo but apparently sent from his yacht while returning from Yugoslavia, warned that any attack on the new Iraqi regime would be considered aggression against the UAR. Nasser also charged that the US landing in Lebanon was a threat to peace in the Middle East and, in view of the UN report that there had been no UAR interference in that country, a "farce."

NYT, 17 Jul 58, 1:2.

16 Jul 58
Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion, having received the previous day a British request for permission to overfly Israel enroute to Jordan in case intervention there was required, sought an expression of US views before presenting the question to his Cabinet.

(PS) Mag, Tel Aviv to SecState, 57, 16 Jul 58.
16 Jul 58

A Moscow radio broadcast warned the UK against committing the "final, fatal error" of intervening in the Middle East. The broadcast came amidst the "confident predictions of diplomats" that intervention in Jordan was imminent.

NYT, 17 Jul 58, 1:4, 3:1.

16 Jul 58

The US Ambassador to Israel reported information that Nasser had ordered his agents in Jordan to start action designed to overthrow King Hussein on 16 or 17 July.

(46) Msg, Tel Aviv to SecState, 47, 16 Jul 58, DA IN 133367.

16 Jul 58

The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed CINCSPECOMME to stage, if possible, a demonstration flight by carrier-based jets over refugee camps on the west bank of the Jordan River and over Amman and the northern border of Jordan for 75 miles at about 0600Z, 17 July. The object was to discourage any uprising by disaffected Jordanians and Palestinian Arabs, suspected because of reported arms concentrations just north of the Jordanian border. The Governments of Jordan and Israel had been notified about the demonstration, and CINCSPECOMME was instructed to notify the British.


16 Jul 58

CNO directed CINCSPECOMME to maintain a special alert during the period 17-18 July. "Unusual events" requiring counteraction might arise from unpredictable Soviet and UAR moves, from Lebanese Army defection or opposition, or from the unsettled situation in Jordan and Iraq.

(46) Msg, CNO to CINCSPECOMME and CINCNEM, 29515, 162351Z Jul 58, JMEPO Lebanon Msg File.

16 Jul 58

An Israeli official warned the US Embassy twice that Nasser was planning an immediate coup involving the assassination of King Hussein and the overthrow of the Jordanian Government. The Israeli Government believed Nasser wanted the King out of the way at once to preclude any successful request by him for intervention by Western forces.

(46) Msg, Tel Aviv to SecState, 54, 16 Jul 58, DA IN 133685 (17 Jul 58).

17 Jul 58

CNO directed CINCPACFLT to send one reinforced battalion landing team in fast shipping to the Persian Gulf area. He advised that it might be necessary to increase this force to a regimental landing team on relatively short notice.

(46) Msg, CNO to CINCPACFLT, 29519, 170031Z Jul 58, JMEPO Lebanon Msg File.

17 Jul 58

The Chief of Naval Operations directed COMSIXTHFLT to stand by to evacuate King Hussein from Amman with two planes and appropriate air cover.

At 0401Z, the Chief of Naval Operations directed COMSIXTHFLT to coordinate his air demonstration over Jordan with the British, since British forces might go into Jordan. In a further message sent 30 minutes later at British request, CNO directed COMSIXTHFLT to confine his air demonstration to the west bank of the Jordan River and to coordinate it with the British Commander in Chief, Middle East Air Force. If COMSIXTHFLT was unable to effect coordination, he was to cancel the demonstration. The British request had been passed by Adm Sir Michael Denny, BJSM, to Maj Gen V. B. Barnes, JMEPG, together with notice that British paratroops were scheduled to land at Amman by 0800Z.

(MG) Msg, CNO to COMSIXTHFLT, 170401Z Jul 58;

Adm Sir Michael Denny informed Gen Barnes at 0430Z that the aim of the British operation in Jordan was to support King Hussein and his Government and to protect Western lives and property in Amman. One parachute brigade group (less one battalion) would be moved to Amman to secure the airfields, and the Guard brigade at Cyprus would be used to reinforce the parachute unit. The UK was also moving troops for reinforcement to Kuwait and in the Persian Gulf area generally, and British warships would stand by off Libya to embark the King there if necessary.

(PS) Memo for Record, Maj Gen V. B. Barnes, Chmn JMEPG, "Conference with V/Adm Denny, RN," 17 Jul 58, JMEPG Lebanon Mag File.

The US and British Ambassadors in Baghdad submitted their joint conclusion as of 0600Z that Allied landings in Iraq, unless swiftly executed in overwhelming force, would very likely lead to indiscriminate killing and looting of Americans and Europeans by mobs whom the Army would be totally unable, even if willing, to control. Further, landings in Jordan would also entail the risk that this might happen.

(PS) Msg, Baghdad to SecState, 161, 17 Jul 58, DA IN 133964.

The US Ambassador in Jordan reported that he had seen the message the British Embassy was shortly to present to Hussein, according to the King's request for military intervention. British troops would be flown to Amman from Cyprus in sufficient strength to provide for the security of the airfield, the capital, and the person of the King. The British message stated that this action had "US moral support."

(PS) Msg, Amman to SecState, 139, 17 Jul 58.

COMSIXTHFLT launched jet aircraft from two carriers by 0700Z to stage the West Bank demonstration flight over Jordan. The carriers recovered their aircraft prior to 1000Z after a successful operation without incident.

(PS) Msg, COMSIXTHFLT to CINCSPCOMME, 2240
170740Z Jul 58. (PS) Msg, COMSIXTHFLT to CNO, 2355
171140Z Jul 58.
17 Jul 58 One transport carrying the advance party and commander of the British 16th Parachute Brigade arrived at Amman at 0700Z. It had been ordered down over Israel but had disregarded the Israeli instructions. Other aircraft in the first flight had turned back to Cyprus. At about 1000Z, seven British transports arrived at Amman, landing approximately 500 paratroops.


17 Jul 58 At 0900Z the US Ambassador in Tel Aviv presented the US answers to questions posed by Premier Ben Gurion the previous day regarding the British request for overflight rights should intervention in Jordan be required. The answers stated that the US supported the British request, that Jordan also desired Israel to permit the overflights, and that no other practical alternative route existed by which British forces might quickly come to King Hussein's aid.

(PS) Msg, Tel Aviv to SecState, 64, 18 Jul 58.

17 Jul 58 A senior member of the UN Observer Group informed the US Ambassador in Beirut that the Group had decided to resume its operations. There was still to be no official liaison with US forces, but there would be no objection to private contacts.

(3) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 442, 17 Jul 58, OCJCS files.

17 Jul 58 CINCSPECOMME informed the Chief of Naval Operations that he considered the designation of a US political advisor for his staff to be desirable.

(3) Msg, CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 170911Z Jul 58, CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec 6.

17 Jul 58 Deputy Undersecretary of State Robert Murphy, the President's special emissary, arrived in Beirut.

NYT, 18 Jul 58, 6:6.

17 Jul 58 The French Ambassador in Beirut informed the US Ambassador that he was under pressure from Adm Jozan to permit a landing of French forces from the naval units stationed in Lebanese waters. The French Ambassador had been stalling, he said, and McClintock strongly urged him to prevent any landing of French marines.

(3) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 447, 17 Jul 58, OCJCS files.

17 Jul 58 Armored cars still patrolled Baghdad, but otherwise the city seemed to have resumed its normal activities. Illustrated brochures were distributed showing UAR President Nasser and Iraqi Premier Kassem together, and crowds in the street shouted their approval of Nasser. Baghdad radio announced that the Iraqi Government had decided to restore normal diplomatic relations with the USSR immediately. (Iraqi-Soviet relations had been severed in 1955 by the government of King Faisal.)

17 Jul 58

A crowd of Russians gathered before the US Embassy in Moscow to protest against the US landing in Lebanon. The well-organized demonstration, staged by an estimated 2,000 people, lasted about five hours. The crowd was orderly and well-controlled.

NYT, 18 Jul 58, 1:4.

17 Jul 58

At approximately 1330Z the British Government received official notification of Israeli permission for overflight. The notice was accompanied by an Israeli protest against the earlier British effort to overfly prior to receipt of permission.


17 Jul 58

Fifteen aircraft, comprising the second echelon of the British overflight of Israel, began arriving at Amman at 1530Z. They set down approximately 600 paratroopers, bringing the total of British forces in the airport area to about 1100.

(3) Msg, USAIRA Amman to DEPTAR, CX 54, 171922Z Jul 58, DA IN 134088, JMEFG Lebanon Msg File.

17 Jul 58

Prime Minister Macmillan told the House of Commons that the British intervention in Jordan had occurred at the request of King Hussein and had deterred a potential coup d'etat. The British forces were not dispatched to suppress the revolt in Iraq; their mission was to prevent the spread of revolution from Iraq to Jordan by conspiracy and aggression. Despite strong opposition from the Labour Party, the Macmillan Government received a comfortable majority when the House voted on the issue.

NYT, 18 Jul 58, 1:8.

17 Jul 58

In a note delivered to the State Department, the French Government complained of the absence of US-UK consultation with France on matters relating to the Middle East crisis. France had interests in the Middle East, had supported US-UK intervention there, and had received the impression that tripartite consultations with the French were desired by the US and UK. Even though France permitted use of her bases and overflights of her territory, which might implicate her in an unfavorable aftermath of the crisis, she was not enjoying consultation rights with the US and UK.

(6) Msg, SecState to Paris, 284, 18 Jul 58, DA IN 135061 (19 Jul 58).

17 Jul 58

The UN Observer Group in Lebanon, in a report to the Security Council, asked for additional men and aircraft so that it could maintain a direct and constant patrol of the 179-mile border between Lebanon and Syria.

NYT, 18 Jul 58, 1:5, text, 6:3-8.

17 Jul 58

The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed USCINCEUR that the Greek Government, because of its concern for Greek nationals in Egypt and elsewhere, had refused to allow further landings in Greece of US aircraft. Greece would permit overflights, as high as possible, and
would assist with navigational aids, but requested that this be given no publicity. Routine flights, not connected with operations in Lebanon, might be approved at a later date.


17 Jul 58

The Turkish Foreign Minister informed the US Ambassador in Ankara that King Hussein had requested Turkish intervention in both Syria and Iraq, and that Turkey, though not concerned with Syria, was ready and wished to move into Iraq. While not wanting to push the US into an "adventure," Turkey urgently requested effective US backing in the form of moral and material support. The Foreign Minister argued that Iraq would be lost to the West unless immediate steps were taken, that the entry of the USSR into Iraq must be forestalled, that whichever side entered first was unlikely to be dislodged by the other, and that the USSR, if it wished, could already consider Turkey an aggressor because of the facilities recently made available to the US at Adana.

A few hours later the Ambassador submitted to Washington his opinion that while the Turkish political leaders might desire to intervene in Iraq, it was probable that the Turkish General Staff, when ordered to do so, would "raise so many conditions that effect will be non-compliance."


17 Jul 58

The UN Security Council held two sessions on the Middle East crisis. At the first meeting, in the afternoon, the Council agreed to add to its agenda a complaint by Jordan, submitted that morning, that the UAR was interfering in Jordan's internal affairs. Jordan announced that it had asked the UK and US for assistance against UAR-inspired "subversive elements" and that the UK had responded in conformity with Article 51 of the UN Charter. The UK delegate then promised the withdrawal of British troops as soon as the UN was able to ensure Jordanian independence and integrity. There followed a long and bitter speech by the Soviet delegate, who concentrated his attack on the US. Ambassador Lodge announced US support of the British action in Jordan and charged that a plan existed, "master-minded from one source," to take over the Middle East. He urged adoption of the US resolution of 15 July calling for the establishment of an international military force for Lebanon. The Soviet delegate asked the Security Council to request the immediate withdrawal of Western troops from Lebanon and Jordan, or else, he said, he would call for a special session of the General Assembly.

As the second Council session opened, in the evening, Sweden introduced a resolution calling for a suspension of the activities of the UN Observer Group in Lebanon, since, it charged, the US action had
Substantially altered the situation there. The Soviet delegate announced that he would support this resolution.


17 Jul 58

CINCSPECOMME informed the JCS that he had ordered: (1) the 1st BLT, 8th Marines, to land across the beach northeast of Beirut at 180000Z; (2) Army Force A to make an administrative landing at Beirut airport beginning at 190400Z, and to be bivouacked near the airport, available for employment as needed; and (3) Army Force B to remain on 24-hour alert in Germany. CINCSPECOMME was consolidating his forces in the Beirut area and would develop this area as a base from which to conduct such other operations as might be required.

(6E) Mag, CINCSPECOMME to JCS, 2776, 171916Z Jul 58, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 3.

17 Jul 58

UAR President Nasser, following a secret flight to Moscow, conferred with Premier Khrushchev. He reportedly urged the Soviet leader not to take any action in the Middle East that would threaten world peace. Nasser was said to be gravely concerned over the possibility that US and British landings in the Middle East would precipitate Soviet intervention in that area. He reportedly advised Khrushchev, however, that Soviet help would be expected if Western troops attacked Syria.

NYT, 19 Jul 58, 1:8.

17 Jul 58

The US Ambassador in Cairo informed the UAR Foreign Ministry that any attack on US forces by troops of the UAR, or under UAR control, would lead to "grave consequences."

NYT, 19 Jul 58, 1:7; text of a State Dept announcement, 3:2-3.

17 Jul 58

CINCSPECOMME discussed the US military build-up in Lebanon with Presidential representative Murphy and US Ambassador McClintock. Neither diplomat was able to provide guidance concerning the ultimate direction of the US intervention. Adm Holloway, accordingly, was playing the operation 'a good deal by ear,' in his own words. The next US move, he believed, should be to inspire Gen Chehab to use the Lebanese Army aggressively against the rebels.

(8E) Mag, CINCSPECOMME [sic] to CNO, 2979, 181821Z Jul 58, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 3.

17 Jul 58

The Secretary of State instructed the US Ambassador in Jordan to inform King Hussein that the US response to his request for military intervention was taking the form of strong support of the British operation, as evidenced by the morning's demonstration flight by US aircraft and the statements made by Ambassador Lodge at the UN during the day. The US would continue to keep the situation under close observation to determine whether further measures were necessary.

(PS) Mag, SecState to Amman, 132, 17 Jul 58.
During discussions in Washington with British Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd, Secretary Dulles confirmed the US willingness to provide logistic support to the British forces in Jordan if necessary. Lloyd strongly urged the US to consider placing at least a token force in Jordan as a means of demonstrating US-UK solidarity.

Secretary Dulles replied that no such move was currently contemplated but that the US would study the possibility should the British encounter unexpected difficulties in Jordan. The conferees agreed to concert their efforts to determine the best means of holding Kuwait, Bahrein, Qatar, and Dharan for the West. The British Government had not yet decided whether military intervention in Kuwait was desirable, in view of the adverse political developments that might result.


The Secretary of State informed the US Ambassador in Vienna that the US Air Force was seriously handicapped by being unable to overfly Austria. He therefore requested that efforts be made to obtain permission for a maximum number of overflights with minimum advance notification.

(AS) Msg, SecState to Vienna, 158, 17 Jul 58,
DA IN 134512 (18 Jul 58), JMEPG Lebanon Msg File.

The Saudi Arabian Prime Minister, having received the US Ambassador's explanation of the US action in Lebanon, stated that Saudi Arabia's policy during the current Middle East crisis would be one of complete neutrality and non-interference.

(AS) Msg, Jidda to SecState, 71, 17 Jul 58,
DA IN 134516 (18 Jul 58).

Noting that the previous plans for US contributions to the Arab Union budget were no longer valid, the State Department instructed the US Ambassador in Amman to resume direct budgetary support to Jordan. The Ambassador was authorized to release up to $7.5 million in FY 58 funds for budgetary support in the second quarter of Jordan's current fiscal year.

(AS) Msg, SecState to Amman, 119 (?), 17 Jul 58,
DA IN 135480 (20 Jul 58).

According to the New York Times, the White House talks between President Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles, and British Foreign Secretary Lloyd had resulted in an agreement to limit the intervention in the Middle East to Lebanon and Jordan. So long as the new Iraqi Government respected Western oil interests, there would be no intervention in Iraq. Reportedly, officials felt that the current Anglo-American actions would suffice to restore Western prestige in the Middle East and to stabilize Saudi Arabia and the other friendly oil-producing states of the Persian Gulf. The State Department announced that, while US aircraft had supported the British landing, there was no plan at present to send US troops to Jordan. State Department officials
confirmed that King Hussein's appeal had gone to the US as well as to the UK, but said that, in view of the UK's long experience in Jordan, it had been deemed wise to leave the operation to the British.

NYT, 18 Jul 58, 1:6-7.

18 Jul 58
The Chief of Naval Operations requested CINCSPECOMME's advice on how to make the earliest possible delivery of 1500 drums of diesel oil and gasoline to Amman to relieve the critical POL situation in Jordan. This was to be a stopgap measure, pending arrival of a tanker at Aqaba about 22 July and replacing a projected USAF operation from Bahrain that had been blocked by political considerations.

(9) Msg, CNO to CINCSPECOMME, 180727Z Jul 58, CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec 6.

18 Jul 58
The French cruiser DE GRASSE in company with three French destroyers entered Beirut harbor. The four vessels departed Beirut at 0500Z the next morning.

(9) Msg, COMSIXTHFLT to CINCSPECOMME, 180940Z Jul 58. (9) Msg, COMSIXTHFLT to CINCSPECOMME, 3250, 190850Z Jul 58.

18 Jul 58
The US Ambassador in Amman reported that both Hussein and Rifai were intensely disappointed when informed that the US would not send troops to Jordan. The panic that had precipitated Hussein's call for foreign troops had itself caused a serious loss of prestige for the Jordanian Government, but the fact that the UK alone had answered the call posed a special problem for the regime. The presence of British troops was resented by the public as indicating a return of British control over Jordan. Hence the Jordanian leaders felt that US forces were necessary to offset the purely British character of the foreign contingent. In reporting to Washington, however, the Ambassador counseled against sending US troops, inasmuch as no justification had been offered other than on psychological grounds. He recommended that the US concentrate on measures of a humanitarian nature to assist the Jordanian population, such as POL airlift, providing free food and other supplies, and financial and economic aid.

(9) Msg, Amman to SecState, 169, 18 Jul 58.

18 Jul 58
The first units of the 2nd Battalion, 8th Marines (Minus), airlifted from the United States via Port Lyautéy, began arriving at Beirut at 1000Z. Final landings occurred on 20 July. The battalion was assigned to reserve and shore party augmentation duties.


18 Jul 58
The USAFRA in Athens advised US military headquarters concerned that the Greek Air Force was willing to ignore any occasional deviations from conditions laid down by the Greek Government regarding landings by US aircraft, providing there were no undesirable publicity
or other complications. Similarly, empty cargo aircraft returning westward would be permitted to land at Athens as long as they attracted no attention.

(2) Msg, USAFRA Athens to USAFE ADVON, 181045Z Jul 58, JMEPG Lebanon Msg File.

18 Jul 58

The Government of Turkey informed the US Embassy in Ankara that it would permit the US to stockpile ammunition and moderate quantities of other military equipment such as tanks, artillery, and aircraft at Adana Military Airfield under the Military Facilities Agreement.


18 Jul 58

UAR President Nasser, in a speech in Damascus, denounced Western actions in the Middle East, supported the new regime in Iraq, and said that the Arabs would fight to defend Arab nationalism. "We shall not be terrorized," he declared, "by threats of fleets or atomic bombs."

NYT, 19 Jul 58, 2:3; excerpts, 2:4-5.

18 Jul 58

Egyptian-UAR officials expressed alarm over Secretary Dulles' message to Nasser of 17 July, which stated that the US had intervened at Lebanon's request for no purpose other than to preserve Lebanon's independence and protect US nationals, that the US hoped US-UAR relations would not be unduly strained, but that if US forces were attacked by UAR forces or by elements under UAR control or direction "there would be grave danger that the scope of the problem would expand and the state of our relations be seriously impaired."

A UAR Foreign Office official to whom this message was first conveyed thought Nasser would surely interpret it as an ultimatum. Ali Sabri, Minister of State for Presidential Affairs, also anticipated a violent reaction to the message by Nasser, who was expected to arrive in Egypt on 19 July. Sabri argued that a single instance in which the US concluded that some attacking force was connected with the UAR would put the fate of the UAR in the hands of the American Government or even possibly some local US commander. The US Ambassador in Cairo endeavored to assure Sabri that the US was not looking for a pretext to cause trouble but for a means to avoid it.

(5) Msg, SecState to Cairo, 148, 17 Jul 58.

(5) Msg, Cairo to SecState, 169, 18 Jul 58. (5) Msg, Cairo to SecState, 176, 18 Jul 58.

18 Jul 58

USCINCEUR requested the JCS to authorize expansion of the number of C-124s for use in BLUE BAT from the 36 on hand to the 54 called for by CINCSPECOMME OPLAN 215-58. He supported this request by citing the current and anticipated imposition of airlift requirements beyond those of the original plan and the limitations placed on landing and refueling in Greece.

18 Jul 58  Tens of thousands of Russians surrounded the US Embassy in Moscow, shouting, whistling, and throwing stones, bricks, ink bottles, and other missiles at the building. Soviet policemen and soldiers stood by and watched the crowd break two-thirds of the windows on the first floor of the Embassy before, after more than an hour, forcing the crowd back from the building. Earlier in the day several delegations of Russians had presented petitions to the Embassy, calling for the withdrawal of US troops from Lebanon.
   NYT, 19 Jul 58, 1:6-7.

18 Jul 58  East German mobs attacked the US and British military missions in Potsdam. An estimated 1,000 demonstrators tore down flags and damaged the building while shouting slogans against the US and British actions in the Middle East. The two missions received no protection from Soviet or East German authorities.
   NYT, 19 Jul 58, 3:1.
18 Jul 58

The US Ambassador in Baghdad reported that the Government of the Iraqi Republic had given formal notice of its withdrawal from the Arab Union and that it repudiated all financial, military, and other obligations devolving upon Iraq from that union.

(U) Msg, Baghdad to SecState, unnumbered, 18 Jul 58, DA IN 721198 (19 Jul 58), JMEFG Lebanon Msg File.

18 Jul 58

In response to a request for permission to fly US aircraft over Israel to deliver petroleum products to Jordan, Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion replied that if the flights were absolutely necessary, the US should "do it but don't ask us." Ben Gurion added, however, that Israel would have to make a gesture of protest against any such overflight and that a supply line to Jordan not involving use of Israel's airspace must be established without delay. He wished the US to realize the extent to which the overflight question was exposing Israel to the danger of Soviet-UAR retaliation.

(57) Msg, SecState to Tel Aviv, 42, 18 Jul 58.

(57) Msg, Tel Aviv to SecState, 72, 18 Jul 58.

18 Jul 58

Baghdad Radio Announced that the new Iraqi regime would "respect its obligations" toward foreign oil interests. In Beirut, an IPC spokesman said a normal flow of oil was still being pumped through to the Tripoli refinery.

NYT, 19 Jul 58, 5:1.

18 Jul 58

Secretary Dulles and Foreign Minister Lloyd, conferring in Washington on the Middle East crisis, agreed that Turkey's proposal to send Turkish troops into Iraq was unwise. They foresaw that such a move would not win the approval of world opinion, in view of the absence of internal resistance to the new Iraqi regime. It would probably solidify the Iraqi people behind their new government and might provoke a dangerous Soviet reaction.

(57) Msg, SecState to London, 600, 18 Jul 58.

18 Jul 58

The UN Security Council failed to agree on action to be taken concerning the Middle East Crisis. The USSR vetoed the US proposal to dispatch a UN force to Lebanon, and the Council also voted down both a Soviet resolution calling for the withdrawal of US and British troops from Lebanon and Jordan and a Swedish proposal that the operations of the UN Observer Group be suspended. Late in the day, US Ambassador Lodge introduced a resolution calling an emergency session of the General Assembly, but withheld the move from a vote pending a compromise resolution that the Japanese delegation had earlier indicated it planned to introduce. A few hours after the Council had adjourned until 21 July, the Soviet Union circulated the draft of a resolution calling an emergency session of the General Assembly. This differed in context from the US resolution in that it blamed the Middle East crisis on the Western intervention and charged that the US and British actions constituted a serious threat to peace and security.

18 Jul 58
CINCSPECOMME informed the Chief of Naval Operations that gasoline was available in drums and diesel oil in 5-gallon tins at Beirut. He intended to begin the POL airlift to Jordan on 19 July; using C-124 aircraft as they completed lifting Army Force A from Adana to Beirut.

CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 3050, 182151Z Jul 58, CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec 6.

18 Jul 58
The US Ambassador in Vienna was informed that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had given assurance there would be no further US overflights of Austria without adequate clearance. The standing arrangement permitted flights by 30 planes a day over Austria under a 48-hour clearance procedure. If the Ambassador thought it desirable, these flights could be limited to night operations and could occur at levels up to 20,000 feet to attract less notice. Should cessation of all overflights be required, planes flying from Germany to the Middle East would be forced to take a 300-mile detour.

Secretary Dulles informed the Turkish Government that the US saw grave implications in Turkey's proposal to intervene in Iraq (see item of 17 July 58) and felt unable to give encouragement to the action without further information regarding Turkey's plans, capabilities, and estimate of the situation. Besides raising the question of the military feasibility of the scheme, considering the difficult terrain of the Iraqi-Turkish border region, Secretary Dulles stressed particularly the absence of any organized group within Iraq opposing the new regime that would welcome the Turkish invaders.

Secretary Dulles to SecState to Vienna, 172, 18 Jul 58.

19 Jul 58
The IAR and the new Iraqi Government concluded an agreement embracing mutual defense and cooperation in the economic, military, and international fields.

NYT, 20 Jul 58, 1:6-7; text, 14:1-2.

19 Jul 58
The US Ambassador in Moscow offered his opinion that the USSR would react with force to any Turkish intervention in Iraq and might even attack Turkey directly.

Mag, Moscow to SecState, 157, 19 Jul 58.

19 Jul 58
The US Air Force Attache in Vienna reported that the Austrian Minister of Defense had announced that airspace over the part of Austria lying between West Germany and Italy was closed to all aerial traffic above 5,000 meters altitude and was closed to all but commercial aircraft below this altitude, effective 19 July.

Mag, USAF in Vienna to USAFE, U-433, 190930Z Jul 58, AF IN 23393, JMEFG Lebanon Mag File.

19 Jul 58
The US Ambassador in Athens reported that the Prime Minister of Greece had agreed to modify his Government's earlier position on landing rights for US aircraft engaged in BLUE BAT. The Air Attache in Athens furnished instructions to interested US commands for complying with the new conditions. Publicity was to be avoided and crews warned to be silent about BLUE BAT; when possible,
night operations would be scheduled and flights spaced to prevent mass arrivals at any one base, with clearance requests submitted 24 hours in advance; destination of eastward flights was to be Turkey only. These conditions applied to all aircraft connected with BLUE BAT.

(4) Msg, Athens to SecState, 176, 19 Jul 58, DA IN 135133.

19 Jul 58

Jordan's King Hussein told a news conference that he had requested that US troops be sent to Jordan, and, he said, "we expect them."

NYT, 20 Jul 58, 1:5.

19 Jul 58

The US Ambassador in Jordan was instructed to inform King Hussein and Premier Rifai that the US could not comply with their request for political, economic, and military assistance to enable Jordan, in the name of the Arab Union Government, to put down the insurrection in Iraq. The US and UK had come to the aid of Jordan in response to a call for help to preserve Jordan's independence and integrity; the proposed undertaking went beyond the original purpose of the operation.

(3) Msg, SecState to Amman, 203,19 Jul 58.

19 Jul 58

The Foreign Minister of Iraq informed the US Embassy that one aircraft on each Monday and one on each Wednesday could be used to evacuate American nationals from Iraq.

(4) Msg, USARMA Baghdad to DEPTAR CX 44, 191410Z July 58, DA IN 135303, (20 Jul 58).

19 Jul 58

Army Force A (187th Airborne Battle Group) began arriving at Beirut from Adana by air at 0400Z, completing the operation at 2230Z. It numbered approximately 1720 personnel. Force B (503rd Airborne Battle Group) remained in Germany on 24-hour alert. Force C (combat and service support units), already partly transported to Adana, would begin airlift to Beirut when the Force A movement was completed. Force D (service support) was scheduled to move by sea from French and German ports.


19 Jul 58

CINCUSAF indicated that without further augmentation of his airlift capability it would require approximately 8 days to complete the movement of Force C to Lebanon. On 22 July CINCUSAFCOM advised that this schedule was acceptable to him.


19 Jul 58

Premier Nikita Khrushchev of the Soviet Union, in a letter to President Eisenhower, proposed a conference of the heads of government of the USSR, the US, Britain,
France, and India, with the UN Secretary General participating, to prevent the war that he said was made imminent by the "aggressive act" of the US and Britain in sending troops into Lebanon and Jordan. He proposed to meet at Geneva on 22 July, but stated that the USSR was agreeable to any other place, including Washington, and to another date, though he stressed the need for speedy action. He informed the President that he was simultaneously approaching the other heads of government referred to above.


19 Jul 58 CONSEVENTHFLT issued orders organizing a task group with the mission of deploying the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines, from the Western Pacific to the Persian Gulf to conduct operations as directed in support of US interests.

(25) Msg, CONSEVENTHFLT to CTF 76 and CTF 79, 3562, 191652Z Jul 58, JMBPG Lebanon Msg File.

19 Jul 58 The US Ambassador in Vienna concluded that in view of the unfavorable publicity being given the matter, any further overflight of Austria would seriously weaken the US moral and propaganda position. Hence he recommended that all overflights cease. If some future emergency made them necessary, Austrian authorization should not be requested and maximum concealment should be practiced. The State Department and Headquarters USAF concurred in these recommendations.

(25) Msg, Vienna to SecState, 191, 19 Jul 58; (s) Msg, SecState to Vienna, 180, 19 Jul 58. (s) Msg, Hq USAF to CINCUSAFE, APEX 000060, 201730Z Jul 58, JMBPG Lebanon Msg File.

19 Jul 58 In the evening the Japanese UN delegation circulated a draft resolution to other members of the Security Council. Designed as a compromise measure, the resolution called for the UN Observer Group in Lebanon to continue its activities and requested the Secretary General to take measures forthwith to assist the Group in establishing conditions that would make possible the withdrawal of US troops. This was generally taken to imply an enlargement of the Observer Group.

NYT, 20 Jul 58, 1:5 (includes text).

19 Jul 58 CONSIXTHFLT reported that in operations over Lebanon, 16-19 July, 16 aircraft of his command had received damage from ground fire.

(25) Msg, CONSIXTHFLT to CINCSPECOMME, 3892, 200725Z Jul 58.

20 Jul 58 Jordan announced the severing of diplomatic relations with the UAR because of Cairo's recognition of the new Iraqi Government.

NYT, 21 Jul 58, 1:5.

20 Jul 58 The US Ambassador in Jidda transmitted Saudi Arabia's refusal of the US request of 17 July for overflight rights as well as for use of the Dhahran airport in order to fly petroleum from Bahrain to Amman, Jordan.

20 Jul 58 The State Department instructed the US Embassy in Tel Aviv to express to Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion the very deep concern of the US regarding his protest against further British overflights of Israel. The US understood his anxiety and had told the British of Ben Gurion's desire that the UK transport its supplies through channels other than Israel's airspace as soon as possible. The US and UK were hastening to establish such an alternate route. However, loss of Israeli overflight rights at that time would jeopardize the effectiveness of the British forces guarding the political stability of Jordan, which was a matter of profound importance to Israel.

(5) Msg, SecState to Tel Aviv, 52, 20 Jul 58, DA IN 135774, (21 Jul 58).

20 Jul 58 During the meetings of Secretary Dulles and Foreign Minister Lloyd on 19-20 July, it was decided to hold the Baghdad Pact Meeting in London beginning 28 July, as scheduled. Secretary Dulles planned to attend the first day's session.


20 Jul 58 The Chief of Naval Operations notified CINCSFECOMMB that he was authorized to airlift, within his capability, critical POL products requested by the US Embassy in Amman.


21 Jul 58 The situation in Amman was calm, and no incidents involving British troops were reported. Meanwhile, the Damascus, Cairo, and Baghdad radios urged the people of Jordan to assassinate King Hussein and overthrow his Government.

NYT, 22 Jul 58, 15:1, 2, 5.

21 Jul 58 The first aircraft evacuating Americans from Iraq departed Baghdad for Rome at 0820Z, bearing 90 passengers.

(57) Msg, USARMA Baghdad to DEPTAR, CX 47, 211330Z Jul 58, DA IN 135934.

21 Jul 58 In a note handed to the US Ambassador in Moscow, the USSR condemned flights of US military aircraft over Austria as a violation of international law and of the Austrian treaty signed by the US, UK, USSR, and France. The Soviet note called on the US to halt these flights immediately.

NYT, 22 Jul 58, 1:7.

21 Jul 58 In a letter to President Eisenhower, President Chamoun of Lebanon expressed his "profound gratitude" for US assistance.

NYT, 28 Jul 58, 5:3-4 (text).

21 Jul 58 The US Ambassador in Beirut was informed by the head of the UN Observer Group in Lebanon that he had received authorization to establish liaison with US forces through the US Ambassador.

(5) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 567, 21 Jul 58, DA IN 135643, (22 Jul 58).
21 Jul 58 The Chief of the Turkish General Staff presented the US Army Attache in Ankara with the Turkish plan for an invasion of Syria and Iraq, which was dependent on the US providing air cover and technical material assistance. The plan called for the simultaneous occupation of certain areas in northern Syria and Iraq by two Turkish army corps and an armored brigade. The objective was to hold sufficient territory in northern Syria and Iraq to secure Turkey's southern border and protect over half a million ethnic Turks living within the area, including many in northern Iraq who had declared they disliked the new Iraqi regime.

(21) Msg, USARMA Ankara to DEPTAR, AAC 125, 211340Z Jul 58, DA IN 135768.

21 Jul 58 CINCSPECOMME requested that, in view of the size and complexity of the Lebanese operation, a major general or lieutenant general of the Army or Marine Corps be assigned immediately as COMALANFOR. This senior ground force officer's headquarters would comprise an echelon, with highly important duties, between CINCSPECOMME and the two brigadier generals who commanded the Army and Marine forces, respectively.

(21) Msg, CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 4119, 211341Z Jul 58, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 3.

21 Jul 58 In consultation with Secretary Dulles, Israeli Ambassador Eban expressed his country's approval of the US action in Lebanon and urged that US and British troops be withdrawn from the Middle East prematurely. Noting that Israel expected soon to receive a stern protest from the USSR regarding the permission given for US-UK overflights and that Israel's identification with the US-UK intervention would deepen her security problem once the Western forces had withdrawn, Eban suggested that the US and UK should acknowledge a special obligation to aid and protect Israel. Secretary Dulles replied that the US action in Lebanon should give confidence that an Israeli appeal would receive a similar response, and he promised a fresh review of Israeli arms requests.

(21) Msg, SecState to Tel Aviv, 61, 21 Jul 58.

21 Jul 58 The US Ambassador in Rome reported that the Italian Government desired for political reasons to assume that the destination of US aircraft refueling in Italy was Adana and requested the US to avoid any public indication to the contrary.

(21) Msg, Rome to SecState, 240, 21 Jul 58, DA IN 136301 (22 Jul 58), JMEPG Lebanon Msg Pile.

21 Jul 58 At the UN, the Soviet representative strongly attacked the Japanese compromise resolution on the Lebanon question (see item of 19 July 58) because it failed to call for the immediate withdrawal of US troops. Just as the Security Council was about to vote on the Japanese motion, the Lebanese representative requested a postponement on the grounds that his government needed more time to study the resolution. After an acrimonious exchange between the Soviet and US representatives, the vote was postponed until 22 July.

NYT, 22 Jul 58, 178; debate excerpts, 8:1-8.
The US Ambassador in Amman reported that Premier Rifai, upon being informed that the US would not assist Jordan in putting down the Iraqi revolt, maintained that there must have been some misunderstanding inasmuch as Jordan had no intention of intervening militarily in Iraq. Despite this complete reversal of the Jordanian position, Rifai again stressed at length the purely domestic and psychological reasons for wanting US troops in Jordan, namely that they were needed for internal security and to offset reaction to UK troops whose presence was interpreted as a step toward reimposition of British control. To Washington the Ambassador repeated his recommendation that the US forego sending troops but continue to supply commodities and provide financial and economic assistance.

In the evening the US and British Ambassadors were again summoned to the palace, where King Hussein formally requested them to forward a new request for US troops and additional British forces to their Governments. In doing so, the US Ambassador noted evidence that some plan for intervention in Iraq by Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan was in the making, in which Jordan might join. Pointing out that, once stationed in Jordan, US forces would have no choice but to perform expanded security duties if Hussein suddenly ordered the Jordanian Army into Iraq, he underscored his recommendation against sending US troops.

21 Jul 58

Undersecretary of State Murphy was instructed to inform Lebanese officials that the US would assist Lebanon in economic rehabilitation once the present crisis was over.

22 Jul 58

The British War Office told the US Ambassador in London that there were between 1700 and 1800 British troops in Jordan.

22 Jul 58

CINCPACOMME reported that Undersecretary Murphy's efforts in Lebanon were being widely acclaimed. The fact that Murphy had given equal attention to arranging conversations with opposition and Government leaders had been extolled in the press, and one leftist opposition paper had stated "the crisis is on the way to solution." Meanwhile US aircraft had encouraged the favorable turn of opinion by dropping a million leaflets over Lebanon.

22 Jul 58

The UN Secretariat received a protest from the UN Observer Group in Lebanon against low-flying US aircraft that were having a disquieting effect on the Lebanese population and hence making the work of the Observer Group more difficult. The Group was also concerned to note that US flights along the border were drawing Syrian antiaircraft fire, since UN patrol craft might also be fired upon as a result. In forwarding this report to Washington, Ambassador Lodge recommended that both types of operation be stopped if possible.
Replying to Khrushchev's letter of 19 July, President Eisenhower pointed out that the UN Security Council had been created for the purpose of determining whether any threat to peace existed, and, if one did, what measures should be taken. Therefore, if Khrushchev seriously believed there was a threat to peace, he should take it up with the Security Council. Heads of government, the President further pointed out, could represent their countries in the Security Council. If they were to meet, he said, they should make use of the existing machinery and orderly procedure of that body, rather than improvised procedures bypassing it and thus derogating from UN authority and prestige, as proposed by Khrushchev. The US would join in a Security Council meeting of heads of government if such a meeting were generally desired.


By patient discussion Ambassador McClintock persuaded President Chamoun to send immediate instructions to Lebanese delegate Malik at the UN reversing his stand against the Japanese resolution. Malik was directed to acquiesce in the Japanese resolution if it provided that US forces would not be withdrawn from Lebanon until the UN measures were considered adequate, with the determination of adequacy being reserved to the US and Lebanese Governments.

 Msg, Beirut to SecState, 588, 22 Jul 58, DA IN 136295.

CINCSPECOMME requested CINCUSAREUR to ship all of Force E (tank battalion) to Lebanon as soon as possible.

 Msg, CINCSPECOMME to CINCUSAREUR, 221601Z Jul 58, DA IN 136271.

At the UN, the Soviet Union vetoed the Japanese resolution on the Lebanese crisis after the Security Council had rejected Soviet amendments calling for the immediate withdrawal of US forces. The vote on the Japanese resolution was 10-1. After the voting, Secretary General Hammarskjold announced that he intended to strengthen the UN Observer Group, despite the failure of the Security Council to agree on any action in Lebanon. The Council then adjourned indefinitely.

 NYT, 23 Jul 58, 1:4; debate excerpts, 4:1-8.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff noted an estimate by JMEPG of the US forces that might be required in Lebanon if UAR covert assistance to the Lebanese opposition continued and long-term military support of the Lebanese Government was required. The estimate of Army and Marine land forces was two divisions (or equivalent) and one armored cavalry regiment, with supporting elements, totaling approximately 50,000 personnel. If the UAR intensified its covert intervention, up to three divisions might be required. The study pointed out that military operations in Lebanon of the magnitude indicated in the estimate would reduce US logistical readiness for general war and cause significant deficiencies in US ground force availability until a partial mobilization of industry and personnel became effective.
(3) Deo On JCS 1887/479, "Estimate of the Magnitude of U.S. Military Forces which May Be Required in Lebanon for an Extended Period of Time (6)," 22 Jul 58, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 3.

22 Jul 58 With State Department and OSD concurrence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff canceled a study concerned with contingency planning for evacuation of American citizens from Iraq, which had been directed following interdepartmental consultations on 18 July. (3) JCS 1887/481, Note by Secys, "Iraq (U)," 22 Jul 58. (U) N/H of JCS 1887/481, 22 Jul 58. Both in CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec 6.

22 Jul 58 By this date, in response to President Eisenhower's request on 16 July, a flash study on what the US could do to strengthen the military position of Turkey and Iran had been prepared and used by the Chairman, JCS, in discussions with the President. Further, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) had arranged for expedited delivery of various items of ground force materiel to Turkey and Iran, and for certain naval items to Iran. His office was in the process of determining that other items should be similarly expedited. (3) JCS 1887/478, Note by Secys, "Possible Action by the United States to Strengthen Immediately the Military Position of Turkey and Iran (6)," 22 Jul 58, CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec 6.

22 Jul 58 Governments friendly to the West had been reassured by the US-UK moves, but their internal opposition had been strengthened, and anti-Western demonstrations could be expected. The Arab world in general was in a period of revolutionary ferment and was likely to continue to undergo periods of violence and irrationality. (3) 22 Jul 58.

22 Jul 58 The State Department announced that the US had expressed its regrets to Austria for flights made over that country without Austrian permission. A-Department spokesman emphasized that the aircraft had been unarmed transports and stated that all unauthorized overflights of Austrian territory had ceased.

NYT, 23 Jul 58, 8:6.

22 Jul 58 The Chief of Naval Operations directed CINCSPECOMME to continue airlifting critical POL products to Amman until surface support became effective or until the US Embassy in Amman advised that the airlift was no longer required. (3) Mag, CNO to CINCSPECOMME, 221931Z Jul 58, CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec 6.

23 Jul 58 Adm Sir Michael Denny, BJSN, Washington, informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that UK authorities had concluded that the sending of further British forces to Jordan would make no contribution to political stability there.
but that the arrival of a small US force would have an effect out of all proportion to its size. Accordingly, approaches were being made through the State Department to request the sending of a contingent of US troops, "however small," into Jordan.


23 Jul 58 The US Ambassador in Beirut reported the salient details of the financial crisis confronting Lebanon as outlined by the acting Minister of Finance. Since the crisis was expected to be acute for the following three months, the Minister of Finance requested that the US give immediate consideration to providing budgetary support for Lebanon.

(5) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 635, 23 Jul 58.

23 Jul 58 President Eisenhower received a letter from Prime Minister Macmillan that urged US military participation in Jordan in company with the British and requested a US airlift from Cyprus to Asman to provide partial logistic support to the British forces.

(5) Memo, Dir NE S.Asia and Afr Reg OSD (ISA) to Asst SecDef (ISA), "Logistic Airlift in Support of UK Forces in Jordan," 23 Jul 58, CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec 6.

23 Jul 58 Advising CINCSPECOMME that higher US authorities had reservations regarding the number of US troops to be stationed in Lebanon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed him to clear with them before moving Army Force B from Germany, except in emergency.

(5) Memo, JCS to CINCSPECOMME, JCS 945311, 23 Jul 58; CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 3.

23 Jul 58 Premier Khrushchev replied to President Eisenhower's letter of 22 July. Agreeing to a meeting of heads of government within the framework of the Security Council, Khrushchev stated that Premier Nehru of India should participate in the special session of the Security Council, and also representatives of the "interested Arab states." Again stressing the need for speed, he proposed that the meeting begin in New York on 28 July.


23 Jul 58 The Soviet newspaper Izvestia opposed a heads-of-government meeting in the Security Council because, it said, that US would have a "mechanical majority" in the Council. Moreover, asked Izvestia, did the US "seriously imagine that anyone could agree to discuss important problems with Chiang Kai-shek?"

NYT, 23 Jul 58, 117.

23 Jul 58 The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved CINCSPECOMME's recommendation that a senior officer be appointed to the joint ground force command in Lebanon (see item of 21 July). Maj Gen Paul D. Adams, USA, was designated to serve as COMAMLANFOR. CINCSPECOMME retained over-all command and responsibility for major military and policy decisions; COMAMLANFOR, with a joint staff of Army and Marine personnel, was charged with all joint and combined
aspects of land force operations and support planning in the Middle East area and with assisting CINCSPECOMME in maintaining liaison with Gen Chéhab and other commanders. The Department of the Army directed USAREUR to assist Gen Adams by supplying personnel, equipment, and units, including a signal detachment, as required.

(AS) Mag, DA to USCINCEUR and CINCUSAREUR, DA 945422, 23 Jul 58, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 3.

23 Jul 58

Speaker Oseiran of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies issued a call for Parliament to meet on 31 July to elect a successor to President Chamoun.

NYT, 24 Jul 58, 1:8.

24 Jul 58

In a note delivered to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, the Soviet Union accused Turkey of planning to attack Iraq and strongly warned against such action. A spokesman for the Turkish Foreign Ministry denied the Soviet charge.

NYT, 25 Jul 58, 4:5.

24 Jul 58

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the Secretary of Defense request the Department of State to consider, as a matter of priority, the assignment of a political advisor to the staff of CINCSPECOMME, in view of the complex and changing political situation in the Middle East and the international ramifications of the operations CINCSPECOMME was then directing in that area (see item of 17 July).

(AS) Memo, CJCS to SecDef, "The Assignment of a Political Advisor to CINCSPECOMME's Staff (U)," 24 Jul 58, derived from (S) JCS 1887/480, 22 Jul 58. Both in CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec 6.

24 Jul 58

The Joint Chiefs of Staff notified CINCSPECOMME that the US Government had approved the British request for US assistance in airlifting logistic support from Cyprus for the British forces in Jordan. They instructed him to ascertain British requirements and render such assistance as he could without jeopardizing his primary mission.

(AS) Mag, JCS to CINCSPECOMME, JCS 94552, 24 Jul 58, CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec 6.

24 Jul 58

The Joint Chiefs of Staff advised CINCSPECOMME that the Israeli Ambassador had told Secretary Dulles the US had clearance for overflight of Israel in support of British forces in Jordan "for a number of days."

(AS) Mag, JCS to CINCSPECOMME, JCS 94552, 24 Jul 58, CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec 6.

24 Jul 58

The strength of US Marine Corps units in Lebanon was as follows:

1st Battalion, 8th Marines 1622
2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines 1721
3rd Battalion, 6th Marines 1552
2nd Battalion, 8th Marines 840
Air Units 404

TOTAL 5239

(AS) JWR Situation Report No. 12 (Middle East), 25 Jul 58, CCS 319.1 (7-16-58) sec 1.
25 Jul 58  CINCELM REAR forwarded the estimate of logistic support required by the British by airlift from Cyprus to Jordan pending establishment of a sealift to Jordan about 1 August. In terms of C-124 aircraft loads it totaled 55 per day, for purposes of routine fuel and dry-cargo supply maintenance and the establishment of a minimum reserve of jet fuel.

(TS) Mag, CINCELM REAR to CNO, 250362Z Jul 58, CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec 6.

25 Jul 58  The US Ambassador in Amman reported that in the light of US refusal to send troops to Jordan he had been presented with an alternate proposal by King Hussein and Rifai. Jordan proposed to increase her internal security forces so that foreign troops could depart. While the idea of intervening in Iraq would be given up, border tribes and agents would be organized to penetrate Syria in order to create unrest. To achieve these objectives it was requested that the US provide Jordan with the estimated $8 million necessary to raise two additional brigades recruited from tribes loyal to the King, and that the US and Jordan conclude a mutual defense agreement under which the US would re-equip the Jordanian Army and supply technical and other military assistance under the supervision of a US MAAG. In addition, on grounds that the Baghdad Pact was no longer an effective defense arrangement, it was requested that the US undertake to establish a new regional defense organization to be known as METO, which would include Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco, US, UK, France, West Germany, Greece, Libya, and Italy.

(TS) Mag, Amman to SecState, 272, 25 Jul 58.

25 Jul 58  At a meeting of President Chamoun, Gen Chehab, Undersecretary Murphy, Ambassador McClintock, and Adm Holloway, Gen Chehab rejected the idea of any large-scale joint Lebanese-US operations against the rebels, since he was sure his mixed army of Christians and Moslems would break apart if called upon to take all-out action against the largely Moslem opposition. The scoring of some military success against the rebels seemed important, however, as a means of improving political conditions prior to the presidential election scheduled for 31 July. Accordingly the conferees agreed that the Lebanese Army would undertake an operation that afternoon with the limited objective of reducing the size of the rebel-held Baata district of Beirut, without attempting to clean out the area entirely. To increase the forces available to Gen Chehab for this and other operations, US troops would so far as possible replace Lebanese units in static positions. Also, the US would respond to Lebanese requests for light military material, such as small arms and ammunition, tear gas, and psywar loudspeaker trucks.

(TS) Mag, Beirut to SecState, 698, 25 Jul 58, DA IN 137951, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 4.

25 Jul 58  The US Ambassador in Cairo transmitted a formal protest received from the UAR which charged that American aircraft had violated UAR airspace in Syria and had
intercepted UAR civil aircraft. The protest described seven infractions occurring on 18 and 21 July and warned that UAR armed forces had been ordered from that day to take any measures necessary to protect the airspace from violation.

(6) Msg, Cairo to SecState, 298, 25 Jul 58, DA IN 137905.

25 Jul 58

Secretary General Hammarskjold requested the consent of the Government of Lebanon to expand the functions and increase the size of the UN Observer Group.

NYT, 26 Jul 58, 3:8.

25 Jul 58

The US UN delegation in New York was instructed to advise Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold confidentially that the US was prepared to offer substantial financial assistance for expanding the UN Observer Group in Lebanon.


25 Jul 58

The Swiss Government announced that it had refused permission for US military transport aircraft to overfly Switzerland when the US had requested such permission for the night of 15-16 July. Since that time, said the announcement, three US aircraft had violated Swiss airspace by mistake, but the Swiss Government did not contemplate making any protest.

NYT, 26 Jul 58, 3:7.

25 Jul 58

In a brief reply to Khrushchev's letter of 23 July, President Eisenhower wrote the Soviet leader that any discussion of the Middle East in the UN Security Council should be carried out under the established rules of the Council. He reiterated that any member nation might be represented by any member of its government, including the head of state, and pointed out that the Council was empowered to invite representatives of non-member nations to participate in the discussion under certain conditions. He also insisted that the Council concern itself with the Middle East in general, rather than limit discussion to a consideration of Lebanon and Jordan.

NYT, 26 Jul 58, 1:8; text, 2:4-8.

25 Jul 58

Secretary of State Dulles informed the US Embassy in Beirut that if General Chehab had reasonably wide backing among the Lebanese, he would be acceptable to the US as President of Lebanon. Indeed, the US would be willing to help persuade him to undertake the candidacy if necessary.


25 Jul 58

Secretary of State Dulles cautioned the US Embassy in Beirut that US forces in Lebanon should not be deployed near the Syrian frontier in the present circumstances.

(6) Msg, SecState to Beirut, 487, 25 July 58, DA IN 138311 (26 Jul 58).
25 Jul 58 In view of indications that the crisis in the Lebanese situation had passed, Air Force commands were authorized to decrease their alert status.

TS HQ USAF to CINCSAO at al, APVVC TS 1592, 252208Z Jul 58, JMEM Lebanon Msg File.

26 Jul 58 Change No. 6 to BLUE BAT formally designated Maj Gen Paul D. Adams, USA, as COMAMLANFOR, effective at 1200Z.

(2) Msg, CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 6456, 261001Z Jul 58. JMEM Lebanon Msg File.

26 Jul 58 In a note to the West German Government, released by TASS, the Soviet Union called on West Germany to stop allowing the US to use German bases as staging points for its military activities in the Middle East.

NYT, 27 Jul 58, 7:2.

CINCSPECOMME directed COMAMLANFOR to prepare contingent plans, and COMAMNAVFOR and COMAMAIRFOR to prepare corresponding supporting plans, for the following: (1) reinforcing the Basta of rebel forces; (2) defending Beirut against reinforced rebel forces; (3) defending Lebanon against UAR intervention; and (4) securing the Tripoli and Sidon areas. The plans were to embrace action taken by both US and Lebanese forces together or by US forces alone.

(27) Msg, CINCSPECOMME to COMAMLANFOR, COMAMNAVFOR, and COMAMAIRFOR, 6673, 261521Z Jul 58, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 4.

26 Jul 58 The US Ambassador in Beirut reported that members of Admiral Holloway's staff had assured him US aircraft were under strict orders not to violate UAR airspace. There was no record of any violation of the Syrian border, as charged by the UAR (see item of 25 July 58), but a further investigation was underway. It was quite possible that US aircraft had intercepted some UAR planes for identification purposes, but any such action fell under the terms of the notice to air traffic issued at the beginning of the Lebanese operation.

(42) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 737, 26 Jul 58, DA IN 138448 (27 Jul 58).

26 Jul 58 In a letter submitted to the UN Security Council and circulated as a UN document the UAR charged that US aircraft on 18 and 21 July had committed three violations of UAR airspace and had intercepted four UAR civil and commercial planes.


26 Jul 58 As instructed by the State Department, the US Embassy in London informed the Foreign Office of the following US position regarding action in the Persian Gulf: (1) the US would continue to support the special British position in the Persian Gulf; (2) the US agreed with the British inclination not to intervene in Kuwait under the present circumstances and would counsel against military occupation except in the event of a coup d'etat or by prior agreement with the Ruler of Kuwait; and (3) the US endorsed the British plan to maintain forces in the Persian Gulf that could intervene in Kuwait or Qatar within 36 hours time, if necessary.
26 Jul 58
Force C virtually completed its movement by air to Beirut. Its strength of 1632, added to the Force A strength of 1755, brought the total Army personnel in Lebanon to 3387. Force B remained in Germany, with one company on 12-hour alert and the remainder on 24-hour alert status. Forces D and E were en route to the objective area by sea, with estimated time of arrival 2-5 August.

(26) JWR Situation Report No. 14 (Middle East), 27 Jul 58, CCS 319.1 (7-16-58) sec 1.

27 Jul 58
The US Army Attache in Amman reported arrival at 1800Z of the first USAF C-119's airlifting supplies from Cyprus to the British forces in Jordan.

(26) Mag, USARMA Amman to DEPTAR, C 64, 281430Z Jul 58, DA IN 139785.

27 Jul 58
Since US forces in Beirut were finding it increasingly difficult to obtain suitable land and sufficient room for supply dumps and tactical troop deployment, CINCSFECOMME reported that further augmentation, in addition to Forces D and E already en route, would not be desirable.

(26) Mag, CINCSFECOMME to CNO, 6936, 272111Z Jul 58, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 4.

28 Jul 58
CINCSFECOMME informed the JCS that the British Commanders in Chief in the Middle East had requested him to arrange to continue the airlift from Cyprus to Amman beyond 1 August. CINCSFECOMME advised the JCS that he was reluctant to be committed to this airlift on a continuing basis.

(26) Mag, CINCSFECOMME to CNO, 6976, 280556Z Jul 58, CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec 7.

28 Jul 58
With regard to the Syrian border violations charged by the UAR (see item of 25 July 58), CINCSFECOMME received a report from his air commander that there had been no US air activity whatever on 18 July and that no US military aircraft had operated on 21 July in the area of the alleged violations.

(26) Mag, Beirut to SecState, 763, 28 Jul 58, DA IN 139904 (29 Jul 58).

28 Jul 58
At the first session of the Baghdad Pact meeting in London, Secretary Dulles cited the intervention in Lebanon as proof that the US was loyal to its friends and capable of quick decisive action. He assured the Pact members that in time of trouble the US would "act promptly, vigorously and even at great risk to itself to insure their independence and integrity." The US would not be dissuaded by Soviet attempts to play upon the world's fear of war.

(26) Mag, London to SecState, SECTO 15, 28 Jul 58, DA IN 139309 (29 Jul 58).
NOTE REGARDING THE LAST ENTRY FOR 28 Jul 58:

Despite the reference in message JCS 945598, 28 Jul 58, to HONEST JOHN launchers and missiles currently en route to Lebanon, these weapons were still in Germany and never left there. Only the HONEST JOHN battery’s personnel were en route, by sea. The following additional information is pertinent:

23 Jul 58 In a message to CINCUSAREUR, CINCSPECOMME requested

TO RD: Msg, CINCSPECOMME to CINCUSAREUR, 231956Z Jul 58, DA IN 136978, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 3.

26 Jul 58 The Chief of Staff, Army, advised CINCUSAREUR of the State Department request that HONEST JOHN launchers and missiles not be landed in Lebanon. Apparently by decision of CINCUSAREUR, the HONEST JOHN unit’s entire equipment was unloaded at Bremerhaven. The battery’s personnel had already departed, however, on board another ship.

TO RD: Msg, CINCSPECOMME to CINCUSAREUR, 271409Z Jul 58, DA IN 138563.

31 Jul 58 CINCSPECOMME concurred in a recommendation by CINCUSAREUR that the men of the HONEST JOHN battery, upon arrival at Beirut, be returned to Germany to rejoin their equipment, to be held in a 48-hour alert status.

TO RD: Msg, CINCSPECOMME to JCS, 312126Z Jul 58; (3) Mag, CINCUSAREUR to CINCSPECOMME, SX 5760, 30 Jul 58, DA IN 139776; CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 4.

3-4 Aug 58 Their ship having reached Beirut on 3 Aug, the men were flown back to their home station in Germany the following day.

TOP SECRET
28 Jul 58 In London, Secretary Dulles signed a declaration of collective security with the Prime Ministers of the UK, Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan— the members of the Baghdad Pact, less Iraq. The US was pledged to cooperate with these states for their security and defense, and to "promptly enter into agreements designed to give effect to this cooperation." A US official told reporters that this action by the US was equivalent to joining the Baghdad Pact.

NYT, 29 Jul 58, 1:5-6; text, 6:4-5.

28 Jul 58 In reply to President Eisenhower's letter of 25 July, Premier Khrushchev said the Soviet Government considered it essential and urgent to convene a conference of heads of government, including Premier Nehru of India, as previously proposed. By insisting on the procedures of a regular session of the Security Council, the US, he charged, was trying to stall off such a meeting of heads of government as could promptly take the decisions necessary to end the armed intervention in Lebanon and Jordan, and preserve and strengthen universal peace. Noting that Premier de Gaulle of France preferred a meeting in Europe, he said the Soviet Government, without objecting to New York, now favored de Gaulle's view, but any city desired by the US was acceptable.


28 Jul 58 The Joint Chiefs of Staff, with State and Defense concurrence, directed CINCSPECOMME not to land the battery of HONEST JOHN launchers and missiles currently en route to Lebanon. The weapons, however, might be maintained afloat, immediately available for use if directed by JCS. A State Department request for this action had been forwarded to JCS by the Deputy Secretary of Defense two days earlier.


29 Jul 58 Lebanese Premier Solh escaped unhurt when a bomb was detonated near his car while en route to his office. The explosion killed one member of the Premier's motorcycle escort and injured others.

(TS) Msg, USARMA, USAIRA, and ALUSNA Beirut to DEPTAR, CX 274, 291609Z Jul 58, DA IN 139207.

29 Jul 58 Undersecretary Murphy reported that as a result of the attempted assassination of Premier Solh a political crisis had developed in the Lebanese Government involving Gen Chehab. Solh, who had previously espoused an early presidential election and had been expected to support Chehab's candidacy, was now opposed to the election and vehemently condemned Chehab. He blamed Chehab for Lebanon's predicament, which he charged US inactivity conditioned, and proposed to have him and other General Staff officers summarily dismissed. Upon being informed, in response to his direct question, that US forces would not be used to support his government against the Lebanese
Army should there be violent reaction to the removal of Chehab and other officers, Solh stated that he himself would resign and leave the country. Mr Murphy commented that this latest development pointed up the present government's lack of effective power and the attendant possibility of a military coup d'etat to establish real authority. Therefore, the indicated safest course for the US was with Chehab and the military.

(8) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 819, 30 Jul 58.

29 Jul 58

The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed CINCSPECOMME to inform the British that the US could not assume responsibility for the air supply of British forces in Jordan on a continuing basis, because of insufficient available aircraft. If facilities were available, CINCSPECOMME was to continue the airlift temporarily, until 6 August. Meanwhile, he was to ascertain a firm date by which the British line of communications from Aqaba to Amman would be completed, and advise the JCS.

(98) Msg, JCS to CINCSPECOMME, JCS 945707, 292133Z Jul 58, CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec 7.

30 Jul 58

While in consultation with Adm Holloway and the US Ambassador in Beirut, Gen Chehab explicitly stated that he would not request withdrawal of US forces from Lebanon until rebel military activity had been reduced and contained.

(97) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 820, 30 Jul 58, DA IN 139637.

31 Jul 58

The UN Observer Group in Lebanon, in its second report, stated that no more than limited smuggling of arms into Lebanon—and that largely confined to small arms and ammunition—had occurred up to 15 July, and that no persons had been found who had "indubitably" infiltrated for the purpose of fighting. These conclusions were based on the results of air patrolling, both day and night, checked against the results of day ground patrolling, all-night watches, and occasional night patrols. Arrangements had been made with Opposition leaders on 15 July for unimpeded access to all the frontier under their control; but the arrival of US troops on that date had complicated the Group's task, and constituted one reason for the 15 July cut-off date for the report. However, the Group stated, no information had reached it since 15 July that would warrant a change in the general conclusions set forth in the report.

NYT, 1 Aug 58, 1:7-8; 2:3-6, 7.
31 Jul 58 The US Ambassador in Beirut learned from discussion with Chamoun and Chehab that neither of them desired expansion of the UN Observer Group in Lebanon. Chamoun wanted US forces to remain in Lebanon until stability was restored; he would consider increasing UN forces only if US troops were withdrawn prematurely. Chehab, on the other hand, openly opposed increasing the Observer Group and, indeed, expected to ask for its departure about the same time US troops were withdrawn.

   (6) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 867, 31 Jul 58, DA IN 140275, (1 Aug 58).

31 Jul 58 Gen Fuad Chehab was elected President of Lebanon by a vote of 48 to 7 (with 1 abstention) on the second ballot in the Lebanese Parliament. The only other candidate pledged his support to General Chehab after the election. Ten of the 56 members of the Parliament did not participate, including Premier Sami Solh, who had opposed the holding of the election so long as violence continued.

   NYT, 1 Aug 58, 1:8.

31 Jul 58 At a press conference Secretary Dulles informed newsmen that the US hoped there would be a greater measure of political stability in Lebanon at the time of US troop withdrawal than was the case when they arrived. However, he said, "whatever our views may be, we would not stay in Lebanon after we had been asked to withdraw by the duly constituted Government of Lebanon."


31 Jul 58 The US Ambassador in Lebanon reported that President-elect Chehab, under political pressure for an immediate public declaration calling on US forces to withdraw, asked if it might not be possible for the US to announce that the improved security situation in Lebanon would presently make it possible for US troops to leave. Chehab expressed the civil war rapidly to die out now that the election was over, and he felt that Syrian-Egyptian interference would not be resumed again for some while, since Nasser reportedly had been severely shaken by the swift and effective US intervention in Lebanon. At the same time Chehab expressed the hope that US would help Lebanon with financial and military assistance, referring specifically to a need for US funds for the purchase of certain French-manufactured arms that were essential to Lebanese T/O & E's.

   (6) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 869, 31 Jul 58.

31 Jul 58 The US Ambassador in Lebanon advised CNO that President-elect Chehab had stated how very pleased he was in his personal and official relationships with Admiral Holloway. Gen Chehab had said, "The Admiral showed an instant comprehension of our situation from the very moment we met on the airport road." The Ambassador had indicated to Chehab that he fully concurred.

   (6) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 875, 1 Aug 58.
1 Aug 58

Replying to Premier Khrushchev's letter of 28 July about a meeting of heads of government in regard to the Middle East situation, President Eisenhower stated that he was instructing the US Permanent Representative to the Security Council to seek a special meeting of that body on or about 12 August, at which heads of governments and foreign ministers might have direct discussions. The US would not insist on New York as the place, but ruled out Moscow. The US position, the President said, was that (1) the UN Security Council had the principal responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, and (2) through the Council, which represented them, the smaller nations participated in decisions inevitably affecting them. Khrushchev's proposal, on the other hand, was that five great powers should impose their decision on the rest of the world in a manner reminiscent of the system of political domination in Eastern Europe.


1 Aug 58

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, having noted the British desire for combined planning with US commanders in the Middle East, cabled the following tentative guidance to CINCNEIM REAR, CINCSPECOMME, and COMIDEASTFOR, to be applicable to all US-UK planning discussions: discussions relating to the Middle East, without commitment of US forces or facilities, could be carried on at all levels, exchange of information was authorized, and close liaison with the British was to be maintained by all commands, but the use of the term "combined planning" was to be avoided; no US forces or US actions in support of any US-UK plan could be committed by any commander without specific approval of the JCS.

(1) Msg, JCS to CINCNEIM REAR ECHelon, CINCSPECOMME, and COMIDEASTFOR, JCS 945925, 1 Aug 58, derived from (1) JCS 1887/485, 31 Jul 58. Both in CSS 381 (8-23-57) sec 7.

1 Aug 58

On the basis of investigation reports submitted to CINCSPECOMME, the US Ambassador in Beirut recommended that the US issue a denial of the UAR charge that US aircraft had violated the Syrian border. The US should concede, however, that its planes had intercepted UAR civil aircraft for identification purposes and should acknowledge that this sort of interception would continue as long as US forces remained in the area.

(2) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 889, 1 Aug 58, DA IN 140617 (2 Aug 58).

1 Aug 58

Task Group 74.1, proceeding from the Pacific to the Persian Gulf bearing the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines, reported to CINCSPECOMME for operational control at 2330Z.

(3) Msg, CTG 74.1 to CINCSPECOMME, 012323Z Aug 58, JMEPO Lebanon Msg File.
1 Aug 58

Army Sgt James R. Nettles was killed by rebel snipers on the outskirts of Beirut, the first ground force fatality resulting from hostile action since US forces entered Lebanon on 15 July.

NYT, 3 Aug 58, 1:5. (G) Msg, CINCSECOMME to CNO, 9168, 022126Z Aug 58.

2 Aug 58

Replying to Prime Minister Macmillan's letter of 27 July, Secretary Dulles agreed with the suggestion that combined US-UK military planning should be speeded and expanded, in anticipation of further trouble in the Middle East if the Soviet Union declined to attend the proposed special UN Security Council meeting. Secretary Dulles wrote that "possible areas of trouble which our military planners should examine urgently include the Persian Gulf, Libya, Sudan and also Jordan in view of the possibility that there may be an attempted coup in that unhappy country while your forces are still there." He proposed that the planning be undertaken by increased liaison between the British Chiefs of Staff and CINCSPECOMME Headquarters in London.


2 Aug 58

The Israeli Ambassador informed the State Department that Israel had received a Soviet note on 1 August strongly protesting the US-UK overflights permitted by Israel. The Soviet note accused Israel of associating with the Western powers in acts of aggression and charged Israel with responsibility for a resulting increase in Middle East tension, which might develop into armed conflict. The Ambassador said Israel did not regret granting the overflight permission, but Prime Minister Ben Gurion believed that by making the request the US and UK had incurred an inescapable moral obligation. The Prime Minister thought it urgently necessary for US policy regarding the independence and integrity of Israel to be made clearly known to the Soviets.

(2) Msg, SecState to Tel Aviv, 110, 2 Aug 58.

2 Aug 58

The US Ambassador in Tel Aviv transmitted an urgent message from Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion that demanded immediate cessation of US overflights of Israel. The British Ambassador in Tel Aviv had received a similar demand. The Israeli Foreign Office intimated that Ben Gurion's insistent action followed from his receipt of the stern Soviet note of 1 August and from concern that he had already exceeded the authority allowed him by the Cabinet in granting overflight permission. After consultation with his British colleague, the US Ambassador concluded that Ben Gurion had decided that the urgency of the supply needs of Jordan and the British forces there was not sufficient to justify the risk Israel was running in permitting overflights and that he did not feel able to resist strong Cabinet and potential public opposition to the matter.

(25) Msg, Tel Aviv to SecState, 137, 2 Aug 58, DA IN 140962 (3 Aug 58).

- 36 -
2 Aug 58 The US Government extended recognition to the Government of the Republic of Iraq, after noting Iraq's agreement to be bound by the UN Charter and Iraq's other international obligations.


2 Aug 58 King Hussein of Jordan announced, in Amman, the formal dissolution of the Arab Union.

NYT, 3 Aug 58, 1:6.

3 Aug 58 Ships bearing Force E (tank battalion) and a major part of Force D (service support) arrived at Beirut and began unloading. When completely debarked, the two Forces would add 72 tanks, 756 vehicles, and 5182 Army personnel to the US forces present in Lebanon.

(PT) JWR Situation Report No. 22 (Middle East), 4 Aug 58, CGS 319.1 (7-16-58) sec 2.

3 Aug 58 Premier Khrushchev of the Soviet Union and Mao Tse-tung, the leader of Communist China, issued a joint communiqué in Peiping, after four days of consultations there, (1) denouncing the "flagrant aggression" carried out by the US and Britain in Lebanon and Jordan, (2) maintaining that a conference of the heads of government of the big powers should be called at once to discuss the situation in the Middle East, and (3) demanding that the US and Britain immediately withdraw their forces from Lebanon and Jordan.

NYT, 4 Aug 58, 1:8, 3:2-5.

3 Aug 58 Undersecretary of State Robert Murphy completed talks begun the previous evening with the leaders of the new Government of Iraq. During these talks he had assured them that the US had no intention of invading Iraq, or otherwise interfering with Iraq's revolution. The Iraqi leaders had (1) assured Mr. Murphy that their revolt had had no inspiration or help from without; (2) spoken of cooperation, rather than an alliance, with the United Arab Republic; and (3) stated, without evidencing hostility toward the Baghdad Pact, that Iraq's adherence to that Pact was under active study.

NYT, 4 Aug 58, 1:7, 5:5-7.

3 Aug 58 Speaking in blunt terms to Israeli Ambassador Eban, Secretary Dulles said that he and the President were shocked by the appearance that, upon receiving the Soviet protest against US-UK overflights, Israel had immediately requested that the flights be stopped.

The US and UK had acted in the Middle East "to show Nasser and the Soviets there was a point beyond which they could not go," and the two Western nations understood they had Israel's support. The US could not successfully defend the independence of Israel and other countries in the area if "Israel felt so menaced by the USSR that it would instantly do whatever the Soviets want." Secretary Dulles recalled the assurance given under the American Doctrine that the US would instantly come to Israel's aid if attacked by a Communist state.

(TE) Mag, SecState to Tel Aviv, III, 3 Aug 58.
3 Aug 58
At the request of the State Department, CNO directed
that the task group bearing the 3rd Battalion, 3rd
Marines, return to Singapore and reconvert to CINCPACFLT
control, but he cautioned that it must be prepared to
reverse course again if the situation in the Persian
Gulf worsened.
(C) Mag, CNO to CINCSPECOMME and CINCPACFLT,
20840, 031815Z Aug 58, JMEPD Lebanon Mag File.

4 Aug 58
General Fuad Chehab, in his first statement to the
nation after becoming President-elect of Lebanon,
invoked unity as the basis for achieving the national
aims, "of which the foremost is the withdrawal of
foreign troops."
NYT, 5 Aug 58, 1:1.

4 Aug 58
The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the Joint Strategic
Survey Council to assess the situation that was likely
to exist in the Middle East after the immediate crisis
there had passed and to submit recommendations on
actions that could be taken to improve the position
of the US in the area.
(U) SM-522-58 to JSO, "Long-Range Actions in the
Middle East (U)," 4 Aug 58, CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec 7,
derived from (C) JCS 1887/482, 25 Jul 58, same file,
see 6.

5 Aug 58
In reply to President Eisenhower's letter of 1 August,
Premier Khrushchev expressed regret that the President
(and Prime Minister Macmillan) had made impossible a
meeting of the five heads of government proposed by
the Soviet Union. However, since the withdrawal of
foreign troops from Lebanon and Jordan was still
urgently necessary in the interests of peace and the
independence of those countries, the Soviet Government
was instructing its UN representative to request a
special session of the General Assembly. The Security
Council, he said, with its membership consisting
principally of countries belonging to NATO, the
Baghdad Pact, and SEATO, plus Chiang Kai-shek's China,
had already shown itself to be incapable of dealing
with the problem. He hoped the US would support the
Soviet request for a special session of the General
Assembly as a step toward relaxing tensions and pre-
paring the way for a meeting at the summit.
Dept of State Bulletin, vol XXXIX, No. 1001
(1 Sep 58), pp. 342-346.

5 Aug 58
Secretary Dulles received a letter from Prime Minister
Ben Gurion that authorized resumption of the US air-
lift over Israel to Jordan (see item of 3 August 58).
Ben Gurion avowed that the stoppage begun on 3 August
had been requested for reasons other than acquiescence
in the Soviet protest of 1 August. The Soviet note
would not be answered for several days, and Israel's
reply would be a firm but polite rejection of the
charge that by permitting overflights, Israel was
aiding US-UK "aggression."
(C) Mag, SecState to Tel Aviv, 119, 5 Aug 58.
5 Aug 58

The Israeli Ambassador in Washington conveyed his Government's permission for US aircraft to overfly Israel on consecutive nights beginning 5 August and ending at dawn on 10 August. US military aircraft would not be authorized to overfly Israel thereafter.

(25) Msg, JCS to CINCSPECOMME, JCS 946117,
5 Aug 58, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 4.

5 Aug 58

The Joint Chiefs of Staff formally directed CINCSPECOMME to begin planning for orderly but prompt withdrawal of US forces and material from Lebanon, in view of the probability that Chehab would ask for US troop withdrawal upon assuming the presidency. CINCSPECOMME had, in fact, already informed CNO that he had ordered the preparation of phased withdrawal plans immediately after Chehab's election. CINCSPECOMME had noted that Chehab could hardly do otherwise than set the withdrawal of US forces as an early objective of his administration, and he believed the early departure of some Marine forces would greatly assist Chehab in resisting internal political pressures.

In a related message sent later the same day, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed CINCSPECOMME that the Department of State considered it would be politically desirable to reduce the number of US forces in Lebanon. Accordingly, they directed him to submit recommendations concerning the reductions that could be made, consistent with his mission.

(26) Msg, JCS to CINCSPECOMME, JCS 946103,
051914Z Aug 58. (26) Msg, CINCNEIM REAR to CNO, 9678,
051101Z Aug 58. (26) Msg, JCS to CINCSPECOMME, JCS
946107, 051948Z Aug 58. All in CCS 381 Lebanon
(5-13-58) sec 4.

5 Aug 58

Because of the unstable situation in Jordan, the US
Ambassador in Amman was authorized to proceed with
Phase I evacuation of dependents. In view of the
imminent outbreak of disturbances, the departure was
to be arranged quietly so as not to precipitate a

(25) Msg, SecState to Amman, 420, 5 Aug 58.
(26) Msg, Amman to SecState, 415, 8 Aug 58. (27) Msg,
SecState to Amman, 471, 8 Aug 58.

5 Aug 58

The US Department of State agreed to a British pro-
posal to train Jordanian and Lebanese pilots in the
UK, instead of in their home country, to fly the
Hawker Hunter aircraft allocated to Jordan and Lebanon.
Delivery of the Hawker Hunters to Jordan and Lebanon
would thus be postponed until the training period of
about four months duration was completed.

(26) Msg, London to SecState, 737, 2 Aug 58.

5 Aug 58

CNO directed CINCLANTFLT to sail TRANSPHIBRON 8 from
the United States, with one Marine BLT plus a RLT
Headquarters and Hq Company embarked, to relieve one
TRANSPHIBRON and BLT in the Mediterranean.

(27) Msg, CNO to CINCLANTFLT, 20981, 052327Z
Aug 58, JMEF6 Lebanon Mag Fils.
6 Aug 58

The Government of Lebanon formally endorsed the status of forces agreement that had been negotiated by the US Embassy in Beirut. The agreement's terms were brief and extremely liberal, reserving all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction to the US military authorities, barring civil suits, and exempting the forces from all taxation, import duties, and mail and customs inspections.

(5) Mag, CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 1569, 101341Z Aug 58.

6 Aug 58

The US Ambassador in Amman conveyed the response to Jordan's request of 25 July for various forms of US assistance. The US decision on providing funds for two additional brigades for Jordan, as well as on a US-Jordanian mutual defense treaty and establishment of a MAAG in Jordan, would be deferred until after the UN Security Council meeting on the Middle East. With respect to the request for a new regional defense organization, the US disagreed with Jordan regarding the current effectiveness of the Baghdad Pact arrangement and considered Jordan's proposal both undesirable and unfeasible. Premier Rifai, stressing the need for an overt show of US support, indicated that preliminary coordination with the US Military Attache would be started in anticipation of a favorable decision on the postponed issues. The US Ambassador commented that he concurred in Rifai's assessment that the situation required tangible evidence of US interest if the pro-Western government of Jordan were to survive.

(5) Mag, SecState to Amman, 397, 2 Aug 58.


6 Aug 58

The US Ambassador in Amman reported that one battalion of approximately 900 British troops had disembarked from a UK carrier and cruiser at Aqaba on the night of 6 August. The battalion was being transported overland to Amman.

(5) Mag, Amman to SecState, 409, 7 Aug 58, DA IN 142579 (6 Aug 58).

7 Aug 58

The US Ambassador in Beirut requested discretionary authority for CINCSPECOMME to initiate withdrawal of one and possibly two Marine battalions. The Ambassador and Adm Holloway had discussed with Gen Chehab the advisability of a symbolic withdrawal of US forces, and Chehab had concurred that there would be political advantage in a token re-embarkation, providing the bulk of US forces remained intact in Lebanon until peace and security were assured. However, the Secretary of State, although conceding some psychological value in a reduction of US forces in the near future, declined to grant the discretionary authority at that time.

(5) Mag, Beirut to SecState, 993, 7 Aug 58.

(5) Mag, SecState to Beirut, 779, 9 Aug 58.
7 Aug 58 The Soviet press announced the completion of Soviet military and naval exercises in the Transcaucuses and Turkestan that had begun 18 July.

\[\text{(6) Mag, ALUSNA USARMA USAIRA Moscow to CNO, O446, 071010Z Aug 58.}\]

7 Aug 58 The UN Security Council unanimously adopted a US resolution calling for an emergency session of the General Assembly, beginning 8 August, to consider the Middle East situation.

\[\text{NYT, 8 Aug 58, 1:7.}\]

7 Aug 58 Forwarding four alternative evacuation plans, CINCSPECOMM recommended adoption of Plan A, which called for embarkation of one Marine battalion in amphibious shipping within three days after date of receipt of the JCS execution order. The Marine battalion would then serve as a floating reserve. CINCSPECOMM requested authorization to initiate the plan at a time he would recommend after his meeting with Chehab on 11 August. He proposed, moreover, that the JCS authorize stoppage of all further unloading of equipment and supplies at Beirut, except items essential to operations ashore.

\[\text{(25) Msg, CINCSPECOMM to CNO, 0724, 072216Z Aug 58, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 4.}\]

8 Aug 58 At the first meeting of the emergency session of the UN General Assembly, Secretary General Hammarskjold set forth a program for stabilizing the Middle East, with the following principal provisions: (1) a declaration by the Arab states reaffirming their adherence to the principles of mutual respect for each other's territory, nonaggression, and noninterference in each other's internal affairs; (2) the continuation and extension of existing UN activities in Lebanon and Jordan; (3) joint action by the Arab states, assisted by the UN, to further their economic development.

\[\text{NYT, 9 Aug 58, 1:1.}\]

8 Aug 58 The US State Department concurred in the British proposal to stagger training periods of Jordanian and Lebanese pilots sent to the UK for instruction in flying Hawker Hunter aircraft, a certain number of which were earmarked for delivery to Jordan and Lebanon as soon as the pilots qualified. The first group of Jordanian pilots would begin training 10 August; training of the last group of Jordanian and all the Lebanese pilots would be deferred until 1959.

\[\text{(6) Mag, London to SecState, 823, 7 Aug 58.}\]

\[\text{(5) Mag, SecState to London, 1602, 8 Aug 58.}\]

8 Aug 58 CNO advised CINCSPECOMM of the State Department's concern that a sudden deterioration of the internal security situation in Jordan might not permit evacuation of all US nationals by commercial means. Military airlift might be called for on short notice and ground forces might be required to convoy Americans from their area of residence to the Amman airport. CINCSPECOMM accordingly requested CINCUSAFE to establish contact
with COMSIXTHFLT and prepare for a possible air evacuation of US nationals from Amman.

(25) Msg, CINCPECOMME to CINCUSAFE and COMSIXTHFLT, 1348, 091755z Aug 58, JMEPG Lebanon Msg File.

9 Aug 58

Jordanian Premier Rifai, speaking for himself and King Hussein, informed the US Ambassador that they would reject outright any suggestion that Jordan be made a "ward of the UN" and they would not accept the stationing of any type of UN force or observer group in their country. Jordan's leaders had no confidence in the UN's ability to give protection against either aggression or subversion. All Jordan wanted was to be given sufficient arms to defend itself, whereupon the British forces could depart.


9 Aug 58

Jordanian Prime Minister Rifai revealed to the US Ambassador his plan for action in the event of a serious rebellion among the West Bank refugees. He intended to abandon the West Bank to Israel, set up defenses behind the Jordan River, and guard the capital city of Amman as the symbol of Hussein's rule. Thus the country would revert to the territorial boundaries of the earlier Trans-Jordan. In commenting to the State Department the Ambassador was skeptical that Rifai would actually abandon the West Bank, which included Jerusalem, but he believed Rifai's "last stand" concept faithfully reflected Jordan's desperate situation.


10 Aug 58

To Undersecretary Murphy, stopping over in the UK, Foreign Minister Lloyd emphasized that the US and UK must keep together on their action regarding Lebanon and Jordan. In particular Lloyd said it would be an "absolute disaster" if US forces left Lebanon before arrangements for Jordan's future had been settled, allowing a parallel British withdrawal. He believed the US and UK should give the appearance of willingness to stay in Jordan and Lebanon for a decade if need be, in order to induce Nasser and the Soviets to begin working toward a realistic current settlement. Hence he doubted the wisdom of public announcements that US forces would withdraw when requested by a legitimate Lebanese Government. Discussion revolved around the possibility of arranging some sort of neutral status or UN guardianship for Lebanon and Jordan, since the whole Western intervention would appear a fiasco if, a few weeks after withdrawal, Jordan and/or Lebanon joined the UAR.


If this could come about without precipitating a war or substantially benefiting Nasser's UAR.

11 Aug 58

At a morning meeting with Ambassador McClintock and Adm Holloway, President-elect Chehab gave his opinion that withdrawal of one Marine battalion from Lebanon would be helpful to the internal political situation and would be consistent with the improved security conditions in the country. He believed such a token withdrawal would make it easier for moderate opposition leaders to keep their followers under control and would highlight unfavourably any extreme action undertaken by Syrian and Egyptian agents. With regard to timing, he thought it important that the operation begin before the UN General Assembly resumed its sessions on 13 August. A voluntary withdrawal, made with the approval of the Lebanese Government and before Soviet delegates had had an opportunity to speak in New York, would avoid any appearance that the US had acted under a Soviet threat. President Chamoun concurred generally with these opinions. Chehab made certain suggestions regarding the proposed US communique announcing the withdrawal, and the Ambassador forwarded a draft text to Washington later in the day.

11 Aug 58

CINCSPCOMME proposed, subject to Washington approval, to begin withdrawal of the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines, from Beirut into amphibious shipping at 0500Z 13 August. He recommended that the communique announcing the withdrawal be released in Beirut and Washington 24 hours earlier. Full press and other publicity coverage of the operation was planned.

JCS approval was dispatched later the same day, and the State Department sent a parallel authorization to the US Ambassador in Beirut, together with the amended text of the communique to be issued.

11 Aug 58

The US Ambassador in Lebanon reported that Galo Plaza of the UN Observer Group had completely reversed his original attitude toward the landing of US forces in Lebanon. He now felt the US should not withdraw until the security situation had improved materially. The Ambassador also commented on the cordial cooperation that existed between Gen Bull, Adm Holloway, and other members of UN and US staffs.

11 Aug 58

The US Army Attache in London reported that the British had 2,914 troops and 388 RAF personnel stationed in Amman. The British War Office, for purposes of logistic and administrative planning, assumed the 16th Parachute Brigade (or a comparable unit) would remain in Jordan at least six months rather than the two months initially forecasted.
12 Aug 58  The US Ambassador in Amman reported that a pattern to the British course of action in Jordan was becoming apparent. Indications were that Britain hoped to regain the position of influence it held prior to the ouster of Glubb Pasha by convincing Hussein that British troops were indispensable to keep him in power and avoid civil war. To this end pressure was being applied to have Rifai replaced by a more tractable Prime Minister. The Ambassador warned that if Rifai were removed both Hussein and Jordan would be lost.

(6) Msg, Amman to SecState, 461, 12 Aug 58.

12 Aug 58  In private consultations with Soviet delegate Gromyko at the UN, Secretary Dulles pointed out that US forces could be quickly withdrawn from Lebanon if the work of the UN Observer Group was continued and neighboring Middle East states pledged themselves to let Lebanon alone. In Jordan, on the other hand, no clear-cut solution was foreseeable; a collapse of Hussein's regime might lead to an Israeli seizure of the West Bank, which could provoke Arab retaliation and create grave consequences for the US and USSR. Gromyko showed a constructive interest and suggested that the US and USSR might agree on a statement providing assurances of the political independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon and Jordan. He declared, however, that Jordan's internal affairs should be left to the Jordanians.


13 Aug 58  Re-embarkation of the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines, at Beirut began at 0500Z. The operation was completed, in a total loading time of 49 hours, at 150600Z August.

(7) Mag, CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 2475, 1317562 Aug 58.  
(8) Mag, CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 2978, 1507512 Aug 58.  
(9) Mag, CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 3198, 15200062 Aug 58.  
All in JMEPG Lebanon Mag File.

13 Aug 58  The UK requested the US to seek Israeli permission for overflight by US aircraft bearing 24 anti-tank guns to the British forces in Jordan, where the weapons were urgently needed for protection in case the Jordanian armored corps rebelled and attacked the British. Although reluctant to approach Israel in view of earlier US assurances that overflights would be completed on 10 August, the State Department recognized the danger of having the British wait for transportation of the weapons by sea.

(7) Mag, SecState to New York, TOSEC 3, 13 Aug 58.

13 Aug 58  In an address before the third emergency special session of the UN General Assembly, President Eisenhower presented a program for peace in the Middle East consisting of the following six elements: (1) UN efforts to assure the continued independence and integrity of Lebanon; (2) UN measures to preserve peace in Jordan; (3) UN steps to control the fomenting from without of civil strife; (4) creation of a standby UN Peace Force; (5) steps, under UN auspices, to establish an Arab development institution on a regional basis, to be governed by the Arab states themselves but capable of
attracting international capital, both public and private; (6) steps, on the initiative of the countries involved, to avoid a new arms-race spiral in the Middle East.

13 Aug 58  
Following President Eisenhower to the rostrum at the emergency session of the General Assembly, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko again denounced American and British intervention in Lebanon and Jordan, asserted that oil was the real reason for it, and urged the Assembly to support a Soviet resolution calling for the withdrawal of the US and British forces without delay.

Nyt, 14 Aug 58, 1:8.

14 Aug 58  
The US Ambassador in Beirut jointly with the Director USOM-ICA reported that a study of Lebanon's financial capabilities indicated insufficient cash resources to meet Lebanon's ordinary budget obligations through the second six months of 1958. Lebanon would not even be able to meet the September payrolls. The USOM Team therefore recommended that the US, in order to prevent a financial crisis, make a cash grant of $5 million to support the ordinary budget, and in addition release the 6 million Lebanese pounds of counterpart funds provided under Richards aid, which would be used for extraordinary budget expenditures in support of development projects.

Let Mus, Beirut to SecState, 1108, 14 Aug 58.

14 Aug 58  
During the UN General Assembly debate on the Middle East situation Jordan's representative said that UN measures designed to prevent aggression against Jordan or interference in her internal affairs "must not envisage by any means the dispatch of United Nations forces or United Nations observers to be stationed on Jordan territory or guard the Jordanian frontier." However, it was "imperative" that inciting propaganda, both in radio broadcasts and in the press, be stopped, and his Government would not object to a special UN agency to monitor such propaganda.

Nyt, 15 Aug 58, 1:1, 4:8.

15 Aug 58  
The US Ambassador in Beirut reported that Gen Chehab had commented on the beneficial political effect of the 13 August retraction of one Marine Battalion and was considering whether to suggest a further withdrawal before his inauguration as President on 24 September. He repeatedly expressed gratification over the original landing of US forces, remarking that their presence had saved the country from complete anarchy.

The General said he had been approached by the UN Observer Group concerning the establishment of a UN armed police force in Lebanon but had said he was opposed to the idea. Chehab stressed that the Lebanese people would have to find a solution themselves and could not depend on the perpetual stationing
of foreign forces in Lebanon, whether UN or US.

15 Aug 58

The Joint Chiefs of Staff released Force B (503rd Airborne Battle Group) from its alert status in Europe after having consulted CINSCPECOMME.

(3) Mag, JCS to CINSCPECOMME, JCS 946511, 13 Aug 58. (3) Mag, CINSCPECOMME to JCS, 2551, 1320162 Aug 58. (3) Mag, JCS to USCINCEUR, JCS 946617, 15 Aug 58. All in CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 4.

15 Aug 58

COMAMLANFOR requested Department of the Army authorization to contribute $3,500 worth of medical supplies and 800 blankets to a project for the relief of distress among the civilian population of Northern Lebanon. The Department of the Army granted this authorization the following day, with State Department concurrence.

(U) Mag, COMAMLANFOR to DEPTAR, 151600Z Aug 58, DA IN 736386 (16 Aug 58). (3) Mag, DA to COMAMLANFOR and CINCUSAREUR, DA 946690, 16 Aug 58. Both in JMEPG Lebanon Msg File.

15 Aug 58

The third report of the UN Observer Group in Lebanon followed the previous reports of the Group in failing to substantiate the Lebanese Government's charges of massive infiltration of personnel and materiel into Lebanon. The third report said that a few arms might have been brought into the country illegally, but that this practice had declined since the presidential election of 31 July. As of 10 August, the Group had 166 ground observers and 24 air-operations personnel; since 15 July it had been able, through "tact, patience and perseverance," to recover ground lost as a result of the US troop landings and bring the main possible infiltration routes under "direct observation." Though 24-hour air observation of the border had not yet been established, it would be upon receipt of a UN shipment of 8 planes and 6 helicopters.

NYT, 16 Aug 58, 5:1.

18 Aug 58

In a very plain-spoken consultation with UAR delegate Fawzi at the UN, Secretary Dulles repeatedly stressed that US and British forces could quickly withdraw from Lebanon and Jordan if the UAR gave firm assurances it intended to "lay off" those two countries, exercising its influence to calm rather than excite the unsettled conditions in the area.

(3) Mag, New York to SecState, DELGA 655, 18 Aug 58.

18 Aug 58

The representatives of Iraq, India, and Indonesia, speaking for the first time in the UN General Assembly's Middle East debate, called for the immediate withdrawal of US troops from Lebanon and British troops from Jordan. Meanwhile Nasser and Crown Prince Faisal of Saudi Arabia issued a joint communiqué condemning the presence of foreign troops on Arab soil.

NYT, 19 Aug 58, 13:1, 3.
19 Aug 58

Premier Rifai appealed urgently to the US Ambassador in Amman for an early indication of US intentions regarding King Hussein's proposals for a US-Jordanian mutual defense treaty, establishment of a MAAG in Jordan, and US financing of a 2-brigade expansion of the Jordanian Army. Rifai had determined that the British troops must depart not later than 1 October. If by that time substantial US support had not been pledged, he intended to resign, having concluded that the pro-Western policy of his administration had been a failure. The next Premier would, with little doubt, seek to reach an accommodation with the UAR and Jordan's other pro-Nasser neighbors.


20 Aug 58

The first shipment of US military material received by Iraq since the 14 July coup d'état arrived at Basra. A State Department spokesman said it did not constitute a resumption of military aid but the fulfillment of previous obligations.

NYT, 21 Aug 58, 1:4, 10:4.

21 Aug 58

The Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized CINCSPECOMME to airlift 24 106-mm. rifles and 1200 rounds of ammunition for these anti-tank weapons from Cyprus to Amman, in support of British forces in Jordan, upon receipt of confirmation that Israel had granted overflight rights.

(L) Msg, JCS to CINCSPECOMME and USAIRA Tel Aviv, JCS 946908, 21 Aug 58, CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec 8.

21 Aug 58

The UN General Assembly unanimously passed a resolution sponsored by the Arab states (1) recording renewed assurances by the members of the Arab League that they would observe their pact to respect each other's system of government and refrain from any action designed to change the system of a member state; (2) calling upon members of the UN to follow a policy of strict non-interference in each other's affairs and respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of each
other; (3) requesting the Secretary General to make such practical arrangements, in the light of the foregoing, as would facilitate the withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon and Jordan; (4) inviting the Secretary General to consult with the Arab countries of the Near East regarding an Arab development institution designed to further economic growth in these countries; and (5) requesting the Secretary General to report on the above as appropriate, the first report to be made not later than 30 September 1958.


23 Aug 58

The Secretary of State informed the US Ambassador in Beirut that the US was making available $5 million for the support of Lebanon's ordinary budget over the next two months.

(a) Msg, SecState to Beirut, 974, 23 Aug 58.
(b) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 1287, 26 Aug 58. (c) Msg, SecState to Beirut, 1017, 27 Aug 58.

23 Aug 58

The US Ambassador in Amman reported that the British were developing a plan to activate two additional Jordanian rifle brigades, so designed as to increase the internal security capability but not the offensive capability of Hussein's army. The British hoped the US would agree to assist financially in the project, whose annual cost was estimated at $5 million.

(b) Msg, Amman to SecState, 611, 23 Aug 58.

23 Aug 58

Gen Adams, COMAMLANFOR, reported that while on aerial reconnaissance an engine failure had forced his helicopter to crash land in shallow water, 50 feet from the beach near Beirut. He had escaped with only minor injuries and was back on duty.

(U) Msg, COMAMLANFOR to DEPTAR and CINCUSAREUR, 231615Z Aug 58, DA IN 740594, JMEPG Lebanon Msg File.

24 Aug 58

CINCSPECOMME reported his interview with Gen Chehab following the wounding of an American soldier. He had told Chehab that the road block where the incident had occurred must be liquidated and the houses in the vicinity cleaned out. This could be done by (1) the Lebanese Army, or (2) the Lebanese Army and US tanks, or (3) US forces alone. Chehab agreed that the Lebanese Army would carry out the operation that afternoon. Further, he readily assented to the stationing of US tanks along the American lines of communication wherever they had been subjected to sniper fire, and he agreed to disseminate widely an order of the day to the Lebanese Army explaining that the US forces were present for a friendly purpose but would react vigorously if their military security was jeopardized or their movements restricted in agreed areas of operation.

(247) Msg, CINCSPECOMME to CHQ, 241401Z Aug 58, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-56) sec 5.
25 Aug 58 UN Secretary General Hammarskjold left New York by air for the Middle East, to carry out consultations designed to lead to a withdrawal of US troops from Lebanon and British troops from Jordan, in accordance with the Arab resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 21 August.

NYT, 26 Aug 58, 5:3.

25 Aug 58 The US Ambassador in Lebanon reported that Gen Chehab had called a meeting of all rebel leaders with the limited objective of eliciting a declaration foreswearing acts of violence in order that Beirut and other towns might be opened up. Instead, the rebel leaders presented a manifesto containing political demands which the General felt would only provoke Christian Loyalists to further reprisals against the Moslem opposition. With respect to their insistence on immediate withdrawal of US forces, Chehab stated flatly that US forces would remain until violence had ceased and the security situation had returned to normal. He pointed out that the opposition itself, rather than create a vicious circle, must cooperate to restore order if they wished to see the Americans leave.

(45) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 1269, 24 Aug 58.

(47) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 1311, 27 Aug 58.

28 Aug 58 As instructed by the Secretary of State, the US Ambassador in Amman informed King Hussein and Premier Rifai that, in addition to other forms of assistance, the US would provide up to $10 million in budgetary support for each of the remaining two quarters of the fiscal year, making the total supplied during Jordanian FY 1959 approximately $42 million. While specific commitments for subsequent fiscal years could not be made because of US appropriation procedures, the past record of US assistance should give assurance of continuing help. In response the King and Rifai vowed to continue their fight to maintain the independence and integrity of Jordan and agreed to drop any further consideration of abdication and resignation. They also pledged to consult with US officials prior to taking any action on withdrawal of British troops.

(46) Msg, SecState to Amman, 666, 27 Aug 58.


29 Aug 58 UN Secretary General Hammarskjold and Premier Rifai of Jordan issued a joint communique stating that their three days of talks had "indicated a large area of agreement" regarding practical arrangements leading to withdrawal of British troops from Jordan. Informed sources were reported as saying that Hammarskjold had been given a Jordanian plan for the establishment of a UN "presence" in Jordan, the United Arab Republic, and Iraq before Jordan would request the British troops to leave.

NYT, 30 Aug 58, 1:7.
29 Aug 58  The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the following actions to be taken by CINCSPECOMME: (1) Reduce the number of aircraft in Composite Air Strike Force B, at Adana, Turkey, during the period 1-15 September 1958; (2) carry out personnel rotation in the CASF B and USAFE forces at Adana during the same period. 


30 Aug 58  The US Ambassador in Amman reported that King Hussein was pressing for an early decision on US assistance to the Jordanian Army and had stressed that provision for two additional modern-equipped brigades was a minimum requirement. King Hussein was also concerned over the "antiquated administration" of the Army and had asked for a US military survey and evaluation team to make recommendations for reorganization of his country's armed forces. 

(3) Msg, Amman to SecState, 700, 30 Aug 58.

5 Sep 58  The US Ambassador in Lebanon reported that President-elect Chehab believed it would strengthen his position in the internal political situation if the withdrawal of a second US Marine battalion occurred by 15 September. The Ambassador and Adm Holloway agreed with Chehab that announcement of a further US withdrawal would be particularly useful if it preceded UN Secretary General Hammarskjöld's scheduled visit to Beirut. Accordingly, the Ambassador requested authorization to inform Chehab and Chamoun officially of the US intent to retract one Marine battalion by 15 September, before they began discussions with Hammarskjöld on 10 September. 

(3) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 1434, 5 Sep 58.

5 Sep 58  Lebanese rebels closed down their four clandestine radio stations which had been broadcasting anti-Government propaganda. In a final broadcast, the "Voice of Arabism" announced the shut-down was being made in the national interest. 

NYT, 6 Sep 58, 1:6.

9 Sep 58  Secretary Dulles, at a press conference, said that while the situation in Lebanon appeared to be improving, it would be premature to announce any definitive plans for total withdrawal of US troops. 

NYT, 10 Sep 58, 8:8.

9 Sep 58  The Joint Chiefs of Staff, with State Department concurrence, approved CINCSPECOMME's recommendation that the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, be embarked in TRANSPHIBRON 4 beginning 15 September and sail for the United States about 19 September. They also approved for planning purposes the retraction of the last Marine unit, the 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines, on 30 September, to serve as afloat reserve, and the departure of the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines, for the United States about 1 October. It was assumed that the 2nd Battalion, 8th Marines, would return to the United States in
company with either the 19 September or the 1 October sailing, depending on the availability of shipping.

\[\text{(25)}\text{ Mag, JCS to CINCSPECOMME, JCS 947739, 091754Z Sep 58. (26) Mag, CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 0634, 0607452 Sep 58; (26) Mag, CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 0633, 0607512 Sep 58. All in JMEFG Lebanon Mag File.}\]

10 Sep 58

CINCSPECOMME ordered the embarkation in TRANSPHIBRON 4 of the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, beginning 15 September, and the 2nd Battalion, 8th Marines, beginning about 17 September, with the whole force to sail for the United States when ready. Also, having received the approved text from JCS, CINCSPECOMME released a statement announcing the intended withdrawal of the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines.

\[\text{(27) Mag, CINCSPECOMME to COMAMNAVFOR and COMAMLANFOR, 1833, 100646Z Sep 58, JMEFG Lebanon Mag File. NYT, 11 Sep 58, 1:8. (27) Mag, JCS to CINCSPECOMME, JCS 947739, 10 Sep 58, reproduced in (27) JCS 1887/500, "Withdrawal of Marine Battalion From Lebanon (U)," 10 Sep 58, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 5.}\]

10 Sep 58

The US Ambassador in Baghdad was instructed to inform the Iraqi Prime Minister that, in the absence of any firm training activity or apparent Iraqi interest to date in resuming such activity, the US was withdrawing its training personnel. The Ambassador was to say, if asked, that the training mission could be reconstituted if the Iraqi Government was prepared to affirm and implement its responsibilities under outstanding US-Iraqi agreements. He was also to say that clarification of the Iraqi Government's attitude concerning existing bilateral agreements and future US-Iraqi military relations was desired before the US took a decision on resuming the shipment of major items (including F-86 aircraft) of programmed military aid to Iraq.

\[\text{(27) Mag, SecState to Baghdad, 960, 10 Sep 58, DA IN 152479, reproduced in (27) JCS 1887/501, "F-86 Training Activity in Iraq (U)," 10 Sep 58, CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec 9.}\]

12 Sep 58

The Joint Chiefs of Staff received informally a State Department opinion that, if conditions remained generally stabilized in Lebanon, it might be possible to withdraw the remaining US forces by the end of October. Until the British left Jordan, however, it might be necessary to maintain a "political presence" in Lebanon, through a token force. The State Department understood that UN Secretary General Hammarskjold (who was en route to New York following completion of his Middle East tour) did not intend to make any recommendation concerning withdrawal of US and British forces when reporting to the General Assembly. By stern talk Hammarskjold had extracted a number of pledges from Nasser, but since the Secretary General had reservations about Nasser fulfilling his promises, he reportedly did not regard the arrangements he had made as providing a firm basis for withdrawal of Western forces.
16 Sep 58

Lebanese Foreign Minister Malik was elected President of the UN General Assembly by a 45-31-4 vote, despite the fact that his opponent, Sudan’s Foreign Minister Mahgoub, had the support of the other Arab states and the Soviet bloc.

NYT, 17 Sep 58, 1:8.

16 Sep 58

The Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized CINCSPECOMME to begin outloading and departure of Army service units from Lebanon as shipping became available. CINCSPECOMME accordingly directed that the operation begin on 22 September.

(JCS) Msg, JCS to CINCSPECOMME, JCS 948066, 152202Z Sep 58, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 5. (JCS) Msg, Amman to SecState, 812, 9 Sep 58.

17 Sep 58

The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed CINCSPECOMME to submit an outline plan for withdrawal of all US forces, equipment, and basic supplies from Lebanon by 15 October 1958, assuming no requirement for support of British forces in Jordan during the period.

(JCS) Msg, JCS to CINCSPECOMME, JCS 948177, 17 Sep 58, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 5.

18 Sep 58

Answering a query from the Secretary of State regarding the minimum time required to accomplish the complete withdrawal of US forces from Lebanon, the Director, Joint Staff, stated that this operation could be completed between 15 and 20 October. He pointed out that this estimate was predicated on the immediate issuance of directives to ready the sea transportation, and that any delay in issuing these directives would correspondingly delay the withdrawal.

(JCS) Memo, Dir JS to SecState, "Withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Lebanon (47)," 18 Sep 58, reproduced in (JCS) JCS 1887/502, same subj, 19 Sep 58, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 5.

19 Sep 58

The US Ambassador in Amman conveyed to King Hussein the US decision to respond to his request for a survey team, which would both investigate the current military requirements of Jordan and develop recommendations looking toward improvement of the organization and administration of the Jordanian Army.

(JCS) Msg, SecState to Amman, 846, 18 Sep 58. (JCS) Msg, Amman to SecState, 925, 19 Sep 58.

19 Sep 58

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the concept and outline plan for withdrawal of US forces from Lebanon submitted by CINCSPECOMME. All troops, equipment, and basic supplies were to be returned by sea or air to their home station by 15 October. The plan called for the operation to commence on 22 September, and, following a phased retraction of Army, Marine, Navy, and Air Force elements, to be completed by the deactivation of COMAMNAVFOR, COMAMLANFOR, and COMAMAIRFOR on 15 October.
Execution of the plan would be directed by JCS. The plan assumed there would be no requirement for support of British forces in Jordan during the period.

(26) Msg, JCS to CINCSECOMME, JCS 948303, 19 Sep 58. (26) Msg, CINCNEIW REAR to CNO, 4666, 181746Z Sep 58. Both in JMEPG Lebanon Mag File.

20 Sep 58

The State Department concluded that the target date of 15 October for completion of the US withdrawal from Lebanon was too early and that the end of October was a more realistic planning goal. The principal complication was the need to coordinate the US move with the British departure from Jordan, a matter which was under continuing discussion with the British Government. The Department of Defense had been informed of the change. Routine outloading of heavy equipment from Lebanon would continue, as would the assembly of shipping, in anticipation of a firm decision on the date of full withdrawal.

(26) Msg, SecState to Beirut, 1307, 20 Sep 58.

(26) Msg, CNO to CINCSECOMME, 24346, 222123Z Sep 58, JMEPG Lebanon Mag File.

20 Sep 58

In an unannounced early-morning move arranged by Ambassador McElroy, a US Army helicopter lifted Lebanese Premier Soli from his residence to the Beirut airport, from which a USAF plane transported him to Adana. The Turkish Government then assumed responsibility for his movements.

(26) Msg, CINCSECOMME to CNO, 241251Z Sep 58, DA IN 156184.

21 Sep 58

In the wake of a series of kidnappings and threats of violence by opposing Lebanese political forces, an around-the-clock curfew was placed in effect in Beirut at 1800Z.

NYT, 22 Sep 58, 10:1.

23 Sep 58

Gen Chehab took office as President of Lebanon. Retiring President Chamoun left for a short vacation in the mountains but said he would return soon "to serve Lebanon as a simple citizen." Chehab, in an inaugural speech, said he would work for the withdrawal of US forces.

NYT, 24 Sep 58, 1:4.

24 Sep 58

An outbreak of Christian-Moslem strife appeared imminent in Lebanon. The Christian Phalangist Party had taken the initiative by calling a general strike and launching terrorist activity against the Moslems. US military forces, while continuing withdrawal of equipment and personnel according to schedule, had taken appropriate defense measures and made a show of force. CINCSECOMME reported sending a warning to the Christian insurgents that US artillery would destroy the Phalange headquarters if any sabotage or interference with American movements emanated from their quarter. To preclude any appearance that the US command was taking sides in the civil dispute, a similar warning had been issued to Moslem elements in...
the Basta district. CINCSPECOMME also reported that the Lebanese Army was acting vigorously and had issued an order that any unauthorized person carrying weapons in public would be shot on sight.


24 Sep 58

In Beirut the Cabinet to serve under President Chehab was announced. Rashid Karami, former Tripoli rebel leader, was Prime Minister as well as Minister of Interior and Defense. The Cabinet consisted of four Christians, three Moslems, and one Druze, and did not include any military members.

(27) Msg, USARMA Beirut to ACSI, CX 331, 251206Z Sep 58, DA IN 156527.

24 Sep 58

UN Secretary General Hammarskjold, at British request, obtained Nasser's permission for British troops to use Syria as part of their route of their planned withdrawal from Jordan.

(28) Msg, New York to SecState, 38, 24 Sep 58.

25 Sep 58

The US Ambassador in Beirut reported that despite the renewed civil disturbances in Lebanon, President Chehab had stated explicitly that the US should adhere to its phased plan of withdrawal, which would see the departure of the last US forces before the end of October.

(29) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 1703, 25 Sep 58.

25 Sep 58

Referring to the JCS memorandum of 24 July 1958 to the Secretary of Defense concerning a political advisor for CINCSPECOMME, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) informed the JCS that the Department of State considered the assignment of a political advisor to CINCSPECOMME's staff to be unnecessary "in view of the fortuitous developments in Lebanon and the emergency session of the United Nations General Assembly."

(30) N/H of JCS 1887/480, 30 Sep 58, CGS 381 (8-23-57) sec 6.

26 Sep 58

The Joint Chiefs of Staff notified CINCNEIM that they approved the draft US-UK Planning Group paper titled "Coordination of U.S./U.K. Plans for the Persian Gulf," subject to certain modifications contained in their message.

(31) Msg, JCS to CINCNEIM, JCS 948629, 26 Sep 58, derived from (32) JCS 1887/499, 3 Sep 58. Both in CGS 381 (8-23-57) sec 9.

26 Sep 58

CINCSPECOMME recommended that he be authorized to complete the re-embarkation of the 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines, by 30 September. When this was accomplished, he believed it would be feasible for the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines, already afloat, to depart for the United States. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, with State Department concurrence, approved these dispositions following day.
26 Sep 58

In a summary statement of the results of the US operation, CINCSPECOMME noted that the situation in Lebanon had been changed in the direction the US intended. "Lebanese have had an orderly and practically unanimous election of a President, the new President has been inaugurated and a government of high calibre, which seems determined to govern and to unify and pacify the country, has taken charge, and importantly, Lebanon is subject to no outside pressure or jeopardy. We have demonstrated our ability to quickly deploy in great strength in the Middle East in case of danger to American lives and property and for other political objectives dictated by our country. I believe all of these are worthy accomplishments and will justify us in the eyes of the world and history."

30 Sep 58

The US Ambassador in Beirut reported that the head of the Phalange Party had requested him to use his good offices in negotiating a political solution that would end the Phalange-called Christian general strike. The Ambassador thereupon asked various Lebanese political leaders to a meeting at his house, where he proposed a formula to resolve the deadlock. The formula provided for a vote of confidence for Premier Karami's Cabinet, an expansion of the Cabinet to allow three or four positions for pro-Chamoun loyalists or other Christian elements who felt they were without representation in the Government, and agreement to a subsequent increase in the membership of Parliament from 66 to 88.

30 Sep 58

USARMA in Baghdad reported the announcement of major changes in the Iraqi Cabinet, marked by the departure of several pro-Nasser officials. In addition, Col Abdul Salam Arif, recently deposed Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior, had been appointed Ambassador to West Germany. The Cabinet replacements appeared to be generally conservative, nationalist, and neutralist in outlook.

30 Sep 58

TRANSPHIBRON 8, with Headquarters, 6th Marines, and the 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines, embarked, arrived in the Beirut area from the United States.

(7) Msg, JCS to CINCSPECOMME, JCS 948733, 271607Z Sep 58. Both in JMEPG Lebanon Msg File.
1 Oct 58
The 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines, departed Beirut for the United States in TRANSPHIBRON 6, while TRANSPHIBRON 2, bearing the 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines, sailed for Naples. No Marine units remained ashore in Lebanon, but approximately 7500 Army personnel held positions in the Beirut area.

NYT, 2 Oct 58, 1:7, 11:3.

1 Oct 58
The UN Observer Group in Lebanon reported that it had detected no cases of infiltration across the Lebanese border in the last five weeks. Though some areas of Lebanon were still held by armed forces in opposition to the Government at Beirut, the report said, and though there was some tribal feuding, conditions within the country and along its borders were generally peaceful.

NYT, 2 Oct 58, 20:1, 11:3.

1 Oct 58
Sir Pieron Dixon, head of the British UN delegation, circulated a memorandum at UN headquarters stating that the British Government, in consultation with Jordan, had agreed to begin the withdrawal of its troops from Jordan on 20 October. In a speech opening the Jordanian Parliament, King Hussein made a parallel statement.

NYT, 2 Oct 58, 11:4-5, 7-8.

2 Oct 58
Former President Chamoun of Lebanon in effect rejected the three points suggested by US Ambassador Mcclintock as a basis for resolving the Lebanese deadlock, after a visit by the Ambassador. Former Premier Saeb Salaam, the leader of the rebels in Beirut while Chamoun was President, also rejected the three points, declaring that the US Ambassador should have no part in Lebanon's internal affairs (see item of 30 September).

NYT, 3 Oct 58, 8:3.

2 Oct 58
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, addressing the UN General Assembly, attacked Secretary General Hammarskjold's report of 30 September as containing "artificial optimism" and being incorrect, unobjective, and one-sided. He charged that the US and Britain were flouting the will of the Assembly, as expressed in the resolution of 21 August, in not withdrawing their troops from Lebanon and Jordan immediately. He was answered the following day by the Jordanian delegate, who maintained that Hammarskjold had correctly interpreted the resolution, which Jordan had helped draw up.

NYT, 3 Oct 58, 1:4, 11:4; 4 Oct 58, 1:5.

5 Oct 58
According to the New York Times, Premier Kassem of Iraq broke up a plot against him by officers in the regiment of Col. Abdel Salam Arif, whom Premier Kassem had recently deposed as Deputy Premier. Kassem had reportedly placed Col. Arif under house arrest, transferred the officers of the regiment to distant points or placed them under surveillance, and moved the regiment, after disarming it, about 50 miles north of Baghdad. The attempted coup d'etat was presumably an expression of pro-Nasser sentiment.

The US Ambassador in Beirut reported on the Lebanese reaction to the wording of the communique on withdrawal of US forces. The phrase, having been seized upon by the Egyptian government, was intended to stay in place indefinitely. The US overtures to prevailing to prevail was able to reassure the Prime Minister, following the meeting with Karaml, of the US commitment to stay in the area. The text was particularly up to speed with the Army's wishes. The Ambassador also made it clear that the text of the letter would be published, but the fact that it was signed by the Prime Minister in any case, and no matter what circumstance, was commented on in the Ambassador's cable. The US Ambassador also commented that the US troops would be totally withdrawn from the area, and that the US would not hold any talks with the Lebanese government on the future of the troops. The US overtures to prevailing were able to reassure the Prime Minister, following the meeting with Karaml, of the US commitment to stay in the area indefinitely. The US overtures to prevailing were able to reassure the Prime Minister, following the meeting with Karaml, of the US commitment to stay in the area indefinitely.
Christian rather than a Moslem would help mitigate any propaganda repercussions.


13 Oct 58

In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that the draft version of NSC 5820, "U.S. Policy Toward the Near East," was acceptable from a military point of view, provided their comments and recommendations for modifications were accepted. Subject to this provision, they recommended that the Secretary concur in the adoption of NSC 5820 to supersede NSC 5801/1 as US policy toward the Near East. One objection to NSC 5820 raised by the JCS was with regard to US policy toward Iraq. While agreeing that the US should seek to maintain friendly relations with the new Iraqi regime, the JCS recommended deletion of "continue to offer United States technical assistance . . . ." Rather than asking Iraq to accept US technical assistance as a continuation of programs repudiated by the new regime, or offering assistance before Iraq asked for it, the US should consider any Iraqi requests for new programs or the reinstatement of old ones on the same basis as requests from other Near Eastern countries. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also disagreed with the policy proposed in NSC 5820 regarding the leaders of pan-Arab nationalism, especially Nasser (that the US should seek to work with these leaders as much as possible while seeking to exert constructive influence on them). The JCS view was that the US should disassociate "legitimate Arab nationalism" from Nasser's leadership and deal with Nasser only in his role as political head of the UAR.


14 Oct 58

The US Ambassador in London was informed that the British expected to withdraw the main body of their forces from Jordan by air in a period of about five days time, beginning 25 October, by flying them non-stop from Amman to Cyprus, over Syria and Lebanon. With the assistance of the UN Secretary General the
UK had gained UAR permission to overfly Syria and UAR agreement to the stationing of UN officials in Amman, Damascus, and Beirut to control ground-to-air communications with the British aircraft.

14 Oct 58

The US Ambassador in Jordan reported the arrival of the US military survey team, headed by Brig Gen Richard A. Risden, USA. He also reported that evacuation of British forces was proceeding according to schedule and that King Hussein planned to leave on a European vacation the first week of November.

15 Oct 58

The formation of a new, four-man Lebanese Cabinet was announced. The Cabinet, formed after it became clear that Premier Karami could not obtain the required vote of confidence for the one he had originally organized, seemed acceptable to all factions, and its formation appeared to have saved the country from the renewed threat of civil war. The new Cabinet consisted of: Rashid Karami, a Sunni Moslem, as Premier, and also holding the four ministerial posts of Finance, National Economy, Defense, and Information; Hussein Oueini, a Sunni Moslem, as Foreign Minister, Minister of Justice, and Minister of Planning (economic development); Raymond Edde, a Maronite Roman Catholic, as Minister of the Interior, Social Affairs, and Communications; and Pierre Gemayel, a Maronite Roman Catholic and Phalangist leader, as Minister of Public Works, Education, Agriculture, and Health.

Two days later the Lebanese Parliament gave Premier Karami's new Cabinet a unanimous vote of confidence.

17 Oct 58

The US Ambassador in Beirut reported that Lebanon still desired aircraft as well as other military assistance. He recommended that if possible the US go ahead with all or part of the program to provide Hawker Hunter planes and find other funds for military assistance for the ground forces.

18 Oct 58

CINCSECOMME requested the Navy Department to consider bestowing suitable awards on two component commanders in recognition of outstanding performance of duty in connection with BLUE BAT. He recommended Maj Gen Adams, COMAMLANFOR, for the Navy's Distinguished Service Medal and Major Gen Viccellio, COMAMAIRFOR, for the Legion of Merit.
18 Oct 58  The UK Ministry of Defense announced that all British troops in Jordan would be withdrawn from that country by about 11 November. At the UN, it was announced that the UN Observer Group in Lebanon would assist in the British evacuation.


19 Oct 58  The last major US military unit in Lebanon, the 187th Airborne Battle Group, began leaving by air from Beirut Airport. At the same time, US Embassy wives and children, who had left Lebanon months earlier, began returning.

NYT, 20 Oct 58, 5:3.

20 Oct 58  After extensive observation of Lebanon's defense establishment, the US Ambassador in Beirut, with the concurrence of Adm Holloway and Gen Adams, had concluded that a complete reorganization of the Lebanese armed forces was indicated. Military capability could be greatly improved if men and materiel already on hand were utilized efficiently. He therefore proposed that the US, by suggesting that future investment in the Lebanese armed forces as currently organized would not be worthwhile, try to elicit a request from President Chehab for a US training mission to undertake a reorganization study. The Ambassador recommended that the US approve such a request, should one be made.

(8) Msg, Beirut to SecState, 2019, 20 Oct 58, OCJCS Files.

23 Oct 58  CINCSPECOMME moved his headquarters to London, effective 1200Z. The final withdrawal movement from Lebanon continued, the status of Army personnel being as follows:

Departed by airlift 2263
Departed by sealift 2506
Total ashore Beirut 2012


23 Oct 58  After reviewing pertinent actions of the JCS and higher authority related to the implementation of Operation BLUE BAT, J-3 recommended that the JCS direct an appropriate agency of the Joint Staff to investigate the feasibility of, and if appropriate develop, a uniform system of progressive alert procedures for all commands established by the Secretary of Defense and such other commands as might be involved in the implementation of war plans. This uniform alert system was to be designed to (1) assist the JCS in expeditiously determining and directing the degree of alert to be attained, and (2) prevent misinterpretation of alert and security directives.

24 Oct 58

The airlift of British paratroops from Jordan to Cyprus, over Syria, began.


25 Oct 58

CINCSPECOMME dispatched his final BLUE BAT SITREP, reporting the operation completed, with all forces having departed Beirut and reverted to normal operational control.

(6) Msg, CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 5358, 251221Z Oct 58.

28 Oct 58

The US Ambassador in Beirut was informed that both the State and Defense Departments did not favor US involvement in the program he had suggested for reorganization and re-equipment of the Lebanese armed forces (see item of 20 October 58). Instead, only routine continuation of the Military Assistance Program and possibly visits and training programs for Lebanese officers were contemplated.

(6) Msg, SecState to Beirut, 1696, 28 Oct 58.

28 Oct 58

The presence of these forces, it was noted, had slowed the trend in both countries toward seizure of control by local forces sympathetic to the UAR. It had not, however, changed basic trends in the area, which would continue in the direction of neutralism and accommodation with Pan-Arab nationalism. The most significant immediate consequence of the US-UK withdrawal would be the increased danger to the shaky regime of King Hussein, who, if he continued his present government and policies, might well be overthrown within a few months. This also raised the possibility of Israeli and UAR intervention in Jordan. The withdrawal of US forces from Lebanon was not likely to produce any marked or sudden change in that country.

(57)

28 Oct 58, J-2 files.

30 Oct 58

The Secretary of State, noting the timing of King Hussein's vacation and the fact that no member of the royal family would be left in Jordan during the critical period following the departure of British forces, queried the US Ambassador in Amman on the possibility that Hussein might be planning not to return. The Ambassador's opinion was that the King definitely intended to return after approximately one month, and that he was obliged to go to Europe both for reasons of health and in connection with his contemplated betrothal.

(6) Msg, SecState to Amman, 1104, 30 Oct 58.
(6) Msg, Amman to SecState, 1234, 31 Oct 58.

30 Oct 58

The National Security Council amended and adopted the draft statement of policy in NSC 5820, "U.S. Policy Toward the Near East," as revised by the NSC Planning Board. The final version, NSC 5820/1, was

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approved by the President on 4 November. Some of the changes proposed by the JCS (see item of 13 October 58) had been incorporated in NSC 5820/1, although their recommendation concerning policy toward Iraq was not fully adopted.

The primary objectives of NSC 5820/1 were (1) denial of the Near East area to Soviet domination, and (2) continued availability of sufficient Near Eastern oil to meet vital Western European requirements on reasonable terms. Secondary objectives included (1) political evolution and economic and social development in the area to promote stable governments, popularly supported and resistant to Communist influence and subversion, and (2) the expansion of US and, where appropriate, Free World influence in the area, and the countering and reduction of Communist influence.

To achieve these ends, the US should, among other things: (1) endeavor to establish an effective working relationship with Arab nationalism, seeking at the same time to influence, stabilize, and contain the movement, and recognizing that a policy of US accommodation to radical pan-Arab nationalism as symbolized by Nasser would include many elements contrary to US interests; (2) accept neutralist policies of Near Eastern states when necessary; (3) support the idea of Arab unity; (4) promote national and regional economic development; and (5) support leadership groups that offered the best prospect of progress toward US objectives in this area.

With regard to Lebanon, the US should support the continued independence and integrity of that country, without becoming too closely identified with individual factions in Lebanese politics, and should seek discreetly to disengage from relationships that might be disadvantageous to US interests.

With regard to Jordan, the US should, among other things, seek to bring about the "peaceful evolution of Jordan's political status," to reduce the US commitment to Jordan, and to transfer to Jordan's Arab neighbors responsibility for economic support of Jordan if possible.

With regard to Iraq, the US should: (1) seek to maintain friendly relations with the new government on a reciprocal basis, including a willingness to continue US technical assistance; (2) acquiesce in but not actively encourage Iraqi withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact; (3) on request, indicate US willingness to give sympathetic consideration to the continuance of limited military assistance if the Iraqis were prepared to cooperate in making its continuation fruitful; and (4) encourage pro-Western elements within Iraq, but avoid becoming identified with specific individuals and political issues.

30 Oct 58 The head of the UN Observer Group in Lebanon, Galo Plaza, announced that he considered the work of the Group to have been completed, and that he hoped to arrange for the Group's withdrawal as soon as possible. His statement followed a declaration on 29 October by Premier Karami that the need for the Observer Group had ended and that he expected to ask the Group to leave soon.