CHRONOLOGY OF JCS INVOLVEMENT IN NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENSE
1946-1975

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The JCS Historical Division prepared this chronology in response to a request by the Plans and Policy Directorate, J-5. As specified in the request, the chronology covers the years 1946 through 1975. For the period 1946-1958, the terms of reference called for inclusion of the JCS and higher level US decisions and agreements with Canada leading to the formal conclusion of the NORAD agreement in 1958, as well as the milestones in the development of US continental defense and the resolution of interservice disputes on this matter. Coverage is less extensive in the period after the formal establishment of NORAD, since the requester wished only the following topics to be treated after 1958: developments, changes, revisions, and additions to NORAD, but not the NORAD relation to CONAD; renewals of the NORAD agreement; and possible NORAD assumption of an aerospace defense mission.

Note on Classification

Owing to the nature of some of the sources used, the overall classification of this work is SECRET. The information presented in many of the individual items is unclassified, however, and with proper care it may be extracted for use without classification.
INTRODUCTION

Canada and the United States gained valuable experience in defense collaboration during the years of World War II. The threat to the security of the northeastern United States and Canada caused the United States on the eve of entry into World War II to take a number of steps to facilitate Western Hemisphere defense. Among them were the establishment, in agreement with Canada, of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada-United States, on 17 August 1940 and the conclusion of the destroyer-leased bases negotiations with the British in September 1940, which gave the United States among other things a 99-year lease on bases in Newfoundland.

In 1941 the United States put forces in Labrador, a dependency of Newfoundland, which was a British crown colony at the time. This also involved relations with Canada, since in late 1940 Newfoundland had leased land to Canada near Goose Bay in Labrador for 99 years. The lease contained a stipulation that the base Canada planned to build would be made available for use by US aircraft for the duration of World War II and for as long afterward as the governments agreed was necessary. The United States established base areas in Newfoundland—one near St. John's (Fort Pepperrell), another at Argentina (Port McAndrew), and a third at Stephenville (Ernest Harmon AFB). A US Naval Operating Base was also established at Argentina. In April 1941 a US agreement with Denmark provided for US defense of the Danish possession, Greenland, and gave the United States rights to build bases there.

From these beginnings Canada and the United States continued their military collaboration throughout World War II.


With the end of hostilities in September 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff began to consider the postwar defense needs of the Western Hemisphere, and it was immediately clear in the light of new weapons and the probable threat from the USSR that the United States should collaborate with Canada in planning defensive measures. Acting in response to a JCS request of 19 October 1945 (JCS 1541), the Secretaries of War and the Navy instructed the US Army and Navy members of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense to initiate conversations leading to the revision of the Joint Canadian-US Basic Defense Plan (ABC-22), which had been in effect during World War II. The revision would provide a continuing basis for joint action of Canadian and US military forces to ensure the security of Alaska, Canada, Labrador, Newfoundland, and the northern portion of the United States. Danger areas in the northern half of the Western Hemisphere, in the JCS view, included the Arctic air approaches as well as the Atlantic and Pacific sea and air approaches to the North American continent. The US proposal that revision of ABC-22 be undertaken was put forward at the
meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense held in New York City on 7-8 November 1945.

(Decl) Dec On JCS 1541, 20 Oct 45; (Decl) JCS 1541/1, 20 Nov 45; CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 1.
16-17 Jan 46 At the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada-US (PJBD) meeting on 16-17 Jan 46 it was stated that the Canadian Government had approved the US proposal to revise the Joint Canadian-US Basic Defense Plan (ABC-22) and had designated a committee to work with one to be set up by the United States.

(TS) JCS 1541/2, 1 Mar 46, CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 2.

28 Feb 46 The Secretaries of War and the Navy informed the JCS that they had approved in principle the recommendations of the PJBD for proceeding with the revision of ABC-22. They desired to establish a US committee for this purpose comprised of the US Service members of the PJBD (in a capacity distinct from their membership on the PJBD), representatives of the JCS, and a liaison representative of the Secretary of State. The US committee was to be headed by the senior Service member, and the Secretaries requested that the JCS detail representatives to the committee. When subsequently appointed, the US committee and the corresponding Canadian committee became the US and Canadian Sections of the Canada-US Military Cooperation Committee (MCC). Besides fostering this development, the PJBD had drafted a statement of principles that should be incorporated in the revised Canada-US basic security plan. Among other things, it contemplated that in time of emergency a United Canada-United States Chiefs of Staff (CANUSA) organization would be set up, charged with the implementation and strategic direction of the plan.

(TS) JCS 1541/2, 1 Mar 46, CCS 091 (9-10-45) sec 2.

21 Mar 46 The US Army Air Forces (AAF) established the Air Defense Command at Mitchel Field with a mission of defending the continental United States against air attack. This command, headed by Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer, was allocated 4 fighter squadrons, a few radars, and 6 numbered air forces, only 2 of which were active. The Air Defense Command was one of three new commands that the AAF created at this time, the others being the Strategic Air Command and the Tactical Air Command.

(S) Fifteen Years of Air Defense, NORAD Historical Reference Paper No. 3 (1960), p. 2.
The JCS informed the Service members of the PJBD and the Secretaries of War and the Navy that they had directed the Joint Staff Planners to arrange for JCS representation on the Canada-US MCC. It was their view, however, that the responsibility for revising ABC-22 should rest primarily with the military members of the PJBD, with the added JCS representation being "on a flexible basis." At the same time, all agencies of the OJCS would be available to provide technical advice on request. With reference to the PJBD recommendation that a United Canadian-United States Chiefs of Staff (CANUSA) organization be established, the JCS sounded a cautionary note. Its desirability should be carefully weighed, they wrote, intimating that a US-Canadian tie of this nature might set a pattern requiring the JCS to meet bilaterally or multilaterally with the chiefs of staff committees of other allies.

(Decl) Memo, JCS to Service Members, PJBD, 30 Mar 46; (Decl) Dec On JCS 1541/5, 1 Apr 46; CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 3.

President Harry S. Truman approved the 34th Recommendation of the PJBD, which revised the 1st Recommendation, providing for a free and comprehensive exchange of military information affecting the security of the two countries, subject to national policies and such restrictions as might be specified by the two governments. He also approved the 35th PJBD Recommendation providing that Canada and the United States would cooperate closely in all matters relating to the security of the northern part of the Western Hemisphere.


The Canada-US MCC held its first meeting in Washington during the period 20-23 May 46. There it was agreed that the Canadian and US Sections would continue their work toward completion of a full outline basic security plan and the preparation of detailed annexes on the most pressing security requirements of the two countries, including establishment of the necessary elements of an integrated air defense system and completion of mapping and photographic programs. Following the meeting, the Senior US Army and Navy Members submitted to the JCS a report of the proceedings (JCS 1541/6) with two documents representing the MCC's initial effort--an Appreciation of Requirements for Canadian-US Security and an Outline of Joint Canadian-US Basic Security Plan.
2 Jul 46
(Cont.)
On 2 Jul 46 the JCS agreed with the main elements of the analysis in the Appreciation and approved the Outline Plan as a suitable initial step toward preparation of a complete plan. The JCS said that they would take into account the need for release of classified information to Canada as part of their more general consideration of disclosure policy for foreign countries.

(TS) JCS 1541/6, 1 Jun 46; (Decl) Dec On JCS 1541/7, 2 Jul 46; CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 4.
Dziuban, Military Relations Between the United States and Canada, p. 336.

13 Aug 46
The Senior US Army and Navy Members, MCC, submitted a completed Canada-US Joint Basic Security Plan (JCS 1541/8) to the JCS for approval on 3 Jul 46. They reported that the Canadian Chiefs of Staff had concurred in the plan and in the Appreciation of the Requirements for Canadian-US Basic Security (see item of 2 Jul 46).

On 13 Aug 46 the JCS approved the plan and advised the Senior US Army and Navy Members, MCC, of their action, stating that they had directed the Joint Intelligence Committee to prepare a tentative outline plan for Canadian-US intelligence collaboration. The JCS noted that preparatory measures were to be effected by specific agreements that would be embodied in the annexes to the basic plan.

(Decl) JCS 1541/8, 10 Jul 46; (Decl) Dec On JCS 1541/9, 13 Aug 46; (Decl) Memo, JCS to Senior US Army and Navy Members, MCC, 13 Aug 46; CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 5.

After preparation and approval of this first Canada-US Basic Security Plan, the MCC reviewed the Plan annually, revising it when appropriate. The Plan continues in effect to the present day. The periodic revisions and the JCS and Canadian Chiefs of Staff approval of them are not included in this chronology.

12 Dec 46
The JCS submitted to the President an overall plan for the unified command of US forces outside the continental United States. The plan described commands that might be activated in strategic areas of the world, including an Alaskan Command and a Northeast Command. The latter would encompass the US forces in Newfoundland, Labrador, and Greenland; the missions of both the Alaskan and Northeast Commands would include the protection of the United States from air attack through their areas.
12 Dec 46
(Cont.)

The President approved this first unified command plan (UCP) on 14 December 1946.

(Decl) JCS 1259/27, 11 Dec 46, CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 4.
1 Jan 47

The JCS established the Alaskan Command (ALCOM) under the UCP and designated an air officer, Major General Howard A. Craig, as Commander in Chief, Alaska (CINCAL). CINCAL's mission was to (1) maintain the security of Alaska, including the protection of sea and air communications, and protect the US from attack through that area and the Arctic regions within his command; (2) support the Far East, Pacific, and SAC commanders in their missions; (3) control the airways through the Arctic, except as that responsibility was otherwise assigned; (4) make plans for accomplishing those missions in case of a general emergency.

CINCAL subsequently delegated the tasks of planning and executing the air defense mission to the Alaskan Air Command, which the AAF had established in Dec 45. Army and Navy component commands of ALCOM were formally established on 15 Nov 47, as the US Army Alaska (USARAL) and the Alaskan Sea Frontier. The Commander, Alaskan Air Command, was authorized to exercise operational control over the antiaircraft forces of USARAL during maneuvers and in an emergency.


12 Feb 47

The PJD had its 36th Recommendation of 20 Nov 46 set forth the following measures for close coordination of the armed forces of Canada and the United States: (1) interchange of military personnel as mutually agreed; (2) adoption as far as practicable of common designs and standards in arms, equipment, organization, and methods of training, with new developments to be encouraged; (3) cooperation and exchange of observers in connection with exercises and the development and tests of material of common interest; (4) reciprocal provision of military, naval, and air facilities by mutual arrangement with each country providing for transit through its territory and territorial waters of military aircraft and public vessels of the other; (5) unless otherwise agreed, each country to be primarily responsible for mapping its own territory and providing maps; and (6) a statement of principles governing various administrative aspects of mutually agreed military activities, designed to rule out any permanent impairment of the sovereignty of either nation.

The Canadian Government approved the 36th Recommendation on 16 Jan 47, and President Truman approved it.
on 4 Feb 47. On 12 Feb 47, Canada and the United States publicly announced the collaborative measures agreed to as a result of the 36th PJBD Recommendation.


21 May 47

Following JCS acceptance of the Joint Canada-US Basic Security Plan (see item of 13 Aug 46), the MCC monitored the preparation of a series of appendices to the basic plan through a number of parallel national subcommittees of technical experts. This work served not only to integrate and coordinate the views of interested agencies but also to establish informal working relationships on a broad basis between the Canadian and US Services.

At a meeting in Washington on 1-2 Apr 47, the MCC approved the first three of these appendices for submission to the Chiefs of Staff of Canada and the US: Appendix A, Air Interceptor and Air Warning; Appendix B, Meteorological Services; and Appendix C, Mapping, Charting and Air Photography. Other appendices were under study.

(Decl) JCS 1541/10, 6 May 47, CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 6.

At the recommendation of the Senior US Army and Navy Members of the MCC, the JCS noted on 21 May 47 that acceptance of the Joint Canada-US Basic Security Plan and its appendices did not commit either country to any action but only provided an agreed war plan for the security of the North American continent.

(Decl) Dec On JCS 1541/10, 21 May 47, same file.

MCC preparation and approval of the remaining appendices proceeded over the next year, and the Chiefs of Staff of both countries approved each appendix as it was produced. For the appendices as well as JCS and Canadian Chiefs of Staff action on them, see the following:

Appendix A, Air Interceptor and Air Warning
JCS 1541/11, CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 6.

Appendix B, Meteorological Services,
JCS 1541/12, same file, sec 6.
21 May 47
(Cont.)

Appendix D, Air Navigation Aids, JCS 1541/18, same file, sec 7.
Appendix E, Strategic Information, JCS 1541/14, same file, sec 7.
Appendix F, Strategic Air Reconnaissance, JCS 1541/14, same file, sec 7.
Appendix H, Protection of Sea Lines of Communication, JCS 1541/24, same file, sec 8.
Appendix I, Mobile Striking Forces, JCS 1541/19, same file, sec 7.
Appendix J, Signal Communications, JCS 1541/28, same file, sec 10.

(For further action, see item of 3 Jun 48.)

29 Aug 47

The MCC, at a meeting on 21-25 Jul 47, approved a statement of principles (JCS 1541/17) for use as policy guidance for the MCC planning committee and subcommittees charged with preparing peacetime measures to permit implementation of the Canadian-US Basic Security Plan in the event of war or emergency conditions. The MCC believed that preparatory measures should reduce to an acceptable maximum the time needed to provide the facilities and equipment and to deploy and support the forces required to defend Canada and the US. The MCC considered an acceptable maximum to be 12 months after 1951, with the entire Joint Basic Security Plan being capable of execution with one month's notice by 1 Jul 57. Implementation measures through 1949 should be concerned primarily with fundamentals of each country's defense complex, such as continuation of mapping and meteorological programs, development of detailed planning to allow rapid mobilization of forces, and furtherance of standardization in arms, equipment, and operating procedures. In succeeding years, it might be necessary to provide for certain installations or to initiate construction projects. On 5 Aug 47, the Senior US Army and Navy Members of the MCC asked the JCS to note the MCC statement of principles.
On 29 Aug 47, the JCS noted the statement of principles. Subsequently, the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee, at meetings on 9 and 25 Sep 47, noted the statement and approved it with a minor revision.

Pursuant to the National Security Act of 1947, James V. Forrestal was sworn in as the first Secretary of Defense (SecDef). On the following day the new National Military Establishment (later the Department of Defense) began operations. It consisted of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and included the US Air Force as a separate Service, to which the former AAF commands and personnel had been transferred.

The SecDef informed the JCS that he and the Secretary of State had agreed that a uniform and clearly defined policy and procedure (JCS 1541/23) should apply to publicity for plans and operations jointly conducted by Canada and the United States.
or conducted by either country in the territory of the other. It would be the policy of the two governments to issue simple factual announcements at an early stage about those projects that could be classified "unrestricted" from the point of view of military security and of the international political situation. Public announcements would require the approval of both governments, and primary responsibility for public announcement would rest with the country whose territory was used. The State Department and the Service members of the US Section, PJBD, would consider each case as it arose.

(Decl) JCS 1541/23, 9 Dec 47, CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 8.
The JCS noted the conclusion of the US Section, MCC, that the US Air Force should assist the Canadians with aeronautical charting in the Canadian Arctic and that the US Navy should assist with hydrographic charting of Newfoundland and Labrador in order to permit implementation in 1952 of the Air Photography, Hydrographic Survey, Mapping and Charting Appendix to the Canada-US Basic Security Plan.


On 9 Mar 48, the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee concurred in the MCC recommendation for US participation in air photography and charting in certain areas of Canadian responsibility and forwarded the MCC recommendation to the Canadian Cabinet Defence Committee for decision. On 15 Apr 48, the Cabinet Defence Committee approved the recommendation with the understanding that all information resulting from the US Air Force and Navy operations would be made available to Canada.

(Decl) N/H of JCS 1541/26, 13 May 48, same file.

Following consultations with the JCS in Florida and Washington during Mar 48, the SecDef issued a statement of "Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff," known as the Key West Agreement. Primary functions of the US Air Force included:

To be responsible for defense of the United States against air attack in accordance with the policies and procedures of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

To formulate joint doctrines and procedures, in coordination with the other Services, for the defense of the United States against air attack, and to provide the Air Force units, facilities, and equipment required therefor.

The Army had among its primary functions "to organize, train, and equip Army antiaircraft artillery units" and "to provide Army forces as required for the defense of the United States against air attack, in accordance with joint doctrines and procedures approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." The parallel provision in the listing of primary functions of the Navy read:

To provide naval (including naval air) forces as required for the defense of the United States against air attack, in accordance with joint doctrines and procedures approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
At the Newport conference, 20-22 Aug 48, the Sec Def approved a JCS recommendation that he issue a supplement to the Key West Agreement. The supplement made two points: (1) exclusive Service responsibility in a given field did not preclude participation by another Service; (2) the Service with the primary function had the responsibility to determine the requirements but in doing so must take into account the contributions that might be made by the forces of another Service.

The JCS established the Continental US Defense Planning Group. They instructed the Director of the Group to ensure that plans, estimates, and studies necessary to permit the JCS to carry out their joint responsibilities for continental defense were prepared. They stated that the Group should be guided by such special international arrangements as might be made between the US and other countries important to the defense of the United States.

The US Section, MCC, recommended (JCS 1541/29) on 24 Mar 48 that the JCS note the following MCC conclusion regarding implementation measures for the Canada-US Basic Security Plan for the period 1 Apr 49 to 30 Jun 50: (1) a vigorous program of research and development had a high priority; (2) no obstacle appeared to be in the way of the time schedule set forth in the MCC memorandum contained in JCS 1541/17 (see item of 29 Aug 47) for the appendices on meteorological services, air navigation aids, strategic information, strategic air reconnaissance, antiaircraft ground defense, and mobile striking forces; (3) serious difficulties were anticipated in achieving timely definition of implementing measures for the appendices on air interceptor and air warning; air photography, hydrographic survey, mapping and charting; protection of sea lines of communication; and signal communications. The MCC considered it essential that the MC undertake: an early review of the basic plan with revision looking toward the attainment of an adequate defense establishment properly balanced between offensive and defensive requirements with a phased program to provide the most effective defense at any stage of
its development; and a determination of the roles to be played by each nation.

On 30 Apr 48, the JCS noted the MCC conclusions.


25 May 48

The CSA recommended that the JCS establish the Northeast Command as provided in the UCP (see item of 12 Dec 46). He also recommended that the JCS designate the CSAF as their executive agent, that the Canadian Government be informed through the PJBD, and that the Government of Newfoundland be notified. Further, CSA proposed that CSAF then issue a press release in accordance with the SecDef directive (see item of 28 Nov 47) on publicity regarding US operations in or over Canadian territory. The CSA recommendations had the informal concurrence of the State Department.

(Decl) JCS 1259/74, 25 May 48, CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 10.

The JCS were unable to reach agreement on establishment of the Northeast Command until Apr 49. For further action see items of 30 Nov 48, 22 Dec 48, 3 Mar 49, and 11 Apr 49.

3 Jun 48

The JCS informed the US Section, MCC, of their review of the appendices of the Canada-US Basic Security Plan. The JCS viewed these appendices as excellent progress in combined planning and considered the associated force requirements not to be excessive. With respect to specific appendices, they made the following comments: passages in the Air Interceptor and Air Warning Appendix indicating the necessity for a particular command structure should be deleted pending formulation of a command appendix; both the Air Interceptor and Air Warning Appendix and the Antiaircraft Ground Defense Appendix should be reconsidered in the light of up-to-date capabilities studies. The JCS found nothing in the remaining appendices that was inconsistent with current US planning and stated that subsequent revisions of the Basic Plan should phase force requirements over the period of time up to 1955-1957.

(Decl) SH-10249 to US Sec MCC, 3 Jun 48, CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 11. (Decl) JCS 1541/27, 19 May 48, same file, sec 9.

20 Oct 48

During the spring of 1948, Congress considered but adjourned without acting on an Air Force proposal for establishing an aircraft warning and control
network using available radars or ones ready for immediate procurement. The proposal was subsequently referred to as the "radar fence program." On 1 Jul 48, the SecDef requested the JCS to consider the program and submit recommendations before Congress reconvened in January 1949.

(3) JCS 3899, 3 Jul 48, CCS 413.44 (7-1-48) sec 1.

On 20 Oct 48, the JCS informed SecDef that a modified radar fence program had been designed to provide air defense coverage in two increments. The first, or interim increment, proceeding within authorized troop strengths and using equipment on hand or under procurement, would provide an extremely limited air defense for CONUS and Alaska. The second increment, phased for initiation in FY 1950, would give additional protection for vital areas covered only sketchily by the first increment. The latter increment would require equipment not currently on hand or programmed and would include 4 Navy radar picket ships. Further expansion and improvement of the program would await experience gained through operational tests of the defenses in being. The JCS informed SecDef that there was an urgent need for realistic development, engineering, and operational testing of the radar fence program. They recommended that SecDef:

establish the modified program (later called the Interim Program) as a matter of priority; support early Congressional authorization for the overall program and budget requests for immediate implementation of the first two increments and for successive increments as they became practicable; and seek authority from Congress for the Secretary of the Air Force to acquire lands and implement construction for the program. (For further action, see item of 30 Mar 49.)

(Dec) Memo, JCS to SecDef, 20 Oct 48 (JCS 1899/2), CCS 413.44 (7-1-48) sec 1.

30 Nov 48

The CNO informed the JCS of his opposition to establishment of the Northeast Command as a unified command. He would agree to a USAF command in Newfoundland, Labrador, and Greenland with operational control exercised by the JCS through the CSAF in the same manner as the JCS exercised control over the Commander, US Naval Forces, Western Pacific. The purpose of the command would be to protect CONUS, in collaboration with the USAF Air Defense Command, against air attack through the northeast air approaches and to command the USAF bases and forces in Newfoundland, Labrador, and Greenland. (For further action, see item of 22 Dec 48.)

(Conf) 17) JCS 1259/106, 30 Nov 48, CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 14.
The US Air Force established the Continental Air Command, placing the Air Defense and Tactical Air Commands under it. This action was designed to enable the US Air Force to order the full weight of the combined units into either defensive or tactical operations as might be required in the event of enemy attack on the United States and to permit rapid cooperation with the Army and Navy in a future emergency. Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer, USAF, then commander of the Air Defense Command, took command of the new Continental Air Command, with headquarters at Mitchel Air Force Base in New York.

At the same time, Canada, which had previously had no separate organization for air defense, established the Air Defence Group as a separate organization within the Headquarters, RCAF, at Ottawa. The Air Defence Group moved to RCAF Station St. Hubert the following year.


The CSAF recommended to the JCS the establishment of the Northeast Command as proposed by the CSA (see item of 25 May 48). Arguing against the CNO objections (see item of 30 Nov 48) to such a unified command, the CSAF stated that increasing enemy capabilities during the next ten to fifteen years would undoubtedly require an expansion and development of bases in the northeast area and that a single-Service command, such as CNO had proposed, could not adequately meet the requirement. (For further action, see item 3 Mar 49.)

(Decl) JCS 1259/113, 22 Dec 48, CCS 381 (1-24-42) see 15.
The USAF Continental Air Command established an Eastern and a Western Air Defense Group and assigned responsibility for CONUS air defense to them instead of to the numbered air forces.

The USAF Continental Air Command on 1 Sep 49 re-designated the Eastern and Western Air Defense Groups as Eastern and Western Air Defense Forces. The USAF Air Defense Command was reduced to record status and eventually abolished on 1 Jul 50.

(S) Fifteen Years of Air Defense, p. 7.

On 5 Jan 49 the JCS concluded that they could not agree on the establishment of the Northeast Command; they referred the matter to the Operations Deputies for preparation of a memo setting forth the divergent Service views for decision by SecDef. After further consultations, however, the JCS agreed on 3 Mar 49 that it was their intention to set up a unified command covering the northeast approaches. They asked CSAF to draft a directive establishing the Northeast Command, so drawn as not to interfere with the duties of CINCLANT. (For further action, see item of 11 Apr 49.)


The US Section, MCC, recommended (JCS 1541/55) to the JCS on 10 Jan 49 a reorganization of the US Section in order to meet a Canadian desire for more direct integration of Canadian-US basic security planning with overall strategic planning. The reorganization proposal provided that: the US Section, MCC, should be part of the structure of the Joint Strategic Plans Committee (JSPC) and not of the US Section, PJBD; close liaison should be maintained between the US Sections of the MCC and the PJBD; and membership of the US Section, MCC, should be reconstituted to consist of the Service members of the JSPC or their representatives designated on a relatively permanent basis, plus a representative of the State Department in a liaison capacity.

On 10 Jan 49 the US Steering and Coordinating Member MCC, informed the Director, Joint Staff, that the MCC had before it a number of urgent tasks, including complete revision of the Canada-US Basic Security Plan. He noted that the Canadian Section of the MCC had been completely reorganized and requested that the parallel reorganization of the US Section be considered as a matter of priority.
10 Mar 49  
On 10 Mar 49, the JCS approved the reorganization of the US Section, MCC, and informed the SecDef of their action the following day. The SecDef approved the reorganization on 15 Mar 49.

(US) JCS 1541/55, 13 Jan 49; (Decl) N/H of JCS 1541/55, 16 Mar 49; (Decl) MCM-52 to D/JS, 10 Jan 49; CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 14. (Decl) JCS 1541/59, 25 Feb 49, same file, sec 15.

30 Mar 49  
President Truman signed a bill authorizing an Interim Program for Aircraft Control and Warning Systems in the United States and Alaska. However, funds for the construction of the radar stations and control centers involved in the system were not provided.


11 Apr 49  
The JCS approved changes to the paragraph of the UCP (see item of 12 Dec 46) that defined the Northeast Command. The revised paragraph assigned the Commander in Chief, Northeast (CINCNOR) the mission of maintaining the security of his command, "including protection of sea and air communications except as otherwise assigned, and defend the United States from attack through the Arctic regions within his command." The JCS specified that CINCNOR should support the European, Atlantic, and Strategic Air Commanders in their missions and that establishment of the Northeast Command would not affect the existing responsibilities of CINCLANT. CINCLANT would continue to exercise unified command over the forces currently assigned and would retain administrative and operational control over the naval facilities and base at Argentina. The JCS designated CSAF as their executive agent for the Northeast Command.

(Decl) Dec On JCS 1259/136, 11 Apr 49, CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 16.

On 13 Apr 49 the JCS advised the SecDef that the Northeast Command should be established, comprising the forces assigned to US bases in Newfoundland-Labrador and Greenland. Subject to his concurrence, they recommended that SecDef inform SecState and arrange for the US Section, PJBD, to notify the Canadian Government. SecDef took these actions on 20 Apr 49, noting that after the effective date of the North Atlantic Pact and receipt of advice that the Canadian Government had been informed, he intended to issue a press release cleared with the Dept of State. (For further action, see item of 22 Sep 49.)

(Decl) Enc, JCS to SecDef, 13 Apr 49 (JCS 1259/136); (C) JCS 1259/147, 21 Apr 49; same file, sec 17.
The JCS amended the directive to the Director of the Continental US Defense Planning Group (see item of 26 Apr 48). The JCS charged the Director of the Group with the preparation of a Basic Defense Plan to coordinate the efforts of the armed forces in carrying out the functions assigned by the Key West Agreement that pertained to the defense of the continental United States. In addition, the Director was to prepare such other plans or studies as he considered necessary. He would exercise no command functions, but would serve as an agency subordinate to the JCS to search out points of conflict, overlapping functions, and gaps in responsibility in the plans and activities of those commands and Services having responsibilities for continental defense. He would also make recommendations to the commands or Services concerned and provide for the necessary corrective action in the Basic Defense Plan. To accomplish this mission, the JCS authorized the Director, Continental US Defense Planning Group, to obtain and review the plans of responsible commanders and Services.


The MCC on 25 Mar 49 submitted to the JCS and the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee the Canada-US Emergency Defense Plan (JCS 1995). The Plan provided for the mutual defense of Canada and the US against a common enemy, using the forces currently available. The Plan assumed that the USSR was capable of reaching any important industrial concentration in Canada and the US in one-way attacks, using B-29 type aircraft, and of launching two-way attacks from northeast Siberia against Alaska and northwestern Canada, reaching in the extreme case the general line Puget Sound-Edmonton.

(TS) JCS 1995, 30 Mar 49, CCS 692 (9-10-45) sec 16.

On 21 Apr 49 the JCS approved the Canada-US Emergency Defense Plan, and the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee gave it general approval with minor changes on 26 Apr 49.


The MCC reviewed and revised the Canada-US Emergency Defense Plan annually thereafter and, in 1951, it was included as part of the Canada-US Basic Security Plan. Further revisions in the Emergency Defense Plan and Canadian and US action on them are not included in this chronology.
22 Sep 49

In late April 1949, the US Section, PJBD, informed its Canadian counterpart of the JCS "plan and desire" to establish the Northeast Command as a unified command in Newfoundland and Labrador. On 3 Jun 49, the US Section, PJBD, was informed that the Canadian Chiefs of Staff had considered the matter but were withholding final decision, apparently owing to the approaching Canadian national elections. On 11 Jul 49, the US Section, PJBD, asked SecDef for additional information that might be provided informally to the Canadian Section, PJBD, to assist the Canadian deliberations. The SecDef forwarded this request to the JCS.

(C) Memo, Actg Chm, US Sec PJBD to SecDef, 11 Jul 49; Memo, ExecSecy OSD to JCS, 13 Jul 49; Encs to JCS 1259/157, 14 Jul 49; CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 18.

On 22 Sep 49, the JCS approved the following information concerning the Northeast Command to be forwarded informally to the Canadians: the command was intended primarily to provide a more direct operational control by the JCS over all US forces stationed in Newfoundland, Labrador and Greenland to facilitate development of joint and Canadian-US plans and surveys for use in emergencies; the missions of the command conformed to the approved Canada-US Emergency Defense Plan (JCS 1995); and CINCNE would be guided by such special international arrangements as might be made between the US and Canada in planning and conducting pertinent operations. The JCS outlined the broad functions stemming from CINCNE's missions, including provision that he would coordinate operations with appropriate Canadian officials and refer any problem affecting the national policies of either country to proper governmental authorities. The JCS provided this information to the US Section, PJBD.

(Decl) Dec On JCS 1259/168, 22 Sep 49, CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 18. (Decl) Memo, JCS to SecDef, 23 Sep 49; (Decl) SM-1920-49 to Actg Chm, US Sec PJBD, 23 Sep 49; same file, sec 19.

22 Nov 49

President Truman announced on 23 Sep 49 that there was evidence of a recent atomic explosion in the USSR. On 16 Nov 49 the CSAF recommended that the JCS direct the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC) to evaluate the strategic significance of air defense of CONUS and Alaska in the light of this event. In addition, the JSSC should collaborate with the Research and Development Board to determine, as a matter of highest priority, the best means to improve the technological capabilities of US air defense. The CSAF also recommended that the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, with the Air Staff, study how best to use all available resources to improve US air defense in the
short term and determine the minimum acceptable air defense system for CONUS and Alaska under existing technological limitations.

Public Papers of the Presidents, Harry S. Truman, 1949, p. 485. (Decl) JCS 2084, 16 Nov 49, CCS 373.24 US (9-8-49) sec 1.

On 22 Nov 49, the JCS agreed to direct the JSSC to evaluate the strategic significance of air defense of CONUS and Alaska on the assumption that the USSR possessed an atomic bomb stockpile, but they deferred action on the other CSAF recommendations, pending completion of the JSSC report. The JCS agreed that they would back the CSAF to the limit in his dealings with higher authority in the attempt to solve the short-term problem of continental air defense within the capabilities available to him.

(Decl) N/H of JCS 2084, 23 Nov 49, CCS 373.24 US (9-8-49) sec 1.

On 1 Dec 49, the CSAF recommended to the JCS that he present to them a detailed exposition of current US air defense capabilities together with an examination of what could be done to improve the situation with the resources then available and a specific program for increasing those resources. The JCS approved the recommendation on 20 Dec 49. (For further action, see item of 11 May 50.)

(Decl) JCS 2084/1, 1 Dec 49; (Decl) Dec On JCS 2084/1, 20 Dec 49; same file.

The US Section, PJBD, informed the JCS of indications that the Canadian Government desired to be assured that the proposed Northeast Command was not territorial but administrative and tactical, with a mission to maintain the security of US forces and to plan and cooperate with Canadian forces for the defense of such parts of North America and the sea and air approaches thereto as might be agreed upon by the two countries. The Canadians had also expressed a preference for designation of the command as "US Forces, Northeast."


On 2 Dec 49 the JCS requested the US Section, PJBD, to inform the Canadians that the Northeast Command would be established as a unified command to facilitate planning and tactical employment of US forces assigned and that the missions of the command would be in consonance with those stated by the Canadians. The JCS expected that the command would plan in concert with the Canadian forces for such defense tasks as might be agreed upon by the two countries. They said that
1949

2 Dec 49 (Cont.)

the command would be designated "US Northeast Command." (For further action, see item of 13 Jun 50.)


9 Dec 49

The JCS submitted for SecDef approval a charter revising the organization of the US Section, MCC. The new charter would establish the US Section as a committee of the JCS charged with preparation, continuing revision, and submission of recommendations for implementation of the Canada-US Basic Security Plan. Previously, the US Section, MCC, had been part of the structure of the Joint Strategic Plans Committee (see item of 10 Mar 49). The revision was necessary; the JCS informed SecDef, to raise the operating level of the US Section to the JCS representative level, since thenceforward the members of the US Section, MCC, were to serve also as the JCS representatives to the Regional Planning Committee of the Canada-United States Regional Planning Group (CUSRPG) under NATO.

(Decl) Memo, JCS to SecDef, 9 Dec 49, CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 18. (Decl) JCS 1541/62, 28 Oct 49, same file, sec 17.

The SecDef concurred on 23 Dec 49 in the charter for the US Section, MCC, and it was issued as JCS 202/74 on 27 Dec 49.

(Decl) N/H of JCS 1541/62, 27 Dec 49, CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 17.

30 Dec 49

The CSA informed the JCS that he shared the concern of the CSAF (see item of 22 Nov 49) regarding the problem of air defense of CONUS. He considered that there was an urgent requirement for a unified command for the defense of the US to insure adequate protection against Soviet capabilities, and he recommended the establishment of such a command.

(TS) JCS 1259/179, 21 Dec 49, CCS 381 US (5-23-46) sec 12.

On 30 Dec 49, the JCS deferred action on the CSA recommendation pending further studies on the entire question of US air defense.

(TS) N/H of JCS 1259/179, 30 Dec 49, same file.
1950

5 Jan 50 The US Section, MCC, submitted to the JCS on 22 Dec 49 a Canada-US Regional Planning Group "Strategic Concept and Outline Plan for Defense of the Canada-US Region in the Event of a War with the USSR Commencing approximately 1 July 1954." The US Section concluded that: the strategic concept and outline plan, while adequate as a statement of intentions, might not prove capable of implementation in view of perspective enemy atomic capabilities; the extent to which the concept could be implemented required further study; until better defense systems became available, current systems should continue to be developed; and the concept and outline plan were satisfactory for initial NATO planning purposes. The US Section recommended that the JCS approve these conclusions and approve the concept and outline plan for tabling and consideration by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, Canada-US Regional Planning Group, NATO, at its next meeting.

(TS) JCS 1541/63, 22 Dec 49, CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 18.

On 5 Jan 50, the JCS approved the US Section recommendations, subject to minor amendments in the concept.

(TS) Dec On JCS 1541/63, 5 Jan 50, same file.

24 Jan 50 The CSAF on 23 Nov 49 again called to JCS attention the fact that the USSR had attained atomic weapons nearly four years in advance of the estimated probable date. He believed that this invalidated the existing schedule of the radar fence program and made its completion at the earliest possible time essential. CSAF recommended that the JCS concur in the acceleration of the completion of the aircraft control and warning system for CONUS and Alaska (see Items of 20 Oct 48 and 30 Mar 49) and approve an effort to obtain the $35.5 million authorized by Congress but not then available for expenditure in FY 1950. On 6 Dec 49, the CNO recommended that CSAF provide further information on the system, and CSAF provided the information on 17 Jan 50.

(Decl) JCS 1899/4, 23 Nov 49; (Decl) JCS 1899/5, 6 Dec 49; (Decl) JCS 1899/6, 17 Jan 50; CCS 413.44 (7-1-48) sec 2.

On 24 Jan 50, the JCS approved the CSAF recommendation to accelerate the program and seek the release of $35.5 million.

(Decl) Dec On JCS 1899/4, 24 Jan 50, same file.
At JCS direction (see item of 22 Nov 49), the CSAF on 2 Mar 50 made a presentation to the JCS on "Attainment and Maintenance of an Operational Air Defense System in the Continental United States and Alaska." The Air Force held that the air defense of CONUS and Alaska was inadequate and that an operational air defense system capable of deterring or effectively countering enemy air attacks should be in being by 1 Jul 52. The Air Force concluded that the following action should be taken immediately: (1) place under operational control of commanders responsible for the air defense of CONUS and Alaska the regular forces allocated in the current emergency plan to the air defense mission at the outbreak of war, in order that an improved air defense system could be attained at the earliest practicable date; (2) direct each Service to make available for air defense those forces in CONUS and Alaska having an important air defense capability but not then assigned an air defense mission under the emergency war plan, insofar as possible without serious detriment to primary missions. The Air Force envisaged a radar system as the basic minimum warning system associated with the maximum acceptable degree of calculated risk on 1 Jul 52 and the foreseeable future after that. Additional warning means, including submarine pickets, airborne early warning, and mobile warning systems in the NATO countries should supplement the basic system as practicable. The Air Force recommended that the JCS present the air defense problem in these terms to the President and the Congress.

(Decl) JCS 2084/3, 3 Mar 50, CCS 373.24 US (9-8-49) sec 1.

The Army and Navy did not agree with the Air Force, considering that the presentation did not fully answer the questions posed by the JCS. The Army and Navy believed that: the air defenses of CONUS and Alaska would be dangerously inadequate against estimated Soviet capabilities as of 1 Jul 52; US intelligence was inadequate to provide a reliable evaluation of enemy intentions or capabilities; and there was an immediate need for a comprehensive plan for the air defense of CONUS and Alaska. The Army and Navy also believed there were interim measures the JCS could take, within current resources, that would enhance US air defense capabilities pending formulation and approval of a comprehensive plan. The Army held that the JCS should provide a command system capable of directing and coordinating the air defense effort, but the Navy pointed out that the problem of command structure for air defense was already before the JCS in the Basic Defense Plan for CONUS (JCS 2085/1). There were a number of other points of disagreement.

(TS) JCS 2084/9, 11 May 50, same file, sec 2.
After a review of the divergent Service views on the air defense presentation, the JCS directed the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group on 11 Oct 50 to undertake a study of the effectiveness of present and projected US air defense weapons and weapon systems.

(Decl) JCS 2084/12, 12 Jul 50; (Decl) Dec On JCS 2084/12, 11 Oct 50; CCS 373.24 US (9-8-49) sec 2.

The Chairman, US Section, PJBD, informed the JCS that the proposed establishment of the US Northeast Command had been approved by the Canadian Government. Should US defense authorities desire to issue a press release, the Canadian Government suggested the Canadian Department of National Defence might wish to issue a joint or similar release. The Chairman, US Section, had been asked to inform the JCS that the Canadian Government appreciated the manner in which US authorities had taken Canadian views into account. (For further action, see item of 29 Aug 50.)

(Decl) JCS 1259/187, 16 Jun 50, CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 19.

The USAF and Steering Member, PJBD, submitted to the JCS for approval on 20 Apr 50 a proposed draft security agreement (JCS 1541/64) between Canada and the US. The agreement would provide for the Chiefs of Staff of each country to make every effort to maintain the security classification and safeguard military information of the other country or military information of joint origin. On 15 Jun 50, the JCS approved the agreement subject to a revision to substitute the word "government" for "Chiefs of Staff" throughout the document in order to safeguard classified information that might be exchanged through channels not controlled by the Chiefs of Staff of the two countries.

(TS) JCS 1541/64, 24 Apr 50; CCS 092 (9-10-54) sec 18. (Decl) Dec On JCS 1541/65, 15 Jun 50, same file, sec 21.

On 11 Aug 50, the SecDef forwarded the draft agreement to the Canadian Minister of Defence, stating that his letter signified US approval of the agreement. The Canadian Minister of Defence advised SecDef of Canadian approval on 15 Sep 50, and the agreement became effective on that date.

(Decl) N/H of JCS 1541/64, 14 Aug 50, CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 18. (Decl) JCS 1541/66, 26 Sep 50, same file, sec 23.
1950

1 Jul 50  Until early 1950 no Army AA units had been assigned primarily to continental air defense, and then only two units were assigned, one in the Washington-Baltimore area and the other at the Atomic Energy Commission works at Hanford, Washington. An Army study, completed in Mar 50, had concluded that there was no means to exercise centralized command over AA units when they were in air defense. Individual units looked to the Air Force for operational control and to Army area commands for logistical and administrative support. Following the outbreak of the Korean War the Army activated additional AA units for use in air defense of CONUS and established the Army Antiaircraft Command at the Pentagon on 1 Jul 50 with MG Willard W. Irvine as commanding general. He moved his headquarters to Mitchel Field on 1 Nov 50 to be near Continental Air Command headquarters. (For further action, see item of 1 Jan 51.)

(S) Fifteen Years of Air Defense, p. 9.

17 Aug 50  The JCS agreed to consider the establishment of a unified air defense command for the US and have CSAF submit a paper on the subject. (For further action, see item of 30 Oct 50.)

(Decl) JCS 1259/191, 25 Sep 50, CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 22.

29 Aug 50  The CSAF recommended on 10 Aug 50 that the JCS implement the decision to establish the US Northeast Command (see item of 11 Apr 49).

(Decl) JCS 1259/189, 10 Aug 50, CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 22.

On 29 Aug 50, the JCS agreed to establish the US Northeast Command on 1 Oct 50. They notified the SecDef and the Chairman, US Section, PJBD, on 30 Aug 50, suggesting a joint Canadian-US press release.

(Decl) Dec On JCS 1259/189, 29 Aug 50; (Decl) Memo, JCS to SecDef, 30 Aug 50; (Decl) SM-2041-50 to Chm, US Sec PJBD, 30 Aug 50; same file.

On 7 Sep 50, the JCS were advised that the Canadian Government had approved the proposed release on the US Northeast Command but did not wish to issue a joint and simultaneous announcement. On 8 Sep 50, the SecDef concurred in the JCS proposal to establish the command. He also informed the Secretary of State on that date. (For further action, see item of 1 Oct 50.)
1950

29 Aug 50
(Decl) Memo, US Sec PJBD to Secy JCS, 7 Sep 50;
(Decl) N/H of JCS 1259/189, 11 Sep 50; (Decl) Memo,
SecDef to CJCS, 8 Sep 50; (TS) Ltr, SecDef to Sec
State, 8 Sep 50; CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 22.

1 Oct 50
The US Northeast Command (USNEC) was established as
a unified command under the JCS, with MG Lyman P.
Whitten, USAF, as CINCNE and headquarters at Ft.
Pepperrell, St. Johns, Newfoundland. The CSAF served
as the JCS executive agent. (For the USNEC mission,
see item of 11 Apr 49.) Also on 1 Oct 50, the USAF
established the Northeast Air Command (NEAC) as the
Air Force component of the unified command and assign
it all units of the USAF Newfoundland Base Command
and Greenland Base Command.

(Decl) Dec On JCS 1259/189, 29 Aug 50; (Decl) Msg,
JCS 90097 to CINCNE and CINCLANT, 29 Aug 50; CCS 381
(1-24-42) sec 22. Lydus H. Buss, (S) U.S. Air

30 Oct 50
The CSAF recommended on 25 Sep 50 that the UCP be
modified by adding provision for a United States Air
Defense Command.

(Decl) JCS 1259/191, 25 Sep 50, CCS 381 (1-24-42)
sec 22.

On 30 Oct 50, the JCS agreed that provision for a US
Air Defense Command should not be incorporated in the
UCP since that plan dealt solely with command of US
forces outside CONUS. The CSAF undertook to draft
and submit a separate JCS directive for the establish-
ment of a unified air defense command for the US.

(Decl) SM-2730-50 to Dir of Plans, USAF, 30 Oct 50,
same file, sec 23.

11 Dec 50
The Secretary of State on 13 Nov 50 advised the
SecDef that the uniform publicity policy and pro-
cedure for Canadian-US defense plans and operations
(see item of 28 Nov 47) had not worked well in
practice and that this matter had been discussed at
the PJBD meetings on 19-20 Feb 48 and 27-31 May 50.
At both meetings the US Section had suggested changes
in the policy, and at the 2-5 Oct 50 PJBD meeting the
Canadian Section had presented a draft revision. The
Secretary of State requested SecDef's comments on
this proposed revision.

The SecDef on 11 Dec 50 informed SecState that he
agreed to the revisions, which set up direct liaison
and responsibility for clearance of routine press
matters between the Public Information Offices of the
Defense Departments of both nations. He suggested a provision be included that the Directors of Public Information of either nation, whenever they deemed it necessary or desirable, should recommend that press releases be handled through diplomatic channels.

(Decl) Ltr, SecState’to SecDef, 13 Nov 50; (Decl) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 11 Dec 50; CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 24.

The agreed policy on public affairs aspects of Canadian-US defense plans and operations was issued as a directive by the Acting SecDef on 19 Mar 51, replacing the memorandum of 29 Dec 47 on the same subject.

(Decl) Memo, Acting SecDef to Secys of Mil Depts et al., 19 Mar 51, same file, sec 28.

The CSAF on 26 Jun 50 advised the JCS that review of the air attack threat faced by Canada and the US indicated a need for a joint aircraft warning system in being and operational on D-day of the approved Canada-US Emergency Defense Plan. Currently, however most of the radar stations in Canada were scheduled to be installed after D-day. The CSAF recommended that the problem of air raid warning be considered by the PJBD, with particular attention to possible action by the Canadian Government to accelerate, extend, and man the Canadian radar system.

(Decl) JCS 1899/10, 27 Jun 50, CCS 413,44 (7-1-48) sec 2.

On 11 Aug 50 the CSAF observed that the problem of radar installations could not be isolated from the air defense problem as a whole. He believed overall requirements for the integration of the Canadian and US radar systems could not be developed until the JCS resolved their divergent views that currently prevented their agreement on an air defense system for CONUS. Pending that resolution, CSA thought the USAF, in consultation with the RCAF, should concentrate on developing a more definitive proposal for implementing the already approved interim early warning system.

(Decl) JCS 1899/11, 14 Aug 50, same file.

On 6 Sep 50 the CSAF withdrew his recommendation of 26 Jun 50 and submitted a "Plan for the Extension of the Continental Air Defense System" which would provide additional warning for CONUS and an important aircraft control and warning capability in Canadian
vital areas and the Newfoundland Base Command. He characterized it as "a logical extension northward" of the approved warning system already under construc-
tion. The plan would extend and consolidate the aircraft control and warning nets of Canada and the US as one operational system, providing a

division of costs between the two countries and a

means of operational control of the system. The

CSAF recommended that the plan be forwarded to the

US Section, PJBD.

(Cont.)

15 Dec 50

On 15 Dec 50 the JCS agreed to forward the plan to the

US Section, PJBD, with a statement that they had not

approved it but did believe the plan provided

"a suitable basis for consideration of the problems

incident to the extension and integration of the

Canadian and US air control and early warning systems

on an interim basis during the emergency period."

The JCS asked for PJBD consideration of the accept-

ability of the plan and the feasibility of its imple-

mentation.

On 15 Dec 50 the JCS concurred that action was

necessary to solve the problems of defense of border

installations and that the MCC was the proper agency

to undertake the task. (In fact, the MCC had already

begun informal consideration of the matter.) The JCS

advised the SecDef of their opinion on 18 Dec 50, and

he furnished the JCS views to the Secretary of State

on 5 Jan 51. (For further action, see item of

20 Jun 51.)

At a 2-5 Oct 50 meeting, the PJBD recommended that

Canadian-US planning for the defense of install-
lations on or near the border of the two countries

be conducted by the MCC.

(Decl) SM-3079-50 to Steering Member, US Sec MCC,
15 Dec 50 (JCS 1899/13), CCS 413.44 (7-1-48) sec 3.

15 Dec 50

(Decl) SM-3065-50 to Steering Member, US Sec PJBD,
15 Dec 50 (JCS 1899/13), CCS 413.44 (7-1-48) sec 3.

15 Dec 50

(Decl) JCS 1541/67, 24 Nov 50, CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 23.

On 15 Dec 50, the JCS concurred that action was

necessary to solve the problems of defense of border

installations and that the MCC was the proper agency

to undertake the task. (In fact, the MCC had already

begun informal consideration of the matter.) The JCS

advised the SecDef of their opinion on 18 Dec 50, and

he furnished the JCS views to the Secretary of State

on 5 Jan 51. (For further action, see item of

20 Jun 51.)

(Decl) Dec On JCS 1541/68, 15 Dec 50; (Decl) N/H of
JCS 1541/68, 9 Jan 51; (Decl) Memo, JCS to SecDef,
18 Dec 50; (Decl) SM-3079-50 to US Sec MCC, 18 Dec 50;
same file, sec 24.
1951

1 Jan 51  The US Air Force reactivated the USAF Air Defense Command (ADC) as a major command with the sole mission of air defense of CONUS. Headquarters ADC opened at Colorado Springs, Colorado, on 8 Jan 51 under the command of LTG Ennis C. Whitehead. GEN Benjamin W. Chidlaw succeeded him as the ADC commander in Aug 51.

On 15 Jan 51, the Army Antiaircraft Command (ARAACOM) moved its headquarters to Colorado Springs to operate alongside the USAF ADC. Subsequently, on 10 Apr 51, all AA units in CONUS were allocated to the Army Antiaircraft Command. At that time there were 23 AA battalions—6 automatic weapons, 9 90mm, and 8 120mm battalions.

(S) Fifteen Years of Air Defense, pp. 4, 7, 11.

5 Jan 51  On 4 Dec 50 the RCAF Member, PJBD, passed to his USAF counterpart a proposal that already bore the approval of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff. He sought USAF concurrence in its submission to the PJBD. The Canadian proposal was designed to remove the current handicap of having to obtain governmental approval in both countries for each joint air defense training exercise. Also, while war planning was proceeding on the assumption that the air defense forces of either country could be employed, disregarding national boundaries, this principle had not been tied down in an intergovernmental agreement. The intent was to obtain, through the PJBD, blanket permission for the air defense forces of Canada and the US to carry out joint air defense training exercises as necessary in peacetime and to reinforce one another in emergency. The agreements would be applicable in two vital areas: a large eastern region encompassing the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence and a lesser one in the Vancouver-Washington area.

On 27 Dec 50 the CSAF brought this proposal before the JCS, recommending approval. On 5 Jan 51 the JCS advised the US Section, PJBD, that they approved the central purpose of the Canadian proposal and recommended that it be considered by PJBD. (For further action, see items of 25 Sep 51 and 18 Jan 52.)

The CSAF on 8 Jan 51 recommended JCS approval of a Unified Air Defense Command Plan to establish a functional air defense command. The CSAF proposal included a Commander in Chief, US Air Defense Command (CINCAD) who would: (1) exercise unified command over all forces allocated to him by the JCS; (2) in accomplishing his mission, arrange for the appropriate employment of available forces of other commanders having an air defense capability; (3) in dire emergency, and during air battle, assume operational control of such forces as were capable of assisting in air defense of the US, notifying the JCS of such action. CINCAD would coordinate the air defense of the US with that of Canada and Mexico in accordance with agreed plans and policies. He would exercise unified command over component Army, Navy, and Air Force forces and have a joint staff with representatives of the components in key positions. In conducting the air defense battle, however, he would be authorized to bypass the component commanders with respect to operational control of AA weapons and tactical employment of aircraft.

On 19 Jan 51, the CNO objected to the CSAF proposal on the grounds that an approved concept for air defense was lacking, the responsibilities of the component commanders were not clearly defined, and no reference had been made to an integrated air defense system covering CONUS, Canada, and Alaska. The CNO said that Canadian members of the PJBD had indicated informally a willingness to accept a US officer to exercise operational control over an integrated air defense system for North America, provided some changes were made in the command relationships of CINCNE. The CNO also pointed out that JCS consideration of the problem of air defense of North America had been unduly protracted.
The JCS considered the CSAF proposal and the CNO objections on 24 Jan 51 and agreed that the CSAF would monitor the preparation and presentation to the JCS of a joint briefing on the defense of the US against air attack. The JCS considered the matter again on 9 Feb 51, but reached no agreement. Following the meeting, the CSAF and the CNO withdrew their papers from JCS consideration.

On 6 Feb 51, the US Section of the PJBD forwarded to the JCS a revised plan for the Extension of the Permanent Radar Net of the Continental Air Defense System (see item of 15 Dec 50), with notice of PJDB Recommendation 51/1 that the plan was feasible and acceptable and should be implemented. The plan provided for the extension and consolidation of the presently programmed continental aircraft control and warning systems of Canada and the US into one operational system to meet the air defense needs of both countries. The target date for operation of the projected system was 1 Jul 52. The US Section of the PJBD advised the JCS that expeditious action was required to implement the plan on the scheduled target date.

On 16 Feb 51, the JCS approved the implementation of the plan and the recommendations of the PJBD.

The SecDef on 23 Feb 51 requested SecState approval of the PJBD recommendation. The SecDef understood that when the President's approval had been obtained, an exchange of notes would permit prompt implementation of the plan. He pointed out that because of
1951

16 Feb 51 (Cont.) the short construction and navigation season, construction of all basic facilities would have to be well advanced by Oct 51 if the system was to be operative by 1 Jul 52.

(TS) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 23 Feb 51, Encl to JCS 1899/18, 23 Feb 51, CCS 413.44 (7-1-48) sec 3.

The President approved PJBD Recommendation 51/1 on 14 Apr 51, subject to the availability of the required funds. (For further action, see item of 1 Aug 51.)

(TS) N/H of JCS 1899/18, 20 Apr 51, same file.

23 Apr 51 In Feb 51, CINCNE forwarded a study of "Forces proposed for the Performance of the CINCNE Mission," and CSAF submitted it to the JCS for consideration on 14 Mar 51.

(Decl) JCS 1259/201, 19 Mar 51, CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 24.

On 23 Apr 51, the JCS directed CSAF, as their executive agent, to advise CINCNE that final action on his study had been deferred pending completion of overall force studies, but that programming had been approved for construction, equipping, and manning of 10 US radar installations in the Newfoundland/Labrador area. An aircraft control and warning group to operate these stations would be assigned at an appropriate time, and it was planned to deploy 2 fighter interceptor squadrons to USNEC during the period 1 Jul 52 to 1 Jul 54 when facilities were available. (Previously no combat forces had been allocated to USNEC because of the limited overall availability of forces.)

(Decl) Dec On JCS 1259/204, 23 Apr 51; (Decl) JCS 1259/204, 13 Apr 51; same file, sec 25.

1 May 51 The US and Canada announced agreement in principle, arranged through the PJBD, on certain changes in the March 1941 agreement for US 99-year lease of naval and air bases in Newfoundland. The US had operated four bases in Newfoundland since 1941, but reconsideration had become necessary owing to the
1 May 51 (Cont.)

incorporation of Newfoundland as the tenth Canadian province on 1 Apr 49. Accordingly, Canada had requested that the US negotiate changes in parts of the 1941 agreement regarding customs and excise taxes, income tax arrangements, military postal facilities, and jurisdiction of courts in criminal cases. When Canada had passed the necessary domestic legislation to implement the PJBD agreement, an exchange of notes would take place.


1 Jun 51

The Canadian Air Defence Group was redesignated the Air Defence Command, under Air Vice Marshal C. R. Dunlap.

(3) Seventeen Years of Air Defense, p. 6.

20 Jun 51

The US Section, MCC, forwarded to the JCS on 8 Jun 51 a MCC list of vital installations that might require coordinated US-Canadian defense measures because of their location on or near the Canadian-US border. The contemplated measures included both antiaircraft defense and protection against subversive activities, the latter falling largely outside military responsibility. It was recommended that responsibility for planning and coordinating the provision of antiaircraft defense rest with the CG, Air Defense Command, on the US side, and the AOC, Air Defence Command, on the Canadian side. The US Section, MCC, recommended that the JCS: (1) approve the list of installations and assignment of antiaircraft defense responsibility; (2) direct the Continental US Defense Planning Group to pass the MCC list to the US nonmilitary agencies responsible for protection against subversive activities, requesting those agencies to collaborate with their Canadian counterparts to carry out the necessary protective measures. When the Canadians had also approved the list, it should be forwarded to SecDef. (For further action, see item of 25 Aug 51.)

(TS) JCS 1541/71, 12 Jun 51, CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 28.

The JCS on 20 Jun 51 approved the recommendations of the US Section, MCC.

1951

1 Aug 51  Through an exchange of notes, Canada and the US agreed on a proposed radar extension plan (later designated Pinetree). It involved building 33 radar stations in Canada stretching in a line across southern Canada and up the eastern coast. The US would finance 22 stations and Canada 11. The US Northeast Command would man 9 of the stations in its area, the USAF ADC 8 stations along the southern Canadian border, and the RCAF ADC the other 16 stations. (To provide coverage until the Pinetree Line became operational, Canada set up a 5-station temporary system.)

(U) Seventeen Years of Air Defense, pp. 6-8.

8 Aug 51  The Canadian Government issued Order-in-Council PC 348 providing the legal basis for the operation of radar stations, aircraft ground control systems, and radio stations in Canada by US personnel. On 30 Oct 51, the USAF and Steering Member, PJBD, provided the Order-in-Council to the JCS for information and requested that SecDef determine whether or not the US needed to issue parallel authority to permit operation of Canadian equipment in the US.

(U) JCS 1541/74, 2 Nov 51, CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 29.

25 Aug 51  The US Section, MCC, advised the JCS on 9 Aug 51 that the Canadian Chiefs of Staff had approved the list of vital border installations (see item of 20 Jun 51) subject to certain amendments. The Canadians wanted additions to indicate that: the installations were "essential militarily to the joint Canada-US defense of North America"; when military operating rights were required by the forces of one country in the territory of the other, the military commander would request such rights through his own command channels and the rights would then be negotiated through usual diplomatic channels; authority would be delegated to the responsible commanders to arrange for combined surveys within either country with operational control vested in an officer of the country in which the survey would take place; and delegated authority
1951

25 Aug 51 (Cont.)

would include power to authorize admission
of the necessary survey personnel and
equipment from one country to the other.
The US Section requested JCS approval of
these changes.

(TS) JCS 1541/72, 11 Aug 51, CCS 092 (9-10-45)
sec 29.

The JCS on 25 Aug 51 approved the Canadian
changes and forwarded the revised list of
vital installations to the SecDef. On
6 Sep 51, SecDef informed SecState that
the JCS and Canadian Chiefs of Staff had
approved the conclusions regarding the
defense of the Canada-US border installations
and requested that this information be
furnished the US Section, PJBD.

(TS) Dec On JCS 1541/72, 25 Aug 51; (TS)
Memo, JCS to SecDef, 27 Aug 51; (TS) Ltr,
SecDef to SecState, 6 Sep 51; same file.

25 Sep 51

The SecDef informed SecState that the PJBD
had considered the problems involved in
allowing air defense aircraft of either
the US or Canada to fly over the territory
of the other country to carry out interception
of unidentified aircraft. At its 7-11 May 51
meeting the PJBD had adopted Recommendation
51/4, which permitted interceptor flights
over both countries subject to a number of
stipulations, and the Canadian Government
had approved it on 30 May 51. The CSAF
had already agreed to the provisions of
Recommendation 51/4 as an interim measure,
and SecDef requested that the recommendation
be submitted to the President for full US
approval.

(S) JCS 1541/73, 26 Sep 51, CCS 092 (9-10-45)
sec 29.

The President approved PJBD Recommendation
51/4 on 9 Oct 51.

(S) N/H of JCS 1541/73, 1 Nov 51, same file.
At an informal conference of CJCS, the Canadian Chiefs of Staff, and members of the Canadian Government in Ottawa, 1-2 Aug 51, the Canadians expressed concern over their lack of participation in the US Northeast Command. The CJCS reported that the Canadians seemed to have in mind some sort of combined command with a Canadian deputy commander. The Canadians had been offered a liaison arrangement but had indicated that was not what they wanted. On 2 Oct 51, the CSAF recommended that the JCS inform the Canadians through the PJBD that they did not consider it necessary or desirable at that time to reorganize USNEC into a combined Canada-US command. The CNO concurred with this view on 17 Oct 51.

(Decl) JCS 1259/209, 3 Oct 51; (U) JCS 1259/211, 17 Oct 51; CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 26.

On 24 Oct 51, however, CSAF advised the JCS that Canadian participation in the US Northeast Command would do much to allay Canadian apprehension over US activities in Canada and would be beneficial to military operations in the northeast area. Accordingly, he recommended that the JCS inform the Canadians, through the PJBD, that participation in the form of Canadian representation on the staff of CINCNE would be welcomed but that it was considered both undesirable and unnecessary to convert USNEC to a combined Canada-US command.

(Decl) JCS 1259/214, 24 Oct 51, same file.

On 26 Oct 51, the JCS approved the CSAF recommendation and directed the US Section, PJBD, to inform the Canadians accordingly. The JCS listed the following reasons against conversion to a combined command: USNEC had been established primarily to provide more direct operational control over US forces in Canada and Greenland; the existing command was not territorial and its primary operational functions were associated with support of SAC and MATS; no combat forces were allocated to it and any assigned in the future would be for US air and base defense. The JCS also stated that establishment of a combined or NATO command for the Canada-US region was unlikely in the foreseeable future and, if one should be established, there was no indication that USNEC would be more than a subordinate element.

(Decl) Dec On JCS 1259/214, 26 Oct 51; (S) SM-2585-51 to Chm, US Sec PJBD, 26 Oct 51; CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 26.
26 Oct 51

The JCS approved a Basic Defense Plan for the Continental United States. It assigned responsibility in general terms, leaving detailed planning to subordinate commanders. Primary responsibility for air defense was assigned to the US Air Force, but the other Services were expected to contribute as necessary. In case of hostilities, all defending forces would come under command of CSAF, but until the moment of attack the defensive forces remained scattered among a number of commands. The most important of these were the USAF Air Defense Command and the US Army Antiaircraft Command. The approaches to the Continental US were guarded by forces assigned to CINCLANT, CINCPAC, CINCNE, and CINCAL.

(TS) Dec On JCS 2086/1, 29 Oct 51; (TS) JCS 2086/1, 5 Apr 50; CCS 381 US (5-23-46) PB pt 1A.

31 Dec 51

The US forces assigned to air defense of the North American continent at the end of 1951 consisted of 51 fighter interceptor squadrons, 48 antiaircraft gun battalions, and 65 radar stations. The fighter interceptors were mainly propeller-driven aircraft or early model jets. A few all-weather jets, F-89Bs or F-94As, were available, but the F-94s carried no de-icing equipment. Fighter interceptors carried fixed guns, either .50-caliber machine guns or 20mm cannons. Antiaircraft weapons were 40mm, 90mm, and 120mm guns, and the radars were World War II types, nearly all clustered around only the most vital target areas.

(S) Seventeen Years of Air Defense, p. 9.
18 Jan 52
At its Nov 51 meeting the PJBD adopted two recommendations related to the air defense: (1) Movement of Service Aircraft Across the Canada-US Border, providing for complete reciprocity in the rights enjoyed by aircraft of either country flying over the territory of the other in matters of concern to mutual defense, subject to certain enumerated restrictions; (2) Mutual Reinforcement in Wartime of Air Defense Forces. Canada approved both recommendations on 13 Dec 51, stipulating that approval of 51/5 was subject to provisions to ensure guns were safe and that bombs carried no fuses.

(S) JCS 1541/75, 10 Jan 52; (TS) JCS 1541/76, 10 Jan 52; CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 30.

On 18 Jan 51, the JCS approved both PJBD recommendations, including the Canadian amplification to 51/5.

(S) Dec On JCS 1541/75, 18 Jan 52; (TS) Dec On JCS 1541/76, 18 Jan 52; (Decl) SM-177-52 and SM-178-52 to US MilMembers, PJBD, 18 Jan 52; same file.

The Acting SecDef concurred in the two recommendations on 13 Feb 52 and so informed the PJBD. Subsequently, President Truman approved Recommendation 51/5, and the PJBD agreed on arrangements and procedures, none of which applied to SAC aircraft, for moving aircraft across the international border.

(Decl) Ltrs, Actg SecDef to Chm, US Sec PJBD, 13 Feb 52, CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 30.

(S) JCS KOI 848, 14 Apr 52, same file, sec 31.

16 Apr 52
At a 23 Oct 51 MCC meeting, the Canadians requested a US list of military operating requirements, to include all requirements for bases and facilities already submitted to the Canadian Government but not yet approved, and all other pre-D-day anticipated requirements, indicating the intended use by and importance to the US. The Canadians also requested that the US designate a single military channel for presentation of future requirements. On 7 Apr 52, the US Section, MCC, recommended to the JCS that these lists be provided to the Canadians and that the MCC be designated as the military channel for exchange of information on operating requirements.

(TS) JCS 1541/77, 7 Apr 52, CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 31.
1952

16 Apr 52
(Cont.)
The JCS on 16 Apr 52 approved the US Section's recommendations with certain amendments. Also, to avoid misapplication that had caused confusion in the past, the term "Service-to-Service channel" would thereafter be interpreted to mean direct communications at the Canadian and US Service Chiefs level only.

(TS) Dec On JCS 1541/77, 16 Apr 52; (Decl) SM-981-52 to CSA, CNO, and CSAF, 16 Apr 52; (Decl) SM-982-52 to US Sec, MCC, 16 Apr 52; same file.

5 Nov 52
On 13 Oct 52 the CSAF informed the JCS that US fighter forces were scheduled for deployment to US bases in Canada in the near future. This deployment raised the problem of Canadian apprehension over US military activity in Canada. Accordingly, CSAF proposed a concept in general accord with the Command Appendix to the Canada-US Emergency Defense Plan (MCC 300/3), for submission to the PJBD. By its terms, US fighter aircraft while operating over Canadian territory would come under the overall operational control of the appropriate Canadian military commander. Initially the only forces in this category would be the fighter and aircraft control and warning units of the US Northeast Command. On 29 Oct 52 the CNO recommended that, rather than moving immediately to the governmental level in the PJBD, the proposal be submitted first to the MCC, whose recommendations would come to the Canadian and US Chiefs of Staff for approval.

(Decl) JCS 1259/253, 15 Oct 52, CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 33. (TS) JCS 1259/258, 29 Oct 52, same file, sec 34.

On 5 Nov 52 the JCS agreed to refer the matter to the MCC, requesting the US Section to seek a military agreement providing for Canadian operational control of US defense forces operating from bases in Canada. (For further action, see item of 10 Dec 52.)

(Decl) Dec On JCS 1259/258, 5 Nov 52, CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 34. (Decl) JCS 1259/260, 4 Nov 52; (Decl) SM-2559-52 to Chm, US Sec MCC, 5 Nov 52; same file, sec 35.
1952

10 Dec 52 The MCC on 21 Nov 52 reached agreement on Canadian operational control of US air defense forces operating from bases within Canada. The agreement took the form of a revised Command Appendix (App F) to the Canada-US Emergency Defense Plan. The general provisions of the appendix were the following: (1) any forces located in Canada and employed in execution of the plan would operate under a commander designated by Canada; (2) any forces in the US and Alaska and employed in execution of the plan would have a commander designated by the US; (3) forces of either country serving in the territory of the other would be under immediate command of a commander designated by their own government. These provisions did not apply, however, to forces stationed at the US leased bases in Canada (Argentia, Harmon, and Pepperrell, in Newfoundland). The forces there, all under the US Northeast Command, were covered by a special provision: US air defense forces (fighter aircraft, aircraft control and warning units, and AA artillery) when operating over Canadian territory would be considered to be employed in tasks implicit in the Emergency Defense Plan; they would be under Canadian operational control. (Operational control was defined as "the power of directing, coordinating and controlling the operational activities of deployed units which may, or may not, be under the command or operational command of the authority exercising operational control"; it specifically excluded redeployment.) Arrangements for exercising this operational control were to be agreed upon by the Canadian AOC, Air Defence Command, and the US CINCNE.

(TS) JCS 1259/268, 28 Nov 52, CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 36.

On 10 Dec 52 the JCS approved the revised Command Appendix, informed the US Section, MCC, and directed CSAF to prepare implementing instructions to CINCNE for JCS approval. (For further action, see items of 2 Mar and 2 Apr 53.)

(TS) Dec On JCS 1259/268, 10 Dec 52, same file.
12 Dec 52

The CSAP informed the JCS on 1 Dec 52 that the target date of 1 Jul 52, previously approved by the JCS (see item of 16 Feb 51), for the extended radar program for CONUS and Canada had not been met. The US-Canadian Project Pinetree Office had recommended a new date of 1 Jul 54, and the CSAP recommended that Canadian concurrence with that date be sought through the PJBD.

(Decl) JCS 1899/20, 3 Dec 52, CCS 413.44 (7-1-48) sec 3.

On 12 Dec 52 the JCS approved the recommendation and instructed the US Section, PJBD, accordingly.

(Decl) Dec On JCS 1899/20, 12 Dec 52, same file.

22 Dec 52

The SecDef on 17 Dec 52 asked for JCS comment on a draft Presidential policy statement on an early warning system. The draft indicated that recent technical advances made it possible, for the first time, to envisage the establishment at acceptable cost of a distant early warning system designed to give 3 to 6 hours warning of aircraft approaching over land and sea approaches to the US. The draft also included provision for the DOD to develop, install, and operate the system with $75 million to be included in the FY 1955 budget for that purpose and a target date for completion of 31 Dec 55.

(TS) JCS 1899/21, 18 Dec 52, CCS 413.44 (7-1-48) sec 3.

On 22 Dec 52, the JCS informed SecDef that the proposed Presidential statement should be withheld for several reasons, including the following: the implication that a proven system for early warning would be available by a set date was premature; such an early warning system would not provide unequivocal warning unless backed up by other extensive systems; and the statement would focus undue attention on defensive as opposed to offensive measures.

(TS) Dec On JCS 1899/22, 22 Dec 52; (TE) Memo, JCS to SecDef, 22 Dec 52; same file.
22 Dec 52
(Cont.)
The Deputy SecDef on 23 Dec 52 forwarded the JCS views to the Executive Secretary, NSC, with his concurrence. (For further action, see item of 31 Dec 52.)

(TS) JCS 1899/23, 30 Dec 52, CCS 413.44 (7-1-48) sec 4.

27 Dec 52
The Deputy SecDef replied to a recommendation of the US Section, PJBD, of 28 Nov 52 that Canada be notified through the MCC of any significant changes in personnel or activities at the 99-year leased bases in Newfoundland during peacetime. He informed the Chairman, US Section, PJBD, that the DOD was willing as "a matter of courtesy and not of obligation" to give Canada advance notice of changes on a voluntary basis, but it would still be necessary to clear classified information in accordance with the policies of the State-Defense Military Information Control Committee.

(S-GP 1) Ltr, DepSecDef to Chm, US Sec PJBD, 27 Dec 52, CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 37.

31 Dec 52
The President approved NSC 139, a policy statement on continental defense providing for construction of an early warning system. NSC 139 recognized that the estimated time scale on which the USSR might possess sufficient nuclear weapons to deliver heavily destructive attacks on the US required planning for an effective system of air, sea, and land defense. A key element of this system would be a radar screen to afford from 3 to 6 hours warning, and NSC 139 designated DOD to develop and install such an early warning line as "a matter of high urgency" with completion by 31 Dec 55.

(TS) NSC 139, 31 Dec 52, CCS 413.44 (7-1-48) sec 4.

On 12 Jan 53, SecDef called on the JCS to initiate planning of an effective system of air, sea, and land defenses with a target date for readiness of 31 Dec 55. On 19 Jan 53, the SecDef directed the JCS to prepare plans for the establishment and operation of the early warning system, assigning the Department of the Air Force responsibility for the initial phase of the system (acceleration of development of necessary equipment and installation of several test stations) under the name Project COUNTERCHANGE.

(TS) JCS 1899/24, 15 Jan 53; (TS) JCS 1899/25, 21 Jan 53; same file.
8 Jan 53
At a meeting on 10-13 Dec 52, the MCC agreed that its terms of reference were adequate to accomplish its function as the primary bilateral military agency concerned with recommendations for the security of Canada and the US (including Alaska). The MCC also restated its procedures and channels of communication.

(S) JCS 1541/81, 24 Dec 52, CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 32.
The JCS approved the restated procedures and channels of communication on 8 Jan 53, and the Canadian Chiefs of Staff did likewise on 22 Jan 53.

(S) Dec On JCS 1541/81, 9 Jan 53; (S) N/H of JCS 1541/81, 23 Jan 53; same file.

2 Mar 53
At a 25 Feb-2 Mar 53 MCC meeting it was stated that the Canadian Chiefs of Staff had approved the revised Command Appendix to the Canada-US Emergency Defense Plan (see item of 10 Dec 52) which provided for Canadian operational control of US fighter forces operating from bases in Canada.

(Decl) Memo, US Sec MCC to Secy JCS, 6 Mar 53; (Decl) SM-419-53 to CSA, CNO, and CSAF, 9 Mar 53; CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 38. (TS) N/H of JCS 2159/268, 10 Mar 53, same file, sec 36.

2 Apr 53
The JCS approved CSAF's proposed implementing instructions to CINCNE for the revised Command Appendix to the Canada-US Emergency Defense Plan (see item of 10 Dec 52), giving Canada operational control of US fighter forces operating from bases in Canada. CINCNE was designated as the immediate commander of US air defense forces assigned to his command and was direct to make the necessary arrangements with the AOC, RCAN Air Defence Command, for the latter's assumption of operational control. CINCNE was authorized to plan concert with the AOC, Air Defence Command, within areas of assigned responsibility for the defense of Newfoundland, Labrador, and the northeast approaches to North America. CINCNE was authorized to exchange personnel between his headquarters and that of the Air Defence Command.

(Decl) Dec On JCS 1259/279, 2 Apr 53, CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 38.

9 Apr 53
During Jan 53 the US had provided information to Canada, through the PJBD, on the COUNTERCHANGE project, the test phase of development of the early warning system (see item of 31 Dec 52). In a note to the US on 27 Feb 53, Canada proposed establishment of a Canada-US Military Study Group (MSG), which should consider those aspects of the North American Defense system in general, and the early warning system in particular, that were of mutual concern. Canadian officials indicated informally
that they were not prepared to consider proposals for extension of the early warning program past the COUNTERCHANGE phase until they had had time to review the report of the MSG.

On 9 Apr 53 the JCS approved a CSAF recommendation for the establishment of a US Section of the MSG. The CSAF would serve as the executive agent and the US Section would include: A USAF general officer as chairman; representatives from USAF Headquarters, the Air Defense Command, the Air Research and Development Command, the Alaskan Air Command, and the Northeast Air Command; and representatives from the Departments of Army and Navy as desired.

(TS) JCS 1899/28, 3 Apr 53; (TS) Dec On JCS 1899/28, 10 Apr 53; (TS) SM-772-53 to Steering Mbr, US Sec PJBd, 10 Apr 53; CCS 413.44 (7-1-48) sec 4.

Subsequently, the Secretaries of Defense and State concurred in the establishment of the US Section of the MSG, the latter requesting participation of a State Department representative in the Section. On 19 May 53, the Acting Secretary of State informed the SecDef that he proposed to conclude an agreement with Canada on this matter by replying favorably to the Canadian note.

(TS) JCS 1899/31, 6 May 53; (TS) JCS 1899/34, 1 Jun 53; same file, sec 5.

Beginning in Jan 52 the JCS periodically considered seaward extension of the CONUS land-based radar system to critical areas contiguous to the East and West Coasts. The US Navy and Air Force could not agree, however, and the conflicting Service views were ultimately expressed in the US Naval Basic Defense Plan for Continental United States (NBDP 1-5; JCS 1899/27) of 30 Mar 53 and the Air Force Plan for Defense of Continental United States Against Air Attack (DOCONUSAA) (JCS 1899/36) of 13 Jun 53. The Air Force plan called for 20 picket vessels to operate 8 stations in extension of radar cover off the Atlantic and Pacific coastal areas, but the Navy plan did not provide forces for that specific mission. There was also an unresolved question of who would have operational control of the picket ships, a naval commander or the commander charged with air defense of CONUS.

(TS) JCS 1899/27, 1 Apr 53, CCS 413.44 (7-1-48) sec 4. (TS) JCS 1899/36, 17 Jun 53, same file, sec 5.

The Continental US Defense Planning Group presented the JCS on 11 Jul 53 a review of these Service plans and the divergent views contained therein. The
1953

11 Jul 53 (Cont.)
Planning Group recommended that the JCS direct CNO to revise his plan to provide forces for the Air Force plan that would operate in close support of the air defense commanders to extend the radar coverage seaward, but the JCS took no action on that recommendation.

(TS) JCS 1899/40, 11 Jul 53, CCS 413.44 (7-1-48) sec 6.

29 Jul 53
The Continental US Defense Planning Group on 30 Jun 53 submitted to the JCS a Joint Outline Plan for an Early Warning System. The plan, which would fulfill the requirement of NSC 139 (see item of 31 Dec 52) by providing for the early warning portion of the Air Defense System, included the following provisions: existing unilateral and joint command structures would be used insofar as possible to establish and operate continuously an early warning system to consist of a chain of electronic high and low altitude detectors across roughly the 54th Parallel (the Southern Canada Line) and airborne early warning (AEW) and picket ship barriers would be joined to the Southern Canada Line at the Atlantic and Pacific ends; a northern line (DEW Line) joining the Alaskan Air Defense System to the Northeast Air Command's air defense system at Probisher Bay would be constructed; and the CSAF would retain command over all USAF forces and exercise operational control over all other US military forces operating as part of the early warning system and not specifically assigned to the unified commands of the JCS.

(TS) JCS 1899/39, 30 Jun 53, CCS 413.44 (7-1-48) sec 6.

The JCS considered the Outline Plan on 14 Jul 53 and returned it to the Planning Group with instructions for revision. The Planning Group submitted a revised Outline Plan to the JCS on 20 Jul 53. Although by now in substantial agreement on most features of the plan, the JCS held divergent views on one key matter, which they submitted to SecDef for resolution on 29 Jul 53. The Army and Air Force believed all aircraft engaged in the early warning system should be provided by USAF; CNO held that Naval planes should participate in the system. (Not immediately decided by SecDef, this matter was overtaken by events.)

In June 53 the NSC Planning Board established a Continental Defense Committee, under the chairmanship of LTG Harold R. Hull, USA (Ret.), to review planned programs, organization, and other continental defense matters. The Committee report, circulated on 22 Jul 53 as NSC 159, stated a need for prompt action on the matter of continental defense. Among other things, the report assigned highest priority to the following programs: the southern Canada early warning system, including the seaward extensions; and seaward extension of contiguous radar coverage.


At ASD(ISA) request, the JCS reviewed NSC 159 and informed the SecDef on 4 Aug 53 that: Service plans for an effective system of land, sea, and air defense and the Joint Outline Plan for an Early Warning System would provide a defense system to reduce materially the effects of a direct military attack against CONUS; existing machinery within the DOD, together with certain other Federal agencies, ought to be adequate to ensure continuing, coordinated evaluation of the net capabilities of the USSR to inflict direct injury on the US and action in the field of continental defense; resources allocated for development of defensive programs should be directly related to US and allied offensive retaliatory capability; programs to increase aircraft identification should be accorded the same priority as the establishment of a program for an early warning system; priorities of programs for detection and area defense against clandestine introduction and detonation in place of atomic demolition weapons against selected critical target systems should be reviewed from time to time in light of the changing threat.

(TS) Dec On JCS 1899/52, 4 Aug 53; Memo, JCS to SecDef, 4 Aug 53; CCS 381 US (5-23-46) sec 25.

SecDef informed the Chairman, US Section, PJBD, on 11 Aug 53 that the US should do everything it could to impress the Canadians with the fact that the US considered them partners in defense arrangements and would exert itself to prevent any unauthorized disclosure of joint plans. The SecDef wished to establish a closer relationship with the Canadian defense authorities and would encourage the JCS to work more closely with the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee.

(C) JCS 1541/83, 14 Aug 53, CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 33.
27 Aug 53

The NSC on 6 Aug 53 considered NSC 159 (see item of 4 Aug 53) and requested the JCS to submit recommendations on continental defense including views on an integrated military program and the priorities, size, and timing of these various programs.


On 27 Aug 53, the JCS agreed on the following priorities, which they forwarded to SecDef the following day:

Priority I: (1) complete as soon as possible a southern Canada early warning system of radars across the 54th Parallel, and extend seaward a minimum barrier of ships and aircraft in the Atlantic approaches at the same time the southern Canada line became effective; install a Pacific barrier when forces were available; (2) extend to seaward contiguous radar coverage as soon as possible; (3) provide methods of aircraft identification as soon as possible.

In Priority II: (1) provide an air control system as soon as possible; (2) provide low frequency analysis and recording (LOFAR) for distant detection of submarines by 31 Dec 55; (3) provide gap filler radars for low altitude surveillance, with priority to areas in northeast US to parallel installation of the air control system; (4) increase fighter interceptor forces by 31 Dec 55; (5) increase AA forces by 31 Dec 55; (6) decide on the northern Canadian early warning line (DEW Line) after completion of Project CORRODE feasibility testing and a MSG report.

Priority III: (1) improve harbor defenses; (2) increase coastal escorts and coastal ASW patrol.


22 Sep 53

The JCS considered a draft NSC policy (NSC 159/3) on continental defense, designed to replace NSC 139 (see item of 31 Dec 52). They informed the SecDef that they were engaged in development of a strategic concept to meet the requirements imposed by both the Soviet threat and the dictates of a sound economy. They recommended that the draft NSC policy not be approved until they had completed their strategy review.

(TS) JCS 1899/63, 19 Sep 53; (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, 22 Sep 53; CCS 381 US (5-23-46) sec 27.
1953

22 Sep 53 (Cont.)

On 25 Sep 53 the President approved NSC 159/4, containing a statement of US policy on continental defense, as a guide to the Executive Departments in implementing their programs during FY 1954 and future years.

(TS) NSC 159/4, 25 Sep 53, same file, sec 28.

26 Sep 53

At the recommendation of the Continental US Defense Planning Group, the JCS approved guidance on military requirements for early warning installations in Canada, based on the Joint Outline Plan for an Early Warning System (see item of 29 Jul 53) then under consideration. They furnished this guidance to the MSG (through the CSAF), stating that it was desirable as a first step for the MSG to report acceptance in principle of the requirement for an electronic early warning system generally located along the Alcan Highway and the 54th Parallel from Alaska to the east coast of Canada.

(TS) Dec on JCS 1899/64, 26 Sep 53, CCS 413.4 (7-1-48) sec 7. (TS) SM-1655-53 to CSAF, 26 Sep 53, same file, sec 8.

20 Oct 53

At a meeting on 7-8 Oct 53, the MSG agreed to submit an interim report to the Canadian and US Chiefs of Staff recommending the installation of an early warning system between Alaska and Newfoundland across North America generally along the 55th Parallel (a system that eventually became known as the Mid-Canada Line). It was needed to correct the inadequacies of the early warning time then provided by the programmed air defense system of the two countries.

(S) JCS 1899/69, 20 Oct 53, CCS 413.44 (7-1-48) sec 8.

On 20 Oct 53 the JCS noted the MSG report and concurred in the recommendation therein. They requested the US Section of the PJBD to seek Canadian agreement for an early warning system as outlined in the MSG report. On 6 Nov 53, Canada agreed to the establishment of the proposed early warning line, indicating a readiness to proceed with the necessary surveys and siting. (For further action, see item of 8 Apr 54.)

21 Nov 53

The SecDef on 27 Oct 53 referred to the President's approval of the statement of policy on continental defense (NSC 159/4—see item of 22 Sep 53) and asked the JCS to complete a more precise definition of the programs, with phasing and costing, for the seaward extensions of the southern Canadian early warning system, fighter interceptor forces, and antiaircraft forces. The following day, the Special Assistant to the President requested that this information be furnished in the DOD progress report on NSC 159/4 because there was special interest in programs that required Canadian cooperation.


On 21 Nov 53 the JCS forwarded Army, Navy and Air Force memorandums providing, respectively, more precise definitions of continental defense programs for antiaircraft forces, seaward extensions of the southern Canadian early warning system, and fighter interceptor forces. The JCS informed SecDef that they had approved the programs contained in the Service memorandums and that every effort would be made to meet the requirements of NSC 159/4. They did not agree, however, that the continental defense program should take preclusive priority over essential offensive programs, and they considered that this program should be adjusted in relation to support available for other essential commitments. The JCS also submitted to SecDef on 21 Nov 53 a detailed progress report on planning for implementation of DOD responsibility in programs for continental defense as provided in NSC 159/4.


27 Nov 53

The SecDef on 19 Nov 53 requested JCS comments on changes to the staffing and functioning of the US Section of the PJBD to make Canadian and US defense collaboration more effective. Among other things he proposed that the military members of the US Section report to him, through their Steering Member, and work in close coordination with the ASD(ISA). The SecDef also asked about the possibility of a US liaison officer in Ottawa or a small US joint military office there as a counterpart to the Canadian Joint Staff Office in Washington.

(Decl) JCS 1541/85, 20 Nov 53, CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 34.

On 27 Nov 53 the JCS informed SecDef that they had considered the whole problem of Canada-US relations
pertaining to defense, including an examination of the three organizations (PJBD, MCC, and MSG) charged with US-Canadian military cooperation; their mode of operation, membership, and responsibilities; and the difficulties encountered by these organizations. They had found that these organizations provided an effective means for carrying out collaborative programs. The JCS noted a Canadian reluctance to permit bilateral planning during the period 1951 to October 1953, but they added that currently there seemed to be a general change in the Canadian attitude and that progress was being made. Therefore, since an effective organization already existed for Canadian-US military cooperation, the JCS believed that no changes should be made in the terms of reference of the existing agencies. In addition, the JCS considered that any sort of US joint agency or liaison officer in Ottawa would detract from and possibly destroy the close relationship currently in effect.

(S) Dec On JCS 1541/86, 1 Dec 53; (S) Memo, JCS to SecDef, 27 Nov 53; same file.

At CJCS request, CSAF presented the JCS a review of command arrangements for the defense of the US in order to identify the best method of bringing the air defense function under "more immediate cognizance of the JCS and meeting the increasing Soviet threat of nuclear attack. At that time CSAF discharged his responsibility for US air defense through a unilateral USAF command while exercising operational control of certain other forces with an air defense capability pursuant to mutual agreement among the Services. Further, he said, there was a closely integrated system of coordination with Canadian and Mexican agencies and with such elements of the US Government as the CAA, FCC, and Federal Civil Defense Administration. CSAF found this arrangement an effective and economical working solution to the problem. He believed that neither a unified nor a specified command as usually defined would be suitable for the air defense of the US and that more frequent reports on his part could meet the JCS need for cognizance. The JCS considered the CSAF paper but deferred action on it pending submission of CJCS views. (For further action, see item of 22 Jan 54.)

(TS) JCS 1899/89, 16 Dec 53, CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 45
(TS) JCS 1899/100, 25 Jan 54, same file, sec 46.
At a 17-18 Dec 53 meeting, the MSG considered problems involved in the selection of and specifications for equipment for the Mid-Canada segment of the Early Warning System for North America (previously referred to as the southern Canadian early warning system). The MSG agreed to submit to their respective chiefs of staff a report containing recommendations on this matter.

(TS) JCS 1899/95, 7 Jan 54, CCS 413.44 (7-1-48) sec 8.

On 8 Jan 54, the JCS approved the MSG report and concurred that early detailed planning should be undertaken jointly by the USAF and the RCAF to develop mutually acceptable military characteristics for the Mid-Canada segment of the Early Warning System and to complete selection and specifications for the equipment. The JCS informed the PJBD of their action.

(TS) Dec On JCS 1899/95, 8 Jan 54; (TS) SM-14-54 to Chm, US Sec PJBD, 8 Jan 54; same file.

On 30 Jun 54, the Canadian Chiefs of Staff informed the JCS that the Canadian Government had agreed to the construction of the Mid-Canada Line as a Canadian project at Canadian expense. (This agreement was made formal by a Canadian note to the State Department on 14 Jul 54.) The Canadians inquired if their understanding that the US intended to proceed simultaneously with the seaward extension in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans was correct.

(TS) JCS 1899/134, 21 Jul 54; (S) Canadian Note No. 463 to SecState, 14 Jul 54, Encl to JCS 1899/139, 12 Aug 54; CCS 413.44 (7-1-48) sec 8.

The CJCS replied to the Canadian Chiefs of Staff on 8 Jul 54 that it was the US intention to bring the seaward extensions into readiness progressively with the Atlantic portion (Argentia-to-Azores) essentially complete by 1957 and the Pacific portion (Kodiak-to-Hawaii) as soon as possible thereafter. (For further action, see item of 30 Jul 54.)

(TS) Ltr, CJCS to Chm Canadian Chiefs of Staff, 8 Jul 54, Encl to JCS 1899/134, 21 Jul 54, same file

The CJCS on 15 Jan 54 brought to JCS attention the emphasis placed on air defense by the President, the HSC, and the Senate Committee on Armed Services as well as the fact that at least one of the special committees on continental defense had commented
adversely on the air defense command arrangements. In an era when enemy capabilities to inflict massive damage on the continental US by surprise air attack were increasing rapidly, the CJCS considered it the duty of the JCS to establish a suitable "joint" command for the air defense of the US. He used the term "joint," realizing that the necessary terms of reference might not fit exactly the current definition of a "unified" command. He requested JCS approval of such a joint command.

(1954) JCS 1899/100, 25 Jan 54, CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 46.

On 22 Jan 54, the JCS approved in principle "the establishment of a JCS command for the air defense of the United States" and directed preparation of the necessary terms of reference. (For further action, see item of 16 Jul 54.)

(1954) JCS 1899/100, 25 Jan 54; (C) SM-59-54 to JSPC, 25 Jan 54; same file.

1 Feb 54

The JCS agreed that the Continental US Defense Planning Group was no longer needed and disestablished it effective 1 Feb 54. The personnel and functions of the Planning Group were transferred to the Joint Strategic Plans Group of the Joint Staff.


15 Feb 54

The NSC on 11 Feb 54 circulated a revised draft policy statement, NSC 5408, on continental defense, designed to replace NSC 159/4 (see item of 23 Sep 53). The principal change was to place fighter interceptor and antiaircraft forces in the category of programs having the highest priority and to make clear that increased emphasis on continental defense was not to jeopardize the objective of a balanced budget.


On 15 Feb 54, the JCS found the draft statement acceptable subject to minor amendments, and the President approved the revised policy on continental defense as NSC 5408 on 24 Feb 54.

1954

24 Feb 54

The Acting SecDef on 19 Feb 54 informed the JCS that it had become increasingly apparent that the work of the PJBD involved budgetary, public relations, and other nonstrategic matters, and he requested them to instruct the Steering Member to report to SecDef through the ASD(ISA). The JCS would still be requested to comment on matters within their purview. The JCS on 24 Feb 54 so instructed the Steering Member.

(S) JCS 1541/87, 2 Mar 54; (S) SM-171-54 to Steering Member, PJBD, 24 Feb 54; CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 36.

Subsequently guidance for the Military Members, US Section, PJBD, was issued as DOD Directive 5132.5, 3 May 54. President Eisenhower on 26 Feb 54 had authorized SecDef to make changes thereafter to the US Armed Forces membership on the PJBD on the recommendation of the Secretary of the Military Department concerned.

(U) 1st N/H of JCS 1541/87, 14 May 54; (U) JCS 1541/88, 5 Mar 54, same file.

8 Apr 54

On 5 Apr 54 the JCS approved, with minor amendments, a draft public statement on continental defense intended for simultaneous release by the US and Canadian Governments. The statement was issued in Ottawa and by SecDef in Washington on 8 Apr 54. It reviewed the cooperation of the two countries since World War II in developing a defense of North America against air attack, stressing the continuous collaboration and joint planning that had occurred. The statement reviewed the four-year effort to construct the Pinetree Line of detection and aircraft control radars, and it revealed the recent intergovernmental agreement to proceed with an early warning radar system generally to the north of the settled territory in Canada (the Mid-Canada Line), as well as the US undertaking to extend early warning barriers into the seaward approaches. It was noted that "the Alaska radar system is coordinated with those in Canada and the continental United States, and the development of airborne radar is well advanced." As evidence of the close cooperation between US and Canadian air defense commands, "unidentified aircraft are investigated by the most immediately available interceptor force, whether Canadian or American." The final paragraph of the statement related the entire effort to NATO: "The Defense of North America is part of the defense of the North Atlantic Region to which both Canada and the United States are pledged as signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty."

At a 2-3 Jun 54 meeting, the MSG decided that intergovernmental agreement should be concluded on the need to establish a distant early warning (DEW) line and so recommended to the US and Canadian Chiefs of Staff. On 9 Jul 54, the JCS approved the MSG recommendation and requested the US Section of the PJBD to seek Canadian agreement on this matter.

(S) JCS 1899/125, 29 Jun 54; (S) Dec On JCS 1899/125, 9 Jul 54; (S) SM-630-54 to Chm, US Sec PJBD, 9 Jul 54; CCS 413.44 (7-1-48) sec 8.

A Canadian note of 2 Sep 54 to the Secretary of State advised that the Canadian Government agreed in principle to the need for the establishment of a distant early warning line across the most northerly practicable part of North America, without prejudice to the extent of Canadian participation and subject to further review when necessary studies and cost estimates were complete.

(S) Canadian Note No. 580 to SecState, Encl to JCS 1899/149, 15 Sep 54, same file.

Agreement on the location, characteristics, operational concept, and forces and facility requirements for the DEW line were the subject of long and difficult negotiations that extended from late 1954 throughout 1955 and into 1956. These problems are contained in the JCS 1899 series in file location CCS 413.44 (7-10-48) sections 9-13.

As finally resolved, the DEW line comprised: a land-based route and western and eastern sea extensions. The land portion ran from Cape Dyer, Baffin Island, generally within two degrees of the 69th Parallel, to Cape Lisburne, Alaska. The Western sea extension ran from Umnak in the Aleutians to Midway Island, and six land-based radars extended coverage from the last Alaskan radar at Naknek out to Umnak. In 1956 two eastern extension routes were approved: one from Cape Farewell, Greenland, to the Azores; the other across Greenland to Iceland and then to the United Kingdom. The DEW line was declared technically ready by 15 Jul 57, but many more months were required before the line met required performance standards.

(S) Seventeen Years of Air Defense, MCRAD Reference Paper No. 9, pp. 16-17.

During the period Feb-Jun 54 the JCS considered the terms of reference for a joint air defense command
16 Jul 54 (Cont.)

(see item of 22 Jan 54) but were unable to reach agreement. They did agree on 25 Jun 54 to refer their individual proposals on the matter to an ad hoc committee to resolve as many of the divergent views as possible and to define the remaining issues.

(TS) JCS 1899/115, 28 May 54; (TS) JCS 1899/122, 22 Jun 54; CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 48. (TS) JCS 1899/124, 24 Jun 54; (TS) JCS 1899/126, 26 Jun 54; same file, sec 49.

On 16 Jul 54, the JCS considered the report of the ad hoc committee and approved the establishment of the Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) as a joint command for the defense of CONUS against air attack. They designated the Department of the Air Force to be the executive agency for the command and designated the Headquarters, USAF Air Defense Command, augmented by representatives from the other Services, as Headquarters, CONAD. The JCS also approved the terms of reference and mission for CONAD. The Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command (CINCONAD) would be a USAF general officer and would also be designated Commander, USAF Air Defense Command. He would exercise operational control over all forces assigned or otherwise made available by the JCS or other authority. The command would consist initially of the USAF Air Defense Command, the US Army Antiaircraft Command, and a Naval command composed of forces of the contiguous Naval radar coverage system. The commanders of this Navy command and the Army Antiaircraft Command would serve as principal advisers to CINCONAD on Navy and Army matters, respectively, and a Marine Corps representative would be assigned to the CONAD staff.

Forces and operations of the seaward extensions of the early warning system would continue under CINCLANT and CINCPAC, and the early warning installations in Alaska and the US Northeast Command would continue under CINCAL and CINCNE. Those commanders, however, were to support CINCONAD in accordance with plans approved by the JCS and mutual agreements by the commanders concerned to insure that plans for and operations of the elements of the early warning system would be responsive to the needs of CINCONAD.

(TS) JCS 1899/128, 1 Jul 54; (C) JCS 1899/133, 19 Jul 54; CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 49.

On 26 Jul 54 the JCS informed SecDef of their decision to establish CONAD and requested his approval of the mission statement, organizational structure, and terms of reference.
16 Jul 54
(Cont.)

(Decl) Dec On JCS 1899/135, 26 Jul 54; (Decl) Memo, JCS to SecDef, 26 Jul 54; same file, sec 50.

On 30 Jul 54, the SecDef approved the establishment of CONAD as a joint command effective 1 Sep 54 and the designation of the Department of the Air Force as the executive agency for the command. The SecDef stated that his office would notify the Canadian Government of this decision before release of the public announcement that was in preparation.

(Decl) N/H of JCS 1899/135, 4 Aug 54, same file.

2 Aug 54

The JCS informed the US Section of the MSG that they had approved a program to provide for the seaward extensions of the Mid-Canada Line from Argentia to the Azores in the Atlantic and from Kodiak to Hawaii in the Pacific. In anticipation of a Canadian question at the next MSG meeting concerning movement of the western terminal of the programmed Atlantic extension to the tip of Greenland, the JCS opposed any modification in the existing program for the Line or its extensions.

(TS) Dec On JCS 1899/137, 2 Aug 54; (TS) JCS 1899/137, 29 Jul 54; (TS) SM-665-54 to Chm, US Sec MSG, 2 Aug 54; CCS 413.44 (7-1-48) sec 8.

1 Sep 54

The JCS established the Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) with headquarters at Ent Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado, under the command of General Benjamin W. Chidlaw, USAF, as CINCONAD. CINCONAD's mission was as approved by the JCS on 16 Jul 54 (see item) and forces initially allocated to CONAD were those of the USAF Air Defense Command, the Army Antiaircraft Command, and the naval forces of the contiguous radar coverage system.

(S) Fifteen Years of Air Defense, NORAD Historical Reference Paper No. 3, pp. 47-49.

5 Nov 54

The Canadian Chiefs of Staff suggested to the JCS on 30 Sep 54 a reappraisal of the problem of continental defense, in view of the advances made by the Soviet Union in the fields of mass destruction weapons and bomber aircraft and the possible effects of fallout of atomic and thermonuclear weapons. Specifically, the Canadians proposed a joint Canada-US study to define clearly the effects of fallout. Upon completion of that study, they proposed three further studies: on the effects of fallout on present plans for the defense of North America; a reexamination of the weapon systems of the two countries for the defense of North America; and a
determination of a joint approach for implementation of revised weapon systems.

(TS) JCS 1899/159, 9 Oct 54, CCS 381 (5-23-46) sec 49.

On 5 Nov 54 the JCS agreed that the studies suggested by the Canadian Chiefs of Staff were not required since the problem of fallout from TN weapons did not affect the objectives of the continental defense system. Moreover, studies then under way had the common objective of suggesting remedies for the deficiencies in their weapon systems and defense plans. The JCS concluded that there was a requirement for discussions of a broad nature to collate information available and under study. They believed that it should be made clear to the Canadians that US military representatives were ready at any time to discuss these matters and that, when the legal bars had been removed, such discussions could include weapons effects. They so informed the Canadian Chiefs of Staff on 10 Nov 54.

(TS) Dec On JCS 1899/161, 5 Nov 54; (TS) Ltr, CJCS to Chm Canadian Chiefs of Staff, 10 Nov 54; same file, sec 50.
8 Feb 55

On 7-8 Feb 55, personnel of CONAD and the RCAF Air Defence Command briefed the MSG. They pointed out that Soviet development of high-performance long-range jet bombers as well as both atomic and thermonuclear weapons had greatly increased the Soviet threat to North America. The personnel of the two commands outlined trends in cooperation and command that might be developed between CONAD and the RCAF Air Defence Command and proposed that the most effective organizational arrangement for the air defense of North America was the integration of the two air defense systems and the ultimate establishment of a combined command.

At the conclusion of the briefing, the MSG agreed that each section would bring this matter to the attention of the higher authorities in their respective military establishments. Subsequently, the Canadian Chiefs of Staff concurred in principle in the need for a combined air defense command but did not submit the proposal to the Canadian Cabinet. (For further action, see item of 14 Dec 55.)

(S) Memo, US Steering Mbr PJBD to Distribution, 9 May 55, CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 40. (S) JCS 1541/102, 5 Dec 55, same file, sec 41.

18 Feb 55

The JCS approved and forwarded to the SecDef a revised Unified Command Plan, which took account of the establishment of CONAD. The SecDef approved the revised UCP and the JCS issued it on 9 Mar 55.

(TS) Dec On JCS 1259/337, 18 Feb 55; (C) N/H of JCS 1259/337, 10 Mar 55, CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 53. (C) SM-180-55 to CINCAL et al., 9 Mar 55, same file, sec 54.

1 Mar 55

At an Aug 54 MSG meeting and an Oct 54 PJBD meeting, US and Canadian representatives discussed changes in the working relationships between the air defense agencies of the two countries in light of the establishment of CONAD. At the PJBD meeting, the USAF Member proposed certain changes in the composition of the US Section of the MSG to reflect the
establishment of CONAD, and the Canadian Air Force Member of the PJBD concurred. These changes, which the CSAF subsequently carried out, substituted CONAD representation for US Air Defense Command representation and designated the USAF Member of the PJBD as Chairman of the US Section, MSG.

(TS) JCS 1899/187, 21 Feb 55, CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 54.

The JCS on 1 Mar 55 noted the changes in the composition of the US Section, MSG.


26 Oct 55

CINCONAD on 31 Jan 55 submitted to the JCS his Air Defense Plan, Continental United States (1-55), providing for the employment of forces assigned or otherwise allocated to the air defense of the continental US should war occur.


On 26 Oct 55 the JCS approved the plan subject to certain modification for accuracy and clarity. They informed CINCONAD of their action on 28 Oct 55. One of the JCS modifications was a change to provide that the CG, Army Antiaircraft Command, would provide AA defense forces to the extent appropriate units were available and would command these AA units except insofar as operational control was assigned to subordinate joint air defense commanders. The JCS made this change on the grounds that Service component commanders under CINCONAD were to provide combat-ready forces and joint commanders under CINCONAD were responsible for combat operations.


14 Dec 55

The CSAF called to JCS attention on 5 Dec 55 the CONAD-RCAF Air Defence Command briefing given the MSG (see item of 8 Feb 55) on the possible integration of the Canadian and US air defense commands and the fact that the Canadian Chiefs of Staff had approved in
principle the establishment of such a combined command. The CSAF recommended that the JCS approve in principle the desirability of establishing a combined Canada-US North American air defense command and that they inform the Canadian Chiefs of Staff, asking for suggestions regarding further action. He also recommended that he, together with CSA and CNO, be charged with developing the details of a combined air defense command.

(8) JCS 1541/102, 5 Dec 55, CCS 092 (9-10-45)
sec 41.

On 14 Dec 55, the JCS agreed to refer the CSAF recommendations to the JSPC for further study based on the following guidance: (1) a combined Canada-US command was probably not acceptable to the Canadians at that time and should not be proposed; (2) the proposal to the Canadians should be limited to the peacetime integration of operational control of Canadian and US warning systems and air forces assigned to continental air defense; (3) the SecDef should be informed. (For further action, see item of 18 Jan 56.)

(8) N/H of JCS 1541/102, 16 Dec 55; (TS) SM-1012-55 to JSPC, 15 Dec 55; same file.
1956

4 Jan 56
The Deputy SecDef informed the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the CJCS of a new policy agreed between DOD and the Canadian Department of National Defence for publicity regarding the DEW Line. The policy supplemented the "Directive Concerning Publicity Relating to the Joint Canadian-US Defense Plans and Operations," of 19 Mar 51 (JCS MOI 783) and defined the policy and procedures pertaining to the security of official information regarding the DEW Line.

(U) JCS 1899/245, 11 Jan 56, CCS 413.44 (7-1-48) sec 12.

18 Jan 56
The JCS concluded that agreement should be reached with the Canadian Chiefs of Staff on a peacetime air defense arrangement that would provide: (1) operational integration of the continental elements of the air defense systems of both countries; (2) centralization of authority for operational control of the continental-based forces of both countries assigned and such augmentation forces as might be allocated to continental air defense; (3) a peacetime continental air defense arrangement between Canada and the US that would be readily adaptable to meet conditions imposed in the event of a general war or at such times as might be mutually agreeable. The JCS informed the SecDef of their decision and requested his concurrence prior to soliciting the views of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff. They also directed the CSAF to undertake, in conjunction with CSA and CNO, studies and actions necessary to develop the details of a US military position.

(TS) Dec On JCS 1541/103, 18 Jan 56; (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, 18 Jan 56; (TS) SM-36-56 to CSAF, 18 Jan 56; CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 41.

On 10 Feb 56, the SecDef informed the JCS of his approval, and they raised the matter with the Canadian Chiefs of Staff on 14 Feb 56.

(TS) N/H of JCS 1541/103, 15 Feb 56; (TS) SM-126-56 to Chm, Canadian Chiefs of Staff, 14 Feb-56; same file.
27 Feb 56
The Canadian Chiefs of Staff informed the JCS of their agreement that a study of methods of integrating peacetime operational control of continental elements of the air defense of North America should be undertaken. They suggested it be done by an ad hoc group of US and Canadian Air Force officers reporting separately to the Canadian and US Chiefs of Staff. They further suggested that, to avoid raising delicate political problems, the ad hoc group limit its discussions and recommendations to the problems of operational control, a subject "very sensitive politically" in Canada, and that there be no leakage of information to the press on the proposed ad hoc group or its discussions. (For further action, see item of 27 Mar 56.)

(TS) JCS 1541/104, 27 Feb 56, CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 41.

28 Feb 56
In early Feb 56, CINCONAD requested that he be relieved from further participation in Alaska-Canada-US emergency defense planning. He believed that his participation in the preparation of the Canada-US Emergency Defense Plan as well as publication of the CONAD Air Defense Plan, Continental US, adequately covered air defense planning for the West Coast and Canada.

(C) JCS 1995/25, 14 Feb 56, CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 41.

On 28 Feb 56, the JCS decided to seek Canadian agreement before relieving CINCONAD of the responsibility. Canadian agreement was obtained through the MCC, and the JCS informed CINCONAD on 10 Jul 56 that he was relieved from participation in Alaska-Canada-US emergency planning.

(C) JCS 1995/26, 28 Feb 56; (C) SM-160-56 to Chm, US Sec MCC, 28 Feb 56; CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 41. (C) Dec On JCS 1995/28, 10 Jul 56; (C) SM-570-56 to CINCONAD, 10 Jul 56; same file, sec 42.

27 Mar 56
The JCS accepted in principle the Canadian Chiefs of Staff suggestion for the study of methods to integrate operational control of the continental air defenses of Canada and the US by an ad hoc group of air force
officers of the two countries reporting separately through their air chief of staff to their respective chiefs of staff. The JCS so informed the Canadian Chiefs of Staff and stated that, from the US point of view, the Army and Navy, as well as the Air Force, should be represented in the ad hoc group because of the composition of US air defense forces. The JCS believed that the ad hoc group should be formed in early May 1956 to allow time for CINCONAD to complete a study and for the development of a US position. They authorized the CSAF to represent them in negotiations on the establishment of the ad hoc group and informed the Canadian Chiefs of Staff that every precaution would be taken to preclude leakage of information on this matter. The JCS also directed the CSAF, in collaboration with the CSA and the CNO, to take the required actions leading to the establishment of a Canada-US ad hoc group.

(TS) Dec On JCS 1541/105, 27 Mar 56;
(TS) SM-243-56 to Chm, Canadian Chiefs of Staff, 27 Mar 56; (C) SM-244-56 to CSA, CNO, and CSAF, 27 Mar 56; CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 41.

The Canadian Chiefs of Staff agreed with the JCS on the establishment of an ad hoc group to study the integration of operational control of the continental air defense of Canada and the US in peacetime. They recommended that the study be assigned to the Canada-US MSG which, in turn, could organize the ad hoc group under its supervision. The Royal Canadian Navy considered it unnecessary to participate in the study, so the Canadian section of the ad hoc study group would consist of Army and RCAF officers. So that the group would not be constrained by inflexible Service or national positions, the Canadian Chiefs of Staff planned to issue only general guidance to their designees. They suggested the group meet as soon as convenient in May. (For further action, see item of 19 Jun 56.)

(TS) JCS 1541/106, 23 May 56, CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 41.
1956

18 May 56

The SecDef on 2 Feb 56 requested JCS comment on whether the existing operational control assignment for weapons in continental air defense clearly delineated the responsibility of CINCONAD to control of all continental antiaircraft defense, including the assignment of individual batteries to designated targets. If so, he also asked whether the installation of the AN/FSQ-1 Systems to control NIKE units would result in any conflict in the operation of the overall defense system.

(S) JCS 1899/252, 3 Feb 56, CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 57.

The JCS considered this matter on 17 Apr 55, but could not reach agreement. They did decide to forward their divergent views to the SecDef, which they eventually did on 18 May 56. The CJCS believed that CINCONAD's terms of reference should be clarified to provide: centralized operational control of all air defense forces assigned, attached, or otherwise made available, including assignment of individual AA batteries to designated targets; and responsibility for recommending to the JCS the operational requirements in CONUS for air defense weapons and surveillance systems. Army and Air Force development and procurement of weapons and systems should be in accordance with the requirements laid down by CINCONAD. The CNO and the CSAF generally agreed with CJCS, but CSA considered the current CINCONAD terms of reference should not be changed until systems were fully operational and experience was gained with various new weapons.

(TS) JCS 1899/264, 9 May 56; (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, 18 May 56; (TS) CM-297-56 to SecDef, 18 May 56; same file, sec 59.

On 21 Jun 56 the SecDef agreed with the CJCS on the specific problem of the AN/FSQ-1 equipment. (For the SecDef decision on CINCONAD terms of reference, see item of 5 Jun 56.)

(C) Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 21 Jun 56, CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 61. (C) N/H of JCS 1899/264, 27 Jun 56, same file, sec 59.
The JCS forwarded to the SecDef a proposed revised Unified Command Plan that, among other things, provided for the disestablishment of the US Northeast Command by 1 Sep 56, with residual tasks assigned to appropriate commanders, and for assignment to CINCONAD of responsibility for the air defense of Alaska and the northeast. In accordance with these changes, CINICAL would report to the JCS through CINCONAD on all matters pertaining to the air defense of the North American Continent, and operational control of the Alaskan air defense forces would be vested in CINCONAD.

On 21 Jun 56 the SecDef approved the revised UCP, informing the Secretary of State of these approved changes the following day.

The JCS distributed the approved UCP to the CINCs on 3 Jul 56, stating that it was effective upon receipt. The JCS also notified the Canadian Chiefs of Staff on 3 Jul 56 of the changes in the US command structure with regard to CINICAL, CINCNE, and CINCONAD.

After hearing a presentation on continental defense by Army and Air Force spokesmen, the Armed Forces Policy Council agreed that there were problems that needed to be solved. Consequently, the JCS were requested to make recommendations to the SecDef on a concept for CONAD covering command relationships and operational control to clarify the authority of CINCONAD.
5 Jun 56 (Cont.) On 5 Jun 56, the JCS informed SecDef that some of the current problems of CONAD stemmed from its organization and the wording of the current terms of reference (see item of 16 Jul 54). Since CONAD did not precisely fit any of the types of joint command prescribed in the manual, Joint Action of the Armed Forces (JAAF), they believed that it should be organized under a concept where CINCONAD: (1) would not serve as Commander, USAF Air Defense Command; (2) would establish a separate and distinct headquarters and exercise operational control over the Army Antiaircraft Command, the USAF Air Defense Command, and Naval Forces, CONAD, and other forces assigned or made available to those commands; (3) would establish a joint staff to operate under the basic principles set forth in JAAF. The JCS considered that CINCONAD's operational control should include those functions of command involving composition of subordinate forces, assignment of tasks, designation of objectives, and authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the air defense mission. The CJCS, supported by the CMC, the CNO, and the CSAF, favored authority for CINCONAD to centralize operational control of all air defense forces assigned, attached, or otherwise made available, including assignment of individual AA batteries to designated targets. The CSA believed that CINCONAD should have authority to assign targets through subordinate joint commanders to the local AA defense commanders, but not to exclude the exercise of initiative by the local AA defense to engage all enemy targets and not to include designation of targets by CINCONAD and his subordinate joint commanders to the individual AA batteries.

(TS) JCS 1899/268, 29 May 56; (TS) Dec On JCS 1899/265, 5 Jun 56; CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 60. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, 5 Jun 56, same file, sec 61.

On 19 Jun 56, the SecDef approved the concept for a new terms of reference for CINCONAD as proposed by the JCS. With regard to the divergent views on CINCONAD's operational control, the SecDef concurred with the position of the CJCS. (For further action, see item of 24 Aug 56.)

(C) JCS 1899/274, 26 Jun 56, CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 61.
19 Jun 56
The JCS accepted the Canadian Chiefs of Staff recommendation (see item of 14 May 56) that the MSG organize the ad hoc group to study the integration of operational control of the continental air defense systems of the two countries. The JCS directed the US Section of the MSG to take the necessary actions to accomplish the study within the framework of the MSG. The JCS and the Canadian Chiefs of Staff would furnish their respective sections appropriate general guidance. (For further action, see items of 24 Aug 56 and 6 Feb 57.)

1 Aug 56
The DepSecDef on 2 Jul 56 noted that, under the revised UCP (see item of 4 Jun 56), CINCAL's functions and responsibilities would be greatly reduced, and he asked the JCS to reconsider the need for retaining that command.

24 Aug 56
The JCS approved a CINCONAD study of 28 Apr 56 as initial general guidance for development of the combined study on integration of operational control of US and Canadian continental air defense. In transmitting it to the US Section, MSG, they also restated the provisions for inclusion in any combined arrangement as approved on 18 Jan 56 (see item) and concurred in a CINCONAD view that: (1) operational
24 Aug 56 (Cont.)

control of the air defense forces in Alaska should be included as a part of an integrated air defense system for the US and Canada; (2) the system for the integration of operational control of the continental air defenses of Canada and the US must be developed and exercised over a period of years in order to be effective when needed and not require major adjustment from a peacetime to a general war status; (3) the possibility that a commander of one nationality might exercise operational control over subordinate combat forces of the other nation should not be a governing factor in developing combined recommendations on the optimum arrangement for integrating Canadian and US air defenses.

The JCS also said that the terms of reference for CINCONAD, then under revision, would be forwarded to the US Section, MSG, when approved by SecDef, as additional general guidance. (For further action, see item of 6 Feb 57.)


24 Aug 56

The JCS submitted to the SecDef revised terms of reference for CINCONAD in accordance with SecDef's 19 Jun 56 decision (see item of 5 Jun 56) on this matter. The JCS were still not in agreement on several points. The principal one was that CSAF and CMC wanted the terms of reference to specify that CINCONAD would be a USAF officer. The CSA and CNO preferred allowance for assignment of an officer of another Service if that should prove desirable, and CJCS endorsed this view.


On 31 Aug 56 the Deputy SecDef approved the revised terms of reference for CINCONAD, resolving the divergencies as recommended by CJCS. The JCS furnished the revised terms of reference to CINCONAD on 4 Sep 56. A copy was supplied to the US Section, MSG, on 14 Sep 56.

(C) H/H of JCS 1899/281, 7 Sep 56, CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 62. (TS) Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 31 Aug 56; (C) SM-716-56 to CINCONAD, 4 Sep 56; (C) JCS 1899/283, 4 Sep 56; same file, sec 63. (C) H/H of JCS 1541/109, 17 Sep 56; (C) SM-748-56 to Chm, US Sec MSG, 14 Sep 56; CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 42.

69
1 Sep 56

The US Northeast Command was disestablished and CINCONAD assumed responsibility for all US air defense activities in the northeast area and operational control over all US air defense forces assigned or allocated for the defense of that area. CINCONAD also became responsible for all air defense activities in Alaska and operational control of air defense forces assigned or allocated for Alaska. He designated CINCAL as the commander responsible to him for all air defense activities in Alaska; operational control would be exercised by CINCAL as before through the Commander, Alaskan Air Command, a component of ALCOM. CINCONAD also assumed responsibility for development of plans and requirements for the air defense of Alaska and the northeast area.

(C) JCS 1259/371, 29 Nov 56, CCS 381
(1-24-42) sec 57.

10 Oct 56

At the recommendation of the CJCS, and in order to facilitate a reappraisal of US objectives for national security, the JCS recommended to SecDef the establishment of an ad hoc committee to study the general problem of air defense of North America. The JCS proposed that such a group reevaluate the concepts of continental air defense in light of increasing Soviet capabilities and the technological improvements in weapons and weapons delivery systems and then submit appropriate recommendations to them.

(S) JCS 1899/285, 10 Oct 56; (S) Memo, JCS to SecDef, 10 Oct 56; CCS 334 Air Defense of North America Ad Hoc Committee (9-20-56) sec 1.

On 11 Oct 56, the SecDef approved the establishment of an ad hoc committee. Later, on 7 Nov 56, with JCS and SecDef approval, the CJCS appointed retired general officers from the Army, Navy, and Air Force (GEN Thomas T. Handy, USA; ADM John T. Ballentine, USN; and GEN Carl A. Spaatz, USAP) and Dr. Albert T. Hill, Director of Research, WSEG, to the Ad Hoc Committee on North American Air Defense.

(S) N/H of JCS 1899/285, 17 Oct 56; (S) CM-400-56 to Spaatz, Handy, Ballentine, and Hill, 7 Nov 56; same file.
1956

10 Oct 56
(Cont.)

The report of the Ad Hoc Committee on North American Air Defense to the JCS was dated 28 Jun 57. During the subsequent JCS consideration of the report and the comments on it by selected commanders of unified commands, its content became increasingly outmoded owing to the progress of CINCONAD's planning and the establishment of NORAD in Sep 57. On 26 Feb 58 the JCS agreed to note the report.


26 Nov 56

The SecDef informed the Armed Forces Policy Council that the following problems relating to Service roles and missions and air defense had been resolved after consideration of the recommendations of the JCS and civilian officials of OSD: (1) the Army had been assigned responsibility for the development, procurement, and manning of land-based surface-to-air missile systems for point defense (NIKE I, NIKE B, and land-based TALOS); (2) the Air Force had been assigned similar responsibility for land-based surface-to-air missile systems for area defense (BOMARC); (3) the Navy, in coordination with the Army and the Air Force, had received the same responsibility for ship-based air defense weapon systems for the accomplishment of its assigned functions; (4) the Marine Corps had been authorized to adapt to its organic use such surface-to-air weapon systems developed by the other Services as might be required in the accomplishment of its assigned functions.

(U) JCS 1478/81, 15 Mar 57, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 58.
The MSG on 19 Dec 56 recommended that the conclusion of the ad hoc group studying integrated operational control of Canadian and US air defenses be approved. The ad hoc group had concluded that, in order to provide the most effective air defense of North America, operational control over all continental elements of forces made available for the air defense of Canada, CONUS, and Alaska should be integrated and delegated to a single commander, who would be responsible to the chiefs of staff of both countries. The ad hoc group also provided a general mission statement and terms of reference for a Commander in Chief, Air Defense, Canada-United States (CINCADCANUS).

On 6 Feb 57 the JCS approved the conclusions of the ad hoc group as the basic principles on which integrated operational control of the air defenses of Canada, CONUS, and Alaska would be undertaken. They further agreed that the Canadian Chiefs of Staff and the JCS should take action to secure the approval of both governments with the understanding that integration of operational control would be limited to the continental elements of the air defense systems of both countries (to include the extension to seaward of the contiguous radar coverage), including the continental portions of the warning systems. The JCS requested SecDef approval of their action.

On 16 Mar 57, the SecDef approved the basic principles for peacetime integration of operational control of the continental air defenses of Canada and the US as proposed by the MSG and approved by the JCS. He stipulated that his action should not be construed as approval for future US force levels for continental defense as contained in the MSG report. His action did constitute the required governmental approval to proceed with further action including detailed planning for the integration. He noted that account would have to be taken of the impact on the proposed command structure and operational procedures.
1957

6 Feb 57

(Cont.)
of the need to maintain in US custody in peacetime any atomic weapons located in Canada for use by Canadian forces. He requested that terms of reference for the CINCADACANUS as might be agreed with the Canadian Chiefs of Staff be submitted to him before implementation and that the JCS submit appropriate recommendations for necessary governmental or intergovernmental agreement to implement the military aspects of the integration. The SecDef had informed the Secretary of State and the President of this action. (For further action, see item of 11 Apr 57.)

(TS) JCS 1541/115, 20 Mar 57, CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 44.

13 Feb 57

The CSAF furnished the JCS a progress report on CINCONAD's air defense planning in the northeast area, stating that command and operational arrangements of a permanent nature would be effective on 1 Apr 57. CINCONAD had also reported that he and the Air Officer Commanding, RCAF Air Defence Command had signed an air defense agreement providing a mutual understanding for the exercise of command and control of all air defense forces operating in and/or over Canadian territory located within the northeast area. (This agreement superseded the earlier agreement between the AOC, RCAF ADC, and CINCNOR; a copy had been forwarded to the PJBD.)

(C) JCS 1259/384, 14 Feb 57, CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 71.

19 Mar 57

The JCS noted a CSAF account of an informal discussion with the Chairman of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff, General Poulkes, on 4 Mar 57. General Poulkes had stated that he saw no difficulty in obtaining Canadian government approval for the integration of operational control of North American air defenses if he could assure his government that a Canadian officer would occupy the deputy command position. In replying, CSAF had noted that one of the ad hoc group's conclusions was that the commander in chief and his deputy should not normally be from the same nation. Assuming the commander in chief would be a US officer, he was certain the JCS would concur in the appointment of a Canadian officer as the deputy.

(TS) Dec On JCS 1541/114, 19 Mar 57, CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 43.
11 Apr 57

The JCS notified the Canadian Chiefs of Staff of their and SecDef’s approval of the basic principles for integration of operational control of the continental air defenses of North America. They suggested that, when Canadian Government approval had been given, CONAD and Canadian representatives should form an ad hoc group to develop initial plans for consideration by the MSG and approval by the Canadian Chiefs of Staff and the JCS.

(TS) Dec On JCS 1541/116, 11 Apr 57; (TS) SM-292-57 to Chm, Canadian Chiefs of Staff, 11 Apr 57; (TS) SM-293-57 to CINCONAD, 11 Apr 57; CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 44.

The Canadian Chiefs of Staff notified the JCS of their approval on 26 Apr 57, but the Canadian Government had yet to approve the integration. (For further action, see item of 1 Aug 57.)

(TS) N/H of JCS 1541/116, 3 May 57, same file.

28 Jun 57

The Deputy ASD(ISA) furnished the JCS with the State Department views on the principles for integration of Canadian and US air defenses. The State Department considered it highly important from a political viewpoint that: one of the three sectors into which the North American Continent was to be divided, as then planned, be commanded by a Canadian; if CINCADCANUS was to be an American, the deputy should be a Canadian; the location of the headquarters should be explored with the Canadians with an effort to accede to Canadian preference if one was expressed; the principles on interception of unidentified aircraft in the airspace of the other country as laid down by the PJBD should be examined to see whether they would be equally applicable under unified command; and steps should be taken to make the rules of interception and engagement exactly the same over both countries. The State Department presented these suggestions because of the extreme sensitivity of the Canadian Government and public to any implication that Canada was being placed in a secondary position or was of interest to the US mainly because of its terrain. (For further action, see item of 4 Sep 57.)

(TS) JCS 1541/118, 2 Jul 57, CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 44.
1957

24 Jul 57

CINCONAD on 14 May 57 recommended that:
(1) a formal agreement be executed between Canada and the US affirming the fact that the air defense of the two countries was one problem and that both would react automatically and in unison against any attack against the North American Continent;
(2) pending conclusion of such an agreement, the policy regarding exchange officers be modified to provide that all personnel involved in air defense be continued on duty, subject to any governmental decision that might be made after an attack.

(TS) JCS 2019/226, 6 Jun 57, CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 74.

On 24 Jul 57 the JCS informed CINCONAD that they considered it unnecessary to seek such an agreement and that the US Air Force was requesting a modification of the RCAF exchange officer policy to ensure the availability of Canadian officers in Canada-US air defense assignments.

(TS) Dec On JCS 2019/230, 24 Jul 57; (TS) SM-543-57 to CINCONAD, 24 Jul 57; same file, sec 75.

1 Aug 57

The SecDef and the Canadian Minister of National Defense announced that their two governments had agreed to the establishment at an early date of a system of integrated operational control of the air defense forces in CONUS, Alaska, and Canada under an integrated command responsible to the chiefs of staff of both countries. A headquarters would be set up in Colorado Springs, Colorado, and joint plans and procedures would be worked out in peacetime, ready for immediate use in case of emergency. Other aspects of command and administration would remain the national responsibility. This bilateral arrangement extended the mutual security objectives of NATO to the air defense of the Canada-US Region.

(U) DM-242-57 to CJCS, 31 Jul 57, CCS 092 (2-10-45) sec 44.

At this time the Canadian Government announced the appointment of Air Marshal C. Roy Slemon, RCAF, as Deputy CINACANUS.

(TS) JCS 1541/121, 26 Aug 57, p. 863, CCS 092 (2-10-45) sec 45.
1957

16 Aug 57  CINCONAD on 13 Aug 57 noted that a long series of realignments would be necessary to integrate fully the air defense systems of Canada and the US. As an initial step, he proposed that the Canadian Chiefs of Staff order, effective 12 Sep 57, operational control over the RCAF Air Defence Command (commanded by Air Vice Marshal Wray with headquarters at St. Hubert near Montreal) transferred to the integrated headquarters in Colorado Springs. On the same date, CONAD Headquarters would issue orders that Air Vice Marshal Wray was responsible to CINCADCANUS for operational control of all Canadian and US air defense forces in Canada. CINCONAD also found the short titles ADCANUS and CINCADCANUS awkward and recommended designation of the new command as the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD).

(C) Msg, CINCONAD to CJCS and Chm, Canadian Chief of Staff, 12 Aug 55, CAF IN 86165, CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 44.

On 16 Aug 57, the JCS concurred in the CINCONAD recommendations and requested SecDef approval of this course of action, including the change in name from ADCANUS to NORAD.

(C) JCS 1541/120, 16 Aug 57; (C) Memo, JCS to SecDef, 16 Aug 57; same file.

The Deputy SecDef approved on 29 Aug 57. He stated that his action eliminated the requirement that the specific terms of reference and other proposals concerning NORAD be submitted to the SecDef for approval.

(C) H/H of JCS 1541/120, 3 Sep 57, CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 44. (C) JCS 1541/123, 3 Sep 57, same file, sec 45.

4 Sep 57  The JCS approved political guidance for CINCONAD for use in development of plans for integration of operational control of the continental air defenses of Canada and the US. After considering the suggestions of the State Department (see item of 28 Jun 57), the JCS advised CINCONAD that: (1) one of the principal geographic subdivisions of the integrated command, preferably comprising a large segment of the American Middle West, should be commanded by a Canadian; (2) the commander and his deputy should not be from the same country, but this should not preclude designation of the commander and deputy from...
4 Sep 57  
(Cont.)
the same country when the forces or territory of the other country were very small; (3) the location of the headquarters should not be discussed in development of detailed plans with Canadian representatives since Canada and the US had already announced selection of Colorado Springs; (4) the JCS recognized the need for common procedures for cross-border intercepts and rules of engagement and had approved a recommendation of the MSG that common plans and procedures for use in wartime be prepared and approved. The JCS requested that they be informed as soon as a tentative agreement had been reached with the Canadian representatives concerning geographic regional and sector boundaries so that appropriate governmental agencies could assess the political implications.

(TS) Dec On JCS 1541/121, 4 Sep 57; (TS) SM-639-57 to CINCONAD, 4 Sep 57; CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 45.

6 Sep 57
The Canadian Chiefs of Staff informed the JCS on 12 Aug 57 that they considered the ad hoc group conclusions and the MSG report on them (see item of 6 Feb 57), including the terms of reference for CINCADCANUS, to be a satisfactory directive for the commander to plan the organization of his command. The Canadian Chiefs of Staff felt, however, that CINCADCANUS and his deputy should themselves study the report and prepare detailed terms of reference for submission to the MSG and consideration by the chiefs of staff of both countries. Air Marshal Slemon, RCAF, the designated Deputy CINCADCANUS (see item of 1 Aug 57), would be available in early September to collaborate with CINCONAD.

(TS) JCS 1541/119, 16 Aug 57, CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 44.

On 6 Sep 57, the JCS accepted the Canadian Chiefs of Staff proposals and directed CINCONAD, in collaboration with Air Marshal Slemon, to develop initial plans and detailed terms of reference for submission to the MSG for consideration by the chiefs of staff of both countries. (For further action, see item of 11 Oct 57.)

(TS) Dec On JCS 1541/122, 6 Sep 57; (TS) SM-649-57 to Chm, Canadian Chiefs of Staff, 6 Sep 57; (TS) SM-650-57 to CINCONAD, 6 Sep 57; same file, sec 45.
The North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) was established at Ent Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado, effective 120001Z Sep 57. CINCNORAD exercised operational control over Canadian and US air defense forces in Canada through the AOC, Canadian Air Defence Command, and over all other US air defense forces in CONUS, Alaska, and Greenland in accordance with TOR for CINCONAD. All policies, plans, rules, procedures, and agreements established by and with CONAD remained in effect under NORAD for all US commands, forces, and units concerned. Publicity was to be released only by authority of the JCS and the Canadian Chiefs of Staff in the US and Canada respectively. General Earl E. Partridge, USAF, who was already serving as CINCONAD, was designated CINCNORAD, and Air Marshal C. Roy Slemon, RCAF, served as Deputy CINCNORAD.

(C) Book msg, CINCONAD COOP X0151, 11 Sep 57, CAP IN 93796 (12 Sep 57), CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 45. (S) Fifteen Years of Air Defense, NORAD Historical Reference Paper No. 3, p. 68.

CINCNORAD and Deputy CINCNORAD prepared and submitted to the Canadian Chiefs of Staff and the JCS proposed terms of reference for NORAD, requesting approval and publication as well as designation by both chiefs of staff of their respective executive agents for NORAD. CINCNORAD and his deputy also requested that, concurrent with the approval and publication of the terms of reference, the JCS disestablish CONAD.

(C) JCS 1541/124, 17 Oct 57, CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 45.

On 14 Nov 57, the CJCS informed the JCS that the Canadian Chiefs of Staff had accepted the proposed terms of reference for NORAD subject to certain changes. The Canadians hoped that the JCS might find it convenient to approve the terms of reference without submitting them to the MSG. The CJCS concurred that the terms of reference need not be reviewed by the MSG, but recommended that they be considered by an appropriate committee of the JCS. Accordingly, the NORAD terms of reference were submitted to the JSPC.

(C) CH-40-57 to JCS, 14 Nov 57; (C) JCS 1541/127, 18 Nov 57; CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 46.
1957

11 Oct 57 (Cont.) The JCS were unable to reach agreement on the terms of reference until January 1958 because of divergent views on the question of retaining CONAD as a distinct organization. On 23 Dec 57, the CSAF informed the JCS that the Canadians were restive at the US delay in approving the terms of reference. (For further action, see item of 10 Jan 58.)

(S) Memo, CSAF to CJCS, 23 Dec 57, same file.

17 Oct 57 Following the 1 Aug 57 announcement of the US-Canadian agreement on the integrated air defense command, the Canadian Liberal Opposition subjected the Conservative Government to sharp criticism for failing to consult Parliament before agreeing to the command and for failing to secure a formal written agreement. Prime Minister Diefenbaker mentioned these difficulties during a visit with President Eisenhower on 17 Oct 57 and expressed the hope that the operation of NORAD would be preceded by a governmental agreement, thereby demonstrating the continued supremacy of civilian authority over the military. Subsequently the Canadian Government requested and received US agreement in principle for development of a governmental agreement on NORAD in a form for publication. (For further action, see item of 2 May 58.)

(S) JCS 1541/134, 25 Feb 58, CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 48.

15 Nov 57 In early Nov 57, the Canadian Chiefs of Staff advised the CJCS that they preferred to keep the exchange of military views on the development of guidelines for CINC NORAD informal until such time as agreement had been reached between the JCS and the Canadian Chiefs of Staff on the NORAD terms of reference. The Canadians believed the determination of a sound concept of air defense for North America must be based upon: (1) a clearly defined concept of the target systems that the enemy must attack to achieve his objectives; (2) an appreciation of the threat to the target systems; (3) a definition of the level of defense required. They also believed that
in defining the target system, CINCNORAD should be guided by the strategic concept for the defense of North America as agreed in NATO document MC 14/2, revised 21 Feb 57, which included defense of the strategic nuclear counteroffensive capability (SAC), and protection of as much as possible of the warmaking industrial capacity and military potential of North America.

(S) JCS 1541/125, 6 Nov 57, CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 45.

The JCS considered this matter on 15 Nov 57 and referred it to the JSPC for consideration with the proposed terms of reference for NORAD (see item of 11 Oct 57).

(S) Dec On JCS 1541/125, 15 Nov 57, same file.
The JCS on 8 Jan 58 considered the proposed terms of reference for NORAD (see item of 11 Oct 57) and agreed that they should be rewritten so as not to include the responsibilities of CINCONAD or the responsibility for the air defense of US bases in Greenland.

(TS) JCS 1541/132, 9 Jan 58, CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 47.

On 10 Jan 58, the JCS considered and approved terms of reference for CINCNORAD revised in accordance with their above decision. These terms of reference provided that NORAD was an integrated (US-Canada) command including, as component commands: The USAF Air Defense Command, US Army Air Defense Command; US Naval Forces, Continental Air Defense Command, and the Air Defence Command of Canada. CINCNORAD was responsible to the US JCS and the Canadian Chiefs of Staff and was charged with the mission of defending the CONUS, Canada, and Alaska against air attack and supporting other US and Canadian commands. CINCNORAD was assigned operational control over the component commands, the air defense forces of those commands, the air defense forces in Alaska, and all other defense forces assigned, attached, or otherwise made available to him by proper authority. The terms of reference specified that CINCNORAD and his deputy would not be of the same nationality.

The JCS forwarded the revised terms of reference to the Canadian Chiefs of Staff, stating that provision should be made for designation of a national commander responsible to the US JCS for purely national matters. Such action was necessary to insure recognition of US responsibilities for the air defense of US installations in Greenland, for assisting in the air defense of Mexico, and for the necessity of national channels for transmittal of certain classified material concerning purely national matters. The JCS also advised CINCONAD of their action, providing him a revised terms of reference for his responsibilities as CINCONAD upon final approval of the NORAD terms of reference.

(TS) Dec On JCS 1541/132, 10 Jan 58, CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 47. (TS) SM-35-58 to Canadian Chiefs of Staff, 10 Jan 58; (TS) SM-36-58 to CINCONAD, 10 Jan 58; same file, sec 48.
On 24 Jan 58, CINCONAD informed the CSAF that the revised NORAD terms of reference were adequate and "that the North American air defense system can be made to operate effectively under this charter." The commander believed that the terms of reference for his responsibilities as CINCONAD introduced unnecessary duplication and confusion into what should be a relatively simple arrangement with a clear division of responsibilities between CINCONAD and CINCNORAD. Therefore he proposed that he, as the senior US officer, be issued a letter augmenting the NORAD terms of reference and designating him the US national commander with appropriate tasks and responsibilities. Subsequently, on 12 Feb 58, the JCS decided that final action on the CINCONAD terms of reference should not be taken until after Canadian approval of the NORAD terms of reference.

(C) JCS 1541/133, 31 Jan 58; (C) Dec On JCS 1541/133, 14 Feb 58; CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 48.

The Canadian Chiefs of Staff on 14 Apr 58 informed JCS that they and their Minister of National Defence concurred in the revised terms of reference for CINCNORAD (see item of 10 Jan 58), subject to changing the mission for support of other US and Canadian commands to read other "continental" US and Canadian commands.

(S) JCS 1541/138, 18 Apr 58, CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 49.

The JCS considered the Canadian change on 2 May 58, noting that it would preclude CINCNORAD from supporting US and Canadian commands in areas adjacent to continental North America. They recognized, however, that support for such US commands could be included in the CINCONAD terms of reference. Thereupon they approved the CINCNORAD terms of reference with the Canadian change and submitted them to SecDef.

(TS) Dec On JCS 1541/141, 2 May 58; (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, 2 May 58; same file.
2 May 58
(Cont.)

On 7 May 58 the SecDef approved the CINCNORAD terms of reference and forwarded them to the State Department for consideration with the proposed governmental notes on NORAD. On 28 May 58, the Deputy SecDef informed the JCS that the State Department had concurred in the proposed terms of reference for CINCNORAD. The Deputy Secretary requested the JCS, in coordination with the appropriate Canadian military authorities, to implement the terms of reference. (For further action, see item of 10 Jun 58.)

(U) N/H of JCS 1541/141, 12 May 58; (TS) N/H of JCS 1541/141, 13 May 58; (S) N/H of JCS 1541/141, 9 Jun 58; CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 49.

2 May 58

The JCS considered a State Department draft note intended to constitute the text of a bilateral US-Canadian agreement on future organization and operation of NORAD. The draft enumerated generally the same missions, responsibilities, authority, and operational control as provided in the proposed terms of reference for CINCNORAD, and the JCS informed SecDef that they found the draft acceptable from a military point of view.

(S) Dec on JCS 1541/140, 2 May 58; (S) JCS 1541/140, 1 May 58; (S) Memo, JCS to SecDef, 2 May 58; CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 49.

On 12 May 58, Canada and the US concluded an exchange of notes making formal the future organization and operation of NORAD. The State Department made the exchange public on 19 May 58, stating that NORAD had been operating on an interim basis pending the conclusion of the formal governmental agreement.

Dept of State Bulletin, 9 Jun 58, pp. 979-980.

2 May 58

The Asst SecState on 22 Apr 58 requested the concurrence of SecDef in a Canadian proposal for a joint Canadian-US ministerial committee to consider important defense programs of mutual interest. The ASD(ISA) asked for JCS views on the matter.

(S) JCS 1541/142, 1 May 58, CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 49.
On 2 May 58 the JCS informed SecDef that they believed that most Canadian-US defense problems could be resolved by the NORAD organization, the MCC, the PJBD, or by the Canadian Defence Minister and the SecDef. In the event of problems that could not be resolved by those methods, the JCS favored the current procedure of conducting meetings for consultation at the request of either government.

(S) Dec on JCS 1541/142, 2 May 58; (S) Memo, JCS to SecDef, 2 May 58; same file.

President Eisenhower on 22 Jul 58 informed the SecDef of a discussion he had had during a recent visit with the Canadian Prime Minister regarding a combined ministerial committee. The purpose of such a committee, he said, would be to make sure that both governments had a coordinated view toward joint efforts to produce an adequate security for the two countries and to supervise the PJBD. The President believed that the functions of the PJBD would not be impaired by this arrangement, and he expected that when the joint committee met, the Canadian and US PJBD representatives would be in attendance. The President's letter to SecDef ended with the following: "It is still necessary that none of the services within the Defense Department attempt to shortcut the PJBD in bringing joint defense problems to the attention of political officials. We must be very careful in this particular regard; their appropriate contact is the PJBD."

(U) N/H of JCS 1541/142, 25 Jul 58, CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 49.

On 10 Jul 58, Canada and the US announced the establishment of the Canada-US Committee on Joint Defense to further the policy of cooperation between the two countries on matters relating to continental defense. The Committee consisted of the Canadian Ministers for External Affairs, National Defence, and Finance and the US Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury.

Dept of State Bulletin, 4 Aug 58, pp. 208-209.
The Canadian Chiefs of Staff forwarded to the JCS on 7 Jan 58 a statement by the Canadian Prime Minister that emphasized that NORAD was an integral part of the NATO military structure in the Canada-US Region and would report to the Standing Group and the NATO Council in a manner similar to that followed by other NATO commands. The Canadian Chiefs of Staff did not intend that NORAD should report directly to anyone but the Canadian and US Chiefs of Staff, but it was felt in Ottawa that the Canada-US Region should report regularly on its activities in progress reports of the NATO Military Committee so that the NATO Council could be kept informed. In addition, Canada would continue to show its NORAD forces in the NATO Annual Review document.

(S) JCS 1541/131, 9 Jan 58, CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 47.

On 28 Feb 58, the JCS approved memorandums for the SecDef and the Chairman of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff setting forth their view that NORAD had been established through bilateral agreement and was not and should not be a NATO organization. The JCS believed that there should be no change in the existing agreed Canadian-US reporting procedures, which provided:

(1) NORAD reported only to the US and Canadian Chiefs of Staff; (2) the individual US and Canadian Military Services reported nationally to the Canada-US Regional Planning Group (CUSRPG) such matters of NATO concern as were authorized by the "Security Agreement Between the US and Canada"; (3) CUSRPG would forward to the NATO Military Committee plans for and other agreed material pertaining to the defense of the Canada-US region, but excluding NORAD plans; (4) the US would continue to report its continental US air defense forces to CUSRPG in accordance with established procedures.

(S) JCS 1541/134, 25 Feb 58; (U) N/H of JCS 1541/134, 29 Apr 58; same file, sec 48.

Before the memorandums were dispatched, the Chairman of the Canadian Joint Staff called on the CJCS to explain certain Canadian political difficulties in this
13 May 58 (Cont.)

He stated that any military program in Canada with a NATO label had little opposition, but the prevalence of anti-American political sentiment led to attacks on any military program considered to be a bilateral arrangement between the US and Canada outside the NATO context. He gave assurance that the Canadian Chiefs of Staff had no intention of attempting to bring NORAD under the NATO Military Committee or Standing Group. They wished only to be able to advise their government that the arrangements with the US fulfilled NATO Regional responsibilities, and to avoid receiving a JCS communication so worded as to provide a basis for domestic political attack on Canadian military cooperation with the US. As a result, the CJCS revised the memorandums to delete the point that NORAD was not and should not be a NATO organization, thus avoiding a subject difficult for the Canadians. The CJCS further revised the memorandums to state that the CUSPAG would forward to the NATO Military Committee only agreed material, not to include plans, pertaining to the Canada-US Region. The Chairman of the Canadian Joint Staff assured the CJCS that these revisions would make the memorandum acceptable to the Canadian Chiefs of Staff. The JCS considered and noted the CJCS revision of the memorandums on 13 May 58.

(S) Dec On JCS 1541/134, 13 May 58, CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 48. (S) JCS 1541/139, 29 Apr 58; (S) Dec On JCS 1541/139, 13 May 58; same file, sec 49.

26 May 58

The CSAF on 7 Mar 58 proposed that the MCC be designated the staff agency of the JCS and Canadian Chiefs of Staff for consideration of NORAD matters of combined interest. He also thought that the Army, Navy, and Air Force members of the JSPC should be designated as the US members of the MCC. The CSA objected on 31 Mar 58 to changing the US membership of the MCC but did support amendment of the MCC terms of reference to include cognizance of NORAD matters.

(S) JCS 1541/135, 11 Mar 58; (C) JCS 1541/137, 3 Apr 58; CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 48.
On 26 May 58 the JCS revised the charter of the US Section of the MGC to eliminate inconsistency with the approved terms of reference for CINCNORAD and to provide more specific authorization for the MCC to handle NORAD matters that were referred to it.

(S) Dec on JCS 1541/144, 29 May 58, same file.

The JCS and the Canadian Chiefs of Staff, separately, informed CINCNORAD that his terms of reference had been approved and were effective 10 Jun 58.

(U) N/H of JCS 1541/141, 11 Jun 58; (C) N/H of JCS 1541/141, 18 Jun 58; CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 49.

At the same time, the JCS informed CINCONAD that the terms of reference already provided him (see item of 10 Jan 58) were effective as of 10 Jun 58. These terms of reference established CINCONAD as a US joint command under the JCS, with a mission of defending US installations in Greenland against air attack, assisting in air defense of Mexico, and coordinating and implementing purely national matters pertaining to the air defense of CONUS and Alaska, besides supporting the adjacent US unified commands and SAC in their missions as appropriate. The Department of the Air Force was designated the executive agency for CINCONAD. As the senior US officer in Headquarters, NORAD, CINCONAD was to exercise operational control over the USAF Air Defense, the US Army Air Defense Command, and the US Naval Forces, CONAD, and forces assigned, attached or otherwise made available to those commands in carrying out national responsibilities. He was not to serve as a component commander within CONAD.

(C) N/H of JCS 1541/132, 11 Jun 58, CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 47. (C) Msg, JCS 943043 to CINCONAD, 10 Jun 58, same file, sec 50.

The CSAF informed the JCS on 29 May 58 that the gradual expansion of NORAD and component commands had prompted CINCNORAD to state a requirement for a new headquarters including a hardened combat operations center (COC). The CSAF said that there appeared to be three feasible solutions: (1) remain at Ent AFB
and locate the new COC at Peterson Field (3 miles away); (2) remain at Ent AFB for an interim period and build a hardened COC in Blodgett Peak or Cheyenne Mountain; (3) relocate NORAD and the component headquarters at Lowry AFB.

(S) JCS 1541/145, 3 Jun 58, CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 50.

After considering a J-4 report, the JCS on 30 Jun 58 requested CINCNORAD to develop and submit his justification and recommendations for a headquarters site, including cost estimates. The JCS provided guidance to assist CINCNORAD in his study, the main point being that the location of the headquarters should be determined by the optimum location for the hardened COC. (For further action, see item of 18 Mar 59.)

(U) N/H of JCS 1541/145, 13 Jun 58, CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 50. (S) Dec On JCS 1541/148, 30 Jun 58; (S) SM-449-58 to CINCNORAD, 30 Jun 58, same file, sec 51.

CINCNORAD informed the CJCS that during a recent visit to Ottawa he had been informed that the NATO Secretary General had made a flat statement in Canada that NORAD was not a part of NATO. In reaction, the Canadian Prime Minister had stated: "There is no NATO command in North America. Military planning in the area is, however, reported to NATO through the Canada-US Regional Planning Group which is made up of the Chiefs of Staff of both countries. This group reports to the Standing Group and through that agency to the Military Committee and the NATO Council. Accordingly, the NATO Council is kept informed of air defense arrangements in the Canada-US Region." CINCNORAD suggested that this statement be circulated within the DOD and other US agencies for use in reply to questions on this subject.

(U) JCS 1541/147, 16 Jun 58, CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 51.

On 20 Aug 58 the JCS informed SecDef that the Canadian Prime Minister's statement was an acceptable interpretation of the relationship of NORAD to NATO. Accordingly, they recommended that the statement be circulated to high
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20 Aug 58

(Cont.)

officials of the DOD and other interested
US Government agencies for use in reply to
question on this relationship. (For further
action, see item of 2 Apr 59.)

(5) JCS 1541/155, 13 Aug 58; (U) Memo, JCS
to SecDef, 20 Aug 58; same file, sec 52.

8 Sep 58

With the approval of the President and Sec
Def, the JCS issued a revised unified command
plan that implemented provisions of the
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of
1958. Among other things, the 1958 Act ended
the executive agency arrangement and made
each commander of a unified or specified com-
mand responsible to SecDef, through the JCS,
for the accomplishment of his mission. CONAD
was now designated a unified command, rather
than a joint command; as prescribed in the
Act, CINCONAD exercised "operational command"
over the forces assigned. The UCP stated
that CINCONAD's responsibilities could best
be defined within the context of those of
CINCNORAD and that they were set forth in the
CINCONAD terms of reference, issued separately.
(For the existing terms of reference, see item
of 10 Jun 58; for further action revising them,
see item of 31 Dec 58.)

(C) JCS 1259/419, 4 Sep 58, CCS 381 (1-24-42)
sec 80. (C) SM-643-58 to CINCAL et al., 8 Sep
58, same file, sec 81.

24 Dec 58

CINCNORAD on 5 Sep 58 requested JCS approval
of the US manpower space requirements for a
proposed Northern NORAD Region Headquarters.
Subsequently, on 3 Nov 58, he recommended that,
pending submission of his overall package pro-
posal for his subordinate organizations, the
JCS note the need for US positions on the
Northern NORAD Region commander's staff and
direct the CSA and CSAF to allocate the required
manpower spaces to their component commanders to
allow CINCNORAD to fill the key staff positions
in the Northern Region Headquarters.

(C) JCS 1541/159, 17 Sep 58, CCS 092 (9-10-45)
sec 53. (C) JCS 1541/172, 17 Dec 58, same file,
sec 55.

On 24 Dec 58, the JCS decided that US manpower
space requirements for the Northern NORAD region
staff should not be approved before consideration
of CINCNORAD's requirements for all subordinate
organizations of his command. They did request
the CSA and CSAF to allocate the required
manpower spaces to their respective component commands in NORAD to enable CINCNORAD to fill urgent US requirements. (For further action, see item of 10 Feb 59.)

(C) Dec On JCS 1541/172, 24 Dec 58; (C) SM-1060-58 to CSA and CSAF, 24 Dec 58; (S) CM-1061-58 to CINCNORAD, 24 Dec 58; CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 55.

CINCNORAD forwarded to the JCS and the Canadian Chiefs of Staff on 3 Jul 58 recommended military policy guidance for his command.

(S) JCS 1541/150, 15 Jul 58, CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 51.

On 24 Dec 58, the JCS approved this guidance with certain changes and forwarded it to SecDef. The military policy guidance for CINCNORAD as approved by the JCS provided:

1. The United States and Canada must maintain a defense posture at all times adequate to make its proper contribution to the overall deterrence of Soviet aggression, or, in the event of war, to insure the survival of the United States and Canada as free nations. In this connection, the requirements for air defense should not be considered in isolation from the requirements for other defensive and offensive forces.

2. Further, to accomplish these objectives, the United States and Canada intend to achieve and to maintain, at an appropriate state of readiness, an effective integrated air defense system capable of defending the essential elements of the Canada/United States war-making capacity, and providing an appropriate degree of protection to key population centers against attack by aircraft and missiles. Areas and installations which are not essential to the war effort may have to remain relatively undefended.

3. To this end, CINCNORAD should submit to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee studies, recommendations, and periodic long-range objective plans designed to accomplish the agreed objectives relative to air defense. In the event that budgetary, manpower, or other limitations preclude the approval of such recommendations or plans, it is
anticipated that CINCNORAD's recommendations for lesser air defense programs, within the limitations imposed, will be requested and considered by the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee and the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff prior to approval of their respective national programs.

After the Canadian Chiefs of Staff had approved the military policy guidance, it was forwarded to CINCNORAD on 3 Feb 59.

The JCS issued revised terms of reference for CINCONAD to bring them into consonance with the DOD Reorganization Act of 1958 and the revised "CP" (see item of 8 Sep 58). Changes from the existing CINCONAD terms of reference (see item 10 Jun 58) lay mainly in the new terminology resulting from the 1958 Act, which appeared particularly in the first part of the following passage:

3. Without duplicating the functions and responsibilities of CINCNORAD, CINCONAD is responsible to the Secretary of Defense, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for accomplishment of the following missions and tasks:

a. Exercise operational command over all United States forces assigned, attached, or otherwise made available in order to:

   (1) Coordinate, implement, and control purely national actions in defending the Continental United States including Alaska against air attack if unilateral U.S. action is required.

   (2) Defend U.S. installations in Greenland against air attack.

   (3) Assist in the defense of Mexico against air attack, in accordance with approved plans and agreements.

b. Support CINCAL, CINCLANT, CINCPAC, CINCPAC, and CINCPAC in their missions, as appropriate.
In approving these terms of reference, specifically regarding subpara 3 a (1), the JCS noted that "it was not their intention to provide for the assumption of operational responsibility by CINCONAD for the air defense of the United States and Alaska except in the circumstance of action by Canada or the United States which make it impossible for CINCNORAD to exercise this assigned responsibility."

The practice of issuing CINCONAD terms of reference as a separate document lapsed with the next revision of the UCP. The JCS distributed a new UCP on 4 Feb 61 that incorporated the above terms of reference without substantial change.

(C) SM-105-61 to CINCAL et al., 4 Feb 61, JMF 5160 (15 Jul 60). (U) 1st N/H of JCS 1541/168, 7 Mar 61, CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 54.
In Nov 58, CINCONAD submittea to the JCS (through the CSAF) a proposed plan for the geographical reorganization of the NORAD system, including provision for the realignment of NORAD regional boundaries and allocation of command positions between Canada and the US. (Initially, after the establishment of the command, CINCMORAD had set up a geographical organization with five regions and 23 divisions.) The new plan contained nine major subdivisions, five of which would include forces and/or territory of both countries. Of those five, one would be commanded by a Canadian and two would have Canadian deputy commanders. The configuration of the proposed regional areas was based on the installation of SAGE and other control elements. On 12 Dec 58, CINCONAD submitted descriptions of the areas of responsibility of the proposed NORAD regions as well as estimated activation dates.

On 10 Feb 59 the JCS forwarded the proposed NORAD regional boundary plan to the SecDef, requesting that they be advised of any political implications that might affect the NORAD reorganization. (For further action, see item of 22 Jul 59.)

The CJCS brought to JCS attention on 23 Sep 58 that CINCMORAD, being directly responsible to both US and Canadian Chiefs of Staff, could be directed by either with the approval of the other to increase the alert status of his forces. In the event the JCS considered that CINCONAD should increase the alert status of all his forces under circumstances in which he had not done so on his own initiative (as provided in his terms of reference), machinery had been set up whereby the JCS would notify the Canadian Chiefs of Staff through the Canadian Joint Staff in Washington of the desirability of directing CINCMORAD to take such action. No order would be issued to CINCMORAD until the concurrence of the
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(Cont.)

Canadian Chiefs of Staff had been received. The machinery referred to by the CJCS had been instituted at his direction as an informal working arrangement between his office and the Canadian Joint Staff in Washington. He suggested that the JCS might want to make this machinery formal.

(S) CH-185-58 to JCS, 23 Sep 58, Encl to JCS 1541/160, 24 Sep 58, CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 53.

On 11 Feb 59 the JCS approved the procedure instituted by the CJCS and on the following day designated the Director for Operations, J-3, as the individual to initiate action to: obtain Canadian concurrency in such instances; thereafter transmit the directive to CINC NORAD to increase his readiness; and inform the Secretaries of Defense and State.

(S) Dec On JCS 1541/171, 12 Feb 59; (S) SM-157-59 to Dir for Operations, J-3, 12 Feb 58 (JCS 1541/171); CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 55.

25 Feb 59

In response to a Canadian request for an interpretation of the terms of reference of CINC NORAD in regard to his authority to declare increased readiness of NORAD forces, the JCS informed the Canadian Chiefs of Staff that the terms of reference authorized CINC NORAD to increase the operational readiness whenever in his judgment such action should be taken. However, it was the JCS opinion that, time permitting, CINC NORAD should request advice from the Canadian Chiefs of Staff and the JCS before directing an increase in the alert status in circumstances of heightened international tension. In addition, they concluded that CINC NORAD should be encouraged to establish a system of increasing his readiness in such a manner as not to be apparent to anyone outside his command.

(S) Dec On JCS 1541/181, 25 Feb 59; JCSM-69-59, to Cm, Canadian Chiefs of Staff, 25 Feb 59; (JCS 1541/181); JMP 9081/3180 (25 Feb 59).
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The Canadian Chiefs of Staff informed the JCS on 20 Mar 59 that they could not accept the JCS position. They contended that the responsibility for assessing the available information to determine if an increase in readiness was warranted must be with the chiefs of staff of the two countries, in consultation with the political authorities, as agreed at the Dec 58 meeting of the Canada-US Committee on Joint Defence.

(TS) JCS 1541/189, 25 Mar 59, JMF 9081/3180 (1 May 59).

On 1 May 59, the JCS replied to the Canadian Chiefs of Staff that, although they did not agree with the Canadian interpretation of the discussions at the Dec 58 meeting, they did agree that CINCNORAD was not in a position to assess all the political factors available at the governmental level. Therefore they considered that it should be the responsibility of the chiefs of staff of both countries, in consultation with their respective political authorities, to increase the readiness during periods of international tension when factors of overriding political significance were involved. The JCS reiterated, however, that CINCNORAD was authorized to increase operational readiness as set forth in his terms of reference, and that he could be directed by either the JCS or the Canadian Chiefs of Staff, with the approval of the other, to increase the alert status of all forces under his control. (For further action, see item of 2 Oct 59.)

(S) Dec On JCS 1541/196, 1 May 59; (S) JCSM-166-59 to Chm, Canadian Chiefs of Staff, 1 May 59 (JCS 1541/196); same file.

18 Mar 59

CINCNORAD recommended to the JCS on 31 Jul 58 that a hardened combat operations center (COC) with an adjacent headquarters complex for NORAD be constructed without delay in the Colorado Springs area.

(S) JCS 1541/153, 7 Aug 58, CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 51.
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18 Mar 59 (Cont.)
On 24 Sep 58, the JCS deferred consideration on the location of the NORAD Headquarters until completion of CSAP site surveys and cost estimates for several proposals. Subsequently, on 18 Mar 59, the JCS approved the Cheyenne Mountain site as the location for the NORAD COC with the understanding that the CSAP would continue studies to insure that the maximum economies would be effected.

(C) SM-703-58 to CSAF, 24 Sep 58, same file, sec 53. (S) Dec On JCS 1541/186, 18 Mar 59, JMF 9081/5000 (18 Mar 59).

2 Apr 59
The Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs on 28 Jan 59 referred to the JCS-endorsed statement by the Canadian Prime Minister concerning the relationship of NORAD to NATO (see item of 20 Aug 58) and informed the Deputy ASD(ISA) that it would be desirable to avoid use of that direct quotation. Instead, the Asst SecState proposed the following:
"NORAD is a joint United States-Canadian Air Defense Command established within the Canada-United States portion of the NATO area. Strictly speaking, it is not a NATO Command. The activities of NORAD are reported to NATO through the Canada-United States Regional Planning Group, which is composed of the Chiefs of Staff of both countries; this group reports to the NATO Standing Group which in turn reports to the NATO Military Committee and the NATO Council. Accordingly, the NATO Council is kept informed of air defense arrangements in the Canada-United States region."

(C) JCS 1541/183, 17 Feb 59, JMF 9081/500 (2 Apr 59).

On 2 Apr 59, the JCS approved the State Department revision subject to a change to state that: "NORAD is an integrated Canada-United States Air Defense Command established through bilateral agreement within the Canada-United States region of the NATO area." They also proposed inclusion of a statement that the Canada-US Regional Planning Group had no assigned forces and was not a command "in the real sense of the word."

(C) Dec On JCS 1541/187, 7 Apr 59; (C) JCSM-109-59 to SecDef, 7 Apr 59 (JCS 1541/187); same file.
23 Jun 59  CINCNORAD on 15 Dec 58 submitted a plan to reorganize his command in consonance with the concepts and principles developed in connection with the full operational command over assigned US forces now exercised by CINCONAD. Subsequently, on 27 Mar 59, CINCONAD submitted a plan for the Organization and Functions, Headquarters, North American/Continental Air Defense Command, setting forth the organization, principles, and manpower requirements for reorganization of the NORAD/CONAD headquarters and superseding all previous submissions pertaining to reorganization by those headquarters. CINCONAD stated that two separate and distinct headquarters, one for NORAD and one for CONAD, were totally unnecessary.

(U) JCS 1541/173, 17 Dec 58, CCS 092 (9-10-45) sec 55. (U) N/H of JCS 1541/180, 30 Mar 59, JMF 5164 (2 Feb 59) sec 1.

On 23 Jun 59, the JCS approved the plan for implementation, subject to a number of specific changes and guidance pertaining to the phased transfer of personnel from the components, the assumption of additional functions, and the personnel requirements and organization of the Headquarters, CONAD.

(C) Dec On JCS 1541/203, 23 Jun 59; (C) SM-630-59 to CINCONAD, 23 Jun 59 (JCS 1541/203); same file, sec 2.

22 Jul 59  The ASD(ISA) on 19 Feb 59 requested State Department advice on the political implications of the NORAD regional boundary plan (see item of 10 Feb 59). The Asst SecState replied on 10 Apr 59, commenting on part of the plan that proposed both a US commander and deputy commander in the 26th Region, which included Toronto. He suggested either modification of the boundaries or the appointment of a Canadian deputy commander.

(S) JCS 1541/199, 30 Apr 59, JMF 9081/9200 (28 Apr 59).

On 22 Jul 59, the JCS informed SecDef that, pending Canadian reaction to the plan, it would appear unprofitable to assess further the international political implications involved. Therefore they recommended that the boundaries of the 26th NORAD Region not be altered at that time and that the plan
On 17 Aug 59, the Canadian Cabinet Defense Committee agreed in principle with the subordinate NORAD organization and the allocation of command positions within the proposed areas, but suggested that Canadian interests would be better served if Canadian officers were appointed deputy commanders in the 29th Region, the Grand Forks Sector, and the Detroit Sector. The Canadians posed no objection to either the boundaries or nationality designation for the deputy commander of the 26th Region. CINCONAD advised the JCS on 25 Sep 59 of his concurrence with the Canadian proposals except for a Canadian deputy commander for the Detroit Sector.

On 13 Nov 59, the JCS concurred with the Canadian proposal that Canadian officers should be deputy commanders in the 29th Region and the Grand Forks Sector, but they did not accept a Canadian officer as deputy commander in the Detroit Sector. The JCS forwarded to the Canadian Chiefs of Staff a NORAD command position proposal (setting forth NORAD regional boundaries and designating command nationality for the regions and subordinate sectors), which incorporated the above decisions. On 25 Nov 59, the Canadian Chiefs of Staff notified the JCS that they concurred with the command position proposal.

On 31 Dec 59, the JCS advised SecDef of the revisions necessitated in the NORAD regional boundary plan by the above NORAD command position proposal. They recommended that this proposal be forwarded to the State Department and the White House for an assessment of domestic political implications and then be returned to them so that firm guidance could be furnished to CINC NORAD for the organization of subordinate headquarters.
22 Jul 59  
(Cont.) On 28 Mar 60, the Acting ASD(ISA) advised the JCS that the required coordination with US Government agencies on the division of commander positions in the NORAD regional organization had been completed. Accordingly, on 31 Mar 50, the JCS advised CINCNORAD that they concurred with the subordinate organization command position proposal and authorized him to implement it.

(S) 2d N/H of JCS 1541/222, 31 Mar 60, same file.

2 Oct 59 On 30 Sep 59, the Canadian Ambassador in Washington informed SecState that, as a result of the agreement reached at the 15 Dec 58 meeting of the Canada-US Ministerial Committee on Joint Defence, the Canadian Government proposed the following understanding with regard to increasing the state of readiness of CINCNORAD's forces: (1) CINCNORAD was authorized to increase the operational readiness of his forces as set forth in his terms of reference; (2) it would be the responsibility of the chiefs of staff of the two countries, in consultation with their respective political authorities, to reach agreement for increasing states of readiness of NORAD forces during periods of international tension when factors of overriding political significance were involved; (3) should agreement be reached to authorize an increase in the readiness of NORAD forces, agreement would also be reached on the desirability of making a public announcement of the increase; (4) the JCS and the Canadian Chiefs of Staff should be informed in advance of any important training exercise in order that each government might be in a position to deal with any public comment generated by the exercise; (5) either government would be free to make further proposals. On 2 Oct 59, SecState concurred with the above understandings, and the JCS informed CINCNORAD that the understandings became effective as of 2 Oct 59.

(S) JCS 1541/215, 22 Oct 59; (S) Msg, JCS 967478 to CINCNORAD, 27 Oct 59; JMF 9081/3180 (30 Sep 59).
15 Sep 60

The SecDef on 19 Aug 60 asked for JCS views on the appropriate existing command to which operational control of the Satellite Detection and Tracking System should be assigned. The JCS forwarded divergent views to SecDef on 15 Sep 60. CSA and CSAF considered that CINCONAD should retain operational control of the system; CSAF and CINCNORAD were of the opinion that CINCNORAD should exercise operational control of the system. The CJCS recommended that SecDef assign operational command of the system to CINCONAD and specify that CINCNORAD would exercise operational control of the system. On 7 Oct 60 SecDef assigned operational command to CINCONAD and operational control to CINCNORAD.

(C) JCS 2283/99, 22 Aug 60; (S) JCSM-402-60 and CM 604-60 to SecDef, both 15 Sep 60, Encls B and A to JCS 2283/103, 15 Sep 60; (C) JCS 2283/107, 10 Oct 60; JMF 9081/8670 (21 May 59) sec 2.

2 Dec 60

The JCS approved changes in the existing procedures (see item of 11 Feb 59) for obtaining Canadian concurrence for increasing the operational readiness of NORAD forces in order to conform with the Canada-US agreement of 2 Oct 59 (see item), providing for the agreement of the chiefs of staff of both countries in consultation with their respective political authorities. Accordingly, they instructed the Director for Operations, J-3, in the event they determined that the NORAD readiness should be increased, to: obtain Canadian concurrence through the Canadian Joint Staff in Washington; concurrently request the SecDef to inform SecState in order that the counsel of political authorities might be obtained; and, upon receipt of Canadian concurrence, transmit the appropriate directive to CINCNORAD, informing the Secretaries of State and Defense.

(S) Dec On JCS 1541/241, 2 Dec 60; (S) SM-1262-60 to Dir, J-3, 2 Dec 60 (JCS 1541/241); JMF 9081/3180 (30 Sep 59).
The JCS forwarded to CINCNORAD an agreement between DOD and NASA on functions involved in space surveillance of US and foreign satellites and space vehicles for implementation of the NORAD responsibilities contained in it.

(S) SM-222-61 to CINCNORAD, 2 Mar 61, Encl to JCS 2283/118, 15 Feb 61, JMF 8670 (19 Jan 61).

CINCNORAD on 8 Feb 60 submitted to the JCS a plan for Organization of Subordinate NORAD/CONAD Region Headquarters. The plan proposed formal NORAD/CONAD region headquarters to replace the seven provisional region headquarters through which CINCNORAD/CONAD currently exercised operational control/command. The plan did not include the Alaskan and Northern NORAD Regions. On 27 Jun 60, the JCS returned the plan to CINCNORAD for revision to include both region and sector headquarters. Accordingly, on 28 Oct 60, CINCNORAD submitted a plan for the Organization of NORAD/CONAD Region and Sector Headquarters.

(S) JCS 1541/225, 11 Feb 60; (S) SM-620-60 to CINCNORAD, 27 Jun 60 (JCS 1541/233);
(U) JCS 1541/240, 3 Nov 60; JMF 5164 (8 Feb 60) sec 2.

On 17 Mar 61 the JCS forwarded the CINCNORAD plan to SecDef together with certain changes on which they had agreed. They could not agree, however, on the propriety of the Service representation recommended by CINCNORAD for certain command and key staff positions in the region and sector headquarters, and they submitted divergent views on this matter. The CJCS informed SecDef that he favored approval of the plan as submitted by CINCNORAD, with the changes on which the JCS were agreed.

(C) JCSM-151-61 to SecDef, 17 Mar 61; (C) CM-137-61 to SecDef, 17 Mar 61; Encls to JCS 1541/249, 17 Mar 61; JMF 5164 (8 Feb 60) sec 3.

On 31 Mar 61 the SecDef approved the CINCNORAD plan, together with the changes on which the JCS agreed, and the JCS advised CINCNORAD on 3 Apr 61.

(C) 1st N/H of JCS 1541/249, 10 Apr 61; (U) SM-368-61 to CINCNORAD, 3 Apr 61; same file.
At the request of DDR&E, the JCS furnished additional guidance to CINCNORAD and CINCONAD relating to their responsibilities for the Space Detection and Tracking System (SPADATS). The assignment to them of SPADATS, now consisting primarily of SPACETRACK and SPASUR, was not restrictive to those systems alone. It was expected that CINCNORAD would plan for and request operational control, and CINCONAD operational command, of such additional military sensors or systems, or modifications thereto, as were found necessary to the performance of the SPADATS mission as identified by CINCNORAD. Also, assignment of SPADATS operational control to CINCNORAD was predicated on the concept that the central control facility developed therefor would be manned and operated as an integral part of the existing NORAD COC.

(U) Msg, JCS 550944 to CINCONAD and CINCNORAD, 4 Apr 61, App to JCS 2283/128, 31 Mar 61, JMF 2081/8670 (21 May 59) sec 2.

In connection with a proposed statement of functions outlined by CINCNORAD, the JCS clarified the intent behind the assignment of responsibilities for SPADATS to CINCNORAD/CONAD: (1) the assignment of SPADATS implied no change in the mission of CINCNORAD as stated in his TOR; (2) the SPASUR and SPACETRACK elements of SPADATS were assigned to the Departments of the Navy and Air Force respectively to provide manpower spaces and to operate them under operational control of CINCNORAD and operational command of CINCONAD; (3) should effective intelligence support not be forthcoming from other DOD and National Intelligence activities and agencies, recommendations should be submitted to the JCS.

(S) JCS 5849/461, 5 Apr 61; (S) SW-932-61 to CINCNORAD, 29 Aug 61, Encl A to JCS 2283/146, 22 Aug 61; JMF 1040.1 (31 Mar 61) sec 1.
The JCS approved a CINCNORAD/CSAF proposal to relocate the NORAD Alternate Command Post (ALCOP) to the Ottawa Combat Center/Direction Center hardened facility at North Bay, Ontario, from Headquarters 29th NORAD Region at Richards-Gebaur AFB, Kansas City, Mo. Funding for the project would continue to be the responsibility of the USAF. (For further action, see item of 11 Apr 66.)

(U) JCS 2308/188, 3 Apr 63; (U) SM-595-63 to CSAF and CINCNORAD, 3 May 63, Encl A to JCS 2308/193, 29 Apr 63; JMF 4930 (26 Mar 63).
On 11 Dec 63, the Acting CJCS noted with gratification the Canadian Chiefs of Staff agreement to expansion of the NORAD terms of reference. He informed the Canadian Chiefs of Staff that the JCS were also in agreement but that several internal US actions must be taken before such a proposal could be processed through diplomatic channels. Therefore he believed it would be premature for either government to introduce this subject into diplomatic channels at that time.

(S) Ltr, CJCS to Chm, Canadian Chiefs of Staff, 11 Dec 63, Encl to JCS 1541/281, 18 Dec 63, same file.
On 5 May 64, SecDef expressed his views and those of the JCS to SecState. SecState replied on 3 Jul 64 that he was not aware of any political urgency. He believed the question might be kept under review for reconsideration at a more appropriate time.

28 Apr 64

On 10 Dec 63, SecDef called for CINCNORAD to conduct an overall study and analysis of the requirements, technical design, operation plans, and acquisition management for the NORAD C&C complex. The JCS reviewed the resulting Cheyene Mountain Complex Task Force Study Report and told SecDef that they found it generally responsive to his requirements. They recommended approval of the operational level and configuration proposed in the Study Report, subject to certain modifications.
Subsequent to the JCS review of the Cheyenne Mountain Complex Task Force Study Report (see item of 28 Apr 64), the CSAF submitted to the JCS a study on the operational management and technical support concepts of the NORAD Space Defense Center. After considering this study together with the comments of CINCNORAD, the JCS recommended to the SecDef on 24 Aug 64 that: (1) the establishment of a Space Defense Center in Cheyenne Mountain to accomplish the technical and operational functions described in the Cheyenne Mountain Task Force Study Report be approved; (2) the Space Defense Center design, space allocation, installation of equipment, and computer programming be based on CINCNORAD/CONAD requirements; (3) the findings of the DOD Ad Hoc Study Group on DOD Space Detection Surveillance, Tracking, and Data Processing Effort be provided the JCS. On 24 Sep 64 SecDef stated that CINCNORAD/CONAD was responsible for the functional performance, the operational management, and the technical support arrangements for staffing, operating, and maintaining the Space Defense Center in the Cheyenne Mountain Complex. He should proceed with arrangements for staffing, operating, and maintaining the Space Defense Center to achieve full capability by Jan 65.

(S) JCSM-723-64 to SecDef, 24 Aug 64, Encl to JCS 2308/274-5, 24 Aug 64, JMF 4930 (10 Dec 63) sec 2. (C) JCS 2308/274-6, 29 Sep 64, same file, sec 3.
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13 Jan 65
On 30 Dec 64, CINCONAD recommended to the JCS that consideration be given to the early assignment to CINCNORAD of the space defense mission now charged exclusively to CINCONAD. The JCS replied on 13 Jan 65 that timing of the formal proposal to assign an aerospace defense mission to CINCONAD/NORAD was sensitive to current negotiations with Canada. The JCS intended to consider such assignment after negotiation of US-Canadian agreement on consultation and procedures related to the use of nuclear air defense weapons. Assignment of weapon systems to CINCNORAD would be handled separately on a case-by-case basis.

(TS) Msg, CINCONAD to JCS, 301750Z Dec 64.
(TS-GP 3) Msg, JCS 3741 to CINCONAD, 13 Jan 65, Encl E to JCS 1259/637-7, 4 Jan 65, JMF 5160 (21 Aug 63) sec 2. (JCS 1259/637-7 contains a useful review of the CINCNORAD space defense mission question to the end of 64.)

3 Jun 65
The JCS informed SecDef that, in accordance with approved program changes for the phasing out of Navy airborne DEW Line extension and contiguous barrier picket ship operations in FY 1966, it was planned that actual operations by those forces would terminate on 1 Sep 65. At that time, naval participation in CONAD/NORAD operations would be limited to space surveillance (SPASUR) and contingency augmentation forces supplied by CINCLANT and CINCPAC. Therefore the JCS recommended the disestablishment of COMNAVFORCONAD effective 1 Sep 65. Upon SecDef approval, the JCS would initiate required implementing actions, including notification of the Canadian Chief of Defence Staff.

(S-GP 3) JCSM-424-65 to SecDef, 3 Jun 65
(JCS 1541/290-1), JMF 5164 (9 Apr 65).

On 30 Jun 65 the Deputy SecDef approved the disestablishment of COMNAVFORCONAD, and on 1 Jul 65 the JCS informed the Canadian Chief of Defence Staff of this planned action. They anticipated that US Navy participation in NORAD would continue with US naval coordinating, planning, and advisory functions being accomplished effectively by US naval personnel assigned to the joint CONAD/NORAD Headquarters staff and the Regional and Sector Headquarters staffs.

(S-GP 3) JCS 1541/290-2, 6 Jul 65; (S-GP 3)
JCSM-513-65 to Canadian Chief of Defence Staff, 1 Jul 65; same file.

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The JCS advised SecDef of their opinion that the question of expanding CINCNORAD's mission should again be reviewed. They noted that there was general agreement that the mission of defense against space systems should be assigned to CINCNORAD; the question had become primarily one of timing and overcoming other obstacles to such assignment. The JCS noted that adding this mission would not obligate the US to assign specific weapons or units to CINCNORAD if problems of security and political sensitivity dictated otherwise. They considered that SecDef should approach SecState with a recommendation to examine the need for government-to-government negotiations on the Canada-US agreements. Pursuant to the outcome of the negotiations, the JCS would undertake action in conjunction with the Canadian Chief of the Defence Staff to revise the CINCNORAD TOR.

CINCNORAD on 20 Jul 65 provided the JCS with his current requirements for interceptor dispersal bases in Canada to serve as a basis for government-to-government discussion of this matter.

On 3 Sep 65 the JCS informed SecDef that CINCNORAD had a requirement for four Canadian bases for the dispersal of US interceptor aircraft. The JCS supported that requirement, recommending that a summary of the CINCNORAD requirements be used as the basis for initiating negotiations with the Canadians.

On 17 Sep 65 the SecDef concurred in the need for the use of interceptor dispersal bases in Canada but asked for more complete information on the costs involved.

On 10 Dec 65 the JCS forwarded to the SecDef additional cost data on the four proposed Canadian dispersed operating bases.
The CJCS wrote the Canadian Chief of Defence Staff stating that the time appeared appropriate to bring the question of expanding the NORAD mission to include space defense before the two governments. He asked for an assessment of the political climate in Ottawa and for views on the current attitude of the Canadian Government toward a mission expansion and the advisability of a Canadian rather than a US initiative in processing the matter through diplomatic channels. On 27 Jan 66 the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff answered that the Canadian Government was disposed to look favorably on the addition of space defense to NORAD's mission but considered it appropriate for the US State Department to take the initiative. He thought it essential that the Canadian Government be provided with the fullest available information before being requested to give the matter formal consideration.

(TS-GP 4) Memo, CJCS to Chief of Defence Staff, 3 Dec 65, Encl to JCS 1259/663, 8 Dec 65; (TS) Ltr, Vice Chief of Defence Staff to CJCS, 27 Jan 66; JMF 5160 (24 Aug 65).
1966

29 Feb 66

In reply to the Canadian letter of 27 Jan 66 (see item of 3 Dec 65) CJCS furnished the Canadians with a definition of "aerospace defense." A preliminary analysis had indicated to CJCS "that it may be a relatively simple matter, subject to higher authority, to convert the language in the TOR from 'air defense' to 'aerospace defense'. The more difficult problems will probably be concerned with the resources to do the job."

(S) Memo, CJCS to Chief of Defence Staff, 28 Feb 66, JMF 5160 (24 Aug 65).

11 Apr 66

The JCS recommended to SecDef that the NORAD Alternate Command Post (ALCOP) Basic Plan for moving the NORAD ALCOP from Richards-Gebaur AFB, Missouri, to North Bay, Ontario, Canada, be approved. SecDef approval would also constitute approval of the telecommunications requirements under the provisions of DOD Directive 4630.1. The JCS further recommended that subsequent to Canadian Defence Staff approval of the basic plan, the Department of the Air Force be authorized, as an agent of the JCS, to obtain Canadian Defence Staff agreement on joint manning actions and funding and then to implement the plan. On 29 Jun 66, SecDef approved each of the JCS recommendations. On 18 Jul 66 the Chairman notified the Chief of the Defence Staff of these developments and asked that the JCS be informed when Canadian action on the basic plan was completed. (For further action, see item of 29 Sep 71.)

(C) JCSM-228-66, 11 Apr 66, Encl A to JCS 2245/153-1, 10 Mar 66; (C) JCS 2245/153-2, 1 Jul 66; (C) 1st Wk of JCS 2245/153-2, 19 Jul 66; JCS 4530 (8 Oct 65).

31 Jun 66

CINCNORAD on 1 Jun 66 expressed to the JCS his concern over the delay in obtaining Canadian approval for the dispersal of USAF interceptor
21 Jun 66  (Cont.)

The JCS informed CINCNORAD that they shared his concern and stated that State Department and DoD representatives were finalizing instructions for dispatch to the US Ambassador in Canada on this matter. The JCS also brought CINCNORAD's concern to the attention of the ASD(ISA).

(S-GP 4) JCS 1541/296, 3 Jun 66; (S-GP 3) Msg, JCS 4854 to CINCNORAD, 21 Jun 66; (U) DJSM-821-66 to ASD(ISA), 22 Jun 66; JMF 9121 (1 Jun 66).

7 Dec 66

The PJBD discussed the future of NORAD at a 3-7 Oct 66 meeting and decided to seek the views of CINCNORAD, through the appropriate military channel, on his future mission and the requirement to fulfill that mission in the period after 12 May 66 when the Canada-US agreement on NORAD expired. At MCC request, the JCS on 7 Dec 66 asked for CINCNORAD views on this matter. Since CINCNORAD made a major contribution to the forces of NORAD, the JCS also sought his views.

(S-GP 1) JCS 1541/297, 2 Nov 66; (S-GP 1) SM-948-66 to CINCNORAD, 7 Dec 66 (JCS 1541/297-1); (S-GP 4) SM-949-66 to CINCNAD, 7 Dec 66 (JCS 1541/297-1), JMF 9081 (26 Oct 66) sec 1.

Both CINCNORAD (on 20 Dec 66) and CINCNAD (on 23 Jan 67) supported the continuation of NORAD and argued strongly for a change in the NORAD terms of reference to include the mission of "aerospace defense" rather than "air defense" as was currently the case. (For further action, see Item of 9 Mar 67.)

(S-GP 3) JCS 1541/297-3, 3 Jan 67; (S-GP 1) JCS 1541/297-4, 31 Jan 67, same file.
9 Mar 67

The JCS forwarded to the SecDef their views on the renewal of the NORAD agreement. They concluded that the experience of the past years and the outlook for the future indicated a continuing need for a combined Canadian-US command. They believed that the principles in the existing agreement should be accepted as a basis for renegotiation and that, "the appropriate time," the NORAD air defense mission should be changed to an "aerospace defense" one. Such an assignment would charge CINCNORAD with the mission of defending the North American Contine against enemy bombers, missiles, and satellites. Accordingly, the JCS recommended government-to-government negotiations with Canada to renew the NORAD agreement with modification to allow assignment of the mission of aerospace defense.

(TS-GP 3) JCSM-126-67 to SecDef, 9 Mar 67
(JCS 1541/297-5), JMF 9081 (26 Oct 66) sec 1.

The SecDef replied on 8 May 67, endorsing renewal of the NORAD agreement upon its expiration in May 68. He disagreed, however, that any attempt should be made at that time to negotiate a change in the NORAD mission from "air" to "aerospace" defense, although he favored leaving open the possibility of such an amendment in the renewal negotiations. The ASD/ISA had noted on 15 Mar 67 that "we have been loath" to approve earlier recommendations for amendment of the NORAD mission to include aerospace defense owing to policy problems posed by potential demands for multi-national operational control of space and missile systems and the potential loss of flexibility in US decisions concerning the overall deployment of emerging space and missile systems.

(TS-GP 3) JCS 1541/297-3, 11 May 67; (TS-GP 3)
JCS 1541/297-7, 28 Mar 67; same file.

5 Jun 67

The CJCS forwarded to SecDef the views of CINCNORAD and his Canadian deputy on certain difficulties confronting NORAD. The Commander had stated that, unless the US was extremely careful, discussions on the mission and scope of the NORAD agreement could result in a major political event in Canada. He added, "the conclusion and duration of the U.S. position has done much to foment these conditions. A military alliance as important as NORAD must be based upon a feeling of mutual trust and a reasonable exchange of information as to goals and objectives. This is certainly missing now." CINCNORAD and his deputy had noted the limitations on exchange of ballistic missile defense information as an example of the current lack of mutual trust. The CJCS informed the SecDef that the JCS had proposed to the US Military Liaison Committee a statutory determination for release of US sensitive information to Canada to aid in eliminating the misunderstanding.

(S-GP 3) JCS 1541/297-5, 8 Jun 67, JMF 9081
(26 Oct 66) sec 1.
The ASD(ISA) on 19 Dec 67 forwarded to the JCS for comment the Canadian response to the US proposal for extension of the NORAD agreement. The Canadian proposal, which agreed substantially with that of the US, called for an exchange of notes to provide: (1) renewal of agreement of 12 May 58 for a five-year term with the understanding that either party could request a review of the arrangement at any time or terminate the agreement upon one year's notice; (2) renewal of the agreement would not involve in any way a Canadian commitment to participate in an active ballistic missile defense.

(S-GP 4) JCS 1541/311, 27 Dec 57, JMF 803 (30 Nov 67).

On 19 Jan 68 the JCS informed SecDef that the Canadian proposal "probably" represented the best agreement currently attainable and should be accepted as a basis for negotiating renewal of the NORAD agreement. They reaffirmed, however, their position (see item of 9 Mar 67) that the CINCNORAD mission should be expanded to include aerospace defense.

(S-GP 4) JCSM-39-66 to SecDef, 19 Jan 68 (JCS 1541/311-1), same file.

23 Feb 63

In response to a CINCNORAD request to change the command designation of the Continental Air Defense Command to the Continental Aerospace Defense Command, the JCS replied that negotiations for the renewal of the NORAD agreement made favorable consideration of the redesignation inadvisable at that time.

(S-IP 3) Msg, CINCNORAD to JCS, 101618Z Jan 68, JCS IN 29140; (S) Msg, JCS 2239 to CINCNORAD, 28 Feb 63, Encl A to JCS 1279/689, 16 Feb 68; JMF 043 (10 Jan 68).

Mar 68

In an exchange of notes, immediately made public, the US and Canada agreed to renew the NORAD agreement for a period of five years from 12 May 68. The agreement could be reviewed at any time at the request of either party and might be terminated by either government after such review following a one year period of notice.

At a Jan 63 meeting, the MCC agreed that when the renegotiation of the NORAD agreement had been completed, CINCNORAD should be invited to review his terms of reference. The agreement having been renewed on 30 Mar 66, CINCNORAD was duly requested to review his terms of reference. CINCNORAD submitted the results to the CJCS and the Canadian Chief of Defence Staff on 24 Jul 68.

After considering the CINCNORAD submission, the JCS informed SecDef on 24 Sep 68 that the CINCNORAD terms of reference were not current and should be updated. Before approaching the Canadian Chief of the Defence Staff on this matter, they requested SecDef approval to restate the NORAD mission as follows:

(1) defend the continental US (including Alaska) and Canada against aerospace attack;
(2) support other continental US and Canadian commands. The JCS stated that this recommended change would in no way precommit the assignment of additional weapon systems or forces.

On 9 Nov 68 the Deputy SecDef informed the JCS that he did not believe it was either politically expedient or militarily pressing at the present time to recommend to the Canadians such a change in the NORAD mission.

At a meeting, the CJCS and General Allard of the Canadian Defence Staff agreed to establish a US-Canadian working group at the NORAD Headquarters to undertake cooperative studies on aerospace matters. Specifically, the group was to consider such matters as: AWACS; interceptors; long-range radars; alternate command posts; and SOMARCS. In addition the group would be prepared to examine Canadian participation in SENTINEL following Presidential approval of a statutory determination on the release of appropriate atomic information. This group, which was to become the Canada-US Air Defense Cooperative Study Group, would be formed with participation of the US Joint Staff and Services and the Canadian Defence Staff. (For further action, see item of 10 Apr 69.)
CINCNORAD in Jan 69 prepared terms of reference for the Canada-US Air Defense Cooperative Study Group (CANUSAD) (see item of 5 Dec 68), and the Canadian Defence Staff approved them on 27 Mar 69. The JCS approved these terms of reference on 10 Apr 69 and forwarded them to CINCNORAD. The terms of reference established the CANUSAD as a binational ad hoc military study group responsible to the JCS and the Canadian Chief of Defence Staff. CANUSAD was charged with a mission of conducting studies on aerospace defense matters of mutual interest to include development of recommended Canada-US military options on air defense matters and, when appropriate, ballistic missile defense matters for submission to the JCS and the Canadian Defence Staff.

(S) JCS 2289/34, 2 Apr 69; (S) Msg, JCS 6639 to CINCNORAD, 10 Apr 69; JMP 979/303 (19 Dec 68).
1971

14 Jun 71
At CINCNORAD request, the JCS proposed to the Canadian Chief of Defence Staff that the Canada-US Air Defense Cooperative Study Group (see item of 10 Apr 69) be terminated. The Canadian Chief of Defence Staff agreed on 9 Jul 71.

(S) Msg, CINCNORAD to JCS, 13 Apr 70, JCS IN 41014; (S) Msg, JCS 9703 to Canadian Chief of Defence Staff, 14 Jun 71, Encl A to JCS 2323/15-2, 2 Jun 71; (S) Msg, Canadian Chief of Defence Staff to CJCS, 9 Jul 71, JCS IN 23359; JMP 979/303 (13 Apr 70).

29 Sep 71
In 1966 the JCS had recommended and the SecDef had approved (see item of 11 Apr 66) a NORAD Alternate Command Post (ALCOP) Basic Plan, which proposed moving the NORAD ALCOP from Richards-Gebaur AFB to North Bay, Canada. This plan, however, was never approved by the Canadian Government. Consequently, at CINCNORAD request, the JCS requested SecDef approval on 29 Sep 71 to withdraw the NORAD ALCOP Basic Plan from Canadian channels and to seek the concurrence of the Chief of the Canadian Defence Staff to designate Headquarters, 24th NORAD Region, Malmstrom AFB, Montana, as the primary NORAD ALCOP. This latter proposal would combine the CONAD and NORAD ALCOPs. The SecDef approved the JCS request on 14 Oct 71, and the Chief of the Canadian Defence Staff concurred on 10 Nov 71.

(S) JCSM-436-71 to SecDef, 29 Sep 71, Att to JCS 2308/485-2, 21 Sep 71; (S) Ltr, CINCNORAD to JCS, 12 Oct 70, Att to JCS 2308/485, 9 Nov 70; (S) 1st N/H of JCS 2308/485-2, 15 Oct 71; (S) JCSM-475-71 to Chief of Defence Staff, 22 Oct 71, App B to JCS 2308/485-2, 21 Sep 71; (S) JCS 2308/485-3, 17 Nov 71; JMP 363 (12 Oct 70).
In response to a SecDef request for recommendation on the military considerations that should influence a future NORAD agreement, the CJCS furnished him the following six military factors deemed of particular interest in any negotiation of the agreement:

1. Inclusion of an agreed US/Canadian concept for a modernized air defense force setting forth the degree of Canadian participation, command and control arrangements to meet the Canadian desire for control of Canada's airspace, and cost-sharing arrangements for new equipment;

2. Recognition of current Canadian participation in passive aerospace defensive systems;

3. Recognition of Canadian concern over air defense objectives for NORAD, especially Canadian apprehension that the current US air defense objectives (for defense against a small bomber attack with one or two days of strategic warning) might reflect a reduction of emphasis on North American air defense to a degree no longer justifying the NORAD agreement;

4. Provision for emergency consultations as outlined in a 1965 Canada-US agreement on this matter;

5. No consideration of change in command and control until ongoing air defense studies were complete;

6. Adoption of a flexible position on the duration of the agreement, supporting a two-year extension to allow time to develop more definitive cost data prior to negotiation of a new agreement should the Canadians decide to participate actively in modernized force development. The CJCS personally recommended a two-year extension of the present agreement.

(S) JCS 1541/347, 24 Mar 72; (S) CM-2110-72 to SecDef, 17 Aug 72, Encl to JCS 1541/347-2, 7 Aug 72; JMP 803 (22 Mar 72).
13 Apr 73
The JCS informed SecDef that, unless otherwise directed, they would approve CINCAI's request for a realignment of NORAD control centers in Alaska. He proposed to eliminate the boundary lines between the Campion and Murphy Dome NORAD Control Centers, converting Campion to a NORAD Ground Controlled Intercept/Control and Reporting Post and converting Kotzebue to a NORAD Surveillance Station/Forward Air Control Post. SecDef's reply of 23 Apr 73 approved the realignment, subject to the following: "In order to conform to terms of the NORAD Agreement, however, the proposal should be forwarded to the Canadian Department of National Defence for its comments, and final approval... should be withheld until that consultation has been completed." The Canadian authorities responded in a message dated 7 May 73 that read: "Consultation appreciated however we have no comment to offer on proposed realignment," and implementation was ordered the following day.
(U) JCSM-161-73 to SecDef, 13 Apr 73, Encl A to JCS 2147/553, 30 Mar 73; (U) JCS 2147/553-1, 26 Apr 73; (U) Msg, NDHQ to CINCNORAD, 7 May 73, JCS IN 71327; (U) 1st N/H of JCS 2147/553-1, 17 May 73, JMF 364 (7 Feb 73).

10 May 73
By an exchange of notes, the US and Canada extended the NORAD agreement without change for a period of two years from 12 May 73. The event received no publicity, and the extension was listed routinely among other treaty items in the Department of State Bulletin.
(U) Note, Canadian Ambassador to SecState, 10 May 73; (U) Note, DepAsstSecState for Canadian Affairs to Canadian Ambassador, 10 May 73; JMF 802 (10 May 73). Dept of State Bulletin, 11 Jun 73, p. 866.

21 Aug 73
In expressing their concern to SecDef over proposed reductions in US air defense, the JCS argued that unilateral reduction in US air defense forces could be interpreted by Canada as an abrogation of Canadian-US defense agreements, thereby jeopardizing NORAD and other vital military agreements requiring Canadian participation.

(8) JCSM-374-73 to SecDef, 21 Aug 73, Encl to JCS 2458/868-2, 18 Aug 73, JMF 556 (13 Aug 73) sec 1.
In opposing US air defense reductions the CJCS stated that approval of the revised air defense objectives of surveillance and peacetime control of US airspace, together with the corresponding force reductions reflected in recent PDMs, could cause a collapse of Canadian participation in North American air defense and failure to renew the NORAD agreement. On 3 Nov 73, SecDef replied that while the possibility of such a result could not be ruled out, he did not believe it likely that US reductions would affect the basic willingness of the Canadian Government to continue its cooperation in bilateral defense arrangements such as NORAD. "We must, of course, handle our reductions and future planning for NORAD with sensitivity to Canadian interests, and we must not rule out possible 'new roles' for NORAD."

Taking up a SecDef statement that appropriate consultation with Canada on these matters would be scheduled by ASD(ISA), the CJCS recommended on 20 Nov 73 that he and SecDef initiate the consultation by themselves visiting Ottawa within the next few weeks to discuss air defense decisions and the future of NORAD. He suggested that follow-on consultations should proceed under the auspices of the PJBD.

(S) CM-2910-73 to SecDef, 24 Sep 73, Att to JCS 2458/868-13, 26 Sep 73; (S) JCS 2456/868-14, 6 Nov 73; JMF 556 (13 Aug 73) sec 3.

(S) CM-3011-73 to SecDef, 20 Nov 73, Att to 1st N/H of JCS 2458/868-14, 21 Jan 74, same file.
6 Jun 74

The JCS furnished SecDef with specific recommendations, which included the views of CINCNORAD, for changes in the NORAD agreement. They proposed that the agreement contain an unclassified statement setting forth the following NORAD strategic objectives: (1) safeguard the sovereign rights of the US and Canada in North American airspace; (2) contribute to the deterrence of aerospace attack on North America through maximum warning of attack and defensive capabilities; (3) if deterrence failed, inflict maximum possible attrition on the attacking forces. They also proposed the following changes in the agreement: wherever required, change the term "air" to "aerospace" and redesignate NORAD as the "North American Aerospace Defense Command"; include in the stated principles the right of either nation, in situations short of strategic attack on North America, to take unilateral action in its own defensive interests which would not affect the sovereignty of the other; eliminate the 1968 ballistic missile defense caveat; and extend the agreement for a five-year period to 1980 with the right of either party to request review and to terminate with a one-year notification.

11 Jun 74

In response to an ASD(ISA) request for a review of all aspects of North American defense arrangements for consideration in the NORAD agreement renewal, the JCS informed SecDef that there were in existence a number of such agreements and that the MCC had undertaken a project to review more than 250 Canadian-US defense agreements with the objective of validating them for content, currency, and retainability. The JCS recommended that the negotiations for the renewal of the NORAD agreement be addressed without reference to the results of the review of defensive arrangements under way in the MCC.

2 Aug 74

CINCNORAD on 25 Jun 74 informed the JCS that both Canada and the US had indicated that the prime mission for aerospace defense forces was surveillance and control of sovereign airspace. To accomplish that mission, both nations had plans to reconfigure the NORAD Region boundaries so as to provide the maximum practical measure of control of national airspace in time of peace while retaining the capability to fight as a single force if North...
America was ever attacked by air. The US plan provided for the installation of a FAA/USAF Joint Surveillance System (JSS). This system would reduce the existing NORAD command and control regions for six to four and would require the establishment of Region Operations Control Centers (ROCCs) in each region from which airborne warning and control system aircraft would be positioned and from which the peacetime surveillance and control mission would be directed. The Canadians had a similar plan based on a two-region configuration. CINCNORAD supported a MCC recommendation for the collocation of the ROCCs of the two countries.

(5) JCS 1541/353, 2 Jul 74, JMF 803 (8 Apr 74).

On 2 Aug 74, the JCS relayed this information to the SecDef, concurring with the JSS/ROCC concept for air-space control and with the recommendation to collocate US ROCCs with Canada. They asked SecDef to forward this information to SecState, requesting determination of the US and Canadian political positions on this matter in order to allow PJBD action at the Oct 74 meeting.

(5) JCSM-334-74 to SecDef, 2 Aug 74, Encl to JCS 1541/353-1, 19 Jul 74, same file.
In response to an ASD(ISA) request for the JCS position on a proposed Canadian draft for the renewal of the NORAD agreement, the JCS concurred in a revised US draft proposal. They recommended that the term of the renewal of the NORAD agreement be indefinite, provided the Canadians would agree to include the NORAD objectives and a greater emphasis on the evolution of the aerospace nature of CINCNORAD's mission. If these items were not included, the JCS recommended that the agreement be renewed for a period of five years only.

(S) JCS 1541/354, 11 Apr 75; (S) JCSM-137-75 to SecDef, 16 Apr 75, App to JCS 1541/354-1, 15 Apr 75; JMF 803 (5 Feb 74).

The US and Canada agreed to renew the NORAD agreement for an additional period of five years. The agreement became effective 12 May 75. The renewal took "into account the changes in the character of strategic weapons and the threat posed by them to North America which had occurred since NORAD was first established." The agreement made clear that "the continuing, if changing, threat from the manned bomber still calls for close US-Canadian cooperation in air defense for North America. While participating in the warning, aerospace surveillance, and control functions of NORAD, Canada will not participate in any active anti-ballistic missile defense." Under the terms of the new agreement, "close coordination and cooperation will take place between civilian and military aerospace control authorities in the United States and Canada."

Dept of State Bulletin, 2 Jun 75, pp. 749,750. See also Ltr, SecState to Canadian Ambassador, nd, with attachment, App to JCS 1541/351-4, 14 May 75, JMF 803 (5 Feb 74) sec 1.

The JCS issued an approved revision of the UCP. Effective 1 Jul 75, CONAD was disestablished and the Aerospace Defense Command (ADCOM), a specified command, assumed all the responsibilities previously assigned to CONAD. The Commander in Chief, Aerospace Defense Command (CINCAD) was designated to serve as CINCNORAD. The JCS had been in agreement in recommending this feature of the general UCP revision as early as 19 Mar 74.

(C) SM-355-75 to CSA et al., 27 Jun 75, Enci to JCS 1259/758-43, 19 Jun 75, JMF 040 (11 Jan 74) sec 11. (C) JCSM-81-74 to SecDef, 19 Mar 74 (JCS 1259/758-5), same file, sec 2.
Following the renewal of the NORAD agreement, representatives of the Joint Staff, the Canadian Defence Staff, and the NORAD staff met and agreed that the CINCNORAD terms of reference should be revised. (For previous terms of reference, see item of 10 Jun 58.) On 22 Jul 75 the JCS approved revised terms of reference for CINCNORAD and forwarded them to the US Section of the MCC for use in negotiating agreed terms of reference with the Canadian Defence Staff. The proposed terms included recommendations, as agreed by the Joint Staff, Canadian, and NORAD representatives, for: a statement of NORAD objectives; a NORAD mission statement; changes consonant with the language of the renewed NORAD agreement; separate terms of reference for Deputy CINCNORAD and for the national component commanders; a statement of responsibilities of the Commander, Alaskan NORAD Region; and declassification of all parts of the terms of reference. On 8 Aug 75 the MCC accepted the proposed terms of reference subject to certain changes.

(U) SM-404-75 to US Sec MCC, 22 Jul 75, Encl to JCS 1541/351-5, 14 Jul 75, JMF 803 (5 Feb 74) sec 1. (U) MCCM/US 18-75 to Secy JCS, 8 Aug 75, Att to JCS 1541/351-6, 11 Aug 75, same file, sec 2.

1 Oct 75

The JCS recommended SecDef approval of the CINCNORAD terms of reference agreed upon by the MCC. On 19 Nov 75, ASD(ISA) approved the terms of reference for promulgation subject to concurrence by the Government of Canada, and on 21 Nov 75 the JCS forwarded the approved terms of reference to the US Section of the MCC requesting that they be promulgated through the MCC to CINCNORAD for implementation.

(U) JCSM-376-75 to SecDef, 1 Oct 75, Encl A to JCS 1541/351-7, 23 Sep 75; (U) JCS 1541/351-8, 21 Nov 75; (U) SM-668-75 to US Sec MCC, 21 Nov 75; JMF 803 (5 Feb 74) sec 2.

The Canadian Government accepted the terms of reference and, on 3 Feb 76, the CJCS and the Chief of the Canadian Defence Staff forwarded them to CINCNORAD to be effective upon receipt. Although the terms of reference were unclassified, no publicity was given in either Ottawa or Washington to the approval or transmittal to the commander. The CJCS and the Chief of the Defence Staff told CINCNORAD, however, that there was no objection to a public announcement by his headquarters.

(U) Ltr, CJCS and Chief of Canadian Defence Staff to CINCNORAD, 3 Feb 76, Att to JCS 1541/351-9, 18 Feb 76, same file.
The new terms of reference of 3 Feb 76 gave no exceptional emphasis to "aerospace" as distinct from "air" defense. The central paragraphs were the following:

2. In accordance with the terms of the NORAD Agreement concluded between the Governments of Canada and the United States on 8 May 1975, the primary objectives of NORAD are:

a. To assist each country to safeguard the sovereignty of its airspace.

b. To contribute to the deterrence of attack on North America by providing capabilities for warning of attack and for defense against air attacks.

c. Should deterrence fail, to insure an appropriate response against attack by providing for the effective use of the forces of the two countries available for air defense.

3. The mission of the Commander in Chief, North American Air Defense Command (CINCNORAD), is to:

a. Provide surveillance and control of the airspace of Canada and the United States.

b. Provide appropriate response against air attack.

c. Provide warning and assessment of aerospace attack, utilizing mutual support arrangements with other commands.

d. Support other continental United States and Canadian commands.